A Nautical Institute project

sponsored by Lloyds Register EMEA

The Nautical
Institute

Developing a
Climate of Trust
Page 6

Human centred design

makes a difference
Page 7

The International Maritime

Human Element
Bulletin
Issue No. 11 April 2006
ISSN 1747-5015

The Human Element jigsaw

T

he primary aim of the Alert! project

has been to improve the awareness
of the Human Element in the maritime
industry through the publication of these
Bulletins, backed up by the website and its
database of academic and technical papers,
presentations and letters to the editor.
Feedback from our readers has always
been positive, describing the articles in
the Bulletins as interesting, informative
and even entertaining, and it is clear that
we have successfully created a body of
knowledge regarding the Human Element
in shipping. However, it is also clear from
this feedback, that there is a need to
focus on the application of this body of
knowledge to address a number of key
Human Element issues.
This edition of Alert! is loosely titled: How
to do it. It covers a range of issues including
crew competence, training, leadership and
management, ship and system design,
and the application of Human Factors
methodologies. The focus, however, is on
integrating the Human Element a process
that does not just start at the design stage
of a ship and finish at build but one which
must be applied throughout its lifecycle.
Through the Alert! Project, we seek to
represent the views of all sectors of the
maritime industry contributions for the
Bulletin, letters to the editor and articles
and papers for the website database are
always welcome.

The Editor
Alert!
The Nautical Institute
202 Lambeth Road
London SE1 7LQ
United Kingdom
editor@he-alert.org

w: www.he-alert.org
e: editor@he-alert.org

ntegrating the Human Element

into a complex system such as a
ship is a bit like putting together
a jigsaw puzzle. There are many
component parts, some of which are
readily identifiable and easy to link
together such that the semblance of
a picture soon begins to form. There
are, however, others that are not so
obvious, and it takes a certain amount
of trial and error to fit them into the
right slots until, eventually, the whole
picture is complete.
A ship comprises of a number of
component parts (systems) each of
which will have some effect on the
overall performance of that ship.
The extent to which a system will
have such effect will depend on how
critical it is to the safety of the ship
and to its crew. Some systems may
be fully automated, but they will
still require a degree of intervention
from the seafarer, whether it is to set
the initial tolerances or to respond
to alarms. Some may require direct
seafarer input for their operation
and for their maintenance. Others
will require humans to interact with
other humans, and some may be
driven by outside influences such
as the environment, other humans,
or technology.
Furthermore, the
shipboard environment requires
seafarers from a variety of cultural
backgrounds to work, socialise and

live harmoniously with one another.

The process of integrating the Human
Element into this complex system
starts at conception, but it does not
stop there. It is a dynamic process,
which must be kept under review
throughout the lifecycle of the ship
to take account of, for example,
changes in its operating pattern,
system updates, improved technology
and new regulation.
Any of these can have an effect on
the key domains of human factors
engineering and human resources.
Human factors engineering takes
into account the interests and needs
of the crew, especially in respect of
the six abilities (habitability, maintainability, workability, controllability,
manoeuvrability, survivability), occupational health and safety and system
safety. And, the human resources
process considers the mix, number and
competency requirements for the crew.
Ultimately, the aim is to achieve a
balanced development of both the
technological and human aspects of
the ships operational capability, in
order to ensure the safe conduct of the
ship, the safe and timely delivery of its
cargo; and, a safe, happy and healthy
working and living environment for
the crew.
Integrating the Human Element is
indeed a complex jigsaw puzzle

Crew continuity

2 Inside this issue:

and competence

Crew continuity and competence

Training needs analysis .........

