G.R. No.

L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY
AND
NATIONALISM,
INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL.,respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically,
they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2
of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in
the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that
such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know
of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many nonpenal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the
law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said
that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject
of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he
is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as anultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to
the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even,
say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to
be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents
of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title
of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As
far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical.
That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant
to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to
say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of
the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and
to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992

REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, respondents.
G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992
RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL D. UNGOS, BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN,
JR., JOSE D. FLORES, JR., EVELYN G. VILLEGAS, DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON, PASTOR M.
DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS NORMAN C. CERRADA, petitioners,

vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Rene B. Gorospe, Leighton R. Siazon, Manuel M. Sunga, Bienvinido T. Jamoralin, Jr and Paul D. Ungos for petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
These consolidated cases are petitions for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon the following undisputed facts:
Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL
EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY THRESHOLD
LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides as follows:
Sec. (1). The first paragraph of item (1), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals (1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
For single individual or married individual judicially decreed as legally separated with no
qualified dependents P9,000
For head of a family P12,000
For married individual P18,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a
personal exemption of P9,000 each.
Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
(2) Additional exemption.
(a) Taxpayers with dependents. A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional
exemption of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of
dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed four dependents: Provided,
further, That an additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos (1,000) shall be allowed for each child who
otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980: Provided, finally, That the additional exemption
for dependents shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in case of married individuals electing to
compute their income tax liabilities separately.
Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved. 1
The said act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in
"Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
Sec. 1. SCOPE Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7167, these Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing the collection at source of
income tax on compensation income paid on or after January 1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding Tax
Tables (ANNEX "A") which take into account the increase of personal and additional exemptions.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 8. Right to claim the following exemptions. . . .
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the following amount of exemption with respect
to compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. These regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1,
1992.
On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro, filed a petition for mandamus for himself and in behalf all individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the
respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers earned or received on or
after 1 January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. 104069 likewise filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition on their
behalf as well as for those other individual taxpayers who might be similarly situated, to compel the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and additional exemptions allowable
to individuals for income tax purposes in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and to enjoin the respondents from
implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.
In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these two (2) cases were consolidated. Respondents were required to
comment on the petitions, which they did within the prescribed period.
The principal issues to be resolved in these cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by
the President on 19 December 1991, or on 30 January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14
January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30
January 1992, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received
during calendar year 1991.
In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that the Court in its resolution in Caltex (Phils.), Inc. vs. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 97282, 26 June 1991 which is on all fours with this case as to the first issue held:
The central issue presented in the instant petition is the effectivity of R.A. 6965 entitled "An Act Revising
The Form of Taxation on Petroleum Products from Ad Valorem to Specific, Amending For the Purpose
Section 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, As amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty Seven
Hundred Sixty Seven."
Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which provides. "This Act shall take effect upon its
approval"
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal, a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an implementing
regulation was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue Memorandum Circular 85-90,
stating that R.A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception thereof and argued that
the law took effect on September 20, 1990 instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by Executive Order No. 200) which provides:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided. . . .
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we construed
Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid down the rule:
. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause

does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. . . .
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it become effective upon its
approval notwithstanding its express statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine
enunciated in Tanada,supra, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September 20, 1990, or specifically,
on October 5, 1990.
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days following its
publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more
often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among
others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.
As the personal and additional exemptions of individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986, the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, could have adjusted the personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by
increasing the same even without any legislation providing for such adjustment. But the President did not.
However, House Bill 28970, which was subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act 7167, was introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1989 although its passage was delayed and it did not become effective law until 30 January
1992. A perusal, however, of the sponsorship remarks of Congressman Hernando B. Perez, Chairman of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill 28970, provides an indication of the intent of Congress in enacting Rep.
Act 7167. The pertinent legislative journal contains the following:
At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill Provides for increased personal additional exemptions to
individuals in view of the higher standard of living.
The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income of individuals subject to income tax to enable them to
spend for basic necessities and have more disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the basic necessities and that it had been three years since the
last exemption adjustment in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of the
current inflation and of the implementation of the salary standardization law. Stating that it is imperative
for the government to take measures to ease the burden of the individual income tax filers, Mr. Perez then
cited specific examples of how the measure can help assuage the burden to the taxpayers.
He then reiterated that the increase in the prices of commodities has eroded the purchasing power of the
peso despite the recent salary increases and emphasized that the Bill will serve to compensate the
adverse effects of inflation on the taxpayers. . . . (Journal of the House of Representatives, May 23, 1990,
pp. 32-33).
It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167 speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as adjustments "to the poverty
threshold level." Certainly, "the poverty threshold level" is the poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was
enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be need of further adjustments in
personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the fact that these personal and additional exemptions
are fixed amounts to which an individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the devastating effects of high prices
and a depreciated purchasing power of the currency. In the end, it is the lower-income and the middle-income groups of

