[Type here]

CASE#2 ARTICLE 38
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of
Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of
Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void
from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state
or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described
their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to
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admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she
could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the
scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very
beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him
the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued
the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit.
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It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed
to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The
CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal
gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD
THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave
their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into
that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by
it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the
latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept
of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a
real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
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On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating
her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and,
therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its
petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon
of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led
to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of
particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries
only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12
Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires
the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It
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must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in
existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow
an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to
live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through
Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there
being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual
consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or
ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not
contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation
will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that
they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the
husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21
further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore,
been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain
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an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present,

United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular
purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA
ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar
to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the
marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties
supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not
be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
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Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is
a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for
the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together
is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
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accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does
not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost
any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void.
Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud
under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under
Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment
of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into
a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47
(3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
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party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.
Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a
marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further
use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a
judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not
be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case
No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor
F. Leonen per Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14. 2013.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
Per Special Order No. 1554dated September 19, 2013.
1 Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez. Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr. and Associate Justice
Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division. Manila.
2 Id. at 38-39.
3 Id. at 37.
4 Id. at 33-35.
5 Id. at 38-39.
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6 Id. at 39.
7 Id. at 48-49.
8 Id. at 13.
9 Id. at 61-71.
10 Id. at 89-95.
11
Abrams,
Kerry.
Marriage
Fraud
.
100
Cal.
L.
Rev.
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.
Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

12
Abrams,
Kerry.
Marriage
Fraud
.
100
Cal.
L.
Rev.
1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing
Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where
parties married only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop
, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588
(Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d
693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to
protect the girls name and there was an understanding that the parties
would not live together as man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C.
159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an
annulment where parties entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a
child); Chander v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App.
June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get his
pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband knew
that was the purpose of the marriage).
13 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn.
L.
Rev.
1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf;
citing
Immigration
and
Nationality Act (INA), 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage ; 91
Minn.
L.
Rev.
1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG.REC. 27,012,
27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum) (promoting the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).
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15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

16 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn.
L.
Rev.
1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd ,
440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
20
Abrams,
Kerry.
Marriage
Fraud
.
100
Cal.
L.
Rev.
1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd,
440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2011) p. 86.
23
Abrams,
Kerry.
Marriage
Fraud.
100
Cal.
L.
Rev.
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.

24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,

(Quezon City, Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.
25 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon
City, Philippines: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004),
Volume I, p. 231.
27 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004),
Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.
28 Article 4, Family Code.
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[Type here]

29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1975).
30 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn.
L.
Rev.
1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire , 59
N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48586
(1965).
31 Article 4, Family Code.
32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

ARTICLE 34
CASE #19
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581

March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
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G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively,
both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna,
Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of
the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
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so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.

However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of
them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper
lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early
part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that
while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
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pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not
sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by
this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife,
he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified
that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further
testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson
was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his
sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that
the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained
by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.12
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Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose
and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did
not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down
Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed
on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February,
1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed
the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as
one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by
the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave
credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity
of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of
17

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said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer,

stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor
Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.
According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not
require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must
belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription
was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not
govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the
case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of
marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this
Court in Nial v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
18

[Type here]

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which

is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void
from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying
Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No.
175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
19

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Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity

of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Nial.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally,
Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against
him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To
reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise
to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For
her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting
20

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that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position
that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity
of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with;
and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage
was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman
192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the
effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the
prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on
24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly,
the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
(Emphasis ours.)
21

[Type here]

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a

license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28
Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old
Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make
the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to
the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war,
(2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of
marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under
Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being
22

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unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of
an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen
short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule
on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under
the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former
or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law
can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum
requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as
a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character.
It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
23

[Type here]

marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose
was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises
when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on
this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by
Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license,
is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds
that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
24

[Type here]

and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on
24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the
instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment
of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the
parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate
the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
25

[Type here]

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the
fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration
of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose
and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a fiveyear period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the
marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
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WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Acting Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace
Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under
the Courts Wellness Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia AustriaMartinez as Acting Chairperson.
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** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional

member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12
September 2007.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario
L. Guaria III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No.
175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1-8.
5 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the
parties marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.
6 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-930466; Records, pp. 252-258.
7 Id. at 257.
8 Id. at 313-323.
9 Id. at 323.
10 Id. at 321-322.
11 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by
the parties and within the periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after
attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the
parent or guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such
party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen years;

28

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(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has
been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the
subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse,
who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian
of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four
years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four
years from the time the force or intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight
years after the marriage.
12 Records, p. 322.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud
referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for
two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
29

[Type here]

have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church,
religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and
vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
18 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil
registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted
him by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious
sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article
31;
30

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(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the

absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article
10.
19 CA rollo, p. 279.
20 384 Phil. 661 (2000).
21 CA rollo, pp. 278-279.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.
25 Erroneously cited as Nio v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.
26 377 Phil. 919 (1999).
27 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in
Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
28 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized
by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of
the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with
regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls
and vice-consuls.
29 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character.
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30 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.

31 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the
following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties;
and (2) their mutual consent.
32 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla,
Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.
33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2
of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
34 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh
Ed.), pp. 302-310.
35 In Nial v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the
spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein
a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement."
36 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license
shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years desire to marry each other. In such case, the
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publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons from

legalizing their status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
37 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an
"Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived
Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years."
38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137
(1999).
40 Id.
41 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November
1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
42 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other x x x."
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15
April 1999.
45 Id. at 159.
46 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Pearanda, G.R. No. 166616, 27
January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.
47 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September
2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
48 Id.
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).
50 Id.
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51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of
the family in case of unlawful aggression.
52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
53 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
54 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).
55 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties falsify
their affidavit in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that
they have not been cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for
lack of a marriage license, and they will also be criminally liable." Article 76
of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
56 Nial v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.
57 Id. at 130-131.
58 Id.
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