Deterring Nuclear Terrorism

Deterring
Nuclear
Terrorism
By Robert S. Litwak
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

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ISBN: 978-1-938027-59-8
October 2016
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BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Thomas R. Nides, Chair

Public members: William D. Adams, Chairman of the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of
Health and Human Services; David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States;
Carla D. Hayden, Librarian of Congress; John F. Kerry, Secretary of State;
John B. King Jr., Secretary of Education; David J. Skorton, Secretary of
the Smithsonian Institution. Designated appointee of the president from
within the federal government: Fred P. Hochberg, Chairman and President,
Export-Import Bank of the United States
Private Citizen Members: Peter J. Beshar, John T. Casteen III, Thelma
Duggin, Lt. Gen. Susan Helms, USAF (Ret.), Barry S. Jackson, Nathalie
Rayes, Earl W. Stafford, Jane Watson Stetson
WILSON NATIONAL CABINET
Ambassador Joseph B. Gildenhorn & Alma Gildenhorn, Co-chairs
Peter J. Beshar, Eddie & Sylvia Brown, Ambassador Sue & Ambassador
Chuck Cobb, Lester Crown, Thelma Duggin, Judi Flom, Sander R. Gerber,
Harman Family Foundation, Frank F. Islam, Willem Kooyker, Frederic V.
& Marlene A. Malek, Ambassador Robert A. & Julie Mandell, Thomas
R. Nides, Nathalie Rayes, Wayne Rogers, B. Francis Saul II, Diana Davis
Spencer, Earl W. Stafford, Robert Stein, Jane Watson Stetson, Leo Zickler
Table of Contents
1
Preface and Acknowledgments
Executive Summary
11
Introduction
19
The Nexus of Proliferation and Terrorism
35
Terrorist Intentions and Capabilities
53
Iran: Denial through Arms Control
69
North Korea: A Failed State with Nuclear Weapons
87
Russia: The End of Cooperative Threat Reduction?
101
Pakistan: The Most Dangerous Country
117
Recalibrating Deterrence: Between Punishment and Denial
129
Endnotes
Preface and
Acknowledgments
nuclear weapon in the hands of terroristsa game

changer, in President Obamas wordsposes a
catastrophic threat to the United States and the
world. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 by Al Qaeda
accentuated the threatening nexus of nuclear proliferation and
terrorism.
But if a non-state terrorist group were to buy, steal, or build a
bomb, a state would be involvedeither as the source of the
weapon or the weapons-usable fissile material. The countries of
primary concern with respect to the transfer or theft of nuclear
weapons are all at inflection points.
Russia has discontinued the 20-year cooperative threat
reduction program with the United States.
Pakistan has the worlds fastest growing nuclear arsenal
even as this fragile state confronts the threat of homegrown
jihadists.
North Korea, an impoverished state whose ruling regime has a
history of engaging in illicit activities, is poised to significantly
expand its nuclear arsenal and could sell a weapon or
technology to a terrorist group.
And Iran, which remains on the U.S. State Departments state
sponsors of terrorism list, negotiated a nuclear deal with
the worlds major powers that, if successfully implemented,
will hinder the Tehran regimes ability to acquire a bomb or
weapons-grade fissile material for 15 years.
These major shifts, which will affect the risks of nuclear

terrorism, are the occasion for this studys reassessment 15
years after 9/11.
Building on my previous work on rogue and outlier states,
this monographs core argument is that effective strategies on
the state level are the prerequisite for addressing threats of
nuclear terrorism posed by non-state entities, such as Al Qaeda.
Such strategies of deterrence will not eliminate the non-state
threat but will go far in achieving that objective.
This publication could not have been completed without the
help and advice of many colleagues and friends. My thanks
begin with Jane Harman and Andrew Selee for their support
of policy-relevant scholarship and writing at the Wilson Center.
I am especially indebted to Haleh Esfandiari, Bruce Hoffman,
Christian Ostermann, Joseph Pilat, and Paul Stares for their
counsel and encouragement. Special thanks go to Kendra
Heideman, James Morris, and Julia Craig Romano for their
deft editing of the manuscript. Ms. Romano also provided
outstanding research assistance.
I also gratefully acknowledge those who commented on the
draft or with whom I discussed the monographs argument:
Shahram Chubin, Robert Daly, Robert Hathaway, James Person,
Walter Reich, David Sanger, and Thom Shanker.
My sincere thanks go finally to Wilson Center colleagues
for their assistance: librarian Janet Spikes; Evan Pikulski and
Laura Deal of the Centers Nuclear Proliferation International
History Project (NPIHP); intern Elinor Hayes; and the Centers
communications teamCaroline Scullin, Suzanne Napper,
and graphic editor Kathy Butterfieldfor their excellent work
expeditiously moving the monograph through production.
The views expressed here are my own.
Robert S. Litwak
Washington, D.C.
October 2016
Deterring Nuclear Terrorism
Robert S. Litwak is vice president for

scholars and director of international security
studies at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars. He is also a consultant to
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Litwak
served on the National Security Council staff as
director for nonproliferation in the first Clinton
administration. He was an adjunct professor in
the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
Universitys School of Foreign Service and has held visiting
fellowships at Harvard Universitys Center for International Affairs,
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russian Academy
of Sciences, and Oxford University. Dr. Litwak is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations, and received a doctorate in international
relations from the London School of Economics.
Books and Monographs by Robert S. Litwak

Irans Nuclear Chess: After the Deal
Outlier States: American Strategies to Contain, Engage,
or Change Regimes
Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11
Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War
Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (edited with Mitchell Reiss)
Dtente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the
Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976
Security in the Persian Gulf: Sources of Inter-State Conflict
Executive Summary
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are determined, as

President Obama stated, to buy, build or steal a nuclear
weapon and would have no problem with using it. Preventing
a nuclear 9/11 hinges on foiling terrorist efforts to acquire the
capability that would allow them to act on their intention.
That entails blocking the pathways to terrorist acquisition of a
nuclear weapon: transferthe sale or handoff of a weapon from
a nuclear-weapon state; leakagethe theft of a nuclear weapon
or weapons-grade fissile material; and indigenous production
the construction of a nuclear device from illicitly obtained
weapons-grade fissile material.
Each pathway to nuclear acquisition by a non-state terrorist
group is contingent on an act of commission or negligence by
a state. The leakage of a weapon to a terrorist group would
originate from one of the nine nuclear-weapon states, or the
26 states (at current count) with weapons-grade fissile material
in their civilian stocks. Effective strategies on the state level to
prevent nuclear terrorism will not eliminate non-state threats,
but will go far in achieving that objective.
The countries of primary concern with respect to the nexus of
proliferation and terrorismPakistan, North Korea, Iran, and
Russiaare each at an inflection point.
Pakistan continues to build up its nuclear arsenal (including the
development of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons), employs
terrorism as an instrument of state policy, and faces the internal
Left: President Obama at the The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C.,
on March 31 and April 1, 2016.
security threat of radical Islamists attempting to infiltrate its

nuclear establishment.
Russia, which inherited the Soviet Unions vast nuclear arsenal
and stocks of fissile material, recently terminated its nuclearsecurity cooperation with the United States under the NunnLugar program.
North Korea is on the verge of a strategic breakout both
quantitatively (by ramping up its number of warheads) and
qualitatively (by mastering warhead miniaturization), and is
known, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, for its
willingness to sell anything they have to anybody who has the
cash to buy it.
Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism (according to the
U.S. State Department) concluded a nuclear agreement with
the worlds major powers in July 2015 that constrains the
Iranian nuclear program, impeding the Tehran regimes access
to weapons-usable materials for 15 years.
Since 9/11, the Cold War concept of deterrence has been
retooled to address the threats of a new era. Classic deterrence
theory distinguishes between two variants. Deterrence by
punishment seeks to affect the intention of a state to carry out
a hostile act through the credible threat of a punitive response,
whereas deterrence by denial seeks to affect the capabilities
of the target state (either by blocking the acquisition of those
means or through the adoption of defensive measures to render
them ineffective).
The vast majority of work done in the nonproliferation area to
counter nuclear terrorism falls under the rubric of deterrence by
denial. This covers a range of activities, such as export controls
to limit access to technology and physical security at sensitive
sites to lock down fissile material to prevent illicit diversion.
The Obama administration pursued cooperative threat
reductiona deterrence by denial strategyto secure nuclear
weapons and materials globally through a series of four Nuclear
Security Summits, which brought together some 50 heads of

state and made significant progress (e.g., reducing the number
of countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials from 32 in
2010 to 24 by the end of 2015).
To prevent a state from transferring nuclear weapons or
technologies to a terrorist group, the United States has
employed deterrence by punishment. Dating back to 2006,
when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, U.S.
declaratory policy has held that a state that supports or enables
terrorist groups to acquire or use nuclear weapons would be
held fully accountable.
Because North Korea is the one state that might sell a
weapon or nuclear technology to a terrorist group, this general
declaratory policy should be made explicit: The deliberate
transfer of nuclear capabilities by the Pyongyang regime to a
non-state entity could trigger a non-nuclear, regime-changing
response from the United States. A highly contentious issue
relating to nuclear leakage is whether potentially negligent
states, such as Pakistan, should be held fully accountable.
Technical advances in the area of nuclear attribution will
increasingly permit experts to determine the source of fissile
material should an attack occur. The United States has an
interest in publicizing its attribution capabilities so that states of
proliferation concern will know that they need to take possibility
of detection, and the attendant risk of retaliation, into account.
The deterrent threat captured in the calculatedly ambiguous
phrase fully accountable does not commit the United States
to a retaliatory response against the country of origin. The fear
of deterrence by punishment could lead countries that are
the potential sources of nuclear leakage to implement more
effective strategies of deterrence by denial.
An inherent tension exists between the twin variants of
deterrencepunishment and denial. An over-emphasis on the
punitive threat of the former potentially undercuts the target
states incentive for cooperating in the implementation of the
latter. The policy tension between punishment and denial can be
managed but not resolved.
The Iran nuclear accord set an important nonproliferation

precedentdeterrence by denial through arms control.
That approach should be attempted to constrain the nuclear
capabilities of two other hard cases, North Korea and
Pakistan. In both, the objective would be to cap and secure
those countries nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
fissile material. Opting for a negotiated freeze of capabilities
recognizes that a full rollback of either North Koreas or
Pakistans nuclear programs is not a diplomatically attainable
objective. That said, even the more modest goal of capping and
securing their nuclear arsenals would face formidable political
obstacles in both countries.
Negotiating a freeze would buy time and prevent the problem
from getting worse. China, which has balked at applying
meaningful pressure on North Korea to curb its nuclear
ambitions, faces a strategic choice of either acquiescing to
Pyongyangs strategic breakout or living with its adverse
consequences in northeast Asia (e.g., the August 2016 decision
to deploy the THAAD antimissile system in South Korea).
The Obama administration has reportedly floated a deal
that would cap Pakistani nuclear capabilities (in particular,
the expansion into vulnerable tactical nuclear weapons for
battlefield use) in return for relaxing the strict controls on
nuclear exports to Pakistan. The proposal would essentially
trade off Pakistani restraint and transparency for measures
to normalize the Pakistani nuclear program. Constraining the
Pakistani program so that this fragile state does not become the
worlds fourth largest nuclear state can only be accomplished
within the broader geopolitical context. China, which played a
constructive role in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal, should
have an interest in avoiding a spiraling arms race in South Asia
that increases the risk of nuclear leakage from Pakistan.
Denying ISIS the capabilities of a state is essential. Rolling
back the Islamic States control over territory in Iraq and Syria
would block its access to the economic and technological
capabilities of a state. Such a strategy of deterrence by denial

would not eliminate ISISs threat of WMD terrorism, but would
substantially reduce it.
A much more likely event of lower consequence would be the
detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD)a socalled dirty bombby ISIS or another terrorist group. RDDs
have been called weapons of mass disruption because their
consequences would be primarily economic and psychological.
A strategy of deterrence by denial would aim both to block
ISISs (or any other terrorist groups) access to RDD capabilities
and to deploy defenses to prevent a successful attack on
a nuclear power plant. The former would entail securing
radiological materials as is being done with weapons and
weapons-usable materials. But radiological isotopes are in
pervasive use throughout society in medicine and business, so
a denial approach, while necessary, cannot realistically eliminate
the threat.
Nuclear terrorism encompasses a spectrum of threatsthe
detonation of a nuclear bomb, an attack on a civil nuclear
installation, or the dispersal of radiological materials through
a dirty bomb. Each differs in probability and consequence.
But the strategies adopted to counter these variegated
threats share a fundamental characteristic. Their focus is on
state actors, who through their intent or laxness, would be
the source countries of the weapons, nuclear technology,
and radioactive materials that terrorists would either use to
perpetrate attacks or target. This underscores the leitmotif
of this monograph: Effective strategies of deterrence, which
coherently integrate both the denial and punishment variants,
on the state level remain the prerequisite for countering the
non-state threat of nuclear terrorism.
Introduction
While judging the United States generally

resilient to terrorist attack, President Barack
Obama qualified that a potential game changer would be a
nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists, blowing up a major
city.1 This game-changing scenario, which had been a concern
since the 1990s, arose just four months after the presidents
inauguration in 2009: a CIA intercept between two Taliban
leaders in northwestern Pakistan revealed that the terrorist
group had acquired nuclear devices. Though the intercept later
proved unfounded, at the time, according to an administration
official, The entire U.S. policy-making community was very
alarmed. It was an all-hands-on-deck mentality.2 In the war
against ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), the president
has resisted a direct combat role for U.S. forces, but stipulated
that the one scenario in which he would send in U.S. ground
troops is if we discovered that [the Islamic State] had gotten
possession of a nuclear weapon, and we had to run an
operation to get it out of their hands.3
President Obama has warned that Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups are determined to buy, build or steal a nuclear
weapon and would have no problem with using it.4 Preventing
a nuclear 9/11 hinges on foiling terrorist efforts to acquire the
capability that would allow them to act on their intention. That
entails blocking the pathways to terrorist acquisition of a nuclear
weapon: transferthe sale or handoff of a weapon from a
nuclear-weapon state; leakagethe theft of a nuclear weapon
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seeks to aquire a nuclear weapon to conduct a terrorist attack that would
be truly epic.. Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Stringer
11
or weapons-grade fissile material; and indigenous production

the construction of a nuclear device from illicitly obtained
Each pathway to nuclear acquisition by a non-state terrorist
group is contingent on an act of commission or negligence by a
state. Nine statesthe United States, Russia, China, the United
Kingdom, and France (the P5 recognized under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Israel, India, and Pakistan (which
exercised their sovereign right not to join the NPT); and North
Korea (a signatory that withdrew from the NPT)are nuclearweapon states. The leakage of a weapon to a terrorist group
would originate from one of these nine states. The pool of
states with weapons-grade fissile material in their civilian stocks
is much largercurrently 26, down from a Cold War-era high of
57 countries.5
In the transformed political environment after 9/11, the Bush
administrations concern that Saddam Hussein might acquire
and then transfer a nuclear weapon to terrorists drove the
administrations decision to launch a preventive war in Iraq in
2003. At that time, Iraq, as well Libya, North Korea, and Iran,
constituted the core group of countries designated as rogue
states. These states, all designated as state sponsors of
terrorism with nuclear aspirations, embodied the nexus of
proliferation and terrorism. Other countries of concern with
respect to nuclear terrorism were Russia (then participating in
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program [Nunn-Lugar] with
the United States to secure its massive stocks of weapons and
fissile material) and Pakistan (designated a major non-NATO
ally by the United States amidst the scandal over the A.Q.
Khan networks transfer of nuclear technology to Libya, Iran,
and North Korea).
If Obamas game-changing scenario came to passa nuclear
detonation in a major citywhat country would be the likely
source of that weapon? Attempting to answer that question is
12
the rationale for this new monograph on nuclear terrorism 15

years after 9/11. The top three suspects would be:
Pakistanwhich continues to build up its nuclear

arsenal (including the development of battlefield tactical
nuclear weapons), employs terrorism as an instrument
of state policy, and faces the internal security threat
of radical Islamists attempting to infiltrate its nuclear
establishment.
Russiawhich inherited the Soviet Unions vast

nuclear arsenal and stocks of fissile material and
recently terminated its nuclear-security cooperation
with the United States under the Nunn-Lugar program.
North Koreawhich is on the verge of a strategic
breakout both quantitatively (by ramping up its number
of warheads) and qualitatively (by mastering warhead
miniaturization), and is known, as Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates put it, for its willingness to sell anything
they have to anybody who has the cash to buy it.
Missing from this top tier of countries of concern is Iran, the
leading state sponsor of terrorism (according to the U.S. State
Department) that has also had an active nuclear weapons
program. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
concluded between Iran and the worlds major powers in July
2015, impedes the Tehran regimes access to highly enriched
uranium for 15 years.
Proliferation occurs in states. The nuclear weapons and
materials that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or ISIS seek to
acquire exist in states. Effective strategies on the state level are
the prerequisite for addressing non-state threats. A repertoire
of tailored strategies focused on states will not eliminate
terrorist threats, but would go far in achieving this goal. An
ominous aspect of the threat posed by ISIS, which the Obama
administration asserts is neither Islamic nor a state, is that
13
its occupation of territory in Iraq and Syria confers access to

an infrastructure (such as the chemistry department at Mosul
University) that could allow this non-state actor to acquire
state-like WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capabilities.
Hence, the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy is to roll back ISISs
territorial gains to mitigate this threat.
The principal routes to nuclear acquisition by a terrorist group
politically motivated transfer or sale, leakage, and indigenous
productioncan be countered through a retooled Cold War
strategy of deterrence targeting states. Al Qaeda and ISIS
cannot be deterred from attempting to realize their apocalyptic
vision, but the states, which would be the source of the
weapons or fissile materials that they would need to carry
out nuclear terrorism, are susceptible to deterrence. Classic
deterrence theory from the Cold War era, pioneered by political
scientist Glenn Snyder, usefully distinguishes between two
variantsdeterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial.6
Deterrence by punishmentthreatening a potentially
devastating punitive response to a hostile actis the variant
most commonly associated with this strategy. After North
Korea conducted a test in 2006 and became a self-proclaimed
nuclear-weapon state, President Bush enunciated a policy
of deterrence by punishment, which was repeated verbatim
by the Obama administration in its Nuclear Posture Review
of 2010: it threatened to hold fully accountable any state,
terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables
terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction,
whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe
haven for such efforts. The fully accountable formulation
was strategically ambiguousthreatening retaliation, but
not locking the United States into a particular response. This
declaratory policy directed at the countries of concern was
essentially a large strategic bumper sticker: dont even think
about transferring a nuclear weapon or materials to a non-state
14
terrorist group. For North Korea, the threat of regime-changing

retaliation in this deterrent formulation was tacit but clear. The
threat of holding states fully accountable creates coercive
pressure for states to end their sponsorship of terrorism, and to
develop the governmental capacity and political will to exercise
sovereign control over nuclear weapons and materials on their
territory. Advances in nuclear forensicsattribution technology
permitting nuclear materials to be traced back to their source
countrypromise to increase the credibility of deterrence by
punishment
The essential complement to deterrence by punishment is
deterrence by denial. Whereas the former addresses intention,
the latter focuses on denying terrorists access to nuclear
weapons or fissile material through physical security measures
adopted by states. That was the impetus behind the now
dormant Cooperative Threat Reduction program with Russia,
initiated at the end of the Cold War to secure the Soviet Unions
nuclear arsenal and materials, and, since 2009, four nuclear
security summits convened by the Obama administration,
which led 15 countries to give up their weapons-grade
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. But terrorist acquisition
of nuclear capabilities remains an urgent threat. The Nuclear
Threat Initiative, a non-governmental organization, estimates
that more than 1,800 metric tons of nuclear material, much of it
vulnerable to theft, resides in 24 countries.7
The Iran nuclear deal is essentially a form of deterrence by
denial in that the agreement blocks Iranian acquisition of
weapons-grade fissile material and, hence, the threat of transfer
or leakage to a terrorist group. The JCPOA, the product of
coercive pressure and engagement, could be a precedent for
North Korea, which is on the verge of a strategic breakout. With
Iran and North Korea, diplomacy to mitigate the nuclear threat
has been complicated by the mixed message from Washington
as to whether the objective is to change these states conduct
15
or their ruling regimes. For example, the U.S.-South Korean

military exercises in March 2016 featured a beheading
operation (often referred to as decapitation) aimed at the
Kim Jong-un regime.8 In the case of Pakistan, officials have
expressed concern that the United States might launch a
preventive strike to seize the countrys nuclear arsenal.
With these countries of concern, a policy tension exists
between the punishment and denial variants of deterrence. An
over-emphasis on the punitive threat of the former potentially
undercuts the target states incentive for cooperating in
the implementation of the latter. This policy tension can be
managed but not resolved. The purpose of this monograph is
to identify effective strategies on the state level to address
non-state threats. In fashioning such tailored strategies of
deterrence, U.S. policymakers must navigate the political space
between punishment and denial.
Right: On the floor of The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, held in

Washington, D.C. on March 31 and April 1, 2016.
Photo courtesy of whitehouse.gov
16
17
The Nexus of
Proliferation and
Terrorism
Proliferation Dynamics
A traditional tenet of arms control policy is that proliferation
occurs in states. That formulation reflected the long-standing
assessment that nuclear weapons would be acquired and
controlled exclusively by state actors. John F. Kennedys famous
nightmare vision of a world of 30 states with nuclear weapons
by the 1970s, or other predictions of an impending proliferation
cascade, did not come to pass.9 The nine states (the United
States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and
North Korea) that have gone nuclear, as well as those seeking
to acquire nuclear weapons, represent the full range of regime
typedemocratic, authoritarian, and military. Democratization
can increase political transparency and accountability as well
as facilitate open debate and scrutiny of motivation, but it will
not, per se, restrain proliferation. Indeed, a majority of the
states in the nuclear club are established democracies. The
diversity of political systems among nuclear-weapon states
underscores that regime intention, not regime type, is the
critical proliferation indicator.
The extensive literature on nonproliferation highlights a range
of domestic and international factors that have led states to
abstain from or acquire nuclear weapons. For each state facing
that choice, the strategic calculus has been highly contextdependent. During the Cold War, the structure of bipolarity
inhibited proliferation: the United States and the Soviet Union
implemented strategies of extended deterrence within their
19
competing alliance systems to assuage the security concerns

of their smaller allies. For that reason, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), which institutionalized the extended
deterrent commitment of the United States, has been called
one of the most effective nonproliferation instruments in
history.
Nuclear abstinence and voluntary reversal have also been
attributed to the combination of U.S. pressure in tandem with
security guarantees (Taiwan, South Korea); transformations
in civil-military relations (Brazil, Argentina); domestic political
changes precipitated by a transformation of the international
environment (Ukraine, South Africa); and the normative
constraint on nuclear acquisition from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.10 In sum, the world is not one of 30 or more
nuclear powers because the vast majority of states do not have
a national security or other overriding imperative that would
compel them to acquire nuclear weapons.
Though regime type does not axiomatically drive a state to
acquire nuclear weapons, the character of a regime does fuel
the perception of threat by other states. The United States may
assert a general interest in nonproliferation as an international
norm, but, in practice, it focuses on adversarial proliferators
states that combine capabilities with hostile intent. Hence, with
reason, Washington focuses on Iran more than on Israel. The
linkage between proliferation and terrorism was reinforced by
the fact that the primary countries of proliferation concern (Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea) had also been designated
state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. Department of State.
After 9/11, the nexus was central to the Bush administrations
redefinition of threat-and the case for preventive war in Iraq.
The concern was that if one of these rogue states acquired
nuclear weapons, its regime might employ them either directly
in a clandestine attack or indirectly by giving or selling them
to a non-state terrorist group. This section will focus on the
traditional concern about the nuclear terrorist threats linked to
state actorsfrom Stalins Soviet Union during the Cold War
20
to the contemporary rogue state threat. Whether or not the

traditional assumption about nuclear weapons being acquired
and controlled exclusively by states will continue to hold will be
examined in the following section on the evolving urgent threat
posed by non-state terrorist groups.
June 3, 1961: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, left, and U.S. President John F. Kennedy
Photo courtesy of www.state.gov
From the Cold War to 9/11

