United States v. Ashley Lamar Lindsey, 11th Cir. (2016)
United States v. Ashley Lamar Lindsey, 11th Cir. (2016)
United States v. Ashley Lamar Lindsey, 11th Cir. (2016)
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Case: 15-15081
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In 2013, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Lindsey, charging her
with one count of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641.
Pretrial, while released on bond, Lindsey violated the conditions of her release four
times, by testing positive for marijuana three times, and failing to report for
urinalysis testing as scheduled. The court modified the terms of her release to
include a requirement that she undergo a substance abuse evaluation and treatment
program, but did not revoke her bond. Lindsey then pleaded guilty to the charges
in the indictment, but prior to sentencing, she violated the conditions of bond again
by testing positive for marijuana at least five times, and eventually the court
revoked her bond.
Lindsey was then sentenced to 36 months probation, and less than a year
later, she was arrested and admitted to five probation violations, including her use
of marijuana. The court revoked her probation, sentencing her to six months
imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release, with conditions that
she participate in mental health and substance abuse treatment programs, and that
she perform 50 hours of community service. Lindsey was released from prison in
December 2014, but nine months later, was charged with violating the terms of her
supervised release, for testing positive for marijuana and for failing to participate
in required drug treatment sessions. At the final revocation hearing, Lindsey
admitted violating her supervised release as alleged in the petition for revocation.
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The court determined that the guidelines recommended a sentence of three to nine
months imprisonment, with a statutory maximum of two years, and imposed a
sentence of two years imprisonment. On appeal, Lindsey argues that her sentence
after revocation of supervised release was substantively unreasonable.
After
unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court may revoke supervised release
upon a finding of a Grade C violation of the conditions of supervised release.
U.S.S.G. 7B1.3(a)(2). A Grade C violation is any conduct constituting (A) a
federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or
less; or (B) a violation of any other condition of supervision.
U.S.S.G.
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The 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
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(2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just
punishment for the offense; and (4) the kinds of sentences and sentencing range
established by the Guidelines, and in the case of a violation of supervised release,
the applicable Guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) (cross-referencing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7)).
If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err, we consider
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Pugh, 515
F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U .S. at 51). [W]e will not second guess the
weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [ 3553(a)] factor ... as
long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the
circumstances presented. United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted). We may conclude there was
an abuse of discretion if the district court (1) does not account for a factor that
should have received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in balancing
the sentencing factors. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010)
(en banc). The district courts unjustified reliance on any one 3553(a) factor may
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Case: 15-15081
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