G.R. Nos.

118866-68 September 17, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ, alias RODOLFO DOMINGO or
"OMPONG," accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal from three sentences of reclusion perpetua,
accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, aliasRodolfo Domingo or
"Ompong," consistent with his negative pleas when arraigned
on November 5, 1992 and January 11, 1993, 1 impugns his
conviction for multiple murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029,
92-8030 and 92-8031 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, 2 of
Antipolo, Rizal. He anchors his entreaty for the reversal thereof
mainly on the ground that he was not fully and appropriately
apprised of or allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior
to and while undergoing custodial investigation.

In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of

Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children, 12-year old Karen
Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John Lester D. Laroya, were
discovered in their residence at 13 Emerald Street, Greenpark
Village, Cainta, Rizal by their horrified neighbors. The starcrossed trio were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab
wounds, and each of them had a knife still embedded in and
protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also
bore external signs of sexual assault. 3
None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome
murders. Two of them later testified in court, namely, Harold Jim
F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former merely recounted
how, while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya residence,
he and his friends stumbled upon the dead bodies of the
victims. Anita Pangan, on the other hand, recalled that at around
9:00 P.M. of June 23, 1992, appellant, who was a brother-in-law
of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some candies at her store
which is located inside the village. 4
Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn
statements just three days after the incident, the assertions in
which were of the same import as their respective testimonies

in court. 5 On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended

appellant at the house of his brother in Fort Bonifacio. SPO1
Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta Police Station in
Cainta, Rizal interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the
same day that he was arrested.

one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the

presence of counsel." Corollary thereto, paragraph 3 thereof
declares that any confession or admission obtained in violation
of the same shall be inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant.

This police officer declared in the trial court that before he

questioned appellant as to his participation in said crimes, all
steps were undertaken to completely inform the latter of his
rights and this he did in the presence of appellant's supposed
counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva. Appellant
then signed, likewise in the presence of said counsel, an
extrajudicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he
allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims. 6

An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in

said paragraph of Section 12 upon being held as a suspect and
made to undergo custodial investigation by the police
authorities. 9 As explained by this Court in People
vs. Marra, 10 custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once
as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to
elicit incriminating statements.

When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was

observed by the trial court to be afflicted with a problem in
expressing himself and an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo).
By appellant's own account, he only reached the fourth grade of
elementary schooling and, although conversant with Tagalog,
he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his name.
He bluntly repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and
insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel of his
choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva,
when he was interrogated at the police headquarters in Cainta,
Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Parenthetically, his answers to the questions appearing therein
are in surprisingly fluent, flawless and expressive
Tagalog, 7which could not have been done by him because of
his defect in speech and articulation.
He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police
authorities into signing the same, and not that he did so
voluntarily. While he admits having been at the residence of the
victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly denied
having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that same
night when he proceeded to his brother's place in Fort
Bonifacio. 8
1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1,
of Article III of the Constitution requires that "[a]ny person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a

requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain
those rights to the accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and
understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
The defendant in the dock must be made to understand
comprehensively, in the language or dialect that he knows, the
full extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere
characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the
rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and
inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the
procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is
entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented
and ramified by statutory law. 11
2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his
testimony before the lower court that the investigation of
appellant in connection with the murders actually commenced
at around 9:00 A.M. on June 27, 1992 at the police headquarters
in Cainta, Rizal, at the time when appellant was still without
counsel. 12 The sworn statement containing appellant's
extrajudicial confession itself shows that it was taken at around

11:00 A.M. 13 Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed

appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any
statement he made could be used for or against him in any
court, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own
choice, he nonetheless failed to tell appellant that if the latter
could not afford the services of counsel, he could be provided
with one. 14

services of a lawyer he shall be provided with one would have

been rectified by said counsel at that very stage of the
investigation. Indeed, from our earliest jurisprudence, the law
vouchsafes to the accused the right to an effective counsel, one
who can be made to act in protection of his rights, 16 and not by
merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone
who possesses a law degree.

The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all
fatal to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession
supposedly executed by appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr.
Jurisprudence along these lines have all been too consistent
an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously
have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Indeed,
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, could not be any
clearer.

Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of
such counsel at that stage of custodial interrogation are the
signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory
reading of the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of
the manner in which he conducted the interrogation, yields no
evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the
appellant his rights under the Constitution.

To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the

accused must perforce be informed, on top of all his other
rights enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of his
choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he
shall be provided with one. Without this further safeguard, the
cautionary right to counsel would merely
2 impress upon the
accused, more so upon an impecunious person like appellant
who is hardly educated, that his right thereto would mean
simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the
financial capacity to obtain legal services, and nothing more.
Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to
how appellant was able to engage the services of Atty. Lorenza
Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel who was allegedly present
when appellant executed his confession and who was not even
subpoenaed to testify thereon. This significant circumstance
lends credence to the latter's denial that he ever met in person,
much less executed the confession in the presence of, said
counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the record is that this
counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law
enforcers themselves, thus putting into serious doubt her
independence and competence in assisting appellant during the
investigation 15 as to affect its admissibility.
Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of
such serious charge involved in the cases, the failure of SPO1
Atanacio, Jr. to fully apprise appellant of all his rights,
particularly the requirement that if he could not afford the

In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al., 17 this Court aptly emphasized

these constitutional safeguards in this wise:
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as
the commencement of an adversary proceeding against
the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout
the interrogation. After such warnings
have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive
these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a

result of interrogation can be used

against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado"
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements
without full warnings of constitutional rights.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation
of accused persons." And, as this Court has already
stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described
by this Court.
. . . After a person is arrested and his
custodial investigation begins, a
confrontation arises which at best may
be termed unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned
and "cross-examined" not only by one
but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale.
He finds himself in strange and
unfamiliar surroundings, and every
person he meets, he considers hostile
to him. The investigators are welltrained and seasoned in their work.
They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it, out of the
detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they
were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them
into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights seeks to remedy this
imbalance.

3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of

the corpus delicti in this case, appellant's conviction must be
set aside for his extrajudicial confession is obviously
inadmissible in evidence against him. The rule is that an
extrajudicial confession, where admissible must be
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti in order to
sustain a finding of guilt. 18 Both must co-exist. The insistence of
the Office of the Solicitor General that appellant's confession
could nonetheless be treated as an "admission" which could
therefore be admitted in evidence is misplaced, for the Bill of
Rights treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in the
same light. 19 In addition, it should be stressed that in
appellant's case, no eyewitnesses to the actual killings were
ever presented to testify in court, and the prosecution relied
primarily on circumstantial evidence to inculpate appellant in
crimes wherein he was meted three penalties of reclusion
perpetua.

Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Rodolfo de
la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or "Ompong," is hereby
ACQUITTED. His immediate release is accordingly ordered
unless there be any other lawful cause for his continued
incarceration.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109773

March 30, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELBERTO BASE, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
It is significant that, with the exception of appellant's putative
extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt
has been presented by the People. The proposition that the
medical findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how
he allegedly committed the crimes falls
3 into the fatal error of
figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the
validity and admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial
confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied
and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the
basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which
has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en
probando.
Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme
penal consequences of the crimes on account of the shaky and
decrepit circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution.
While the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature a
weak one by itself, it assumes commensurate significance and
strength where the evidence for the prosecution itself is frail
and effete. For, needless to state, the prosecution must not rely
on the weakness of the evidence of the defense but upon the
vigor of its own. 20 In sum, the presumption of innocence
enjoyed by appellant has remained intact and impervious to the
prosecution's assault thereon.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, of Antipolo, Rizal in

In the early morning of February 8, 1990, a group of men arrived at

the residence of Julianito Luna y Tagle, Barangay Captain of
Namunga, Rosario, Batangas. One of the two men who introduced
themselves as policemen allegedly looking for a certain Hernandez
suddenly shot Julianito in the head with a .45 caliber pistol and
immediately after, they sped away in an owner-type jeep.
Accused-appellant Elberto Base was among those identified on
board the jeep and, together with Conrado Guno, Frederick Lazaro
and Eduardo Patrocinio, were indicted for Murder with Direct Assault
Upon a Person in Authority in a Second Amended
Information 1 alleging that
That on or about the 8th day of February 1990, at about
7:00 o'clock in the morning, in Barangay Namunga,
Municipality of Rosario, Province of Batangas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, armed with a caliber .38 revolver
and .45 caliber pistol, conspiring and confederating
together, acting in common accord and mutually helping
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation and
by means of a motor vehicle which is a top down owner
type jeep colored green with Plate No. UV-CFU-178, and
without justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the
said .45 caliber pistol, suddenly and without warning, one
Julianito Luna y Tagle known to them to be an elected
Barangay Captain (Punong Barangay) of the said
Municipality while in the performance of his official duties or
on the occasion thereof, or in connection therewith, thereby

inflicting upon the latter [a] gun shot wound, 1 x 1 cm., left
temporal region, 2 cm. above the left ear, entry with
contusion collar, inwards, upwards and backwards, with exit
at right occipital region and with avulsion of brain, complete
fracture of skull, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, accused Elberto Base and Conrado Guno
pleaded not guilty 2 to the crime charged. Frederick Lazaro and
Eduardo Patrocinio have remained at large.
Trial thereafter ensued after which the court a quo rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Elberto Base guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased P50,000.00 for the death of Julianito Luna; the
total sum of P40,000.00 as actual damages; and the
amount of P100,000.00, by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused Elberto Base is a detention
prisoner, the preventive imprisonment he had undergone
should be taken into consideration in the computation of his
sentence.
And for failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of accused Conrado Guno beyond reasonable doubt of
the charge against him in the Information, he is hereby
ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED. 3
Dissatisfied, accused Elberto Base interposed this appeal alleging
that
I
THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ELBERTO BASE OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION DESPITE ITS INADMISSIBILITY.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
[THE] CRIME OF MURDER.
The prosecution's version of the incident adopted the trial court's
factual narration of what transpired thus:
. . . around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 1990
three men arrived in the residence of Julianito Luna in
Namunga, Rosario, Batangas. One was identified to be
called Apple who knocked at the door and the person who
accompanied his two other companions. After Apple left,
Julianito Luna who was the Barangay Captain of the place
together with his wife and son Arvin went out and Julianito
Luna talked with the two men who introduced themselves
as policemen and were looking for one Hernandez.
Julianito told the two men that he did not know the man they
were looking for and told Arvin to accompany the two men
to one Ka Prado. At that juncture the man armed with a .45
pistol shot Julianito once hitting the latter on his head and
Julianito sprawled on the ground.
After the shooting the two men ran towards their top down
owner jeep colored green parked
4 on the National Highway
in front of the residence of Julianito Luna and thereafter
sped away towards the direction of the Poblacion of Ibaan,
Batangas.
Julianito Luna was rushed to a local hospital in Rosario,
Batangas who was given first aid and at a time when he
was about to be brought to Manila, he expired due to a gun
shot wound, 1 x 1 cm. left temporal region, 2 cm. above the
left ear, entry with contusion collar, inwards, upwards and
backwards, with exit at right occipital region and with
avulsion of brain complete fracture of skull, which directly
caused his death.
Early reports having reached the 217th PC Co. in Masaya,
Rosario, Batangas a team of PC and Police elements was
immediately dispatched to track down the assassins of
Julianito Luna and in due time the motor vehicle of the
assassins was recovered in the premises of the house of
Mrs. Amelia Quizon in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City already
parked but without the assassins.
The motor vehicle was brought to the camp of the 217th PC
Co., but was immediately returned to the place based upon
a notion that the assassins would come back to the place to
recover the same vehicle.

As expected, not long thereafter Elberto Base one of the

accused arrived in the premises of the house of Mrs. Amelia
Quizon in order to recover the top down owner type jeep
and it was then when he was collared by a team of PC
soldiers who were all in civilian clothes and brought to the
camp together with the motor vehicle.
In the camp in a line-up of several people Elberto Base was
positively identified by Amelia Quizon as one of the
passengers of the jeep who parked the jeep in her premises
and also the person who tried to recover the jeep when he
was finally collared by the PC soldiers. What made her so
remember Base is the scar on the face of the latter.
It was also established that before the vehicle in question
was brought to Lodlod, Lipa City by the assassins, the latter
passed by the house of the brother of Leo Vale in San Jose,
Batangas, and because the brother of Leo Vale was not
there, Leo Vale was requested by the passengers of the
jeep to accompany them to the house of the husband of
Amelia Quizon in Lodlod, Lipa City, to which request Leo
Vale acceded.
And in a line-up of several people Leo Vale positively
identified accused Elberto Base as one of the passengers of
the jeep whom he accompanied to Lodlod, Lipa City, and
which identification he reiterated when he testified in Court.
He also identified the subject vehicle, which the passenger
boarded and left in the premises of the residence of Amelia
Quizon.
The owner of the jeep involved with Plate No. UV-CPU-170
which the assassins used was established to be that of
Loreto Angeles of Paraaque, Metro Manila. It was
established that on February 7, 1990 accused Frederick
Lazaro known to him as policemen of Paraaque together
with accused Eduardo Patrocinio borrowed from him the
said vehicle telling him that he was going to Carmen,
Pangasinan, to which request he acceded and promising
him to return said jeep the following day.
While in the camp of the 217th PC Company Elberto Base
executed a written Sworn Statement with the assistance
and presence of Atty. Romeo Reyes of Rosario, Batangas,
who testified in court, to the effect that he assisted the
accused in the execution of his statement, by telling Elberto
Base of his constitutional rights before said execution. He
further testified that throughout the proceedings he was
present and the accused read the contents of his statement
before swearing to the truth of the same.1wphi1.nt

A perusal of the statement of Elberto Base shows that he

was well aware of the intended plot to kill Julianito Luna, by
admitting that a week before the killing he was with the
assassins surveiling the residence of Julianito Luna.
He also admitted to be with accused Frederick Lazaro and
Patrocinio when the jeep in question was borrowed by the
two and was with accused Lazaro and Patrocinio when they
left Kalayaan, Pasay City in proceeding to San Juan,
Batangas that day when Julianito Luna was shot.
Accused Base also admitted that he was left on a shed in
Ibaan, Batangas when Frederick Lazaro and Patrocinio
returned to Rosario and when they came back, he was
fetched and was with them in going to San Jose, Batangas
in the house of one June Vale and later on in Barangay
Lodlod, Lipa City where they left the jeep in the premises of
the house of Amelia Quizon. And finally Base admitted in his
statement that he was told to recover the jeep in Lodlod,
Lipa City.
Accused-appellant denied having anything to do with the fatal
shooting of the victim and alleges, in sum, that he was tortured to
admit the crime. As culled from his testimony, at around 5:00 to 6:00
p.m. in the afternoon of February 8, 1990, he had just disembarked
at the bus stop at Mataas na Lupa, Lipa City after visiting his uncle
Mauro Espina, his sister-in-law Perla Ronquillo and Opring Espina in
Maricaban, Pasay City. 4 From there, he intended to proceed on
board a jeepney to the terminal near the market in Lipa City. 5
However, he never reached his destination because he was picked
up by three armed men in civilian clothes who told him to come along
with them as they would ask him some questions. 6 He was brought
to Lodlod, Lipa City at the house of Amelia Quizon. 7 Upon their
arrival at Quizon's place, a gun was poked at accused-appellant and
he was ordered to lie down facing the ground. 8 As he lay thus, he
was trussed up at the neck, bound hand and foot with abaca rope
with his hands tied behind his back. 9 He was then loaded on a top
down jeep and brought to the 217th PC Company Detachment in
Rosario, Batangas. 10
Upon their arrival at the PC Detachment, accused-appellant was
brought to the CAFGU barracks and there he was mauled, pounded
with gun barrels and gun butts 11 by fifteen (15) persons 12 and forced
to admit to the shooting of the victim. 13 As a result of the mauling, his
lips bled and he broke a tooth. 14 To underscore just how tightly his
captors bound him, accused-appellant likewise showed the court a
quo a scar on his left arm allegedly caused by the tying of the rope. 15

As his lips bled because of the beating, accused wiped it across the
leg of his trousers pointing to a dark stain on the left leg of his pants
he was wearing in court 16 which was allegedly caused by brushing
his bloodied lips thereon. 17 After wiping his bloodied mouth, the
physical abuse continued despite accused's entreaties and
protestations as to why he was being beaten up. 18 He even informed
them that he was a Barangay Council member, to no avail. 19 After he
was manhandled, he was interrogated by Sgt. Romulo Mercado who
sat by a typewriter and took down his statements. 20
Accused-appellant, however, claimed that although Sgt. Mercado
asked him questions, the latter did not take down accused's real
answers and instead the said investigator typed what he wanted to
type therein. 21 Accused further testified that he was not given any
opportunity to read in whole or in part the typewritten
statement 22 and that it was only upon arraignment that he came to
know that the written statement taken from him which he was forced
to sign was actually a confession. 23
With regard to the manner in which the custodial interrogation was
conducted and the Sworn Statement 24 was executed, accusedappellant testified that his pleas to his interrogators that they observe
his constitutional rights went unheeded. 25 He likewise claimed that
although the sworn statement bore the attesting signature of Atty.
Romeo Reyes, he neither knew nor saw Atty. Reyes at the 217th PC
Detachment on February 8, 1990. 26Accused-appellant
denied thet
5
he knew his co-accused Conrado Guno, Frederick Lazaro and
Eduardo Patrocinio. 27 He likewise denied knowing Leo Valle and
Erlinda Angeles. 28
The crux of accused-appellant's appeal hinges on the admissibility of
the Sworn Statement dated February 8, 1990. In challenging its
probative value, he insists in sum that the document is inadmissible
in evidence because it was executed in violation of his constitutional
rights, firstly his right to counsel of his own choice.
We disagree.
Sec. 12, Article III of the Constitution embodies the mandatory
safeguards afforded a person under investigation for the commission
of a crime and the concomitant duty of the State and its agencies to
enforce such mandate. It declares that:
Sec. 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(1) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation

or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(2) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(3) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
Numerous decisions 29 of this court rule that for an extrajudicial
confession to be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with
the assistance of competent and independence counsel; 3.] express;
and 4.] in writing. 30
The mantle of protection afforded by the above quoted constitutional
provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into
custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody. 31 The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant
is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. 32
However, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from
confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to
protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit
although untrue. 33 It must be remembered in this regard that while
the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of
counsel de parte is not absolute. 34 Indeed
The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of
his own choice" were explicit details which were added
upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986
Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where,
during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to
the detainee would be one appointed by the military and
therefore beholden to the military.35
xxx

xxx

xxx

Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3

of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that
the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is

exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and

independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation
will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede,
nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could
not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.
While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer. 36
Verily, to bean effective counsel "[a] lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer
is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. 37 The counsel, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."38
A circumspect scrutiny of the records leaves this Court unconvinced
of accused-appellant's claim that he was not adequately assisted by
counsel during his custodial interrogation. Noteworthy are the
following excerpts of the testimony of the interrogating officer, Sgt.
Romulo Mercado:
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. Now, in connection with your investigation of the death of
Julianito Luna, do you remember if you ever investigated a
person, a certain person in the name of Elberto Base y
Malasmas?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, do you recall if he gave a written statement?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Yes, but that written statement which the accused

Elberto Base gave you, will you be able to recognize it?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. What language did he prefer to be asked of him?

A. Yes, sir.
A. Tagalog, sir.
Q. I am showing you the original of a written statement
consisting of four pages, and found in the possession of the
public prosecutor, please go over this written statement and
tell us if you recognize it?

Q. Let me invite your attention to the question appearing on

page 2, "Narito si Atty. Romeo T. Reyes na maari naming
ibigay sa iyo. Nais mo ba na asistihan ka niya?" Did you ask
him that question?

WITNESS:

Q. I will now address your attention to the signature

appearing on page 1 above the typewritten name Elberto
Base y Malasmas and below the information regarding his
constitutional rights and second signature purports to be
that of Elberto Base y Malasmas also on page 1 and after
he was offered the servies of Atty. Romeo T. Reyes and
after he has also expressed his consent to be assisted by
Atty. Reyes, whose signature[s] are those both legibly
reading Elberto Base?
A. Those are the signatures of Elberto Base, sir.

A. Yes, sir.
A. I was the one who took this that is why I know the
affidavit.
Q. It would appear from the face of this statement on page
one and again on page 4 that Elberto Base was assisted by
a lawyer in the person of Atty. Romeo T. Reyes, is that
correct?

xxx

xxx

Q. And the answer here appearing is " Opo." Who gave that
answer?

ATTY. CRESCINI:

A. Elberto, sir.

Q. Why do you know that those signatures marked in

evidence as Exhibits "V-6", "V-7" and "V-8" are the
signatures of Elberto Base?
xxx

xxx

xxx
WITNESS:

A. Yes, sir.

ATTY. CRESCINI:
xxx

xxx

xxx

6
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. All these statement appears to be in question and
answer form, please tell the court who propounded those
questions?

A. I was present when he affixed his signatures, sir.

Q. The first page also purports to show that you have read
and explain[ed] to the affiant Elberto Base y Malasmas his
constitutional rights. Did you actually read that to him?

Q. During the entire investigation you were conducting of

the witness Base, was Atty. Reyes whom you delegated to
assist Elberto Base present?

WITNESS:
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
A. He was there, sir.

WITNESS:

Q. Now there appears on page 3 marked as Exhibit "B-2"

this last question, the last question, "Nakahanda ka bang
lagdaan at sumpaan ang salaysay naito?" This is continued
to page 4, did you really ask him that question?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the answers appearing there, whose answers were
those?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Those were the answers of Elberto Malasmas (sic), sir.

Q. And the answer is here is "Opo". Who gave that answer?

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. The questions and answer[s] appears to be in Filipino.

Before you reduce[d] the statement in writing, did you
explain or ascertain from him what language or dialect he
was conversant most?
WITNESS:

xxx

A. Elberto Base, sir.

xxx
ATTY. CRESCINI:

Q. I will invite your attention to the signature appearing on

page one above the typewritten name Romeo T. Reyes,
opposite that of Elberto Base, as well as another signature
on the last page, below the phrase, "assisted by" and above
the typewritten name Atty. Romeo T. Reyes. Whose
signatures are those?
A. Those are the signatures of Atty. Reyes.
Q. Why do you say so?

xxx

xxx

A. When he signed that, we were facing each other.

xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. CRESCINI:

Q. And approximately, before February 8, 1990, do you

remember how many investigation have you conducted?

Q. Before Elberto Base signed his statement marked as

Exhibits "V" to "V-3" respectively, did you give him the
opportunity to read the same?

A. Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
A. I cannot remember anymore, sir.

WITNESS:
Q. About one hundred Mr. Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Less, sir.
Q. And after reading it out, did he sign his statement?
A. He was in front of us, I and Atty. Reyes when he affixed
his signature.

Q. And you know Atty. Reyes very well?

Q. Now, in your investigation conducted Mr. Witness, would

you agree with me that it is your procedure that before
proceeding with the investigation, you usually reduced into
writing the rights of the accused to be investigated?

Q. Now, Mr. Witness, I noticed that there is a

superimposition of the name Romeo T. Reyes on the name
printed as Conrado Reyes. Will you please explain the
significance of that written name Romeo T. Reyes on the
printed name Conrado T. Reyes?
WITNESS:
A. It was superimposed because I thought he was Atty.
Conrado Reyes.
ATTY. HERMOSO:

Q. Did he sign it voluntarily?

A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. This statement purports to have been subscribed and
sworn to before Captain Edmon Zaide, Administering Officer
on February 8, 1990. Do you know that as a fact?
A. I know that, sir.

Q. Why do you know that?

A. Because Capt. Zaide was also there. We were facing
each other. 39

Q. And as a matter of fact, the right[s] were also reduced

into writing when you investigated Elberto Base, correct?

A. I know him very well but I do not know his first name.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, so you would agree with me that
before you started to investigate Mr. Elberto Base, those
rights of the accused were already reduced into writing?
A. No, sir.
Q. So when did you reduce that (sic) rights into writing?

Sgt. Mercado remained steadfast and unwavering with regard to the

regularity in the conduct of the investigation despite repeated
attempts of defense counsel to throw him off track on cross
examination:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, you are the investigator who
conducted an investigation on Elberto Base, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. So you will admit that you do not know that well Atty.
Romeo T. Reyes?

WITNESS:

Q. Alright, I noticed that before you conducted the

investigation on Elberto Base, the name Atty. Romeo T.
Reyes was already typewritten on the top portion of your
sworn statement. Is that correct?
A. When he was in front of me and I was typing that
investigation, that was the time I put the name Atty. Romeo
T. Reyes.
Q. So you will agree with me that even before you started
the investigation of Elberto Base, Atty. Reyes' name was
already indicated at the start of the salaysay?

A. When he was in front of me, sir.

ATTY. CRESCINI:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, I noticed that in your investigation
conducted on Elberto Base, there is already a name of a
certain Atty. Romeo T. Reyes. Do you know this Atty. Romeo
T. Reyes? On the top portion of that investigation you
conducted on Elberto Base?

Q. How long have you been an investigator?

Objection, Your Honor. Misleading. Already answered.

COURT:

A. Yes, sir.

Sustained.

Q. How long have you known him?

ATTY. HERMOSO:

A. More or less seven months, sir.

Q. You will agree with me that before you reduced the rights
of the accused into writing, during the custodial investigation

A. More or less eight years, sir.

ATTY. HERMOSO:

the name Romeo T. Reyes was already placed on the

sworn statement.?

Q. Did you call Atty. Reyes before you investigated this

Base?

ATTY. CRESCINI:

A. Yes, sir.

Same objection.

COURT:

COURT:

Q. At the time that you inform[ed] the accused of his

constitutional rights particularly his right to be assisted by
counsel, did you personally inform him that before you
investigate him, he has the right to be assisted by counsel
of his choice?

Q. During all the time?

A. Yes, sir.

Sustained.
ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, I noticed that there were several
signatures on this Exhibit "V" for the prosecution marked as
Exhibits "V-6", "V-7", "V-9" on page 1 and on Exhibit "V-3"
submarkings "V-8", "V-10" and "V-11" and "V-12", now will
you please see for yourself these markings. Now, these
signatures marked as "V-5", "V-6", "V-7" and "V-9" and "V10", "V-11" and "V-12" were affixed by the respective names
appearing therein simultaneously?

A. Yes sir.

A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q. And did he inform you that he will be assisted by
counsel?

ATTY. HERMOSO:

Q. But did he inform you [of] the name of his lawyer whom
he wanted to represent him?

Q. You will admit Mr. Witness that Atty. Reyes' name came
into the picture because of your knowledge that this
statement would not be acceptable to court (sic) if the
accused is not assisted by counsel is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was this statement taken?

A. Because we know that the said statement will not be

acceptable in court if the accused is to be investigated and
is not assisted by a lawyer, that is why we have Atty. Reyes
called and presented him to the witness if he will accept
Atty. Reyes.

A. In our headquarters, sir.

COURT:

Q. Where was that?

Q. And did the accused accept the services of Atty. Reyes

when you told him that?

Q. And Atty. Reyes happened to be there?

A. We have him called (sic).

Proceed.

A. He told me he could not secure a services (sic) of a

lawyer during that time.

A. No, sir.

A. At Barangay Masaya, Rosario, Batangas.

Q. Is there any occasion when the witness first ask[ed] the

opinion of Atty. Reyes whether he should answer the
questioned or not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And these persons signed or affixed their signatures after

this statement of Elberto Base was typewritten, is it not, Mr.
Witness?

COURT:

A. I cannot remember, sir.

WITNESS:

WITNESS:

Q. Was there an occasion when Atty. Reyes would advise

the accused not to answer any question that you
propounded?

WITNESS:
Q. How did the name of Atty. Reyes come into the picture?
A. Yes, sir. If he is a suspect.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did Atty. Reyes first confer with the accused?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, did I get you right Mr. Witness that the assistance of
Atty. Romeo T. Reyes is through your insistence and not
thru the request of the accused?
ATTY. CRESCINI:
Objection, Your honor. There is no showing of insistence on
the part of the witness. It assumes a fact not testified.
COURT:
Reform your question.
ATTY. HERMOSO:

Q. Do I get you right Mr. Witness that Atty. Romeo T. Reyes'

name was brought to the 217th PC Company to assist the
accused Elberto Base because of your knowledge that this
statement is not acceptable to court if not assisted by [a]
lawyer?

A. I called for him. I was not yet sure if he will assist the
accused because he was not sure if the accused will
commit and the accused consented.

ATTY. CRESCINI:

A. He consented.

Objection Your Honor. Already answered.

Q. Now, Mr. Witness, what was the condition, body and

mind of the accused at the time he was being investigated?

Q. Did the accused consented (sic)?

COURT:

was extended by a policeman and two (2) PC soldiers

whose name I can no longer recall.
Q. But you can recall the name of the company commander
of the 217th PC Company?
A. Well, I understand he is no longer the executive officer
who attended me and brought me to the place where Base
was. I can't recall the name.
Q. Did you go to the 217th PC Company?

A. He was in good condition, sir.

Q. It was upon your initiative and not the accused that the
services of Atty. Reyes [was secured] to assist him in your
investigation?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q. So it is not the accused, would you agree with me, it was
9
you who requested?
ATTY. CRESCINI:

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you sure of that?
Q. Were you able to see that person, Elberto Base?
A. Yes, sir. 40
A. Yes, sir.
Even more revealing on the voluntariness in the taking of accusedappellant's statement is the following testimony of Atty. Romeo T.
Reyes who was with the accused and assisted him during the taking
thereof:

Q. Where in particular did you see him?

A. He was at the investigation room at the time I arrived.

ATTY. CRESCINI:

Q. If you see him again, will you be able to identify him?

Q. Now, on that date, sometime at about 8:00 in the

evening, do you recall having been requested to assist to
(sic) a person under custodial investigation?

A. Yes, sir.

Objection Your Honor. Already answered.

A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERMOSO:

Q. Will you look inside the Courtroom and point to him if he

is present?
A. Mr. Base is the one wearing a maong type shirt.

