321 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

No. L-26115. November 29, 1971.

CARLOS SANDICO,SR.,and TEOPISTOP. TIMBOL,

petitioners, vs. THEHONORABLE MINERVA R.
INOCENCIO PIGUING, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, and DESIDERIO
PARAS,respondents.

323

VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 323

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

Judgments; Interpretation of parties as embodied in a

subsequent agreement.·–No doubt exists that the parties entered
into the agreement, fully aware of the judgment of the appellate
court ordering the respondent to comply with two obligations, to
wit, payment of a sum of money and recognition of the easement.
The receipt evidencing the agreement, aside from providing for the
reduction of the money judgment, provides for the reconstruction of
the irrigation canal. Such constitutes the interpretation accorded by
the parties to that part of the dispositive portion of the appellate
courtÊs judgment condemning the respondent to recognize the
easement. This stipulation·– one wherein the respondent clearly
recognizes his obligation „to reconstruct the irrigation canal‰·–
embodied in precise and clear terms in the receipt binds the said
respondent, a signatory to the said receipt, and requires from him
full compliance.
Same; Reduction of money judgment by subsequent agreement
of parties; Effect of.·We adjudge the respondentÊs judgment debt as
having been fully satisfied. We see no valid objection to the
petitioners and the respondent entering into an agreement
regarding the monetary obligation of the latter under the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, reducing the same from P6,000 to P4,000.
The payment by the respondent of the lesser amount of P4.000,
accepted by the petitioners without any protest or objection and
acknowledged by them as „in full satisfaction of the money
judgment‰ in civil case 1554, completely extinguished the judgment
debt and released the respondent from his pecuniary responsibility
Same; Contempt of court for failure to execute judgment; Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in connection with Section 10 of the
same Rule.·–Section 9 refers to a judgment directing the
performance of a specific act which the said judgment requires the
party or person to personally do because of his personal
qualifications and circumstances. Section 10 refers to a judgment
requiring the execution of a conveyance of land or the delivery of
deeds or other documents or the performance of any other specific
act susceptible of execution by some other person or in some other
way provided by law with the same effect. Under section 10, the
court may designate some other person todo the act ordained to be
done by the judgment, the reasonable cost of its performance
chargeable to the disobedient party. The act, when so done, shall
have the same effect as if performed by the party himself. In such
an instance, the dis-obedient party incurs no liability for contempt.
Under section 9, the court may resort to proceedings for contempt in
order to enforce obedience to a judgment which requires the
personal performance of a specific act other than the payment of
money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property.

324

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs.Piguing

Civil law; Obligations and contracts; Novation.·Novation

results in two stipulations·one to extinguish an existing obligation,
the other to substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is
that novation effects a substitution or modification of an obligation
by another or an extinguishment of one obligation by the creation of
another. Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates that the
same be so declared in unequivocal terms·– clearly and
unmistakably shown by the express agreement of the parties or by
acts of equivalent import·– or that there is complete and
substantial incompatibility between the two obligations.
Remedial law; Writ of execution; Grounds for the quashal of the
writ of execution.·Courtshave jurisdiction to entertain motions to
quash previously issued writs of execution because courts have the
inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct the errors
of their ministerial officers and to control their own processes.
However, this power, well circumscribed, to quash the writ, may be
exercised only in certain situations, as when it appears that (a) the
writ has been improvidently issued, or (b) the writ is defective in
substance, or (c) the writ has been issued against the wrong party,
or (d) the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or (e)
the writ has been issued without authority, or (f) there has been a
change in the situation of the parties which renders such execution
inequitable, or (g) the controversy has never been submitted to the
judgment of the court, and, therefore, no judgment at all has ever
been rendered thereon.

PETITION for review by certiorari from a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioners.
Abel de Ocera for respondent Desiderio Paras.