The specter of nuclear terrorism has been a major concern
since the creation of the first atomic bomb. In 1946, a year after
two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan to end World War II
and three years before the Soviet Union tested its own weapon,
J. Robert Oppenheimer, the technical director of the Manhattan
Project, was asked in a closed Senate hearing whether a
21
nuclear bomb could be smuggled into New York. Oppenheimer

answered, Of course, it could be done, and [a few] people
could destroy New York. Oppenheimer was pessimistic
about the practical possibility of preventing nuclear terrorism.
When a startled senator asked what instrument would you
use to detect an atomic bomb hidden somewhere in a city,
Oppenheimer quipped, a screwdriver to open every crate.11
The USSRs successful test of an atomic bomb in 1949
fueled concern that the Soviet regime might launch a sneak
attack on the United States through nuclear terrorism. A 1950
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) warned that the Soviet
Union has the capability for clandestine atomic explosions in
ports and selected inland areas.12 An updated NIE on Soviet
intentions and capabilities in 1951 identified different smuggling
scenarios, including the specter of the Soviet Unions secreting
a disassembled bomb into an isolated section of the U.S.
Along with capabilities, the CIA estimate also saw potential
Soviet intent to utilize this unorthodox mode of attack: The
USSR will have no scruples about employing any weapon
or tactic which promises success in terms of over-all Soviet
objectives.13 Against this background of perceived threat from
Americas Cold War adversarythe second nuclear-weapon
statean interagency group involving the Department of
Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission (the precursor to
the Department of Energy) examined possible defenses. The
resulting Screwdriver report, so-named after Oppenheimers
famous quip, concluded that wide-area detection of nuclear
weapons and materials was not technically feasible, but that
reasonably good point detection could be provided at key
points of entry to detect kilogram-quantities of weaponsgrade plutonium and uranium.14 The recommendations of the
Screwdriver report were implemented through Project Doorstep
during the 1950s and 1960s. Among the measures taken to
address the covert threat was the setting up of instruments at
the main ports of entry used by Soviet-bloc diplomats to detect
nuclear materials.
22
The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Mao regimes testing of an

atomic bomb in 1964 generated renewed concern about the
vulnerability of the United States to a clandestine nuclear attack
from the Soviet Union or China. A 1968 National Intelligence
Estimate warned that the Beijing regime might attempt to
smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States to deter the
Johnson administration from launching a preemptive strike on
China. Though successive NIEs during the 1950s and 1960s laid
out various potential scenarios, the CIA never considered such a
clandestine attack to be likelynor does the available evidence
(including some archival materials) indicate that the option
was ever seriously contemplated by Moscow or Beijing.15 The
general view of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism by the Soviet
Union and China was that such an attack would be the prelude
to the initiation of general war. Once the United States (and the
Soviet Union) acquired secure second-strike capabilities in the
1960s (thereby negating the possibility of a decapitating first
strike), the concern about state-derived threats abated.
The signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968
was a milestone in establishing and codifying nonproliferation
as an international norm. The NPTs so-called grand bargain
was that five nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Soviet
Union, China, Britain, and France) would not assist efforts by
non-nuclear states to acquire weapons (Article I) and would
make good faith efforts to eliminate their arsenals (Article
VI). In return, the non-nuclear signatories pledged to forgo
weapons acquisition (Article II), and place their civil nuclear
facilities under international safeguards (Article III); they would
then be permitted to obtain and develop nuclear technology for
energy and other peaceful applications (Article IV). The essence
of this grand bargain was presaged in Eisenhowers 1953
Atoms for Peace plan, which established the linkage between
nonproliferation and peaceful use by offering the benefits of
nuclear technology to states that renounced nuclear weapons.16
The Atoms for Peace initiative was viewed by the Eisenhower
administration through a Cold War prism in which the priorities
23
were to maintain U.S. global leadership and reduce Soviet

influence. However, as South Asia nuclear expert Peter Lavoy
concludes, an unintended outcome of the Atoms for Peaces
liberal nuclear export policy was the proliferation of worldwide
nuclear research and power programs, which, in three states
Israel, Pakistan, and Indialed to the diversion of U.S. nuclear
assistance to military use.17 All three countries posed a
challenge to the promulgation of an international norm against
proliferation by exercising their sovereign right to abstain from
the NPT, but none was perceived by the United States as an
adversarial proliferator combining nuclear capability with hostile
intent.
During the 1980s, concern about the nexus of terrorism and
proliferation focused on certain Third World countriesa group
eventually designated by U.S. officials as rogue states. A
critical development in this evolution was the inauguration of
the Department of States official listing of countries employing
terrorism as an instrument of state policy. The Secretary of
State was mandated by Congress to make this determination
on an annual basis under a provision of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. The step ushered in a heightened
U.S. focus on the problem of state-sponsored terrorism that
continued under the Reagan administration. The proliferation
of ballistic missile programs in the Third World and the Saddam
Hussein regimes use of chemical weapons against Iran during
the 1980s symbolized the emerging nexus of terrorism and
proliferation.
The term rogue state entered the U.S. foreign policy lexicon
as the Cold War ended and after the 1991 Gulf War to reverse
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Husseins Iraq was
the rogue archetype: a regime pursuing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and employing terrorism as an instrument
of state policy. The Clinton administration designated the
rogueswhose core group was Iraq, Iran, North Korea,
and Libyaas a distinct category of states in the post-Cold
War international system. Rogue state was a unilateral
24
American political concept, without foundation in international

law, which was analytically soft and applied selectively against
a diverse set of states that were hostile to the United States.
The concept also proved problematic in practice. Once a state
was relegated to this category beyond the pale, the default
strategy was comprehensive containment and isolation.
Diplomatic engagement, as when the Clinton administration
concluded a nuclear deal with North Korea in 1994 or sought
to explore the possibilities after the election of a reformist
president in Iran in 1997, was castigated by hard-line critics as
tantamount to appeasement. The administration recognized that
the term had become a political straitjacket, frustrating its ability
to apply differentiated strategies tailored to the circumstances
in each country, so it was expunged from the U.S. diplomatic
lexicon by the Clinton State Department in June 2000 and
replaced with the awkward moniker states of concern.
Though the term rogue state was revived by the George W.
Bush administration before 9/11, the rogue concept was central
to its strategy under the Bush Doctrine after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001.
The Nexus after 9/11

Despite assertions that everything has changed, 9/11 did not
change the structure of international relations. But it did lead to
a redefinition of threat. In its 2002 National Security Strategy,
the Bush administration explicitly argued that the dangers of the
post-9/11 world derived from the very character of Americas
adversariesirredeemable rogue states and undeterrable
terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, whose only constraints are
practical and technical, not moral or political. WMD proliferation
and terrorism created a deadly nexus of capabilities and
intentions. U.S. policymakers were driven by the nightmare
scenario of a rogue state transferring a nuclear, biological, or
chemical capability to a terrorist group in order to carry out a
mass-casualty attack on the American homeland.
25
Crowd witnesses South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing as a result of terrorist attack
while North Tower burns on September 11, 2001 at 9:59 am in New York.
Photo Dan Howell / Shutterstock.com
The redefinition of threat precipitated a major shift in strategy.

The Bush administration asserted that the Cold War concepts of
containment and deterrence were less likely to work against
leaders of rogue states [who are] more willing to take risks
and more prone than an orthodox great power rival (such as the
Soviet Union or contemporary China) to use weapons of mass
destruction.18 The 2002 National Security Strategy elevated the
use of force, as a matter of common sense and self-defense,
not only preemptively, against imminent threats (a usage
consistent with international law), but also preventively, against
26
emerging threats before they are formed.19 This articulation of

the so-called Bush Doctrine propelled the shift from a pre-9/11
strategy of containment and deterrence to a post-9/11 emphasis
on regime change. Changing the conduct of rogue states was
deemed unlikely and inadequate because their threatening
behavior was inextricably linked to the character of their ruling
regimes: it derived from their true nature, as President Bush
put it.20
Iraq became the test case for the new strategy. Before 9/11,
Saddam Hussein was likened by Secretary of State Colin Powell
to a toothache.21 Afterwards, the asserted nexus between
proliferation and terrorismSaddams resistance to the WMD
disarmament mandated by the UN Security Council, and
the Iraqi regimes purported links to Al Qaedaprovided the
rationale for a preventive war of regime change. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld later acknowledged that the decision
to go to war was based not on new intelligence, but rather on
viewing old intelligence through the prism of 9/11.22 In making
the case for urgent action, President Bush argued that after
9/11, the United States cannot wait for the final proofthe
smoking gunthat could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud. . . . To those who viewed Iraq as a strategic diversion
from the war on terrorism, Bush bluntly countered, To the
contrary, confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to
winning the war on terror.23
After the successful U.S. military march on Baghdad in April
2003 to oust Saddam, Bush administration officials described
the intervention in Iraq as a typea model of coercive
nonproliferation through regime change.24 In the heady
weeks after the cessation of major combat operations,
before the onset of the deadly Iraqi insurgency against U.S.
forces, President Bush stated that the Iraq precedent had
implications for how the United States would approach the
challenges posed by other rogue states, specifically North
Korea and Iran. In Iraq, he claimed, America had redefin[ed]
war by demonstrating the U.S. ability to decapitate a regime
27
without inflicting unacceptable collateral damage on the

civilian population.25 A senior administration official said that
the message of Iraq for Irans theocratic regime was: Take a
number.26
Just eight months after the fall of Baghdad, in December
2003, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi announced that his
country was voluntarily terminating its covert WMD programs
and submitting to intrusive international inspections to certify
compliance. The surprise announcement, which came on the
heels of a financial settlement for the terrorist bombing of
Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, was hailed by
President Bush as an important step that would permit Libya
to rejoin the international community. If Iraq had set an
important precedentnonproliferation through a change of
regimeLibya offered the alternative: nonproliferation through
change in a regime.
Bush administration officials claimed Qaddafis strategic
turnabout as a dividend of the Iraq war. Qaddafi had been
scared straight (as one analyst put it) by the demonstration
effect of the regime-change precedent. The Iraq war may have
been a necessary condition for Qaddafis diplomatic volte-face,
but it was not sufficient. The crux of the Libyan deal was the
Bush administrations tacit but clear assurance of security for
the regime: in short, if Qaddafi halted his objectionable external
behavior with respect to terrorism and proliferation, Washington
would not press for a change of regime in Tripoli. Without such
a credible security assuranceif he had believed he was
targeted for regime change regardless of any change in his
behaviorQaddafi would have had no incentive to relinquish his
WMD arsenal.
The contrasting nonproliferation precedents of 2003a change
of regime in Iraq; a change in a regime in Libyaprovided the
political backdrop for the escalating nuclear crises with North
Korea and Iran. In dealing with the nuclear defiance in Iran and
North Korea, the Bush administration was caught between
28
the precedents set in Iraq and Libya. The administration could

not replicate the Iraq precedent of direct military intervention,
and it was unwilling to offer Tehran and Pyongyang the security
assurance that had sealed the Libya deal. It failed to make clear
whether the goal ofU.S. policy was to replace regimes or to
change their conduct. As a consequence, the administration
missed opportunities to test Iranian and North Korean
intentions.
Barack Obama campaigned for the presidency on a controversial
platform of negotiating with rogue states. The shift was evident
in his January 2009 inaugural address, when he offered to
extend a hand [to adversaries] if you are willing to unclench
your fist.27 The Obama administration jettisoned regime change
rhetoric and the term rogue state. Instead, Obama referred
to Iran and North Korea as outlier states and reframed the
challenges they posed in terms of their noncompliance with
established international norms rather than in terms of the
unilateral U.S. rogue concept. The Obama administration
offered adversarial governments a structured choice: abide by
international norms and gain the economic benefits of greater
integration with the international community, or remain in
noncompliance and face international isolation and punitive
consequences.
But the outliers rebuffed the extended hand. North Korea
conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, while Iran
continued to flout UN Security Council resolutions requiring
the suspension of its uranium-enrichment program. Both
Pyongyang and Tehran seized on NATOs 2011 intervention
in Libya as proof that Qaddafi had been duped by the West
when he dismantled his nuclear program. For North Korea
and Iran, the rationale that the Libyan military operation was
undertaken as a humanitarian intervention rather than to
achieve nonproliferation ends is an analytical distinction without
a political difference. By taking down regimes in Iraq (2003)
and Libya (2011), Washington effectively priced itself out of the
security assurance market with Iran and North Korea.
29
The foreign policy dispute between the Obama administration

and its critics centered on the appropriateness and efficacy of
engaging hostile statesnotably North Korea, Burma, Sudan,
Syria, and, most pressingly, Iran. But this debate over means
has been a surrogate for a more fundamental debate over ends.
The crucial issue remains the character of the regimesthe
persisting policy tension between the objectives of behavior
change and regime change, and whether the former can be
achieved only through the latter. Hardliners view engagement
as tantamount to appeasementrewarding bad behavior
and doomed to failure. The Obama strategy was described
by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as a two-track
approach of pressure and engagement.28 Primary among the
administrations multiple means to bring [recalcitrant states]
into compliance with international nonproliferation norms
have been smart sanctions on the target regimes core interest
groupsthat is, imposing tangible costs on those responsible
for the objectionable behavior.29 With Iran, for example, the
focus was on interest groups such as the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC), the hard-line military institution that not
only controls the countrys nuclear program, but also plays a
lucrative role in commercial and black-market activities. The aim
of the two-track strategy of pressure and engagement was to
change the target regimes calculus of decision with respect to
its nuclear capabilities.
In the post-9/11 period, rogue statesIraq, Libya, Iran, and
North Koreawere the primary focus of U.S. security policy,
and the motivating scenario underlying the Bush Doctrine of
preemption was that these regimes would either directly
employ weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear) or
deliberately transfer them to an undeterrable terrorist group like
Al Qaeda. In launching a preventive war of regime change in
Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration argued that the magnitude
of the threatthe conjunction of WMD capabilities and the
character of the Saddam Hussein regimenegated a reliance
on the traditional strategies of containment and deterrence.
30
Unable to replicate the Iraq model of coercive nonproliferation

through regime change, the Bush administration negotiated a
verifiable WMD disarmament agreement with Libya that left
the Qaddafi regime in power. The Libyan deal was a form of
deterrence by denial as it limited (and indeed eliminated) the
Qaddafi regimes WMD capabilities.
The Obama administration sought to replicate the Libyan
model with Iran and North Korea by offering their regimes
the structured choice between compliance and isolation.
With Iran under the coercive pressure of economic sanctions,
the 2013 election of a pragmatic president, Hassan Rouhani,
created a political opportunity for revived diplomacy. Protracted
negotiations over 20 months culminated in the historic Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015. The
JCPOA significantly reduces Irans potential plutonium route to
nuclear acquisition and bought time by blocking Irans access to
weapons-grade enriched uranium for 15 years. These negotiated
limits on Irans nuclear capabilities constituted a form of
deterrence by denial.
In contrast to Iran, the two-track strategy of pressure and
engagement has not yielded results with North Korea, which
crossed the nuclear weapons threshold in October 2006.
Diplomacy with Pyongyang has stalled over the Kim Jong-un
regimes demand to be accepted as a nuclear-weapon state
by the United States and the other Six-Party Talk members as
a precondition for the resumption of negotiations. Meanwhile,
North Korea has engaged in military provocations along the
demilitarized zone with South Korea and conducted additional
nuclear and ballistic missile tests. With the option of deterrence
by denial through arms control with North Korea blocked, the
Obama administration bolstered its essential complement
deterrence by punishment. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,
the administration renew[ed] the U.S. commitment [made
by the Bush administration after North Koreas 2006 nuclear
test] to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or
other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts
31
to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by

facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven
for such efforts.30 Though the catalyst for this declaratory
policy was specificNorth Koreas crossing of the nuclear
thresholdthe deterrent threat to hold any state or non-state
fully accountable was a generic response to the threat
of a rogue state deliberately transferring nuclear or other
unconventional weapons to a terrorist group. But though this
motivating scenario of U.S. strategy was central to the Bush
administrations case for a preventive war against Iraq as a
matter of urgency, WMD transfer was not the most likely
contingency. Indeed, the controversial NIE on Iraqs WMD
programs in October 2002 concluded that the one circumstance
under which a desperate Saddam Hussein might either use
WMD against the United States or transfer those capabilities to
a terrorist organization was that which the Bush administration
was about to embark upona march on Baghdad to topple the
regime.31
More likely than the direct transfer of unconventional weapons
from a rogue state to a terrorist group is the inadvertent
leakage of nuclear and other WMD-related materials to
terrorist groups from states that exert inadequate controls
over these dangerous technologies. For this pathway to
terrorist acquisition, the countries of primary concern are
not the roguesIran and North Koreabut rather Russia
and Pakistan. U.S. relations with Russia, which had already
deteriorated under Putin in the 2000s, further declined after
the Kremlins aggression in eastern Ukraine and annexation
of Crimea. Within that political context, Washington and
Moscow did not renew the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program, which had been established at the end of the Cold
War to secure Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
The looming question is whether the upgraded CTR-funded
security measures at Russian sites will continueor whether
their erosion will increase the risk of leakage. Meanwhile,
32
Pakistan continues to build up its nuclear arsenal, including the

development of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan
has had a contradictory relationship with the United States:
while designated a major non-NATO ally after 9/11, it has
employed terrorism as an instrument of state policy against
India and was the country to which Osama bin Laden fled from
Afghanistan.
The states examined in this study lie at the nexus of
proliferation and terrorism, where terrorist acquisition of a
nuclear capability could occur either through direct transfer
(North Korea and Iran) or indirect leakage (Pakistan and
Russia). To address these threats, the United States faces the
challenge of managing the policy tension between strategies
of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. An
over-emphasis on the punitive threat of the former could
undercut the target states incentive for cooperating in the
implementation of the latter. Effective strategies integrating
both variants of deterrence should be tailored to the particular
circumstances in each state. Such strategies will address the
potential threat of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. The goal is
to create a structure of inducements and penalties to eliminate
state sponsorship of terrorism, and to have passive sponsors
whose regimes have turned a blind eye to terrorist activities
on their sovereign territory desist. Effective strategies on the
state level to prevent nuclear transfer or leakage will go far in
countering non-state threats.
33
Terrorist Intentions
and Capabilities
The Rise of Mass-Casualty Terrorism

Threat is the conjunction of hostile intent and the capability to
act on it. In his historic Prague speech in April 2009, President
Obama declared nuclear terrorism the most immediate and
extreme threat to global security, and warned that Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups are determined to buy, build or
steal a nuclear weapon and would have no problem with
using it.32
At the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom was
that the threat of nuclear war between the great powers had
declined, but that the use of a single weapon by a terrorist
group had increased. This new calculus of threat reflected the
rise of terrorist groups, notably Al Qaeda, with the intention of
carrying out mass-casualty attacks, and increased concern that
they could acquire this capability through the sale or handoff
(transfer) of a weapon from a state, or the theft (leakage) of
a nuclear weapon or the weapons-grade fissile material that
would permit terrorists to construct a rudimentary bomb.
Before the 1990s, the orthodox view was that most terrorist
groups were not motivated to carry out operations with the
explicit goal of inflicting maximum casualties. Based upon
empirical evidence from the 1970s and 1980s, the widely
held belief among Western experts was that national selfdetermination or ethnic-separatist groups (such as the
Provisional Irish Republican Army) that employed terrorism
Left: People gathered in front of the Stock Exchange to remember the victims of the terrorist attacks
that took place on March 22. Photo taken on March 29, 2016 in Brussels, Belgium.
Photo courtesy of CRM / Shutterstock.com
35
thought that mass-casualty attacks would be counterproductive

by generating a public backlash against their cause. Even radical
groups, such as the Red Brigades in Italy, and professional
terrorists, such as Carlos the Jackal and Abu Nidal,
conformed to this traditional model of terrorism in which
extraordinary means were incompatible with limited ends.33
Notwithstanding instances of mass-casualty attacks using highexplosives (e.g., the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Lebanon), the conventional wisdom was captured
in terrorism expert Bryan Jenkins classic formulation from the
mid-1970s, Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of
people listening and not a lot of people dead.34 The prevailing
rationale that terrorists would eschew mass-casualty attacks
using conventional means was extended to their potential
acquisition and use of WMDthe misleading popular term that
encompasses chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) weapons.
Developments in the 1990s did not overturn the conventional
wisdom but did call its underlying assumptions into question.35
A major impetus behind this reassessment was three terrorist
attacks not linked to a concrete political agenda and explicitly
intended to inflict maximum civilian casualties. The increased
lethality of terrorist incidents during this period was primarily
attributable to a significant increase in terrorist groups whose
primary motivation was religion.36 The first episode occurred
in February 1993, when Islamic radicals bombed one of the
World Trade Center towers in the hope of toppling it into the
other. Two years later, in March 1995, the millennial Japanese
religious cult Aum Shinrikyo attacked the Tokyo subway
system with sarin gas, killing a dozen persons and injuring an
additional 3,700. The third episode came only weeks afterward,
in April 1995, when two anti-government, Christian, white
supremacists detonated a truck bomb (employing a homemade
explosive derived from fertilizer) to destroy the U.S. federal
office building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. Terrorism
expert Bruce Hoffman observes that two other unsuccessful
36
terrorist attempts, which failed to generate public attention

precisely because they were unsuccessful, augured the new
era of mass-casualty terrorisman abortive terrorist plot
in 1986 to bring down a Pan Am jet, hijacked in Karachi, in
downtown Tel Aviv, and a foiled attempt by the Armed Islamic
Group in 1994 to crash an Air France jet, hijacked in Algiers, into
the Eiffel Tower.37
The increasing lethality of terrorism promoted the emerging
linkage of the terrorism and proliferation agendas. This new
focus was evident in the controversial U.S. cruise missile
strikes in 1998 on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in
Khartoum, Sudan, in retaliation for the bombing of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by an Al Qaeda cell. The
Clinton administration claimed that the plant was controlled
by the bin Laden organization and was intended to produce
chemical weaponsa conclusion whose supporting evidence
is disputed by critics. What is now known is that in the 1990s,
when Osama bin Laden was building the Al Qaeda organization
and refining its organizing concepts (including the contrived
religious rationale for killing civilians in mass-casualty attacks),
he expressed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. 38
In 1999, a congressionally appointed national panel on terrorism
readiness, chaired by the then Virginia governor James
Gilmore, concluded that previous beliefs about the restraint
on terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) devices may be disappearing, and that the most
likely terrorist groups to use CBRN were fundamentalist or
apocalyptic religious organizations, cults, and extreme singleissue groups.39 But in making that case about emerging
threats, the Gilmore Commission presciently sought to
counter the growing trend in the public policy debate to view
catastrophic terrorism as synonymous with WMD terrorism. It
also underscored that higher-probability conventional attacks
can have catastrophic consequences. For example, citing the
hurdles that a terrorist group would encounter in developing an
37
effective chemical weapon, the report speculated that a terrorist

group might instead attempt to engineer a chemical disaster by
attacking an industrial plant or storage facility. The Commission
rejected the guiding assumption, evident in U.S. government
counter-terrorism planning, that smaller-scale, non-masscasualty events are a lesser-included contingency that can be
addressed adequately by preparations for higher-end masscasualty attacks.40
After 9/11, the Taliban regime rebuffed the U.S. ultimatum to
either hand over Osama bin Laden and dismantle Al Qaedas
terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan or face regime change.
The plausible reasons for the rejection are that the Taliban
were reliant on the so-called Afghan Arabs, who played a
key military role in the ongoing civil war with the Northern
Alliance, and that the Talibans fundamentalist ideology was in
accord with bin Ladens brand of Islamic extremism. Only after
the successful military campaign in late 2001 to overthrow
the Kabul regime was the symbiotic relationship between the
Taliban and Al Qaeda fully evident. Al Qaedas infrastructure
in Afghanistan included training facilities (through which an
estimated 10,000 to 20,000 fighters passed) and laboratories
for developing and testing WMD capabilities.41 Al Qaedas
immediate focus was on chemical and biological weapons,
but documents from a Kabul safe house obtained by CNN
also ominously confirmed its long-term interest in acquiring
a nuclear capability. Al Qaeda may have used the Afghan
governments civilian activities as cover for obtaining nuclear
know-how and technology. Expert analysis of open-source
information by the Institute for Science and International
Security found no credible evidence that either bin Laden
or Al Qaeda possesses nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile
material to make them. [But] if they had a secret, fixed base
in Afghanistan, over the last several years Al Qaeda and its
Taliban allies could have made significant progress on nuclear
research.42
38
The importance for Al Qaeda of essentially owning a country

from which to operate unfettered cannot be overstated. For
that reason, the war in Afghanistan was a war of necessity,
to destroy Al Qaedas terrorist infrastructure and to deny the
protection of a sovereign state to a group bent on perpetrating
further mass-casualty attacks. This regime-changing war also
established a cautionary precedent and a deterrent against
state collusion with non-state terrorist actors.
Though 9/11 overturned the old orthodoxy about terrorism, the
Bush administration struggled to articulate a vision of, and a
strategy for, what the White House termed the global war on
terrorism. Strikingly, the National Security Strategy report of
September 2002 mentioned neither Islamist terrorism nor
Al Qaeda, the organization headed by Osama bin Laden that
had attacked the United States. The documents sweeping
characterization of the threat focused not on the perpetrators
but on the illegitimate instrument of violence that they
employed: The enemy is not a single political regime or person
or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorismpremeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.
The Bush administrations National Security Strategy report,
repeating a formulation earlier used by the president in his
address to Congress after 9/11, did attempt to circumscribe
the challenge. In declaring that the United States is fighting
a war against terrorists of global reach, the administration
was attempting to distinguish between terrorist groups that
aspire to carry out a mass-casualty attack in the United States
from distant locations (e.g., Al Qaeda in Afghanistan) and
other organizations, such as the Basque ETA in Spain, which
employ terrorism to advance limited political objectives within
their own state or immediate geographical area.43 In contrast
to the National Security Strategy, the 9/11 Commission
Report provided a succinct, focused definition of the threat:
[T]he enemy is not just terrorism, some generic evil. This
vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this
moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed
by Islamist terrorismespecially the al Qaeda network, its
39
affiliates and its ideology.44 Echoing this assessment, National

Intelligence Director John Negroponte, the first incumbent of
the consolidated post recommended by the 9/11 Commission,
told the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in February 2006
that Al Qaeda is the top prioritythe primary major threat
to the United States. According to U.S. intelligence, Al Qaeda
was among nearly 40 terrorist organizations, insurgencies,
or cults [that] have used, possessed, or expressed an interest
in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or
weapons.45
The rise of the Islamic State as an offshoot of Al Qaeda in
Iraq and the stunning success of its military offensive to
occupy territory in 2014 has transformed the regional security
environment. ISISs control over a large swath of territory in
Iraq and Syria, including the occupation of a major urban area
like Mosul, confers technological and engineering assets of a
magnitude traditionally only under the control of a state that
could allow it to develop WMD capabilities. ISISs interest in
acquiring WMD capabilities is reflected in its active chemical
weapons program. ISIS has used a well-stocked chemistry lab
at the University of Mosul to produce hydrogen peroxide-based
chemical bombs. The Islamic State reportedly used mustard
gas, which experts believe was fabricated in that university
lab, against Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq in August 2015.46
U.S. airstrikes targeted the Mosul campus to attack what the
Pentagon described as a weapons-storage facility in March
2016.47 A hyperbolic article in the Islamic States propaganda
magazine, Dabiq, raised the hypothetical that ISIS, having
seized banks with billions of dollars, could tap sympathizers
in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons
dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region. The article
proclaimed that the terrorist group was seeking to pull off
something truly epic.48 This proclaimed intention underscores
the necessity of denying the Islamic State the capabilities of
a state. Such a strategy of deterrence by denial (as discussed
in the Recalibrating Deterrence section below) would
40
not eliminate the WMD threat posed by ISIS, but would

substantially reduce it.
Pathways to Nuclear Acquisition

After the catastrophic terrorist attacks on 9/11, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair declared that the only constraints on Al
Qaedas obtaining and using a nuclear weapon were practical
and technical, not political or moral.49 The same holds today
for the Islamic State. What then are the routes by which a
terrorist group could acquire a nuclear weapon? The three broad
pathways to nuclear weapons acquisition by a terrorist group
are: (1) transferthe deliberate handoff or sale of a weapon
from a state; (2) leakagean unauthorized transfer or theft of a
weapon from an inadequately secured site; and (3) indigenous
productionmanufacture of a nuclear device from leaked
weapons-grade fissile material and bomb components.
TRANSFER
After 9/11, the Bush administrations National Strategy to