This is only a follow-up question.

Q. And can you recall the name of that person whom you
assisted?

COURT:

A. I think Elberto Base.

Q. About what time in the evening of February 8, 1990 did

they go to you when you went to the headquarters to assist
him?

Reform and make it clear.

Q. And if you see that person and having so requested, did

you accommodate the request to assist him?

A. The team that invited me arrived past 7:30 in the

evening, after having our supper.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you able to talk to him?

Q. Who in particular requested you to give assistance to

Elberto Base?

A. Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q. According to you a while ago, it is upon your initiative
that Atty. Romeo T. Reyes went to the 217th PC Company
to assist the accused?
WITNESS:

A. I was made to understand that I was invited by the

company commander of the 217th PC Company in
Barangay Namunga, Rosario, Batangas and the invitation

Q. What about?

A. Well, I told him about the gravity of the offense of which

he is being investigated and also I informed him of his
constitutional right.

Q. Whose signature is that?

A. That is my signature, sir.

Q. May I also invite your attention to the signature

appearing on the fourth page marked as Exh, "B-8" above
the typewritten name Elberto Base, whose signature is that?

Q. From whom in particular did you come to know about the

matter and gravity of his offense?

ATTY. CRESCINI:

A. That is the signature of Elberto Base.

May I place on the record that the witness has identified

Exh. "B-9". May I also invite your attention to an initial
appearing on the left hand margin at the bottom of page 2.
Whose initial is that?

Q. Why do you know that Exhibits "B-6", and "B-8" are the
signature of the accused?

A. The incident that took place was a public knowledge in

Rosario and I was apprised of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense and I informed
Mr. Base that you are bring investigated of a very grave
offense.

A. I was present when those signatures were affixed by

Elberto Base.

A. That is my initial, sir.

Q. In what language did you confer with Mr. Base more

particularly as far as advising him of his constitutional right
is concerned?

Q. How about this initial on page 3 at the left bottom portion,

whose initial is that?

Q. It also appears that this statement was sworn to on

February 8, 1990 before Capt. Eduardo Zayde, were you
present when this was sworn to?

A. In Tagalog, sir.

A. That is my initial.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And after so advising him about the gravity of the offense

for which he is being investigated as well as his
constitutional right, what did Mr. Base tell you?

Q. And finally, I address your attention to the last page to

the signature appearing above the typewritten name,
Romeo Reyes, whose signature is that?

Q. Now, let us go back to the taking of the statements. How

did Elberto Base give this statement?

A. Well, he insists that he is willing to give a voluntary

10
statement.

A. That is my signature.

A. He gave it in the vernacular.

Q. And the manner in which he gave this statement?

Q. And did he in fact give a statement?

Q. Do you know why you were required by the investigator

to affix your signature on each and all pages?

A. Casual manner.

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it voluntary?

Q. Were you present during the taking of his statement?

Q. Why?

A. Voluntary.

A. Yes, sir.

A. Just to show that I was present when the statement on

each and every page was taken.

Q. The very first portion of this statement, Exh. "B", started

with a narration by the investigator for some of the
constitutional rights of Elberto Base. Were you present
when this was done?

Q. Do you know if after the taking of the statement if Mr.

Base is given the opportunity to read such written
statement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you the original of the statement that
purports to be the written statement of Elberto Base
consisting of four (4) pages, and may I invite your attention
to a signature appearing above the typewritten name Atty.
Romeo Reyes, do you recognize that signature?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. I address your attention to the signatures appearing on

page 2 above the typewritten name Elberto Base marked as
Exhibits "B-6" and "B-7", so you know whose signatures are
those?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And all the answers, was in the vernacular, were these

given by Elberto?

Q. Whose signatures are those?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Those are the signatures of Elberto Base.

ATTY. CRESCINI:
That will be all, Your Honor, just two additional questions.

Q. Testifying before this Honorable Court in his defense, the

accused Elberto Base alleged not only that he was not
assisted by lawyer, that no lawyer was presented and he
also manifested that he was in the investigation room and
even in the course thereof he was maltreated and that his
lips were wounded, he had a broken tooth and a broken
bone at the back. Now, in the course of your staying at the
217th PC Company, he said you arrived at around 7:00
until the conclusion of his statement, did you notice any
maltreatment of this accused Elberto Base?

A. I cannot because 7:30 was dark and it was a black out

during that time they arrived.

A. I don't (sic) notice anything.

A. I think three (3).

ATTY. HERMOSO:

Q. Up to what time did you stay there Atty. Reyes at the

headquarters of the PC?

Q. Do you know these persons who entered your house?

Q. You went with them to the 217th PC Company?

A. I can no longer remember the name, but I am very sure

there was one (1) policeman who was with them.

A. Yes, sir.

A. I stayed there past 12:00 o'clock.

Q. From that time of your arrival sometime at 7:20 in the
evening until your departure at past 12:00 o'clock did you
notice any force exerted or applied on the person of Elberto
Base in the course of the investigation?

Q. And these persons who came to your house, did you

allow them to enter your house?

Q. How many persons?

xxx

xxx

A. P.C. vehicle.

A. Yes, sir.

Like Sgt. Mercado, Atty. Reyes remained constant and steadfast

despite intense grilling by defense counsel on cross-examination:

Q. What?
A. They extended to me an invitation to go to the camp of
the 217th PC Co. in Barangay Namunga, Rosario,
Batangas.

ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q. Alright, you said on February 8, 1990 at around 7:30 p.m.
a team from the 217th PC Company came to your house, is
that correct?

Q. So, the three policemen, what do you mean by extended

to you an invitation?
A. I was told that the company commander is requesting my
presence.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many persons came to your house then?
A. I think more than five (5).
Q. You cannot say even the number of these persons who
came to your house?

xxx

xxx

Q. Did you notice any injury in (sic) his person?

A. I did not notice any injury, sir.

xxx

Q. What vehicle did you use going to that headquarters?

xxx

A. There is no force exerted against Base.

41

Q. Since when have you been aware of this incident, Mr.

Witness?
A. Since the very morning, that was the news already in
town.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, the moment these three (3) perosns entered your

house, what was their purpose in going to your house, did
they inform you what was their purpose in going to your
house?

11

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, before this incident happened, before you were

invited to the 217th PC Co. do you already know this
incident?
A. Yes, sir, they informed me.
Q. Before you were informed by these policemen who came
to your house are you aware already of this incident of the
killing of Julianito Luna?

xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q. Now, what happened when you arrived at the 217th PC
Company?
A. I was introduced to Elberto Base.
Q. What happened after the introduction?
A. Well, I was told, that Elberto Base will give a voluntary
statement. I asked the investigating officer in the person of
Captain Zayde, if I can be allowed to talk to Elberto Base
before the actual taking of his statement.
Q. So, Mr. Witness, when you said that you be allowed to
talk with Mr. Base before the actual taking of the statement,
when you arrived there, there was no statement yet taken?
A. No statement yet.
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, who introduced you to Mr. Elberto
Base?

A. The company commander, whose name I forgot and

Capt. Zayde the investigating officer.

Q. And inside the investigation room aside from you and Mr.
Elberto Base while you were talking thereat, was there any
person inside?

Q. And where was that introduction made?

Q. So, actually the start of the giving of the statement of the

accused Elberto Base commenced after 8:30?
ATTY. CRESCINI:

A. Capt. Zayde was out in the room.

A. In the investigation room.
Q. How about the person who was typing?
Q. Who were present in the investigation room?

Objection, if your Honor, please, the witness did not fix the
period at exactly 8:30, he said around 8:30. So it's in that
neighborhood. It would be or should be around 8:30.

A. He was still there.

A. Mr. Base, Capt. Zayde and a PC officer also who is in
front of the typewriter.

COURT:
Q. Aside from the person who was in front of the typewriter,
was there another person inside the investigation room?

Q. What was that person doing in front of the typewriter?

A. There was none.
A. Well, he was then ready to take the statement of Mr.
Base.
Q. Do you know this person who is in front of the
typewriter?

Q. And the accused while he was in the investigation room

not in handcuffs?

To the best of your recollection, at about what time did the

investigator I am referring to Sgt. Mercado, start taking
down the written statement of Elberto Base?
A. Sir, in my presence?
Q. In your presence?

A. He was not handcuff (sic).

A. It was past 8:00 o'clock already, sir.

A. Ya, yes.
Q. What is the name, Mr. Witness?

12

A. A certain Sgt. Mercado.

Q. How about you do you know if he knows you, this Sgt.
Mercado?
A. Before the incident, I don't think so.
Q. Now, this Sgt. Mercado, is not included in the person
who fetched you in your house?
A. I could not remember.
Q. Now, when you requested that you first talk with Mr.
Elberto Base, were your request granted?

Q. Now, you said that you arrived there at 8:30 in the

evening of February 8, 1990, and according to you the
investigation officer have (sic) not yet taken the statement of
Elberto Base, is that correct?
A. Actually there were papers already in the typewriter and I
requested him to start all over again.

A. Maybe past 8:30, Your Honor.

Q. You are not certain?

Q. And who was that person you informed to start all over
again?
A. Sgt. Mercado.
Q. And did he start all over again?

A. I am not very sure of time, Your Honor.

Q. When the investigation started taking down the
statement of Elberto Base in your presence, you did not
consult your watch to determine what time the investigation
started?

A. Yes, sir, after I have conferred with Mr. Elberto Base.

Q. Where did you talk with Mr. Elberto Base?

Q. I am showing to you this alleged Extra-Judicial

Statement which was taken on February 8, 1990, at 217th
PC Company at around 8:00 p.m. in the presence of Atty.
Romeo Reyes. Would you kindly tell this Honorable Court if
your statement a while ago that your request from Sgt.
Mercado to start all over again was followed?

A. Well, inside the investigation room also.

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you not give a more specific time considering your

previous testimony that you arrived in the camp at around
8:30 in the evening?

A. I did not, Your Honor, but I am very sure now that

because of my conference that I have with Elberto Base the
actual taking of the statement took place about 8:30 to 9:00
o'clock in the evening.
COURT:
So you are not certain as to the exact time?
A. I am very certain, Your Honor.

Q. And that was per your previous declaration 8:30 in the

evening?

A. Yes, sir, I introduced myself.

Q. That you were requested by Capt. Zayde to help you in
the investigation?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. After arriving in the camp you hate (sic) to talk with the
commanding officer and Capt. Zayde?

A. That's not exactly (sic).

Q. You said, that is not exactly, what was the exact words?
(sic).

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And only after such conference were you introduced with
accused Elberto Base?

A. I could not recall exactly the words that I used but I told
him that I was requested to assist you in the conduct of the
investigation.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Now, I noticed in this alleged Extra-Judicial investigation,

Mr. Witness, that there was an erasure in the name
Conrado Reyes, do you have a hand in the changing of
your name in the first name, Mr. Witness?
A. Yes, sir, this is my correction.
Q. You requested correction of your name after it was
already typewritten?
A. Yes, sir.

A. Conference with himself.

COURT:

ATTY. HERMOSO:

What else did you tell him?

I think that would be all for the witness, Your Honor.

A. And I told him if he has a counsel of his own. And he

said, none. I further asked him if he is willing to be assisted
by a counsel in the giving of his statement consider (sic)
the gravity of the offense for which he is being investigated.

COURT:

Q. With Capt. Zayde and the commanding officer?

A. I have no conference with Capt. Zayde with Elberto
Base, only.
Q. By conference, I meant that you talk (sic) with the
commanding officer and Capt. Zayde before you had your
conference with the accused?

13

Q. Any further statement that you gave?

A. Yes, sir.
Q And for how long did your conference with the accused
last?
A. About 20 minutes, sir.
Q. It was only after the conference with the accused that his
statement was taken again?
A. Yes, sir.

You said that you informed the accused of his right to

remain silent, will you demonstrate to the Court how you
explained that right of the accused to Elberto Base?

A. After saying that he was willing to make use of my

assistance, I informed him on his constitutional rights and
after I have informed him I asked him if he is still willing to
give a free and voluntary statement.

A. Yes, sir, I told him in the vernacular that, "Ikaw ay

puedeng huwag magsalita at sumagot sa mga katanungang
(sic) ng investigador dito sa imbitigasyong ito hangang ikaw
ay huwag na (sic) magbigay ng salaysay sapagkat ito ay
maaring gamitin laban sa iyo."

Q. You said that you informed him of his constitutional

rights, what constitutional rights did you inform the
accused?

Q. That's how you explained to the accused?

A. That he is still presumed to be innocent, that he is

entitled to a lawyer of his own choice and that it is his right
to remain silent.

Q. For how many minutes did the investigation last?

ATTY. HERMOSO:
Q. The rights that you told him you explained to him?

A. Yes, Your Honor, on that particular right to remain silent.

A. I think it's almost three (3) hours.

Now, Mr. Witness, you said you were able to talk with Mr.
Base after he was introduced to you?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are those the rights that you explained to him?

Q. In the course of the investigation, when a particular

question is asked to the accused, you, as a counsel, during
that proceedings, did you at any particular moment advise
your client not to answer that question because it will be
very detrimental to him?

Q. And the first thing you utter (sic) when he was introduced
to you, is that, I am Atty. Reyes?

A. And that his statement that will be given will be used

against him. That is all that I informed the accused, Your
Honor.

A. There are times before the actual taking of the statement,

I interviewed Mr. Base and after narrating to me the incident
I told him if that will be substance of his testimony to be

given to the investigator and he told me, yes. And on the

basis of that assurance, will (sic) I allow him to answer
questions within the context of the narration that he gave to
me, although there are times when I have to caution him
during our conference that this is dangerous. There are
statements that are dangerous and I cautioned him to
beware.
Q. You have not yet answered my question. Repeat the
question.

Q. You did not answer the question of the court?

A. I did not advise him to sign. 42
The foregoing testimonial excerpts vividly show that Atty. Reyes'
participation during the custodial investigation of accused was
anything but perfunctory. Much less could it be argued that he was
remiss in his duties to assist the accused. On the contrary, they in
fact underscore his active participation in the proceedings.

Q. In the course of the investigation, when a particular

question is asked to the accused, you, as a counsel, during
that proceedings, did you at any particular moment advise
your client not to answer that question because it will be
very detrimental to him?

To support his claim that his sworn statement was irregularly taken,
accused-appellant further insists that the same was obtained through
force and paints a graphic picture of torture in the hands of fifteen
persons who repeatedly beat him up with gun barrels and butts 43 as
a result of which he allegedly lost a tooth and sustained contusions,
a busted mouth and broken bones at his back. 44

A. I cautioned him to think first before he answer (sic).

We remain unpersuaded.

Q. But your observation was not included in the

investigation conducted by the investigator?

For all accused-appellant's protestations to the contrary, his tale of

coercion and torture in the hands of his interrogators taxes
credulity vis--vis his testimonial declarations that despite
supposedly being severely mauled and sustaining injuries as a result
thereof he did not: 1.] complain to the senior officer of his
interrogators about how he was treated during his custodial
investigation; 45 2.] tell his wife of his injuries when she arrived the
next day nor did he ask her to take him to a hospital for
treatment; 46 3.] inform his lawyer of the alleged injuries he sustained
at the hands of his interrogators although he had several
opportunities to do so; 47 4.] inform his lawyer that he was forced to
sign the sworn statement; 48 5.] present any medical certificate to
prove the existence of his alleged injuries. Topping accusedappellant's incredible tale of torture is his almost two-year silence on
the incident which only came to light when he testified in
court. 49 Accused-appellant explains away these lapses as the
products of his "fear" of his interrogators. 50 However, his failure to
speak up and disclose his fear at the earliest opportunity subjects to
serious doubt the reality and substance of that supposed
fear. 51 Along the same vein, accused-appellant's unsupported claims
of physical abuse in the hands of his interrogators imply ring hollow
in the absence of other proof to corroborate them. Indeed

A. It was not included.

Q. You did not request that this 14
advice to the accused be
given to the accused?
A. I did not, Your Honor.
Q. After the statement of the accused was taken then by the
investigator, you and the accused together read the
statement again?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. Read the statement for the first time?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. And did you discuss this written statement to the
accused before he signed it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you advise him not to sign the statement?
A. Well, I told him if he is still willing to sign the statement.

. . . bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities

in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient
in view of the standing rule enunciated in the cases
of People v. Mada-I Santalani; 52 People
v. Balane; 53 and People v. Villanueva, 54 that where the
defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or
dures nor violence on their person; where they failed to
complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where

they did not institute any criminal or administrative action

against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where
there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined
by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these
were considered by this Court as factors indicating
voluntariness. 55
Going by accused-appellant's account, the Court likewise finds it odd
for accused-appellant's interrogators who picked him up for
questioning as he disembarked from a bus at Mataas na Lupa, Lipa
City 56 to take a detour by first bringing him to Lodlod, Lipa City at the
house of Amelia Quizon 57 where he was bound hand and foot at gun
point, 58 loaded on a top down jeep and then brought to the 217th PC
Detachment in Rosario, Batangas 59instead of being forthwith taken
to the PC Camp for questioning after being apprehended at the bus
stop. Settled is the rule that evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in
itself. 60 Suffice it to state in this regard that such circumstances
narrated by accused-appellant only tends to underscore the
incongruity of his tale of torture.
A circumspect scrutiny of accused-appellant's Sinumpaang
Salaysay 61 clearly shows how he and his co-accused planned the
killing of the deceased as well as the sequence of events before and
after the occurrence of the incident. These events could not have
been supplied either any of those interviewed by the peace officers
or by the peace officers themselves because the said statement is
replete with details which only one who has an intricate knowledge
thereof can supply, 62 Verily
It remains only to note that the extrajudicial statements of
Romeo Jabil and Rufo Llenarasas are replete with details
and they corroborate and complement each other so
substantially that it is very difficult to suppose that the
statements had been merely derived from the creative
imagination of the police officers involved. The confessions,
in other words, have the ring of truth about them. 63
When, as in this case, "[a]n extrajudicial statement satisfies the
requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high
order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowing confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. 64 The defense has the burden of
proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress, promise or
reward." 65 Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he failed to
overcome to overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus

delecti." In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to

prove the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a certain result
has been proven, i.e. a man has died and 2.] some person is
criminally responsible. 66
In this case, it is indubitable that a crime has been committed and
that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that
accused-appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit
the crime. 67 In fact, he was seen by the prosecution witnesses in the
company of his other co-accused. Furthermore, Atty. Romeo T.
Reyes, and the interrogator, Sgt. Romulo Mercado, testified to the
voluntariness of his confession. In this regard, it must be stressed
that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be
some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime
apart from the confession." 68
All told, an overall scrutiny of the records of this case leads us to no
other conclusion but the correctness of the trial court in holding that
the accused-appellant and his co-accused committed murder. What
remains to be determined is whether the elements of the crime have
been established.
Conspiracy is alleged in the information charging the accusedappellant of the crime. Conspiracy

15

. . . exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

conerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or
subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint
purpose, concert of action or community of
interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each
of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the
act of all. 69
A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay 70 would readily show
accused-appellant's complicity in the slaying of the victim. In the
sworn statement, he narrated that a week before the killing, he was
with the assassins in conducting a surveillance of the victim's
residence. 71 He also declared that he was with Frederick Lazaro and
Eduardo Patrocinio when the jeep with Plate Number CFU-178 was
borrowed by the two accused 72 and that he was with them when
they left Pasay City bound for San Juan, Batangas, the day the
victim was shot. 73 He likewise averred that he was left on a shed in
Ibaan, Batangas when Lazaro and Patrocinio returned to Rosario,
Batangas and that he was with them when they went to the house of
Jun Vale at San Jose, Batangas; 74 from there they proceeded to
Lodlod, Lipa City where they left the jeep in the premises of Amelia
Quizon's house. 75 Finally, accused-appellant admitted that he was
told to recover the jeep in Lodlod, Lipa City on the day he was
arrested. 76

The one-week interval when accused-appellant and his coconspirators first cased the victim's house up to the actual date of the
killing underscores the presence of evident premeditation. For this
aggravating circumstance to be considered, there must be proof of
the following elements thereof, i.e., 1.] the time the offenders
determined to commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that
they clung to their determination; and 3.] a sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow reflection upon the
consequences of the act. 77
Treachery is also alleged in the information indicting the
accused.1wphi1 There is treachery "[w]hen the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make." 78 The essence of alevosia is
the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the victim's part. 79 The fact that treachery
may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean it
can not also be appreciated if the attack is frontally launched. 80 Even
a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and the victim
is unarmed. 81 In this case, the suddenness of the shooting without
the slightest provocation from the victim who was unarmed and had
no opportunity to defend himself, clearly qualified by the crime with
treachery. 82
At the time the crime was committed on February 8, 1990, murder
was punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances
with no mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty of death
would be imposable under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, since the offense was committed during the suspension of
the imposition of the death penalty and prior to its reimposition under
Republic Act No. 7659, 63 the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.89 This penalty is single and indivisible, thus, it shall be
imposed regardless of any attending aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. 85

This Court, however, can not sustain the award of moral damages in
the absence of sufficient evidence to support it. 89 It is elementary
that for moral damages to be proper adjudicated in criminal offenses
resulting in physical injuries, there must be a factual basis for the
award thereof. 90
WHEREFORE, with the sole MODIFICATION that the award of One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos by way of moral damages
be DELETED, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respects.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 1975
CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro, The PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO CALARA, JR., and LOURDES
CALARA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37424 March 3, 1975
MAXIMO SIMEON, LOUIS MEDNATT, INOCENTES DE LUNA,
RUBEN MIRANDA, ALFONSO BALLESTEROS, RUDOLFO
SUAREZ, MANUEL MANALO, ALBERTO GABION, and RAFAEL
BRILL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the
Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38929 March 3, 1975

The sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos awarded by the

court a quo as civil indemnity ex delicto, without further need of proof
of damage, is proper as it follows prevailing damages jurisprudence
and is in line with the policy of the Court. 86 With regard to actual
damages, the trial court found that the wife of the victim spent
Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for food and drinks
during the deceased's ten-day wake; Ten 'Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos for funeral services and transportation expenses of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos. 87 Since accused-appellant does not
question this finding of the trial court, he is liable to private
complainants in the said amount as actual damages. 88

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, District Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch II, VICENTE
LONGAKIT, and JAIME DALION, respondents.
Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.
Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.

Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.

Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant
Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza for respondent and
petitioner People of the Philippines.

FERNANDEZ, J.:+.wph!1
The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20,
Article IV of the New Constitution, which reads:t.hqw
No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates
16 the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence,
and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible
a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense who has not been informed of his
right (to remain silent and) to counsel. 1
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate
has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective
effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has
not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against
the accused, if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his
right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be
so informed before that date.

Accordingly, We hereby sustain the orders of the respondent

Judges in G.R. No.
L-37201-02 2 and G.R. No. L-37424 3 declaring admissible the
confessions of the accused in said cases, and We hereby set
aside the order of the respondent Judge challenged in G.R. No.
L-38929 4 which declared inadmissible the confessions of the
accused in said case, although they have not been informed of
their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the
confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of
the New Constitution.

The remark of Senator Cuenco, when Republic Act No. 1083 was
being discussed in the Senate, that the bill which became
Republic Act No. 1083 provides that the detained person should
be informed of his right to counsel, was only the personal
opinion of Senator Cuenco. We grant that he was, as We
personally knew him to be, a learned lawyer and senator. But
his statement could reflect only his personal opinion because if
Congress had wanted Republic Act No. 1083 to grant a detained
person a right to counsel and to be informed of such right, it
should have been so worded. Congress did not do so.

The reasons for these rulings are as follows:

As originally worded, Senate Bill No. 50, which became

Republic Act No. 1083, provided: "In every case the person
detained shall be allowed, upon his request, to have the
services of an attorney or counsel. In the period of amendment,
the phrase "have the services of" was changed to the present
wording "communicate and confer anytime with his." As the
Solicitor General points out in his able memorandum,
apparently the purpose was to bring the provision in harmony
with the provision of a complementary measure, Republic Act
No. 857 (effective July 16, 1953), which provides:t.hqw

Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the

first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of
an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such
right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that
any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be
inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only
when the right already existed and had been violated.
Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in G.R.
Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the
effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules
then in force, no right had been violated as to render them
inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of
"their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed
of such right," because, We repeat, no such right existed at the
time.
The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act No. 1083
enacted in l954, which reads as follows:t.hqw
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and
to be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right
granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be
informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a
request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and
confer with counsel at any time.

SECTION 1. Any public officer who shall

obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise prevent an
attorney entitled to practice in the courts of the
Philippines from visiting and conferring
privately with a person arrested, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, said
visit and conference being requested by the
person arrested or by another acting in his
behalf, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform
the detained person of his "right" to counsel. They only allow
him to request to be given counsel. It is not for this Court to add
a requirement and carry on where both Congress and the
President stopped.
The history behind the new right granted to a detained person
by Section 20, Article IV of the New constitution to counsel and
to be informed of said right under pain of a confession taken in
violation thereof being rendered inadmissible in evidence,
clearly shows the intention to give this constitutional guaranty
not a retroactive, but a prospective, effect so as to cover only
confessions taken after the effectivity of the New Constitution.

To begin with, Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,

provides:t.hqw
Confession.The declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, may be given in evidence
against him.
And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:
Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.
Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are
universally recognized as admissible in evidence against him,
based on the presumption that no one would declare anything
against himself unless such declarations were true.
Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately
17 prompted by truth and
and knowingly confess to a crime unless
conscience. (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358).
The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible,
must be voluntary. And the first rule in this connection was that
before the confession could be admitted in evidence, the
prosecution must first show to the satisfaction of the Court that
the same was freely and voluntarily made, as provided for in
Section 4 of Act 619 of the Philippine Commission (U.S. vs.
Pascual, August 29, 1903, 2 Phil. 458). But with the repeal of
said provision of law by the Administrative Code in 1916, the
burden of proof was changed. Now, a confession is admissible
in evidence without previous proof of its voluntariness on the
theory that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is
proved (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 264;
People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53, 57, citing U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil.
308; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People v. Singh, 45 Phil.
676; People v. Pereto, 21 SCRA 1469).
And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial
confession was made involuntarily, it stands discredited in the
eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed. It is
incompetent as evidence and must be rejected. The defense

need not prove that its contents are false (U.S. vs. Delos Santos,
24 Phil. 329, 358; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 325, November, 1921).
The same rule was followed in People vs. Nishishima.
"Involuntary confessions are uniformly held inadmissible as
evidence by some courts on the ground that a confession so
obtained is unreliable, and by some on the ground of
humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or
unfairness towards the accused in criminal proceedings. ... ."
(57 Phil. 26, 48, 51; 1932). 4* In the concurring opinion of Justice
Butte, he said: "Apart, from the fact that involuntary
confessions will be declared incompetent and are therefore
utterly futile, it is high time to put a stop to these (third degree)
practices which are a blot on our Philippine civilization."
This rule was, however, changed by this court in 1953 in the
case of People vs. Delos Santos, et al., G.R. No. L-4880, citing
the rule in Moncado vs. People's Court, et al., 80 Phil 1, and
followed in the case of People vs. Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. L7472, January 31, 1956), to the effect that "a confession to be
repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by
force or violence or intimidation, but alsothat it is false or
untrue, for the law rejects the confession when by force or
violence, the accused is compelled against this will to tell a
falsehood, not when by such force and violence is compelled to
tell the truth." This ruling was followed in a number of cases. 5
But the ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court et al., 80 Phil 1,
which was the basis of the leading case of People vs. Delos
Santos, supra, was overruled in the case of Stonehill vs.
Diokno (20 SCRA 383, June 19, 1963), holding that evidence
illegally obtained is not admissible in evidence. So, We reverted
to the original rule. As stated by this Court, speaking
thru Justice Teehankee in People vs. Urro (44 SCRA 473, April
27, 1972), "involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
force or intimidation are null and voidand are abhorred by law
which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods
to secure a confession." "A coerced confession stands
discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never
existed." The defense need not prove that its contents are false.
Thus, We turned full circle and returned to the rule originally
established in the case of U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 323
and People vs. Nishishima, 42 Phil. 26. (See also People vs.
Imperio, 44 SCRA 75).

It must be noted that all these Philippine cases refer to coerced

confessions, whether the coercion was physical, mental and/or
emotional.
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided the
following cases: Massiah vs. United States(377 U.S. 201,
1964), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478, 1964); and Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966). In Miranda vs. Arizona, it was
held:t.hqw
To summarize, we hold that when an individual
is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against selfincrimination is jeopardized. Procedural
safeguards must be employed to protect the
privilege *[384 U.S. 479]* and unless other fully
effective means are adopted to notify the
person of his right of silence and to assure that
the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required.
He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warning have been given, and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make
statement. But unless and until such warning
and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him.
(Miranda vs. Arizona, supra, p. 478)[Emphasis
Ours]
When invoked in this jurisdiction, however, the Miranda rule
was rejected by this Court. In the cases of People vs. Jose (37
SCRA 450, February 6, 1971) and People vs. Paras 56 SCRA 248,

March 29, 1974), We rejected the rule that an extrajudicial

confession given without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence. This Court in the Jose case(as in the
Paras case), held:t.hqw
The inadmissibility of his extrajudicial
statements is likewise being questioned by
Jose on the other ground that he was not
assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Massiah
vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (37
U.S. 478) and Miranda vs .Arizona (384 U.S.
436).
The provision of the Constitution of the
Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights),
Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall ...
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel ... ." While the said provision is
identical to that in the Constitution of the
United States, in this18
jurisdiction the term
criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this
Court in U.S. vs. Beechman, 23 Phil 258 (1912),
in connection with a similar provision in the
Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902), to mean
proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to rendition of the judgment.
Implementing the said Constitutional provision,
We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court that "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ...
(b) to be present and defend in person and by
attorney at every state of the proceedings, that
is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of
the judgment." The only instances where an
accused is entitled to counsel before
arraignment, if he so requests, are during the
second stage of preliminary investigation (Rule
112, Section 11) and after the arrest(Rule 113,
Section 18). The rule in the United States need
not be unquestioningly adhered to in this
jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding

effect here, but also because in interpreting a

provision of the Constitution the meaning
attached hereto at the time of the adoption
thereof should be considered. And even there
the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be
deduced from the absence of unanimity in the
voting by the members of the United States
Supreme Court in all the three above-cited
cases. (People vs. Jose, supra, at page 472).
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution was aware of the
Escobedo and Miranda rule which had been rejected in the case
of Jose. That is the reason why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was
expressly included as a new right granted to a detained person
in the present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution.
When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of this
Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972 meeting of the 17man committee of the Steering Council, Delegate Leviste (O)
expressly made of record that "we are adopting here the rulings
of US Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We
cannot agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the existence
of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20,
Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our considered opinion,
clearly shows that the new right granted therein to a detained
person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain
of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has
and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It
did not exist before its incorporation in our New Constitution, as
We held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.
The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the historical fact
that the constitutional and legal guarantees as well as the legal
precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary,
underwent a slow and tedious development. The constitutional
guarantee in question might indeed have come late in the
progress of the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had
come under Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to proclaim; We
cannot properly do more.

Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional

guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the
administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the
acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the
People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where
confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force
although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional
Convention could not have intended such a a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of
justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally
suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.
Even in the United States, the trend is now towards
prospectivity. As noted in the memorandum of the Solicitor
General:t.hqw
... That survey indicates that in the early
decisions rejecting retroactivity, the United
States Supreme Court did not require "pure
prospectivity;" the new constitutional
requirements there were applied to all cases
still pending on direct review at the time they
were announced. (See Linkletter vs. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965) (on admissibility of
illegally-seized evidence); Tehan vs. Shott, 382
U.S. 406 (1966) (on the self-incrimination rule of
Griffin vs. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). But
the Court began a new course with Johnson
vs. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). It departed
from Linkletter and Tehan and came closer to
"pure prospectivity" by refusing to permit
cases still pending on direct review to benefit
from the new in-custody interrogation
requirements of Miranda vs. Arizona. As Chief
Justice Warren observed in Jenkins vs.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), "With Johnson
we began increasing emphasis upon the point
at which law enforcement officials relied upon
practices not yet prescribed." "More recently,"
he continued, "we have selected the point of
initial reliance." That development began
with Stovall vs. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (on
the line-up requirements of United States vs.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert vs.

California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). These new

rulings were held applicable only in the
immediate cases "and all future cases which
involve confrontation for identification
purposes conducted in the absence of counsel
after the dates of Wade and Gilbert." The fact
that Wade and Gilbert were thus the only
beneficiaries of the new rules was described as
an "unavoidable consequence of the necessity
that constitutional adjudications not stand as
mere dictum." In Jenkins vs. Delaware itself,
the Court held that the Miranda requirement did
not apply to a re-trial after June 13, 1966 the
cut-off point set for the Miranda requirement
by Johnson vs. New Jersey because Jenkins
original trial had begun before the cut-off point.
Thus, the remarkable thing about this
development in judge-made law is not that it is
given limited retroactive effort. That is to be
expected in the case of judicial decision as
distinguished from legislation. The notable
thing is that the limited
19retroactivity given to
judge-made law in the beginning by Linkletter
vs. Walker has been abandoned as the
Supreme Court in Johnson vs. New Jersey and
in Jenkins vs. Delaware moved toward "pure
prospectivity" (pp. 26-28) (Respondents'
memorandum, Feb. 16, 1974).
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:t.
hqw
Retroactive effect of penal laws.Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same,
is not applicable to the present cases: First, because of the
inclusion We have arrived at that the constitutional provision in
question has a prospective and not a retrospective effect, based

on the reasons We have given; second, because the "penal

laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer
to substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision in
question is basically aprocedural rule of evidence involving the
incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and therefore
cannot be included in the term "penal laws;" 6 and third,
because constitutional provisions as a rule should be given a
prospective effect. 7
Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained
person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain
of any confession given by him in violation thereof declared
inadmissible in evidence, to be prospective, and that
confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution are admissible in evidence against the accused,
his fundamental right to prove that his confession was
involuntary still stands. Our present ruling does not in any way
diminish any of his rights before the effectivity of the New
Constitution.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions for writs of
certiorari in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 and G.R. No. L-37424 are
denied and that in G.R. No. L-38929 is granted. As a
consequence, all the confessions involved in said cases are
hereby declared admissible in evidence. No costs.
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still
innocent and unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a
harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the
youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero,
are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is
confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed
no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12
years, has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her
untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil act" of non-

consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of

death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an
excuse nor does there exist any other rational justification other than
lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts
narrating the horrible experience and the tragic demise of a young
and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant, as such facts are
ably supported by evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as
houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1953.
His task was to take care of Isip's house which was
under construction adjacent to her old residence
situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian
Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
But he stayed and slept in an apartment also
owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 510).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was
Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by
Isip's house on her way to school and play inside
the compound yard, catching maya birds together
with other children. While they were playing,
appellant was always around washing his clothes.
Inside the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN,
August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995,
pp.17; 20-22).
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant
joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around
10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was
already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked
permission from Isip to go out with his friends
(TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who
also owned a store fronting the compound, saw
Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four times
catching birds inside Isip's unfinished house
around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished
house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's
store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).

On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a

resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house
between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office
regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V.
Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the
house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house,
Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That
same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw
Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the
unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp.
3-7; 14-17).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed
up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed appellant that there was none left
of it. She notice that appellant appeared to be
uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was
disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a
dazed manner. She asked why he looked so
worried but he did not answer. Then he left and
walked back to the compound (TSN, September
18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).

20
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter,
Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her
daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown
belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty
white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber
slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for
supper that night. On the following day, June 26,
1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant
boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando
Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the
top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had
thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995,
pp. 4-9; September 27, l995; pp. 14-17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy
found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the
septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw
to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan
(TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).

With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless

body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic
tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the
autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh
right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm.
angle of the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm.
left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect,
right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac
area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left,
posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right
4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm.
lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior
aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows, right,
4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm, forearms, left,
posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left,
dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right anterolateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right
anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left
antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral
aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x
3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks,
neck, subepicardial, subpleural petechial
hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual

Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete
lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock position
corresponding to the face of a watch edges
congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18,
1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126).
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and
SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that
her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was
missing. According to her, it was unlikely for
appellant to just disappear from the apartment
since whenever he would go out, he would
normally return on the same day or early morning
of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp.
6-11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also
informed that a townmate of appellant was working
in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan
City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of
the factory confirmed to them that appellant used
to work at the factory but she did not know his
present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the
other hand, informed them that appellant could
possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park,
Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime.
At the second floor of the house under
construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms
a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a
yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira
Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They
also found inside another room a pair of blue
slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant.
Also found in the yard, three armslength away from
the septic tank were an underwear, a leather
wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers
positively identified by Isip as appellant's
belongings. These items were brought to the police
station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August
18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).

A police report was subsequently prepared

including a referral slip addressed to the office of
the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1
Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's underwear
from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 38; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant
was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant
executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he raped and killed the
victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with
the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them
that he was not alone in raping and killing the
victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his coconspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21).
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with
homicide in an Information which reads: 2

21
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years
old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse
with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO
against her will and without her consent; that on
the occasion of said sexual assault, the abovenamed accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of
which, said victim died.
Contrary to law. 3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court
rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crime
charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and
to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y

Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further
sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake
of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be
immediately forwarded to the Honorable Supreme
Court for the automatic review in accordance to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code. (RPC), as amended, 5 appellant insists that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against him
is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his
testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version
of what transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian
Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of
Maria Isip, appellant's employer. After consuming
three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned
by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning
the jeepney at 12 o'clock noon. Then he had lunch
and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from
Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He
also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5).
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of
going out with his friend, opted to rejoin Gregorio
Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session.
They consumed one case of red horse beer.
Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched
him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to
Zaldy's house and bought a bottle of gin. They
finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m. After

consuming the bottle of gin, they went out and

bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It
was already 9 o'clock in the evening. While they
were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet.
After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet,
appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina
Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera
informed him that there was none left of it. He left
the store and proceeded to Isip's apartment. But
because it was already closed, he decided to sleep
at the second floor of Isip's unfinished house.
Around 10 o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived
carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside
the room where appellant was sleeping. As
appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife.
Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead
body of the child or they would kill him. He,
however, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by
Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the
dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped
dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon,
Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever
see him again, they would kill him. At 4 o'clock the
following morning, he left the compound and
proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the
police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police
officers allegedly brought him to a big house
somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the
police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not
admit that he was the one who raped and killed the
victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by
Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to
sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October
16, 1995, pp. 9-11). 6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest
circumspection in the review thereof since "there can be no stake
higher and no penalty more severe . . . than the termination of a
human life." 7 For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled

can never be restored. In order therefore, that appellant's guilty mind

be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the records are not
shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with
appellant's proffered excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any direct
evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve
him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence 8 and
pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is
more than one
circumstance;

22

2. the facts
from which the
inferences are
derived are
proven; and
3. the
combination of
all the
circumstances
is such as to
produce a
conviction
beyond
reasonable
doubt.

Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to

support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. 10 Facts and circumstances
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force,
may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the
court. 11

In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several

circumstantial evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is
more than enough to prove appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera,
sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished
big house where the crime happened and the
septic tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan
was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is
located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in
the evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry
Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of
the compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where
the unfinished big house is situated buying rice
noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accused's
hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsagging manner. That the accused appeared
uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That the
accused did not reply to her queries why he looked
worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C.
Suni, categorically testified that on June 25, 1995
between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way
to his in-laws house, he met accused Larry
Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-law's
residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to
the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also
saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the
gate of the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of
the unfinished big house where victim's body was
found inside the septic tank, testified that accused
Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since November
20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a
Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her
to leave. That after finishing some work she asked
him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is
customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in
the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the
next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not

return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7,

1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando
Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying the
route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which
include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry
Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded
his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00
early morning and alighted on top of the overpass
of the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was
found in the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of
the incident. This is a clear indication that the
victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated or there was
any reason for them to testify falsely against the
accused. The absence of any evidence as to the
existence of improper motive sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimonies of the witnesses,
therefore, should be given full faith and credit.
(People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988
162 SCRA 276,. 284; People vs. Ali L-18512
October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the
custodial investigation and after having been
informed of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public
Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement
admitting the commission of the crime. Said
confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed
to have been freely and voluntarily given. That
accused did not complain to the proper authorities
of any maltreatment on his person (People vs.
delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150 SCRA
311). He did not even informed the Inquest
Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his

statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced,

coersed or was promised of reward or leniency.
That his confession abound with details know only
to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the
Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and
as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and
explained to the accused his constitutional rights
and was present all throughout the giving of the
testimony. That he signed the statement given by
the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to
notice any irregularity in the manner of the
investigation and the physical conditions of the
accused. The post mortem findings shows that the
cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation;
Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate.
Consistent with the testimony of the accused that
he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the
table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto,
hinawakan ko siya sa kamay
tapos
tinulak ko siya, tapos
23
tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa.
Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos
ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or
tortured in giving the statement. There were no
medical certificate submitted by the accused to
sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police
officers.
There being no evidence
presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a
result of violence, torture,
maltreatment, intimidation, threat
or promise of reward or leniency
nor that the investigating officer
could have been motivated to
concoct facts narrated in said
affidavit; the confession of the
accused is held to be true,
correct and freely or voluntarily

given. (People v. Tuazon 6

SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6
SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52
SCRA 71, People v. Pingol 35
SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in
open Court that he was notable to enter the
apartment where he is sleeping because it was
already closed and he proceeded to the second
floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said
while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the
cadaver of the victim and dumped it inside his
room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered
him to have sex with the dead body but he refused.
That the two asked him to assist them in dumping
the dead body of the victim in the septic tank
downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is
unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry
Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not in the
unfinished house. That he slept in the said
unfinished house only that night of June 25, 1995
because the apartment where he was staying was
already closed. The Court is at a loss how would
Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in
the second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when
brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the
second floor of the unfinished house where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping, why will
Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs
only to be disposed/dump later in the septic tank
located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can
easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic
tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child
was taken to the room where accused Larry
Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to
have sex with the dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of
human testimony except it's
conformity to aver knowledge

observation and experience.

Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous.
(People vs. Santos L-385 Nov.
16, 1979)
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime
and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the body
of the victim in the septic tank, he could have
apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer
or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His
failure and omission to reveal the same is
unnatural. An innocent person will at once naturally
and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a
matter of preservation and self-defense and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's
silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent
will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
(People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH The circumstance of flight of the
accused strongly indicate his consciousness of
guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning
after the incident and did not return until he was
arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995. 12
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases,
to wit: 13
1). An accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape, where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the
felony of rape with homicide defined and penalized under

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using
force or
intimidation;
2.) When the
woman is
deprived of
reason or
otherwise
unconscious:
and

24

3.) When the

woman is
under twelve
years of age
or is
demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion

perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the

crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1.) When the
victim is under
eighteen (18)
years of age
and the
offender is a
parent,
ascendant,
step-parent,
guardian,
relative by
consanguinity
or affinity
within the third
civil degree, or
the commonlaw spouse of
the parent of
the victim.
2.) When the
victim is under
the custody of
the police or
military
authorities.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a

homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

3.) When the

rape is
committed in
full view of the
husband,
parent, any of
the children or
other relatives
within the third
degree of
consanguinity.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a

homicide is committed the penalty shall be death.

4.) When the

victim is a

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,

the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.

religious or a
child below
seven (7)
years old.
5.) When the
offender
knows that he
is afflicted with
Acquired
Immune
Deficiency
Syndrome
(AIDS)
disease.
6.) When
committed by
any member
of the Armed
Forces of the
Philippines or
Philippine
National
Police or any
law
enforcement
agency
7.) When by
reason or on
the occasion
of the rape,
the victim has
suffered
permanent
physical
mutilation. 14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still
considered a crime against chastity, 15 although under the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-classified as a
crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus,
may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended
party.

The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual

congress with a woman by force and without consent. 16 (Under the
new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and the victim
may even be a
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and
consent becomes immaterial 18 not only because force is not an
element of statutory rape, 19 but the absence of a free consent is
presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will
therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman
is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this
case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven
but also the other element that the perpetrator's evil acts with the
offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or
threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this
case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim
was adequately proven. This is shown from the testimony of the
medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination on the
child's body:
Q: And after that what other
parts25
or the victim did you
examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia
of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out
after you examined the genitalia
of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with
complete laceration at 4:00
o'clock and 8:00 o'clock position
and that the edges were
congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused
the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances
this might have (sic) caused by a
penetration of an organ.

Q: So, the laceration was

caused by the penetration of a
male organ?

18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom

bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.

A: Adult male organ, sir.

Q: You are very sure of that, Mr.
Witness?

19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking

bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape
yung batang babae?.

A: I am very sure of that. 20

S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession,

appellant himself admitted that he had sexual congress with the
unconscious child.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga
sandali o oras na iyon?
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng
bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung
malaking bahay na ginagawa,
tapos dumating yung batang
babae. Pag-pasok niya sa
kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa
kamay tapos tinulak ko siya.
Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa
mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na
siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang
babae na sinasabi mo?
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to
a dirty white short placed atop
this investigator's table. Subject
evidence were part of evidences
recovered at the crime scene).
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape
yung batang babae?
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing.
Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa
ko.

20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras

nangyari?
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng
gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko
na matandaan kung anong
petsa, basta araw ng Linggo.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, M.M.
22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan
ng batang babae na ni rape mo?
S: Hindi ko po alam.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong
ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan
ng batang babae na iyong ni
rape at pinatay ay si MA.
VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan
mo ha ito?
S: Oho.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo,
nakaraos ka ba?
S: Naka-isa po.

25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo

kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng
"NAKARAOS", maaari bang
ipaliwanag mo ito?

32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?

S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa
kong masama, natatakot ako sa
mga pulis.

S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.

26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan
parte na katawan ng batang
babae yung iyong ari?

33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA.

VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya
sa poso-negra?

S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari

nung babae.

S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung

pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na
siya sa poso-negra.

27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si

MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa
ang sumunod mong ginawa?

34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong

krimen na ito, mayroon ka
kasama?

S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.

S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.

28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA.

VICTORIA
26 matapos mong itulak
sa terrace?

35. T: Noong mga oras o

sandaling gahasain mo si MA.
VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba
siya o patay na?

S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
S: Buhay pa po.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso
negra na sinasabi mo?

36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?

S: Doon din sa malaking bahay

ni ATE MARIA.

S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa

terrace. 21

30. T: Bakit mo namang

naisipang ilagay si MA.
VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo
inilagay siya?
S: Natatakot po ako.

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the

victim's vagina; rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into
the female sex organ is enough to consummate the sexual
intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the male's organ or instrument
of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman's private parts is
sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim,
force was indeed employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover,
from appellant's own account, he pushed the victim causing the latter
to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that
instance that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient

desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile

invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had
not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether
before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial
confession, which he, however, claims was executed in violation of
his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the
records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned
and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory
and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer:
Q Will you please inform the
Court what was that call about?
A We went to the station,
police investigation together with
Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we
were told by Police Officer
Alabastro that one Larry
Mahinay would like to confess of
the crime of, I think, rape with
homicide.
Q And upon reaching the
investigation room of Valenzuela
PNP who were the other person
present?
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir,
Police Officer Nacis and other
investigator inside the
investigation room and the
parents of the child who was
allegedly raped.
Q And when you reached the
investigation room do you notice
whether the accused already
there?
A The accused was already
there.

Q Was he alone?

was the first thing that you did as

assisting lawyer to the accused?

A Yes, sir, these were the said

rights reduced into writing.

A First, I tried to explain to

him his right, sir, under the
constitution.

ATTY. PRINCIPE:

A He was alone, sir.

Q So, when you were already
infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro
and the other PNP Officers, what
did they tell you, if any?
A They told us together with
Atty. Zapanta that this Larry
Mahinay would like to confess of
the crime charged, sir.
Q By the way, who was that
Atty. Zapanta?
A Our immediate Superior of
the Public Attorney's Office.
Q Was he also present at the
start27
of the question and answer
period to the accused?
A No more, sir, he already
went to our office. I was left
alone.
Q But he saw the accused,
Larry Mahinay?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta
left at what time did the question
and answer period start?
A If I am not mistaken at
around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in
the afternoon, sir.
Q And when this question
and answer period started, what

Q What are those right?

May we request, Your Honor,

that this document be marked as
our Exhibit A. proper.

A That he has the right to

remain silent. That he has the
right of a counsel of his own
choice and that if he has no
counsel a lawyer will be
appointed to him and that he
has the right to refuse to answer
any question that would
incriminate him.

Q Do you recall after reducing

into writing this constitutional
right of the accused whether you
asked him to sign to
acknowledge or to conform?

Q Now, after enumerating

these constitutional rights of
accused Larry Mahinay, do you
recall whether this constitutional
right enumerated by you were
reduced in writing?

Q But you were present?

A Yes, sir, and it was also

explained to him one by one by
Police Officer Alabastro.
Q I show to you this
constitutional right which you
said were reduced into writing,
will you be able to recognize the
same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please go over this
and tell the Court whether that is
the same document you
mentioned?

A I was the one who asked

him, sir. It was Police Officer
Alabastro.

A I was then present when he

signed.
Q There is a signature in this
constitutional right after the
enumeration, before and after
there are two (2) signatures, will
you please recognize the two (2)
signatures?
A These were the same
signatures signed in my
presence, sir.
Q The signature of whom?
A The signature of Larry
Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor,
that the two (2) signatures

identified by my compaero be
encircled and marked as Exhibit
A-1 and A-2.

A I had also explained to him,

sir.
Q In Filipino?

Q After you said that you

apprised the accused of his
constitutional right explaining to
him in Filipino, in local dialect,
what was the respond of the
accused?
A Larry Mahinay said that we
will proceed with his statement.
Q What was the reply?

A In Tagalog, sir.
Q And there is also a
signature after the waiver in
Filipino over the typewritten
name Larry Mahinay,
"Nagsasalaysay", whose
signature is that?
A This is also signed in my
presence.

A He said "Opo".
Q Did you ask him of his
educational attainment?
A 28
It was the Police Officer
who asked him.
Q In your presence?
A In my presence, sir.
Q And when he said or when
he replied "Opo" so the question
started?
A Yes, sir.
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A
that there is also a waiver of
rights, were you present also
when he signed this waiver?
A Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q Did you explain to him the
meaning of this waiver?

Q Why are you sure that this

is his signature?
A He signed in my presence,
sir.
Q And below immediately are
the two (2) signatures. The first
one is when Larry Mahinay
subscribed and sworn to, there
is a signature here, do you
recognize this signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your
first signature is a Certification
that you have personally
examined the accused Larry
Mahinay and testified that he
voluntary executed the Extra
Judicial Confession, do you
recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature,
sir. 23 (emphasis supplied).

Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead
body of the victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too
unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New
Jersey, 24
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself - such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no
test or the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial
cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of
witnesses. Settled is the rule that the findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial
court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive
and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts. 25 In this case, the trial court's findings, conclusions and
evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with
the highest respect, 26 the same being supported by substantial
evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which
when considered would have affected the outcome of this case 27or
justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court
below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the
principal witnesses for the prosecution all the more strengthens the
conclusion that no such motive exists. 28 Neither was any wrong
motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is
correct. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by R.A. 7659 "when by reason or on occasion of the rape,
a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." This special
complex crime is treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape
- that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) "attendant circumstances"
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the
penalty is death. In cases where any of those circumstances is
proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the
circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect

the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 53 of

the RPC However, if any of those circumstances proven but not
alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under
Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the
penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning aggravating
circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under
R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the
information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance.
But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death - subject to the
usual proof of such circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty
prescribed by law for the crime of "rape with homicide", the court has
no option but to apply the same "regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of
the crime" 29 in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as
amended. 30This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of
death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article
47 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in
which it must be imposed
29 under existing
laws, except when the guilty person is below
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime or is more than seventy
years of age or when upon appeal or automatic
review of the case by the Supreme Court, the
required majority vote is not obtained for the
imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the
death penalty, appellant tried to alter his date of birth to show that he
was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he committed
the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of
death if the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of
the commission of the crime. 31 Again, the record rebuffs appellant on
this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20
years of age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a
civil indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of

rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances

under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended
law, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventyfive thousand pesos (P75,000.00). 32 In addition to such indemnity,
she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code 33 in such amount as the court deems just, without the
necessity for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 34 Civil indemnity
is different from the award of moral and exemplary damages. 35 The
requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in
Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is
"recognized that the victim's injury is inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per
se the award of moral damages". 36 Thus, it was held that a
conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the
victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the
crime was attended by one or more aggravating circumstances
pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code 38 after proof that the
offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory
damages. 39 Under the circumstances of this case, appellant is liable
to the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure
that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful
means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down
the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining,
inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and
observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the
time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is hightime to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by
ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of
new legal developments:
1. The person arrested,
detained, invited or under
custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to
and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any; Every other

warnings, information or
communication must be in a
language known to and
understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent and
that anystatement he makes
may be used as evidence
against him;
3. He must be informed that he
has the right to be assisted at all
times and have the presence of
an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;
4. He must be informed that if he
has no lawyer or cannot afford
the services of a lawyer, one will
be provided for him; and that a
lawyer may also be engaged by
any person in his behalf, or may
be appointed by the court upon
petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the
person arrested has a lawyer, he
must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any
form shall be conducted except
in the presence of his counsel or
after a valid waiver has been
made;
6. The person arrested must be
informed that, at any time, he
has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient
means - telephone, radio, letter
or messenger - with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed),
any member of his immediate

family, or any medical doctor,

priest or minister chosen by him
or by any one from his
immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer
with duly accredited national or
international non-government
organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to
ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he
has the right to waive any of said
rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person
arrested waives his right to a
lawyer, he must be informed that
it must be done in writing AND in
the presence
of counsel,
30
otherwise, he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he
insist on his waiver and chooses
to speak;
9. That the person arrested must
be informed that he may indicate
in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he
does not wish to be questioned
with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same
had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it
has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be
informed that his initial waiver of
his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his
rights does not bar him from

invoking it at any time during the

process, regardless of whether
he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed
that any statement or evidence,
as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing,
whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence
to the separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 42 that
R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by
a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED
except for the award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is
INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision,
let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122142 May 17, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 12, Manila, finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims
Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50,000.00
each and to pay the sum of P4,000.00 representing the amount of
money stolen.
The information alleged
That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating with one, whose true name,
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent
of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and
carry away the amount of P4,000.00 cash
belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to
the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine
Currency; that on the occasion thereof and by
reason of the aforesaid robbery, the said accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal
violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA
and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to
death, thereby inflicting upon the said victims
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of their death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused
Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned, accusedappellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin
Ines, Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat.
Ines of the Western Police District investigated the robbery with
homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following effect:
Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas
whose business was selling chickens to customers. Cabosas's
business was located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

MENDOZA, J.:
In the morning of August 11, 1989, accused-appellant was asked to
deliver dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at

Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344 C.M. Recto Avenue in Sta. Cruz,
Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant came back and
turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines
testified that after receiving report of the killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo
Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas from which they learned that the
latter has received a call from Emma Cabrera informing Angie that
her house had been robbed and her two maids killed. They were told
that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to attend
the burial of his grandfather. Pat. Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor
Valdez, Pfc. Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. Renato Gutierrez
went to Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find accused-appellant.
They were told by the sister of accused-appellant, Merly Asuncion,
that accused-appellant had gone to La Union. According to Pat. Ines,
accused-appellant confided to his sister that he had allegedly done
something wrong in Manila.
Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements, both executed on August
11, 1989, one of which, he said, had been executed by Helen N.
Moral, a househelp of Emma Cabrera, and the other by Angie C. De
los Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I, Moral said that upon
arriving in the house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her
employer's nephew, Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims
sprawled on the floor. She told Pat. Ines that accused-appellant used
to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their place.
On the other hand, in her sworn statement
31given on August 14, 1989
and marked as Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated that on
August 11, 1989, she had seen accused-appellant and Ronnie
Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin
Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. 2
Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990, he and his group received
information from Pat. Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that
accused-appellant was in Cataban, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and the next day, March
4, 1990, they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they
brought to Manila. Pat. Ines said accused-appellant was positively
identified by Anita De los Reyes as one of those whom she saw
running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto Avenue,
Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands. 3
Pat. Ines testified that on that same day, March 4, 1990, accusedappellant gave a confession (Exh. O) in writing with the assistance of
counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he admitted
participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. Pat.
Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the circumstances
of accused-appellant's arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to
sign the booking and information sheet. 4
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession was presented in
evidence as Exhibit O. 5 In it, accused-appellant said he started

working for Angie Cabosas in the latter's business on Blumentritt

Street, Manila three or four months before the incident. Cabosas and
accused-appellant's sister Merly Asuncion, had been neighbors in
Rosales, Pangasinan. Accused-appellant's work was to deliver
dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular customer to whom
he made deliveries in the morning. On August 10, 1989, his fellow
employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to
be able to go to La Union to visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after
learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of Emma
Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull the heist.
Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from
shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her.
Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the
younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she died. Thereafter, the
two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie
had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt
Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while accused-appellant proceeded
to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed
by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.

Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. F) that

Remedios Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died.

The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC

Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said
that on March 4, 1990, he happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD,
representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked by
Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accusedexecuting an extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los
Reyes, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights,
explaining to him that any statement made by him could be used
against him in court, but accused-appellant said he was willing to
give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission of
the crime of robbery with homicide. 6

With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido
and the extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn
statements of Helen Moral (Exh. I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. L),
the prosecution rested its case.

The other prosecution witness was Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, medicolegal officer who conducted autopsies on August 11, 1989 on the
victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. After proper
identification (Exh. D) by the victim's employer, Antonio Cabrera, Dr.
Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega
suffered 16 stab wounds from which she died.
Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which
affected her vital organs, specifically the right and left lungs and the
heart, causing her death. Six of these wounds were fatal so that she
could not survive despite immediate medical attention. He concluded
that the assailant and the victim could be facing each other when
wounds nos. 1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were
inflicted and that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side
of the victim when he inflicted wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5) and at the
victim's back when assailant inflicted wound no. 16 (Exh. B-6). He
said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these
wounds by using a single bladed weapon. 7

Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with
seven fatal ones that caused her death. The fatal wounds damaged
her left and right lungs and the heart that she would not survive
despite immediate medical attention. He observed that in wounds
nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Exhs. G-1, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant
and the victim could be facing each other, while in wounds nos. 4, 9
and 11 (Exhs. G-4, G-6, and G-7, respectively), the assailant could
have been at the back of the victim. He said that there could be one
or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single bladed
weapon. 8
Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims, Nena
Berjuega and Remedios Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He stated that the
weapon used on both victims could have been the same and that
both victims sustained multiple stab wounds. 9

The defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant

Jimmy Obrero y Corla. Accused-appellant testified that he had
worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street for four (4) months
before the incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of his sister,
Merly Asuncion, in Pangasinan. Angie's business was selling dressed
chickens. Accused-appellant said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August
11, 1989, he delivered dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera's
residence on C.M. Recto Avenue. He came back from his errand at
around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of P2,000.00 which had
been paid to him. He denied participation in the commission of the
crime and claimed that he was arrested without a warrant in
Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges
against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to
execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen
Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the
contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he
does not know how to read. 10
On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused JIMMY
OBRERO Y CORLA, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and punishable under Article 294(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced

to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all

the accessory penalties provided by law. He is
further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims,
Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as
civil indemnity for their death and the additional
sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of money taken,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject
of paragraph 1 of the same 12.

His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid

Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered.