Leadership and managerial skills

for Shipmasters

Comfort design of ship accommodation 3

Integrating the human element

4/5

Improving safety by applying

human factors methodologies

Developing a climate of trust

Human centred design

makes a difference

What's new

Accident investigation reports

Reports and Studies

Tony Baker,
Manager - North Insurance Management Ltd
North of England P&I Association Limited

ecruiting and employing competent

seafarers is essential for the safe
operation of todays ships. Unfortunately
too many significant insurance claims
now have their roots in lack of basic
skills. Human error is a notoriously
difficult area to come to grips with, but
crew competence is an issue that must
be addressed.
Seafarers with a good knowledge of a
company and its ships, who identify with
both and display care and loyalty are less
likely to produce claims. Ship owners and
operators can achieve a high level of crew
continuity and competence by providing
seafarers with secure employment and
taking human factors into account
including recruitment, health, training
and general awareness of shipboard best
practice and by investing in high quality
risk-management systems.
The key to best practice is to base risk
assessment on good quality information
and to introduce control measures that

either prevent or reduce loss. Key areas

in training could, for example, include
bridge team management,which addresses
communications between seafarers of
different nationalities and ensures proper
application of the collision regulations.
P&I clubs can provide both information
and systems to help ship owners with
their risk-management programmes. An
example would be the pre-employment
medical programmes offered by some
clubs, including North of England, that
aim to ensure that only suitably healthy
seafarers are employed.
Interpretation of regulations on minimum
manning can also cause problems. The
intention of the regulations is to provide
for a safe minimum number of competent
persons on board a ship. But, if the
minimum number becomes the norm, the
stress of navigating in heavily trafficked
waters and the ever-growing reporting
burden may now be asking too much of
todays seafarers.

Training Needs Analysis

What, How, Why

The International Maritime
Human Element Bulletin
Editor: David Squire, FNI
Published by the Nautical Institute, the
worlds leading international professional
body for qualified mariners

www.nautinst.org
Membership info: sec@nautinst.org

Mark Brunt,
Training and Human Factors Consultant
CCD Design & Ergonomics Ltd

raining Needs Analysis (TNA) measures

the skills needed to do something, and
how the people involved match these
skills. By subtracting existing skill from
skill needed, a list of Training Objectives
is created, forming a basis for developing
training material.
TNA provides two other essential outputs:

The opinions expressed herein are those of the editor

or contributors and do not necessarily represent the
views of The Nautical Institute or Lloyds Register EMEA.

The skills to be trained will guide the

selection
of training media, such as

The Nautical Institute and Lloyds Register EMEA,

their affiliates and subsidiaries and their respective
officers, employees or agents are, individually and
collectively, referred to as The Nautical Institute
and Lloyds Register EMEA. The Nautical Institute and
Lloyds Register EMEA assume no responsibility and
shall not be liable to any person for any loss, damage
or expense caused by reliance on the information or
advice in this Bulletin or howsoever provided, unless
that person has signed a contract with an entity from
The Nautical Institute and Lloyds Register EMEA for
the provision of this information or advice and in that
case any responsibility or liability is exclusively on the
terms and conditions set out in that contract.

checklists - which are good for supporting

procedural skills; and team training building a team from disparate cultural
backgrounds - which cannot be done
individually.

Design & artwork production by:

Jacamar (UK) Ltd +44 (0)23 92410108
Printing by: Indigo Press +44 (0)23 8023 1196
Web site by: Informatic +44 (0)1243 555 108
Cartoons by: NewsLink Services
(India Office) +91-9811649064

Gathering the TNA data will provide

optimum
familiarisation for the analysts of
both the tasks and the trainees. However
well the analysis results are written down,
the best understanding will remain with
the analysts.
The best TNA work results from a team
of subject matter experts (people with
knowledge/experience of the tasks

and environment) and others, such as

psychologists/ergonomists, who may
not necessarily be experts in the subject
matter but have an understanding of
skills, skill acquisition and retention and
of the merits of different training media.
Properly done, the TNA process makes
training efficient, cost effective and
interesting, since the resulting training will
align with the need. The process works
particularly well for the introduction of a
new system, or when replacing an existing
system, where all users are at the same
level of training need. TNA will also identify
and help with situations where the user
population has a mixed skill level or varied
cultural backgrounds.
In summary, a disciplined/structured TNA
process will optimise the use of training
media and training manpower. The end
result will see the provision of suitably
qualified and experienced people to
conduct the job, thus minimising risks and
unnecessary costs to shipping personnel,
environment and the industry.