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction declared that current
and potential future linkages between terrorist groups and
state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous and
require priority attention.50 The nexus between terrorism and
proliferation was the primary impetus underlying the elevation
of military preemption as an option in the Bush administrations
post-9/11 strategy. The transfer scenario was central to the
Bush administrations urgent case for preventive war to topple
the Saddam Hussein regime, which was then accused (contrary
to the CIAs assessment) of having had direct links to Al Qaeda.
The commonly attributed motivation for a rogue regime to
hand off a nuclear weapon or technology to a terrorist group is
a convergence of strategic interest between them. But even
when a state-sponsorship link exists, as between Iran and
Hezbollah, major constraints exert a powerful deterrent effect.
41
State sponsors employ terrorist groups as instruments of policy,

and that implies a high degree of control. A WMD transfer
would be an extraordinary actboth in its escalatory character
and in its consequent threat to regime survival. Crossing that
Rubicon would mean relinquishing control of the most valuable
military asset in the states arsenal. The transferring state would
be taking the risk that the unconventional weapon employed by
the terrorist group could not be traced to it and thereby trigger
a devastating U.S. retaliatory strike. For example, Iran has not
provided chemical weapons to Hezbollah out of concern about
regime security. Iran experts Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh note
that the Islamic Republics leadership is risk-averse to actions
that could threaten regime survivaland that the transfer of
nuclear arms to potentially uncontrollable clients would expose
the regime to an unacceptable risk.51
The only strategic interest that could plausibly justify the risk of
a state-to-non-state transfer would be regime survival itself. Of
particular relevance to this issue is the controversial National
Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 on Iraq, which concluded
that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate might decide
that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in
conducting a [WMD] attack against the United States would be
his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of
victims with him.52 Ironically, the course upon which the Bush
administration was about to embark was the very scenario in
which a desperate Saddam Hussein would most plausibly
hand off unconventional capabilities to a terrorist group.
Another possible motivation for WMD transfer to a non-state
actor, cited with respect to impoverished North Korea, is
economic. North Koreas status as an economic basket case
with an advanced nuclear weapons program creates a chilling
conjunction of dire need and dangerous capabilities. Past
experience makes black-market sales a cause of concern,
since the Kim family regime has relied on illicit activities
from passing counterfeit money to selling drugs and ballistic
missilesto maintain power. North Korea has engaged in
42
covert nuclear commerce on the state-to-state level: with Syria,

by providing a prototype nuclear reactor that Israel bombed in
September 2007; and with Burma, where suspicions of nuclear
cooperation have prompted the Obama administration to
express growing concern.53 As a former U.S. official warned, a
desperate, economically destitute North Korea could be willing
to sell anything [to anyone] if the price is right.
LEAKAGE
Though the deliberate transfer scenario focused on Iran and

North Korea has dominated the post-9/11 security debate,
the more likely route by which terrorists might gain access to
nuclear weapons or materials would be through unintended
leakage from inadequately secured sites. This acute concern
centers primarily on Russia (which has an enormous legacy
nuclear force and infrastructure from the Cold War) and Pakistan
(which is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is poised
to overtake Britain as the worlds fifth-largest nuclear power,
behind the United States, Russia, China, and France). Moreover,
with Chinas announced plan to provide two civilian nuclearpower reactors to Pakistan, the scope of the potential leakage
problem will expand in tandem with Pakistans increased
production of fissile material.54 In 2004, the existence of a
long-suspected nuclear smuggling ring headed by A.Q. Khan,
the so-called father of Pakistans nuclear-weapons program,
was publicly confirmed. In a tearful confession on Pakistani
television, Khan stated that his network had transferred nuclear
components to Iran, Libya, and North Korea over a 15-year
period, but that the government had not authorized these illicit
activities.55
In addition to the leakage of sensitive technologies from the
A.Q. Khan network to unpredictable states, another highly
disturbing development was a reported meeting of Pakistani
nuclear scientists with Osama bin Laden only weeks before
9/11. Supporters of the Talibans ultra-orthodox version of Islamic
rule and jihadist causes, the scientists expressed the belief
43
that Pakistans nuclear capability is the property of the whole

Muslim community.56 The episode underscored Al Qaedas
driving intention to carry out a mass-casualty attack employing
still more powerful unconventional weapons.
The Islamabad government responded to the embarrassing
revelations about the Khan network by instituting additional
measures to ensure the physical security of the countrys
nuclear stockpile against theft and unauthorized use. When
questioned about the threat of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling
into the hands of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, President Obama
expressed confidence in 2009 that we can make sure that
Pakistans nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily because the
Pakistani army recognizes the hazards of those weapons
falling into the wrong hands. Weve got strong military-tomilitary consultation and cooperation.57 That assurance
notwithstanding, Pakistan expert Stephen Cohen warned that
the system of nuclear safeguards could be circumvented in a
determined conspiracy.58
INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION
The third pathway to nuclear-weapons acquisition is indigenous

productionthe possibility that, without the direct assistance
of a state, a non-state actor could translate its aspiration to
acquire an unconventional weapon into the construction of
a homegrown WMD capability. A 1982 National Intelligence
Estimate reflected the prevailing Cold War assessment of
the nuclear threat: During the period of this Estimate, the
ability of subnational groups to acquire nuclear materials and
to fabricate a workable nuclear device probably will remain
low. The technical skills required probably will remain beyond
the capabilities of well-known terrorist groups, and special
nuclear material will remain difficult to acquire.59 In October
2001, however, the CIA concluded that fabrication of at least
a crude nuclear device was within Al Qaedas capabilities, if it
could obtain fissile material.60
44
Expert opinion remains divided over the feasibility and likelihood

of this acquisition routespecifically, whether the primary
constraint on a non-state actors ability to construct a nuclear
weapon is mere access to the requisite nuclear material. On
one side are those who argue that terrorists could build a
simple gun-type device based on illicitly obtained highly
enriched uranium.61 A 1977 report by the U.S. Congresss Office
of Technology Assessment famously concluded that a small
group of people (possibly terrorists or criminals), none of whom
have ever had access to classified literature, could possibly
design and build a crude nuclear explosive device.62 While
enriched uranium would offer the easier pathway to a weapon,
some analysts go further, even claiming that the construction
of a more complex implosion-type weapon using plutonium
was potentially within a sophisticated terrorist groups technical
grasp. Other experts, however, are skeptical of this technical
assessment. For example, Stephen Younger, a physicist longexperienced in nuclear-weapons design at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, observes: Just put a slug of uranium
into a gun barrel and shoot it into another slug of uranium is
one description of how easy it is to make a nuclear explosive.
Really? [D]esign problems can be solved by experimentation,
as indeed all nuclear states solved them in the design of their
own weapons, but that requires a level of technical resources
that, until recently, few countries could draw upon.63
In addition to weapons-grade fissile material and a workable
bomb design, a terrorist group would require sophisticated
machine tools, a high-explosive testing range for triggering
the device, and additional infrastructure. But notwithstanding
these constraints, nuclear experts Matt Bunn and Anthony
Wier conclude: A nuclear attack might be one of the difficult
missions a terrorist group could hope to try, but if a highly
capable group acquired a stolen nuclear bomb or enough
nuclear material to make one, there can be few grounds for
confidence that they would be unable to use it.64 Concern
that a non-state terrorist group could cross this technological
threshold to construct a nuclear-weapons capability has
45
invigorated efforts to globally secure weapons-grade fissile

material. President Obama made this one of the pillars of
the comprehensive arms control and nonproliferation agenda
that he laid out in his Prague speech. A major objective of
the four Nuclear Security Summits convened by the Obama
administration since 2010 and involving some 50 world leaders
has been to secure the estimated 2,000 metric tons of highly
enriched uranium and separated plutonium worldwide. An
essential complement to securing materials is denying a
terrorist group a scientific-technological infrastructure and
financing rivaling that of a statefor example, of the kind
acquired by the Islamic State through its occupation of Mosul.
DIRTY BOMBS
Given the significant hurdles of buying, making, or stealing

a weapon, nuclear terrorism is most likely to take the form
of a so-called dirty bomb (also referred to as radiation
dispersal devices, or RDD), which uses dynamite or some
other conventional explosive to disperse radioactive material.
A dirty bomb would not require weapons-grade fissile material,
but could use radioactive sources, such as cesium and
strontium, which are employed commercially or in hospitals.
The immediate casualties from a dirty bomb attack would result
from the blast effect of the devices conventional explosive
rather than its radioactive core. The number of victims resulting
from a dirty bombs radiological effects would depend on a
number of factorsthe most significant of them being the
ability of the device to aerosolize the radioactive material,
thereby causing further human contamination through
dissemination by wind. Though casualty estimates derived
from models of RDD attacks vary significantly, they are of a
scale such that a report from the National Defense University in
Washington, D.C. concluded, contrary to popular beliefs, RDDs
are not weapons of mass destruction.65 The consequences
of a dirty bomb attack would be primarily economic, social,
and psychological, as local, state, and federal governments
undertake a lengthy and expensive clean-up, and civilians shun
46
areas they consider contaminated even when that clean-up

process has been completed. Because public fear of radiation
could well trigger mass panic, RDDs have been called weapons
of mass disruption.66 The only dirty bomb incident was carried
out by the Chechen resistance movement, whose leaders
repeatedly threatened a chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) attack against Russia in the 1990s. In November
1995, a Chechen separatist leader contacted the media to
warn that a dirty bomb containing cesium had been buried in
a Moscow park. The Russian authorities deactivated the dirty
bomb, which was probably deployed by the Chechens as an
instrument of psychological warfare.
Across the spectrum of WMD capabilities, the formidable gap
between a nascent capability and a usable weapon has been
evident in terrorist efforts to employ biological and chemical
weapons against civilian targets. In the few recorded cases,
technical and environmental hurdles (e.g., the degradation of
bio-agents when exposed to sunlight) impeded the effective
dissemination of toxins. For example, Japans Aum Shinrikyo,
after having given up on acquiring a nuclear capability, failed
on at least nine occasions to carry out a bio-attack because
either the botulinum agents they grew were not toxic or the
aerosol sprayers used to spread anthrax clogged and became
inoperative. Moreover, when Aum switched over in frustration
from bio-agents to nerve gas, the terrorist group resorted to
plastic trash bags with poked-out holes to disseminate the
sarin gas in the Tokyo attack.67 The October 2001 anthrax attack
on the U.S. Senate and two other sites killed five people and
was an additional psychological blow to a nation that only a
month earlier had suffered 9/11. Most ominous about the attack
was that the toxic agent was highly sophisticated in design,
absolutely not the work of an amateur, though its mode of
dissemination (letters passing through the postal system)
limited the number of persons exposed.
In the post-9/11 era, U.S. intelligence officials have maintained
that a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction
47
is less likely than a conventional attack, and would be far

less lethal than a WMD attack carried out by a state. That
conclusion highlights the continuing relevance of the Gilmore
Commissions 1999 finding: [The] capabilities required
to annihilate large numbers of personsi.e., to achieve a
genuinely mass-casualty chemical and biological weapon or
nuclear/radiological deviceappear, at least for now, to be
beyond the reach not only of the vast majority of existent
terrorist organizations but also of many established nationstates.68 That condition could be changing if terrorists gain
access to technologies that would permit the effective
dissemination of a radioactive material or a biological or
chemical agent over a broad geographical area. In the absence
of such a capability, the impact of a chemical, biological,
or radiological attack on the U.S. homeland would likely be
economic and psychological.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington utilizing
hijacked commercial aircraft loaded with jet fuel (a low-tech
cruise missile with a chemical agent) highlight the important
distinction between mass-casualty and WMD attacks. Facing
difficult hurdles to acquire an effective unconventional weapon,
terrorists may alternatively strike vulnerable conventional
targets to achieve a truly mass-casualty attack. Among the
many such soft targets are chemical plants on the outskirts of
major U.S. cities and the railroad tank cars, laden with noxious
chemicals, that pass through urban areas. Two particular
chemicals used for widespread industrial purposes are
phosgene and chlorine, which were employed during World War
I to produce chemical weapons. But whereas a chemical attack
during World War I used a few hundred pounds of chemicals,
an attack on vulnerable stocks involving hundreds of tons of
commercially-used chemicals could have a death toll potentially
exceeding that of a low yield nuclear weapon.69
Though terrorists can mount mass-casualty attacks using
conventional means, apocalyptic groups such as Al Qaeda and
the Islamic State retain an interest in RDDs because they are
48
capable of generating large-scale socio-economic disruption

and are far easier to acquire than a nuclear weapon. The Aspen
Homeland Security Group soberly concluded: The acquisition
and dispersal of small quantities of radioactive materials such
as cesium and cobalt, which are regularly used in medical and
industrial activities, are far less technologically challenging
than building and detonating a nuclear bomb. It is, therefore,
somewhat surprising terrorists have not taken this path.70
After the Brussels bombing in March 2016, the press reported
that an ISIS sympathizer had worked and committed an act
of sabotage at Belgiums Doel nuclear power plant before
joining ISIS in Syria. Fears that ISIS was plotting an attack on
Belgiums nuclear facilities were fueled by a video of a top
Belgian nuclear official seized in the apartment of a terrorist
suspect.71 In Iraq, ISIS is reported to have seized 88 pounds of
uranium compounds stored at Mosul University, which, though
fortunately not weapons-grade, could presumably be utilized in
a radiological device.72
Implications
The conjunction of terrorist intentions and capabilities that
President Obama addressed in his Prague speech continues to
define the contemporary threat of nuclear terrorism. Jihadist
terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State remain
driven, in the words of ISISs propaganda, to pull off something
truly epic. As these organizations uncompromising ideology
demands the creation of a pan-Islamic caliphate, no way exists
to end their terrorism through a political process of negotiation.
With these jihadist terrorist intentions set and evidently
immutable, U.S. policymakers must instead focus on the
capabilities side of the equation to forestall nuclear terrorism.
The nuclear weapons and materials that a non-state actor like
Al Qaeda or ISIS seek to acquire exist in states. The retooling
of a Cold War conceptdeterrenceto address the threat
of nuclear terrorism in the post-9/11 era underscores the
49
centrality of state-based strategies. Effectiveness on the state

levelfrom ending sponsorship of terrorism to developing
governmental capacity and the political will to exert sovereign
control over nuclear weapons and materials on states own
territoryis the key to countering non-state threats. A
particularly worrisome development since 2014 has been ISISs
occupation of large parts of northern Iraq and Syria. Though
U.S. policymakers continue to assert that the Islamic State
is not a state, its control of territory has given it access to an
infrastructure (such as at Mosul University) that could allow it
to acquire state-like WMD capabilities. Hence the centerpiece
of the U.S. strategy is to deny ISIS those capabilities by rolling
back its territorial gains.
The central argument of this monograph in calling for the
recalibration of deterrence is that effective strategies on the
state level will not end non-state terrorist threats but would
mark significant progress toward that long-term objective.
Attention now shifts to four states of concernRussia,
Pakistan, North Korea, and Iranwhich could be targets of
terrorist efforts to buy, build, or steal a nuclear weapon.
50
Members of French special police forces of the Research and Intervention Brigade (BRI) and forensic
experts are seen in a raid zone in Saint-Denis, near Paris, France, after the November 13, 2015
terrorist attacks in the French capital. REUTERS/Christian Hartmann
51
Iran: Denial through

Arms Control
Iran embodies the nexus of terrorism and proliferation that

redefined threat after the 9/11 attacks. The Islamic Republic
remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism on the U.S.
State Departments annual designation and had a longtime
covert program to acquire nuclear weapons.73 Because of
this conjunction, Iran always arises as a country of concern
in discussions of nuclear terrorism. An Aspen Homeland
Security Group report, assessing possible pathways of terrorist
acquisition of nuclear weapons, noted in 2012: [M]ight hostile
nations secretly provide terrorists with such weapons to carry
out deniable attacks against their foes? Many analysts see this
as one of the dangers posed by Irans nuclear program.74
This nightmare scenario, the plausibility of which is widely
doubted by Iran experts, would require the Tehran regime
to relinquish operational control of a nuclear or other
unconventional weapon to a terrorist client group such as
Hezbollah. In addition to the likely political constraints on
the transfer scenario, a major consequence of the nuclear
agreementthe Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the
JCPOA)concluded between Iran and the worlds major
powers in 2015 is to shut off this pathway of terrorist acquisition
in practical terms. Under the nuclear accord, Irans ability
to produce weapons-grade fissile material, and therefore a
weapon, is blocked for at least 15 years. If the agreement is
successfully implemented, it cuts off the terrorists pathways
to the bombtransfer, theft, or construction. With respect
to nuclear terrorism, the arms-control agreement limiting the
Left: Irans nuclear facility at Arak, Photo courtesy of en.wikipedia.org
53
Islamic Republics capabilities is an instrument of deterrence by

denialand moves Iran down the list of nations of concern.75
Revolutionary State or Ordinary Country?

In an April 2010 interview with the New York Times about
the administrations Nuclear Posture Review, President
Obama described Iran as an outliera state flouting
international norms by defying its obligations under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Senior White House aides confirmed
that the use of the term was a calculated departure from
the unilateral Bush-era moniker of rogue statethat is,
reframing the Iranian challenge not in terms of a unilateral
American political concept, but instead in terms of its noncompliance with established international norms.76 The shift in
nomenclature from rogue to outlier was intended to convey
that a pathway was open for Iran to rejoin the community of
nations if it complied with nonproliferation norms and ceased
to employ terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
The dilemma is that the Tehran regime views these foreign
policy issuesthe conduct that makes Iran an outlieras an
important source of domestic legitimation. Hence the nuclear
issue is a surrogate for a broader debate about the countrys
futureabout...how it should interact with the wider world,
observes Persian Gulf security specialist Shahram Chubin.77
Irans instrumental use of terrorism is also a proxy for this more
fundamental debate. In Henry Kissingers apt formulation,
Iran has to make a decision whether it wants to be a nation
or a cause.78 Yet, since the 1979 Revolution that swept the
Shah of Iran from power and led to the creation of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the countrys ruling regime refuses to make
that choice. On the nuclear issue and on other issues affecting
Irans national interests, Tehran fastidiously asserts its rights
as a republic in an international order of sovereign states. At
the same time, the theocratic regime pursues an ideologically
driven foreign policy (such as its support of Hezbollah) to
54
maintain revolutionary lan at home. Tehrans rejection of what

it views as a U.S.-dominated international order is at the heart
of the Islamic Republics identity and worldview. Without these
revolutionary thoughts, as President Hashemi Rafsanjani
once candidly acknowledged, Iran would become an ordinary
country.79
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Irans competing dual identitiesrevolutionary state/ordinary

countrycontinually roil the countrys politics, including
the domestic debate over the nuclear program. After the
damning June 2003 report of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) about Irans covert nuclear program, President
Mohammed Khatami acknowledged the need to balance
the countrys right to nuclear technology under the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with its
responsibilities to the international community: We have the
right to use this knowledge and you [the IAEA and international
community] have the right to be assured that it would be
channeled in the right way.80
President Hassan Rouhani, a centrist who pledged to bridge
the political chasm between moderates and conservatives,
came to office in 2013, after the disastrous eight-year tenure
of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on a platform of resolving
the nuclear issue to end the countrys isolation and the
punishing international sanctions that weakened the economy.
Irans Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, gave Rouhani authority
to conduct negotiations with the P5+1 (the permanent
members of the UN Security Councilthe United States,
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and Franceplus Germany)
and quieted hardline opposition. When Rouhani attended
the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2014, one
participant described his remarks as an application to rejoin the
international community.81 But while acquiescing to Rouhanis
revitalized nuclear diplomacy in the wake of his electoral
55
mandate, the Supreme Leader remained the final arbiter of any

prospective agreement, based on a strategic calculus that has
regime stability and survival as its paramount objective. His
decision making on the nuclear issue has hinged on how he
manages the unresolved tension over Irans relationship with
the outside world, in general, and the United States (the Great
Satan), in particular. During the nuclear negotiations with the
P5+1, Khameneis dilemma was whether the economic benefits
of an agreement (sanctions relief) outweighed its political costs
(alienating hardline interest groups, especially the Revolutionary
Guard, upon which the regimes survival depends).
TERRORISM
As with the nuclear issue, Irans use of terrorism as an

instrument of state policy has also been a proxy for the more
fundamental debate about Irans unresolved identity crisis. The
U.S. State Department designated Iran as a state sponsor of
terrorism in 1984. The move followed a series of terrorist acts
in the Middle East (most notably, the October 1983 bombing
of the U.S. military barracks in Beirut) in which Iran was directly
or indirectly implicated. President Ronald Reagan identified
Iran, along with Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua, as
outlaw governments that constituted a new international
version of Murder Incorporated. In the post-Cold War era, the
Tehran regimes support for international terrorism, in tandem
with its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, led the Clinton
administration to designate Iran a rogue state. In 1992, Iran
was linked to the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos
Aires in March and the murder of Iranian Kurdish leaders
in Berlin in September. In June 1996, 19 American military
personnel were killed in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia, and an Iranian-backed group of Shia Muslims
was suspected of the attack. After 9/11, the Tehran regime
rejected President Bushs with us or against us rhetoric
Who defines terrorism and who is a terrorist? asked Iranian
President Khatami.82 He reiterated the longstanding Iranian
56
position that Middle Eastern groups employing terrorism, such

as Hamas and Hezbollah, were exercising a legitimate right to
oppose occupation. In mid-May 2003, the Bush administration,
citing communications intercepts by U.S. intelligence, charged
that Al Qaeda operatives based in Iran had been involved in
three truck bombings in the Saudi capital of Riyadh that left 34
dead, including 7 Americans.
Though state-sponsored terrorism has declined since 2001,
Iran remains its most active sponsor, according to the U.S.
State Department. But the character of that sponsorship has
evolved since the 1990s, when Iran conducted far-flung terrorist
operations from Buenos Aires to Berlin. In the post-9/11
era, Iranian-backed terrorism has favored Palestinian groups,
including Hamas, which employ terrorism against Israel. Irans
backing of these Palestinian rejectionists is strategic because
of its perceived utility to the clerical regime as a source of
domestic legitimacya validation abroad of the revolutionary
vision it promotes at home. Support for terrorist groups also
is a source of bargaining leverage and deterrence. As then
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte observed
in 2006, Iran regards this capability as a critical regime
safeguard by deterring United States and Israeli attacks,
by distracting and weakening Israel, and enhancing Irans
regional influence through intimidation.83 A decade later, Irans
instrumental employment of terrorism continued, as National
Counterterrorism Center director Nicholas Rasmussen told
the Senate Intelligence Committee that Iran works through
the IRGC-QF [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force]
and Ministry of Intelligence and Security to support groups
that target U.S. and Israeli interests globally.84 Iran has used
terrorist groups as proxies to further its interests while retaining
a degree of deniability.
In the transformed security environment after 9/11, concern
about an Iranian nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation
was elevated because the key institutional liaison with
57
terrorist groupsthe Revolutionary Guardsalso played a

key role in the countrys pursuit of unconventional weapons
(through its acquisition of foreign dual-use technologies,
which have both civilian and military applications). The extent
of IRGC involvement in the nuclear program is unclear.85
The Revolutionary Guards control some of Irans nuclear
infrastructure, such as the Fordow enrichment facility located on
an IRGC base near Qom.
Yet the Tehran regime, fearing military escalation with the
United States or Israel, has also imposed restraints on its
surrogates, such as Hezbollah.86 Thus, Iran has refrained from
transferring chemical or biological weapons to its proxies
even though it has the capability to do so. This counterfactual
suggests not only a low risk-taking propensity, but also a degree
of centralized control over the WMD programs and terrorist
operations within the IRGC, lowering the risk of unauthorized
transfer to or use by a terrorist group.87 As terrorism expert
Daniel Byman observes: Irans past behavior suggests it is
not likely to provide chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons to a terrorist group. Because these weapons can be
devastatingor, at the very least, psychologically terrifying
even when the number directly affected is lowthey are far
more likely to provoke escalation. In addition, these weapons
are widely seen as heinous, potentially de-legitimating both
the group and its state sponsor. Byman argues that the one
scenario under which these traditional restraints would no
longer hold would be an invasion of Iran with the objective of
regime change.88
Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions

BACKGROUND
Suspicions of Irans nuclear intentions date back to the Shahs

era. The initial components of Irans nuclear infrastructure
(a five-megawatt light-water research reactor and related
58
laboratories at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center) were

acquired through nuclear cooperation with the United States
under the Atoms for Peace program. After acceding to
the NPT in 1970, the Shah launched an ambitious plan to
develop civil nuclear energy, which envisioned not only reactor
construction but the acquisition of nuclear fuel-cycle technology
(including uranium enrichment and reprocessing) to reduce the
countrys reliance on outside assistance. Although no evidence
has emerged confirming that Iran actually began a dedicated
nuclear-weapons program under the Shah, concluded an
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report,
Iranian officials appreciated that the acquisition of enrichment
and reprocessing facilities for Irans civilian nuclear-power
program would inherently create a nuclear-weapons option89
After the 1979 Revolution, Khomeini ordered a halt to
construction of German-made nuclear reactors at Bushehr. This
gave rise to a belief that the Supreme Leader was anti-nuclear.
Yet the memoir of former nuclear negotiator and current Iranian
President Hassan Rouhani recounts that, during his exile in
Paris, Khomeini rebuffed the recommendation of a visiting
Iranian scientific delegation to scrap the nuclear program
on economic grounds. Khomeini reportedly recognized the
strategic value of keeping the option open.90 In the mid-1980s,
as the clerical regime faced a national security imperative at
the height of the attritional Iran-Iraq War, it indeed revived the
nuclear infrastructure inherited from the Shah.
Details of Irans extensive covert program to acquire sensitive
nuclear technology surfaced after the IAEAs June 2003 report
based on Iranian opposition sources, which had charged Iran
with possessing undeclared nuclear facilities and pursuing
activities outside the NPT safeguards system.91 Of particular
importance were essential design plans and components that
Pakistani black marketer A.Q. Khan provided for a pilot uraniumenrichment plant at Natanz. The currently deployed Iranian
centrifuges, the IR-1 and more sophisticated IR-2 models,
59
are based on the design plans for Pakistani centrifuges, the