To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign

five times is not the same confession (Exh. O) but different parts
thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had
been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed again
as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to
give a statement. (Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the
end of page 2 to authenticate that page as part of his confession.
(Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third page at the end of his
confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the third
page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O).

SO ORDERED.
Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity of
this extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of his conviction
for the crime of robbery with homicide. He claims that Atty. De los
Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession, was not the
counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused
to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the
extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily
executed by him.
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution provides in32
pertinent parts:
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in
this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third
degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,
which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are

Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force

and threat. Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of
the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek medical
treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the
fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that
he refused to sign it.

We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed

from the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant five times.
Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed
from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and
information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the
extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason
the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The
inference rather was that no force was used to make accusedappellant execute the confession, otherwise, he could also have
been forced to sign the booking and information sheet.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant's consent in
executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be
sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of
the crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could
have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma
Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together with
his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon
given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the
other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the
medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims
were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has
been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by
the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be

said of a mind on which violence and torture have been

applied. 11 When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession
are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did
not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in
the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where
abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily
executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There
is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is
corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential
facts contained in such confession. 12
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is
the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings
effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such
as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, 12(1) was
derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an
unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical
of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs
the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the
suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following
warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he
must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against
him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if
he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 1
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De
los Reyes to establish that the above-enumerated requisites were
fully satisfied when accused-appellant executed his extrajudicial
confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified: 14
Q What happened during the
investigation of the accused?
A He consented to give a written
statement to me, sir.
Q Now, when accused Jimmy
Obrero consented to give
statement, Patrolman, was he
assisted by counsel?
A Yes, sir, we provided him with
a lawyer.
Q And who was that lawyer that
was provided by you?

A Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes,

sir.

having pointed out to him his

constitutional right?

Q And who personally took down

the statement of the accused?

A This portion sir, this "sagotopo" and then it was further

affirmed by his signature over his
typewritten name, sir.

A I was the one who personally

took the statement of accused
Obrero.
Q Do you know what was the
gist of that statement that was
given to you, what was it all
about?
A It's all about the admission of
Jimmy Obrero, the gruesome
slaying of two househelps.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Before having taken down the
admission of Jimmy Obrero,
what investigative steps did you
33 relative to his
undertake
constitutional right, patrolman?
A I informed Jimmy Obrero of his
constitutional right to remain
silent, to have an attorney; that
everything that he will say will be
used for or against him. He,
however, consented to proceed
with the written statement.
Q Now, Patrolman, did you
indicate his constitutional rights
that you stated in this written
statement of Jimmy Obrero?
A Yes, sir, I put it on the
statement which he voluntarily
gave.
Q And will you please tell us
which part of the statement of
Jimmy Obrero is it indicated, the
consent which he gave after

For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified: 15

Q: Were you able to confront the
suspect at that time, herein
accused?
A: Yes, sir, I told him for the
purpose of investigation
custodial investigation I can
render my services to him and
afterwards avail the services of
another lawyer and I told him his
rights under the law, sir.
Q: What was the reply of Jimmy
Obrero, the accused, in this case
at that time you confronted
Jimmy Obrero?
A: He is willing at that time and
[voluntarily] gave his affirmation
that he wanted to secure my
services, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After having manifested that
he will retain your services as
counsel for the investigation,
Atty. De los Reyes, what
happened next?
A I told him the rights under the
Constitution, the right to remain
silent, the right to secure lawyer,
the right not to give statement,
the right not to be placed in any
identification procedure in a
police line up, and I told him that
all the evidences he might give
will be utilized against him in the

court with respect to the case

and despite of that, he said he
wanted to give his statement to
the police in my presence.
Q Was he able to give statement
to the police?
A Yes, sir. I was there inside the
room with the client and
observing fairly [when he] gave
statement voluntarily.
Q Was that statement taken
down into writing?
A In a question and answer form,
sir.
Indeed, the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads:
MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG
SALIGANG BATAS:
Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, ay aking
isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang Pagnanakaw
na may kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa
iyo ang iyong mga karapatan ayon sa ating
Binagong Saligang Batas:
1. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag sagutin
ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo;
2. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado
na iyong sariling pili na maaaring makatulong sa
iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka
makakakuha ng iyong abogado ay bibigyan ka
namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa
iyo;
3. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng
iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong salaysay ay
maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o
pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang tao sa alinmang
hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.

Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga

karapatan, nais mo pa bang magbigay ng iyong
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?

and law enforcement authorities can be

symbiotic. 18
Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in
custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here,
accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though
presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent
counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was
station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accusedappellant. On this point, he testified as follows:

SAGOT : (ni Jimmy Obrero y

Corla) Opo.
TANONG: Kung ganoon ay
sabihin mo ulit ang iyong
pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa
ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na
ipipirma o imamakinilya ko?

34

(Sg
d.)
JI
M
MY
OB
RE
RO
y
CO
RL
A

There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to

accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he
wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel
or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of
warnings, in several decisions 16 of this Court, has been found to be
merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful
information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have
been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accusedappellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he
only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as
stated in People v.
Januario: 17
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an
individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or
by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such
petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever
testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as
in many areas, the relationship between lawyers

Q Now, whenever there is a

crime committed wherein the
member of police to which you
belong or working but could not
solve the crime and then you
were designated as counsel to
extend legal assistance to a
suspect who is under a custodial
investigation and in that
conference with the suspect you
may have inquired confidential
information, what would you do,
will you keep it to yourself or you
must have to divulge that to your
co-policeman because you know
that?
A If I am the lawyer, then all the
testimonies and declaration is
my preferential right, I can
divulge it even to my fellow
officer.
Q Now, by the way, do you have
authority to practice the law
profession, did you get approval
or permit from the civil
A Previously, when I was at the
JAGO, we are authorized
verbally [as long as] it will not
hamper our time, we will not
work our time during the police
duty, ma'am.
Q According to you, you were
extending legal assistance to
your client who was charged of
illegal recruitment, do you not

consider that conflict of duty

because no less than your
organization was the one
investigating that?
A I am extending my legal
assistance to the client I am
handling the case because if it is
true that he committed the crime
then I will back out, if I found
suspicion and there is no proof
at all, I go to the litigation.
ATTY. ALISUAG:
That is all, Your Honor. 19
The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:
As shown in Exhibit "O", accused consented to
giving his extrajudicial confession after he was
informed of rights under custodial investigation, by
affixing his signature thereto (Exhibit "O-3"). And
absent any showing that the assisting lawyer,
though a station commander but of another police
station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this
Court holds that the proceedings were regularly
conducted. In fact, he testified that he first asked
the accused if he is accepting his legal services
(TSN, March 5, 1991, p. 4); that he informed the
accused of his Miranda rights and despite the
warning, he decided to give his confession just the
same; that he was at all time present when the
accused was being interrogated with the accused
giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid, p. 4); that he
read to the accused the questions and answers
before he signed his extrajudicial confession (Ibid,
p. 8). Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De los
Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a
member of the police force, when he lend his
assistance to the accused during his in-custody
interrogation. 20
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula, 21 the independent
counsel required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the
police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this
case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of
the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to
have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the

investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such

a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the
suspect during custodial investigation. 22

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial

confession is inadmissible in evidence.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accusedappellant cannot stand. The prosecution tried to introduce
circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's guilt consisting of the
sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral, the househelp who
said accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the
Cabrera residence, and Anita de los Reyes who said that on March
11, 1989 she was passing in front of the Gatlin Building where the
killing took place when she saw accused-appellant running down the
stairs with blood in his hands. These statements are likewise
inadmissible for being hearsay. Consequently, there is no
identification of accused-appellant.
And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus
delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession
(Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as already stated, is
inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to
object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed
evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of
35cannot thus affirm the
proof which rested on the prosecution. We
conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural
irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of
the case. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free
because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the
principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to
convict one single innocent person.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, convicting accusedappellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with
homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the
release of accused-appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held
for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10)
days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a
robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously
for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence.
There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,
something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely
necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to
torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The
prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure
the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will
had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted
him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later,
against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,
purporting it to be a reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's
Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this
case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners
as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, in
addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who shall over do himself in
the correction or handling of a prisoner or
detention prisoner under his charge, by the
imposition of punishments in a cruel and
humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a
confession, or to obtain some information from the
prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the
physical injuries or damage caused.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest
being the case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly
condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort
confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of
human rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately, such instances
constitute the exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed
upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs.
Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her
house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of
seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an
ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on
suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September
8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged
limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the
herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by
a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores
conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave
evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September
9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling
Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. 5 As a
result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in
an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in
the municipality of Montalban, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with Juling
Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and three
of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent of gain and by means of force,
intimidation and violence upon the person of one
Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the person of said
Natividad Fernando, cash money of an
undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad
Fernando, thereby causing damage and prejudice
to the latter in an undetermined amount; that by
reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for

purpose of enabling them (accused) to take, steal

and carry away the said cash money in pursuance
of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring
the success of their criminal act, with intent to kill,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a dagger
said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of
her body, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the
head and extremities, which directly caused her
death, and the total amount of the loss is
P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the
accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial
judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding the
accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death
penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are
as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was
gathered that in the early morning of August 23,
1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad
36twilight of her life, was
Fernando, widow, in the
robbed and then hacked to death by the accused
and two others in her (victim's) own residence at
Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified
that he heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife
having an argument in connection with the robbery
and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It
appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit
and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain
"Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina,
Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed
to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further
agreed among them to enter the premises of the
victim's house at the back yard by climbing over
the fence; that once inside the premises, they will
search every room, especially the aparador and
filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking for cash
money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August
22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
accused Francisco Galit and his two companions,
Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous
agreement, met at the place where they formerly

saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three

conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and
upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building,
they stopped and they waited at the side of the
road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00
o'clock that night, the three repaired to the
premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that
they entered the said premises through the back
wall of the house; that while entering the premises
of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near
the piggery compound, which he picked up and
used it to destroy the back portion of the wall of the
house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered
the house through the hole that they made,
followed by the accused Galit and next to him was
"Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August
23, 1977 when the three were able to gain
entrance into the house of the victim; as the three
could not find anything valuable inside the first
room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the
screen of the door of the victim, Natividad
Fernando; that upon entering the room of the
victim, the three accused decided to kill first the
victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the
room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was
then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim,
who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a
moaning sound from the victim; that after the victim
was killed, the three accused began searching the
room for valuables; that they helped each other in
opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the
victim, where they found some money; that when
the three accused left the room of the victim, they
brought with them some papers and pictures which
they threw outside; that after killing and robbing the
victim, the three accused went out of the premises
of the house, using the same way by which they
gained entrance, which was through the back
portion of the wall; that the three accused walked
towards the river bank where they divided the loot
that they got from the room of the victim; that their
respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of
them; and that after receiving their shares of the
loot, the three accused left and went home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his
room, which was adjoining that of accused
Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and
his wife quarreling about the intention of accused
Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he
further stated that he overheard accused Galit

saying that he and his other two companions

robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad
Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab
wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage
and the cause of death was due to shock and
hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal
Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the
pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the
commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in
Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal.
He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession
extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as
described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented
by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings
of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not
supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness,
Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were
living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977,
because the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when
he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the
police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were
quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving
the house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene",
the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the
wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter was
insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about
two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene;
that upon learning of what the accused had done, he went to the
Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about
what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went
to their house and arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down
the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an
arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested

shall have the right to communicate with his

lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible
or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the
accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the
accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the
accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it
a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:

know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was
only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his
relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation
he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed reenactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained
in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the
prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there
is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in
toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for
whatever action he may deem proper to take against the
investigating officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is

hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the
accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released
37
immediately
unless
I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyofrom
ang custody
inyong mga
karapatan
sa held on other charges. With
costs
de oficio.
ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung
inyong
nanaisin ay maaaring
hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o
saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang
salaysay, na anuman
17. SO ORDERED.
ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa
anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang
manananggol at kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang
manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa
ng PEOPLE
NBI. Ngayon
at alam
mo na
THE
OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigayvs.
ng isang kusang-loob na
salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does
not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed
of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there
should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no
showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his
arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not

Nelson Lidua for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the
respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to
be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of

the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for
the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The
relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having
allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, 1the PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave
to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE
THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS.
HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE
IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB
86.

(s) Felip

(Printed
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL
Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of
Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos
was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his
answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in
writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not
indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's
findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although
he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented

from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle
his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered
basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;"
that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place,
"Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop
stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his
statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation
turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that
no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe
Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in
Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29,
1987. In that place and during that time, according to the
indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following
manner, to wit: said accused ... having been
entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of
passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the
total amount of P76,700.65,
38 with the express
obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale,
account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once
in possession thereof and instead of complying
with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then
and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert
the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65
and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and
refused to make good his obligation, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not
Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was
undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of
the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included "the
(above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on
February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been
marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given
on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been
marked as Exhibit K.

The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s

Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the
objection was that "said document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed
under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all
the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except
Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A
"inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of
accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch
Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded
of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and
that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with
the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible
"Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J.
Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in
the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused
was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was
denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said
Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr.
v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135
SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in
custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the
rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation
of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense
of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to
him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the
constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained
at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could
not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional
provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now
assailed in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this
Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the

Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court

required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition,
and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further
with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ...
vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or
judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the
same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently
required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The
comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General
have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause
with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course
and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent
Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of
the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed
whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the
instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by
lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in
question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue
of whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent
Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now
proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction
that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of
rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the
right of a person not to be compelled to be a

witness against himself set out in the first

sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and
is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment
of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation,
i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation
for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly
the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the
rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now
embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights
of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more
explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who
39 compulsion of
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The
right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
15

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It
prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions
and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn
and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial,

hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a

witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known
axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of
the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things,
neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in
behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second
right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons
"under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what
makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence,
that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately
applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation
for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly
derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law
enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation
for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x
(these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural

safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody
interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional
rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The
situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by
this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and "cross-examined" not
only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to
him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study
have taught them to extract the truth, or what may

pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are

unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and
coercive presence of the officers of the law in such
an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy
this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some
crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made
"under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in
one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and before any
sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving
himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that
such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the
circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony

40

It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed,

i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial
interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or
already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by
the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at
the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public
prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal
case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there
is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial
interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason
that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other
persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the
first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e.,

the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the

time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights
in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused
"occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness."
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant
is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to
testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from
being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be
compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which
he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to
do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a
co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words unlike an
ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled
to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can
refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any
question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so.
This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be crossexamined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to
any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected
therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the
evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him
for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal
action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the
crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct
from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that
specific question, on the strength of the right against self-

incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of

the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution).
Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should
testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in
that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular
question which might implicate him for a different and distinct
offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following
rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or
with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in
some significant way, and on being interrogated by
the police: the continuing right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be
subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or
any other means which vitiates the free will; and to
have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such
refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf,
subject to cross-examination by
the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to
refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.

It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has

misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set
forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken
them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with
the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor
sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent
and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual
and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as
to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount
to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His
Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They
should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos
was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term
should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he
appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person
under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to
the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed
41that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during
the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as
Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit
K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before
the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They
may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x
(of) the violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination
when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties,
complaining companies, or complaining employers because being
interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety
or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or
zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether
employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral
coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to
draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law
that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by
his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due
process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the

offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity

to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit
the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The
employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the
investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his
defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject
his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a
subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not
been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his
"Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are
submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly
considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain
instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that
violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to
bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter, on a
person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly
offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from
the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on
proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation
of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the
general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced
statements may not in justice be received against the makers
thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at
all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting
aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No.
3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is
hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the
prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter
proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary
restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio,
is now declared of no further force and effect.
G.R. No. 76547 July 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALBERT OLAES y AMOROSO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
The decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXII in Olongapo
City, in Criminal Case No. 3602 involving a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
has been brought to us on appeal 2 by accused-appellant who was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P30,000.00 and the costs. The confiscation and immediate
destruction of six (6) lids of marijuana subject matter of the case was
also ordered. 3
In an information dated March 27, 1978, appellant was charged with
unlawfully selling six (6) lids of marijuana. 4On March 16, 1979,
appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, was duly arraigned and,
having pleaded not guilty, 5trial on the merits ensued.
Based on the evidence for the prosecution, the court a quo narrated
the case for the People as follows:
That at 12:50 in the afternoon of June 15, 1977,
said officers were at their office at the CANU
investigating Manuelito Bernardo, whom they
arrested earlier at No. 41 Harris St., East BajacBajac, Olongapo City for possession of several lids
of marijuana. Bernardo informed them that the lids
of marijuana confiscated from him came from
one alias "Abet" and his brother alias "Bonjing".
They made Bernardo agree to act as buyer and to
go to the house which, according to Bernardo, was
the source of the confiscated marijuana. After
giving instructions to Bernardo about the prearranged signal, they all proceeded near the house
of "Abet" located at No. 116 Jones Street,
Olongapo City. Bernardo entered the compound

bringing with him marked money amounting to

P300.00 (These were earlier xeroxed after the
signature of Pacifico Mugar was affixed).itc-asl
After consummating the deal on the marijuana,
Bernardo came out and surrendered the same to
the officers. Immediately, they entered "Abet's"
house and found him in the living room with some
other persons. "Abet" was confronted, searched,
and in his person was found the P300.00 marked
money and lids of marijuana. "Abet" was
interrogated on the spot as to the whereabouts of
other marijuana if any. They proceeded next door
at his brother Benjamin Olaes' kitchen where they
recovered sixty more lids of marijuana. Thereafter,
"Abet", which (sic) was later identified as accused
Albert Olaes was brought to the CANU office for
investigation. Albert Olaes was finger-printed by
C2C Armando Cases and the booking sheet and
arrest report were prepared (Exhibit "G"). The
sworn statement of Olaes was taken by Pacifico
Mugar (Exhibit "K"). Pfc. Abello together with
Capitulo, Elgar, Macomb
42and Cases executed a
Joint Affidavit in connection with this case (Exhibit
"H"). The sixty lids of marijuana which were
confiscated from the kitchen of Benjamin Olaes are
covered and stated in the Receipt for Property
Seized (Exhibit "I"). 6
On the other hand, the decision makes the factual recital that
The defense version per testimony of accused
Alberto Olaes tends to show that on June 15,
1977, at around two o'clock in the afternoon, he
was at their house located at 116 Jones Street
Kalalake, Olongapo City. While at Room 5 of said
address, a certain Eling carrying a bag came to
their house asking for his brother Benjamin Olaes
who was not home at that time. Eling was carrying
a bag of dog food. Upon being told that Benjamin
was out, Eling asked to be accompanied to Room
2 also located at 116 Jones Street, Olongapo City,
where he left the bag in his brother's room,
particularly in the "lababo". Thereafter, he and
Eling went out of the room and he went home to

his residence at Room 5, 116 Jones Street,

Olongapo City. He executed a sworn statement in
connection with this case. He does not know any
person by the name of Lito. He affixed his
signature on his statement because he was
mauled by the investigator and was threatened to
be killed.
On cross-examination, he stated that he does not
know who among the investigators beat him up
and neither does he know who arrested him. All his
personal circumstances stated in his statement are
true. He also declared that Eling came from
Saletran, Dasmarinas. Cavite. 7
Opining that the testimony of appellant is incredible and relying
heavily on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as
the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant "corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti," the court below rendered its judgment of
conviction stated at the outset of this decision. Hence, this appeal
where appellant submits as alleged reversible errors (1) the
conviction based on an extrajudicial confession extracted in violation
of due process and the bill of rights of the fundamental law: (2) the
conviction under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425
(selling) even if one of the elements of the offense is missing; and (3)
the resolution of doubt on the defense theory by reason of noncorroboration. 8
We find for appellant and decree his acquittal.
Firstly, the extrajudicial confession 9 executed by appellant on June
15, 1977 is inadmissible in evidence. An examination thereof shows
that he was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to be assisted by counsel during said investigation. He was also
asked if he was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and he
answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person
under custodial investigation may be waived, nonetheless the waiver
must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but in
the presence and with the assistance of counsel. 10
In the case at bar, the waiver was made without the assistance of
counsel. 11 This omission alone is sufficient to invalidate the
confession. 12 While the trial court observed that the narration of the
accused in his extrajudicial confession is complete in every detail
and did not show any sign of suspicious circumstance to indicate that

there was pressure of restraints exerted upon his person, 13 having

been made without the mandatory assistance of counsel the same is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given. 14
Secondly, this case exemplifies the instance where the nonpresentation of the supposed poseur-buyer is fatal to the
prosecution's case. The records show that the alleged sales
transaction took place inside the house of appellant. In other words,
the transaction was supposedly witnessed only by the poseur-buyer,
Manuelito Bernardo. Only he has personal knowledge of such
transaction which is the subject matter of this prosecution. In People
vs. Ramos, 15 where the alleged informant and poseur-buyer was
one and the same person, we stressed that without the testimony of
said poseur-buyer, there is no convincing evidence pointing to the
accused as having sold marijuana. In this case, the police officers did
not see the actual sale of marijuana. For the culprit to be convicted,
the element of sale must be unequivocably established. Yet, the
alleged poseur-buyer in the "buy-bust" operation, the only one who
allegedly dealt directly with appellant in the purchase of marijuana,
was not presented at all at the trial. Under such circumstances, we
have repeatedly held that the failure of the prosecution to present the
alleged buyer was a fatal blow to the case against the accused. 16
The other prosecution witnesses admitted that it was only when the
alleged poseur-buyer left the house of appellant and gave the signal
indicating the consummation of the transaction that they started to
approach the house of appellant and entered the same. Thereafter,
they allegedly searched the person of appellant and proceeded to
the adjoining room where they claimed to have recovered other
prohibited drugs. 17 We have carefully reviewed the records and find
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not inspire
belief.
While suspiciously dovetailing on certain aspects in their testimonies,
the members of said law enforcement team, despite the fact that they
claim to have been together before, during and after the operation,
enmeshed themselves in significant inconsistencies and
contradictions.
Thus, for instance, Cpl. Ernesto Abello claimed that the marked
money which was used to purchase the marijuana was zeroxed
before it was given to the poseur-buyer who later allegedly paid it to
appellant. 18 On the other hand, Pfc. Jaime Capitulo who allegedly
recovered the marked money from appellant testified that it was after

such money was retrieved and the team had returned to their office
that he turned over the money to their superior, Capt. Aldaba, and it
was then that zerox copies of the money were made presumably for
purposes of evidence, 19 only to subsequently reverse himself by
claiming that the same was zeroxed before they were given to the
poseur-buyer. 20 It will be noted that it is this evidence, with the
confusing testimony thereon, by which the prosecution seeks to link
appellant to the supposed sale.

learned of the alleged consummation of the illicit transaction when

they were supposedly given a signal by their so-called poseur-buyer
after the latter left appellant's house. However, what they reportedly
learned from said poseur-buyer was indubitably hearsay as the latter
was never called to appear and testify at the trial. Since what was
conducted was a warrantless search and the arrest of appellant was
unlawful, any evidence obtained from him is also inadmissible in
evidence.

P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. Obviously, this amendment having taken

effect after the alleged commission of the crime in the case at bar, it
could not have been given retroactive effect.

Now, the poseur-buyer, according to the prosecution witnesses, was

supposed to give them a pre-arranged signal after he had made the
purchase of the marijuana. He is alleged to have done so but, as to
the signal pre-arranged and given, the versions of said witnesses are
in hopeless disarray. According to Cpl. Abello, Bernardo "would be
coming out of the backdoor and he will be combing his hair. 21 On the
other hand, Sgt. Glenn Logan testified that the prearranged signal
was that Bernardo would put out his handkerchief and wipe his
face. 22 These were all contradicted in the testimony of Pfc. Jaime
Capitulo who claimed that the informant was able to give the prearranged signal because the investigating team had with them an
electric device with a receiver that received Bernardo's signal which
could be heard by everyone in the group. 23 How this would be
possible and why the witnesses are at loggerheads
hereon, the
43
prosecution does not say.

It is further undisputed that the six (6) lids of marijuana supposedly

bought by the poseur-buyer was taken by the police officers not from
appellant but from said poseur-buyer. 27 Appellant's disclaimer of
ownership of the prohibited drug should have cautioned and alerted
the prosecution to the fact that the testimony of their alleged poseurbuyer was not merely corroborative nor cumulative but direct and
material to the defense of appellant who claims innocence of the
offense imputed to him. 28 It is also significant that the identity of the
informer and/or poseur-buyer was already known during the
trial. 29 Despite all these, the prosecution opted not to present him for
reasons which remain unknown. Such unexplained failure to present
this vital witness gives rise to the presumption that, if he had been
presented, his testimony would probably not have supported the
case of the prosecution. 30

SO ORDERED.

Again, Sgt. Logan declared that the search was conducted in the
residence of appellant resulting in the seizure of sixty (60) lids of
marijuana. 24 On the contrary, Pat. Abella clearly explained that said
sixty (60) lids of marijuana were hidden and recovered in the kitchen
of the house of Benjamin Olaes, a brother of appellant, which was a
separate residence. 25 These conflicting testimonies, which further
discredit said witnesses, are apart from the consideration that
appellant herein is charged not with illegal possession but with the
sale of marijuana.
We also do not lose sight of the fact that without the testimony of the
supposed poseur-buyer proving the alleged sale of marijuana inside
appellant's house, the unlawful intrusion into the sanctity of
appellant's abode and the unreasonable search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution are clearly established. It is
undisputed that the police operatives did not have either a search
warrant or a warrant of arrest. 26 The searches on the person of
appellant and of his house were not also incidental to a lawful arrest.
The police officers admittedly did not have personal knowledge at all
of what actually transpired inside the appellant's house. They only

WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused-appellant not having been

proved with the requisite quantum of evidence, the appealed
decision is REVERSED and he is hereby ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt, with costs de officio.

G.R. No. 71273 July 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLONIO HIZON y VELASCO alias Rey Bakla, ARMANDO
LIPATA y BARNOBAL alias Teddy and JOHN DOE alias BOY
Bungal-At Large, accused, ARMANDO LIPATA y BARNOBAL
alias Teddy, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

The foregoing considerations cannot but rule out a verdict of guilty,

there being an exiguity of any other independent incriminating
evidence, aside from appellant's uncounselled and inadmissible
extrajudicial confession. While the theory of the defense is not totally
convincing, the Court cannot tip the scales of justice against him in
the face of the cardinal and long entrenched rule that the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the defense.
One final observation. What cannot escape our attention is the
penalty imposed by the trial court, that is, life imprisonment and a
fine of P30,000.00. The court a quo obviously failed to consider that
the alleged crime was committed on June 15, 1977. Under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425, prior to its amendment on February 17,
1980 by Presidential Decree No. 1675, the act of selling marijuana
was punishable by imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P12,000.00
to P20,000.00. 31 Due to the urgent necessity of reinforcing the drive
against dangerous drugs by making "drug-pushing" a capital offense,
Presidential Decree No. 1675 was subsequently passed providing for
the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from

CRUZ, J.:
Diosdado Gandillo was a seaman who had just returned from abroad
and was naturally looking forward to the enjoyment of his hardearned wages. But this was not to be. In the early morning of April 3,
1983, the police found his bloodied corpse along the EDSA highway
in Quezon City. He had been stabbed to death and apparently also
robbed. 1
In due time, Armando Lipata, together with Apolonio Hizon and a
John Doe alias Boy Bungal, was charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide. 2 Only accused-appellant Lipata was tried as his coaccused were then at large. The trial judge 3 found him guilty as
charged and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
was also condemned to pay the civil indemnity in the sum of
P30,000.00, the value of the stolen articles, the funeral expenses,
and the costs. 4

The prosecution sought to prove that in the evening of April 2, 1983,

Gandillo gave a drinking party at a cousin's house for some relatives
and friends. These included Ciriaco Cruzado, who later declared that
Gandillo had on him an Omega gold watch, a gold necklace, a ring,
US $2,400.00 and P900.00 in cash when he left at 10 p.m. 5At about
2 o'clock in the morning of April 3, 1983, he was standing in front of
the Ketch Department Store in Cubao, Quezon City, apparently
waiting for a ride. He was approached by the three accused, who,
taking advantage of his intoxication, divested him of his necklace.
When he protested and resisted, they began stabbing him,
continuing to do so even as he ran and fell, until he died. The three
men then escaped with their loot. Later, one of them, the herein
accused-appellant, sold the victim's Omega watch for P150.00 to a
person named Victor. 6
The prosecution presented only four witnesses, to wit, the medical
examiner who autopsied the corpse, the victim's widow, the police
investigator of the case, and Ciriaco Cruzado. None of them testified
on the actual killing.
Major Dario Gajardo spoke only of the 19 stab wounds sustained by
Gandillo and declared that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory
arrest due to shock and hemorrhage. 7 Mrs.
44Gloria Gandillo, the
widow, merely Identified her earlier statement to the police and
detailed her late husband's income and the funeral
expenses. 8 Cruzado testified about the drinking party the night
before the tragedy and the disappearance of the articles Gandillo
was carrying when he left. 9 Pat. Melencio Lim said it was he who
found the dead body of Gandillo and thereafter took the accusedappellant's statement. He also received the two other statements
taken by another investigator from the accused Hizon and an alleged
eyewitness, Mario Estorninos. 10
For his part, Lipata claimed alibi and said he was in Samar at the
time the crime was committed. 11 He was corroborated by a neighbor,
who said he talked to the accused-appellant on April 3, 1983, when
the latter passed by his farm. 12 Lipata related how he returned to
Manila only in November, 1983, and was soon arrested and
investigated for the killing of Gandillo. He said the confession had
already been prepared when he was asked to sign it and that he did
so for fear of being "salvaged." 13
None of the four prosecution witnesses actually saw the killing of
Gandillo. The statements of Hizon and Estorninos, who were not
presented in court, were correctly rejected by the trial court. the only

possible basis for the conviction, therefore, was Lipata's extrajudicial

confession, which, however, he disowned at the trial.
The defense argued that the said confession was inadmissible
because it was violative of the Bill of Rights, particularly of Article IV,
Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution, providing as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible evidence.
and of the existing jurisprudence interpreting the said provision,
especially Morales v. Enrile, 14 and People v. Galit.15
The trial court disagreed and noted four distinctions between Galit
and the instant case that, in its view, made Lipata's confession
voluntary. 16 The judge also said that the narration "reflects
spontaneity and coherence" and 'the response in every question is
fully informative, sometimes beyond the requirements of the
questions."
The Court is not convinced.
A reading of the alleged confession clearly shows that Lipata was not
fully and properly informed of his rights, particularly of his right to the
assistance of counsel. The procedure in connection with the waiver
of this right as laid down in the Galit case is most explicit. The
suspect must be informed that he has a right to the assistance of
counsel and assured that if he cannot afford to retain counsel of his
own he will be provided with one for free. While he may choose to
waive the right, such waiver must be a knowing and intelligent one
and in any case must be made only with the assistance of counsel.
Any waiver made without observance of these requirements is null
and void.
Contrary to the trial judge's finding, there was in this case also the
usual kilometric statement of the suspect's rights during a custodial
investigation ending with the question of whether he understood the
advice and followed by the brief reply, "Opo." 17 This was the same

answer given when he was later asked, "Kahit na wala kang

abogado sa kasalukuyan ay magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?"
("Even if you have no lawyer at the moment, are you still willing to
give your statement?") 18 There is nothing in the written confession
showing that a lawyer assisted Lipata when he made the answer
waiving his right to the assistance of counsel. There is no record
elsewhere of any such assistance when the waiver was made. What
appears in the sworn statement only is that, having made the waiver,
Lipata was immediately subjected to the questioning that resulted in
the detailed narration of how Gandillo was robbed and killed.
The other reason the trial court considered the sworn statement to
have been voluntarily given was that it was spontaneous and
contained details that the accused-appellant would not have known if
he had not really committed the offense imputed to him. It does not
appear so to the Court. As a matter of fact, a mere reading of the
claimed confession will show that it was not really that detailed such
that it could not have come except only from the killer himself. The
only details noted by the trial court are the exact location of the
scene of the crime, the Identity of the person who bought the stolen
watch, and the specification of the balisong. 19 These are matters that
could have been supplied by any zealous investigator preparing a
statement for the suspect's signature in hopes of an easy conviction.
These are not details only the suspect could have revealed. They
were known to the police as early as April 6, 1983, 20 when Hizon
was investigated, more than eight months before the supposed
confession was taken from Lipata.
The trial court's own factual findings are, indeed, replete with details
of how the offense was committed. To quote from the decision:
Unfortunately for him, he was spotted by a group
of malefactors which consisted of three accused:
Lipata, Hizon, and one Boy Bungi or Boy Bungal.
Lipata is also known as Teddy Kulot. Hizon is also
known as Rey Bakla.
They decided to rob their drunken victim. Boy
approached the victim by placing his arm on the
latter's shoulder. Then Boy snatched the victim's
necklace. Gandillo defended himself by hitting Boy.
But Hizon held Gandillo's arms, and Boy stabbed
him in front.