taxpayers (not the high-income taxpayers) who stand to benefit most from the increase of personal and additional
exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To that extent, the act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the
present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing
personal and additional exemptions for individual taxpayers.
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for shall be available thenceforth,
that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become effective. In other words, these exemptions are available upon the filing of
personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code, done not later than the 15th day of April
after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, as aforestated, on 30 January 1992,
the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But these
increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received
during the calendar year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in respect of compensation
income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been
presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not been enacted. To make Rep.
Act 7167 refer back to income received during 1990 would require language explicitly retroactive in purport and effect,
language that would have to authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such
language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available only in respect of compensation
income received during 1992, as the implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide. Revenue
Regulations No. 1-92 would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993, and
thus literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the implementing regulations collide frontally
with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval." The objective of the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-92
the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of course, entirely understandable to defer to 1993 the reduction of
governmental tax revenues which irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167. But the law-making authority
has spoken and the Court can not refuse to apply the law-maker's words. Whether or not the government can afford the
drop in tax revenues resulting from such increased exemptions was for Congress (not this Court) to decide.
WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the regulations shall take effect
on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. They should take effect on
compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased exemptions on
compensation income earned during calendar year 1991 who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15 April
1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased exemptions, are entitled to the corresponding
tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159747

April 13, 2004

GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,

vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F.
DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO
MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P
Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in part:

2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by military personnel
who occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan, II
3.
4. The said crime was committed as follows:
4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila, a meeting was held
and presided by Senator Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the affidavit of Perfecto Ragil and made an
integral part of this complaint.

4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels
occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal of
support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan,
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director Matillano is quoted verbatim, to wit:
1. That I am a member of the Communication Electronics and Information Systems Services, Armed Forces of
the Philippines with the rank of Major;
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security Guard (PSG) during our Very Important
Person (VIP) Protection Course sometime in last week of March 2003;
3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of the pamphlet of the National Recovery
Program (NRP) and told me that: "Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya mo na walang bahid ng corruption kaya
basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took the pamphlet but never had the time to read it;
4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano invited me to join him in a meeting where the
NRP would be discussed and that there would be a special guest;
5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in the evening of June 4, 2003 in a house
located somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila;
6. That upon arrival we were given a document consisting of about 3-4 pages containing discussion of issues and
concerns within the framework of NRP and we were likewise served with dinner;
7. That while we were still having dinner at about past 11 o'clock in the evening, Sen. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
arrived together with another fellow who was later introduced as Capt. Turingan;
8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting proper started presided by Sen. Honasan;
9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the government including the military
institution, the judiciary, the executive branch and the like;
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of
NRP. At this point, I raised the argument that it is my belief that reforms will be achieved through the democratic
processes and not thru force and violence and/or armed struggle. Sen. Honasan countered that "we will never
achieve reforms through the democratic processes because the people who are in power will not give up their
positions as they have their vested interests to protect." After a few more exchanges of views, Sen. Honasan
appeared irritated and asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then asked whether all those present
numbering 30 people, more or less, are really committed, Sen. Honasan replied: "Kung kaya nating pumatay sa
ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil." I decided not to pursue further
questions;
11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action to achieve the goals of NRP, i.e., overthrow
of the government under the present leadership thru armed revolution and after which, a junta will be constituted
and that junta will run the new government. He further said that some of us will resign from the military service
and occupy civilian positions in the new government. He also said that there is urgency that we implement this
plan and that we would be notified of the next activities.
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the rites that we were to undergo-some sort of
"blood compact". He read a prayer that sounded more like a pledge and we all recited it with raised arms and
clenched fists. He then took a knife and demonstrated how to make a cut on the left upper inner arm until it
bleeds. The cut was in form of the letter "I" in the old alphabet but was done in a way that it actually looked like