P-1 and P-2, provided by the Khan network. In the late 1980s,
just as the Iran-Iraq War was ending, Iran established a unit to
organize covert procurement activities for an undeclared nuclear
program within the Physics Research Center (PHRC), under the
purview of the research and development arm of the Ministry
of Defense. By the late 1990s or early 2000s, the clandestine
nuclear program was consolidated under the AMAD Plan,
whose executive affairs were conducted by the Orchid Office
(so named because of its location on Orchid Street in Tehran).92
The AMAD plans scope of activities included three key
projects: converting uranium ore into the gaseous feedstock for
centrifuges to enrich uranium at the then covert Natanz site;
high-explosive experiments potentially linked to developing the
trigger for nuclear weapons; and the redesign of the Shahab-3
missile reentry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead.93
By the late 1990s, at the height of Khatamis reformist
presidency, Iran crossed the important technological threshold
of self-sufficiency in centrifuge manufacturing.
NUCLEAR DEBATES
Irans nuclear program has been characterized by Shahram

Chubin as marked by persistence and incrementalism, by
determination rather than urgency.94 For Iran, the toppling
of Iraqs Saddam Hussein regime, which invaded the country
in 1980 and used chemical weapons against Iranian forces,
undercut the immediate strategic rationale for nuclear weapons.
But even before the 2003 war eliminated the Iraqi threat, the
clerical regime focused on Israel as an all-purpose bogey to
curry favor with the Arab states and to argue that the Israeli
threat justifies Irans long-range ballistic-missile program. The
unstated case for Irans nuclear weapons program is often
inferred to be the rough regional neighborhoodthe possession
of nuclear weapons by Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the United
States. Yet the Islamic Republics persistent, longstanding
60
nuclear efforts do not reflect a crash program to acquire a

weapon as quickly as possible in the face of an existential
threat. Rather, Irans nuclear motivations appear more akin
to Indias, which sees nuclear weapons as an indicator of
paramount regional position. That implicit rationale for Irans
nuclear weapons program lies in the worldview of regime
hardliners, who see the program as the ultimate guarantor of
Irans influence and security and, not incidentally, their own
power.
The theocratic regime, dismissing suspicions of its nuclear
intentions, has consistently maintained that the country is
merely exercising its prerogative under Article IV of the NPT to
develop civilian nuclear energy. IAEA concerns about possible
military dimensions, Iran claims, are based on fabricated
documents fed to the agency by hostile intelligence services
(viz., America and Israel). Activities that the United States
views as a violation of nonproliferation norms are defended
in Tehran as a sovereign right. From secularists to religious
fundamentalists, a broad domestic consensus exists on Irans
right to have civil nuclear energy, and the populace has been
receptive to the clerics critique of the United States selective
concern about nonproliferation norms. Yet this sentiment does
not translate into across-the-board Iranian political support for a
policy of acquiring nuclear weapons.
The preponderance of Iranian public opinion has supported
neither a full rollback of the nuclear program nor a near-term
breakout to acquire nuclear weapons. Rouhanis unexpected
election created political space for nuclear diplomacy with the
P5+1, which yielded a comprehensive agreement in July 2015.
Under the deal, Iran retains a bounded uranium-enrichmentprogram capacity that leaves Iran, as it has been for the
last decade, a nuclear threshold state. Irans mastery of the
nuclear fuel cycle creates an inherent breakout option for
weaponization. A major focus of the negotiations was extending
that potential breakout period to at least a year (through agreed
61
limits on the number and sophistication of centrifuges, as

well as on the permissible level of enrichment and uranium
stockpile).
For Iran, the nuclear agreement concluded with the P5+1 is
compatible with Irans core national security requirements, as
the country faces no existential threat from a foreign power
necessitating the urgent acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, to the extent that the Iranian leadership perceives a
threat to regime survival, the sources are internal rather than
external.95 From a national security perspective, the nuclear
hedge (which the Tehran regime retains under the agreement)
is Irans strategic sweet spotmaintaining the potential of a
nuclear option, while avoiding the regional and international
costs of actual weaponization. As former President Hashemi
Rafsanjani candidly admitted in 2005: As long as we can enrich
uranium and master the [nuclear] fuel cycle, we dont need
anything else. Our neighbors will be able to draw the proper
conclusions.96
The JCPOA reaffirmed Khomeinis fatwa and the Islamic
Republics NPT commitment that under no circumstances will
Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons. Yet
despite that bald declaration of intent, the agreement leaves
Iran with the capabilities that allow it to retain its hedge option.
The accord hedged the hedge, so to speak.
The Nuclear Agreement: A Deal,

Not a Grand Bargain
The JCPOA, a detailed 109-page document with five annexes,
offers both sides a winning political narrative. The Obama
administration can highlight the meaningful constraints the
agreement places on Irans nuclear programcutting off the
plutonium route to a bomb and sharply reducing the number
of centrifuges to the sole uranium enrichment site at Natanz
62
and the extension to one year of the breakout time Iran

would need to acquire a nuclear weapon if the Tehran regime
made that strategic decision. President Rouhani and his chief
negotiator, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, can argue
that they codified Irans sovereign right to enrich uranium and
stood up to American bullying. President Obama, challenging
his critics to offer a better alternative to the deal, argued that
the only alternative to diplomacy is force. That optionwhat,
by now, would be the most telegraphed punch in historyhas
major liabilities. A military strike on Irans nuclear infrastructure
would only delay not end the program, could well escalate into
a war with Iran, carries the risk of spewing radioactive toxins
into the environment, and could have the perverse effect of
domestically bolstering the theocratic regime in the wake of a
foreign attack.
None of the JCPOAs prominent critics came out in favor of
the military option as an alternative to the deal. Instead, they
argued that if tough sanctions created an Iranian incentive for
a deal, still tougher sanctions could lead to a better deal. The
contradictory argument, as one observer put it, was that Iran
is so irrational that it constitutes a unique threat, but so rational
that it would succumb to the coercive pressure of additional
sanctions.
The diplomatic endgame in Vienna involved painful
compromises. The agreement buys time (10-15 years), but
after that period Irans breakout time will again begin to shrink.
In addition, technical questions and concerns (notably on
verification and inspections) have been raised, which will put
the agreement to the test during its implementation. But the
two major criticisms that have been expressed about the
nuclear agreement are on grounds beyond its realistic scope.
The first broad criticism is that the deal will not lead to a full
rollback of Irans nuclear program. When President Obama
assumed office in 2009, Iran had 9,000 centrifuges and was
already a nuclear threshold state, since centrifuges that spin to
63
produce low-enriched uranium for reactors can keep spinning

to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons. This was the
crux of the dispute between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu
and President Obama. The former pushed for a full rollback of
Irans nuclear infrastructure to deny Iran any hedge option for
a weapon, whereas the latter set the American red line further
down the technological continuum at weaponization. The
maximalist objectivefull dismantlement with zero centrifuges
spinningwas no longer an achievable outcome when
negotiations with Iran began in 2013.
The second line of criticism has been that the deal does not
address Irans increasingly assertive regional role, including
its support for terrorist proxies, such as Hezbollah. From
the U.S. perspective, the regional situation with respect to
Iran is contradictory: the two are tacitly aligned in Iraq in the
fight against ISIS and have parallel interests in Afghanistan,
where both want to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban. But
where U.S. and Iranian interests divergeSyria, Yemen, and
LebanonWashington will have to meet those challenges
through a revitalized strategy of containment.
The nuclear agreement is a deal, not a grand bargain. Iran is
not the Soviet Union, but that Cold War experience is pertinent,
as Washington then pursued pragmatic engagement with
the Kremlin on arms control within the context of an overall
containment strategy. As a deal, the nuclear accord is
transactional, not transformational (to use James MacGregor
Burnss classic policy dichotomy). U.S. hardliners are critical of
the agreement because it does not affect the character of the
Tehran regime, which they view as the source of the Iranian
threat.
Though the nuclear accord is transactional, it is embedded in
the broader issue of Irans societal evolution. Obama and Irans
Supreme Leader Khamenei are each making a tacit bet. Obama
is defending the deal in transactional terms (that it addresses
a discrete, urgent challenge), but betting that it will empower
64
Irans moderate faction and put the country on a more favorable

societal trajectory. Khamenei is making the opposite betthat
the regime can benefit from the transactional nature of the
agreement (sanctions relief) and forestall the deals potentially
transformational implications to preserve Irans revolutionary
deep state.
Assessment and Implications

The landmark nuclear agreement blocks the two pathways
plutonium and highly enriched uraniumby which Iran could
attain a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years. The plutonium
route was closed off when the core of Irans Arak heavy-water
reactor (whose operation could have produced weapons-grade
fissile material) was removed in January 2016. Irans uranium
enrichment program was not fully rolled back, but it was
significantly limited, both in terms of permissible operational
centrifuges (confined to the sole enrichment site of Natanz) and
the allowed percentage of enrichment (3.67 percent, a level
well short of that necessary for a weapon).
Irans ability to enrich uranium provides Tehran with an inherent
hedge to produce a weapon.
When asked once about the possibility of a military option
to resolve Irans nuclear challenge, the IAEA chief Mohamed
ElBaradei observed, You cannot bomb knowledgea
reference to Irans demonstrated capability to enrich uranium.
So long as the clerical regime retains power, that threat can be
mitigated but not eliminated. The gap between Irans pursuit
of a hedge and the U.S. red line pegged to the technological
achievement of weaponization created space for coercive
diplomacy to affect Supreme Leader Khameneis strategic
calculus.
Irans employment of terrorism as an instrument of state
policy and pursuit of nuclear weapons inevitably gives rise to
65
concern about a possible nexusnuclear terrorism. Irans

past behavior, not transferring chemical or biological weapons
to Hezbollah when it had the capacity to do so, highlights
the political constraintsspecifically, the realistic fear of a
devastating retaliatory strike against Iran by the United States
or Israel if a proxy carried out a mass-casualty terrorist attack.
Improvements in WMD attribution technology (potentially
allowing an unconventional weapon or weapons-grade fissile
material to be traced back to its source country) will bolster
the credibility of this retaliatory threat, a form of deterrence by
punishment. That political source of restraint is now bolstered
by the practical constraints of the nuclear agreement that
effectively cut off Irans routes to a weapon or weapons-grade
fissile material. The JCPOAs verification protocols, bolstered
by the IAEAs advanced monitoring technologies, are robust
but cannot eliminate the possibility of cheating. If the Tehran
regime did make the strategic decision to develop new covert
facilities for bomb-making, they would be running a great risk
of detection; that the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz
and Fordow were both covert sites before their discovery by
intelligence services would give the Iranians pause.
The JCPOA required protracted negotiations to achieve what is
essentially a straightforward tradeoff between technology and
transparency. The difficulty in getting to yes is testimony to
the proxy status of the nuclear issue in Iranian politics. Irans
identity crisisrevolutionary state/ordinary countryremains
unresolved. Irans support for terrorist organizations like
Hezbollah will continue, because regime hardliners, notably
the Revolutionary Guards, view that as a source of domestic
legitimation. Yet political and practical restraints will bound
Irans relationship with what the U.S. State Department has
designated as foreign terrorist organizations. The negotiated
limits on Irans nuclear program through the JCPOA greatly
reduce the risk that a terrorist group would be able, in President
Obamas Prague speech formulation, to buy, steal, or [acquire
66
the materials to] construct a weapon from Iran. By negotiating

a landmark agreement that significantly limits Irans nuclear
capabilities for an extended period, the United States has
achieved a form of deterrence by denial.
Irans uranium enrichment facility at Natanz (aerial view)
67
North Korea: A Failed

State with Nuclear
Weapons
North Korea defies the neat typology of states that American
officials have employed since the end of the Cold War. The
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a failed
state, where endemic crop failures have precipitated
famine, and chronic fuel shortages have meant that the
lights are literally out in the country.97 Yet this failed state
also possesses a small nuclear arsenal and is unpredictably
aggressive, characteristics that made North Korea a charter
member of the countries that the United States designated as
rogue states. The perverse incongruity of nuclear weapons
and chronic food shortages is emblematic of the challenge
posed by North Korea.
North Korea is on the verge of a strategic breakout. Its mastery
of warhead miniaturization and long-range ballistic missile
technologyalmost certain in the next few yearswill allow
the North to threaten the U.S. homeland with a direct attack.
At the same time, though estimates vary, the DPRK has an
arsenal of 10-16 devices and is adding about one weapon every
six weeks.98 The nexus of nuclear weapons and impoverishment
has raised the specter of the cash-starved Kim family regimes
selling a nuclear weapon to another irresponsible state, or
even a terrorist group. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
bluntly observed, the North Koreans will sell anything they
have to anybody who has the cash to buy it.99 Preventing North
Korean nuclear terrorism will require a strategy incorporating
both variants of deterrencepunishment (through a declaratory
policy that threatens regime-changing retaliation should the
Left: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the launch of a new ballistic missile in this undated
photo released by North Koreas Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 4, 2016.
REUTERS/KCNA
69
North transfer a nuclear weapon or materials to a terrorist

group) and denial (through defense and revived arms-control
negotiations to freeze its nuclear program and forestall a
strategic breakout). As with the other states examined in this
study, the challenge is managing the tension between these
twin policies.
The Nuclear Challenge

North Koreas nuclear program was launched in 1964, when
the Kim Il-sung regime established a nuclear facility at
Yongbyon (60 miles from Pyongyang) with a small research
reactor provided by the Soviet Union.100 North Korea signed
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985,
reportedly in response to pressure from the Soviet Union
and Moscows promise of four light-water nuclear power
reactors.101 (Afterwards, however, the Kim Il-sung regime
pursued dilatory tactics to block implementation of the NPT,
taking nearly seven years to provide a required inventory of its
nuclear materials and facilities.) In 1986, North Korea completed
an indigenously engineered five-megawatt nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon that was well suited to the DPRK: it depended only
on locally obtainable natural uranium, rather than imported
heavy water and enriched uranium. U.S. concern about North
Koreas nuclear intentions was triggered two years later with
the construction of a new Yongbyon facility to chemically extract
weapons-grade plutonium from the spent nuclear reactor
fuel. Such a reprocessing facility served no purpose other
than to support a nuclear weapons program. A CIA National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that the North Koreans,
during a 1989 shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor, could have
separated enough plutonium from spent fuel rods for two
nuclear weapons.102 In addition to the Yongbyon site, North
Korea began construction of two larger reactors (estimated at
50 and 200 megawatts) which, when operational, would have
created a nuclear factory yielding plutonium sufficient for
70
the fabrication of about 30 Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons

annually.103
Nuclear Crises (1994, 2002)

The first nuclear crisis with North Korea was precipitated by
Pyongyangs announcement in April 1994 that the Yongbyon
reactor would be shut down so that some 8,000 spent fuel
rods, containing sufficient plutonium for several bombs, could
be removed. To meet the North Korean nuclear challenge, the
Clinton administration adopted a strategy of coercive diplomacy
based on economic sanctions, after considering, and rejecting,
the alternative of a preventive military strike on the Yongbyon
nuclear installation. The overriding concern for U.S. officials,
in effectively removing the military option from consideration,
was that air strikes could have a catalytic effect triggering a
general war on the Korean peninsula.
Intensive negotiations, jumpstarted by a visit of former
President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang, culminated in the
U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994. The accord
embodied a series of carefully calibrated, reciprocal steps
that would be implemented over a decade-long period, and
that could be halted or broken off in the event of Pyongyangs
non-compliance. North Korea pledged to remain an NPT party
and to cease reprocessing, and traded off its three reactors
and reprocessing facility for two 1000 megawatt proliferationresistant light-water reactors (which were to be constructed
by an international consortium comprising the United States,
Japan, and South Korea). The United States also offered the
DPRK a negative security assurance, pledging that it would
not use nuclear weapons against North Korea while it remained
an NPT party. Finally, Washington and Pyongyang committed
to open diplomatic liaison offices as a first step toward full
normalization of political and economic relations, though
the Clinton administration linked that broader goal to further
71
progress in North-South Korean relations. Congressional

Republicans castigated the Agreed Framework as essentially
an act of appeasement, while Clinton administration officials
argued that the accord made the best of a bad set of options
inherited from the George H.W. Bush administration. As U.S.
chief negotiator Robert Gallucci acknowledged, [E]veryone was
reluctant about the Agreed Framework.104
President George W. Bushs inclusion of North Korea in the
axis of evil after 9/11 as part of a hard-line strategy was
undergirded by an intelligence assessment that the DPRK
system was under extraordinary stress.105 North Korea is
teetering on the edge of economic collapse, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued, and that is a major source
of leverage.106 The premise that North Korea was on the
verge of collapse was marshaled in support of a strategy of
comprehensive containment to squeeze the Pyongyang regime
and thereby hasten that collapse. Conversely, this assessment
of regime vulnerability suggested that the alternative
engagement strategy, which would incorporate economic
carrots to induce a change in North Korean behavior, could have
the perverse effect of propping up the teetering regime.
The second nuclear crisis with North Korea unfolded in October
2002, when the United States confronted North Korea about
a covert uranium-enrichment program, which would offer the
DPRK an alternative route to nuclear weapons acquisition.
As Washington confronted Pyongyang through diplomatic
channels, the Bush administration terminated the Agreed
Framework, which had frozen the plutonium program. The
diplomatic confrontation over North Koreas uranium-enrichment
activities turned into a much more urgent situation involving
its renewed acquisition of plutonium. In 2003, North Korea
withdrew from the NPT and prepared to reprocess 8,000
fuel rods that had been stored in cooling ponds pursuant to
the Agreed Framework, and to extract sufficient plutonium
for approximately six nuclear weapons. Preoccupied in Iraq
72
and without a viable military option, the Bush administration

acquiesced to this breakout of North Koreas plutonium
program.
Three years later, in October 2006, North Korea conducted
a nuclear test and became the worlds ninth nuclear-weapon
state. This bold move overturned the U.S. assumption that a
Chinese red line would deter Pyongyang from crossing the
nuclear threshold. In response, the UN Security Council, with
Chinese and Russian support, imposed sanctions to block the
Kim Jong-il regimes importation of luxury goods and authorized
the United States and other states to interdict North Korean
shipping to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery and
related materials.107 In February 2007, during Six-Party Talks
(involving North Korea, the United States, China, South Korea,
Japan, and Russia), North Korea agreed to dismantle the
Yongbyon nuclear facility and to make a full disclosure of its
past and present programs. In October 2008, after North Korea
had halted activities at Yongbyon and released a document
about its nuclear history (though omitting disclosure of its
uranium enrichment program and its nuclear exports to other
countries), the Bush administration removed the DPRK from the
U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.108
North Koreas crossing of the nuclear threshold, raising the
grim prospect of the cash-starved Kim regime selling a nuclear
weapon to a terrorist group, prompted President Bush to
enunciate a policy of deterrence by punishment: The transfer
of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or nonstate entities would be considered a grave threat to the United
States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for
the consequences of such action.109 While Bushs statement
specifically referenced North Korea, the administration
subsequently broadened that formulation into a general policy.110
Yet the difficulty of enforcing red lines was evidenced in 2007,
months after the North Korean nuclear test and the Bush
73
administrations deterrent threat, when Pyongyang conducted

a state-to-state transfer with Syria by providing a prototype
nuclear reactor. The Bush administration, hesitant to attack Syria
in the wake of the WMD intelligence fiasco in Iraq, was also
concerned it could trigger an escalation in Syrian meddling in
Iraq, which the United States was desperately attempting to
stabilize in the face of a determined Sunni insurgency. Israel
bombed the Syrian nuclear facility, which had not yet become
operational, in September 2007.
From Strategic Patience to Strategic Breakout

President Obama campaigned on a platform of diplomatically
engaging adversary states. His inaugural address metaphor of
extending a hand to unclenched fists was a stark contrast to
the Bush administrations regime-change rhetoric. Dropping
the rogue state rubric, Obama referred to North Korea and
Iran as outliersstates defying international nonproliferation
norms. In practice, the emphasis on behavior change signaled
a willingness to offer North Korea an assurance of regime
security to seal a denuclearization deal. But the Obama
administrations gesture of conciliation was met by renewed
North Korean provocations to force concessions, including
international recognition of the DPRKs status as a de facto
nuclear-weapon state. In 2009-2010, the fist remained clenched.
North Korea carried out long-range ballistic missile launches, a
second nuclear test, an attack on a South Korean naval vessel
(killing 46 sailors), and the shelling of a South Korean border
island.
After the May 2009 nuclear test, President Obama, framing
the issue in terms of the Kim Jong-il regimes violation of
international norms, declared: By acting in blatant defiance
of the United Nations Security Council, North Korea is directly
and recklessly challenging the international community.
Such provocations will only serve to deepen North Koreas
74
isolation.111 The administration, adopting a stance that

officials characterized as strategic patience, maintained
the emphasis on changing Pyongyangs behavior and ruled
out any concessions merely to bring North Korea back to the
negotiating table. U.S. intelligence analysts speculated that
the spike in North Korean belligerence was linked to domestic
politics; the ailing Kim Jong-il, who was reported to have
suffered a stroke in August 2008, sought to bolster the position
of his eventual heir, third son Kim Jong-un.112
When Kim Jong-un succeeded Kim Jong-il after his death
in December 2011, the window for diplomatic engagement
appeared to open. A Leap Day agreement was reached
between U.S. and North Korean diplomats on February 29,
2012, under which the North would suspend ballistic missile
tests and open itself to international inspections in return for
the resumption of U.S. food aid. But within two weeks, the
Leap Day agreement fell apart when Pyongyang announced
plans to launch a satellite using a ballistic missile covered under
the moratorium. During a visit to South Korea, President Obama
said the days of rewards for provocations were over.113 In
February 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear-weapon
test amidst evidence from commercial satellite imagery that
its 5MW plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon had been
restarted. The Kim Jong-un regime also reportedly expanded
the countrys uranium enrichment capacity with the installation
of additional cascades of centrifuges at its Yongbyon facility.114
These developments raised the specter of North Koreas
considerably expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal.
A Johns Hopkins University study approximates the current
number of North Korean nuclear weapons at 10-16 devices
(comprised of 6-8 fashioned from plutonium and 4-8 from
weapons-grade uranium). The report estimates that the Norths
nuclear arsenal (depending on the growth scenario) could
range from 20 to 100 weapons by 2020.115 Additionally, in
early 2015, American and South Korean intelligence officials
75
concluded that North Korea, which by that point had conducted

four nuclear tests, had crossed another important threshold
mounting a small nuclear warhead on a missile capable of
hitting Japan. In February 2016, a month after a fourth nuclear
weapons test, North Korea launched a small satellite on a
three-stage ballistic missile, but experts believe the deployment
of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the
U.S. homeland is several years away.116 The Norths robust
development program has also included preliminary testing of
submarine-launched and land-mobile ballistic missiles.
North Korea is working toward a strategic breakout that poses
a twin threat. Qualitatively, the Norths mastery of warhead
miniaturization and intercontinental ballistic missile technology
will allow the Kim Jong-un regime to threaten a nuclear strike
on the U.S. homeland in the near future. Quantitatively, the
uninterrupted growth of North Koreas nuclear arsenal elevates
the risk that this unpredictable regime could sell a nuclear
device or weapons-grade fissile material to a terrorist group.
Nuclear Weapons and Regime Security

For a beleaguered regime whose paramount concern is survival,
domestic politics appear the key determinant of foreign policy.
The conditions that led some Western analysts to categorize
North Korea as a failed state manifested themselves in the
1990s, when an economy that had stagnated during the 1980s
sharply declined, with national output contracting by roughly
one-half. North Korean society was further beset by a mass
famine that resulted in deaths estimated as high as one million;
average life expectancy dropped by more than six years during
the 1990s.117 With national output plummeting, Pyongyang
made the stunning public admission in 1993 that the North
Korean economy was in a grave state.118
For Kim Il-sung, the Great Leader who founded the North
Korean state, domestic exigencies created an imperative for
76
external engagement. The Great Leader moved to ease

relations with the outside world, which meant putting the
nuclear program on the negotiating table with the United States
as a means of alleviating the countrys acute economic crisis.
But the strategy carried the risk of political contagion that
could weaken the regimes totalitarian grip over North Korean
society. The ruling elite have been insulated from the adverse
consequences of North Koreas failed autarkic policies through
a court economy that distributes food and foreign consumer
goods to the regimes most loyal cadres.119 But because North
Korea, unlike oil-exporting Iran, does not have a ready source
of hard currency, the regime has engaged in criminal activities
(including counterfeiting and drug smuggling) to sustain its
court economy.
North Koreas nuclear intentions must be viewed through the
prism of regime security. The nuclear program is, at once, a
driver of the countrys international isolation and the primary
source of its bargaining leverage with the outside world.
Does the Kim regime regard nuclear weapons as a deterrent
capability vital to regime survival or as a bargaining chip to
extract economic inducements from the United States, South
Korea, and Japan? An International Institute for Strategic
Studies study of North Koreas WMD programs concluded,
The historical record suggests that the answer is both, and
the emphasis that Pyongyang places on one or the other varies
with domestic conditions and external circumstances.120
The second nuclear crisis, in October 2002, over the covert
uranium enrichment program played out against the backdrop
of U.S. preparations for a war of regime change in Iraq and
President Bushs inclusion of North Korea in the axis of
evil. The chief North Korean nuclear negotiator told his U.S.
counterpart, If we disarm ourselves because of U.S. pressure,
then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistans Taliban, to
be beaten to death.121 A senior DPRK official lectured visiting
U.S. congressional staff members that Washington should
77
stop trying so hard to convince us to abandon our nuclear

program and start thinking about how you are going to live with
a nuclear North Korea.122
Since conducting its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea
has demanded that it be accepted as a nuclear-weapon
statea condition flatly rejected by the Bush and Obama
administrations. After the NATO intervention in Libya in
2011, North Korea said that Qaddafi had been tricked into
disarmament in 2003 through a U.S. assurance of regime
security.123 The Libyan intervention offered the North a useful
pretext for hanging on to its deterrent. In 2013, the Kim Jong-un
regime declared that its nuclear arsenal was not a bargaining
chip and would not be relinquished even for billions of
dollars.124 Nonetheless, North Korea has pursued negotiations
in response to an internal crisis (such as the famine in the
1990s) to extract additional aid from South Korea, Japan, and
the United States. As a seasoned U.S. negotiator put it: North
Korea does not respond to pressure, but without pressure
North Korea does not respond. The question is whether the
combination of coercive diplomacy and revitalized diplomacy
can forestall North Koreas imminent strategic breakout.