Leadership and managerial skills

for shipmasters

Capt I G Sangameswar, MNI ,

Assistant Director (Training Standards), Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore

take over command and to build the

confidence of newly promoted masters.

he shipmaster is entrusted with the

overriding authority and responsibility
for the safety and security of the ship. Poor
decisions made by a shipmaster could
result in damage to the ship and its cargo,
pollution of the marine environment,
and/or loss of lives. Such incidents could,
in addition to legal sanctions, tarnish
the reputation and impact the overall
business of the company. It is therefore
important for a shipmaster to be not only
technically competent but also to possess
the leadership and managerial abilities to
effectively lead his crew and run the ship.
To this end, the Maritime and Port Authority
of Singapore (MPA) has introduced the
Command Assessment Programme (CAP), a
voluntary programme, which can be used
by shipping companies to assess some
of the leadership competencies, such as
decision-making, team management,
culture-building and emotional stability
all of which are important for effective
performance as a shipmaster. It is used
by companies to groom chief mates to

The CAP is conducted, over a period of

3 days, by a team of qualified and experienced master-mariner trainers and
occupational psychologists. It comprises of:

Psychological Assessment
Psychometric questionnaires, interviews
and observations are used to gather
information on personality, leadership
style, stress coping ability and
psychological qualities of the participant.

Simulation-based Assessment
A full-mission shiphandling simulator
at the Integrated Simulator Centre of
Singapore is used to conduct assessment
exercises. Participants are required to
take command of the ship in handling
a variety of challenging situations and
emergencies.

Written/oral presentation
Participants are required to study
information about the issues/problems
in a particular case scenario onboard a
ship. They are then required to evaluate
the information, provide judgement on

the situation and recommend actions on

how to handle that situation in a multicultural environment.

Peer Group Exercise

Participants are presented with challenging tasks and required to work together
as a group to accomplish a given objective
within the time limit set. The design of
the programme allows the participants
to be brought into an out-of-the-box
environment to measure/reconfirm many
elicited behavioural patterns in various
environments.
On completion of the CAP the
psychologist will provide an assessment
of the key strengths and weaknesses of
each individual and identify areas for
development. To date 102 participants
have completed the programme, and
the feedback from participants and their
companies has been encouraging.
The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and are not necessarily those of the
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore.

For further information on the CAP go

to: www.stet.com.sg/maritime/cap.htm

Comfort design of ship accommodation

a harmonization of theoretical analyses and experiences!
Dr Osamu Niho, Deputy General Manager, Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd

t is a final goal for a ship designer to

deliver the vessel with which the owner
is fully satisfied. For his satisfaction, what
are the most critical requirements for
commercial vessels such as oil tankers,
bulkers, container ships, gas carriers
and so on? Maximum cargo carrying
capacity, high service speed, economical
fuel oil consumption, robust structure,
easy maintenanceIn addition to these,
comfort in accommodation - noise and
vibration, for example - is one of his
important concerns, considering crews
habitability and working conditions.
Referring to design criteria, capacity,
speed, strength etc. are all scientific and
objective. Meanwhile, criteria on noise
and vibration have a very subjective
nature, which involves many human
elements. In case of objective criteria,
theoretical analysis is most helpful.
For the issue which involves human
elements, analysis alone may not be
adequate to satisfy the criteria and
actual experiences play an important role
as well.