CASTRO, J.:

On April 16, 1960 the spouses Carlos Sandico and Enrica

Timbol, and Teopisto P. Timbol, administrator of the estate
of the late Sixta Paras, obtained a judgment in their favor
against Desiderio Paras (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent) in civil case 1554, an action for easement and
damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and modified the
judgment, as follows:

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VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 325

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

„IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment affirmed and modified; as a

consequence, defendant is condemned to recognize the easement
which is held binding as to him; he is sentenced to pay plaintiffs the
sums of P5,000.00 actual, and P500.00 exemplary damages, and
1
P500.00 attorneyÊs fees; plus costs inboth instances.‰

Thereafter, upon remand to the court aquoof civil case

1554, the Sandicos and Timbol (hereinafter referred to as
the petitioners) moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the appellate courtÊs judgment which
had acquired finality. Acting upon the motion, the court
aquoissued a writ of execution on July 22, 1964. This writ
the provincial sheriff served upon the respondent on
August 22, 1964.
Meanwhile the petitioners and the respondent reached a
settlement, finally agreeing to the reduction of the money
judgment from P6,000 to P4,000. Thus, the respondent, on
August 5, 1964, paid the petitioners the sum of P3,000; he
made another payment in the amount of P1,000 as
evidenced by a receipt issued by the petitionersÊ counsel.
This receipt is hereunder reproduced in full:

„P1.000.00

„RECEIVED from Mr. Desiderio Paras the sum of ONE

THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), Philippine Currency, in full
satisfaction of the money judgment rendered against him in Civil
Case No. 1554 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, it being
understood that the portion of the final judgment rendered in the
said case ordering him to reconstruct the irrigation canal in
question shall be complied with by him immediately.
„City of Angeles, August 31, 1964.
„(SGD.) DALMACIO P. TIMBOL
„Counsel for Plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 1554

„I AGREE:
(SGD.) DESIDERIO PARAS‰

Subsequently, the petitioners sent the respondent a letter

dated November 5, 1964 demanding compliance by the
latter with the portion of the judgment in civil case 1554
relative to the reconstruction and reopening of the
irrigation canal.

_______________

1 CA-GR 28414-R, November 18, 1963.

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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

On February 12,1965 the provincial sheriff returned the

writ of execution issued on July 22, 1964 unsatisfied.
Upon failure and refusal of the respondent to rebuild
and reopen the irrigation canal, the petitioners, on March
3, 1965, filed with the court a quo, with Judge Minerva R.
Inocencio Piguing (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent judge) presiding, a motion to declare the said
private respondent in contempt of court, pursuant to the
provisions of section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Opposing the motion, the respondent alleged recognition by
him of the existence of the easement and compliance with
the appellate courtÊs judgment, stating that he had dug a
canal in its former place, measuring about one-and-a-half
feet deep, for the petitionersÊ use.
On September 8, 1965 the respondent judge issued an
order denying the petitionersÊ motion to declare the
respondent in contempt of court, ruling that

„.. .it appears from the dispositive part of the decision that the
defendant was only ordered to recognize the easement which is held
binding as to him and to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P5,000.00
actual, and P500.00 exemplary damages.
„Apparently, it is clear from the dispositive part of the decision
that there is nothing to show that the defendant was ordered to
reconstruct the canal.‰

On September 16, 1965 the petitioners moved for the

issuance of an alias writ of execution to enforce the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. This motion the
respondent judge granted in an order dated September 25,
1965. On November 3, 1965, the respondent moved to set
aside the said alias writ, alleging full satisfaction of the
money judgment per agreement of the parties when the
petitioners received the sum of P4,000 in August, 1964 as
evidenced by the receipt dated August 31, 1964.
The respondent judge then issued an order dated
November 11, 1965 directing the provincial sheriff to
suspend the execution of the alias writ until further orders.
On February 3, 1966 the respondent judge issued an order
recalling, and directing the quashal of, the alias writ of exe-

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VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 327

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing
cution. The respondent judge stated in her order that the
agreement of the parlies „novated‰ the money judgment
provided for in the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling
that the said decision

„...which is sought now to be executed by this Court, has already

been fully satisfied as to the money judgment and nothing more is
left to be executed from the aforesaid Decision as it does not allege
(aside from money judgment) any other condition except for the
defendants to recognize the easement therein.‰