The North Korean nuclear crisis is embedded in the broader
issue of regime survival. Though the privations of North Korean
society have led to periodic predictions of regime collapse, the
Kim family regime has proved remarkably resilient. The dilemma
is that the regime-change and proliferation timelines are not in
sync. Though the threat posed by North Korea derives from the
character of its regime, U.S. policymakers cannot wait for an
indeterminate process of regime change to play out while the
Kim Jong-un regime achieves a strategic breakout.
In 1999, former Secretary of Defense William Perry conducted
a policy review for the Clinton administration concluding that
78
the Norths economic weakness, though unlikely to lead to

regime collapse, did create a motivation for the Pyongyang
regime to negotiate. [W]e must deal with the DPRK regime as
it is, Perry argued, not as we might wish it to be.125 The Perry
report advocated a strategy of comprehensive engagement that
linked North Korean denuclearization (through compliance with
the Agreed Framework) to the normalization of relations with
the United States.
Three years later, in 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz spoke of a teetering North Korea whose economic
weakness was a source of leverage. This premise suggested
that the nonproliferation and regime-change timelines could
be brought into sync. The United States could eliminate the
North Korean nuclear threat through a comprehensive squeeze
strategy to bring down the rogue regime. In short, a hard
landing for the North Korean regime was inevitable, and the
United States could hasten that outcome. The assessment also
strongly argued against the alternative strategy of engagement,
because any inducements offered to the Kim Jong-il regime
to promote its compliance with international nonproliferation
norms would merely serve to prop up a vulnerable regime. That
perception of a regime living on borrowed time removed the
urgency and utility of nuclear agreements with North Korea.
Indeed, in October 2002, the revelation of DPRKs covert
uranium-enrichment program led the Bush administration to
declare the Agreed Framework dead. To confront the North
Koreans about a uranium-enrichment program of unknown
scope, the Bush administration terminated the nuclear
agreement that had frozen a plutonium program of known
scope.
Underlying the Obama administrations offer to Pyongyang
of normalization of relations for denuclearization was an
assessment that the nuclear and regime-change timelines
were not in sync, and that the two issues therefore needed to
be decoupled. The Obama administration sought to test North
79
Koreas intentions by offering a structured choice to obtain a

nuclear agreement curtailing the DPRKs capabilities in the near
term; it relegated the internal process of societal change to
play out on an indeterminate timetable. North Koreas second
nuclear test, in May 2009, was a direct rebuff to the new
U.S. administrations overture. Pyongyangs hardened position
indicated an emphasis less on using its nuclear program as
a bargaining chip to extract concessions than on obtaining
international recognition as a de facto nuclear-weapon state.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reiterating the U.S. objective
of denuclearization, rejected Pyongyangs nuclear assertiveness:
Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States
will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nucleararmed North Korea.126
The Pyongyang regime has been able to defy the international
community because it has also been able to defy its chief
patron, China. The North Korean nuclear test in 2006 crossed
what Western analysts widely viewed as a Chinese red
line given Beijings logical apprehension that Pyongyangs
provocative action could drive Tokyo and Seoul to reconsider
their non-nuclear status. The Kims have likewise rebuffed
Chinese calls for economic reforms and have maintained the
North Korean economys military first orientation. In North
Korea expert Andrei Lankovs succinct judgment, Reforms
mean death.127 Kim Jong-un has maintained this defiant
rejection of economic reform, while a senior North Korean
official told the Chinese in May 2016 that the countrys policy
of expanding its nuclear arsenal was permanent.128 Against
the backdrop of the Kim regimes political intransigence and
military advances, Secretary of State John Kerry called North
Korea the most important proliferation problem in East Asia
and underscored that China has the most leverage to address
it.129
China has long viewed an uneasy status quo in North Korea
as preferable to change. A so-called hard landingregime
80
collapsewould, at minimum, create a refugee crisis and risk

triggering a conflict on the Korean peninsula. Alternatively, a
soft landingpeaceful reunification between North and
South Koreawould end North Koreas status as a buffer
state and leave China with a formidable pro-Western regional
powerand perhaps U.S. troopson its border. Facing
unacceptable alternatives, Beijing made a strategic decision to
prop up the vulnerable Kim family regime through economic
assistance (food and fuel) and investments in politically
connected North Korean trading companies. China turned a
blind eye to UN sanctions adopted after the 2006 and 2009
nuclear tests by allowing the transshipment of North Korean
military goods and technology to Iran, and by serving as the
primary conduit for luxury goods to maintain the lavish lifestyle
of the regimes elite. Chinas sustaining assistance has allowed
the North Korean regime to avoid the hard choice between
impoverished autarky and destabilizing integration into the
international system. In so doing, Beijing effectively undercut
the ability of the international community to bring meaningful
pressure to bear on Pyongyang to alter its conduct. Will North
Koreas imminent strategic breakout alter Chinas strategic
calculus?
The projected growth of North Koreas nuclear arsenal creates
an increased risk of nuclear terrorism. Since 9/11, North Korea
has both offered assurances that it would not transfer nuclear
weapons to terrorists and threatened to do so. In 2005, two
years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq to topple the Saddam
Hussein regime, a North Korean vice foreign minister warned
that the regime had no plans to transfer but would not rule it
out if the United States drives [us] into a corner.130
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned about
the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear
technology.131 Though information about North Koreas record
of nuclear exports is scant, two prominent state-to-state
transfers are known: first, in 2001, the Pyongyang regime sold
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uranium hexafluoride (the feedstock for centrifuges) to Libya

via Pakistans A.Q. Khan; and second, in September 2007, the
Israeli Air Force bombed a nuclear reactor in Syria (not yet
operational) provided by North Korea.132 The urgent threat
is that the Norths increased production of weapons-grade
uranium potentially creates a new cash crop for the financially
strapped regime.133
After North Koreas nuclear test in 2006, the Bush
administration declared that the Kim regime would be held
fully accountable if it transferred nuclear weapons or material
to states or non-state entities. But fully accountable can
mean a host of things. An alternative to calculated ambiguity
would be an explicit red line: the deliberate transfer of WMD
capabilities by a state to a non-state actor could trigger a
non-nuclear, regime-changing response from the United
States. Such a stance, which goes beyond current U.S.
declaratory policy, could prove an effective form of deterrence
by punishment. Further advances in nuclear forensicsthe
ability to attribute fissile material to its country of originwould
bolster the credibility of this threat.
Tightened UN Security Council sanctions, passed in March
2016 after North Koreas fourth nuclear weapons test, requires
states to inspect all cargo passing through their territory to
or from the DPRK.134 This interdiction measure, in tandem
with sanctions curtailing North Koreas access to funding and
technology for its nuclear program, falls under the rubric of
deterrence by denial. As with the four other major UN sanctions
imposed on North Korea since 2006, effectiveness depends on
Chinese enforcement, which has been tepid. China has turned
a blind eye to the DPRKs sophisticated procurement network
utilizing front companies and transshipment arrangements to
import sensitive dual-use (i.e., civilian and military) technologies
prohibited under UN sanctions.135
The most effective form of deterrence by denial would
be an agreement, such as that concluded with Iran, to
curtail North Koreas nuclear capabilities. Though U.S. and
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North Korean diplomats met secretly to discuss a possible

resumption of negotiation, a diplomatic impasse has persisted
over Pyongyangs non-starter insistence that the DPRK be
recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.136 Yet, strategic
patience has resulted in acquiescence, as North Korea
builds up its nuclear arsenal and makes substantial progress
in miniaturizing warheads and acquiring an intercontinental
ballistic-missile capability.
With North Korea on the verge of a strategic breakout, the
United States should pivot to serious diplomacy. The objective
should be to prevent this quantitative and qualitative breakout
by negotiating a freeze on North Koreas nuclear and missile
programs. Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, calls these goals the Three Nos: (1)
no new production of weapons-usable fissile material; (2) no
testing of weapons or ballistic missiles; and (3) no exports of
nuclear technology or weapons.137 A freeze would preclude
the additional testing that North Korea still needs to master
miniaturization and reliable long-range missiles. If a freeze could
be negotiated, its implementation would pose major verification
challenges.
North Koreas strategic breakout would be a game-changer
not only for the United States, but would also have adverse
consequences for China (such as U.S. deployment of the
THAAD antimissile system to South Korea). The United States
and China have a mutual interest in preventing a North Korean
strategic breakout. This conjunction of interest creates the
political space for coordinated diplomacy to freeze North Korean
capabilities. That will require Chinas applying meaningful
pressure on the Kim Jong-un regimenot to promote regime
collapse (with its attendant negative consequences for Beijing),
but to accept a capping of its capabilities. China faces the
choice of either working with the United States to prevent
North Koreas nuclear breakout or living with its strategic
consequences in northeast Asia as South Korea and Japan
invariably respond.
83
The nuclear agreement with Iran is a relevant precedent. As

with Iran, the goal of reinvigorated nuclear diplomacy with
North Korea would be to buy time and prevent a deteriorating
situation from getting worse. Negotiating with North Korea
has its pitfalls: Pyongyang has cheated on past agreements
and any American concessions, such as providing sanctions
relief in return for a freeze, will be characterized as propping
up an odious regime. While North Korea has stated that it is
not interested in an Iran-type deal and that its situation was
quite different, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that
the nuclear agreement concluded between Iran and the worlds
major powers (the P5+1) in 2015 was a positive reference for
negotiations with Pyongyang.138
A Harvard Kennedy School study on preventing nuclear
terrorism laid out alternative futures for 2030: a high-security
scenario, in which North Koreas nuclear capabilities have
been verifiably eliminated or capped at a low level, pending
elimination; and a low-security scenario, in which the North
continues to expand its arsenal, to well over 100 nuclear
weapons.139 A complete rollback of North Koreas nuclear
program in the near term is not feasible with a regime that
regards nuclear weapons as both a deterrent vital to regime
survival and a bargaining chip to extract economic concessions.
That policy duality for North Korea has its analogue in the
United States twin strategy of deterrencea punishment
variant that threatens regime-changing retaliation should a
North Korean-origin nuclear weapon or weapons-grade fissile
material be transferred to a terrorist group; and a denial
variant (through a negotiated freeze) that requires North Korean
compliance and entails U.S. concessions (i.e., sanctions relief)
that are potentially regime-extending. A negotiated freeze to
cap the DPRKs nuclear and missile capabilities would offer
both North Korea and the United States positive narratives:
Pyongyang would claim that the world had recognized North
Korea as a nuclear power; alternatively, the United States could
assert that the freeze significantly constrains North Koreas
84
program, prevents a strategic breakout that could threaten the

U.S. homeland, and is an interim step toward the eventual goal
of denuclearization.
A former senior U.S. official once quipped: problems have
solutions; dilemmas have horns. North Koreas nuclear
challenge poses a dilemma because it is embedded in the
broader question of the Norths societal evolution. For the
United States, managing this tension (as it works toward
a negotiated freeze of North Koreas program) will require
Washington to decouple the nuclear issue from the question
of regime change and rely on internal forces as the agent of
societal change.
85
Russia: The End of

Cooperative Threat
Reduction?
The specter of an inadequately secured Russian nuclear
weapons falling into terrorist hands dates to the end of the Cold
War. Just after the failed August 1991 coup by Soviet regime
dead-enders to oust President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Kremlin
leader responded with silence to a question from visiting U.S.
Senator Sam Nunn as to whether he had lost command and
control of the USSRs nuclear forces during the crisis.140 The
Soviet empire, which disintegrated into 15 successor states
four months after the coup, comprised one-seventh of the
Earths land mass and possessed a Cold War nuclear arsenal
estimated at 35,000 weapons, 1,000 tons of highly enriched
uranium, and 100 tons of plutonium.141 Citing the magnitude of
the threat posed by post-Soviet loose nukes, Senators Nunn
and Richard Lugar convinced a reluctant U.S. Congress to fund
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to dismantle
Soviet nuclear weapons and secure weapons-grade fissile
material.
What began as an emergency measure in 1991 in response
to an urgent threat evolved into a $2 billion comprehensive
program spanning more than two decades. During that period,
Russia deactivated 7,600 nuclear warheads and secured 24
nuclear weapons storage sites, as well as eliminating huge
stockpiles of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. In
October 2012, the Russian government announced that it would
not renew the Nunn-Lugar CTR program upon its expiration
in 2013. Though narrowly justified in terms of the countrys
improved nuclear security situation, President Vladimir Putins
Left: Military parade in Red Square, Moscow.
Photo courtesy of http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/
87
decision reflected the downturn in U.S.-Russian relations and

his regimes broader push to curtail American influence in
various spheres of Russian public policy.142
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program as defense by other
means.143 By significantly reducing the threat that a Russian
loose nuke could be illicitly transferred by sale or theft to
a terrorist group, CTR was an effective form of deterrence
by denial. The end of CTR raises concerns about Russian
backslidingwhether, for example, the financially strapped
Putin regime will continue to fund the U.S.-financed security
upgrades at Russian nuclear sites. Some experts already see
an uptick in the threat. Though the formal CTR program has
lapsed, Russia and the United States continue to cooperate on
a narrower range of issuesfor example, on negotiating and
implementing the nuclear agreement with Iran, removing the
Assad regimes chemical weapons from Syria, and the new
START agreement. Yet the scope of that cooperation will be
affected by the overall state of the bilateral relationship, which
has deteriorated still further with Russias military intervention
in Ukraine in 2014. The discord has spilled over into the
counterterrorism realm as Russia, charging that the U.S. media
had demonized Putin, boycotted the U.S.-sponsored Nuclear
Security Summit in April 2016.144 Notwithstanding Russias
political isolation over Ukraine and talk of a renewed Cold War,
there remains a powerful mutuality of interests between Russia
and the United States to collaborate on preventing nuclear
terrorism. That vital commonality creates political space in this
contentious new era for a fresh approacha rebooted strategy
of cooperative nuclear threat reduction.
Russias Nuclear Legacy

The Soviet Union became the worlds second nuclear-weapon
state in 1949, when it conducted a successful test several years
ahead of American intelligence estimates. From that initial test
88
(designated Joe-1, for Stalin, by U.S. officials) grew a gigantic

Soviet nuclear arsenal. According to a non-governmental survey
of global nuclear weapons inventories compiled by Robert
Norris and Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American
Scientists, in 1959, a decade after the first test, the number of
Soviet nuclear weapons was estimated at 1,060; in 1962 (the
year of the Cuban Missile Crisis), 3,322 weapons; in 1972 (the
year of U.S.-Soviet dtente and the first strategic arms control
agreement), the level had jumped to 14,478; in 1986, the
number of Soviet nuclear weapons peaked at 45,000.145
The Soviet arsenal was comprised of both strategic nuclear
weapons (deployed on the Soviet version of the U.S. triad
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], bombers, and
submarines) and tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield
use. In 1991, when Presidents George H.W. Bush and
Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
committing both sides to reduce substantially their tactical
nuclear weapons stocks, the then Soviet Union was estimated
to have between 14,000 and 21,700 non-strategic (tactical)
warheadsthat is, one-half to two-thirds of the countrys total
nuclear arsenal.146 The Soviet state created an archipelago of
closed nuclear cities for fabricating bomb components and
fissile material and assembling weapons. (Russian nuclear
scientists working in the closed town of Arzamas-16, where
the first Soviet weapon was designed, nicknamed their facility
Los Arzamas.) This vast Soviet military infrastructure was
complemented by an enormous civil nuclear power program,
which encompassed additional fuel-cycle facilities (for plutonium
and enriched-uranium production) and some three dozen
operating nuclear reactors at 10 sites.
The Soviet nuclear test in 1949 gave rise to concern that the
Stalin regime might attempt to smuggle an atomic bomb into
Washington to carry out a decapitating surprise attack on the
U.S. government. This scenario prompted Oppenheimers quip
that the only effective countermeasure to nuclear smuggling
89
was a screwdriver to open every crate entering the United

States. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the CIA considered
a clandestine attack possible but not plausible. Soviet and East
bloc diplomatic archives, which became accessible to historians
after the Cold War, do not indicate that this option was seriously
considered by the Kremlin (or later by the Chinese, for that
matter). Analytically though, even if Moscow had contemplated
such a covert plan, it would not have fallen under the rubric of
state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Instead, the clandestine
option would simply have offered the Soviet leadership an
alternate means of delivering a nuclear weapon on U.S. soil as
the initiating blow of a general war. What put to rest concern
about this hypothetical option was the deployment in the 1960s
of second-strike nuclear forces (i.e., hardened ICBM sites and
submarine-based ballistic missiles) that could survive a surprise
attack and deliver a devastating retaliatory strike.
During the Cold War, the primary concern relating to nuclear
weapons security was not the contemporary threat of a loose
nuke falling into terrorist possession. Rather, it was fear of
the accidental or unauthorized use of a weapon by a rogue
or unwitting commander somewhere across the vast Soviet
nuclear complex. This focus was born of American concern
about its own arsenal. In the early 1960s, the perceived risk
of accidental nuclear use, or even war, arising from the Berlin
and Cuban missile crises led Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara to support the installation of a permissive action
link on every warhead in the U.S. arsenal to ensure that
nuclear use could only occur through a deliberate decision
taken by the president.147 McNamaras immediate concern was
foreign access, given reports of lax security over stockpiles
of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at NATO bases in Europe.
President Kennedy ordered that all U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe should be equipped with permissive action links, or
PALs, a device attached to or built into a nuclear warhead that
precludes the arming and detonation of the weapon without
inputting an authorization code. In December 1962, Pentagon
90
General Counsel John T. McNaughton gave a speech that laid

out the new nuclear security program whose centerpiece
was PALs and concluded with a direct appeal to the Kremlin:
It is hoped that the Soviet Union will see the logic behind
these policies and take comparable steps.148 Early attempts
by American officials to engage their Soviet counterparts on
PAL technologies were snubbed. As Harvards Graham Allison
observed, Skeptical of the Americans preoccupation with
technological solutions, the Soviet Union counted on people
rather than on technology to control its nuclear arsenal.149
The autocratic Soviet leadership was fixated on maintaining
central control over their nuclear arsenal. Special KGB forces
were involved in custodianship over nuclear weapons, which
were stored in fortified bunkers guarded by ethnic Russians
(considered more politically reliable).150 In addition, the Kremlin
reportedly held the codes for activating nuclear weapons
even more tightly than did Washington during the Cold War.
This Communist Party control even extended to an ability to
circumvent the military chain of command and directly launch
some missiles from the Soviet capital (though intelligence
experts were divided on whether this was operational or a
precautionary backup).151 In an authoritative study published
just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nuclear command
and control expert Bruce Blair offered this assessment: Most
Russian nuclear forcesall strategic weapons and most tactical
weaponsmust receive unlock codes from higher authority,
without which the weapon cannot physically be dispatched or
detonated. However, many strategic weaponsand most
tactical weapons lack sufficient PAL protection.152 The threat
captured in Senator Nunns unanswered question to President
Gorbachev was whether a nuclear security system predicated
on tight centralized control could be maintained under the
chaotic conditions of the post-Soviet era.
91
Nuclear Security and Threat Reduction

The multifaceted strategy to mitigate the threat of nuclear
terrorism in the former Soviet Union has fallen under the rubric
of deterrence by denial. As the post-Cold War era dawned, the
essential first prong of this denial strategy was to circumscribe
the scope of the threat. When the USSR disintegrated in
December 1991, the urgent question regarding the disposition
of the Soviet arsenal was how many of the 15 successor states
would retain nuclear weapons. At the time, three of the newly
independent statesBelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstanhad
approximately 3,400 strategic nuclear weapons (capable of
striking the United States) and more than 3,000 tactical nuclear
weapons deployed on their territory. The United States and
Russia diplomatically engaged these states to conclude the
Lisbon Protocol of May 1992, which committed the three to
transfer all weapons to Russia and to accede to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. By the
end of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons had reportedly been
returned to Russia.153 Despite some political balking by Belarus
and Ukraine, the process of transferring the strategic weapons
to Russia was completed in November 1996. Through the
implementation of the Lisbon Protocol, Russia emerged as the
sole successor nuclear weapon-state to the Soviet Uniona
huge diplomatic achievement whose outcome was not a given
when the USSR broke up.
The second element of threat reduction was nuclear arms
control to reduce the number of warheads in the Russian
stockpile. The Lisbon Protocol committed the newly created
Russian government to implement the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991, under which the United
States and then Soviet Union agreed to reduce their deployed
strategic nuclear weapons from 10,000 to 6,000. In 2010,
after two abortive efforts (START II and III), the United States
and Russia finally agreed on an additional deep cut in their
nuclear arsenals with the signing of the New START, which
92
decreased the number of deployed strategic weapons to

1,550. As referenced above, Russian tactical (i.e., non-strategic)
weapons were substantially reduced through the previously
cited series of reciprocal unilateral actions with the United
StatesPresidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI)initiated in 1991
under Gorbachev and which continued into the Putin era. The
vast majority of Russian tactical nuclear weapons were pulled
from deployment and dismantled, with their nuclear cores
blended down from weapons-grade fissile material into fuel for
nuclear-power generation. By 2014, through the PNI agreement,
the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons had declined
from the estimated Cold War range of 14,000 to 21,700 to
approximately 2,000 warheads.154 By reducing the number of
weapons, and therefore the risk that one might be acquired
by terrorists, these arms control measures were a form of
deterrence by denial.
The third part of the strategy to mitigate the threat of nuclear
terrorism occurring in or emanating from the former Soviet
Union was the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program. Congressional critics of CTR funding questioned
financially supporting the security structure in other states
rather than directly enhancing U.S. military capabilities. But
CTRs utility was underscored by a Department of Energy task
force in January 2001 (nine months before the 9/11 terrorist
attacks) that declared: The most urgent unmet national
security threat to the United States today is the danger that
weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable materials in
Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation
states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at
home.155 A primary CTR mission was to assist Russia in the
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles
and associated infrastructure pursuant to the START agreement.
As of February 2013, the CTR program had helped the Russian
nuclear authorities deactivate 7,613 warheads.156
93
The essential complement to disassembly was securing

weapons-grade fissile material from dismantled warhead cores.
Nunn-Lugar funds supported transportation of 92 train loads of
Russian nuclear warheads from their operational locations to
secure storage sites. The U.S. Department of Energy partnered
with its Russian counterpart, Rosatom, to improve security
at 31 civilian and 11 military sites housing more than half of
the former Soviet Unions 600 metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear materials.157 Washington and Moscow concluded a
landmark 20-year megatons to megawatts agreement under
which Russia blended down 500 tons of fissile material from
decommissioned nuclear warheads and sold the fuel to the
United States to generate electricity from civil nuclear reactors.
Another major CTR initiative focused on supporting and
redirecting former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists facing an
uncertain future to counter the potential risk of their selling their
WMD expertise to a terrorist group or rogue state.
Putins decision in October 2012 to discontinue the NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program occurred against
the political backdrop of deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations.
The move reflected his rejection of Russias perceived junior
partner status and of allowing the United States to leverage
its CTR assistance to intervene in the functioning of sensitive
Russian national security agencies. The bilateral nuclear security
cooperation that continued was further curtailed by Moscow
in response to the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Russia for
its aggression in Ukraine. In a sign of political pique, as noted
above, Russia boycotted the 2016 global Nuclear Security
Summit convened by the Obama administration in Washington.
When suspended in 2014, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program had
compiled an impressive record of accomplishmentassisting
Russia to deactivate over 7,600 nuclear weapons and to
implement comprehensive security and accounting upgrades
for all but a small fraction of the sites housing weapons-usable
material and nuclear warheads.158 Despite assurances from
94
Russia that high security standards would be maintained, the

threat of backsliding is a major concern, given the governments
fiscal plight precipitated by the downturn in the price of oil.
Indeed, by early 2015, new security upgrades had been
canceled at some of Russias closed nuclear cities, and a
project to convert highly enriched uranium into non-weapons
grade fissile material was ended.159 A high-level U.S. Energy
Department advisory panel concluded in August 2014, Russia
continues to have the worlds largest stockpiles of nuclear
weapons, separated plutonium, and highly enriched uranium
(HEU) in the worlds largest number of buildings and bunkers
and a variety of vulnerabilities remain that a sophisticated
conspiracy could exploit.160

With Russia, the potential pathway of nuclear acquisition by
terrorists is neither transfer nor sale (as a deliberate act of state
policy), but thefteither of a weapon or the fissile material to
construct a crude one. The risk of theft arises from both within
and outside Russias nuclear infrastructure. The magnitude of
the insider threat in Russia is reflected in the statistic that from,
2009 to 2012 alone, Rosatom fired 276 manager or executivelevel employees because of corruption charges. Russian
organized crime has penetrated some of the countrys closed
nuclear cities, which increases the risk that an insider could
be bribed to perpetrate nuclear theft.161 With respect to the
external threat, Russias nuclear facilities have been probed by
Chechen terrorists, who have conducted mass-casualty attacks
and aim to take the battle from the Caucasus to Russia proper.
When considering the risk of nuclear theft, one must distinguish
between warheads and weapons-grade fissile material. The
risk of a terrorist groups being able to steal and then detonate
a nuclear weapon is low. The stockpile of Russian warheads,
other than those deployed on intercontinental and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, is stored in special high-security
95
facilities. Moreover, all strategic and most tactical nuclear

weapons (whose numbers have been substantially reduced
through U.S.-Russian arms control agreements) are equipped
with modern technical safeguards (such as PALs).162 More
plausible than the theft of a warhead is that of weapons-grade
fissile material taking into account their sheer volume in Russia
(an estimated 679 tons of highly enriched uranium and 128 tons
of plutoniumwith only 15-30 kg and 5-10 kg, respectively,
needed for a bomb) and the large number of sites at which
these materials are stored.163 To put the risk in perspective,
among the 30 countries where the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) monitors stocks of HEU and plutonium, the
agency has confirmed at least 20 instances of theft or loss, but
not involving militarily significant quantities.164 Notwithstanding
the technical hurdles, a terrorist group could possibly construct
a so-called improvised nuclear device if it acquired the requisite
During the Cold War, the doctrine of mutual assured
destruction, which made nuclear war between the superpowers
unthinkable, was a quintessential strategy of deterrence by
punishment. By contrast, in the post-Cold War era, the United
States and Russia (as the sole nuclear successor state to the
Soviet Union) pursued a cooperative strategy of deterrence
by denial. In addressing the primary pathway by which a
Russian nuclear weapon or weapons-grade fissile material
could be acquired by terroriststhefta policy of deterrence
by punishment is not credible and could be counterproductive.
If a terrorist attack involving a stolen Russian nuclear weapon
occurs, the United States would not plausibly retaliate in kind
against Russia, which retains a nuclear arsenal that could
deliver a devastating retaliatory strike. The calculus of decision
with respect to the transfer or sale of a nuclear weapon by
North Korea would be wholly different. That scenarionuclear
terrorism resulting from a deliberate act of state policywould
warrant a regime-terminating response.
96
Despite the deterioration in bilateral relations over Ukraine,

the United States and Russia have cooperated on discrete
WMD-related issues of mutual interest. On Syria, after the
Assad regime used chemical weapons against the civilian
population in August 2013, the Obama administration and Putin
regime reached an agreement to dismantle Syrias chemical
weapons program. The successful destruction of 1,290 metric
tons of Syrias chemical agents by a June 2014 deadline was
a significant accomplishment. But that cooperation with
Russia has not extended into joint action to end the Syrian
civil war, with Secretary of State John Kerry observing, The
worst of the [chemical] weapons are gone, but the despicable
[Assad] regime and the crisis it has created remain and require
our collective focus.165 Likewise, on Iran, Russia played a
constructive role as part of the P5+1 negotiating group (whose
other members were the United States, Britain, France,
Germany, and China) in achieving the breakthrough agreement
to constrain the Tehran regimes nuclear program. The Syria and
Iran precedents point to the possibility that Russia might join
revived multilateral nuclear diplomacy toward North Korea to
prevent a strategic breakout.
The end of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program as originally conceived two decades ago was
probably inevitable. Even had the bilateral relationship not
deteriorated, Russia had grown resentful and suspicious of an
asymmetrical donor-recipient relationship. When the Russian
government announced the discontinuation of the Nunn-Lugar
program, Russias nuclear agency, Rosatom, declared that
nuclear cooperation could be reestablished on the basis of
equality, mutual benefit, and respect. With a clear reference
to Ukraine, the Rosatom statement further declared that such
a new approach to nuclear security should not depend on
situational changes of political environment.166 Despite the
major negotiated reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals
since the end of the Cold War, nuclear tensions have risen
witness Putins nuclear sabre-rattling in conjunction with
97
Russias invasion and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in

