United States v. Joseph Patterson, III, 4th Cir. (2014)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4406
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH IRA PATTERSON, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00196-1)
Submitted:
October 23, 2014
Before NIEMEYER
Circuit Judge.
and
MOTZ,
Decided:
Circuit
Judges,
November 4, 2014
and
DAVIS,
Senior
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.

Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Mary Lou Newberger, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.
Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Joseph F. Adams,
Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph
Ira
Patterson,
III,
appeals
from
his
thirty-month sentence entered pursuant to the revocation of his

supervised
release.
On
appeal,
Patterson
argues
that
his
sentence is longer than necessary to address the purposes of

supervised release, was improperly based upon the seriousness of
his criminal conduct while on supervised release, and is, thus,
plainly unreasonable.
We affirm.
A district court has broad discretion when imposing a

sentence
upon
revocation
of
supervised
release.
United
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).
We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release

if
it
is
within
the
applicable
plainly unreasonable.
438 (4th Cir. 2006).
statutory
maximum
and
not
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
In exercising its discretion, the district
court is guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the

federal
Guidelines
manual,
as
well
applicable to revocation sentences.

Chapter
Seven
instructs
as
the
statutory
factors
Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.

that,
in
fashioning
revocation sentence, the court should sanction primarily the

defendants breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and
the
criminal
history
of
the
violator.
Id.
(quoting
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012)).

2
U.S.
In
determining the length of a sentence imposed upon revocation of

supervised
release,
18
U.S.C.
3583(e)
(2012)
requires
sentencing court to consider all but two of the factors listed

in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2012).
One of the excluded factors is
the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.
461 F.3d at 439.
18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), Crudup,
We have recognized that [a]lthough 3583(e)
enumerates the factors a district court should consider when

formulating
revocation
sentence,
it
does
not
expressly
prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted

from the statute.
Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.
As long as a court
does not base a revocation sentence predominately on the omitted

3553(a)(2)(A) factors, mere reference to such considerations
does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable
when
those
factors
are
relevant
to,
and
considered
conjunction with, the enumerated 3553(a) factors.
in
Id. at
642.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the
district
defendant
court
should
statutory maximum.
states
receive
proper
the
basis
sentence
for
concluding
imposed,
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
up
to
the
the
Only if a sentence
is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this

court
then
decide
whether
3
the
sentence
is
plainly
unreasonable.
Id. at 439.
A sentence is plainly unreasonable
if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.

Patterson
argues
that
his
Id.
sentence
was
longer
than
necessary, based in part on the fact that the district court

placed
undue
weight
on
the
seriousness
of
his
armed
robbery
offense, which led to the revocation of his supervised release.

In addition, Patterson avers that the district court failed to
give appropriate consideration to the four years he spent in
state prison for that offense.
Because Patterson challenges the
district courts reliance on an inappropriate factor and did not

argue for a sentence below the Policy Statement range, review is
for plain error.
Webb, 738 F.3d at 640.
Under plain error
review, Patterson must show that (1) the court erred, (2) the
error
was
clear
or
substantial rights.
obvious,
and
(3)
Id. at 640-41.
the
error
affected
his
Even if Patterson meets his
burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error and will

deny relief unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id. at
641 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In
this
instance,
the
district
court
directly
addressed Pattersons argument that he had already been punished

for the robbery by noting that Patterson had not yet served a
sentence or otherwise been punished for violating the conditions
of
supervised
release.
The
court
4
observed
that
Pattersons
order of supervision specifically prohibited him from engaging

in criminal conduct and that Patterson engaged in such conduct
within
year
of
his
release.
The
court
also
noted
that
Patterson had been given a lenient original sentence and that

his breach of trust was very serious.
It is clear from the district courts statement that
Pattersons
breach
of
trust
was
the
main
reason
district court imposed the sentence it did.

did
rely
while
on
on
the
seriousness
supervised
of
release,
the
Although the court
Pattersons
this
that
factor
criminal
is
conduct
essentially
redundant with matters courts are already permitted to take

into consideration.
(6th
Cir.
2007).
United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400
Further,
the
courts
consideration
of
the
seriousness of the crime was consistent with recognizing the

magnitude of Pattersons breach of trust.
642
(approving
references
to
omitted
See Webb, 738 F.3d at
sentencing
factors
that
were related to references to permissible sentencing factors).

Thus,
there
was
no
error,
much
less
Accordingly, we affirm Pattersons sentence.

oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
and
materials
legal
before
plain
error.
We dispense with
contentions
this
court
are
and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

October 23, 2014

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

thirty-month sentence entered pursuant to the revocation of his

sentence is longer than necessary to address the purposes of

A district court has broad discretion when imposing a

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,

In exercising its discretion, the district

court is guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the

applicable to revocation sentences.

Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.

revocation sentence, the court should sanction primarily the

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012)).

determining the length of a sentence imposed upon revocation of

sentencing court to consider all but two of the factors listed

One of the excluded factors is

the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the

18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), Crudup,

We have recognized that [a]lthough 3583(e)

enumerates the factors a district court should consider when

prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted

Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.

does not base a revocation sentence predominately on the omitted

conjunction with, the enumerated 3553(a) factors.

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this

A sentence is plainly unreasonable

if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.

necessary, based in part on the fact that the district court

offense, which led to the revocation of his supervised release.

Because Patterson challenges the

district courts reliance on an inappropriate factor and did not

Webb, 738 F.3d at 640.

Under plain error

Even if Patterson meets his

burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error and will

641 (internal quotation marks omitted).

addressed Pattersons argument that he had already been punished

order of supervision specifically prohibited him from engaging

Patterson had been given a lenient original sentence and that

district court imposed the sentence it did.

Although the court

redundant with matters courts are already permitted to take

United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400

seriousness of the crime was consistent with recognizing the

See Webb, 738 F.3d at

were related to references to permissible sentencing factors).

Accordingly, we affirm Pattersons sentence.

argument would not aid the decisional process.

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