Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 89606 August 30, 1990

AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO
LUKBAN, respondents.
Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.
Lukban, Vega, Lozada & Associates for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 15493 entitled, "Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.," which affirmed the
Order dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 86) sustaining
its previous order dated November 18, 1987 directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce
the civil liability of herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on October 16, 1986 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO, JR., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries, defined and
penalized under paragraph 3 Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, and
appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances:
1) voluntary surrender; and
2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong hereby sentence (sic) said accused to
suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) months and twenty (20) days, with the
accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the victim, Francisco Lukban, Jr.,
in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages, and the sum of
P50,000.00 as damages for the incapacity of Francisco Lukban to pursue and
engage in his poultry business.
SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)
On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for probation with the trial court. The application
was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987. The order contained, among others, the following
condition:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly installment of
P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS) every month during the entire period of his
probation. (p. 15, Rollo)
For the months of May, June, July, August, September and October, 1987, petitioner complied with
the above condition by paying in checks the said sum of P2,000.00 monthly, through the City
Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted
the checks and subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo).
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his favor in the criminal case.
The motion was opposed by the petitioner.
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of
execution. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on December 22,
1987. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this Court a
petition for review of the trial court's order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. We
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April 13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the order of the trial
court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by petitioner but respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3,
1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which was filed on September 26, 1989 and
raised the following assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED
APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS
FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONDITION IN THE
PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
OFFENDER IS UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10, Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting private respondent's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3) reasons: 1) that the
decision dated October 16, 1986 had become final and executory and the judge who rendered the
decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear that the probation law provides only for
the suspension of sentence imposed on the accused; that it has absolutely no beating on his civil
liability and that none of the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law relates to civil
liability; and 3) that private respondent is not estopped because he had nothing to do with the filing
and the granting of the probation.
There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in Criminal Case No. Q-33798 finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries had become final
and executory because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of
his right to appeal (See Section 4 of P.D. 968). Likewise, the judgment finding petitioner liable to
private respondent for P126,633.50 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages
had also become final because no appeal was taken therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power of the
trial court to alter or modify. In the case of Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9
SCRA 419, 422-423 cited by respondent appellate court, it was held:

. . . , once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it cannot lawfully
alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v. Chunaco, et al., G.R. No. L-6630, Feb. 29,
1956), especially, considering the fact that, as in the instant case, the alteration or
modification is material and substantial (Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., L-12125, Nov. 23,
1960). In the case of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J. Mcmicking et al., 11 Phil. 276, (cited by
respondents), it was held that "where a final judgment of an executory character had
been rendered in a suit the mission of the court is limited to the execution and
enforcement of the said final judgment in all of its parts and in accordance with its
express orders." The judgment in question is clear, and with the amended writ of
execution, the liability of petitioner is greatly augmented, without the benefit of proper
proceeding. (Emphasis ours)

We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987
granting

the

application

for

probation

and

imposing

some

conditions therein altered or modified the decision dated October

16, 1986. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting the
application for probation and providing as one of the conditions
therein that petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00
monthly during the period of probation did not increase or decrease
the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but merely provided for
the manner of payment by the accused of his civil liability during
the period of probation.
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case
of Budlong v. Apalisok, No. 60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935.
We already ruled that "(T)he 'conviction and sentence' clause of the
statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case."
The pronouncement in Apalisok that "probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case" should not be given a literal meaning.
Interpreting the phrase within the context of that case, it means
that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant
of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender,
if any, is extinguished. This can be inferred from a reading of the
text of the Apalisok case where the issue that was involved therein
was whether a grant of probation carries with it the extinction of
the civil liability of the offender. The reason for ruling that the grant
of probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender is
clear, "(T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are governed by
Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised Penal Code where under

Article 113 thereof provides that: '. . . , the offender shall continue
to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other lights, or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence, or any other reason.'" In the instant case,
the issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability of a
probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a
condition of probation the manner in which a probationer may
settle his civil liability against the offended party during the period
of probation.
Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation
Law enumerates thirteen (13) conditions of probation not one of
which relates to the civil liability of the offender (p. 22, Rollo).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976)
provides:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he
begins to serve his sentence and upon his application,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best.
In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al.,
G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148, We ruled that the
conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law are not
exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it
chooses, the only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the
constitutional rights of the accused. Courts may impose conditions
with the end that these conditions would help the probationer
develop into a law-abiding individual. Thus,
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a
probationer may be classified into general or mandatory

and special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions,

enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require
that probationer should a) present himself to the
probation officer designated to undertake his supervision
at such place as may be specified in the order within 72
hours from receipt of said order, and b) report to the
probation officer at least once a month at such time and
place as specified by said officer. Special or discretionary
conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the
same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts
may additionally impose on the probationer towards his
correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The
enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes
are liberal in character and enable courts to designate
practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer's
constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There