letter "H". Then, he pressed his right thumb against the blood and pressed the thumb on the lower middle portion
of the copy of the Prayer. He then covered his thumb mark in blood with tape. He then pressed the cut on his left
arm against the NRP flag and left mark of letter "I" on it. Everybody else followed;
13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner arm and pricked a portion of it to let it bleed
and I followed what Senator HONASAN did;
14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my life with what Senator HONASAN said that
"kaya nating pumatay ng kasamahan";
15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the place;
16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra cautious that he would not notice it for fear of
my life due to the threat made by Senator HONASAN during the meeting on June 4, 2003 and the information
relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their group had already deeply established their network inside the
intelligence community;
17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came to see me to return the rifle that he
borrowed and told me that when the group arrives at the Malacaang Compound for "D-DAY", my task is to switch
off the telephone PABX that serves the Malacaang complex. I told him that I could not do it. No further
conversation ensued and he left;
18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw flashed on the screen Lieutenant Antonio
Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the June
4th meeting that I attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw
that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner which was displayed and on
which we pressed our wound to leave the imprint of the letter "I";
19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity of the foregoing and in order to charge
SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO" HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN, Capt. GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO
TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others for violation of Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code for
the offense of "coup d'etat". (Emphasis supplied)
The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary
investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take
cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that
the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner filed a reply.
On September 10, 2003, the DOJ Panel issued an Order, to wit:
On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through counsel a "Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction". On
September 1, 2003, complainant filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion.
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be passed upon in the resolution of this
case.
In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional affidavits/evidence and to afford
respondents ample opportunity to controvert the same, respondents, thru counsel are hereby directed to file their
respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on or before September 23, 2003. 1
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo,
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003
on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representation of respondents DOJ Panel, and Director
Matillano submitted their respective comments.
The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues:

1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 or
Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the resolution
of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim of the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The arguments of petitioner are:
1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over all public officials,
including petitioner.
2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 to
conduct the preliminary investigation involving Honasan.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001
is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the powers granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770
and inoperative due to lack of publication, hence null and void.
4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman which
has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of petitioner's Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction
since the issue involved therein is determinative of the validity of the preliminary investigation.
6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's Motion in the guise of directing him to submit
Counter-Affidavit and yet refused and/or failed to perform its duties to resolve petitioner's Motion stating its legal
and factual bases.
The arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:
1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I,
Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No.
1513.
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related to his public office as a Senator. The
factual allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavits are bereft of the requisite nexus between
petitioner's office and the acts complained of.
3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular, as a ground to question the
jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below, is misplaced. The jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant
under the Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from any provision of the joint circular which embodies
the guidelines governing the authority of both the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation on offenses charged in relation to public office.
4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion to clarify jurisdiction which, for all intents
and purposes, is actually a motion to dismiss that is a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ Panel is not required to act or even recognize it since a
preliminary investigation is required solely for the purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. The DOJ panel did not outrightly reject the motion of petitioner but ruled to pass upon the
same in the determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not violated any law or rule or any norm of
discretion.
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are:
1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the petitioner for the
reason that the crime of coup d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) may fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the same is committed "in relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to
Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to conduct preliminary investigation over cases
involving public officers solely from the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is misplaced because the DOJ's
concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving public officials has been

recognized in Sanchez vs. Demetriou (227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ cannot be deputized by the Ombudsman
en masse but must be given in reference to specific cases has no factual or legal basis. There is no rule or law
which requires the Ombudsman to write out individualized authorities to deputize prosecutors on a per case basis.
The power of the Ombudsman to deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the Constitutional grant of power to
request assistance from any government agency necessary to discharge its functions, as well as from the
statutory authority to so deputize said DOJ prosecutors under Sec. 31 of RA 6770.
4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman need
not be published since it neither contains a penal provision nor does it prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any
under pain or penalty. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions
of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law
agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system;
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and
functions:

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice.
There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the
Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such
number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter
provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving
violations of penal laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the
power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient . Petitioner rationalizes that the
1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant to Article 7 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2
The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials. If
it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment
of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15 thereof
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.
. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its
own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8,
1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or
employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or
administrative proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of
the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to
prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City
Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control
and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control
and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined
above. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other
investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular
courts. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to investigate cases from
the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the nature or extent of the authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of
the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors
has long been settled in several decisions of the Court.
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of investigation including
preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive. 3
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said
case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the

government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial
and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government duly
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such
investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied)
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo,5 pronounced that the Ombudsman, under the authority of
Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating
thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to "act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or
omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the
Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution"
(Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate
judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the
exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions
complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act
makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13
hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
.........
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to investigate
erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave
offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes
that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need
for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest. 6
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case and
theDeloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the
nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,7 that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo
vs. Domagas,8 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the approval of
the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did not have the approval
of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo,
191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be
pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the

Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority of the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection
with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth
cases, may conduct the investigation.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the Ombudsman and not
the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged Murder, the
Court held:
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo vs. Domagas andSanchez vs.
Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation relative to
the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases
cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject matter, has been in a
state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, -- the first law on the
Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
...
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple
or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher that prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that
offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall
under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to
his office and the penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000.00.11
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met, the first
requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal
that the crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by
Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to
investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the
1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's
power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object,
or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with
itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent
and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections
12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken
into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in
mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or

amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing
statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.12 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for
other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees in relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent
with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers
involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the
proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations, to wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
Series of 1995
TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTORS AND
THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, THE
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS
AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on the extent to which the
ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was
Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise known as "an act to strengthen the functional and structural organization of the
sandiganbayan, amending for the purpose presidential decree no. 1606, as amended" and its implications on the
jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by discussions on jurisdiction between
the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the department of justice, and by procedural conflicts in the filing of
complaints against public officers and employees, the conduct of preliminary investigations, the preparation of
resolutions and informations, and the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
as deputized prosecutors of the ombudsman.
Recognizing the concerns, the office of the ombudsman and the department of justice, in a series of
consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be observed in the investigation and prosecution of
cases against public officers and employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to
office whether cognizable by the sandiganbayan or the regular courts, and whether filed with the office of the
ombudsman or with the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall be under the control and supervision of the
office of the ombudsman.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses not in
relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the office of the
provincial/city prosecutor, which shall rule thereon with finality.

3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating officer who conducted the
preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending prosecution together with the duly accomplished criminal
informations shall be forwarded to the appropriate approving authority.
4. Considering that the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over public officers and employees and for
effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of cases involving public officers and employees, the
office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall submit to the office of the ombudsman a monthly list of complaints filed
with their respective offices against public officers and employees.
Manila, Philippines, October 5, 1995.

(signed)

(signed)

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Secretary
Department of Justice

ANIANO
A.
DESIERTO
Ombudsman
Office of the Ombudsman

A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on Preliminary Investigation, effective December
1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigationsThe following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information, He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days
from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the information against the respondent, or
direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio,
the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without

conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information
with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the
Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal complaints filed with them for
offenses cognizable by the proper court within their respective territorial jurisdictions, including those offenses which come
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit the records and their
resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot dismiss the
complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can the prosecutor file an Information
with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, and without prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Next, petitioner contends that under OMB-Joint Circular No. 95-001, there is no showing that the Office of the
Ombudsman has deputized the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charge filed against
him.
We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any public
officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either
in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's
authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the
Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation
to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published is not
plausible. We agree with and adopt the Ombudsman's dissertation on the matter, to wit:
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper reading and application of
jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office
of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94
Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been modified or
reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory
act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate
the conduct of persons or the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be
published.14
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a
public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against
public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the
authority to investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him.

The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of those enumerated in the
Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the present
petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel as to the questions
whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the information against the petitioner; and to which court
should the information be filed considering the presence of other respondents in the subject complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159747