Gandillo tried to fight back, but Boy and Lipata

simultaneously stabbed him. Lipata stabbed him
twice in the back. Gandillo was able to push Boy
back. Gandillo ran for his life. But Boy and Lipata
ran after him and kept stabbing him. Gandillo fell
on the road. Even then, Boy and Lipata continued
to stab him. They apparently divested him of the
specified jewelry and cash.
The three malefactors went to Arayat Street, where
they parted ways. The next day, Lipata sold the
watch for P150, to a certain Victor, a buy-and-sell
merchant in Cubao. Then Lipata went to his
hometown in Samar where he hid until things
cooled off. In particular, he hid his balisong there.
The following details are, however, not found in Lipata's sworn
statement:
1. Lipata is also known as Teddy Kulot.
2. Hizon is also known as Rey Bakla.

45

3. Boy approached the victim by placing his hand on the latter's

shoulder.
4. Then Boy snatched the victim's necklace.
5. Gandillo ran for his life.
6. But Boy and Lipata ran after him and kept stabbing him.
7. Gandillo fell on the road.
8. Even then, Boy and Lipata kept stabbing him.
9. The three malefactors went to Arayat Street, where they parted
ways.
So where did these details come from?
They certainly could not have been supplied by the four prosecution
witnesses as none of them actually saw the killing. Evidently, they

were taken from the sworn statement made by the other accused,
Apolonio Hizon, 21 who escaped and has not been tried nor could he
be presented as a prosecution witness, subject to cross-examination
by the defense.
It is clear that the facts relating to the commission of the offense
were taken by the trial judge from Lipata's supposed confession,
which was inadmissible for violation of the Bill of Rights, and Hizon's
sworn statement, which was ostensibly rejected for being hearsay
but was actually considered just the same by the trial court. These
factual findings became the basis of Lipata's conviction.
Parenthetically, no effort seems to have been taken by the authorities
to look for the Victor who had allegedly bought the stolen watch, so
he testify against Lipata and perhaps even be investigated for his
possible involvement in the crime. He, together with Hizon and the
other accused, Boy Bungal, just disappeared without a trace.
It is worth stressing that Morales v. Enrile was already in force at the
time the extra-judicial confession was taken from Lipata on
November 21, 1983, said decision having been rendered six months
earlier, on April 26,1983. The Morales ruling was affirmed in an en
banc decision in People vs. Galit, also through Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr., and has been consistently applied by the Court
since then. And more so now since, significantly, the doctrine has
been embodied in Article III, Section 12(l) of the Constitution of 1987,
thus:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
All law-enforcement officers are enjoined to observe this guaranty
lest its disregard result in the conviction of innocent persons deprived
of the valuable assistance of counsel. The reminder must also be
made that violation of this rule may result in the escape of the guilty,
and all because the investigator has blundered, rendering the
confession inadmissible even if truthful. Constitutional shortcuts are
not allowed to diminish the liberties of the person facing custodial

investigation who is, even at this stage, already fully protected by the
Bill of Rights.
The Court holds that the so-called extrajudicial confession of
Armando Lipata should not have been admitted against him because
it was obtained in violation of the Constitution. Without such
confession, the evidence against the accused-appellant is not, in our
view, sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Even if it
be supposed that his defense of alibi is weak, the prosecution is
nonetheless not strong enough to overcome the constitutional
presumption that he is innocent. This presumption must be and is
hereby upheld.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and the
accused-appellant ACQUITTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 64935 July 19, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHARLIE REPE y REVECENCIO alias FELICIANO RICAFORTE,
JOVENCIO RONTALE alias HERNAN RONTALE y REPE, ROMEO
RONTALE y REPE, ROGELIO DAGUMBOY y BALICOL,
ALFREDO DAGUMBOY Y BALICOL, JORGE SIGNO y BALICOL
and JOEL DOMINGO y SILVERIO, defendants.
David A. Ponce de Leon co-counsel for Alfredo Dagumboy.
Pablo Ebol co-counsel for C. Repe.
Avelino M. Sebastian, Jr. for defendants Dagumboy, Signo and
Domingo.

PADILLA, J.:
This case is before the Court on automatic review of the
decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch XLVII, in Criminal Case No. 2021, finding all the four
(4) accused, namely: Charlie Repe, Alfredo Dagumboy, Jorge Signo
and Joel Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

robbery with homicide and sentencing them to suffer the maximum

penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
Sofronio Parangue and Margarita Parangue in the sum of P5,450.00,
the amount stolen, and in the further sum of P24,000.00 for the death
of said spouses, and to pay costs.
Under an information dated 10 October 1977, 1 filed with the Court of
First Instance of Palawan, the following accused, namely: Charlie
Repe y Revencio alias Feliciano Recaforte, Jovencio Rontale alias
Hernan Rontale y Repe, Romeo Rontale y Repe, Rogelio Dagumboy
y Balicol, Alfredo Dagumboy y Balicol, Jorge Signo y Balicol and Joel
Domingo y Silverio were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band
with Double Homicide. The Information docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2021 alleged:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1976, in Sitio
Marilao, Barrio of Dipla, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, and armed with guns
and other deadly weapons and with the use of a
motor banca, did then 46
and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of force, violence
and intimidation on the persons, and with intent of
gain and against the consent of the owners thereof
SOFRONIO and MARGARITA PARANGUE, took
(sic) and carried (sic) away the following pieces of
personal property, to wit: two (2) sacks of rice, one
(1) fish net and cash money amounting to THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine
Currency to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof in the total sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) that on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take steal and carry away the
articles above-mentioned the above-named
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with evident premeditation and taking advantage of
their superior number and strength and with intent
to kill, treacherously attack, assault, stab and use
personal violence upon Margarita and Sofronio
Parangue thereby inflicting upon them multiple

wounds on different vital parts of their bodies

which caused their instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating
circumstances of alevosia, evident premeditation,
night-time, use of motorized water craft, use of
superior number and strength and penalized under
Article 294 in relation with (sic) Article 296 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on 11 November 1977, the four (4) accused who
were arrested, namely: Charlie Repe, Alfredo Dagumboy, Jorge
Signo and Joel Domingo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The trial proceeded against said four (4) accused, while the other
three (3) accused, namely: Jovencio Rontale, Romeo Rontale and
Rogelio Dagumboy have remained at large to this day.
The evidence for the prosecution, as seen by the court a quo, is as
follows:
In the evening of June 8, 1976, the accused
Charlie Repe y Revecencio alias Feliciano
Recaforte, Alfredo Dagumboy y Balicol, Jorge
Signo y Balicol, Joel Domingo y Silverio, Jovencio
Rontale alias Herman Rontale y Repe, Romeo
Rontale y Repe, Rogelio Dagumboy y Balicol, had
a drinking spree ("inuman") in the house of
Jovencio (alias Herman) Rontale in Barrio
Sandoval, Taytay, Palawan, where they planned
the robbery in question, that is to rob the spouses
Sofronio and Margarita Parangue of Barrio Dipla,
same municipality of Taytay, Palawan. Alfredo
Dagumboy was to operate (makinista) the
motorized banca (pumpboat) they will use in going
to the house of the aforesaid spouses, which
Jovencio borrowed from its owner, Pablo Repe.
As previously planned, they proceeded to the
house of the Parangues, boarding the motorized
banca (pumpboat) at Binyangan, Alfredo being the
makinista. On reaching Barrio Dipla, Taytay,
Palawan, Romeo Rontale, Jovencio (alias
Herman) Rontale, Jorge Signo, Joel Domingo and
Alfredo Dagumboy got down from the pumpboat
leaving Charlie Repe and Rogelio Dagumboy

behind in the pumpboat. Jovencio had a sack with

him. Along the way, Jovencio got from inside of the
sack a.22 caliber gun which he gave to Alfredo.
Romeo was armed with a.25 caliber gun and Joel
with an air gun. When they reached the house of
the spouses, Joel stayed below and Alfredo near
the door upstairs, both to act as "lookouts", while
Jovencio, Jorge, and Romeo entered the house.
Romeo held the hair of the old woman Margarita
who opened the door and pointed his gun at her
with Jovencio and Jorge following behind them.
Inside the house, Jovencio held the old man, tied
his hands and asked him where their money was.
Margarita got their money and gave it to Jovencio
who asked where their other money was.
Margarita told him that it was with their grandchild.
On hearing this, Jovencio told Alfredo and Romeo
to bring the old man to their pumpboat and they
will proceed to the house of the grandchild of the
spouses. Upon reaching the pumpboat, Alfredo
who carried the sack containing the money handed
the same to Jovencio while Romeo who brought
the old man along, turned him over to Rogelio who
placed the old man at one end of the pumpboat.
Alfredo and Romeo returned to the house of the
spouses and joined their companions who all
proceeded to the house of the mentioned
grandchild of the spouses about half a kilometer
away, the same barrio of Dipla. It turned out that
the spouses had no money there. This enraged
Romeo, who right then and there, stabbed the old
woman who died as a result thereof. They went
back to the house of the spouses and ransacked
the place and were able to get a bamboo piggy
bank full with loose change and two (2) sacks of
rice which Jovencio and Romeo carried (a sack
each) to the pumpboat.
When they reached the pumpboat, Rogelio who
learned that the old woman was already dead,
stabbed the old man Sofronio several times and
then he threw him overboard. 2

On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized by the

appellants, reads:
... the evidence for the accused-appellants,
Domingo and Signo showed that on 9 June 1976,
the day the alleged crime was committed,
Domingo and Signo were not at Sto. Marilao,
Barrio Dipla, Taytay, Palawan the place where the
crime was committed, but were at Sitio Topacao,
Barrio Silangga, Taytay, Palawan making charcoal
together with Anecito de la Cruz and Placido
Gregorio. This was testified to by Anecito de la
Cruz and Placido Gregorio and corroborated by
the testimonies of accused-appellants Domingo
and Signo. Subsequently, the two accused were
later arrested and jailed. While in jail, accused
appellants Domingo and Signo were repeatedly
mauled by one Patrolman Adolfo Jaymis who,
against their will, forced them to sign separate
extra-judicial confessions which they later swore to
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cosme
Martinez.

47
As to accused-appellant Alfredo Dagumboy,
evidence shows that he was not at Barrio Dipla
when the alleged crime took place, as he was then
residing at the house of Prudencio Bering at Barrio
Topacao, where he was working as a fisherman.
The latter place was several hours away by boat
from the former. Furthermore, the records show
that when Alfredo Dagumboy was arrested and
jailed, he was also mauled repeatedly by
Patrolman Adolfo Jaymis who, against his will,
forced him to sign an extra-judicial confession
which was subsequently sworn to by him before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cosme Martinez. 3
After trial, a decision was rendered on 27 May 1983 by the court a
quo, convicting the herein four (4) accused-appellants, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding all the four (4) accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide as charged in the
information and taking into consideration the

aggravating circumstances stated above, the Court

sentences said accused Charlie Repe y
Revecencio, Alfredo Dagumboy y Balicol, Jorge
Signo y Balicol and Joel Domingo y Silverio to
suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of Sofronio Parangue
and Margarita Parangue in the sum of P 5,450.00,
the amount stolen, and the sum of P24,000.00 for
the death of Sofronio and Margarita Parangue and
to pay cost. 4
Subsequently, on motion of accused-appellant Charlie Repe, this
Court resolved to grant said Charlie Repe's withdrawal of
appeal. 5 Consequently, the judgment of conviction as to Charlie
Repe became final and executory. 6Hence, this review only as to the
remaining three (3) accused-appellants, namely: Alfredo Dagumboy,
Jorge Signo and Joel Domingo.
The main argument of the appellants is that their extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence for they were taken without
the appellants having been properly informed of their constitutional
rights during their custodial investigation. They principally contend
that the waiver of their constitutional rights was inadequate and
ineffective for it was made without the assistance of counsel. It is
noted that, during the trial, they already assailed the admissibility of
the said confessions on the ground that they were extracted through
force, intimidation and maltreatment. Their assault against said
extrajudicial confessions has persisted in this appeal.
We find merit in the appellants' contention that the assailed
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
As to appellant Alfredo Dagumboy, his extrajudicial confession starts
in this manner
PASUBALI: Ginoong Alfredo
Dagumboy, ipinagbibigay alam
namin sa inyo na kayo'y inuusig
tungkol sa isang kasalanan.
Pinaaalala namin sa inyo ang
magsawalang kibo at
magkaroon ng patnubay ng
manananggol na sarili ninyong
pili. Ito ba ay nauunawaan
ninyo?

SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Pagkatapos na
maipabatid sa inyo and inyong
karapatan sa ilalim ng ating
bagong Saligang Batas na
magsawalang kibo, nais ba
ninyong ipagpatuloy ang
imbistigasyong ito?
SAGOT: Opo, hindi ko po
kailangan ang manananggol sa
imbistigasyong ito.
TANONG: Ipinaaalala rin namin
sa inyo na anumang salaysay
and inyong sasabihin sa
imbistigasyong ito ay maaaring
gamiting ebidensya laban o
panig sa inyo sa alinmang
Hukuman dito sa Pilipinas, ito ba
ay nauunawaan ninyo?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Matapos na
maipaalam sa inyo and inyong
karapatan sa ilalim ng ating
Bagong Saligang Batas, Artikulo
4, Seksyon 20, na magsawalang
kibo at magkaroon ng sariling
manananggol, handa ka na bang
magbigay ng isang kusangloob
na salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo. 7
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the other two (2) appellants,
Joel Domingo and Jorge Signo, the questions and answers
appearing therein in regard to apprisal of their constitutional rights,
and waiver of such rights, are in the same tenor as that contained in
Alfredo Dagomboy's aforequoted confession. 8 Each of the
appellants signed and subscribed his extrajudical confession before
the municipal judge at Taytay, Palawan in May 1977.

Looking at said extrajudicial confessions, it appears that the

appellants were informed of their right to remain silent and right to
counsel, and that they understood such rights. They further affirmed
in said confessions that, although they have been informed of such
rights, they would voluntarily proceed with the custodial investigation
even without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, they affirmed that
they were aware that any statement taken from them could be used
against them.
However, after a careful examination of the entire records of the case
at bar, the Court regrets to say that the appellants were not properly
apprised of their constitutional rights before their custodial
investigation took place, such that their extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence.
In People vs. Galit, 9 this Court set forth the requirements for
investigating officers to follow before and during custodial
investigations. Thus
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce
Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making an arrest and in
conducting a custodial48
investigation, and which We
reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible
or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any

statement obtained in violation of the procedure

herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, implies

a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain and contemplates an
effective communication that results in an
understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this,
there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the accused has been 'informed' of his
rights.

The rule, therefore, is that, when an investigation conducted upon an

accused did not conform to the requirements set forth in People vs.
Galit, the extrajudicial confession taken therein is inadmissible. 10

While it is true that the trial court observed that

appellants' extrajudicial confessions are
interlocking and replete with many minor details
that could have been known only to the appellants,
and hence indicate that they were voluntarily
given, still, one cannot be unmindful of the equallysettled rule that even if the confession of the
accused is "gospel truth", if it was made without
the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given. 12

Moreover, it is clear from the records of this case that the way the
investigating officer apprised the appellants of their constitutional
rights, was pro forma and perfunctory. The three (3) extrajudicial
statements in issue appear to have contained the same afore-quoted
prefatory statements, which indicate that the "appraisal" made was a
purely mechanical act.
In People vs. Newman and Tolentino, 11 this Court held
It can be gleaned from the record of the case that
the advice as to constitutional rights of the
accused, given by the investigating officer, was
perfunctory and pro-forma, intended obviously to
pay lip service to the prescribed norms, through a
recitation by rote of the sacramental advice. This
stereotyped 'advice' appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated, has assumed the nature of a 'legal
form' or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding
on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of
a right is missing. In the case at bar, the two (2)
extrajudicial statements and waivers carry the
same quoted prefatory statement. This, to the mind
of the Court, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative
on the part of the investigating officers to fully and
truly inform the accused of their rights to remain
silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation. The 'informing' done by the police in
the case at bar was nothing more than a superficial
and mechanical act, performed not so much to
attain the objectives of the fundamental law, as to
give a semblance of compliance therewith. The
right of a person under interrogation to be informed

The Court, therefore, rules that the conviction of the appellants

cannot be based on the extrajudicial confessions in issue.
Excluded such extrajudicial confessions, the next question is, did the
prosecution establish nonetheless the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt?
It did.
The three (3) prosecution witnesses, namely, the spouses Rosalyn
and Nemesio Fabrigas and Rosita Jardin, who is Rosalyn's sister,
positively identified the herein three (3) appellants as participants in
the crime charged. They testified that in that early and fateful
morning of 9 June 1976, several men with the struggling Margarita
Parangue, who was being held by one of them, came to the said
witnesses' nipa hut, asking for the money which the said men
believed to be owned by Margarita and safekept in the witnesses'
hut. The same witnesses testified that it was appellant Alfredo
Dagumboy who was holding Margarita and who lit the lamp that
lighted the hut; that they (witnesses) saw the other (2) appellants
outside of the hut, as there was moonlight Jorge Signo was
standing and Joel Domingo was holding an airgun; that thereafter
they (the witnesses) jumped out of the hut, left the old woman and
the several men behind and sought help; and that later in that same

early morning, they saw the dead bloodied body of Margarita

Parangue lying on the ground near the hut. 13
Thus, these three (3) prosecution witnesses were able to recognize
and positively Identified the three (3) appellants as the ones who
came to their nipa hut on 9 June 1976; they declared that the lamp
inside the nipa hut was lit by the appellant Alfredo himself; that the
moon was then shining bright outside the hut where Jorge Signo and
Joel Domingo were seen by them standing; and that coupled with
these circumstances was the fact that the surrounding area of the
nipa hut was clear, there being no other house nor trees planted or
shrubs growing around the place that could have obstructed the light
thrown by the moon. 14
The defense of the three (3) appellants is alibi. Alfredo Dagumboy
testified that prior to 9 June 1976, he, as a fisherman, was at
Maruyog-ruyog, Linapacan, Palawan intending to go fishing; that he
arrived at Tapacao from Maruyug-ruyog only on 20 June 1976. 15 On
the other hand, Joel Domingo and Jorge Signo, in their testimony,
stated that the whole day of 9 June 1976, they, as co-workers, were
at Tapacao, Silanga, Taytay, Palawan making charcoal . 16It is noted
that, as the records show, Marilao, Dipla, Taytay, Palawan, the place
where the crime was committed, is only about
49 seven (7) kilometers
from Tapacao. 17
Alibi is, as a rule, a weak defense. It cannot, in this case, overthrow
witnesses Fabrigas' and Jardin's positive Identification of the said
appellants as the men who came to their nipa hut on that fateful early
morning of 9 June 1976.
Moreover, it is material to note that the appellants together with all
the other accused in the case at bar are in one way or another
related to each other or at least, known and friends to one
another. 18 They are also residents of barrios/barangays Tapacao and
Sandoval, both of which are in the municipality of Taytay,
Palawan. 19 The residence of the appellants, together with that of
their co-accused in this case, and the place of the commission of the
crime are all found in one municipality, that is Taytay, Province of
Palawan.
All told, the Court finds that the participation and the guilt of the
appellants in the crime charged were established by the prosecution
with moral certainty and convincing proof.

The trial court found conspiracy in the case at bar. We agree that
conspiracy among the seven (7) co-accused, including the appellants
herein, has been clearly established by the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and that of co-accused Charlie Repe himself.
Apart from the testimony of the spouses Fabrigas and Rosita Jardin
as to the arrival at their nipa hut in the early morning of 9 June 1976,
of the three (3) appellants herein, with victim Margarita being held by
the hand by Alfredo, several other prosecution witnesses testified as
to the acts of the other persons charged in the instant case, before,
during and after the commission of the crime. These witnesses
testified as follows:
1. Gregorio Lorena on separate occasions after the
crime occurred saw Charlie Repe at the "dance"
party, with the latter's wallet full of money bills. 20
2. Apolonio Soriano was invited by Herman
Rontale (one of the accused at large) to go to
Barrio Dipla to get "fat" pig, which invitation
Apolonio rejected as he knew that there was no fat
pig in Dipla and that instead, something bad would
be done. 21
3. Pablo Repe, the owner of the pumpboat named
"Rosanna", and uncle of Charlie Repe, testified
that it was Herman Rontale who borrowed the boat
on 8 June 1976 and returned it to him on 9 June
1976 in the morning. 22
4. Antonio Hontra saw blood in the middle portion
of "Rosanna" on 13 June 1976. 23
5. Ernesto Repe, owner of an airgun testified that
Romeo Rontale (another accused at large)
borrowed the said gun and returned it on 9 June
1976. 24
As to Charlie Repe, he admitted in his testimony that before the
crime occurred, his three (3) friends, namely, Rogelio Dagumboy,
Herman Rontale and Romeo Rontale, who are co-accused with the
appellants, came to his house and invited him for a drinking spree;
that the said spree lasted until 9:00 o'clock in the evening, during
which his three (3) friends invited him to buy pig that night at Dipla. 25

The totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances establish that

conspiracy existed in the case at bar.
However, we note that the trial court ruled that four (4) aggravating
circumstances treachery, abuse of superior strength, evident
premeditation and use of motorized watercraft-attended the
commission of the crime.
On evident premeditation, we do not agree that it should be
appreciated in the commission of the crime charged. Although
conspiracy existed, it should be observed that this conspiracy was
established by circumstantial evidence only. As ruled in one
case, 26 when conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the
accused in the perpetration of the crime, evident premeditation may
not be appreciated in the absence of proof as to how and when the
plan to kill the victim was hatched, or what period of time elapsed
before it was carried out.
As regards treachery, we also do not see any reason for appreciating
this aggravating circumstance. It must be noted that, in the instant
case, there is no direct evidence pointing to the actual commission of
the crime charged. Not one of the prosecution witnesses saw who
killed the robbed couple. The settled rule is that treachery must be
established by positive evidence in order to be appreciated. 27 No
treachery may be said to have attended the commission of the
offense, as it was not clearly proved with convincing and positive
evidence.
However, as to the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and use of motorized watercraft, the records of the case
clearly show the presence of these aggravating circumstances.
Certainly, the seven (7) persons charged in this case, including
herein three (3) appellants, being armed with weapons, surely and
deliberately used excessive force on the persons of their helpless
victims. Further, all the accused, including the three (3) appellants,
used a motorized banca/watercraft to facilitate the commission of the
crime.
Thus, there being conspiracy and the settled rule being that, in
conspiracy, the guilt of one is the guilt of all, 28 we find all the three (3)
appellants herein guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, with
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use
of motorized vehicle.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the
crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There
being two (2) aggravating circumstances present, with no mitigating
circumstance, applying Article 63 of the said code, the penalty
applicable is death.
However, in view of the 1987 Constitution under which the death
penalty is not imposable, the appropriate penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and ordered to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Sofronio Parangue and Margarita Parangue in
the sum of P5,450.00, the amount stolen, and in the further sum of
P60,000.00 for the death of said spouses, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154130

August 20, 2004

BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner,

50
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police

Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal
logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two
boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being
constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner
Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner
of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the
DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later,
a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the
scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners house in
Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and
convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 24986. On petition for review, we rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner
BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming
petitioners conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.
The facts are briefly restated as follows:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz,
Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are
members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City.
On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco,

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with

finality on January 12, 2004.1 Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration"2 with attached
"Motion for Reconsideration,"3 wherein he makes the following
submissions:
1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY
PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE
PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED
VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE
THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE
DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;

4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED

IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.4
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for
Reconsideration.5
The prosecution was required to comment on petitioners second
Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for
Reconsideration well-taken.6
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a
prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to
admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever
substantive justice may be better served thereby.
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation
of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts
have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our
power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from
its operation.7
The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of
actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence
on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of
the private offended parties.
Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of
SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR
Team during their mission. On the contrary, what appears is that
petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his
hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. SPO1
Capoquian testified thus:

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

a
I could not hear anything important because they were
just laughing.

q
After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in
Daram?
a
We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram
but on our way we saw a boat being constructed there so
we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).
q

xxx

q
And then according to you there was laughter what
was the cause of this laughter?

And you arrived at 5:00 oclock?

Yes sir.

q
And you ate dinner between 5:00 oclock to 2:00
oclock in the morning of September 2, is that correct?
a

Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.

51you to a house where you

q
And Mayor Astorga brought
had dinner?

I dont remember sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

AJ PALATTAO:
q

Were you told not to go away from the place?

No Your Honor.

Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

Yes sir.

q
And you left at 2:00 oclock in the morning of
September 2?
a

xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

a
a

xxx

q
It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00
oclock in the morning of September 2?

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual

restraint imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian
in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam
around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at
that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team
from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by
boat.

q
Up to what point did you reach when you were
allegedly prevented to go somewhere?
a

They did not say anything sir.

Where did you go after that?

Just down until it rained.

ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q

It was raining at that time, is that correct?

Yes sir it was raining.

q
If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that
place, on your part, was there somebody prevented you to
go to another place?

q
And the weather was not good for motorized travel at
that particular time that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?

a
I know it is raining but I could not say that you could
not travel.

q
But on your part can you just leave that place or
somebody will prevent you to go somewhere else?

q
What was the condition of the sea at that time when
you were in Lucoblucob?

a
What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were
already told not to leave the barangay.

AJ NARIO:

a
The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there
were no waves at that time.

q
In other words, you can go places in that barangay but
you are not supposed to leave that barangay, is this
Barangay Daram?

q
While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00
oclock Mayor Astorga was with you having dinner?

a
It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the
evening it rained.

Yes sir.

And of course you also partook of wine?

a
I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no
wine sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Yes Your Honor.

q
You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor
and the foresters, the complainants here?

But it was raining the whole day?

q
It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00
oclock in the morning is that correct?
a

A little bit hard I dont know when the rain stopped, sir.

I dont know Your Honor.

Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.

q
On your part according to you you can go places if
you want although in your impression you cannot leave the
barangay. How about the other companions like Mr. Simon,
Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?
a

No Your Honor.

q
Why are you very positive that in your case you can
leave but in the case of those I have enumerated they
cannot, why?
a

If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took

the witness stand on August 16, 2000 but did not complete
his testimony-in-chief due to lack of material time. His
testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not
touch on the circumstances of the alleged detention.11
On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio
E. Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and
Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance
stating, in pertinent part:
xxx

xxx

xxx;

6. That what transpired may have been caused by human

limitation aggravated by the exhaustion of the team in
scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for
several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been
confronted with the same predicament, hence our
confrontation resulted to a heated
52argument and the
eventual misunderstanding;
7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the
Municipality of Daram, Samar our respect for him prevailed
when he ordered us to take dinner with him and other local
residents thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was
misinterpreted by us;
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation
between the team and the group of Mayor Astorga during
the dinner and we were eventually allowed to leave Daram,
Samar;
9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we
reported the incident to our supervisors who required us to
submit our affidavit;
10. That at present our differences had already been
reconciled and both parties had already express apologies
and are personally no longer interested to pursue the case
against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;
xxx

xxx

xxx.12

Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in

court to testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the
testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts
of the DENR Team.

circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case,

one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while
the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must
prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.18

The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquians testimony negate the

element of detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is
necessarily subjective.13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its
presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must
instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the
victim at the time of the crime.14 As such, SPO1 Capoquian and
SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on
whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended
parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied
on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October

1, 2003 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed
judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986
is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a

reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team
against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,
capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition
that the private offended parties were taken to petitioners house and
prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally
plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and
served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have
advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was
rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private
offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over
dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation
between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also
served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the
house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

G.R. No. 135012

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved.15 He is entitled to an acquittal unless his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.16
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been
proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the
accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a
matter of right. For the prosecutions evidence must stand or fall on
its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.17 Furthermore, where the
evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the
evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly
accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
September 7, 2004

ANITA ESTEBAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City,
and GERARDO ESTEBAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In this present petition for certiorari,1 Anita Esteban seeks to annul
the Orders dated July 9, 1998 and August 20, 1998 issued by Judge
Reynaldo A. Alhambra, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, San Jose City, in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97). The Orders denied petitioners
application for cancellation of the cash bail posted in each case.
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sisterin-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail
of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty.
While out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases,
Gerardo was again charged with another crime for which he was
arrested and detained.
"Fed up with Gerardos actuation," petitioner refused to post another
bail.2 Instead, on June 18, 1998, she filed with the trial court an

application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the
four criminal cases.3She alleged therein that she is "terminating the
cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as certified
to by the City Jail Warden."4
In an Order dated July 9, 1998,5 respondent judge denied petitioners
application, thus:
xxx
"In these cases, accused was allowed enjoyment of his
provisional liberty after money was deposited with the Clerk
of Court as cash bail. Applicant-movant (now petitioner) did
not voluntarily surrender the accused. Instead, the accused
was subsequently charged with another crime for which he
was arrested and detained. His arrest and detention for
another criminal case does not affect the character of the
cash bail posted by applicant-movant in Criminal Cases
Nos. SJC-88(95), SLC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97)
as deposited pending the trial of these cases. Money
deposited as bail even though made by a third person is
considered as the accuseds deposit where there is no
53(State vs. Wilson, 65
relationship of principal and surety
Ohio L-Abs, 422, 115 NE 2d 193). Hence, the money so
deposited takes the nature of property in custodia legis and
is to be applied for payment of fine and costs. And such
application will be made regardless of the fact that the
money was deposited by a third person.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application for
cancellation of bail bonds is hereby DENIED.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration6 but was denied in an
Order dated August 20, 1998.7
Hence, the instant petition assailing the twin Orders as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner states that she is constrained to bring this matter directly to
this Court as the issue is one of first impression.8

Petitioner submits that by surrendering the accused who is now in

jail, her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is
allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the
bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may
be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his
death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon
acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution
of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice
to any liability on the bail." (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners submission is misplaced.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where,
among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to
the court that ordered the latters arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon
application by the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.
We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not
surrender the accused, charged in the four criminal cases, to the trial
court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was
charged in a subsequent criminal case.
Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of
cash deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 (formerly Section 11)
of the same Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment of fine and
costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to
any person who made the deposit. Section 14 provides:
"Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any
person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed
the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit
and a written undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be

considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and

costs, while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the
accused or to whoever made the deposit." (Underscoring
supplied)
The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A
cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person in
his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money
deposited is regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it
can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that may be
imposed by the court. This was the ruling of this Court as early as
1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma.9 Therein we declared that "when a cash
bail is allowed, the two parties to the transaction are the State and
the defendant. Unlike other bail bonds, the money may then be used
in the payment of that in which the State is concerned the fine and
costs. The right of the government is in the nature of a lien on the
money deposited." We further held in the same case that:
"x x x. Similar cases have frequently gained the attention of
the courts in the United States in jurisdictions where
statutes permit a deposit of money to be made in lieu of bail
in criminal cases. The decisions are unanimous in holding
that a fine imposed on the accused may be satisfied from
the cash deposit; and this is true although the money has
been furnished by a third person. This is so because the law
contemplates that the deposit shall be made by the
defendant. The money, x x x, must accordingly be treated
as the property of the accused. As a result, the money could
be applied in payment of any fine imposed and of the costs
(People vs. Laidlaw [1886], Ct. of App. Of New York, 7 N.
E., 910, a case frequently cited approvingly in other
jurisdictions; State of Iowa vs. Owens [1900], 112 Iowa,
403; Mundell vs. Wells, supra.). But while as between the
State and the accused the money deposited by a third
person for the release of the accused is regarded as the
money of the accused, it is not so regarded for any other
purpose. As between the accused and a third person, the
residue of the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a
creditor of property obtain (Wright & Taylor vs. Dougherty
[1908], 138 Iowa, 195; People vs. Gould [1902], 78 N. Y.
Sup., 279; Mundell vs. Wells, supra.)."10
In fine, we fail to discern any taint of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge in denying petitioners application for
cancellation of the accuseds cash bail.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO,
CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO
SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON,
LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA
PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON,
CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S.
MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V.
BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO
CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
54 COL. DIONY A.
COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991

CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT.

DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN
PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP
DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP
Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S.
RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO
JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT
ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS
GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO
PC, respondents.

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.

ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
PA., respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito

Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo
Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey
Sarroza.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO,

CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC.
FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA,

Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson

Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.

Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R.
No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve
practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same
incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1
to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67
(Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (Murder).

Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against

them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to
try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of
GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right
to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No.
408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the
ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority
either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas
corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional
objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of

the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and
medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the
proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant
them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21,
1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the
motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their
respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration
of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within
which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March
14,1990.

I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office
55
Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform
subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the
petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before
the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers
on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp
Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your
witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the
charge/charges against you for violence of AWs
_______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION
TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counteraffidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit
controverting evidence.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of

the charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and
specifications must be signed by a person subject
to military law, and under the oath either that he
has personal knowledge of, or has investigated,
the matters set forth therein and that the same are
true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general courtmartial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of
the matter set forth in said charges, form of
charges, and what disposition of the case should
be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At
such investigation full opportunity shall be given to
the accused to cross-examine witnesses against
him if they are available and to present anything
he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense
or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such
investigation, they shall be accompanied by a

statement of the substance of the testimony taken

on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted
merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were
presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains
unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their
counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948
manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They
invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14
ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued
under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990,
but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamuswith prayer for provisional liberty and a
writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the
answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14,
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the
order for his release and to declare in contempt the commanding
officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also
complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to
release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to
this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional
liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col.
Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional
intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons
with the defined exception is applicable and covers
all military men facing court-martial proceedings.
Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-

Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and

intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail
does not apply to military men facing court-martial
proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null
and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No.
14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on
the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors
and which may as well include other persons
facing charges before General Court-Martial No.
14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for
bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the provisional
liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as
intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454
filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The
petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
where it was raffled to respondent Judge56
Antonio P. Solano. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as
follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were
given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial
investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990,
when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing.
This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied
when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due
process because the investigation was resolved against them owing

to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been

expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit
the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified
shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting
evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions
appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the
charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit
their defense.

object to trial in the absence of

the required investigation. In that
event the court-martial could
itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military
reviewing authorities could
consider the same contention,
reversing a court- martial
conviction where failure to
comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused.
But we are not persuaded that
Congress intended to make
otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because
pre-trial investigations fall short
of the standards prescribed by
Article 70. That Congress has
not required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial
is an indication that the
investigatory plan was not
intended to be exalted to the
jurisdictional level.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an

opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or
forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71
by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to
conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general courtmartial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general courtmartial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial
investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a courtmartial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L
ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial
investigation procedure by
Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71,
Commonwealth Act 408) can
properly be construed as an
indispensable pre-requisite to
the exercise of the Army General
court martial jurisdiction.. The
Article does serve important
functions in the administration of
court-martial procedures and
does provide safeguards to an
accused. Its language is clearly
such that a defendant could

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article
70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate
General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pretrial investigation, court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio.
But this holding has been
expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate
General. This later interpretation
has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in
no way effect the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. The War
Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention
of Congress in 1947 after which

Congress amended Article 70

but left unchanged the language
here under consideration.
compensable pre-requisite to the
exercise of Army general courtmartial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened
without any pretrial investigation under article of
war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but
the court-martial might nevertheless have
jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the
one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil
courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, that issue was resolved more than two years ago
in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:

57 to the contention of
The Court finds that, contrary
petitioners, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of law as provided in the Articles
of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911. The amended charge sheets, charging
petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny
and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed
by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military
law, after he had investigated the matter through
an evaluation of the pertinent records, including
the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies
on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by
Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in
the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of
War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the
fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the
manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the
officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood its
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.

Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted

by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant
to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911,
petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file
their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing
so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the
dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses
against them was their own doing, for they never
even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
witnesses so that they may be made to answer
clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute
in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General
Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of
the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major
command or task force, the commanding officer of
a division, the commanding officer of a military
area, the superintendent of the Military Academy,
the commanding officer of a separate brigade or
body of troops may appoint general courts-martial;
but when any such commander is the accuser or
the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried,
the court shall be appointed by superior competent
authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen.
De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order
itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has
not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General,
the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief
of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its
president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not
disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as
he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly

invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No.

93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for
him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this
was originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
(Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12,
1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or
special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause
stated to the court. The court shall determine the
relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not
receive a challenge to more than one member at a
time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall
ordinarily be presented and decided before those
by the accused are offered. Each side shall be
entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law
member of the court shall not be challenged
except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v.
Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine
Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National
Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine
Scout officers and graduates of the United States
military and naval academies who were on duty
with the Philippine Army, there was a complete
dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside
from the fact that the officer corps of the
developing army was numerically made equate for
the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
national defense program. Because of these
considerations it was then felt that peremptory
challenges should not in the meanwhile be
permitted and that only challenges for cause, in
any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of
the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408),
as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the
approval of the Act, made no mention or reference
to any peremptory challenge by either the trial

judge advocate of a court- martial or by the

accused. After December 17,1958, when the
Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army
became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a
continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length
and breadth of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal
surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had
expanded to a very large number, and a great
many of the officers had been indoctrinated in
military law. It was in these environmental
circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended
on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one
peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that
"the law member of court shall not be challenged
except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No.
8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed
58 Forces to create
military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and
such other cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters
relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory
challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed.
Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall
immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged
member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged
member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or
the National Security Code, which was a compilation and codification
of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the
continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the

State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was

embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant
thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the
other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of
martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of
the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est
anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the
right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39.
To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having
been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the
Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous
regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of
martial law. It is curious that the present government should invoke
the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory
challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to
delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so

motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light
of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the
laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects.
This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety
of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition
for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional
Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private
respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations
of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to
order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the
Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite
the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held that
"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited
refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the
accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no
supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors
in their proceedings are not open to consideration.
The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is
equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an
abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule
65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion"
as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This
is precisely the point at issue in this action
suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and
prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of
a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial
or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional
Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied
in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor
General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be
enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

59

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note

that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the
fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and
are paid out of revenues collected from the people.
All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing
political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also
impress upon this Honorable Court that release on
bail of respondents constitutes a damaging
precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on
bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were
sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number
alone is already discomforting. But, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely resume
their heinous activity which could very well result in

the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,

including this Honorable Court, and replace the
same with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would
violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated
and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they
cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are
not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the

charges were completed, the same still had to
pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of
Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must
reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people,
must stress the point that if the participation of
petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is
confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge
Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can
be filed against him or the existence of a prima
facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent
then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General)
to release petitioner. Respondents must also be
reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War,
indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article
71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be
taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the
charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating
or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even
be punished as a court martial may direct. 6

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that

they had not been charged after more than one year from their
arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on
February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners
submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the
private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991,
pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and
initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of
the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to
submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was
indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and
preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However,
this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was
able to complete it pre-charge investigation only
after one (1) year because hundreds of officers
and thousands of enlisted men were involved in
the failed coup. All of them, as well as other
witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated,
and these inevitably took months to finish. The precharge investigation was rendered doubly difficult
by the fact that those involved were dispersed and
scattered throughout the Philippines. In some
cases, command units, such as the Scout

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by

Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of
appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was
ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour
period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court
did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the
petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents'
contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed
with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate
the following observations of the Court in Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves

the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be
based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long
as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have
not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of
jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of
the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated,
however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to
peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not
have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition
60 is GRANTED, and the
respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War.
In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED,
and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch
II), respondents.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del
Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of
petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is
assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the
constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail. 1 The merit of the
petition on its face is thus apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought
setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail to
P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had
escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case moot and
academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower
court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative
doctrines that should be observed in fixing the amount of the bail
sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional
right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara,
Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on
November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for
his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of
twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on November 25,
1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder 2 and another for
multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail
filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that
there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August
21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge
started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution
resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe
petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting
petitioner's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on
the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if
he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the
excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the

information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the

offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that
on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos,
upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent
Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting
that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to
reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant.
Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the
circumstances concerning the issuance of the above order and the
other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove any
charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed,
moreover, that the challengedorder would find support in circulars of
the Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought
the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no
appearance for both the petitioner and respondents with the former,
upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to submit a
memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in turn
having the same period from receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a
memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on April 6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a
supplemental answer wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped
from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then remained
at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition
for lack of merit, towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated
June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea:
"The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose
opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for
dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this
case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The
issue in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this
Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la
Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and
declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail." 4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition
for certiorari is not warranted, still, as set forth at the opening of this
opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should not
preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligationof fidelity on the part of lower court

judges to the unequivocal command of theConstitution that

excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. 5 Such a right
flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is honored in the
observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of
probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself
scarceand thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as
a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the
subsequent trial. 6 Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this
right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the
proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be
resisted.

the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored

in this case that the Department of Justice did recomend the total
sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify
what, on its face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance
on Villaseor v. Abano. 9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there
summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability
of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for
the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5)
health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7)
probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other
bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at
trial in other cases." 10Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this
decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion:
"Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the required
remedy." 11

61
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered
nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have
been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in
the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7 As
construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible
function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial,
and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive" under the
Eighth Amendment." 8
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of
August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that
should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim,
and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated
murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only
two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly
exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for

No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to

the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told
that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post
such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the
lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the
fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect
for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There
is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would
under the circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping
from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof
desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed
out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional
liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright
if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be
availed of. There would have beenno disappointment of expectations
then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise
to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a
munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 12 It is no wonder that the
resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its
wake.Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is
why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge
did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.

Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a
lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this
Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of
the Abano opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No
doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce
the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order
complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but it flies in the
face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with
thecommand of reason.
With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no
ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the above order.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY
AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER
THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E.
PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and
HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage
as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not
the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the
intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue
with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would
Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively
conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned
debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite
the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the
same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor
62
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to
and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28,
1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpusherein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having
been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does
not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an

information for which no complaint was initially filed
or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence
was denied due process;

the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and

two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised
and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a
warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of
probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and
set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's coaccused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised
similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does
not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very
simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the
Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime
("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means
for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of
the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave
offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6,
1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same
date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash
or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00
(for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was
issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter
of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not
passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority
view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot
absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with common offenses, socalled; this option was suggested by the Solicitor
General in oral argument although it is not offered
in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses
committed in furtherance, or as a necessary
means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to
acts committed in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less
grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make
rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its
course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine
should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood
all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit
to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former
regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by
enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to
the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the
crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes
rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver

penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The
Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the
theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting
the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of
the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid
of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its
course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made
clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one
at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar.
63 If murder were not
complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending
upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2)
for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words,
in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have
to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory
of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted
for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of

sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that

which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the
words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los
casos de concurso de delitos a
que hace referencia este articulo
(75 del Codigo de 1932), esta
basado francamente en el
principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina
Penal del Tribunal Supremo de
Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation
refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal
Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo
anterior no son aplicables en el
caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea
medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
En estos casos solo se
impondra la pena
correspondiente al delito mas
grave en su grado maximo,
hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran
imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada
exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por
separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the
qualification inserted in said amendment,

restricting the imposition of the penalty for the

graver offense in its maximum period to the case
when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt
with separately. The absence of said limitation in
our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there
can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver
than that prescribed for each one of said offenses
put together. In directing that the penalty for the
graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no
other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties
for each offense, if imposed separately. The
reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is
readily discernible. When two or more crimes are
the result of a single act, the offender is deemed
less perverse than when he commits said crimes
thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from
the other, he must suffer the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total
of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandezremains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity
that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for
the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions
relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights
and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding
the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder

and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as

charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations
of the amended information against defendantappellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense
of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that
the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in dealing
with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that
does not exist in the statute books, while64
technically correct so far as
the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially
filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was
filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that
on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of
the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an
offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for
petitioner's arrest without first personallydetermining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the

complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the

Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not
the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of
arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was
raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had
what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which
to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not,
or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance
suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandezas applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that
must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted
to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of
the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by
the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime
or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than
one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have
been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which
petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into
the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error
or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent
Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally
justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have
been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of
these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning
and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to
be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that
would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to
orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members
of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the
trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied
an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the
respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the
better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a
capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the
accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to
claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush
to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently
taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The
proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the
petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of
the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it
on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has
already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the
merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the
view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression
of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and

reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the
former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that
clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the
lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to
and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in
factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that
warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner
Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared
before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990,
they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional
rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion
has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that presentday rebels are less impelled by love of country
65 than by lust for power
and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing,
not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of
their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of
seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated
against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large
attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an
ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that
not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent
need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently
utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in
its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can
only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is
needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive
the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is
properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine

enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a
matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being
merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of
bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond
flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement
as to costs.

employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and

Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal
Mayor for a period of six months from January 1, 1999 to June 30,
1999 for a monthly salary of P26,953.80.

SO ORDERED.

xxxx

G.R. No. 164185

July 23, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor assails the May 20,
2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal
Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A.
Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence2 and acquitting him of the crime
of unlawful appointment under Article 2443 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal
Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased),
a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao,
Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on
July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator
of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.4 A Contract of
Consultancy5 dated February 8, 1999 was executed between the
Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby the former

On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M.

Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.6 The complaint was resolved against
Villapando and Tiape and the following Information7 dated March 19,
2002 charging the two with violation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code was filed with the Sandiganbayan:

That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in San Vicente, Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, committing the crime
herein charged, in relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, conspiring and confederating with accused Orlando M.
Tiape, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously appoint
ORLANDO M. TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of San Vicente,
Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando knowing fully well that
Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing mayoralty
candidate in the Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during
the May 1998 elections, hence is ineligible for appointment to a
public office within one year (1) from the date of the elections, to the
damage and prejudice of the government and of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27465 and
raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not
guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the
prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000.9
After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to
file a demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division
denied his motion but gave him five days within which to inform the
court in writing whether he will nonetheless submit his Demurrer to
Evidence for resolution without leave of court.10Villapando then filed a

Manifestation of Intent to File Demurrer to Evidence,11 and was given

15 days from receipt to file his Demurrer to Evidence. He filed his
Demurrer to Evidence12 on October 28, 2003.
In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division found Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, as
follows:
The Court found the "Demurrer to Evidence" impressed with merit.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 244. Unlawful appointments.Any public officer who
shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person
lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
(underscoring supplied)
A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following
elements, to wit:
1. the offender was a public officer;
66
2. accused nominated or appointed a person to a public
office;
3. such person did not have the legal qualifications
[therefor;] and,
4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did not
have the legal qualifications at the time he made the
nomination or appointment.
Afore-cited elements are hereunder discussed.
1. Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was
committed.
2. Accused appointed Orlando Tiape as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

3. There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called

upon to determine whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of
[his] designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking in
legal qualification. Stated differently, does "legal
qualification" contemplate the one (1) year prohibition on
appointment as provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the
Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local Government Code,
mandating that a candidate who lost in any election shall
not, within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the Government?
The Court answers in the negative.
In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a
public office, "there must be a law providing for the qualifications of a
person to be nominated or appointed" therein. To illuminate further,
Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly discussed in his book that the
qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the
government is provided for by law, which may refer to educational
attainment, civil service eligibility or experience:
As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public officer who
nominates or appoints a person to a public office. The person
nominated or appointed is not qualified and his lack of qualification is
known to the party making the nomination or appointment. The
qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the
government is provided by law. The purpose of the law is to ensure
that the person appointed is competent to perform the duties of the
office, thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service.
The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational
attainment, civil service eligibility or experience. For instance, for one
to be appointed as judge, he must be a lawyer. So if the Judicial and
Bar Council nominates a person for appointment as judge knowing
him to be not a member of the Philippine Bar, such act constitutes a
violation of the law under consideration.
In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the position of
Municipal Administrator. As such, the law that provides for the legal
qualification for the position of municipal administrator is Section
480, Article X of the Local Government Code, to wit:
"Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.(a) No
person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of

good moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in

public administration, law, or any other related course from a
recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management
and administration work for at least five (5) years in the case of the
provincial or city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the
municipal administrator.
xxx

xxx

x x x"

It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much

less prove that Mayor Villapandos appointee, Orlando Tiape, lacked
any of the qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal
Administrator. Prosecutions argument rested on the assertion that
since Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998 election, he necessarily lacked
the required legal qualifications.
It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with
absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who possessed the
required legal qualifications for a position may be temporarily
disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one
year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand,
one may not be temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could
not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal
qualifications imposed by law.
4. Anent the last element, this Court deems it unnecessary to discuss
the same.
WHEREFORE, finding the "Demurrer to Evidence" filed by Mayor
Villapando with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED. Mayor
Villapando is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.13
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People of the
Philippines.
Villapando was required by this Court to file his comment to the
petition. Despite several notices, however, he failed to do so and in a
Resolution14 dated June 7, 2006, this Court informed him that he is
deemed to have waived the filing of his comment and the case shall
be resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN INTERPRETING
THAT THE "LEGAL DISQUALIFICATION" IN ARTICLE 244
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT INCLUDE
THE ONE YEAR PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON LOSING
CANDIDATES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.
II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO, AND EVENTUALLY GRANTING, THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.15
Simply, the issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
67
Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found
in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no
candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their
subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay
elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year
after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or
any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their
subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that
temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of
legal qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a
position are provided by law and that it may well be that one who

possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be

temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by
reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates.
However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be
appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications
stated in the law.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On
the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one
year after such election to be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or
in any of their subsidiaries.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall
knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person
lacking the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials;
Candidates Who Lost in Election. - (a) No elective or appointive local
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no elective or appointive local official shall hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate
who lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the government or any governmentowned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or
in any of their subsidiaries.
Villapandos contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Divisions
interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically.
Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b)
of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Although this Court held in the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan16 that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence,
such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally
refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.17
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding
basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none
is indicated.
Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapandos
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated
Villapando by giving him five days within which to inform it in writing

whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without

leave of court.
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or
without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation
and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.18
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding the basic rules of statutory construction
resulting in its decision granting Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its decision
null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May
20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case
No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapandos
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Let the records of this case be remanded
to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

68
[G.R. No. 101148. August 5, 1992.]

TERRY LYN MAGNO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANDREA DOMINGO, Chairman, Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE,
RICHARD DOE and ROBIN DOE, Respondents.
Nestor P. Ifurung for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS;

PETITION THEREOF BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN A
PERSON IS ALREADY RELEASED FROM DETENTION.
Petitioners release from detention has rendered this petition moot
and academic insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and
detention. A habeas corpus proceeding." . . shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty . . . ." (Rule 102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court).
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; VALIDITY THEREOF
CEASED TO BE AN ISSUE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDING;
REASON THEREFOR. Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an

issue especially because a decision in the deportation proceeding

will not result in petitioners permanent or prolonged detention but
exclusion or departure from this country. Her subsequent
commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the proceedings
before the proper forum, she is found to be an undesirable alien, will
have no more connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and
subsequent detention on the night of 17 July 1991.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. Petitioners
claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at this
instance. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor Generals rejoinder
to petitioners reply, there are factual issues that make petitioners
citizenship controversial. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts;
the factual controversies must first be resolved before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation.

Before the Court of Appeals, two (2) urgent motions for bail were
filed. The first one invoked humanitarian considerations while the
second feared summary deportation without due process of law.
Resolution of the motions was however held in abeyance while
hearings on the petition for habeas corpus were in progress.
Answering the petition for habeas corpus, the CID thru its then
Commissioner Andrea Domingo averred that on 18 July 1991, a
warrant of Arrest/Deportation was issued in the exercise of the
Commissioners powers under Sec. 29, par. (a), sub-par. 17 and
Section 37, par. (a), sub-par.(7) of CA No. 613 otherwise known as
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from
entry into the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with prayer for issuance of a restraining or status quo
order is the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition for habeas
corpus (CA-G.R. SP. No. 25442) wherein petitioner challenged as
illegal and violative of constitutional due process her arrest without a
warrant by agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) and her resultant detention at the CID Detention
Center.
From the petition and supplemental petition, the relevant facts
are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the evening of 17 July 1991, persons claiming to be agents of the
CID picked up the petitioner from her home at 564 Rotary Circle cor.
Bocobo St., Malate, Manila. She was whisked to the CID Detention
Center and there held in custody without any formal charge.
Assailing the warrantless arrest and subsequent arbitrary detention,
a petition for habeas corpus was filed before the Supreme Court.
Said petition was referred to the Court of Appeals with the directive to
decide the case on the merits.
Petitioner claimed that there are no charges against her; neither has
she committed any offense for which she may be arrested or
deprived of her liberty without any formal charge or judicial warrant.
She is an American citizen but by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen, she was granted permanent resident status in the Philippines
since 1986.

"(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be

required under the provisions of this Act.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

"(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any

limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a
nonimmigrant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent Commissioner revoked the permanent resident status of
petitioner because of representations by the US Government thru a
letter of its Consul General Mr. Bruce Beardsley that petitioners
American passport has been revoked and that she is a fugitive from
justice.
In the now assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 14
August 1991, the appellate court upheld the legality of the arrest of
the petitioner and her continued detention
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The irregularity attendant to her arrest on July 17, 1991, as a result
of which she was detained even before the warrant of
arrest/deportation had been issued on July 18, 1991 (which is two
days later), would seem to have been cured by the issuance of the

aforesaid warrant. Her detention has now become lawful by virtue of

the issuance of the warrant based on the Summary Deportation
Order (Annex 6 to the Memorandum of Evidence filed by the
respondent Commissioner). Furthermore, whatever irregularity in the
arrest might have been committed is deemed waived by the herein
petitioners applications for bail (supra) even if such applications
were not granted." (p. 4, par. 3)
Despite denial of the petition for habeas corpus, the appellate courts
decision decreed that it was without prejudice to the continuation of
proceedings before the Board of Commissioners, CID, to determine
the issue of deportability pursuant to Sec. 103 of the Immigration
Rules and Regulations.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, with prayer for a restraining or
status quo order.
Acting on the petition, the Court En Banc in a resolution dated 27
August 1991 required herein respondents to comment thereon;
further, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering
respondents to cease and desist from causing or allowing the
deportation or transportation elsewhere of petitioner.
Prior to the issuance of the TRO on 26 August 1991, petitioner filed
with this Court an Urgent Motion for Bail 69
invoking:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which guarantees all persons,
before conviction, the right to bail, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong.
2. This Courts resolution in the case of Catherine Siy v. Andrea
Domingo, Commissioner, Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (G.R. No. 97152) and Antonio Siy v. Andrea Domingo
(G.R. No. 97159) promulgated on 20 March 1991 which ordered the
release from detention of petitioners therein who, like herein
petitioner, had permanent resident status, pending termination of
deportation proceedings.
3. The fact that deportation proceedings against her have not even
commenced."cralaw virtua1aw library
Granting the motion for bail, this Court in a resolution dated 29
August 1991 held:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"Finding the urgent motion meritorious, and for humanitarian reasons
(petitioner being the mother of two (2) minor children, one aged
seven (7) years and the other two (2) years), the Court Resolved to
GRANT the motion. Petitioner is ordered released from her detention
by Immigration Authorities, upon her posting of a cash bond in the

amount of P5,000.00 or a surety bond in the same amount issued by

a reputable and solvent surety company acceptable to this Court,
conditioned upon her appearance before the Deportation Board,
whenever required, in relation to the deportation proceedings against
her."cralaw virtua1aw library
Public respondents in their comment thru the Solicitor General pray
for the dismissal of the present petition for certiorari, etc.
because:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. By posting a bond to secure provisional liberty, petitioner has
waived her right to question the legality and regularity of her arrest.
2. By opting to pursue relief before the Board of Commissioners,
BID, she should be deemed to have abandoned the instant petition
because the Supreme Court would preempt the Board of
Commissioners if it resolved issues pertaining to deportability of
petitioner. The Board has jurisdiction in the first instance to determine
said issues.
Petitioners reply to the comment, aside from traversing the
allegations therein, asks this Tribunal to divest the BID of jurisdiction
and to render judgment confirming/or declaring that petitioner is a
Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage to a citizen of this country,
dismissing the deportation case, cancelling the bail bond and
forthwith setting her at liberty.
The Solicitor General in his rejoinder reiterates that the petition at bar
is premature and that there are factual issues that render petitioners
citizenship controversial. These, he avers, must first be settled in the
proper forum.
One of the reliefs prayed for in the main petition has been granted by
the 23 August 1991 Resolution (supra) which allowed petitioner to
post bail for her provisional release. Petitioners release from
detention has rendered this petition moot and academic insofar as it
questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas
corpus proceeding." . . shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty . . . ." (Rule
102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court).
Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a
decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioners
permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from
this country. Her subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID,
if, after the proceedings before the proper forum, she is found to be
an undesirable alien, will have no more connection with the
questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent detention on the night
of 17 July 1991.
Petitioners claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this
Court at this instance. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
Generals rejoinder to petitioners reply, there are factual issues that

make petitioners citizenship controversial. The Supreme Court is not

a trier of facts; the factual controversies must first be resolved before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and
academic, without prejudice to the outcome of the deportation
proceedings against the petitioner.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115576 August 4, 1994
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY.
CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ, COMM. SAMUEL M.
SORIANO, COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COMM. NARCISO
C. MONTEIRO, COMM. PAULYNN PAREDES-SICAM, THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?
These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military
commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally
condemned to die by musketry, but their sentence was commuted by
the new Constitution to reclusion perpetua.
Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the
case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 1where we held that
the military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the
courts of justice were functioning.
Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile, 2 this Court directed
the Department of Justice to file the corresponding informations in
the civil courts against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of
the decision.
No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and
Cabangunay, but they have remained under detention.