With their subsequent motion for reconsideration denied by

the respondent judge, the petitioners, on 2May 27, 1966,
filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari
seeking to set aside (1) the order of the respondent judge
dated September 8, 1965 denying their motion to declare
the respondent in contempt of court in civil case 1554, and
(2) the orders of the respondent judge dated February 3,
1966 and March 30, 1966 granting the respondentÊs motion
to set aside the aliaswrit of execution issued in the same
civil case, on the ground that the respondent judge acted in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Here tendered for resolution are the following issues:
(1)Whether the respondent judge correctly construed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals as not requiring the
respondent to reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal,
and consequently, whether the said respondent judge acted
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitionersÊ motion to declare the respondent in
contempt of court for failing and refusing to comply with
the appellate courtÊs judgment; and
(2)Whether the payment by the respondent to the
petitioners of the amount of P4,000 extinguished the money
judgment, and, consequently, whether the respondent judge
acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the recall and quashal of the
aliaswrit of execution.

_______________

2 Amended on September 15, 1966.

328

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs.Piguing
1. Anent the first issue, the petitioners argue that although
the dispositive portion of theappellate courtÊs judgment
omitted any directive to the respondent to reconstruct and
reopen the irrigation canal, the Court of AppealsÊ order
requiring recognition of the easement on the part of the
said respondent suffices to make him aware of his
obligation under the judgment. The only way of recognizing
the easement, the petitioners continue, consists in
performing positive act·– the reconstruction and
restoration of the irrigation canal to its former condition.
Moreover, to understand the full intendment of the
dispositive portion of the judgment directing the
respondent „to recognize the easement‰ necessitates
reference to a statement in the decision of the Court of
Appeals that reads:

„... the result of this must be to justify the conclusion prayed for by
the plaintiffs that the easement should be held to be existing and
binding upon defendant and he should be held to have acted
without authority in closing the canal which should be ordered
reopened.‰

On the other hand, the respondent alleges that there is no

ambiguity in the phraseology of the portion of the Court of
AppealsÊ judgment condemning him to recognize the
easement. Said decision requires him only to „recognize‰
the easement and in compliance therewith, he gives the
petitioners permission to reconstruct and reopen the
irrigation canal themselves. Neither the decision a quo nor
that of the appellate court orders him to reconstruct and
reopen the irrigation canal.
The agreement reached by the petitioners and the
respondent in August, 1964 relative to the judgment of the
appellate court which had acquired finality and the
interpretation by the parties themselves of the said
judgment, specifically its dispositive portion, as embodied
in the receipt dated August 31, 1964, constitute the
considerations of prime importance in the resolution of the
first question. No doubt exists that the parties entered into
the agreement, fully aware of the judgment of the appellate
court ordering the respondent to comply with two
obligations, to wit, payment of a sum of money and
recognition of the easement. The receipt evidencing the
agreement, aside from
 329

VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 329

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

providing for the reduction of the money judgment,

provides for the reconstruction of the irrigation canal. Such
constitutes the interpretation accorded by the parties to
that part of the dispositive portion of the appellate courtÊs
judgment condemning the respondent to recognize the
easement. This stipulation·– one wherein the respondent
clearly recognizes his obligation „to reconstruct the
irrigation canal‰·– embodied in precise and clear terms in
the receipt binds the said respondent, a signatory to the
said receipt, and requires from him full compliance. We
thus fail to perceive any reason to sustain the contention of
the respondent that he has no obligation at all to
reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal, a position
utterly inconsistent with his agreement with the
petitioners as embodied in the receipt dated August 31,
1964.
The record, however, shows that the respondent exerted
efforts to reconstruct the portion of the irrigation canal
running through his land by digging a canal about one
meter wide and about one-and-a-half feet deep. This partial
reconstruction of the irrigation canal the petitioners admit.
Still, the petitioners demand the reconstruction of the
irrigation canal to its former condition·– measuring four
meters wide, five feet deep, and one-hundred and twenty-
eight meters long·– contending that the rebuilt canal
serves no useful purpose because the water passing
through it overflows, which overflow ultimately causes the
destruction of the canal itself. Nonetheless, we believe that
need to give full force and effect to the existence of the
easement demands that the respondent reconstruct the
irrigation canal to its condition before he closed and
destroyed the same. After all, the respondent himself in his
answer dated June 16, 1959 filed with the court aquo
admitted the original dimensions of the irrigation canal as
four meters wide and one-hundred and twenty-eight meters
long. The respondentÊs attempt to rebuild the irrigation
canal, partially and not in conformity with the dimensions
of the original one, does not constitute satisfactory and
substantial compliance with his obligation to recognize the
ease-