At the negotiation stage of a recent new

building contract, noise and vibration
levels in accommodation are inevitable
discussion items. Such design criteria are
often provided for in the Contract Specifications as rules and regulations; IMO
resolutions for noise and ISO guidelines
for vibration in accommodation. However,
neither code nor guideline could solve the
issues. The designer starts the work with
initial arrangement of accommodation
layout based on his idea and sense
cultivated through his experiences.
As for noise, cabin and machinery
arrangements are most dominant. As for
vibration, the designer should consider
not only excitation forces but also
structural response. At the early design
stage, the number of propeller blades
is selected considering the frequency
of excitation force in conjunction with
main engine revolution. The first design
target is to avoid resonance, and the
second to reduce response levels. The
designer pays much attention to main
structural member arrangements, such

as continuing walls from engine casing

through accommodation house and full
underneath support of side, front and aft
walls of house under upper deck.
Todays advanced technology such as
hydrodynamic codes and Finite-Element
Method (FEM) analysis could predict
propeller-induced excitation forces such
as surface forces and bearing forces,
and structural resonant frequency fairly
well. It may be, however, beyond reality
to say that very accurate predictions of
vibration response levels in accelerations
or velocities are feasible. Some designers
might have experienced the discrepancies
between predictions and actual results.
Success in comfort design depends
mostly on initial careful considerations
and arrangements. Design is not an
analysis but a synthesis endorsed by
many experiences.
It goes without saying that a technical
harmonization of advanced analyses and
experiences is the most essential key to
solve the issues relating to human factors.

Integrating the human element A rough guide

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Improving Safety by Applying Human

Factors Methodologies
Kerry Hoad, Technical Officer, Energy Institute

uman Factors is increasingly seen as

a crucial way to improve the safety
performance of industry operations and
help reduce accidents, thereby reducing
cost to businesses and increasing their
efficiency. With this in mind, the Energy
Institute Human Factors Working
Group, representing both upstream
and downstream petroleum industry
operations, was formed in 2001 to be the
focus of UK petroleum industry activities.
To raise awareness of the possibilities
offered by managing Human Factors, the
Working Group commissioned an external
consultant to establish a preliminary series
of Safety Information Bulletins based on:

learned from incidents or

Lessons
near misses

New methods of working

Novel human factors techniques
The Bulletins have been designed to
encourage information sharing between
professionals on the successful application of Human Factors methodologies
to petroleum and allied industries
operations. However, much of the
information provided in the Bulletins can
be transferred from industry to industry
with many of the basic principles being
the same.

Each Bulletin begins by providing an

overview to its human factors aspect and
then describes the issue in detail with the
use of various illustrative media including
flowcharts, illustrations and graphs.
Lastly, the Bulletins refer to other suitable
references and further information.
They cover a broad range of issues from
occupational safety through to those with
major hazard potential; some are relevant
to both offshore and onshore operations, whereas others apply to individual
sectors. Seven bulletins have so far been
developed for:

Manual and mechanical handling;

Safety when using ladders;
staffing requirements for
Assessing
hazardous situations;
Improving alarm systems;
Lifeboat design and body size;
Managing organisational change;
human factors into design
Integrating
and modification of plant
The Working Group has also published a
series of Human Factors Briefing notes on
the following key Human Factors issues:

Alarm handling
Organisational change

Maintenance error
Fatigue
Safety critical procedures
Training and competence
Ergonomics
Safety culture
Communications
Task analysis
Human reliability analysis
Violations
observation and
Behaviour
modification
Root cause analysis
Human factors integration
In addition the Group has produced
guidance on making robust staffing
arrangements for control rooms etc,
and is currently developing guidance on
managing fatigue.
Further information on all these issues can
be found at: www.energyinst.org/technical/
human-and-organisational-factors/humanfactors-safety-information-bulletins

Developing a Climate of Trust:

Nikolaos P Ventikos,
National Technical University of Athens

hen I was thinking of what I could

write in this article regarding
potential interventions of ship-owners
into everyday onboard crew problems, an
illuminating discussion that I had with
a Chief Engineer of a Greek shipping
company came to mind. I asked him what
simple actions shipowners can do towards
continuously enhancing the quality of
work and of onboard living conditions
for crews. His answer can be concisely
summarized as follows: building a climate
of trust between the shipowning company
and seafarers.
In principle, all involved stakeholders
should focus on continuously enhancing
the quality of work and of onboard living
conditions for crews; this way, the maritime
sector can benefit in terms of effectiveness,
safety and environment friendliness.

the Human Face of Shipping

It is a well-known fact that psychology

plays an important role in human
performance and behaviour; in the marine
industry wherein difficult environmental
conditions, limited space and long isolation
of crews can be met, the problems related
to the human element can worsen notably.
Hence, it is of outmost significance for a
shipowner or shipmanager to focus on
developing a climate of trust between him
and the seafarers that man his vessels, to
try to outline and promote the human face
of shipping.
This effort should not be considered as a
trivial one. Policies and practices drafted
by the company management for the
improvement of seafarers life and spirit
need persistence and patience to begin
to pay off. In this context, crew members
would like to see shipowners (or someone
high from the chain of command) to
regularly come onboard and check that all

is well aboard the ship. Seafarers do not

want to work for impersonal companies,
and they certainly do not enjoy listening
to answers such as I am just an employee,
I will see what I can do.
On the contrary, they would like to feel
that they are dealing with a friend, that
they are close to the boss with whom they
could speak and explain their problems,
or demonstrate that they are vivid and
productive parts of a dynamic team.
Moreover, it is important for the people
at sea to know that their families are well
considered by the shipping companies;
to that effect even a phone call from
the company to the family can play an
important role regarding the behaviour
and awareness of the seafarer.
The Chief Engineer told me: when
crewmembers feel secure and well-taken
care of they will give their 110% for the
company. I believe him!

Human centred design

makes a difference

he Royal National Lifeboat Institution

(www.rnli.org.uk) - a charity funded by
voluntary donations and legacies - provides
search and rescue cover around the coast
of the UK and the Republic of Ireland from
over 230 lifeboat stations, with over 4,500
volunteer lifeboat crew. Neil Chaplin, the
RNLIs Principal Naval Architect discusses
their approach to the design of a new class
of slipway-launched lifeboat.
So, the new Tamar class lifeboat, its the
fastest one? No. The biggest then? No.
Typical questions Ive been asked as the
first of this new class of slipway launched
lifeboat enters operational service, but
few have asked about the human centred
design which makes this latest RNLI 25
knot all weather lifeboat different.
Although 7 years of development may be
excessive for any commercial 16 metre
design, the RNLIs demanding search
and rescue role, which requires volunteer
crews to go at immediate notice into
any weather up to 100 miles off shore,
necessitates a rigorous design process,
central to which is the belief that if we
look after the crew, they can look after
the casualties.
Over the past 50 years lifeboats have
progressed from simple 8-knot designs to
25 knot boats packed with technology, but
essentially using the same volunteer crews,
with the same limited training time, and
the same human capabilities. So a major
factor in achieving mission success is to
ensure that the technology employed is
safe, effective and intuitive.

The RNLI has undertaken collaborative

research into human structural response
to shock loading resulting in a seat that
will not bottom out due to shock loadings.
The seat bucket (widened by 50mm to
accommodate larger crew in foul weather
gear) has a large amplitude motion on 2
inclined rails. This motion on a tailored
spring and damper system mitigates
vertical and forward decelerations,
however the relative motion to fixed
consoles means that essential controls
have been engineered onto seat arms.
Since crew are safer seated, the need to
move around the boat at sea is reduced
through an integrated electronics system
which provides remote monitoring and
operation of onboard systems. Although
integrated systems provide the capability
to present a plethora of information and
controls, they could also confuse, mislead
and overload crew unless the interface
is clear, intuitive and tested. The Systems
and Information Management System
(SIMS) developed as part of the project
presented an opportunity to develop a
bespoke user interface.
Since the inception of the project, it was
always recognised that the development
of a common, effective and simple
Human Machine Interface (HMI) would
be fundamental to the success of SIMS.
The plethora of different HMIs assembled
in a typical search and rescue vessel
presents organisations with usability
and training challenges, not to mention
the potential for misinterpretation and
misunderstanding by users. An early