2014 and Russias ambitious nuclear modernization program
to compensate for shortfalls in its conventional military forces.
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations, pursued to
stabilize what strategist Albert Wohlstetter referred to as
the delicate balance of terror, served as the primary forum
for superpower dialogue. A constant tension was whether
such talks should be linked to behavior in other areasfor
example, Soviet adventurism in the Third World during the
1970s. Though outside events affected the overall bilateral
relationship, an explicit linkage to arms control was eschewed
by both superpowers because of their overriding mutuality of
interests. The same urgency holds true today with respect to
the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
The basis for revived U.S.-Russian cooperation exists in the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an international
partnership of 86 nations established by the United States and
Russia in 2006 to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect,
and respond to nuclear terrorism; and in UN Security Council
Resolution 1540, which requires member states to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state
actors.167 The International Atomic Energy Agency, which Russia
alluded to in announcing its decision not to participate in the
2016 Nuclear Security Summit, could be positioned to facilitate
revived nuclear cooperation. Former senators Sam Nunn and
Richard Lugar, co-chairs of the non-governmental Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI), have proposed an agenda for a new U.S.Russian partnership on nuclear security: accelerating efforts to
repatriate and eliminate U.S. and Russian-origin highly enriched
uranium from other countries; collaborating on research and
development of innovative nuclear security technologies;
expanding nuclear security best-practice exchanges; and
utilizing the extensive U.S. and Russian technical expertise to
help support nuclear security improvements in other countries
with nuclear materials.168 A recent monograph on preventing
nuclear terrorism by Harvard Universitys Belfer Center argues
98
for a package of cooperation on security that would also

encompass nuclear energy, which would be an incentive of
particular economic interest to Rosatom.169 The policy challenge
is whether such pragmatic cooperation to address an urgent
persisting threat can be reestablished and insulated from the
vicissitudes of the troubled U.S.-Russian relationship.
Below: Abandoned Nuclear Weapon Storage Facility - Northern Russia

Photo courtesy of Lana Sator
99
Pakistan: The Most

Dangerous Country
Pakistan exemplifies the defining threat of the post-9/11

erathe nexus of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. In 2007,
at the height of U.S. military operations in Iraq, the cover of
Newsweek magazine declared, The Most Dangerous Nation
In the World Isnt Iraq. Its Pakistan.170 That same year a poll
of terrorism experts by Foreign Policy magazine found threequarters viewing Pakistan as the country most likely to transfer
nuclear technology to terrorists in the next few years.171 The
probable pathway of terrorist acquisition of a nuclear device or
weapons-usable materials in Pakistan would be through theft
(leakage) rather than a deliberate act of state policy (as is the
concern, notably, with North Korea). This apprehension arises
from the dangerous conjunction of a fragile state with the
worlds fastest growing nuclear arsenal (including less secure
tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use) and a nuclear
establishment vulnerable to penetration by homegrown radical
Islamists.
The nuclear issue is embedded in the broader context of a
U.S.-Pakistani relationship roiled by contradictions. Each country
views the other as both a partner and a threat. Pakistan was
designated a major non-NATO ally after 9/11 but was also
the country to which the leader of the terrorist group that
perpetrated those attacks was eventually tracked down and
killed. The United States has provided pragmatic assistance
to Pakistan to secure nuclear weapons, while the Islamabad
regime remains obsessed by the specter of a U.S. strike, which
predated the bin Laden mission in 2011, to seize the countrys
Left: An army vehicle carrying the long range surface-to-surface Ghauri missile passes a portrait
of the nations founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, during a military parade to mark Pakistan day in
Islamabad. Photo courtesy of Reuters.
101
nuclear arsenal. This core contradiction creates a major dilemma

for U.S. policymakers attempting to fashion an effective
deterrent strategy, integrating both cooperative and potentially
punitive elements, to mitigate the risk of nuclear terrorism
emanating from Pakistan.
Crossing the Nuclear Threshold

The origins of Pakistans nuclear program date to the 1950s,
when the country joined President Dwight Eisenhowers
Atoms for Peace program for civil nuclear cooperation. For
energy-dependent Pakistan, nuclear power offered an attractive
option and was also a prestigious symbol of modernity.
Pakistans Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established
in 1956, and the countrys first nuclear installation, a U.S.supplied five-megawatt research reactor, became operational
in 1965. In October 1964, China conducted its first nuclear
weapons testa major milestone affecting the security
environment in South Asia. Pakistans Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, anticipating that India (which had facilities not
under IAEA monitoring or safeguards) would cross the nuclear
threshold in response, advocated that the Islamic Republic
establish a nuclear weapons program. In 1965, Bhutto made
the now renowned statement of intent to the Manchester
Guardian: If India makes an atom bomb, then even if we have
to feed on grass and leavesor even if we have to starvewe
shall also produce an atom bomb as we would be left with
no other alternative. The answer to an atom bomb can only
be an atom bomb.172 The bomb lobby led by Bhutto also
advanced this option in recognition of the growing asymmetry
of conventional military power between India and Pakistan and
as an avenue of expanding security cooperation with China to
hedge against sole reliance on the United States.173
Pakistans humiliating military loss to India in December 1971,
which resulted in the independence of the former East Pakistan
as Bangladesh, catapulted Bhutto to the presidency and gave
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fresh impetus to the countrys nuclear weapons program.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, Bhutto convened
Pakistani nuclear experts and reportedly repeated his dramatic
formulation that the country would eat grass, if necessary,
to acquire an atomic bomb. At this seminal conference, in
early 1972, Bhutto called on the countrys nuclear scientists
to develop the latent capabilitya hedge, in nonproliferation
terminologyto allow Pakistan to respond if something
happens, a clear reference to the prospect of Indias crossing
the nuclear weapons threshold. India conducted a peaceful
nuclear explosion, in May 1974, thereby becoming the first
nuclear-weapon state outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Indias 1974 test was the action-forcing event
shifting Pakistans 1972 capability decision into a proliferation
decision.174 A U.S. State Department classified analysis of the
Pakistani weapons program concluded in 1983 that nuclear
design and development work [began] soon after the Indian
test.175 A historical irony is that U.S. officials speculated in 1976
that the establishment of a multinational facility for producing
nuclear fuel in the Shahs Iran, with which the United States
was cultivating a strategic relationship, could offer Pakistan,
then the country of primary proliferation concern to the United
States, an alternative to developing its own capability.176
Pakistan initially pursued the plutonium route to weapons
acquisition, but, after encountering constraints (such as foreign
export control regulations impeding access to technology),
focused its efforts on the uranium-enrichment pathway.
That option was a fortuitous opportunity seized through the
efforts of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear physicist hailed as
a national hero at home, while vilified by the United States
for his black-market proliferation assistance from the 1980s
onward to rogue states, such as Libya, North Korea, and Iran.
In 1974, Khan having worked in the Netherlands for URENCO,
a uranium-enrichment corporation, returned to Pakistan with
purloined centrifuge designs and nuclear-industry contacts
and jumpstarted the countrys uranium-enrichment program.
103
By early 1984, Khan asserted in an interview that Pakistan had

reached an important milestonepossessing the capability
to construct a nuclear weaponbased upon its uraniumenrichment production and weapons-design progress.177
Pakistans fabrication of weapons-usable, highly enriched
uranium flouted its assurance to the United States that only
reactor-grade, low-enriched uranium would be produced.
A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
concluded that Pakistan reached the nuclear weapons threshold
around 1985-86.178 A now declassified U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate in 1986 determined that Pakistan was figuratively only
two screwdriver turns away from an assembled weapon.179
China reportedly played an essential role in Pakistans
acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition to facilitating
Pakistans mastery of uranium enrichment, the Beijing regime
provided proven weapons designs. The Chinese decision to
extend this critical assistance, which began in the late 1970s,
reflected the importance the Beijing leadership attached to
its geostrategic relationship with Pakistan vis--vis India, as
well as Chinas skeptical attitude toward what it perceived
as a discriminatory U.S. nonproliferation policy. With a stock
of highly enriched uranium and weapons design, the key
missing element was a delivery system. Pakistans original
plan was to configure the 40 F-16s procured from the United
States in the mid-1980s for nuclear-weapons delivery. The
F-16s were a tangible symbol of the Reagan administrations
support for Pakistan at the height of the decade-long conflict
to reverse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But U.S. delivery
of a final installment of 28 aircraft was eventually blocked by
congressional legislation (the Pressler amendment) that
linked military and economic aid to a presidential certification
that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device.
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush did not reissue that
certification and the jet aircraft transfers halted. With that mode
of nuclear-weapons delivery blocked, Pakistan turned to ballistic
missiles as an alternative. In the early 1990s, China reportedly
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sold Pakistan about 30 M-11 ballistic missiles and provided

technical assistance to develop an indigenous production
capability.180
Pakistan ended its nuclear ambiguity in May 1998 when it
conducted six explosions on the heels of renewed Indian
testing. Pakistans foreign secretary declared that the purpose
of the tests was to demonstrate the credibility of the countrys
nuclear deterrent.181 Pakistan also commissioned its first
plutonium production reactor to create that alternative pathway
for the acquisition of weapons-usable fissile material. In 2002,
General Khalid Kidwai told an interviewer that Pakistans
nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India and would be
used only if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at
stake. He cited several contingencies that could trigger nuclear
use: if India destroys the bulk of Pakistans conventional forces,
engages in economic strangulation, or foments large-scale
internal subversion in Pakistan.182 Pakistans nuclear intentions
arose from what its military and civil leaderships perceived as
an existential threat to the Islamic Republic posed by India.
But beyond general statements by officials about credible
minimum deterrence, Pakistan has not enunciated a formal
nuclear doctrine.
Proliferation and Terrorism

An Obama administration official made the startling observation
that Pakistan was on pace to becoming the fourth largest
nuclear powereventually eclipsing Britain and France,
and trailing only the United States, Russia, and China.183 A
2015 study by the Federation of American Scientists Hans
Kristensen and Robert Norris estimated the Pakistan nuclear
arsenal at 100-120 weapons and with sufficient weapons-usable
fissile material to top 200 devices.184 Chinese-provided nuclear
reactors, in tandem with a reprocessing facility to separate
plutonium from spent reactor fuel, could permit Pakistan
to increase significantly its annual warhead production. The
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upper bound of the program is unclear because Pakistans

worrying development of tactical nuclear weapons for
battlefield use has been justified by the Islamabad regime as
essential for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent in the
face of Indian conventional superiority. This dramatic growth
of Pakistans nuclear stockpile (with the attendant security
concerns addressed below) highlights the challenge of vertical
proliferation.
Pakistan, through the A.Q. Khan network, has also been a
source of horizontal proliferation by facilitating the efforts
of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. In the post9/11 era, U.S.-Pakistan relations were rocked by revelations
about Pakistans transfer of nuclear technology through the
black-market network of A.Q. Khan to the states of primary
proliferation concern to WashingtonNorth Korea, Iran, and
Libya.185 The Khan network transferred uranium-enrichment
technology to North Korea, thereby permitting the Pyongyang
regime to develop that alternative to its existing plutonium
program. North Koreas development of a covert uraniumenrichment program precipitated the nuclear crisis with the
United States in 2002 that led to the abrogation of the 1994
Agreed Framework. Under a barter arrangement, North Korea
reportedly provided ballistic-missile technology to Pakistan
in return for this uranium-enrichment assistance. In the case
of Iran, Khan provided bomb-related drawings, centrifuge
components, and a secret list of worldwide suppliers. Irans
uranium-enrichment program, the primary focus of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated between Iran and the
worlds major powers in 2015, was largely based on models and
designs obtained from Pakistan.186 Likewise, with Libya, starting
in the mid-1990s, the Khan network received about $100 million
for a nuclear-weapons starter kit: some 4,000 centrifuges and
the drawings to turn uranium into crude warheads. Fortunately,
Libya did not have a cadre of trained scientists to exploit
this technology, a telling sign of which was that much of the
equipment never made it out of packing crates.187
106
The U.S. and British intelligence services uncovered the

disturbing evidence of Pakistans onward proliferation to third
parties through their penetration of the A.Q. Khan network and
their extraordinary access to the Libyan WMD programs after
Qaddafis decision in December 2003 to undergo complete
and verifiable disarmament. Pakistans then president, Pervez
Musharraf, assured President George W. Bush that Pakistani
officials had not been involved in these illicit activities, and that
information obtained from Khans interrogation would be shared
with the U.S. government. Many longtime Pakistan watchers
were skeptical that Khans actions could have occurred without
some official involvement or, at the very least, acquiescence.
Musharraf was caught between the contending pressures of
U.S nonproliferation demands and strong nationalist support
for the father of his countrys nuclear program. The Bush
administration, which desperately sought Pakistani cooperation
on both terrorism and proliferation, evidently decided not
to sanction Pakistan for past behavior, with a view toward
uncovering the scope of past illicit activities and preventing a
future recurrence. The decision prompted speculation that the
primacy of the counterterrorism agenda affected how hard
Washington pressed Musharraf on proliferation.
Even more ominous than the evidence of technology transfers
to states were contacts with widely viewed undeterrable nonstate actorsspecifically, the report that two Pakistani nuclear
scientists had met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in
August 2001. With the 9/11 attacks planned and only weeks
away, the Al Qaeda leader was already exploring ways to obtain
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to mount still deadlier
attacks. These scientists, who supported the Talibans ultraorthodox version of Islamic rule and jihadist causes, expressed
the belief that Pakistans nuclear capability is the property of
the whole Muslim community.188 The ostensibly humanitarian
non-governmental organization that was the umbrella for this
contact included a former commander of Pakistans notorious
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency.189 Although the
Musharraf regime subsequently placed the scientists under
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house arrest, this pre-9/11 episode underscored the profound

danger posed by the potential leakage of Pakistani nuclear
know-how or weapons-related technology to Al Qaeda or
another Islamic extremist group through the action of rogue
elements within its nuclear establishment. In 2013, a U.S. State
Department report described the Khan network as defunct
and that [t]here is no indication that the Pakistani government
has supplied nuclear weapons-related materials to other
countries or non-state actors since the network was exposed
and shut down in 2004.190
Pakistans attitude toward terrorism has been ambivalent.
While thousands of its citizens have been killed in sectarianmotivated terrorist attacks, the Islamabad regime has been
accused of being a passive sponsor of terrorism by turning a
blind eye to homegrown extremists and employing terrorism as
an asymmetrical weapon against India in the ongoing Kashmir
dispute. A 2015 State Department report stated that Pakistan
has not taken sufficient action against externally-focused
groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) , which continued to
operate, train, organize, and fundraise in Pakistan.191
Nuclear Security
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. strategy to prevent Pakistan
from developing and testing nuclear weapons emphasized
the threat of sanctionsa form of deterrence by punishment.
After the May 1998 tests, pursuant to U.S. nonproliferation
legislation, President Clinton imposed additional sanctions to
those in effect since 1990 when the Pressler amendment was
triggered. Those nuclear-related sanctions were waived by
President Bush in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
to gain Pakistani cooperation in the war against Al Qaeda
and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Rather than futilely
attempting to coerce Pakistan to roll back its nuclear program,
Washington instead initiated a highly classified program to
cooperate with the Islamabad regime to secure the countrys
108
nuclear stockpile. In short, the Bush administration did a

turnabout, reorienting the deterrent strategy from punishment
to denial. As David Sanger and William Broad reported in the
New York Times, the United States provided $100 million
of assistance to help with physical security and the training
of Pakistani security personnel. The Obama administration
continued the cooperative program, with State Department,
Energy Department, and intelligence officials meeting secretly,
in locales around the world, with senior Pakistani officials from
the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the key institutional actor in
Pakistans nuclear chain of command.192
In addition to overseeing the movement, deployment, and use
of nuclear weapons, the SPD is also responsible for the security
of the arsenal against both internal and external threats.
Physical security of nuclear sites rests upon a multilayered
defense that includes an elite 20,000 member military force,
modern surveillance equipment, and an inventory system to
track warhead components. SPD also has a vetting program to
assess the political affiliation, religious beliefs, financial status,
and psychological health of its personnel.193 To prevent the
accidental or unauthorized employment of nuclear weapons,
Pakistan developed PALs, permissive action links, without
U.S. assistance. The detonation of a weapon reportedly requires
a 12-digit alphanumeric code, which can only be released by the
National Command Authority (NCA), the supreme body chaired
by the Pakistani prime minister. According to Pakistani officials,
the NCA employs a system requiring two or three people in
the chain of command to authenticate launch codes for nuclear
weapons.194
To further reduce the risk of unapproved use, warhead
components are stored separately from delivery vehicles.
But that key security feature may be changing as Pakistan
moves toward tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the field.
The U.S. fear is that these smaller, short-range weapons are
more vulnerable to theft by a determined outsider or a rogue
109
insider with radical sympathies.195 This shift could exacerbate

an existing vulnerabilityPakistans reliance on ground
transportation to move warheads from site to site, which it does
as a precaution against preemptive attack and seizure. Pakistani
officials, some of whom view the United States as a greater
threat to their nuclear assets than terrorist groups, consider
mobile warheads shuttled around in trucks more secure than
those in a garrisoned arsenal. But that security system rests on
the assumption that determined jihadists cannot gain insider
knowledge of the transportation routes.196
Dramatic events in recent years have accentuated the concern
over terrorist infiltration of Pakistans nuclear establishment.
In January 2011, the governor of Punjab was assassinated by
one of his own bodyguards who accused him of blasphemy.197
In September 2014, Al Qaeda militants, assisted by some
Pakistani naval personnel, attempted to seize a Pakistani
frigate to use the anti-ship missiles against U.S. vessels, but
they were repulsed after a suicide bombing and a prolonged
firefight.198 Nuclear security is further potentially compromised
by widespread corruption: in 2015, Pakistan ranked 117th
of 168 countries in Transparency Internationals Corruptions
Perception Index. U.S. officials continue to express confidence
in the security of Pakistans nuclear stockpile. In October 2015,
White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest stated, [T]he
government of Pakistan is well aware of the range of potential
threats to its nuclear arsenal, and we continue to be confident
that Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force
that understands the importance and the high priority that
the world places on nuclear security.199 But U.S. officials also
acknowledge the limits of their knowledge. The $100-million
assistance program during the George W. Bush and Obama
administrations was a form of cooperative threat reduction,
but unlike the Russian experience with the Nunn-Lugar
program, U.S. experts were not granted access to Pakistani
nuclear sites. A Pakistani military official stated that access
110
to Pakistans nuclear weapons facilities was a red line that

Islamabad would not cross.200
The limits of Pakistani cooperation with the United States on
nuclear security are a reflection of Islamabads suspicion of
U.S. intentions. This distrust was further heightened by the U.S.
Special Forces mission to kill Osama bin Laden in May 2011,
which was undertaken without the foreknowledge of Pakistani
officials. National embarrassment that the worlds most wanted
terrorist was living in Abbottabad about a mile from Pakistans
counterpart to West Point quickly gave way to fury over the
violation of the countrys sovereignty. When then Senator John
Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
visited Islamabad two weeks after the bin Laden raid, the
furious Pakistani leadership demanded a written guarantee that
the United States would never launch a similar mission to grab
or secure Pakistans nuclear arsenal, even if the country had
descended into chaos during an internal crisis.201
The U.S. intelligence communitys black budget for 2013, a
copy of which was obtained by the Washington Post, belied the
confidence about Pakistans nuclear security expressed publicly
by U.S. officials. The document warned that knowledge of the
security of Pakistans nuclear weapons and associated material
encompassed one of the most critical set of...intelligence
gaps. Those blind spots were especially worrisome, the
document said, given the political instability, terrorist threat
and expanding inventory [of nuclear weapons] in that country.
The magnitude of concern within the intelligence community is
such that the budget section for preventing the illicit transfer of
nuclear weapons is divided into two categories: Pakistan and all
other countries.202

In 2016, the Nuclear Threat Initiatives annual Nuclear Security
Index ranked Pakistan dead last for security and control
111
measures out of 23 countries with weapons-usable materials,

and second to last (with only Russia worse) for the risk
environment.203 Pakistan embodies the jarring juxtaposition of
a fragile state threatened by homegrown jihadist terrorists and
the worlds fastest-growing nuclear stockpile.204
The United States never employed a classic deterrence by
punishment strategy, such as threatening a military strike
on Pakistans nuclear sites to prevent weapons acquisition.
However, the Bush and Clinton administrations did impose
punitive economic sanctions on Pakistan in accordance with
the Pressler amendment. After 9/11, when Washingtons
counterterrorism priorities trumped nonproliferation concerns,
U.S. strategy emphasized deterrence by denial, dependent
on cooperation, to secure the Pakistani arsenal. But mutual
suspicion limits cooperation because each views the other as
both partner and threat. In the United States, the complicity of
Pakistans ISI in the harboring of Osama bin Laden is suspected,
but unproven.205 In Pakistan, the daring U.S. helicopter assault
to kill the leader of Al Qaeda reaffirmed Pakistani fears and is
viewed as a potential precedent for seizing Pakistans nuclear
arsenal.
The risk of nuclear theft is increasing as the number of
warheads grows and Pakistan develops, and possibly deploys,
tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use. To the extent that
Pakistan has a formal nuclear doctrine, it has been conveyed
by officials under the rubric credible minimum deterrent. But
with the development of tactical nuclear weapons, Pakistan
is jettisoning minimalism for what it perceives to be the
requirements of credibility. General Khalid Kidwai of Pakistans
National Command Authority, defending the introduction
of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistans inventory, argued
that this new battlefield capability had blocked the avenues
for serious military operations by the other side, and that
the debate has been hi-jacked towards the lesser issues of
command and control, and the possibility of their falling into
112
wrong hands. [That] is unfortunate, because it has distracted

and diverted attention from the real purpose of [tactical nuclear
weapons]reinforcing deterrence [and] preventing war in South
Asia.206 The new emphasis on credibility over minimalism has
implications for the trajectory of the Pakistani nuclear program.
Its ceiling in terms of numbers of warheads is not obvious,
hence fueling the prediction that Pakistans arsenal may well
eventually surpass those of Britain and France.
The $100 million assistance package that the Bush and Obama
administrations provided Pakistan to secure its nuclear arsenal
was a form of deterrence by denial similar to the cooperative
threat reduction program mounted with Russia after the Cold
War. The Obama administration sought to revive periodic
engagement to improve bilateral relations with Pakistan after
they sunk to their nadir with a series of bilateral crises, including
the bin Laden mission, in 2011. The administration pursued
what the New York Timess David Sanger called a transactional
relationship that almost amounts to work-for-aiddropping
the rhetorical pretense of major non-NATO ally and limiting
cooperation to specific projects.207 As with Iran, the Obama
administration sought to limit the scope of Pakistans nuclear
program. A high priority of the secret talks, whose existence
was leaked to the press in October 2015, is forestalling
the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons that are more
vulnerable to theft or unauthorized use, and whose deployment
on the battlefield could provoke inadvertent escalation in a
crisis (such as those in 1999 and in 2000-2002) with India.
Perhaps in response to these U.S. concerns, Pakistan has built,
but reportedly not deployed, tactical nuclear weapons. A key
element of the deal offered by the Obama administration would
be the relaxation of strict controls placed on Pakistan by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of countries that oversees the
export of nuclear technology.208
An arms limitation agreement, such as that floated by the
Obama administration, would be a form of deterrence by denial
113
in that it would bound Pakistani capabilities, but not seek the

now diplomatically unobtainable objective of a full rollback
of the countrys nuclear weapons program. Nonproliferation
experts Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton argue that Pakistans
quest to be regarded as a normal nuclear state could be
conferred if Islamabad accepted several rigorous conditions,
including a commitment by Pakistan to forgo full spectrum
deterrence (entailing the deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons) in lieu of strategic (i.e., minimum) deterrence vis-vis India.209 This alternative future would require a major shift in
Pakistans strategic calculuswith South Asias geopolitics and
Pakistans domestic politics militating against change. Voluntary
restraint to cap capabilities by Pakistan is difficult to envision
while India continues to build up its nuclear forces in response
to China.
China, Pakistans s major strategic backer, has a mutual interest
with the United States in preventing nuclear terrorism or war
in South Asia, and Washington should encourage Beijing, at
a minimum, to exert leverage on Pakistans national security
managers to ensure nuclear security. Washingtons approach
toward Pakistans expanding nuclear program falls under the
rubric of deterrence by denial. But the general declaratory
policy in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 2010namely,
that any state facilitating terrorist access to nuclear weapons
or materials will be held fully accountableis a form of
deterrence by punishment. The calculated ambiguity of that
formulation does not lock the United States into any automatic
retaliatory response, but, for the Islamabad regime, the
couched threat creates an additional incentive to secure the
countrys nuclear arsenal, lest it be held responsible should
a weapon acquired by a terrorist group through leakage be
attributed to Pakistan.
Pakistans nuclear threat is embedded in the wider context
of U.S.-Pakistani relations, which are at an inflection point.
After 9/11, the U.S. counterterrorism agenda and the war
114
in Afghanistan trumped nonproliferation interests. With the

United States ramping down its involvement in Afghanistan
and Pakistan ramping up its nuclear capabilities, these priorities
have been shifting. But getting leverage on Pakistans nuclear
challenge will require addressing the broader geostrategic
environmentthat is, harnessing what should be Chinas and
Indias shared interests in forestalling a nuclear breakout in a
fragile state on their borders.
Above: Pakistani missiles on display in Karachi.