330

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs.Piguing

ment per the appellate courtÊs judgment and to reconstruct

the irrigation canal pursuant to his agreement with the
petitioners in August, 1964.
Due to the respondentÊs failure and refusal to
reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal, the petitioners
sought to declare him in contempt of court, under the
provisions of section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent judge, however, believing that the appellate
courtÊs judgment required the respondent merely to
recognize the easement without doing any positive act of
reconstruction and reopening of the irrigation canal,
dismissed the petitionersÊ motion to declare the respondent
in contempt of court. In doing so, the petitioners allege, the
respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners thus ask us now
to annul the order of the respondent judge denying their
motion to declare the respondent in contempt of court or, by
way of alternative, to declare the respondent in contempt of
court and to punish him accordingly.
The petitioners predicate their stand mainly upon the
provisions of section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Said
section reads:

„Sec. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment.·–When a judgment

requires the performance of any other act than the payment of
money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and
shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same
is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to
obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for
contempt if he disobeys such judgment.‰

Section 9 applies to specific acts other than those covered

by section 10 of the same rule. Section 10 pertinently
provides:

„Sec. l0. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.·–If a judgment

directs a party to execute aconveyance of land, or to deliver deeds or
other documents, or to perform any other speci-

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VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 331

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

fic act, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the
court may direct the act to be done at the cost of disobedient party
by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so
done shall have like effect as if done by the party⁄⁄.‰

Section 9refers to a judgment directing the performance of

a specific act which the said judgment requires the party or
person to personally do because of his personal
qualifications and circumstances. Section 10 refers to a
judgment requiring the execution of a conveyance of land or
the delivery of deeds or other documents or the
performance of any other specific act susceptible of
execution by some other person or in some other way
provided by law with the same effect. Under section 10, the
court may designate some other person to do the act
ordained to be done by the judgment, thereasonable cost of
its performance chargeable to the disobedient party. The
act, when so done, shall have the same effect as if
performed by the party himself. In such an instance,3
the
disobedient party incurs no liability for contempt. Under
section 9, the court may resort to proceedings for contempt
in order to enforce obedience toa judgment which requires
the personal performance of aspecific act other than the
payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or
personal property.
An examination of the case at bar makes it apparent
that the same falls within the contemplation of section 10,
and not of section 9 as the petitioners contend. The
reconstruction and reopening of the irrigation canal may be
done by some other person designated by the court, at the
cost of the respondent. In fact, the respondent in his
attempt to rebuild the irrigation canal, contracted the
services of one Gerardo Salenga. Accordingly, in conformity
with the appellate courtÊs judgment as further mutually
interpreted by the parties themselves, the court aquo,
because of the failure and refusal of the respondent to
restore the irrigation canal to its former condition and to
reopen it, should have appointed some other person to do
the reconstruction, charging the expenses therefor to the
said respondent.

________________

3 Caluag and Garcia vs. Pecson, et al., 82 Phil. 8.

332

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs.Piguing

2. As to the second question, which relates to the money

judgment, the petitioners vehemently insist on their right
to recover an additional sum of P2,000·– the alleged
unsatisfied portion of the appellate courtÊs judgment
requiring the respondent to pay to the petitioners the total
amount of P6,000 corresponding to damages and attorneyÊs
fees. The petitioners allege that their agreement with the
respondent in August, 1964, reducing the amount due from
the respondent, constitutes neither waiver of their claim
for the sum of P2,000 nor novation of the money judgment
provided for in the Court of AppealsÊ decision. They state
that their agreement with the respondent reduced the
amount of the money judgment, subject to the condition
that the latter reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal
immediately. This, they argue, does not constitute
alteration of the appellate courtÊs judgment.
For his part, the respondent contends that his payment
of the sum of P4,000, received and acknowledged by the
petitioners through their counsel as „in full satisfaction of
the money judgment‰ in civil case 1554, extinguished his
pecuniary liability. Thus, when the petitioners,
notwithstanding the admitted payment of the judgment
debt in the lesser amount of P4,000, still sought to enforce
the money judgment for the full amount of P6,000 through
an alias writ of execution, the court a quo, in recalling and
quashing the alis writ previously issued, acted correctly
and within its authority.
Parenthetically, the petitionerÊs application for the
issuance of the aMas writ of execution dated September 16,
1965, the aliaswrit of execution dated September 29, 1965,
and the levy on execution, and the notice of sheriff Ês sale,
both dated October 21, 1965, all refer to the amount of
P6,000 and make no mention whatsoever of the true status
of the judgment debt. On this point, the respondent charges
the petitioners with concealing from the court a quo the
true amount, if any, still due from him. And in effect, he
alleges, the petitioners apparently seek the payment of the
judgment debt twice. The petitioners, however, emphasize