On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and

Paquinto, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) complaining that their continued detention violated their
rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3
In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their
communication as admissible and requested the Republic of the
Philippines to submit a written explanation of their complaint within
six months from the date of transmittal. 4
The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on
Human Rights with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the
Commission, through its Chairman Sedfrey A. Ordoez wrote the
Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release of the
complaints unless criminal charges had already been filed against
them. 5
On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the
Commission that Abaloc had been released on September 29, 1992,
and that Paquinto and Cabangunay were still detained at the
National Penitentiary. There was the intimation that it would not
object to a petition for habeas corpus that70
the Commission might
choose to file for Paquinto and Cabangunay. 6 This assurance was
later confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May 31, 1994. 7
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
June 13, 1994. The writ was immediately issued, returnable on or
before June 22, 1994, on which date a hearing was also scheduled.
At the hearing, Chairman Ordoez argued for the prisoners and
pleaded for their immediate release in view of the failure of the
Department of Justice to file charges against them within the period
specified in the Cruz case. He stressed that their continued detention
despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of
their human rights.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the
respondent Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling in Tan
v. Barrios, 8 the Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to
decisions of the military tribunals that have already become final or to
persons who were already serving their sentence. It suggested that,
under the circumstances, the only recourse of the prisoners was to
reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency.

It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the
convictions of Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military
commissions was promulgated. It has been six years since our
decision in the Cruz case directed the Secretary of Justice to file the
appropriate informations against the civilians still detained under
convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The prisoners have
been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity of their
convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.
The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives
for its failure to file the corresponding charges against the two
detainees before the civil courts. It is unacceptable, of course. It is
not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If
anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were
not the custodian of those records. It is illogical and even absurd to
suggest that because the government cannot prosecute them, the
prisoners' detention must continue.
The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During
the hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General contended that the
prisoners had themselves opted to serve their sentences rather than
undergo another trial. Their ultimate objective, so it was maintained,
was to secure their release by applying for executive clemency. To
prove this, counsel submitted a letter from one
Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that
Leonardo B. Paquinto "chooses to complete the service of his
sentence so that the Board of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction
over his case." 9 No mention was made of Jesus Cabangunay.

assurance of the Department of Justice that it would have no

objection to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus by the
Commission on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.
The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated February 26,
1991, it declared, citing the Tan case, that "those civilians who were
convicted by military courts and who have been serving (but not yet
completed) their sentences of imprisonment for the past many years"
. . . "may be given the option either to complete the service of their
sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction, they
should be credited in the service of their sentence for the full period
of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should be set
free."
Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply
with the directive in the "Cruz Cases" for the filing of the necessary
informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the
offenses involved, without prejudice to said petitioners' exercise of
the option granted to them by this Court's ruling in G.R. Nos. 8548182, William Tan, et al. v. Hernani T. Barrios, etc., et al., supra."
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after
its second motion for extension was denied, in view of the necessity
to decide this petition without further delay. 12 The memorandum was
admitted just the same, but we find it adds nothing to the
respondent's original arguments.

Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both
Paquinto and Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel
and said they had never seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto
denied ever having authorized him to write the letter. Instead, the two
prisoners reiterated their plea to be released on the strength of the
Olaguer decision.

There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be

heeded. The government has failed to show that their continued
detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of
charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever. If no
information can be filed against them because the records have been
lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made to suffer. In the eyes
of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be
guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held. Hence, they
are entitled to be set free.

The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a reexamination of the ruling in Cruz v. Enrile 10 in relation to the case
of Tan v. Barrios, 11 is necessary in view of certain supervening
events. These are the failure of the Department of Justice to file the
informations against the prisoners; the decision of the UNHRC
declaring admissible the communication
No. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus
suggesting the violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the

Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed.
Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but
do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the
public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the
government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself,
which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that
inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a

person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased

for liberty is total and indivisible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and
Leonardo Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute longer.
They are ordered released IMMEDIATELY.
G.R. No. 105597 September 23, 1994
LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA in his capacity as Chief of
Staff of the AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE, in his
capacity as Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
COL. DIONISIO SANTIAGO, in his capacity as the Commanding
Officer of the ISG Detention Center, Fort Bonifacio, Makati,
Metro Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION and LT. COL.
MARCELINO G. MALAJACAN, respondents.
Marlon Alexandre Cruz and Armando M. Marcelo for private
respondent.

71
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on
April 27, 1990 in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt.
He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati
where he was detained for nine months without charges. On January
30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the
office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th,
94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively. A petition
for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the Court
of Appeals on March 7, 1991 which was, however, dismissed by the
said court's Fourth Division in a decision promulgated on June 28,
1991 on the ground that pre-trial investigation for the charges against
the respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and
Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate General's Office
(JAGO). The pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals' decision
state:

As in the Elepante case also, we cannot at this

time order the release of petitioner on a writ
of habeas corpus without giving the military from
here on a reasonable time within which to finish
the investigation of his case and determine
whether he should be formally charged before the
court martial or released for insufficiency of
evidence, especially since, as manifested by
respondents, petitioner has already filed his
counter-affidavits to those supporting the charge
sheet against him and that the matter is now ready
for resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED, but the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines is directed to
take appropriate action in petitioner's case with all
deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of his case. 1
Three months after these charges were filed, the Pre-Trial
Investigative Panel came out with a Resolution dated 27 May 1991
finding no evidence of direct participation by the private respondent
in the December 1989 coup. Said panel nonetheless recommended
that respondent be charged with violation of Article 136 of the
Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion
or Insurrection) and the 96th Article of War in relation to the 94th
Article of War. 2 Consequently, all existing charges against
respondent were dismissed and a new charge for violation of Article
of War No. 96 for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman
for having allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with
other military officers for the purpose of overthrowing the
government, carrying with it the penalty of dismissal from service
was filed with the General Court Martial (GCM) No. 8.
Additionally, the Judge Advocate General's Office endorsed the filing
of charges for violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code to
the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office on October 29, 1991. 3 The City
Prosecutor eventually came out with a resolution dated February 4,
1992, dismissing the charges. 4
Upon private respondent's arraignment (and before entering his plea)
in General Court Martial No. 8 for violation of the 96th Article of War,
private respondent entered a special motion to dismiss the case on
grounds of prescription under AW 38. The said article states:

Art. 38. As to time. Except for desertion, murder

or rape committed in time of war, or for mutiny or
for war offenses, no person subject to military law
shall be liable to be tried or punished by a court
martial for any crime of offense committed more
than two years before the arraignment of such
person. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The private respondent contended that the offense was supposed to
have been committed between August to November, 1989, more
than two years before his arraignment on April 22, 1992. Favorably
resolving the motion to dismiss for being "substantial . . . meritorious
and legally tenable," the General Court Martial dropped the last
remaining charge against private respondent. 5 On April 23, 1992, the
Assistant Trial Judge Advocate submitted a report to the Chief of
Staff quoting the Resolution of GCM No. 8 for "info/notation".
On May 27, 1992 respondent filed a second petition for habeas
corpus before the Court of Appeals where he assailed his continued
detention at the ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal of all
the charges against him. He contended that his continued
confinement under the circumstances amounted to an "illegal
restraint of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the
high prerogative writ of habeas corpus." 6
In a Resolution dated May 29, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of
Appeals ordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Maj. General Arturo
Enrile, Commanding General of the Philippine Army "(t)o produce the
person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q. Malajacan" and to show lawful cause
for the latter's continued detention. 7 On June 3, 1992, respondent
court promulgated the questioned decision issuing a writ of habeas
corpus and commanding herein petitioners to release the private
respondent. In its decision, respondent court held:
While we recognize the fact that under military law,
a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or
conviction, or dismissal is merely recommendatory
and subject to review by the convening authority
and the reviewing authority, We find a glaring
hiatus in the rules and procedure being followed by
the military in general and the respondents in this
particular case, that inevitably leads to unbridled
injustice, which if not corrected by the proper
authorities concerned including this court, will

subject any member of the military to indefinite

confinement. The lack of time limit within which the
Chief of Staff and/or reviewing authority may
approve or disapprove the order of dismissal on
the ground of prescription may be subject to
abuse. 8
Consequently, on June 11, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to annul and set
aside respondent courts decision alleging that:
1. The respondent court may not impose a time
frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the
respondent's case where the law itself provides
none; and,
2. The Resolution of June 3, 1992 contravenes a
previous decision by a co-equal body, the Special
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals which on
September 27, 1991 dismissed respondent's
petition for habeas corpus.
We disagree.

72

In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial

rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial,
we cannot accept petitioners' submission that the absence of any
specific provision limiting the time within which records of general
courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing
authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would
deny private respondent or any military personnel facing charges
before the General Courts Martial, for that matter a judicial
recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What
petitioners suggest is untenable. In the case at bench, the records of
the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and
our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot be
called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have
been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit
ordained by inclusion of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section
1 of the Constitution which mandates the "duty of the Courts of
Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." 9 Moreover, the absence of rules and regulations

mandating a reasonable period within which the appropriate

appellate military authority should act in a case subject to mandatory
review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right. The Bill of
Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to
expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from
procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover,
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy
disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens,
including those in the military and covers the periods before, during
and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2)
which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
The 1987 Constitution reflects both the recognition by the
Constitutional Commission of the necessity of a military force and the
widespread concern, after two decades of authoritarian rule, over its
role in a democratic society. Thus, while the Constitution recognizes
the need for a military force to protect its citizens, it emphatically
ordains the supremacy, at all times of civilian authority over the
military. Through numerous provisions scattered all over the
fundamental law, the constitutional injunction mandating the principle
of civilian supremacy over the military has been given substantive
detail. 10 This detail has been further elaborated by the Rules of
Court and our jurisprudence. 11 Petitioners' thesis, however, would
deny the intent and spirit of these
provisions. 12
A consideration of the history of Philippine military law, moreover,
exposes the fallacy of the petitioner's averments. The first military
law enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines
(Commonwealth Act No. 408 which remains that backbone of
existing military law in our country) is essentially American in
origin. 13 With a few minor amendments, Commonwealth Act No.
408, similar to the American military code of 1928, continues to be
the organic law of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 14 Our system
of court martial proceedings therefore on the surface remains
essentially identical to the system in force in the United States. 15
Paradoxically, developments in our military law have failed to keep
up with developments in law both here and in the United States.
While the Constitution and the Rules of Court have together
expanded the fair trial rights of the accused, military law on the
matter has remained static, if not anachronistic. While admittedly,
military law is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from
the law which governs most of us, 16 because "it is the primary

business of armies and navies to fight or to be ready to fight wars

should the occasion arise," 17 it is distinct only in so far as it
addresses the general recognition of the unique concerns of the
military establishment in safeguarding the government and citizens it
has been sworn to protect, but it cannot exist as an entity wholly
separate from our laws, particularly our Constitution. In the United
States, this recognition has led to the evolution of two basic sources
of specialized jurisprudence: the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), enacted in 1950 by the US Congress and revised in 1968
and the Manual for Court Martial (MCM), most recently revised in
1975. These statutory enactments and the revisions which followed
essentially reflected the growth of jurisprudence in the sphere of civil
rights to the extent that, in some aspects involving the fair trial rights
of the accused, the military statutory requirements have become
more stringent. This is at least true as far as the right to a speedy
disposition of cases is concerned. A few examples are in order.
Article 33 of the UCMJ requires the forwarding to the convening
authority of all documents related to the case within eight (8) days of
the accused's arrest and confinement. Causing unnecessary delay in
the disposition of criminal cases constitutes an actionable offense
under Article 98. In general, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
mandates that immediate steps be taken to try or dismiss cases
against an accused member of the armed forces imposing an
unusually heavy burden on government in establishing diligence in
the disposition of cases. In the arena of military jurisprudence,
decisions interpreting speedy trial requirements adhere to standards
more rigorous than those involving normal Sixth Amendment Rights.
These decisions have required stringent "Sixth Amendment
balancing of 1) length of delay, 2) reasons for delay, 3) timely
assertion of speedy trial right and 4) prejudice to the
accused." 18
Thus, ironically, while U.S. military law has dynamically reflected
changes and trends in fair trial jurisprudence in enacting provisions
giving life to the changes in the law, our military law has been stunted
by legislative inaction. Obviously, current military law and
jurisprudence in the Philippines have failed to respond to actual
changes in the fundamental law guaranteeing and expanding the fair
trial rights to the accused thereby leaving gaps in military law which
enables our system of military justice to ignore on a wholesale basis
substantive rights available to all citizens. The absence of a provision
mandating a period within which appeals may be taken to the
corresponding appellate authority underscores this deficiency.

Yet our Constitution is clear, Section 14 Article III thereof states:

Sec. 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
These rights are clearly available to all citizens even in the absence
of statutory enactment. They cannot be denied to certain individuals
because of gaps in the law for which they are not responsible. They
cannot be taken away from certain individuals because of the nature
of their vocation. Members of the military establishment do not waive
individual rights on taking up military uniform. That they become
subject to uniquely military rules and procedures
does not imply that
73
they agree to exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only those rules
and regulations, and opt to stand apart from those rules which
govern all of the country's citizens. As the respondent Court correctly
held:
As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is
no time frame within which to transmit the records
of the case to the reviewing authority as well as
time limitation within which the Chief of Staff must
act on the recommendation of dismissal However,
it must be stressed that the absence of a rule does
not give to the Chief of Staff indefinite time within
which to act at the expense of the constitutional
right of a citizen to enjoy liberty and to be protected
from illegal or arbitrary detention.
Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in
ordering the petitioners to act with dispatch in dealing with the private
respondent's case. Over three years have elapsed since the
respondent's arrest. To this day, there is no indication and it has
not been alleged that records of the case have been forwarded to
the appropriate military appellate authority.

This case does not even involve complex issues of fact and law. The
central issue which the appropriate military appellate authority will
have to review is whether or not the General Court Martial was
correct in dismissing the case on grounds of prescription under
Article 38 of the Articles of War. We cannot see why the military
appellate review authority should take an interminable length of time
in coming up with a decision on the case. The unjustified delay in
dealing with the respondent's case is a deliberate injustice which
should not be perpetrated on the private respondent a day longer.
II
Petitioner next contends that the Decision of the respondent court
dated June 3, 1992, issuing a writ of habeas corpus in favor of the
private respondent contravenes a previous decision of a co-equal
body, the Court of Appeal's Fourth Division which earlier denied the
same. This is untenable. The factual circumstances surrounding both
decisions are different.
First, at the time of the first petition, the private respondent was being
held in the detention center for eleven months without charges being
filed against him. The pre-trial investigative panel had not yet been
constituted. Because of his confinement without charges, a petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf
on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and continued
detention without charges violated his constitutional rights. 19 The
Fourth Division found adequate support upholding military jurisdiction
over the case of the private respondent under the Articles of War. It
also noted that the case against the private respondent was ongoing
and that it would be difficult to order respondent's release on a writ
of habeas corpus without giving military authorities reasonable time
within which to investigate and try the case. The Court nonetheless
urged the Chief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with all
deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case."
Second, by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was
before the court's Twelfth Division (herein respondent court), the
JAGO's
Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against the
petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of the
Revised Penal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. The
latter subsequently dismissed the case. Moreover at the time the
Twelfth Division rendered its assailed decision, respondent was
already languishing in a military detention center for three years, half

of those spent in the limbo between the GCM's decision dismissing

the cases filed against him and the uncertainty of when the military
appellate process would finally come around in either exonerating
him or overturning the GCM's findings. This in spite of the fact that
even during the first petition before the Fourth Division, the court had
already urged speedy disposition of the case.
Finally, in dismissing the cases against the private respondent, the
General Court Martial had made a determination that the charges
against respondent had prescribed under Article 38 of the Articles of
War. Conformably with this conclusion and with the Court's ruling
in Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense, 20 the lower court was
correct in stating that the respondent could no longer be tried by the
General Court Martial if a period of two years had elapsed prior to
the arraignment of the accused. Clearly, the circumstances, noted
above, had changed so radically in the intervening period that the
appellate court's Twelfth Division had no choice, given the incredible
delay in forwarding the documents to the military appellate authority,
but to issue the writ.
These finding obviously militate against petitioners' contention that
the appellate court's Twelfth Division abused its discretion in issuing
an order allegedly in contravention to the Fourth Division's earlier
orders. The factual circumstances are hardly similar. The respondent
court, under these changed circumstances could be hardly faulted for
issuing the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent.
The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." 21 As we emphasized hereinbefore, and we repeat it once
more, petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules
relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating
the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his
continued confinement. Were we to uphold the proposition that our
courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the law itself
provides no time frame for the proper military authorities to review
the general court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would
mean that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in
petitioner's argument that the Constitution's guarantees are
guarantees available not to all of the people but only to most of them.
Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25018

May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant,
SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON,
intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for
respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination
clause,1 whenever appropriately invoked, has been accorded due
recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the
Constitution.2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3decided in 1937, was quite
74
categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in
order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove
to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal
and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As
phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision,
as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost
liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the
recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held that a
respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft
Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of
the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was
sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the
party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice.
That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965
with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at
the initial hearing of an administrative case7 for alleged immorality,

counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his

first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in
such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional
right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a
plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify
as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to
take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the
very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative
proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a
privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he
was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually
restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as
witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a
bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a
hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such
an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter
upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed
that it could call petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and
interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available
only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a
witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses
interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once
he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the
issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied
that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and
Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the administrative case for
malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed
to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an
answer in intervention was duly filed by them on March 23, 1965

sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited

to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in
their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to incriminate
himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination
cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965,
finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act
and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation
without his consent and against himself." Hence this appeal both by
respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the
outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest
fealty to the principle announced by us in Cabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that
proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge
Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained
wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft
Act,9the complainant requested the investigating committee that
petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which request was
granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a
charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent
Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated
this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the
well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse,
not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the
witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that
while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture
of whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire,
manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income,
there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for
forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal
or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would
be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of
property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner,
for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it
suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly
persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We
conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth

Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its

protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should
not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate
that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could
possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession.
2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by
respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that the constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a
penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect
of such a right, to follow the language of another American
decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal
prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so
used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.et
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As
far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a
perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last year,75
in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony,
to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional
guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high
sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in
line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed
the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding
as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or
mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its
identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice

Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause

enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly
appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against
the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 110357 August 17, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS Y ARELLANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an information filed on 10 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, accused Carlos Tranca y Arellano was charged with
the violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about 07 May 1991, in the Municipality
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without the corresponding
license, prescription of being authorized by law,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and distribute
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is

a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited

law. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2574 and assigned to
Branch 136 of the said court.
At the trial of the case on its merits after the accused had pleaded
not guilty at his arraignment on 25 October 1991, 2 the prosecution
presented as witnesses for its evidence in chief Sgt. Jose Latumbo of
the National Capital Region NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) with office at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, SPO1 Franciso Matundan, Police Lt.
Julita De Villa, and Teresita Alberto, and presented in rebuttal SPO1
Francisco Matundan and SPO3 Albert San Jose. The accused took
the witness stand and presented his sister, Clarita Cheng, as his
witness.
Through the testimonies of Sgt. Jose Latumbo and SPO1 Francisco
Matundan, the prosecution established the following facts:
On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer went
to the office of the NCRNU and proceeded to the desk of their
superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano. Sgt. Jose Latumbo, SPO3 Oliver
Tugade, SPO2 Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco Matundan, and
PO3 Lilia Ochia were summoned by Capt. Miano to a briefing. The
latter told them that the informer had revealed that a certain "JonJon" (later identified as the accused) was selling shabu along
Kalayaan Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then formed a
buy-bust team with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the
poseur-buyer, and the rest, including the informer, forming the
support group. Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with
serial number SN886097 (Exhibit "B") and which had been dusted
with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust operation.
The team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the target area. At
the corner of Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer
spotted the accused, who was standing in front of a house, and
pointed him out to the team members. The team then circled back
and alighted from their vehicles. As planned, Sgt. Latumbo and the
informer approached the accused while the rest of the team took
vantage points so as to observe the operation and close in at the
opportune time.
The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to the accused and told the
latter that his companion was interested in buying shabu. The
informer then asked the accused if he had any for sale. The accused

answered in the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought.

Sgt. Latumbo replied, "Pare, tapatan mo na lang itong piso ko." (In
illegal drug parlance, "piso" means one hundred pesos) The accused
momentarily left the pair and entered his house. When the accused
emerged, he gave a package (Exhibit "F- 2") to Sgt. Latumbo who in
turn handed to the accused the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo
examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it was
really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head.
Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then closed in on the
accused. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and
arrested the accused. Upon interrogation by Capt. Miano, the
accused voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu (Exhibit "F3") and the P100 marked money (Exhibit "B"). The accused was
handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters. 3
On 7 May 1991, SPO1 Matundan requested Teresita Alberto, the
Chief Chemist of the Physical Identification Division of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of
the accused and a P100 bill with serial number SN886097. She
exposed the P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation and found the presence
of fluorescent powder thereon. She likewise exposed the person of
the accused to ultraviolet radiation and discovered fluorescent
powder on his hands, face, and on the opening
76 of the left-side pocket
of the white shorts that he was then wearing. The results of her
examination are contained in her Physical Identification Report No.
PI-073-91 (Exhibit "C"). 4 On the same date, SPO1 Matundan came
to the office of Police Lt. Julita De Villa, a forensic chemist at the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, to deliver specimens
consisting of a 0.06-gram substance wrapped in aluminum foil
(Exhibit "F-2") and a 1.04-gram substance contained in a plastic bag
(Exhibit "F-3"), together with a letter-request (Exhibit "E") asking her
to examine the two specimens. She subjected both specimens to
three different laboratory tests, viz., chemical examination, thin-layer
chromatograhic examination, and infrared spectrometric record
analysis. Both specimens were confirmed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), as stated in her Initial Chemistry Report No.
D-464-91 dated 7 May 1991 (Exhibit "G") and her (Final) Chemistry
Report No. D-464-91 (Exhibit "H"). 5
The accused denied the allegations against him and contended that
he was framed by the police officers. According to him, on 6 May
1991, he was inside his house from morning till night with his
parents, three sisters (one of whom is Clarita Cheng), a brother, two
nieces, a nephew, his wife, and one of his neighbors. At about 11:40
p.m., while he was fixing his videocassette recorder, he heard a

knocking at the front door. He called to ask who was knocking and
someone replied, "Joey." As he was busy, he asked his nephew,
John David, to open the door. When the latter did so, four men
suddenly barged in. He did not know the men then but he later came
to know that they were Police Officers Latumbo, Matundan, Tugade,
and San Jose, who had said that he was "Joey." San Jose grabbed
him by the collar and asked if he was "Jon-Jon." He answered that
he was. They told him, "Kung puede kailangan namin ng pera, kaya
magturo ka na." He replied that he knew nothing. Capt. Miano, who
by then had appeared, slapped him while San Jose poked a pistol at
him and said, "Kung gusto mo, patayin ka na lang namin." He,
together with his parents and the occupants of the house, pleaded
with the police officers to stop. He was then brought out of the house
by the men. He wanted to bring his sister, Clarita Cheng, with him but
she was not allowed to board a police vehicle. He saw Matundan
talking to her sister. Although he could not hear what they were
saying, he noticed his sister giving some money to Matundan. He
was first brought to a damaged building at the Metropolitan along
Ayala Avenue, Makati, where he was made to alight and talk to Capt.
Miano who told him to point to someone selling shabu; he answered
that he knew no one selling shabu. After half an hour, he was brought
to the NARCOM headquarters at Camp Crame.
At 10:40 a.m. the following day, he was investigated by Matundan.
After he was investigated, he was made to stand up and place his
hands behind his back after which he was handcuffed. Latumbo then
got a P100 bill from a drawer and wiped this on the accused's hands
and left pocket of his shorts. His handcuffs were then removed and
he was brought back to his cell. After thirty minutes, he was brought
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for ultraviolet ray examination and then
returned to his cell. 6
Clarita Cheng's testimony corroborates that of the accused, his
brother. She declared that she asked the police officers why they
were treating her brother like that and told them that if they do not
believe him, they should rather just kill him. She wanted to
accompany her brother but they would not let her. Matundan told her
not to worry because her brother would be brought back. He asked
from her P1,000.00 for gasoline which she gave. His brother,
however, was never returned. She searched for him and found that
he was detained at Camp Crame. 7
On rebuttal, SPO3 San Jose and SPO1 Matundan denied that they
barged into the accused's house and illegally arrested him. SPO1
Matundan denied that he received P1,000.00 from Clarita Cheng.

SPO3 San Jose also denied that he wiped a P100 bill on the
accused's hands and pocket while the latter was detained. 8
On 23 March 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision 9 finding
the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
The accused appealed the decision to this Court. He asseverates
that the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor was not
overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
After assiduously going over the appellant's brief and the records of
this case, we find no reason to overturn the trial court's judgment of
conviction.
The trial court found the testimony given by the prosecution
witnesses to be more credible and logical. It said that the prosecution
witnesses "testified candidly and in a straightforward manner that
exuded all the marks of truthfulness." 10
Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue
is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 11 We do not find any such oversight on the part of the trial
court.
The NARCOM agents have in their favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duties. 12The accused
was not able to prove that the police officers had any improper or
ulterior motive in arresting him. The police officers are thus presumed
to have regularly performed their official duty in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary. The accused's allegation that the policemen
barged into his house and demanded that he point to anybody selling
drugs is somewhat hard to believe. As noted by the trial court:
The . . . version advanced by the accused and his
sister is not only by itself weak and easily
contrived, it suffers in logic and cause. Why would
police officers barge into a private dwelling in the
middle of the night only to force somebody to
inform on unnamed drug dealers? They could

much easier pick somebody on a street at a more

convenient time when their target is alone and
away from his family. And it is not logical that they
would do it to extort money from the accused since
by his own testimony none was demanded from
the accused. As such, the defense raised merits
scant considerations. 13
Likewise, his contention that the marked money was wiped on his
hands and pocket was supported by nothing more than his bare
allegation. We have stated that an allegation that one was framed
can be made with ease. That allegation must therefore be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. The presumption that law enforcers
have regularly performed their duties perforce requires that proof of a
frame-up must be strong. 14
The accused also assails the fact that there was not prior
surveillance before the alleged entrapment was effected and
contends that this casts doubt on the regularity of the police
operation. This contention is untenable. A prior surveillance is not a
prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation. There is no
rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. 15 Flexibility is a trait of good 77
police work. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the
need for prior surveillance.
The accused also harps on the fact that there was not mission order
for the buy-bust operation and that there was no investigation report
made after the operation. A mission order is not an essential requisite
for a valid buy-bust operation. The execution of an investigation
report is likewise not indispensable considering further that SPO3
San Jose had testified that he prepared the booking sheet, receipt of
property seized, and the affidavit of arrest. 16 To ask that every buybust operation be conducted in a textbook or blue ribbon manner is
to ask for too much from our law enforcers.
The defense questions the non-presentation of the informer. There is
no merit in this objection. The testimony of the informer would at best
be corroborative since the testimonies of Sgt. Latumbo and SP01
Matundan had sufficiently established how the crime was committed.
The testimony or identity of the informer may be dispensed with
since his narration would be merely corroborative and cumulative
with that of the poseur-buyer who was himself presented and who
took the witness stand for the precise purpose of attesting to the sale
of the illegal drug. 17

The defense contends that the right of the accused against selfincrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an
ultraviolet ray examination. The defense also argues that Chief
Chemist Teresita Alberto failed to inform the accused of his right to
counsel before subjecting him to the examination. These contentions
are without merit. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion
to export communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his
body in evidence, when it may be material. 18 Stated otherwise, it is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. 19 Nor
can the subjection of the accused's body to ultraviolet radiation, in
order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered
a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.
In fine, we affirm the finding of the trial court that the accused was
caught in flagrante selling shabu to the members of the buy-bust
team. The penalty imposed upon the accused, however, must be
modified in view of the new amendments introduced by R.A. No.
7659 20 to Section 15, Article III, and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. R.A. No. 7659 was approved on 13 December
1993 and took effect on 31 December 1993. As thus further
amended, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from
"life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand
to thirty thousand pesos" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos."
However, pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, which amends
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, the new penalty shall be applied if the
quantity of the dangerous drugs involved falls within the first
paragraph of the amended Section 20, and if the quantity would be
lower than that specified in said first paragraph, the penalty shall be
from "prision correccional to reclusion perpetua." The pertinent
portion of the amended Section 20 reads as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the
Crime. The penalties for offenses under Section
3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or

methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
fromprision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
The penalty then in Section 15 is now based on the quantity of the
regulated drugs involved, except where the victim is a minor or
where the regulated drug involved in any offense under Section 15 is
the proximate cause of the death of the victim, in which case the
maximum penalty prescribed in Section 15 shall be imposed
regardless of the quantity of the regulated drugs involved. 21
In People vs. Martin Simon y Sunga, 22 decided on 29 July 1994, this
Court ruled as follows:
(1) Provisions
of R.A. No.
7659 which
are favorable
to the accused
shall be given
retroactive
effect pursuant
to Article 22 of
the Revised
Penal Code.
(2) Where the
quantity of the
dangerous
drug involved
is less than
the quantities
stated in the
first paragraph
of Section 20
of R.A. No.
6425, the
penalty to be
imposed shall

78

range
from prision
correccional to
reclusion
temporal,
and not
reclusion
perpetua. The
reason is that
there is an
overlapping
error, probably
through
oversight in
the drafting, in
the provisions
on the penalty
of reclusion
perpetua as
shown by its
dual
imposition, i.e.
, as the
minimum of
the penalty
where the
quantity of the
dangerous
drugs involved
is more than
those
specified in
the first
paragraph of
the amended
Section 20
and also as
the maximum
of the penalty
where the
quantity of the
dangerous
drugs involved
is less than
those so
specified in

the first
paragraph.
(3)
Considering
that the
aforesaid
penalty
of prision
correccional to
reclusion
temporal shall
depend upon
the quantity of
the dangerous
drugs
involved, each
of the
component
penalties
thereof
prision
correccional, p
rision mayor,
and reclusion
temporal
shall be
considered as
a principal
imposable
penalty
depending on
the quantity,
such that the
quantity of the
drugs
enumerated in
the second
paragraph
should then be
divided into
three, with the
resulting
quotient, and
double or
treble the

same, as the
bases for
determining
the
appropriate
component
penalty.
(4) The
modifying
circumstances
in the Revised
Penal Code
may be
appreciated to
determine the
proper period
of the
corresponding
imposable
penalty or
even to effect
its reduction
by one or
more degrees;
provided,
however, that
in no case
should such
graduation of
penalties
reduce the
imposable
penalty lower
than prision
correccional.
(5) In
appropriate
instances, the
Indeterminate
Sentence Law
shall be
applied and
considering

79

that R.A. No.