review of systems employed on the RNLIs

own and other similar vessels failed to
reveal a suitable HMI for adaptation across
other applications.
Furthermore, since the success of SIMS
will ultimately be judged by the end users,
crew involvement was essential to ensure:

Simplicity of use;
Clarity of presentation of information;
Robustness and reliability;
Redundancy in the event of failure.
This development therefore involved RNLI
staff and crews together with Human
Sciences experts.
The resulting prototype version of SIMS
was fitted to the Tamar for an intensive
period of crew evaluation of the system.
The evaluation trials structure was
developed in conjunction with ergonomics
consultants to ensure that the trials were
relevant and would produce appropriate
input to any re-development of the system
prior to introduction to service.
Seven years is indeed a long time to
develop one boat; however with the seats
and SIMS we now have components that
can be applied to future lifeboat designs
and perhaps retrofitted to current ones to
enhance the safety of our volunteer crews.
Further information on the design
approach to the Tamar Class lifeboat can be
found at: www.he-alert.org (Refs: HE00495
& HE00500)

Whats new

Leading for Safety: A practical guide for

leaders in the Maritime Industry

The 94th (Maritime) session of the

International Labour Conference

www.he-alert.org (Ref: HE00440)

The International Labour Organization has

adopted the Maritime Labour Convention,
2006, which consolidates and updates 68
existing ILO maritime Conventions and
Recommendations adopted since 1920. The
Convention sets minimum requirements
for seafarers to work on a ship and contains
provisions on conditions of employment,
hours of work and rest, accommodation,

The UK Maritime and Coastguard

Agency has updated its booklet Leading
for Safety, which can be downloaded
from the Alert! website database

recreational facilities, food and catering,

health protection, medical care, welfare
and social security protection. It will come
into force after it has been ratified by 30 ILO
member States with a total share of at least
33 per cent of world gross tonnage.

Addendum to Guide for Maritime

Operations

Note: ILO MLC 2006 was implemented in

August 2013. For further information go to:
www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritimelabour-convention/lang--en/index.htm

Both the Guide and the Addendum can

be downloaded from the Alert! website
database
at: www.he-alert.org (Refs:
HE00265 & HE00520)

The US Coastguard has produced

an Addendum to its Crew Endurance
Management Practices: A Guide for
Maritime Operations.

Accident
Investigation
Reports

Collision between a container ship and a linkspan

his report of a collision between a

94483 gross tonne container vessel
and a linkspan highlights a number of
Human Element issues - not least the need
for increased training in the operation,
maintenance and fault finding of technically
complex, and multi-discipline systems.
The ship was entering the swinging
ground, prior to berthing, when her main
engine failed. The engine was unable to
be started astern to reduce the vessel's
headway, resulting in her making heavy
contact with the linkspan. The ship had
been delivered from the builders a few
months before the accident.
An engine failure had occurred as the ship
approached the pilot boarding ground
some four hours previously. Although the
engineers managed to re-start the engine,
they misdiagnosed the cause of this failure
and inadvertently disabled an integral part
of the control system, which led to the
second failure, the cause of which was also
misdiagnosed by the engineers.
The report concludes that although the
engineers on board were experienced and
held appropriate STCW certificates, they
were unable to correctly diagnose the

&

Reports
Studies

DOES WORk kEEP yOu AWAkE AT

NIGHT?