333

VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 333

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

that they demand payment of only the balance of P2,000.

To rebut the respondentÊs charge of concealment, they state
that they informed the court a quo that the respondent
already paid them the sum of P4,000. Furthermore, they
allege that another lawyer, a former associate of their
counsel, prepared their motion for the issuance of the alias
writ of execution, received the alias writ and delivered the
same to the sheriff. Impliedly, therefore, they attribute the
inconsistency regarding the amount still allegedly due from
the respondent to the former associate of their counsel.
Reverting to the second question, the appellate courtÊs
judgment obliges the respondent to do two things: (1) to
recognize the easement, and (2) to pay the petitioners the
sums of P5,000 actual and P500 exemplary damages and
P500 attorneyÊs fees, or a total of P6,000. The full
satisfaction of the said judgment requires specific
performance and payment of a sum of money by the
respondent.
We adjudge the respondentÊs judgment debt as having
been fully satisfied. We see no valid objection to the
petitioners and the respondent entering into an agreement
regarding the monetary obligation of the latter under the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, reducing the same from
P6,000 to P4,000. The payment by the respondent of the
lesser amount of P4,000, accepted by the petitioners
without any protest or objection and acknowledged by them
as „in full satisfaction of the money judgment‰ in civil case
1554, completely extinguished the judgment debt and
released the respondent from his pecuniary liability.
Both the petitioners and the respondent take exception
to the respondent judgeÊs ruling that their agreement of
August, 1964 to reduce the judgment debt, as evidenced by
the receipt hereinbefore adverted to, „novated‰ the money
judgment rendered by the appellate court.
 Novation results in two stipulations·– one to
extinguish an existing 4obligation, the other to substitute a
new one in its place. Fundamental it is that novation
effects a substitution or modification of an obligation by
another or an extinguishment of one obligation by the
creation of an-

_______________

4 Tiu Siuco vs. Habana, 45 Phil. 707.

334

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

other. In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or

modified obligation arose out of the payment by the
respondent of the reduced amount of P4,000 and
substituted the monetary liability for P6,000 of the said
respondent under the appellate courtÊs judgment.
Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates that the same
be so declared in unequivocal terms·clearly and
unmistakably shown by the express agreement of the
parties or by acts of equivalent import·or that there is
complete and 5
substantial incompatibility between the two
obligations.
Neither do we appreciate the petitionersÊ stand that,
according to their agreement with the respondent, their
assent to the reduction of the money judgment was subject
to the condition that the respondent reconstruct and reopen
the portion of the irrigation canal passing through his land
immediately. The petitioners even state that the receipt of
August 31,,1964 embodies this condition.
The terms of the receipt dated August 31, 1964, we find
clear and definite. The receipt neither expressly nor
impliedly declares that the reduction of the money
judgment was conditioned on the respondentÊs
reconstruction and reopening of the irrigation canal. The
receipt merely embodies the recognition by the respondent
of his obligation to reconstruct the irrigation canal. And the
receipt simply requires the respondent to comply with such
obligation „immediately.‰ The obligation of the respondent
remains as a portion of the Court of AppealsÊ judgment. In
fact, the petitioners themselves, in their letter dated
November 5, 1964, sent to the respondent, demanding that
the latter reconstruct the irrigation canal immediately,
referred to the same not as a condition but as „the portion
of the judgment‰ in civil case 1554.
Consequently, the respondent judge, when she granted
the motion of the respondent to set aside the alias writ of
execution and issued the order dated February 3, 1966
recalling and quashing the said alias writ, acted correctly.
Courts have jurisdiction to entertain motions to quash pre-