are

innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the

rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their
specific individual context. It should, however, be borne in
mind that the special or discretionary conditions of
probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to help
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and selfrespecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted
with flexibility in their application, and each case should
be judged on its own merits on the basis of the
problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. . . . .
The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation
of the probationer. That is why, under the law, a post sentence
investigation, which is mandatory, has to be conducted before a
person can be granted probation to help the court in determining
whether the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as
well as the defendant will be served by the granting of the probation
(Alvin Lee Koenig, Post Sentence Investigation, Its Importance and
Utility, IBP Journal, Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp.
381-387). In the case of People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d,
457, 458 (1933), among those which has to be ascertained is the

financial condition and capacity of the offender to meet his

obligations:
. . . there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer
unless there is at least a willingness on his part to right
the wrong committed, and the effect of such an act upon
the individual is of inestimable value, and to a large
extent, determines whether there has been any real
reformation. To be clearly consonant with such a purpose,
the post sentence investigation must include a financial
examination of the offender's capability in order to work
out a system of payment which can effectively accomplish
reimbursement without interfering with the defendant's
family and other financial responsibilities, according to
U.S. Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. . . .
(Sec. 301.1 Comments (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954; Also
2 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Survey of
Release Procedures 38 (1939) cited in The Period and
Conditions of Probation by Sergio F. Go, IBP Journal
Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 406-420).
(Emphasis ours)
The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the
order granting probation "as it may deem best." As already stated, it
is not only limited to those listed under Section 10 of the Probation
Law. Thus, under Section 26, paragraph (d) of the Rules on
Probation Methods and Procedures, among the conditions which
may be imposed in the order granting probation is:
Sec. 26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation
Order may also require the probationer in appropriate
cases, to:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to
the victim or his heirs . . . .

However, this is not to say that the manner by which the

probationer should satisfy the payment of his civil liability in a
criminal case during the probation period may be demanded at will
by him. It is necessary that the condition which provides for a
program of payment of his civil liability will address the offender's
needs and capacity. Such need may be ascertained from the
findings and recommendations in the post-sentence investigation
report submitted by the Probation Officer after investigation of the
financial capacity of the offender and that such condition is to the
end that the interest of the state and the reformation of the
probationer is best served.
In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it
is presumed that when the trial court issued the order of April 15,
1987, the condition that the petitioner has to pay private
respondent P2,000.00 a month for the satisfaction of the civil
liability adjudged against him was recommended by the probation
officer who prepared the post-sentence investigation and that such
condition is, in the judgment of the trial court, "deemed best" under
the circumstances.
Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation which under the
law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation period must have lapsed by
now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify the private respondent in the amount of P2,000.00
monthly during the period of probationmust have also lapsed. If such were the case, there would
therefore, be no more obstacle for the private respondent to enforce the execution of the balance of
the civil liability of the petitioner. However, the records are bereft of allegations to this effect.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated March 16, 1989 of respondent Court
of Appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution as well as the resolution dated August 3, 1989 of the same court are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, the issue having become moot and academic. At the same time, however, I
must express my reservation on the holding that the condition imposed on the probation was a valid
requirement and within the sound discretion of the trial court. I am not certain that the award of civil
damages, having become final and executory, could still be amended by the trial court by providing
for its payment in installments during the period of probation. It seems to me that the said award was
already a vested property right of the victim and that it could be enforced by him immediately and in
full as in ordinary money judgments where there is no indication of a different mode and period of
payment. There is none in the decision in question. That decision was never appealed.
Consequently, I submit that the trial judge had no authority to in effect defer the immediate
enforcement of the civil award of P176,633.50 by requiring the probationer to pay it at the rate of
only P2,000.00 a month, a paltry amount, indeed, considering the total obligation. The fact that the
victim accepted the payments did not validate the condition, which was void ab initio as far as he
was concerned. At any time he saw fit, he could have disregarded that condition as an invalid
amendment of the decision and demanded the immediate issuance of a writ of execution for
the full amount of the civil award. I believe that was his vested right.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, the issue having become moot and academic. At the same time, however, I
must express my reservation on the holding that the condition imposed on the probation was a valid
requirement and within the sound discretion of the trial court. I am not certain that the award of civil
damages, having become final and executory, could still be amended by the trial court by providing
for its payment in installments during the period of probation. It seems to me that the said award was
already a vested property right of the victim and that it could be enforced by him immediately and in
full as in ordinary money judgments where there is no indication of a different mode and period of
payment. There is none in the decision in question. That decision was never appealed.
Consequently, I submit that the trial judge had no authority to in effect defer the immediate
enforcement of the civil award of P176,633.50 by requiring the probationer to pay it at the rate of
only P2,000.00 a month, a paltry amount, indeed, considering the total obligation. The fact that the
victim accepted the payments did not validate the condition, which was void ab initio as far as he
was concerned. At any time he saw fit, he could have disregarded that condition as an invalid
amendment of the decision and demanded the immediate issuance of a writ of execution for
the full amount of the civil award. I believe that was his vested right.