June 15, 2004

SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,

vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F.
DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP-P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO
MATILLANO, AND THE HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is the motion filed by petitioner to cite respondent DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors (respondent
for brevity) in contempt of court for alleged blatant disregard and defiance of the agreement of the parties with this Court
to maintain the status quo before the filing of their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On September 22, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction against respondents alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Panel for assuming jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup detat against petitioner.
Respondents filed their respective comments and petitioner his reply thereto. An oral argument on the case was held on
November 18, 2003. Parties submitted their respective memoranda as required by the Court. On April 13, 2004, the Court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition and upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of the respondent to conduct the
preliminary investigation. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on April 22, 2004, thus he has until May 7, 2004 to file
his motion for reconsideration.
On April 23, 2004, respondent issued its assailed order as follows:
In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 159747 dated 13 April 2004, confirming that this
Investigating Panel has jurisdiction to investigate the instant complaint against respondent Senator Gregorio B.
Honasan II, et al., and to afford respondent full opportunity to controvert the allegations of the complaint and to
adduce evidence;
Wherefore, in the interest of justice, respondent(s) thru counsel are hereby given a final extension of up to 3 May
2004 within which to file their counter-affidavit and controverting evidence furnishing with a copy thereof
complainant with proof of service thereof to this Panel.
Petitioner now comes before this Court with a motion to cite respondent in contempt alleging that the issuance of the
assailed order is in direct contravention and flagrant violation of the agreement of the parties as stated in the Courts
Resolution dated November 18, 2003, which categorically provides:
Further, it was agreed that the Department of Justice, with the assurance of the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
R. Zuo, will maintain the STATUS QUO before the filing of the petition.
Petitioner argues that he still has 15 days from receipt of the Courts decision to file a motion for reconsideration, i.e., until
May 7, 2004, and therefore, until that period, the decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final and executory; he intends to
file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period; the assailed order requiring him to submit his counteraffidavit is premature and intended to pre-empt and render futile and nugatory any action of petitioner with respect to the
Courts decision dated April 13, 2004, subverting his right to due process; the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 has
not lifted said directives to the parties to maintain the status quo nor did the decision automatically lift the status quo order;
the submission of petitioners counter-affidavit would upset the status quo sought to be maintained; with the assailed order
of the respondent panel requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit, the latter has belittled, degraded, obstructed and
impeded the administration of justice and has wantonly defied the Courts authority; and the Panels order only confirms
his fear that his preliminary investigation and detention are being railroaded.
In its Comment, respondent contends that: contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence, a virtual defiance of the court; no such attitude or intent is discernible from its assailed action in proceeding
with the preliminary investigation since the respondent issued the assailed Order in good faith and in the conscientious
implementation of the Courts decision upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of the DOJ to investigate the charges against

petitioner for the crime of coup detat; it has no intention to willfully disregard the authority of the Court since the assailed
order was promulgated in furtherance and in the exercise of their authority to conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against public officers and employees as mandated by the Constitution and laws as confirmed by the Courts decision
dated April 13, 2004; the charges against petitioner was filed in August 2003 and the preliminary investigation was
pending since then because of the jurisdictional issue raised before this Court which was decided on April 13, 2004; upon
receipt of such decision, respondent issued the assailed order with the objective of resolving the investigation taking into
account petitioners right to a speedy disposition of the case against him; the subject order was not in any manner
effected to railroad petitioners arrest and detention but to serve his right to due process by giving him all the opportunity
to controvert the accusations against him and to adduce evidence in his behalf; otherwise, the respondent could have
immediately filed the information against petitioner the moment he failed to submit his counter-affidavit; as a manifestation
of good faith, respondent desisted from further proceeding with the investigation and deferred any action until after the
Courts decision on April 13, 2004; in contempt proceeding, intent, however, goes to the gravamen of the offense, and the
good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered; contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal
offense, and doubts should be resolved in favor of the person against whom proceedings have been brought; and only in
cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power to punish for contempt of court be exercised.
We deny the motion to cite respondent Panel in contempt of court.
Contempt of court is defined as disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority
of the court and administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. 1 The
power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 2 Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice may falter or fail. Such power being drastic and extraordinary in its nature should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.3
In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated November 18, 2003, respondent had stopped from further proceeding
with the preliminary investigation while the case is pending before the court. Respondent issued its assailed order
requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit after receipt of the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 upholding
respondents authority to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup detatagainst petitioner. Although the
Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final as of the date of the issuance of the said assailed order, the court
finds no contemptuous intent on the part of respondent to impede the administration of justice. As respondent has
explained in its Comment, the charges against petitioner was filed with the DOJ in August 2003 and since then, the
preliminary investigation has been pending, thus with the Courts decision upholding their jurisdiction, respondent issued
the assailed order taking into account petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, respondents intention
is to give respondent all the opportunity to controvert the accusation against him and to adduce evidence in his behalf.
The Court finds respondents explanation satisfactory and does not see the act of respondent as contumacious, as herein
earlier defined by the Court.lawphil.net
Petitioner asserts in his Motion that he received on April 22, 2004, a copy of the Courts decision upholding respondents
authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and that he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for reconsideration.
However, verification with the Courts docket section reveals that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration only on
June 8, 2004, or thirty days late. The Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 has already attained finality as of May 8, 2004.
Hence, there is no longer any impediment for respondent to proceed with the preliminary investigation and for petitioner to
comply with the respondents order to submit his counter-affidavit.
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion to cite respondent in contempt of court is DENIED. Respondent is required to give
petitioner a fresh period from receipt of this Resolution to submit his counter-affidavit.
SO ORDERED.