_______________

5 Article 1292, Civil Code of the Philippines.

335

VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 335

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

viously issued writs of execution because courts have the

inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
the errors of their ministerial officers and to control their
own processes. However, this power, well circumscribed, to
quash the writ, may be exercised only in certain situations,
aswhen it appears that (a) the writ has been improvidently
issued, or (b) the writ is defective in substance, or (c) the
writ has been issued against the wrong party, or (d) the
judgment debt has been paid orotherwise satisfied, or (e)
the writ has been issued without authority, or (f) there has
been a change in the situation of the parties which renders
such execution inequitable, or (g) the controversy has never
been submitted to the judgment of the court, and,
therefore,
6
no judgment at all has ever been rendered
thereon. In the instant case, the payment of the judgment
debt by the respondent, although in a reduced amount but
accepted by the petitioners as „in full siatisfaction of the
money judgment,‰ warrants the quashal of the alias writ.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, (1)
declaring that the respondent judge did not act in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order dated February 3, 1966 (granting the respondentÊs
motion to set aside the aliaswrit of execution, and recalling
and quashing the said aliaswrit) and the order dated
March 30, 1966 (denying the petitionersÊ motion for
reconsideration of the order dated February 3, 1966); and
(2) remanding the case to the court a quo with instructions
that the respondent court (a) conduct an ocular inspection
of the irrigation canal passing through the respondentÊs
land to determine whether or not the said canal has been
rebuilt in accordance with its original dimensions; (b) in
the event that the said canal fails to meet the
measurements of the original one, order the respondent to
reconstruct the same to its former condition; and (3) in the
event of the respondentÊs further refusal or failure to do so,
appoint some other person to reconstruct the canal in
accordance with its original dimensions, at the cost of the

_______________

6 Cobb-Perez and Perez vs. Lantin, et al., L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23
SCRA 637.

336

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing

said respondent, pursuant to section 10 of Rule 39 of the

Rules of Court.Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,

Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., concurs and adds brief remarks in a
separate concurrence.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE,J., concurring:

I concur in the result. It seems to me that any ambiguity in

the receipt of August 31, 1964 prepared by Atty. Dalmacio
P. Timbol as counsel for petitioners as judgment creditors
in Civil Case No. 1554 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, to which respondent as judgment debtor had
signed his agreement, must be construed against
petitioners as the parties responsible for the ambiguity.
The condition or clause provided in the said receipt viz,
„that theportion of the final judgment rendered in the said
case ordering him (respondent Paras) to reconstruct the
irrigation canal in question shall be complied with by him
immediately‰ (italics supplied) is ambiguous being
premised on an erroneous statement of fact. Besides the
money part of the judgment, all that the said judgment
ordered respondent was „to recognize the easement which
is held binding as to him.‰
Accordingly, I submit that in the proceedings below with
the remand of the case, respondent should in fairness be
permitted to present competent evidence to clarify his
contention at bar „that he has no obligation at all to
reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal‰ (main opinion,
at p. 5), which, as noted in the main opinion, is a „position
utterly inconsistent‰ with his alleged agreement to do so,as
stated

337

VOL. 42, NOVEMBER 29, 1971 337

Baguio vs. Vda. de Jalagat

in the receipt of August 31, 1964·– which alleged

agreement was in turn based on the erroneous premise
that the judgment in question ordered him to reconstruct
the irrigation canal. If there were in fact an agreement or
recognition on respondentÊs part to reconstruct the
irrigation canal immediately, notwithstanding that he was
not so sentenced under the final judgment, competent
evidence should likewise be permitted in the proceedings
below to determine the nature and extent of his agreement
and undertaking.
No grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
judge in issuing the orders complained of; case remanded to
court a quo with instructions.

Notes.·–Novation of judgment.·A judgment may be

novated by subsequent agreement of the parties (Salvante
vs. Cruz, L-2531, Feb. 28, 1951).
In Fua Cam Lu vs. Yap Fauco, 24 Phil. 287, it was held
that there was novation with respect to the judgment
obligation of the defendants to Âthe plaintiff where, by
agreement between them, after notice of execution sale, the
defendants mortgaged a camarinto the plaintiff for an
amount somewhat less than the judgment, and payable in
 installments over a stated period of time, thereby being
extinguished.

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