Photo courtesy of By SyedNaqvi90 at English Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=32511123
115
Recalibrating
Deterrence: Between
Punishment and
Denial
Deterrence after 9/11
Since 9/11, the Cold War concept of deterrence has been
retooled to address the threats of a new era. Effective
strategies on the state level to prevent nuclear terrorism are
the prerequisite for addressing non-state threats, such as those
posed by Al Qaeda and ISIS. Nuclear acquisition by a terrorist
group requires state involvement, whether as an act of state
policy or a failure to exercise sovereign control over weapons
and weapons-usable fissile material on its territory. Statefocused strategies will not eliminate non-state threats, but will
go far in achieving that objective.
DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
Millennial terrorist groups aspiring to conduct mass-casualty

attacks, like Al Qaeda and ISIS, may not be deterred by the
threat of retaliation, but states, existing in an international
system with laws and norms to govern state behavior, are
subject to leverage to affect their behavior. In 2004, the United
Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution
(UNSCR) 1540 that recognizes non-state WMD terrorism as
a threat to international peace and requires member states
to adopt and enforce corresponding domestic regulatory
measures. A violation of UNSCR 1540 would be referred to
the Security Council for appropriate punitive action under the
Left: The first Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington DC on April 12-13, 2010.
Photo courtesy of www.state.gov
117
UN Charters Chapter VII. UNSCR 1540 added an additional

normative and legal layer to the nonproliferation regime, but a
compliance gap remains because international law, with respect
to states joining or abstaining from treaties, is voluntary.
Most notably, three nuclear statesIndia, Pakistan, and
Israel (undeclared but widely acknowledged)exercised their
sovereign right not to accede to the NPT.
The principal pathways for a non-state actor to acquire a nuclear
weapon or weapons-usable materials from a statetransfer or
leakagehave been countered, respectively, by two updated
variants of traditional deterrence. Deterrence by punishment
seeks to affect the intention of a state to carry out a hostile act
through the credible threat of a punitive response, whereas
deterrence by denial seeks to affect the capabilities of the
target state (either by blocking the acquisition of those means
or through the adoption of defensive measures to render them
ineffective).210
The vast majority of work done in the nonproliferation area to
counter nuclear terrorism falls under the rubric of deterrence
by denial. This covers a range of activities, including export
controls to limit access to technology and physical security
at sensitive sites to lock down fissile material to prevent illicit
diversion, an objective pioneered through the U.S. Cooperative
Threat Reduction program, which the Obama administration
has proposed expanding to regions beyond its original focus
on the former Soviet Union. But some forms of deterrence by
denial can be non-cooperativea notable example of which is
the interdiction of contraband cargoes through the multinational
Proliferation Security Initiative to prevent the trafficking of WMD
technologies.
The Obama administration pursued cooperative threat
reductiona deterrence by denial strategythrough a series
of four Nuclear Security Summits, the last of which was held
in Washington in April 2016 that brought together some 50
heads of state. A signature accomplishment of the summit
process has been the reduction in the number of countries
118
with weapons-usable nuclear materials from 32 in 2010 to

24 by the end of 2015.211 Overall the summits resulted in the
removal of approximately 3,000 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium (HEU), enough for some 100 bombs. But to put that
in perspective, that amount accounts for only 4 percent of
global HEU stocks because the summit initiative focused
only on civilian programs and excluded those devoted to
military use. Meanwhile, Pakistan, China, India, and Japan are
planning facilities that will add to their stocks of plutonium. In
addition, Russia, which has some of the largest stockpiles of
HEU and plutonium, boycotted the 2016 summit in Washington
to express Putins political pique with the United States
over Ukraine sanctions.212 Still, the Nuclear Security Summit
process, the future of which is in question with the end of
the Obama presidency, globally extended the cooperative
security approach. Increased efforts by states to secure nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable materials will impede the ability
of a non-state terrorist group to buy, build, or steal a bomb.
DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT
The impetus for the Bush administrations administration

decision to launch a preventive war to topple the Saddam
Hussein regime in Iraq in 2003 was the nightmare scenario that
a rogue state would transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist
group. Yet the Bush administration did not issue a deterrent
threat to prevent such a transfer from state to non-state actor
until the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006. Dating back
to the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2003, President
Bush had warned North Korea that its efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons would not be tolerated.213 Nonetheless, North Korea
greatly augmented its stock of weapons-grade fissile material
by separating plutonium from its Yongbyon reactors spent
fuel rods. Only after North Korea actually conducted a test in
October 2006 and became a self-proclaimed nuclear weapon
state did President Bush enunciate a policy of deterrence by
punishment: The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by
North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered
119
a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North

Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.214
While Bushs statement specifically referenced North Korea,
the administration subsequently broadened that formulation
into a general policy.215 Yet the difficulty of enforcing red lines
was evidenced in 2007, months after the North Korean nuclear
test and the Bush administrations deterrent threat, when
Pyongyang conducted a state-to-state transfer with Syria by
providing a prototype nuclear reactor. Citing concerns about the
low reliability of intelligence, the Bush administration did not
respond militarily, but Israel took unilateral action, bombing the
Syrian site in September 2008.216
The Obama administrations Nuclear Posture Review of 2010
included a verbatim repetition of the Bush policy on transfer:
renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any
state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports
or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass
destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing
expertise or safe haven for such efforts. But what precisely
does fully accountable mean in practice? To the dismay
of arms control proponents who hold that the sole purpose
of nuclear weapons should be to deter other states nuclear
weapons, the Obama administrations calculated ambiguity left
open the option of using nuclear weapons against foes that
might threaten the United States with biological or chemical
weapons or transfer nuclear material to terrorists.217 For North
Korea, an alternative to calculated ambiguity would be an
explicit red line: the deliberate transfer of WMD capabilities
by the Pyongyang regime to a non-state entity could trigger
a non-nuclear, regime-changing response from the United
States. Such a stance, which goes beyond current U.S.
declaratory policy, could prove an effective form of deterrence
by punishment.
No leader of any nuclear country other than North Korea,
nuclear expert Michael Levi observed, has any meaningful
incentive to deliberately transfer nuclear weapons or materials
120
to a terrorist group.218 For those other countries, a highly

contentious issue relating to nuclear leakage is whether
potentially negligent states, such as Pakistan, should be held
fully accountable. Technical advances in the area of nuclear
attribution will increasingly permit experts to determine the
source of fissile material should an attack occur. Toward that
goal, the Bush administration established the National Technical
Nuclear Forensics Center within the Department of Homeland
Security in 2006. According to this DHS units mission
statement, Nuclear forensics may support attribution efforts
that serve to bolster U.S. defenses against nuclear threats,
across a wide spectrum, by encouraging nations to ensure the
security of their nuclear and radiological materials or weapons
to help prevent unwitting transfers to third parties through loss
of control.219 The United States has an interest in publicizing
its attribution capabilities so that states of proliferation concern
will know that they need to take possibility of detection, and
the attendant risk of retaliation, into account.220 In the thorny
case of Pakisan, political scientist Caitlin Talmadge argued,
It is difficult to imagine that the Pakistani government would
turn a blind eye to a future A.Q. Khan if it believed that nuclear
material or technology could be traced definitively back to
Pakistan and that its people and infrastructure would suffer the
consequences if those items were used in an attack against the
United States.221
But should states be encouraged or threatened to get them
to safeguard nuclear materials? A highly controversial proposal
would extend the deterrent threat to these countries by
enunciating a policy of expanded deterrence under which the
country of origin of the fissile material used in a nuclear terrorist
strike on the U.S. homeland would be held responsible.222 Yet
despite improving attribution capabilities, the United States
might be unable to determine the source of the material after
an attack, and would not want to be locked into automatic
retaliation against a negligent state, such as Russia, which has
a large nuclear weapons stockpile of its own. Opponents of
expanded deterrence hold that threatening retaliation against
121
countries like Russia and Pakistan in response to terrorist

attacks stemming from lax security practices is unwise. It
undercuts efforts to work cooperatively with those states to
improve their nuclear security, dissuades [them] from informing
others if they discover that their nuclear weapons or materials
[have been] stolen, [thereby] undermining any efforts to recover
them, and makes it difficult to work with [them] in the aftermath
of an attack to prevent further detonations.223
Yet the deterrent threat captured in the calculatedly ambiguous
phrase fully accountable does not commit the United States
to a retaliatory response against the country of origin. This
declaratory policy straddles the alternatives of expanded
deterrence and that of non-retaliation. The aim would be to
compel countries that need to improve fissile material security
to do more to deny terrorists access to nuclear and other WMD
capabilities. In short, the fear of deterrence by punishment
could lead countries that are the potential sources of nuclear
leakage to implement more effective strategies of deterrence
by denial. An inherent tension exists between the twin variants
of deterrencepunishment and denial. An over-emphasis on
the punitive threat of the former potentially undercuts the
target states incentive for cooperating in the implementation
of the latter. As discussed below, the policy tension between
punishment and denial can be managed but not resolved.
Deterrence and Threat Reduction

DETERRENCE BY DENIAL THROUGH ARMS CONTROL
The countries of primary concern with respect to the nexus of

proliferation and terrorismPakistan, North Korea, and Iran
are each at an inflection point.
Pakistan presents the striking contrast of a fragile state with a
struggling economy (ranked 170th among states in per capita
GDP) that is on a trajectory to become the worlds fourth largest
nuclear-weapon state. Its doctrine of credible deterrence has
122
entailed the development of tactical nuclear weapons more

vulnerable to theft. Pakistan, rated second lowest for risk
environment, faces a formidable homegrown jihadist threat
that threatens the countrys domestic stability.
North Korea, an essentially failed state with a GDP estimated
at a paltry $40 billion, is nonetheless on the threshold of a
game-changing strategic breakout with nuclear weapons and
intercontinental ballistic missiles that will allow the Kim Jong-un
regime to directly threaten to the U.S. homeland.
Iran concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with
the worlds major powers (the P5+1) that will hinder its access
to weapons-usable nuclear materials for 15 years. By bounding
Irans capabilities, this arms control agreement was a form of
deterrence by denial. The nuclear agreement was transactional
(since it addressed a discrete urgent threat to prevent an Iranian
nuclear breakout to the bomb), but it was not transformational
(as the accord was limited to just the nuclear portfolio). Iran
remains designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S.
State Department, but the JCPOA, if successfully implemented,
radically reduces the risk of Iran transferring a nuclear weapon
or weapons-usable materials to a terrorist group.
The Obama administrations strategy of pressure and
engagement to attain the nuclear accord with Iran
exemplified the successful management of the twin variants
of deterrencepunishment and denial. The administration did
threaten deterrence by punishmentwidely interpreted as
a potential military strike on Irans nuclear infrastructureif
Iran crossed the technological threshold of weaponization.
President Obama also clarified the mixed message of the
Bush administrationmaking clear that the U.S. goal was to
change Iranian behavior (by bringing Irans nuclear program
into compliance with its NPT obligations), not the maximalist
objective of regime change. By narrowing the focus to Iranian
conduct that violated established international norms, the
Obama administration generated multilateral support, which
123
critically included Russia and China, to exert meaningful

pressure on Iran.
The Iran nuclear accord set an important nonproliferation
precedent. Could that approachdeterrence by denial through
arms controlbe applied to constrain the nuclear capabilities of
two other hard cases, North Korea and Pakistan? In both, the
objective would be to cap and secure those countries nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable fissile material. Opting for a
negotiated freeze of capabilities recognizes that a full rollback
of either North Koreas or Pakistans nuclear programs is not
a diplomatically attainable objective. That said, even the more
modest goal of capping and securing their nuclear arsenals
would face formidable political obstacles in both countries.
North Korea is the one state that would plausibly sell a nuclear
weapon or technology to a terrorist group. The consequences
of whether the North has an arsenal of 20 or 100 weapons by
2020 (i.e., the low and high projections of the recent Johns
Hopkins study cited earlier) are enormous. Negotiating a freeze
would buy time and prevent the problem from getting worse.
China, which has balked at applying meaningful pressure on
North Korea to curb its nuclear ambitions, faces a strategic
choice of either acquiescing to Pyongyangs strategic breakout
or living with its adverse consequences in northeast Asia (e.g.,
the August 2016 decision to deploy the THAAD antimissile
system in South Korea). A negotiated freeze offers both North
Korea and the United States positive narratives: Pyongyang
would claim that the world had recognized North Korea as a
nuclear power, while the United States could assert that the
freeze forestalls a direct threat to the U.S. homeland and is
an interim step toward the eventual goal of denuclearization.
Deterrence by denial through arms control would be
complemented by deterrence by punishmenta declaratory
policy that threatens regime-changing retaliation should the North
transfer a nuclear weapon or materials to a terrorist group.
To counter the threat of nuclear leakage in Pakistan, the United
124
States implemented a policy of deterrence by denial in the

country through a $100 million program to secure Pakistans
nuclear laboratories and weapons (e.g., by separating warheads
from triggers and missiles). Yet U.S. officials remain concerned
about scientists who support radical Islamic causes infiltrating
Pakistans nuclear establishment, and, more broadly, about the
remote (but not unthinkable) possibility of an acute regimethreatening political crisis during which nuclear security
is breached and a warhead falls into the hands of Islamic
extremists.224 Indeed, the unilateral U.S. military strike on
Osama bin Ladens compound in Abbottabad that violated
Pakistani sovereignty heightened the preexisting Pakistani
apprehension about such a U.S. commando threat to their
nuclear arsenal. Hence, in a statement to parliament after the
bin Laden raid, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani,
reaffirmed Pakistans strategic relationship with the United
States, but went on to warn, Any attack against Pakistans
strategic assets [code for the countrys nuclear arsenal]
whether overt or covert will find a matching response. Pakistan
reserves the right to retaliate with full force.225 The bin Laden
episode and its aftermath reflected the political tension inherent
in a relationship in which each views the other both as partners
and threats.
The Obama administration has reportedly floated a deal
that would cap Pakistani nuclear capabilities (in particular,
the expansion into vulnerable tactical nuclear weapons for
battlefield use) in return for relaxing the strict controls on
nuclear exports to Pakistan. The proposal would essentially
trade off Pakistani restraint and transparency for measures to
normalize the Pakistani nuclear program, essentially on par with
the nuclear cooperation deal the Bush administration concluded
with India in 2006. Pakistan would reject such an agreement
if India continues to build up its nuclear arsenal and forward
deploys forces that leverage its conventional superiority over
Pakistan. In short, the negotiation of a cap on the Pakistani
program so that this fragile state does not become the worlds
125
fourth largest nuclear state can only be accomplished within the

broader geopolitical context. China, which played a constructive
role in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal, should have an interest
in avoiding a spiraling arms race in South Asia that increases the
risk of nuclear leakage from Pakistan.
Also at a political inflection point is Russia, which made vital
progress in securing its weapons and weapons-usable materials
after the Cold War, but has now ended the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program and runs the risk of backsliding. The Nuclear
Threat Initiatives Security Index ranked Russia as having the
worst risk environment among 24 countries with weaponsusable nuclear materials. Russias attitude is contradictory:
on the one hand, the Putin regime helped achieve the nuclear
deal with Iran as a member of the P5+1; on the other hand,
it boycotted the Nuclear Security Summit convened by the
Obama administration in April 2016. Given the overriding
importance of nuclear security and counterterrorism, the
United States should not link cooperation with Russia in this
realm to other issues, such as Ukraine. Even during the Cold
War, the United States and Soviet Union pursued nuclear arms
control and eschewed linkage to other issues, such as Vietnam,
because of their strong mutuality of interests. In the current
era, however, as a political matter, the open question is whether
pragmatic cooperation to address the urgent persisting threat of
nuclear terrorism can be reestablished and insulated from the
vicissitudes of the troubled U.S.-Russian relationship.
THE ISLAMIC STATE AND WMD TERRORISM
President Obama has stated that the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) is neither Islamic nor a state. But by occupying
territory in Syria and Iraq and declaring that geographical area
a caliphate, ISIS has assumed some of the attributes of a
state. By contrast, Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden preferred
operating in a weak state like Afghanistan and viewed the
establishment of a caliphate as a visionary goal. ISISs control
of a major city like Mosul provides this terrorist organization
126
technological and engineering assets of a magnitude

comparable to a state that could allow it to develop WMD
capabilities. ISIS, which has a declared interest in acquiring
WMD capabilities, has an active chemical weapons program.
ISIS exploited a well-stocked chemistry lab at the University of
Mosul to produce mustard gas for use against Kurdish fighters
in northern Iraq. ISIS propaganda has touted the possibility that,
with the funds seized from banks in Mosul and other cities, the
terrorist organization could tap its sympathizers in Pakistan to
purchase a nuclear weapon from corrupt officials. Rolling back
ISISs control over territory in Iraq and Syria would block its
access to the economic and technological capabilities of a state.
Such a strategy of deterrence by denial would not eliminate ISISs
threat of WMD terrorism, but would substantially reduce it.
This study has focused on the role of deterrence in preventing
catastrophic nuclear terrorism by a non-state actor involving an
actual weapon bought or stolen from a state. This nightmare
scenario is the classic deterrence dilemmamitigating the
threat of a low-probability event of highest consequence. A
much more likely event of lower consequence would be the
detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD)a so-called
dirty bombby ISIS or another terrorist group. After ISISs
deadly attack in Brussels in March 2016, Belgian investigators
discovered that the terrorist cell that conducted the operation
had also surveilled a nuclear power plant and videotaped a
scientist at a nuclear research facility.226 ISIS is motivated to
conduct a dirty bomb attack in the United States or Europe
because it would generate the groups desired resultmass
terror.227 RDDs have been called weapons of mass disruption
because their consequences would be primarily economic
and psychological. Though the cleanup of radioactive materials
wrapped into an RDDs conventional explosive could cost
billions of dollars, fatalities would likely be limited to those in
the blast zone. More serious would be an attack on a nuclear
power plant.
127
A strategy of deterrence by denial would aim both to block

ISISs (or any other terrorist groups) access to RDD capabilities
and to deploy defenses to prevent a successful attack on
a nuclear power plant. The former would entail securing
radiological materials as is being done with weapons and
weapons-usable materials. But radiological isotopes are in
pervasive use throughout society in medicine and business,
so a denial approach, while necessary, cannot realistically
eliminate the threat. As a dirty bomb event is more likely than
not to occur in the future, governments should mount a public
education campaign on RDDs, and how they differ from nuclear
weapons, to stave off mass panic in the wake of an attack.228
A telling indicator of the urgent concern about the dirty bomb
contingency is that at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2016
world leaders were asked to role-play in a scenario devised by
the White House in which a terrorist group acquires radioactive
isotopes stolen from a hospital and plots an attack. The United
States and Britain are planning a joint wargame to assess the
resilience of nuclear power stations to a terrorist attack.229
Nuclear terrorism encompasses a spectrum of threatsthe
detonation of a nuclear bomb, an attack on a civil nuclear
installation, or the dispersal of radiological materials through
a dirty bomb. Each differs in probability and consequence.
But the strategies adopted to counter these variegated
threats share a fundamental characteristic. Their focus is on
state actors, who through their intent or laxness, would be
the source countries of the weapons, nuclear technology,
and radioactive materials that terrorists would either use to
perpetrate attacks or target. This underscores the leitmotif
of this monograph: Effective strategies of deterrence, which
integrate both the denial and punishment variants, on the state
level remain the prerequisite for countering the non-state threat
of nuclear terrorism.
128
Endnotes

Bob Woodward, Obamas Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 363.
Joby Warrick, The Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA
(New York: Vintage Books, 2012), pp. 62-64.
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President

Obama at G20 Press Conference, November 16, 2014 <https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/16/remarks-president-obama-g20press-conference-november-16-2014>.
White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as

Delivered, April 5, 2009 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.
Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey,

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous
Decline? (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 2016),
p. 58 <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorismWeb.pdf>.
The two variants of deterrence were developed in Glenn H. Snyder,

Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, Research Monograph no. 1
(Princeton University, Center for International Studies, January 1959).
Cited in Keeping Nuclear Weapons From Terrorists (editorial), New York

Times, March 27, 2016 <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/opinion/
keeping-nuclear-weapons-from-terrorists.html>.
Anna Fitfield, In drills, U.S., South Korea practice striking Norths

nuclear plants, leaders, Washington Post, March 7, 2016 <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/in-drills-us-south-korea-practice-striking-northsnuclear-plants/2016/03/06/46e6019d-5f04-4277-9b41-e02fc1c2e801_story.
html>.
For example, the Gilpatric Committee report of 1965, written in the

aftermath of Chinas 1964 nuclear test, concluded, The world is fast
approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread
of nuclear weapons. William Burr, ed., The United States, China, and the
Bomb (National Security Archive Briefing Book no. 1) <http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB1/nhch7_3.htm>.
129
10
For a comprehensive review of the academic literature, see Scott D. Sagan,

The Causes of Weapons Proliferation, Annual Review of Political Science
14 (2011): 227. See also Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries
Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press;
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
11
Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and
Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Knopf, 2005), p. 349.
12
Central Intelligence Agency, NIE-3, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions,

November 15, 1950, p. 4; cited in Michah Zenko, Intelligence Estimates
of Nuclear Terrorism in Graham Allison, ed., Confronting the Specter of
Nuclear Terrorism, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 607 (September 2006), p. 90.
130
13
CIA, NIE-31, Soviet Capabilities for Clandestine Attack against the U.S.
with Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Vulnerability of the U.S. to Such
Attack, September 4, 1951; cited in ibid.
14
Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force,

Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (July 2001) <http://nsarchive.gwu.
edu/nukevault/ebb388/docs/EBB008.pdf>.
15
Zenko, Intelligence Estimates of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 92.
16
The historical legacy and continuing policy relevance of the Atoms for
Peace initiative is examined in Jospeh Pilat, ed., Atoms for Peace: A Future
after Fifty Years? (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press/Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2007).
17
Peter Lavoy, The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace, Arms Control
Today, December 1, 2003 <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/
Lavoy>.
18
White House, National Security Strategy 2002, September 17, 2002, pp.
13-14 <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.
19
Ibid., transmittal letter.
20
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Delivers State of

the Union Address, January 29, 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.
21
Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Steps In and the World Looks On, New York
Times, January 24, 1993, section IV, p. 1.
22
Steve Schifferes, Rumsfeld brushes aside WMD fears, BBC News Online,
July 9, 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3054423.stm>.
23
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Address on Iraq,

Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html>. Wolfowitz similarly asserted,
Disarming Iraq and the war on terror are not merely related. Disarming
Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and dismantling its nuclear
weapons program is a crucial part of winning the war on terror. Quoted in
Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, Iraqs Nuclear File: Depiction of Threat
Outgrew Supporting Evidence, Washington Post, August 10, 2003, A9
24
David E. Sanger, Viewing the War as a Lesson to the World, New York
Times, April 6, 2003, B1.
25
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Outlines

Progress in Operation Iraqi Freedom, April 16, 2003 <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030416-9.html>.
26
Sonni Efron, War with Iraq Diplomacy: Looking Past Baghdad to the
Next Challenge, Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2003, p. 10.
27
White House, President Barack Obamas Inaugural Address, January 20,

2009 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/>.
28
U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

Interview with David Sanger and Mark Landler of the New York
Times, August 6, 2010 <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/
texttrans/2010/08/20100809124718su0.4421154.html#axzz4LNO2M8G6>.
29
White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010), p. 11 <https://www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.
pdf>.
30
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 13

<http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_
Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf>.
31
The October 2002 NIEs Key Judgments were declassified in 2004.

