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    This document is a court order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit regarding a defendant, Casey Duante Jackson, who was convicted of armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The order discusses whether the arresting officer violated Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him outside of the officer's jurisdiction. The court determines that the officer was in "hot pursuit" of Jackson, which allowed the extraterritorial arrest. However, the court finds that Jackson's sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment rights under United States v. Booker and remands the case for resentencing.

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    Filed: Patrick Fisher

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    28 views8 pages
    This document is a court order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit regarding a defendant, Casey Duante Jackson, who was convicted of armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The order discusses whether the arresting officer violated Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him outside of the officer's jurisdiction. The court determines that the officer was in "hot pursuit" of Jackson, which allowed the extraterritorial arrest. However, the court finds that Jackson's sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment rights under United States v. Booker and remands the case for resentencing.

    Original Description:

    Filed: 2005-07-06 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 04-5038

    Original Title

    United States v. Jackson, 10th Cir. (2005)

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    This document is a court order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit regarding a defendant, Casey Duante Jackson, who was convicted of armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The order discusses whether the arresting officer violated Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him outside of the officer's jurisdiction. The court determines that the officer was in "hot pursuit" of Jackson, which allowed the extraterritorial arrest. However, the court finds that Jackson's sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment rights under United States v. Booker and remands the case for resentencing.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    28 views8 pages

    Filed: Patrick Fisher

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document is a court order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit regarding a defendant, Casey Duante Jackson, who was convicted of armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The order discusses whether the arresting officer violated Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him outside of the officer's jurisdiction. The court determines that the officer was in "hot pursuit" of Jackson, which allowed the extraterritorial arrest. However, the court finds that Jackson's sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment rights under United States v. Booker and remands the case for resentencing.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
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    of 8

    F I L E D

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    TENTH CIRCUIT

    United States Court of Appeals


    Tenth Circuit

    July 6, 2005

    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.

    No. 04-5038
    (D.C. No. CR-02-174-P)

    CASEY DUANTE JACKSON,

    (N. D. Okla.)

    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to honor the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without
    oral argument.
    Defendant was indicted for armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    2113(a) and (d) (Count One), and for using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
    violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (Count Two). Defendant filed a
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    *

    motion with the district court seeking to quash his arrest and suppress evidence
    allegedly obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district
    court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on both
    counts. The district court then sentenced Defendant to 87 months imprisonment
    for Count One and 84 months imprisonment for Count Two, to be served
    consecutively, followed by concurrent terms of supervised release for five years.
    On August 26, 2002, Sergeant Randy Brock of the Owasso Police
    Department received dispatched information that the Exchange Bank of Owasso
    had been robbed. According to the dispatch, the suspect was a black male
    wearing black baggy windpants and a hooded sweatshirt, and he was last seen
    leaving the bank on foot traveling westbound on 86th Street. Believing the
    suspect could have hidden a vehicle just past the railroad tracks on 86th Street,
    Sgt. Brock proceeded west on 86th Street in search of the suspect. While
    pursuing this route, Sgt. Brock crossed railroad tracks, which were adjacent to the
    bank, and left the city limits of Owasso.
    Approximately one minute after hearing the suspects description, Sgt.
    Brock received another dispatch alerting him that the suspect was armed and that
    a civilian in a red pickup truck was following the suspect. Sgt. Brock recalled

    -2-

    seeing a red pickup truck 2 when he crossed the railroad tracks earlier, and he
    continued west to find the truck. Sgt. Brock caught up with the red pickup truck,
    and the driver informed him that the robbery suspect was driving a purple car
    with a large M on its door and that the car was only a minute or so ahead of
    them. At this point, Sgt. Brock activated his overhead lights and siren and began
    searching for the dark colored car. Assuming the suspect would be traveling on
    the highway, Sgt. Brock turned south onto Highway 11 where he observed a
    purple Chevrolet Cavalier approximately one-fourth to one-half mile ahead of
    him. Sgt. Brock pulled the Cavalier over and ordered the suspect out of the
    vehicle. 3 After additional officers arrived, the officers removed the suspect from
    the vehicle and arrested him. A total of nine minutes elapsed between Sgt.
    Brocks receiving the initial dispatch to his stopping the suspects vehicle.
    The first question presented to this court is whether Defendants
    constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated when Sgt. Brock
    arrested Defendant outside of his jurisdiction. This is a mixed question of law
    and fact. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review
    the district court's factual findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the
    The driver of the red pickup truck was inside the bank during the robbery.
    When the robber fled the bank, the civilian immediately followed him, ultimately
    pursuing him in his red pickup truck.
    2

    side.

