epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL.,
respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a

number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive
portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following
questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed,
and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of
the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these
arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new
Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended
only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons
did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on
the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and
so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in
the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar
as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of
penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they
may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is
to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section
6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the
public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it

applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even,
say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules
laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of
his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its

purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out
by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the
title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy
the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published"
by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were
categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that
publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for
due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus
on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is
that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As
far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it
exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity
after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request
for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once
again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny
and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do
if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents
are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or
on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and
Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner
by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands
of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making
power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of
two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different
subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M.
Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor
vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance
of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law
may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at
the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
informationon matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of
publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the
statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments.
Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its
people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the
Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the
prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil
Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is
in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected
in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner
by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands
of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making
power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of
two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different
subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M.
Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor
vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance
of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law
may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at
the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
informationon matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of
publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the
statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments.
Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its
people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the
Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the
prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil
Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is
in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected
in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 242-250.

2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.

3 Id, pp. 271-280.

4 Id, pp. 288-299.

5 Id, pp. 320-322.

6 136 SCRA 27,46.

7 Rollo, p. 24,6.

8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-

Herrera, and Lorenzo Relova.

9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-
Santos, Efren 1. Plana Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.

10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

Short Title
Tañada v. Tuvera
G.R. Number
G.R. No. L-63915
Date of Promulgation
December 29, 1986
Name of Ponente
Cruz, Isagani A.
Concurred by 8 members
Opinions
Fernan, J., Concurring Opinion
Feliciano, J., Concurring Opinion
11 Justices Participated
Subjects
Publication and Effectivity of Laws
Related to
Article 2 (Chapter 1, Preliminary Title) of Civil Code of the Philippines (1949)
Tañada v. Tuvera