reason for the engine faults. They did not

have a sufficiently good knowledge of the
main engine control system or specific
system engineering training to successfully diagnose faults. The chief engineer
was not the designated chief engineer
for the ship but was transferred at short
notice. He had not received any specific
training in the operation of the Electronic
Control System (ECS) components of the
engine, apart from what could be conveyed
during a 3-day handover with the former
chief engineer. None of the ships technical
staff had received any formal training in
the operation, testing, maintenance or
fault finding of the complex ECS. They
were also not aware of a 24-hour telephone hotline to the engine manufacturer,
to give additional technical support.
The report observes that the generic
training undertaken by marine engineers
during courses leading to professional
qualifications, may be insufficient on its own
to equip engineers to operate, maintain
and successfully diagnose and repair
faults on fully integrated, complex engine
systems. It recommends that shipowners
ensure that, where appropriate, their Safety
Management Systems include the need

for additional measures, such as effective

type-specific training for engineers, and
a longer period of supervision by guarantee engineers.
It recommends a review of the training
requirements for marine engineers within
STCW to take account of continuing
developments in propulsion technology,
particularly where main propulsion
systems employ integrated combinations
of mechanical, electrical, electronic and
hydraulic systems essential to the proper
and continued functioning of the overall
system.
The report also raises questions about the
proliferation and identification of alarms;
the need for joint simulator training
for pilots and tug masters, and for tug
masters to make ship visits in company
with pilots; and the difficulties of effectively
testing the main propulsion systems of
large, powerful vessels when alongside,
prior to departure, due to the potential for
mooring rope failure.

The full report can be downloaded from:

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/
media/547c708fe5274a428d0000ab/
Savannah_Express.pdf

Non-technical skills: the vital

ingredient in world maritime
technology?
Learning from experience
adopting a systems approach to
the analysis of marine incidents

Prof Michael Barnett, David Gatfield, Clair Pekcan

Southampton Solent University
Warsash Maritime Centre

S Goodwin,
Det Norske Veritas, UK

V Pomeroy,
Lloyds Register, UK
B Sherwood Jones, Process Contracting Ltd, UK

This paper discusses fatigue and presents

some of the results from a major research
programme designed to investigate
seafarer fatigue. Common sense, as well
as fatigue research, tells us that we need
enough sleep to feel well rested and
alert. Yet fatigue is a key issue challenging
performance and safety in the maritime
industry. The problem is best addressed
using an approach that seeks to identify
those areas where the problem is greatest and targets solutions accordingly,
allowing us to achieve alertness when
required and sleep when desired.

The authors present a systems

approach to incident analysis as a
practical methodology by which the
learning potential from incidents can be
maximised. Some well-known incidents
are reassessed, which suggest that more
information can be gleaned, including
causal factors that may otherwise be
missed. From a classification society
perspective it is important that incident
analysis is searching and comprehensive
so that appropriate mitigation measures
can be developed to reduce the risk
of recurrences.

The significance of human factors in

commercial shipping operations is now
universally recognized. But, in comparison
with our appreciation of technology, the
application of our knowledge concerning
human performance and the factors that
shape and influence it remains relatively
neglected, and certainly unexploited in
the safe conduct of maritime operations.
This paper opens with a review of recent
accident analyses and case studies
to highlight the importance of nontechnical skills in contributing to major
casualties. It provides an overview of
recent innovative developments in
simulator-based non-technical skills
training and assessment, through which a
number of key issues are addressed.

Downloadable from: www.he-alert.org

(Ref: HE00505)

Downloadable from: www.he-alert.org

(Ref: HE00510)

Downloadable from: www.he-alert.org

(Ref: HE00515)

w: www.he-alert.org
e: editor@he-alert.org

This bulletin is distributed with the kind support of:

Association of Maritime Education and Training Institutions in Asia Pacific; International Federation of
Shipmasters Associations; International Institute of Marine Surveying; Institute of Marine Engineering, Science
and Technology; International Maritime Pilots Association; Newslink; Royal Institute of Navigation;
Royal Institution of Naval Architects