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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4901

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDWARD CLINTON JONES, III,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston.
Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (2:14-cr-00342-RMG-1)

Submitted:

July 31, 2015

Decided:

September 3, 2015

Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC


DEFENDERS OFFICE, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Nathan S. Williams,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Edward Clinton Jones, III, appeals the 151-month sentence
imposed

by

the

district

court

following

his

guilty

plea

to

solicitation of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C.


373, 1958 (2012), and use of interstate commerce facilities in
the commission of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1958.

On

appeal,

procedurally

Jones

unreasonable,

contends
that

the

that

his

district

sentence

court

erred

is
in

failing to sua sponte order a mental competency hearing, and


that

the

court

improperly

delegated

judicial

authority

imposing a special condition of supervised release.

in

Finding no

error, we affirm.
Jones

first

contends

that

his

sentence

is

procedurally

unreasonable because the district court abused its discretion


during sentencing by failing to explain its reasons for denying
his motion for a downward variance.
must

ensure

significant

that

the

procedural

district
error,

In reviewing a sentence, we
court

such

as

did

not

failing

commit
to

any

properly

calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to


consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence.
U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

Gall v. United States, 552

In explaining its sentence, the district

court is not required to robotically tick through 3553(a)s


every subsection.

United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345


2

(4th Cir. 2006).

However, the court must place on the record

an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of


the case before it.

This individualized assessment need not be

elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a rationale tailored


to

the

particular

case

at

hand

meaningful appellate review.

and

adequate

to

permit

United States v. Carter, 564

F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50)
(internal citation and footnote omitted)).
We

conclude

discretion

in

that

the

imposing

district

the

court

151-month

did

not

abuse

sentence.

The

its

court

thoroughly considered the 3553(a) factors in finding that a


within-Guidelines
adequate

sentence

explanation

those factors.

for

was

the

appropriate

sentence

and

imposed

provided

upon

an

balancing

Moreover, the record reflects that the court

adequately considered Jones arguments for a downward variance


but found those mitigating factors insufficient to warrant a
below-Guidelines sentence.
Jones

next

contends

that

the

district

court

abused

its

discretion in failing to sua sponte order a mental competency


hearing.
hearing

The district court must sua sponte order a competency


if

there

is

reasonable

cause

to

believe

that

the

defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or


defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is

unable

to

understand

the

nature
3

and

consequences

of

the

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.


18

U.S.C.

4241(a)

established

(2012).

through

Reasonable

evidence

of

cause

irrational

may

behavior,

be
the

defendants demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning


the defendants competence.

United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d

583, 592-93 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).


The mere presence of mental illness is not, however, equated
with

incompetence.

omitted).

Id.

Competency

at

turns

593
on

(internal

whether

quotation

the

marks

defendant

has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a


reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court did not err in failing to sua


sponte order a competency hearing.

See United States v. Dreyer,

705 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that a district
courts

failure

to

conduct

competency

hearing

on

its

own

motion will always be subject to plain error review); see also


Henderson

v.

(providing
reflects

United

States,

standard
no

indication

inappropriately

at

district

was

court

medications,

for

and

any

the

133

plain

S.

error

that

Jones

point

during

aware
court

Ct.

of

1126-27

(2013)

The

record

review).
acted
the

Jones

adequately
4

1121,

irrationally

proceedings.

mental

The

conditions

inquired

into

or

and

Jones

understanding

of

exists

question

is

the

district court.

proceedings.
left

to

Whether

the

sound

reasonable

discretion

cause

of

the

Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion

in this case.
Finally, Jones contends that the district court violated
Article

III

of

the

Constitution

by

delegating

its

judicial

authority to the probation officer to determine whether mental


health treatment would be a condition of supervised release.
probation

officer

has

the

authority

to

manage

aspects

A
of

sentences and to supervise . . . persons on supervised release


with respect to all conditions imposed by the court.
States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995).

United
A court

may not, however, delegate to a probation officer a judicial


function,

as

Constitution.
improperly

such

Id.

delegation
at

delegated

violates

808-09.

the

To

judicial

Article

determine

authority

of

III
if

of
a

the

court

sentencing,

[courts] have drawn a distinction between the delegation to a


probation officer of a ministerial act or support service and
the ultimate responsibility of imposing the sentence.
States

v.

Nash,

438

F.3d

1302,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

1304-05

(11th

Cir.

United
2006)

Where the court makes the

determination of whether a defendant must abide by a condition,


it

is

permissible

to

delegate
5

to

the

probation

officer

the

details of where and when the condition will be satisfied.

Id.

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).


We conclude that the district court did not err in imposing
on Jones the special condition of supervised release requiring
mental health treatment.
Jones

undergo

mental

The court unequivocally ordered that

health

treatment

as

condition

of

his

supervised release and tasked the officer with the authority to


determine

the

type

of

treatment

necessary

condition, a purely ministerial function.

to

fulfill

the

Thus, the court did

not violate Article III.


Accordingly, we affirm the district courts judgment.
dispense

with

conclusions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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