See National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: Iraqs
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002
<http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf>.
32
White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as

Delivered, April 5, 2009 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>. Emphasis added.
33
Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses,

Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 46.
131
132
34
Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict

in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and World
Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 15, cited in Ibid.
35
See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, second edition (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006), p. 269.
36
Hoffman, Terrorism and WMD, p. 48.
37
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 280-281.
38
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), p. 5.
39
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities, First Annual

Report to the President and the Congress: Assessing the Threat, December
15, 1999, pp. vi-vii.< https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/
nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf>.
40
Ibid., p. 20.
41
The Al Qaeda training estimate is from The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 67.
42
David Albright, Kathryn Beuhler and Holly Higgins, Bin Laden and the
Bomb, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 1 (January/February 2002)
pp. 23-24.
43
Quotations in this paragraph are from White House, National Security

Strategy,
pp. 5, 13, 27.
44
The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 362.
45
David Ruppe, Iran, North Korea Seek to Deter United States, Official
Says, Global Security Newswire, February 3, 2006.
46
Anthony Deutsch, Samples confirm Islamic State used mustard gas in

Iraq - diplomat, Reuters, February 23, 2016 <http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-chemicalweapons-idUSKCN0VO1IC>.
47
Margaret Coker and Ben Kesling, Islamic State Hijacks Mosul University
Chemistry Lab for Making Bombs, Wall Street Journal, April1, 2016 <http://
www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-hijacks-mosul-university-chemistry-labfor-making-bombs-1459503003>.
48
Heather Saul, Isis claims it could buy its first nuclear weapon from
Pakistan within a year, Independent, May 22, 2015 <http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-claims-it-could-buy-its-firstnuclear-weapon-from-pakistan-within-12-months-10270525.html>.
49
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President

and Prime Minister of United Kingdom Tony Blair, September 20, 2001
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/president_016.asp>.
50
White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass

Destruction, December 2002, p. 6 (http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/16092.pdf). This public document was derived from the
classified National Security Presidential Directive 17, which was signed by
President Bush in September 2002.
51
Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh, Cautious Iran, Christian Science Monitor,
May 3, 2006 (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0503/p09s02-coop.html).
52
Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqs

Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd15.pdf>.
53
David Albright, Paul Brannan, Robert Kelley and Andrea Scheel Stricker,
Burma: A Nuclear Wannabe; Suspicious Links to North Korea; HighTech Procurements and Enigmatic Facilities, ISIS Reports, January 28,
2010 <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/burma-a-nuclear-wanabeesuspicious-links-to-north-korea-high-tech-procureme/>.
54
Nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Economist, June 24, 2010

<http://www.economist.com/node/16426072>.
55
Whether or not the Pakistani government was complicit remains a

matter of contention. Nonproliferation scholar Matthew Kroenig argues
that the activities of the A.Q. Kahn network were state-sponsored by
any reasonable definition of the term. Cited in Sagan, The Causes of
Weapons Proliferation, p. 231.
56
Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

(New York: Times Books and Henry Holt, 2004), pp. 20-23.
57
Transcript of President Obamas 100th-Day Press Briefing, New

York Times, April 29, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/
politics/29text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print>.
58
Stephen P. Cohen, The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship and Nuclear

Safety/Security, testimony to Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs, June 12, 2008.
59
Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence EstimateNuclear

Proliferation Trends Through 1987, NIE 4-82, July 27, 1982
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116894>.
133
134
60
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (known as the Silberman-Robb
Commission), Report to the President of the United States, March 31,
2005, p. 276.
61
See, for example, Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, The Seven Myths of
Nuclear Terrorism, Current History (April 2005), pp. 153-161.
62
Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards,

(Washington, DC: OTA, June 1977), p. 30
<https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF>.
63
Stephen M. Younger, Endangered Species:How We Can Avoid Mass

Destruction and Build Lasting Peace (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), p.
89.
64
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction:

How Difficult in Graham Allison, ed., Confronting the Specter of Nuclear
Terrorism, p. 133.
65
Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat

Revisited, Defense Horizons, no. 38 (Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, National Defense University, January 2004), p. 1
<http://hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf>.
66
Michael A. Levi and Michael C. Kelly, Weapons of Mass Disruption,

Scientific American, November 1, 2002
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/weapons-of-mass-disruptio/>.
67
Gilmore Commission Report, p. 48.
68
Ibid., p. 21.
69
Stephen Younger, Endangered Species, p. 99.
70
The Aspen Homeland Security Group, WMD Terrorism: An Update on the

Recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, November 15, 2012, pp. 7-8.
<http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/hsi/
AHSG%20WMD%20Paper%2011.15.12.pdf>.
71
Steven Mufson, Brussels attacks stoke fears about security of Belgian nuclear
facilities, Washington Post, March 25, 2016 <https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/europe/brussels-attacks-stoke-fears-about-security-of-belgiannuclear-facilities/2016/03/25/7e370148-f295-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.
html>. Alissa J. Rubin and Milan Schreuer, Belgium Fears Nuclear Plants Are
Vulnerable, New York Times, March 25, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/world/europe/belgium-fears-nuclearplants-are-vulnerable.html>.
72
Michelle Nichols, Exclusive - Iraq tells U.N. that terrorist groups seized
nuclear materials, Reuters, July 10, 2014 <http://in.reuters.com/article/usiraq-security-nuclear-idINKBN0FE2L620140709>.
73
Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Current Terrorist Threat to the

United States, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Terrorism,
February 12, 2015
<https://www.nctc.gov/docs/Current_Terrorist_Threat_to_the_United_States.
pdf>.
74
The Aspen Homeland Security Group, WMD Terrorism: An Update on the

Recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, November 15, 2012, p. 6
<http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/hsi/
AHSG%20WMD%20Paper%2011.15.12.pdf>.
75 Ibid.
76
David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, Obamas Nuclear

Strategy Intended as a Message, New York Times, April 6,
2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/07arms.
html?scp=9&sq=David+E.+Sanger&st=nyt>.
77
Shahram Chubin, Irans Nuclear Ambitions

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p.
123.
78
Quoted in David Ignatius, Talk Boldly With Iran, Washington Post,

June 23, 2006, p. A25.
79
Cited in Shahram Chubin, Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics

and National Security, Adephi Paper no. 342 (London: Oxford for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 123.
80
Cited in Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, Debating Irans Nuclear

Aspirations, Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), p. 106.
81
Katrin Bennhold and Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Iran Offer Clashing
Accounts of the Civil War in Syria, New York Times, January 23, 2014
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/world/middleeast/rouhani-says-iranhas-no-plan-for-nuclear-weapons.html?_r=0>.
82
Serge Schmemann, U.S. and Partners Quickly Set Sights on a Post-Taliban

Kabul, New York Times, November 13, 2001, p. 5.
135
83
Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte to the Senate

Armed Services Committee, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of
National Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee, February
28, 2006 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2006_
hr/060228-negroponte.htm>.
84
National Counterterrorism Center, Current Terrorist Threat to the United

States.
85
Ariane Tabatabai, Where does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

stand on nuclear negotiations? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March
11, 2015
<http://thebulletin.org/where-does-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-standnuclear-negotiations8084>.
86
Daniel Byman, Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 31, issue 3 (2008), p. 175.
87
Gregory Giles, A Framework for Assessing the Threat of IranianWMD

Terrorism against the United States, Committee on Homealnd Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, U.S. House
of Representatives, hearing on WMD Terrorism and Proliferant States,
September 8, 2005 <http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/WMD_Terrorism_and_
Proliferant_States_9-8-05.pdf?_=1318483610>.
88
Ibid., pp. 178-179.
89
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Irans Strategic Weapons

Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: Routledge for IISS, 2005), p. 11
90
Ray Takeyh, What will Irans new president do? His memoir offers some
clues, Washington Post, July 5, 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/what-will-irans-new-president-do-his-memoir-offerssomeclues/2013/07/05/3aba2764-dcfa-11e2-85de-c03ca84cb4ef_story.html>.
91
The precipitant of the IAEA investigation of Irans uranium enrichment

program was charges made by the dissident group, the National Council of
Resistance of Iran, in August 2002. Also revealed was the existence of a
heavy water plant at Arak, which could support a heavy-water moderated
reactor, which would produce plutonium.
92
IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, Annex, November
8, 2011, pp. 5-6.
93
Ibid., p. 12.
94 Chubin, Irans Nuclear Ambitions, p. 7.
136
95
Shahram Chubin, Is Iran a Military Threat, Survival 56, no. 2 (April-May 2014),
pp. 65-88.
96
Quoted in Dennis Ross, The Cant-Win Kids, New Republic, December

11, 2007 <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/the-cant-win-kids>.
97
Chris Weller, This satellite photo shows just how blacked-out North Korea is
at night, Tech Insider, October 15, 2015
<http://www.techinsider.io/north-korea-is-pitch-black-at-night-2015-10>.
98
Economist Data Team, The clear and present danger of a nuclear North
Korea, Economist, May 26, 2015
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-20>.
99
Cited in Graham T. Allison, North Koreas Lesson: Nukes for Sale,

New York Times, February 12, 2013
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/opinion/north-koreas-lesson-nukes-forsale.html>.
100 For a detailed history of Soviet-North Korean nuclear cooperation see James
Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korea Nuclear
Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York:
Routledge, 2000).
101 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear
Capabilities (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD: Wilson Center Press and
Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 233.
102 Stephen Engelberg with Michael R. Gordon, Intelligence Study Says North
Korea Has Nuclear Bomb, New York Times, December 26, 1993, section 1,
p. 1.
103 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The
First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2004), p. xiv.
104 Former Ambassador Robert Gallucci spoke at a meeting on North Korea in
U.S.-Japan Relations at the Woodrow Wilson Center on January 15, 1999.
105 Cited in Jack Pritchard, What I Saw In North Korea, New York Times,
January 21, 2004, p. A27. Pritchard was a senior State Department official
responsible for North Korea who resigned over differences with the Bush
administration.
106 Howard W. French, Officials Say U.S. Will Reposition Its Troops in South
Korea,
New York Times, June 3, 2003, p. A6.
107 UN Security Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006
< http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>.
137
108 Helene Cooper, U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List, New York
Times, October 12, 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/
asia/13terror.html>.
109 David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and
the Challenges to American Power (New York: Harmony, 2009), p. 327,
emphasis.
110 See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the National
Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, to Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University, Februrary 8, 2008 <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080211-6.html>.
111 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of the President,
May 25, 2009 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statementfrom-the-President-Regarding-North-Korea/>.
112 Glenn Kessler, Analysis: North Korea Tests U.S. Policy of Strategic
Patience, Washington Post, May 27, 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605047.
html?sid=ST2010052502499>.
113 Andrew Quinn, Insight: Obamas North Korean leap of faith falls short,
Reuters, March 30, 2012
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa-leapidUSBRE82T06T20120330 >.
114 Anna Fitfield, North Korea is stepping up uranium production
but for power or nukes? Washington Post, August 13, 2015
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-is-stepping-upuranium-production--but-for-power-or-nukes/2015/08/13/0238f8f6-413f-11e59f53-d1e3ddfd0cda_story.html>.
115 Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn, North Koras Nuclear Futures: Technology and
Strategy, US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015, p. 7 <http://38north.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf>.
116 David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, As North Koreas Nuclear Program
Advances, U.S. Strategy is Tested, New York Times, May 6, 2016
< http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-usstrategy.html>.
117 Associated Press, Life Expectancy Plummets, North Korea Says, May 16,
2001.
118 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History
(New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 297.
138
119 Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hasig, North Korea: Through the Looking Glass
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 66.
120 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), North Koreas Weapon
Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, January 2004), p. 24.
121 Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International
Security (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2011),
p. 141.
122 Ibid (emphasis added).

123 Mark McDonald, North Korea Suggests Libya Should Have Kept Nuclear
Program, New York Times, March 24, 2011
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25korea.html>.
124 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, North
Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, CRS Report
for Congress, no. RL41259 (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, November 7, 2006), p. 8 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/R41259.pdf>.
125 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 420.
126 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at
the United States Institute of Peace, October 11, 2009
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130806.htm>.
127 Mark McDonald, North Koreans Struggle, and Party Keeps Its Grip,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/world/asia/27northkorea.html>.
128 Jane Perlez, North Korea Tells China of Permanent Nuclear Policy,
New York Times, May 31, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/world/asia/china-north-korea-ri-suyong.html>.
129 White House, Press Briefing with Secretary Kerry, Deputy NSC Advisor Ben
Rhodes, and Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz, Ho Chi Minh
City, Vietnam,
May 24, 2016 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/24/
press-briefing-secretary-kerry-deputy-nsc-advisor-ben-rhodes-and>.
130 Quoted in Sheena Chestnut, Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean
Smuggling Networks, International Security 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007),
p. 99.
139
131 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat

Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Statement to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, May 12, 2013
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-090.pdf>.
132 Joshua Pollack, North Koreas Nuclear Exports: On What Terms?38
North, special report 9, October 14, 2010 <http://38north.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/08/38North_SR9_Pollack2.pdf>. David E. Sanger and William
J. Broad, Evidence is Cited Linking Koreans to Libyan Uranium, New York
Times, May 23, 2004 <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/evidenceis-cited-linking-koreans-to-libya-uranium.html>.
133 Graham T. Allison, North Koreas Lesson: Nukes for Sale,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/opinion/north-koreas-lesson-nukes-forsale.html>.
134 Somini Sengupta and Choe Sang-Hun, U.N. Toughens Sanctions on North
Korea in Response to Its Nuclear Program, New York Times, March 2, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions.
html>.
135 Stephanie Lieggi, Robert Shaw, and Masako Toki, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 66, no. 5, September 1, 2010 < http://thebulletin.org/2010/
septemberoctober/taking-control-stopping-north-korean-wmd-relatedprocurement>.
136 Anna Fitfield, U.S. and North Korea have been secretly discussing having
talks about talks, Washington Post, February 2, 2015 <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-and-north-korea-have-beensecretly-discussing-having-talks-about-talks/2015/02/02/ecf935ab-df2344fd-998d-551cb47d9af4_story.html>.
137 Interview with Siegfried Hecker: North Korea complicates the long-term
picture, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 5, 2013 <http://thebulletin.
org/interview-siegfried-hecker-north-korea-complicates-long-term-picture>.
138 Anna Fitfield, North Korea says its not interested in an Iran-style nuclear
deal, Washington Post, July 21, 2015 <https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/asia_pacific/north-korea-says-its-not-interested-in-an-iran-stylenuclear-deal/2015/07/21/63626f6a-9d4d-421b-9ada-ec5509344a43_story.
html>.
139 Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey,
140
pp. 8,12.
140 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms
Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), pp. 379-380.
141 Cited in Jonathan Dean, The Final Stage of Nuclear Arms Control in Brad
Roberts, ed., Proliferation in the 1990s (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995),
p. 271.
142 David Herszenhorn, Russia Wont Renew Pact on Weapons with U.S., New
York Times, October 12, 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/
europe/russia-wont-renew-pact-with-us-on-weapons.html>.
143 Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative
Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, no.
R43143 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2014),
p. 3 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf>.
144 Karen DeYoung, Russia to skip Nuclear Security Summit scheduled for
2016 in Washington, Washington Post, November 5, 2014 <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-to-skip-nuclear-securitysummit-scheduled-for-2016-in-washington/2014/11/05/1daa5bca-6535-11e4bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story.html>.
145 Robert Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, Global nuclear weapons inventories,
19452010, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 4 (July/August 2010), p.
81.
146 Data from the NTI website, Russia: Nuclear, April 2015
<http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/>.
147 Eric Schlosser, Primary Sources: Permissive Action Links and the Threat of
Nuclear War, New Yorker, January 17, 2014 <http://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-ofnuclear-war>.
148 William J. Broad, Guarding the Bomb: A Perfect Record, But Can It Last?
New York Times, January 29, 1991 <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/29/
science/guarding-the-bomb-a-perfect-record-but-can-it-last.
html?pagewanted=all>.
149 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe
(New York: Times Books, 2004), p. 90.
150 Broad, Guarding the Bomb.
151 Ibid.
141
152 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 279.
153 Tom Collina, Fact Sheet: The Lisbon Protocol at a Glance, Arms Control
Association, March 2014 <https://www.armscontrol.org/node/3289>.
154 Cited on NTI website, Russia: Nuclear. The number of tactical nuclear
weapons can only be estimated because the PNI committed each side to
reduce their stockpiles by a percentage target.
155 Nikitin and Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues
for Congress, pp. 3-4.
156 Ibid., p. 20.
157 Nikitin and Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for
Congress, p. 27.
158 Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey,
p. 43 <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorismWeb.pdf >.
159 Bryan Bender, After two decades, US-Russia nuclear security cooperation
becomes casualty of deteriorating relations, Boston Globe, January 19,
2015 <https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/01/19/after-twodecades-russia-nuclear-security-cooperation-becomes-casualty-deterioratingrelations/5nh8NbtjitUE8UqVWFIooL/story.html>.
160 Quoted in Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, The United States and Russia
must repair their partnership on nuclear security, Washington Post,
January 23, 2015
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-and-russiamust-repair-their-partnership-on-nuclear-security/2015/01/23/555b9a60-a27111e4-903f-9f2faf7cd9fe_story.html>.
161 Cited in Bunn, Malin, Roth, and Tobey, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 46.
162 Matthew Bunn, Yuri Morozov, Rolf Mowatt-Larrsen, Simon Saradzhyan,
William Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev, The U.S.-Russia Joint
Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Project on
Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School; and the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences, May 2011), pp. 10,13.
142
163 International Panel on Fissile Materials, Countries: Russia, May 18, 2016
<http://fissilematerials.org/countries/russia.html>.
164 Bunn, Morozov, et. al., The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear
Terrorism, pp. 18-19.
165 Naftali Bendavid, Removal of Chemical Weapons From Syria Is Completed,
Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2014 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/removal-ofchemical-weapons-from-syria-is-completed-1403529356>.
166 Quoted in Matthew Bunn, Russia puts positive spin on nuclear security
cooperation which is good, Nuclear Security Matters blog, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January
23, 2015 <http://nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/blog/russia-putspositive-spin-nuclear-security-cooperation-%E2%80%93-which-good>.
167 Sam Nunn, Remarks at Carnegie Moscow Center, NTI website, February
24, 2016 <http://www.nti.org/analysis/speeches/remarks-carnegie-moscowcenter/>.
168 Nunn and Lugar, The United States and Russia must repair their
partnership on nuclear security.
169 Bunn, Malin, Roth, and Tobey, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. ix. Nuclear
energy cooperation with Russia would also address climate change
concerns by augmenting the worlds supply of low-carbon energy.
170 Ron Moreau, Pakistan: The Most Dangerous? Newsweek, October 20,
2007 <http://www.newsweek.com/pakistan-most-dangerous-102955>.
171 Cited in Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism (commonly referred to as the Graham-Talent WMD Commission),
World at Risk
(New York: Vantage Books, 2008), p. 67 <http://www.pharmathene.com/
World_at_Risk_Report.pdf>.
172 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Series, 2012), p. 7.
173 Ibid., p. 61.
174 Ibid., p. 91.
175 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Nuclear Black Markets:
Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networksA Net
Assessment (London: IISS, 2007), p. 16.
143
176 Dafna Linzer, Past Arguments Dont Square with Current Iran Policy,
Washington Post, March 27, 2005, p. A15. The declassified National
Security Council document cited here is National Security Decision
Memorandum 324, April 20, 1976 on the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
website
<http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm324.
pdf>.
177 Cited on NTI website, Pakistan: Nuclear, April 2016 <http://www.nti.org/
learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/>.
178 IISS, Nuclear Black Markets, p. 22.
179 Cited in Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistans Nuclear Dangers (London:
Routledge for the IISS, 2014), p. 17.
180 Robert Greenberger and Matt Forney, China-Pakistan Missile Pact Shows
a Calculated Strategy, Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1998
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB913672324547291500>.
181 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons,
CRS Report for Congress, no. RL 34248 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, August 1, 2016), p. 6
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf>.
182 Khan, Eating Grass, pp. 351-352.
183 David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obamas Secrets in Wars and
Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), p.
60.
184 Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris, Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 19, 2015
<http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/10/06/0096340215611090.full.
pdf+html>.
185 According to the CIA, Pakistani assistance to Iran included designs for
nuclear weapons components. Douglas Jehl, CIA Says Pakistanis Gave
Iran Nuclear Aid, New York Times, November 24, 2004 <http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/11/24/politics/cia-says-pakistanis-gave-iran-nuclear-aid.
html>.
186 R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, Pakistani scientist Khan describes
Iranian efforts to buy nuclear bombs, Washington Post, March 14, 2010
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/
AR2010031302258.html>.
187 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, Pakistanis Nuclear Earnings:
144
$100 Million New York Times, March 16, 2004 < http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/03/16/world/pakistani-s-nuclear-earnings-100-million.html>.
188 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 20-23.
189 Bunn, et.al., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 16.
190 Quoted in Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons, pp. 22-23.
191 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, June 2, 2016, p.
228
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf>.
192 David E. Sanger, U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistans Nuclear Arsenal,
New York Times, October 15, 2015 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/
world/asia/us-exploring-deal-to-limit-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal.html?_r=0>.
193 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistans Nuclear Dangers, pp. 118-119.
194 Ibid., p. 121. Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons, p. 13.
195 Sanger, U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistans Nuclear Arsenal.
196 Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistans Nuclear Dangers, pp. 128, 134.
197 BBC news, Punjab Governor Salman Taseer assassinated in Islamabad,
January 4, 2011 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12111831>.
198 Syed Shoaib Hasan, Saeed Shah, and Siobhan Gorman, Al Qaeda Militants
Tried to Seize Pakistan Navy Frigate, Wall Street Journal, September
16, 2014 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/al-qaeda-militants-tried-to-seizepakistan-navy-frigate-1410884514>.
199 Quoted in Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons, p. 17.
200 Ibid., p. 21.
201 Sanger, Confront and Conceal, pp. 108-109.
202 Greg Miller, Craig Whitlock, and Barton Gellman, Top-secret U.S.
intelligence files show new levels of distrust of Pakistan, Washington Post,
September 2, 2013 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/top-secret-us-intelligence-files-show-new-levels-of-distrust-ofpakistan/2013/09/02/e19d03c2-11bf-11e3-b630-36617ca6640f_story.html>.
203 Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Security Index, third edition, January
2016 <http://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/NTI_2016-IndexReport_MAR-25-2.pdf>.
145
204 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2015 <http://library.fundforpeace.org/

library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>, p. 20. The Fund for Peace index placed
Pakistan under its High Alert category. The nuclear characterization by
Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Federation of American Scientists
is quoted on NTI website, Pakistan: Nuclear, April 2016 <http://www.nti.org/
learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/>.
205 Bruce Riedel, Pakistans Osama bin Laden Report: Was Pakistan Clueless
or Complicit in Harboring Bin Laden? Brookings Institution, July 12, 2013
<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pakistans-osama-bin-laden-reportwas-pakistan-clueless-or-complicit-in-harboring-bin-laden/>. Riedel reviews
the findings of a secret Pakistani commission report, leaked to Al Jazeera,
which accuses the ISI of gross incompetence, but does not rule out the
possibility of complicity.
206 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, A Conversation
with General Khalid Kidwai, March 23, 2015, p. 5
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf>.
207 Sanger, Confront and Conceal, p. 134.
208 Sanger, U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistans Nuclear Arsenal.
209 Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, Stimson
Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf>.
210 The two variants of deterrence were developed in Glenn H. Snyder,
Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, Research Monograph no. 1
(Princeton University, Center for International Studies, January 1959).
211 Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport, and Jenna Parker, The Nuclear Security
Summit: Accomplishments of the Process, An Arms Control Association
and Partnership for Global Security Report, March 2016 <https://www.
armscontrol.org/files/The-Nuclear-Security-Summits-Accomplishments-ofthe-Process.pdf>.
212 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, As Nuclear Security Summit Begins,
Materials Remain Vulnerable to Theft, New York Times, March 29, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/nuclear-fuels-are-vulnerabledespite-a-push.html>.
213 David E. Sanger, 2 Nuclear Weapons Challenges, 2 Different Strategies,
New York Times, June 21, 2003 <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/21/
world/2-nuclear-weapons-challenges-2-different-strategies.html>.
146
214 David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the
Challenges to American Power (New York: Harmony, 2009), p. 327.
215 See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the National
Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, to Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University, Februrary 8, 2008 <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080211-6.html>.
216 David E. Sanger, Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its
Claims About Syrian Reactor, New York Times, April 25, 2008 <http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/04/25/world/middleeast/25korea.html>.
217 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, White House is Rethinking Nuclear
Policy, New York Times, February 28, 2010 <http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/03/01/us/politics/01nuke.html>.
218 Michael A. Levi, Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism, Council
Special Report, No. 29 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,
2008), p. 1.
219 Department of Homeland Security, National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center, updated March 8, 2011 (emphasis added)
<http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1298646190060.shtm>.
220 For more on nuclear attribution see AAAS and the American Physical Society,
Nuclear Forensic Working Group, Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art,
and Program Needs, December 2012 <http://archives.aaas.org/publications.
php?pub_id=1004>.
221 Caitlin Talmadge, Deterring a Nuclear 9/11, Washington Quarterly, vol. 30,
no. 2, p. 32.
222 Robert L. Gallucci, Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme
Responses to U.S. Vulnerability, Harvard International Review 26, no. 4
(Winter 2005) <http://hir.harvard.edu/energyaverting-nuclear-catastrophe/>.
223 Levi, Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 4; cited in Debra
K. Decker, Before the First Bomb Goes Off: Developing Nuclear Attribution
Standards and Policies, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, April 2011, pp. 34-35.
224 David E. Sanger, Obamas Worst Pakistan Nightmare, New York Times
Magazine, January 11, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/
magazine/11pakistan-t.html>.
225 PM Regrets US Unilateral Action; Warns of Retaliation if Strategic Assets
Attacked, Pakistan Times, May 2, 2011 < http://pakistantimes.net/pt/detail.
php?newsId=21444>.
147
226 Rubin and Schreuer, Belgium Fears Nuclear Plants Are Vulnerable.
227 Michael Eisenstadt and Omar Mukhlis, The Potential for Radiological
Terrorism by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, The Washington Institute,
Policywatch 2671, August 10, 2016 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-potential-for-radiological-terrorism-by-al-qaeda-andthe-islamic-state>.
228 Bunn, Malin, Roth, and Tobey, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 4.
229 Heather Stewart, A terrorist dirty bomb? US summit asks world leaders
to plot response, Guardian (U.S. edition), April 1, 2016 <https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/01/a-terrorist-dirty-bomb-us-summitasks-world-leaders-to-plot-response>.
148
Also by Robert S. Litwak

Outlier States: American Strategies to Contain,
Engage, or Change Regimes
Drawing on historical and theoretical analysis, Robert Litwak makes a
timely and illuminating case for nuanced American policies toward Iran and
North Korea, two of the most challenging countries in American foreign
policy today. This book can serve as a strong foundation for policy debates
on American diplomacy and strategy in the years ahead. Outlier States is
policy-relevant scholarship at its finest.
Lee H. Hamilton, Center on Congress, Indiana University
Nothing has bedeviled U.S. foreign policy more since the end of the Cold
War than how to deal with a collection of despotic, hostile, and dangerous
middle-tier states, such as Iran and North Korea. In this lucid and thoughtful
book, Litwak compares the performances of the George W. Bush and
Obama administrations in handling such foes.
G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs
Logically organized, conceptually clear, analytically robust and practically

useful... Outlier States is destined to become the reference of choice for
U.S. officials seeking a clear exposition of the policy dilemmas and options
for bringing outlier states in from the cold.
Stewart Patrick, American Interest
149
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

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Washington, DC 20004-3027
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Deterring Nuclear Terrorism

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What is the purpose of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars?

What is the purpose of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars?

What countries are of primary concern with respect to the transfer or theft of nuclear weapons?

What countries are of primary concern with respect to the transfer or theft of nuclear weapons?

Deterring

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial

to President Woodrow Wilson, is the nations key nonpartisan policy

Thomas R. Nides, Chair

Preface and Acknowledgments

The Nexus of Proliferation and Terrorism

Terrorist Intentions and Capabilities

Iran: Denial through Arms Control

North Korea: A Failed State with Nuclear Weapons

Russia: The End of Cooperative Threat Reduction?

Pakistan: The Most Dangerous Country

Recalibrating Deterrence: Between Punishment and Denial

nuclear weapon in the hands of terroristsa game

These major shifts, which will affect the risks of nuclear