    When he approached the vehicle, Sgt. Brock noticed a large M on its


    -3-

    light most favorable to the government. United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173,
    1176 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The ultimate determination of the
    officers reasonableness, however, is a question of law and, as such, is reviewed
    de novo. See United States v. Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991).
    Generally, a police officers authority does not extend beyond his
    jurisdiction. Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1990). A warrantless
    arrest executed outside of the arresting officers jurisdiction is analogous to a
    warrantless arrest without probable cause. 4 Id. (citations omitted). For either to
    be permitted, exigent circumstances must be present. Id. One predetermined
    category of exigency is when an officer is found to be in hot pursuit of a suspect.
    See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (citing United States v.
    Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976)). Hot pursuit means some sort of a chase,
    but it need not be an extended hue and cry in and about (the) public streets.
    Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hot pursuit
    occurs when an officer is in immediate or continuous pursuit of a suspect from
    the scene of a crime. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753; see also United States v. Schmidt,
    403 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the government must
    demonstrate an immediate or continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene
    of the crime in order for the warrantless arrest to fall within the hot pursuit
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
    Warrants shall issue except upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
    4

    -4-

    exception to the warrant requirement).


    Against this legal background, we consider whether Sgt. Brock was in hot
    pursuit justifying the arrest of Defendant outside of his jurisdiction. According to
    the factual findings in the district courts order, which are not disputed by
    Defendant, Sgt. Brock immediately responded to the dispatch regarding the
    fleeing felon. Based on his experience, Sgt. Brock surmised that a suspect would
    not flee on foot, and he decided to continue in the direction the suspect was
    heading to search for a getaway car. We need not decide whether this type of an
    unparticularized hunch would justify an arrest made outside of ones jurisdiction
    because in this case Sgt. Brock joined in anothers pursuit. While Sgt. Brock was
    crossing the railroad tracks searching for a getaway car, the civilian in the red
    pickup truck was in hot pursuit of the suspect. This civilian was present during
    the bank robbery and immediately followed the suspect from the bank and
    continued to follow him. The civilians pursuit of the suspect clearly began
    within Sgt. Brocks jurisdiction. Sgt. Brock joined in this hot pursuit when he
    contacted the civilian and obtained additional information from him.
    After meeting with the civilian in the red pickup truck, Sgt. Brock took
    reasonable steps to apprehend the suspect based on the information given to him.
    Sgt. Brocks continuous actions after joining the civilians pursuit were an
    extended effort to apprehend the suspect. Thus, Sgt. Brocks pursuit was
    -5-

    immediate and continuous. We are reluctant to second-guess the investigative


    decisions made by Sgt. Brock in this situation. See United States v. Robertson,
    305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002).
    Additionally, in deciding whether circumstances rise to the level of
    exigency, it is important to consider the gravity of the underlying offense for
    which the underlying arrest is being made. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. The
    underlying offense here, armed bank robbery, is certainly a serious offense.
    We agree with the district court that the exigencies of the situation[,]
    including the fact that the suspect was armed, made the course taken by Sgt.
    Brock imperative. Aplt. Br., Exh. B, at 9 (Dist. Ct. Order). Accordingly, we
    find that Sgt. Brocks arrest of Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
    In his second issue on appeal, Defendant challenges his sentence as being
    imposed in violation of his constitutional rights, as articulated in United States v.
    Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Because he did not raise this issue to the district
    court, we review for plain error. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727,
    732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under that standard, we will only reverse
    Defendants sentence if Defendant can prove that the sentence imposed was (1)
    error, (2) which is plain, (3) which affects his substantial rights, (4) sufficient to
    warrant an exercise of our discretion to correct the error so long as it does not
    seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
    proceedings. Id.
    -6-

    We have recognized two types of Booker errorsconstitutional and nonconstitutional. See United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 906 (10th Cir.
    2005). In this appeal, Defendants only claim is that the district court committed
    constitutional error in sentencing him. Because Defendant claims constitutional
    Booker error, we apply the plain-error review less rigorously. See United States
    v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2003). We agree with the parties that
    the district court committed both clear and plain error by finding quantity facts.
    However, in order to obtain the desired relief, Defendant must also establish the
    third prong of the plain error test by demonstrating that his sentence was
    prejudicial. It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.
    United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
    Defendants sole argument regarding prejudice is that the constitutional
    error is structural in nature and therefore prejudice should be presumed. We
    recently rejected that argument. In United States v. Dowlin, we held that
    constitutional Booker error is not structural error because any prejudice stemming
    from such error can be evaluated on the record developed in the prior
    proceedings. 408 F.3d 647, 668-69 (10th Cir. 2005). Defendant has failed to
    meet his burden as to the prejudice prong and, therefore, cannot demonstrate
    plain error. See id. at 671 (explaining that a partys failure to meet one prong
    of the test is a sufficient reason not to notice plain error).
    -7-

    AFFIRMED.

    Entered for the Court


    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge

    -8-

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