7659 has
unqualifiedly
adopted the
penalties
under the
Revised Penal
Code with
their technical
signification
and effects,
then the
crimes under
the Dangerous
Drugs Act
shall now be
considered as
crimes
punished by
the Revised
Penal Code;
hence,
pursuant to
Section 1 of
the
Indeterminate
Sentence Law,
the
indeterminate
penalty which
may be
imposed shall
be one whose
maximum
shall be within
the range of
the imposable
penalty and
whose
minimum shall
be within the
range of the
penalty next
lower in
degree to the

imposable
penalty.
With the foregoing as our touchstones, and it appearing from
Chemistry Report No. D-464-91 (Exhibit "H") 23signed by Police Lt.
Julita T. De Villa, PNP Forensic Chemist, that the quantity of the
shabu recoverd from the accused in this case is only 1.10 grams, the
imposable penalty under the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6425, as further amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659,
should be prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused may then be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision
correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 136 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati in Criminal Case No. 2754 is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty. Accused
CARLOS TRANCA Y ARELLANO is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 16444

September 8, 1920

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.
Alfredo Calupitan, and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.
Assistant City of Fiscal Felix for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her
to her liberty.
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and

Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this

case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of
First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of
Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor
become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination
of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or
not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional
provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in
contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison
until she should permit the medical examination required by the
court.
The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the
compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the
Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal
Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United
States and practically all state constitutions and in the common law
rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. (President's
Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
section 3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4];
United States Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner
argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the
constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends
that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial
judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to
our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical
question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and
petitioner.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed
the conservative courts emphasize greatly the humanitarianism of
the constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege
in order that its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is
compelled to make evidence against himself. (Compare State vs.
Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259 with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14
Nev., 79. See further State vs. Ah Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506;
State vs. Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650; Thornton vs. State [1903],
117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view and almost directly
in point is People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A woman
was charged with the crime of infanticide. The corner directed two
physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to

determine whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She

objected to the examination, but being threatened with force, yielded,
and the examination was had. The evidence of these physicians was
offered at the trial and ruled out. The court said that the proceeding
was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which
declares that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." Continuing, the court said: "They might
as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to
testify that she had been pregnant, and had been delivered of a
child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look into
her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had
been pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the
right to compel the prisoner now to submit to an examination they are
of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not
possible that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of
argument that evidence thus obtained would be inadmissible against
the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot
refrain from saying that, greatly impressed with the weight of these
decisions, especially the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in
State vs. Height, supra, the instant case was reported by the writer
with the tentative recommendation that the
80court should lay down the
general rule that a defendant can be compelled to disclose only
those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth having
disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of
accused persons, and having been able, as we think, to penetrate
through the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the
constitutional guaranty and the common law principle, we have come
finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the reason of the
case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which
seem to us more progressive in nature. Among these can be
prominently mentioned decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, and the Supreme Court of these Islands. Thus, the always
forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs.
United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an objection
based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth
Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." (See
also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs.
New York [1903], 192 U. S., 585.) The Supreme Court of the

Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the

protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng
[1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil., 735,
and the derivatory principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567, 568,
citing the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands as authority.)
Although we have stated s proposition previously announced by this
court and by the highest tribunal in the United States, we cannot
unconcernedly leave the subject without further consideration. Even
in the opinion Mr. Justice Holmes, to which we have alluded, there
was inserted the careful proviso that "we need not consider how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself." Other courts
have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location of
the dividing line between what is proper and what is improper in this
very broad constitutional field. But here before us is presented what
would seem to be the most extreme case which could be imagined.
While the United States Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree
that testimony that an accused person put on a blouse and it fitted
him is not a violation of the constitutional provision, while the
Supreme Court of Nuevada could go so far as to require the
defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and
while the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could permit
substances taken from the person of an accused to be offered in
evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an
order to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all
of its sanctity to the gaze of strangers. We can only consistently
consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a
result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of
the constitutional provision was and is merely to prohibit testimonial
compulsion.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget
them entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the agrreable
state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to
rest on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one
blind adherence to tradition and precedent. Moreover, we believe
that an unbiased consideration of the history of the constitutional
provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with the
causes which led to its adoption.

The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,

was recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal
systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the
rack. A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling
confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of
perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters
was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against
himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican
government, the principle was taken into the American Constitutions,
and from the United States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in
exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English
days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly
worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of
both its benefits and its abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of Prof.
Wigmore in 5 Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R.,
1902, p. 610 found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and
U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil., 143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go
back once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime
purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal
laws is to purgue the community of persons who violate the laws to
the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules
of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to
protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intemended to
be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid
of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For
instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the
defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a
falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial
reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as
the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due
process of law cause of the Constitution every person has a natural
and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is
extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have
the decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a
woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. As Mr.
Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford ([1891], 141
U. S., 250) said, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay
bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful
authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and

yet, as well suggested by the same court, even superior to the

complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent which
the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately,
all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing
them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions which are put
to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public
estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between
a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations,
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of
delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an
unwarranted extent that criminal trials have sometimes seemed to be
like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as
players, the criminal as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated
spectators. Against such a loose extension of constitutional
guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a
sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we
must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred
by merely sentimental influences. Once again
81 we lay down the rule
that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of
the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall
be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable
and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely
necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being
made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same
sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the
assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by
physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless,
be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and
therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby
denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. 159450

March 30, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is
not a trivial matter to be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of
the demurrer to evidence without express leave of court operates as
a waiver that binds the accused pursuant to the express provision of
the Rules of Court.
Under challenge in this appeal is the decision promulgated on July
31, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 24556, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the conviction for qualified theft of the accused, a teller
of complainant Prudential Bank, and punished her with reclusion
perpetua,1 thereby modifying the decision dated May 26, 2000
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, in Angeles City
(RTC),2 imposing an indeterminate sentence from ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Antecedents
The information charged the accused with qualified theft, alleging:
That on or about the 2nd of January, 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, being
then the teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, Sto. Rosario
Street, Angeles City, and as such is entrusted with cash and other
accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash
money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank,
Angeles Main Branch, represented by its Branch Manager,
EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the damage and prejudice of Prudential
Bank, Angeles Main Branch, in the aforementioned amount of TEN
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO

HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P260,000.00), Philippine

Currency and parity rate.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.3
After the accused pleaded not guilty at arraignment, the State
presented four witnesses, namely: Prudential Bank Branch Manager
Edgardo Panlilio, Sr., Bank Auditor Virgilio Frias, Bank Cashier Noel
Cunanan, and account holder Apolinario Tayag.
The summary of the evidence of the State rendered in the assailed
decision of the CA follows:4
xxx
Among the six tellers in the Angeles City main branch of Prudential
Bank, accused-appellant (hereafter "appellant") was the only teller
assigned to handle dollar deposits and withdrawals.
On January 2, 1996, an internal spot-audit team headed by
Prudential Banks senior audit examiner Virgilio Frias ("Frias"),
inventoried the cash accountabilities of the said branch by manually
counting the money in each of the tellers cash boxes. While the
books of the branch showed that appellant had a cash accountability
of $15,040.52, the money in her cash box was only $5,040.52.
Asked about the shortage of $10,000.00, appellant explained that
there was a withdrawal of $10,000.00 on December 29, 1995 after
the cut-off time which would be treated as a withdrawal on January 2,
1996. Appellant then presented to Frias a withdrawal memo dated
January 2, 1996 showing a withdrawal of $10,000.00 from Dollar
Savings Account No. FX-836 ("FX-836") of Adoracion Tayag and her
co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag.
On January 3, 1996, appellant showed the aforesaid withdrawal
memo to the branch cashier, Noel Cunanan ("Cunanan"). Noticing
that the said withdrawal memo did not contain the required
signatures of two bank officers, Cunanan asked appellant what the
nature of the transaction was. Appellant replied that the depositor,
Apolinario Tayag, had instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from his
account on January 3, 1996, through his driver whom he had sent to
the bank. Cunanan, however, did not notice that while the withdrawal
was supposed to have been made on January 3, 1996, the
withdrawal memo was dated January 2, 1996. Cunanan then

instructed appellant to have the withdrawal posted in the

corresponding ledger and to bring the withdrawal memo back to him
so he and the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio, could affix their
signatures.
Meanwhile, Frias checked the account ledger of FX-836, and found a
"hold jacket" indicating that no withdrawal from the said account
should be allowed to reduce its balance below $35,000.00. The
supposed withdrawal of $10,000.00 had reduced the account
balance of FX-836 to $26,077.51.
From the account ledger, Frias also discovered that a deposit of
$10,000.00 was made on January 2, 1996. He found the deposit
memo on file. Thereafter, Frias compared the signature on the
withdrawal memo with the specimen signatures of the depositors in
their signature card. Finding a "big difference" in the signatures, he
referred the matter to the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio
("Panlilio").

money. While doing this, I tried to pull the alarm at my counter but it
was out of order. This alarm was out of order for quite sometime but I
was still hoping it might work. Since that day, time and again, he kept
on coming back and I couldnt do anything but to give in to his
request. His second, he demanded for (sic) another P600,000 but I
gave him only P530,000. The 3rd & 4th was P550,000 each. Last
December 29, 1995 at around 3:00 pm, I was surprised to see him at
my counter, again, he was asking for money. I was balancing my
dollar transaction. But that time, I had delivered my peso cash box to
our cashier. He saw the bundle of $10,000 which was on top of my
desk because I was writing the breakdown on my cash count. He
wanted me to give it to him & this time he pointed a gun at me and I
got so nervous & gave him the dollars.
During this time, in order for me to be balance with (sic) my
transactions, I cash out checks (suppose to be for late deposit) &
included them in todays clearing. The following day, I validated the
deposit slips as cash deposit. . .

Asked by Panlilio to explain, appellant reiterated that the withdrawal

was made after the cut-off time on December 29, 1995. Doubting her
explanation, Frias conducted another cash count. At that time,
82 of the bank was
appellants accountability based on the books
$21,778.86, but the money in her cash box was only $11,778.86,
thus, short of US$10,000.00. When Panlilio again asked appellant to
explain, the latter started to cry and said she would explain to the
bank president.

Apolinario Tayag denied withdrawing $10,000.00 from FX-836 either

on December 29, 1995 or on January 2, 1996 when he was in
Baguio City. He said he was not familiar with the withdrawal and
deposit memos showing the withdrawal of $10,000.00 from the said
account and the subsequent deposit of the same amount therein. He
also denied the signatures thereon as his or his mothers.

The next day, January 4, 1996, appellant told Panlilio that she gave
the $10,000.00 to a person on December 29, 1995 because her
family was being threatened.

Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed
a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence,5 praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that
the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

In her letter to the bank president dated January 4, 1996, appellant

apologized and explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and another
shortage of P2.2 Million which the audit team had also discovered.
She wrote:
Sometime in the month of September, a man approached me at
my counter and handed me a note demanding me (sic) to give him a
big amount of money of P600,000. I looked at him and told him I
dont have any. He told me to get at my drawer and not to tell
anybody because their companions are at the nearby of my house
(sic) and threatened me that something will happened (sic) to my
kids. That time he looked back and I also saw another man w/ radio
at his waist, who stood up and went out. I nervously handed him the

xxx

However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to

Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis that her filing her demurrer to evidence without
express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule 119, of the
Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence, viz: 6

without express leave of court hence, under Section 15 par. 2 of Rule

119, accused Cristobal has waived her right to present evidence and
submit the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
In view thereof, this case filed against accused Cristobal is hereby
submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
On May 26, 2000, therefore, the RTC rendered its decision finding
and pronouncing the accused guilty of qualified theft,7 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Olivia Aleth Cristobal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Accused Cristobal is also ordered to pay Prudential Bank, the
amount of US $10,000.00, representing the amount that was lost,
plus interest.
SO ORDERED.
The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction on July
31, 2003, albeit modifying the penalty,8 finding and ruling as follows:
The following circumstances as established by the prosecutions
evidence, show beyond reasonable doubt that appellant stole
US$10,000.00 from Prudential Bank:
1. Appellant was the only teller in the Angeles City main
branch of Prudential Bank assigned to handle dollar
transactions. Thus, it was only she who had access to the
subject account for purposes of dollar deposits and
withdrawals;

WHEREFORE, the Demurer to Evidence filed by the accused is

hereby denied for lack of merit.

2. She admitted having transacted or processed the

supposed withdrawal of US$10,000.00 from dollar savings
account no. FX-836;

Reviewing further the records of this case, there is evidence and

proof that the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused Cristobal is

3. It was she who presented to the head auditor, Rolando

Frias, the withdrawal memo for US$10,000.00 supposedly

withdrawn from dollar savings account no. FX-836, saying

that it was withdrawn on December 29, 1995 after the cutoff time and would be considered a withdrawal on January
2, 1996;
4. The said withdrawal memo did not contain the required
signatures of two bank officers;
5. The supposed withdrawal of $10,000.00 from dollar
savings account no. FX-836 reduced the balance thereof
to P26,077.51, violating the "hold jacket" or instruction in the
account ledger which disallowed any withdrawal from the
said account that would reduce the balance thereof
below P35,000.00;
6. The discrepancy in the signature on the withdrawal
memo and the specimen signatures in the depositors
signature card;
7. Asked to explain the shortage of $10,000.00 revealed by
the second cash count, following the discovery of the
aforesaid "hold jacket" in the account ledger and
83
discrepancy in the signatures, appellant
began to cry,
saying she would just explain to the bank president;
8. The depositor, Apolinario Tayag, denied withdrawing
money from dollar savings account no. FX-836 either on
December 29, 1995, when appellant claimed the withdrawal
was made, or on January 2, 1996, the date of the
withdrawal memo, at which time he was in Baguio City. He
was not familiar with the withdrawal and deposit memos
showing the withdrawal of $10,000.00 from the said account
and the subsequent deposit of the same amount therein. He
also denied that the signatures thereon belong to him or his
mother, Adoracion Tayag, with whom he shares the account
as co-signatory;
9. In her letter to the bank president, she admitted
appropriating US$10,000.00 and P2.2 Million, and
explained how she covered it up;
10. Appellant gave different and inconsistent explanations
for her shortage of US$10,000.00. She explained to the
auditors that the said amount was withdrawn on December
29, 1995 after the cut-off time, hence, would be considered

as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996. To the branch cashier,

Noel Cunanan, she said that Apolinario Tayag had
instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from his account
on January 3, 1996, through his driver whom he had sent to
the bank. Later, she told Panlilio and the bank president that
she gave the $10,000.00 to a person on December 29,
1995 because he had threatened her family; and
11. In her letter to the bank president, she mentioned five
instances when the unidentified man supposedly threatened
her and demanded money from her. However, she never
reported any of these incidents to any of the bank officers or
the police authorities.
Even without an eyewitness, the foregoing circumstances indicate
that appellant committed the crime, to the exclusion of all others.
In the absence of an eyewitness, reliance on circumstantial evidence
becomes inevitable. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which
indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the
factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting a felon free and denying proper protection to the
community. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.,
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
As hereinbefore shown, there is more than one circumstance or
indication of appellants guilt. Moreover, the said circumstances, from
which the act of taking could be inferred, had been established by
the prosecutions evidence. And the combination of the said
circumstances is clearly sufficient to convict the appellant of qualified
theft beyond reasonable doubt.
In conclusion, We hold that the totality of the evidence points to no
other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime
charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or
circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt
of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such
evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct
evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.

xxx
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision convicting the accusedappellant of Qualified Theft is
hereby AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION in that the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties of death under
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, and accused-appellant shall
pay Prudential Bank US$10,000.00, withoutinterest.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In her appeal, the accused submits that the CA gravely erred:
1. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused on the basis
of an information for qualified theft that charges the accused
to have taken $10,000.00 on January 2, 1996 when the
evidence on record based on various admissions of the
prosecution's witnesses reveal that the accused did not and
cannot take away $10,000.00 on January 2, 1996.
2. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused based on
an extra-judicial admission that was made without
assistance of counsel and hearsay evidence as testified by
the next most possible suspects to the loss.
3. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused when the
facts and evidence on record do not satisfy the elements of
the crime as charged.
4. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused when the
very procedure employed by the trial court in the case at
bench showed leniency to the prosecution and strictness to
the defense in violation of the constitutional and statutory
rights of the accused.
5. xxx in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the
accused had waived her right to present evidence-in-chief
despite the expressed motion to defer its presentation when
the demurrer to evidence was filed.9
The assigned errors are restated thuswise:

(a) Whether the information filed against the accused was

fatally defective;
(b) Whether the RTC correctly found that the accused had
waived her right to present evidence in her defense; and

Virgilio Frias11 to the effect that she was cleared of her accountability
upon her turning her cash box over to the bank cashier on December
29, 1995, thereby negating the accusation that she had taken the
money on December 29, 1995.

With the information herein conforming to the standard erected by

the Revised Rules of Court and pertinent judicial pronouncements,
the accused was fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft
involving the US$10,000.00 belonging to her employer on or
about January 2, 1996.

The petitioners submission is untenable.

(c) Whether the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount
involved contained in the letter of the accused to the
President of Prudential Bank was admissible under the
rules and jurisprudence.
Ruling
We deny the petition for review and affirm the CAs decision.
1.
Findings of CA and RTC are affirmed
due to being based on the evidence
There is no question about the findings of fact being based on the
evidence adduced by the Prosecution. The
84decisions of both lower
courts are remarkable for their thoroughness and completeness. In
fact, the accused did not impugn the findings of fact, and confined
herself only to the validity of the information and the legality of her
letter due to its being held admissible as evidence against her.
Although she decried her failure to present her evidence on account
of her having demurred without express leave of court, that, too, was
not an obstacle to the correctness of the findings of fact against her.
Thus, we sustain the findings of fact, for findings of the CA upon
factual matters are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless
they are shown to be contrary to the evidence on record.10
2.
Information was sufficient and valid
The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified
theft that allegedly transpired on December 29, 1995, but the
evidence at trial could not be the basis of her conviction because it
actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996;
and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as an
accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare
for her defense. To bolster her submission, she cites the testimony of

3.
The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be
set forth in the information is to enable the accused to adequately
prepare her defense.12 As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the
time or date of the commission of the offense, Section 6 and Section
11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules
applicable,13 provide:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information. (5a)

CA and RTC did not err in deeming petitioner

to have waived her right to present evidence
The accused contended that:
xxx
(2) The trial court denied accused (sic) Demurrer To Evidence and
Motion To Defer Defense Evidence and ruled that the accused is
considered to have waived her evidence (for alleged lack of leave of
court). Although the accused is not principally relying on this error
(because the prosecutions own evidence show that she is not
guilty), still it was error for the trial court to deprive the accused of her
day in court because the demurrer was at the same time, as stated in
the title thereof, also a motion to defer defense evidence.15

Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not

necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint will permit. (10)

The CA rejected her contention in the following manner:16

Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because

it stated the approximate time of the commission of the offense
through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996," and the
accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with
which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as
gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the
charge to enable her to prepare her defense.

Appellants theory that prior leave of court had been requested

because her demurrer was, at the same time, also a motion to defer
defense evidence, cannot be sustained. A motion to defer evidence
does not constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
In fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court
to consider the demurrer before proceeding to hear her evidence.
Furthermore, there is nothing in appellants Demurrer from which it
can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial Court permission
to move for the dismissal of the case.

The information herein did not have to state the precise date when
the offense was committed, considering that the date was not a
material ingredient of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified
theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission.14 Verily, December 29, 1995 and
January 2, 1996 were dates only four days apart.

As to whether or not the Trial Court correctly ruled that appellant

waived the presentation of her evidence when she filed her
"Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence" without prior
leave of court, We rule in the affirmative.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. After the prosecution has rested its
case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to
dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present
defense evidence is unqualified.
Unavoidably, Our attention is drawn to the apparent negligence of
appellants counsel in failing to secure prior leave of court before
filing her Demurrer to Evidence. However, We cannot lose sight of
the fact that in law, the negligence of appellants counsel binds her.
85
Indeed, jurisprudence teems with pronouncements
that a client is
bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.
The CA did not thereby err.
The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of
Court, viz:
Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested
its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the
accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to
dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. (n)
Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have
waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain the

express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby

reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present
evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and
intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to
evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively
waived her right to present her evidence.
It is true that the Court has frequently deemed the failure of the trial
courts to conduct an inquiry into the voluntariness and intelligence of
the waiver to be a sufficient cause to remand cases to the trial courts
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the accused truly intended to
waive their constitutional right to be heard, and whether they
understood the consequences of their waivers.17 In People v.
Bodoso,18 a prosecution for a capital offense, we leaned towards the
protection of the accuseds constitutional right to due process by
outlining the proper steps to be taken before deeming the right to
present evidence as waived, thus:
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every
accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the
proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with
an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his clients right to
present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of
the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such
waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching inquiry" as specified
in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the
accused with their respective counsel on the desire or
manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present
evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the
prosecution and especially the accused with their respective
counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their
presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the
proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to

a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to

determine whether he had conferred with and
completely explained to the accused that he had
the right to present evidence and be heard as well

as its meaning and consequences, together with

the significance and outcome of the waiver of such
right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done
so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time
to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity
of the accused whether he wants to present
evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on
the contradictions and insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory,
file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of
court, if he so believes that the prosecution
evidence is so weak that it need not even be
rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court
shall give the defense enough time to this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give
a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in
a language known and understood by the latter,
hence, the record must state the language used for
this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding
translation thereof in English.
In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing criminal
procedure when the waiver of the right to be present and be heard is
made in criminal cases involving non-capital offenses. After all, in
whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he
makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the
case records to have been validly undertaken, that is, it was done
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. As a matter of
good court practice, the trial court would have to rely upon the most
convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of the waiver which
would amount to the same thing as showing its adherence to the
step-by-step process outlined above.
Also, in Rivera v. People,19 which involved an accused charged with
a non-capital offense who filed a demurrer to evidence without leave
of court, the Court, citing People v. Bodoso, supra, remanded the

case to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings upon finding that

the accused had
not been asked whether he had understood the consequences of
filing the demurrer to evidence without leave of court.
Yet, the accused cannot be extended the benefit of People v. Bodoso
and Rivera v. People. The factual milieus that warranted the
safeguards in said criminal cases had nothing in common with the
factual milieu in which the RTC deemed the herein accused to have
waived her right to present evidence. The accused in People v.
Bodoso, without filing a demurrer to evidence, expressly waived the
right to present evidence. The Court felt that the trial court ought to
have followed the steps outlined therein. The accused in Rivera v.
People filed a demurrer to evidence without having to obtain an
express leave of court, considering that the Sandiganbayan itself had
told him to file the demurrer to evidence. Thus, after the demurrer to
evidence was denied, the accused was held to be still entitled to
present his evidence.
The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially
prejudicial consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence
86 15, Rule 119, of the
without the leave of court required in Section
Revised Rules of Court.20They were well aware of the risk of a denial
of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused impliedly
admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper inferences
therefrom.21 We cannot step in now to alleviate her self-inflicted
plight, for which she had no one to blame but herself; otherwise, we
may unduly diminish the essence of the rule that gave her the
alternative option to waive presenting her own evidence.
4.
Petitioners handwritten letter
is admissible in evidence
The next issue concerns the admissibility of the accuseds letter
dated January 4, 1996 to Prudential Banks President explaining the
shortage of her dollar collection as bank teller,22 the relevant portion
of which follows:
xxx Sometime in the month of September, a man approached me at
my counter and handed me a note demanding me (sic) to give him a
big amount of money of P600,000. I looked at him and told him I
dont have any. He told me to get at my drawer and not to tell

anybody because their companions are at the nearby of my house

(sic) and threatened me that something will happened (sic) to my
kids. That time he looked back and I also saw another man w/ radio
at his waist, who stood up and went out. I nervously handed him the
money. While doing this, I tried to pull the alarm at my counter but it
was out of order. This alarm was out of order for quite sometime but I
was still hoping it might work. Since that day, time and again, he kept
on coming back and I couldnt do anything but to give in to his
request. His second, he demanded for (sic) another P600,000 but I
gave him only P530,000. The 3rd & 4th was P550,000 each. Last
December 29, 1995 at around 3:00 pm, I was surprised to see him at
my counter, again, he was asking for money. I was balancing my
dollar transaction. But that time, I had delivered my peso cash box to
our cashier. He saw the bundle of $10,000 which was on top of my
desk because I was writing the breakdown on my cash count. He
wanted me to give it to him & this time he pointed a gun at me and I
got so nervous & gave him the dollars.
During this time, in order for me to be balance with (sic) my
transactions, I cash out checks (suppose to be for late deposit) &
included them in todays clearing. The following day, I validated the
deposit slips as cash deposit xxx.
The accused submits that the letter was inadmissible for being in
reality an uncounselled extrajudicial confession, and for not being
executed under oath.

Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the

accused when she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made
it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the
assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had
she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial
investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the
Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person
arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating
the latter from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

The submission lacks persuasion.

The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity
depended on its being executed with the assistance of counsel and
its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section
26,23 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against her.
An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the
reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with
the truth, and it is the admitters fault if the admission does not.24 By
virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is
competent primary evidence against the admitter.25
Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its
not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified
theft. Under Section 30,26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a
confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the
offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to "any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense." The
phrase does not cover all kinds of investigations, but contemplates
only a situation wherein "a person is already in custody as a suspect,
or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any
significant way of his liberty."27 The situation of the accused was not
similar to that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the
person is the suspect, even if she is not yet deprived in any
significant way of his liberty.
5.

Penalty was correctly determined

We quote and adopt with approval the CAs discourse on why the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was appropriate for the offense
committed by the accused, to wit:
The foregoing considered, appellants conviction must perforce be
affirmed. The sentence imposed by the Trial Court should, however,
be modified.
The Trial Court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The correct penalty,
however, should be reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code provides that qualified theft
shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Paragraph
(1) of Article 309 states that if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
P22,000, the penalty shall be the maximum period of prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and one year for each
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, but87
the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years (or reclusion
temporal).
Appellant stole US$10,000.00 or P262,140.00 computed based on
the exchange rate on December 29, 1995 when the appropriation
took place.
Under Article 309, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period since the
amount stolen exceeded P22,000.00. To determine the additional
years of imprisonment prescribed in Article 309 (1), the amount of
P22,000.00 should be deducted from P262,140.00, thus, leaving the
amount of P240,140.00. The net amount should then be divided by
P10,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. The result
is the incremental penalty of twenty-four (24) years which must then
be added to the basic penalty of the maximum period of prision
mayor minimum and medium periods. The penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods has a range of six years
(6) and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its maximum period is eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and the
incremental penalty is twenty-four (24) years. Had appellant
committed simple theft, the penalty should have been twenty years

of reclusion temporal, the maximum penalty allowable under Article

309, subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Considering that the theft is qualified by grave abuse of confidence,
the penalty is two degrees higher than that specified under Article
309. Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two degrees higher
than reclusion temporal is death. However, Article 74 of the same
Code provides that in cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
higher than another given penalty, without specifically designating
the name of the former, and if such higher penalty should be that of
death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40,
shall be considered as the next higher penalty.1wphi1
The Supreme Court held that in such a case, the accused should be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty years with the
accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and
affirm the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No.
24556.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150224

May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar
alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D.
Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in
the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total
damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following
Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan
West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal
knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a
bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal
injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the
occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had
carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first
cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the
ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel
Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking
about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her
husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend,
Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant
earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with
Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers
away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told
Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she
would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her
clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was
left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng
stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of
the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the
kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was
doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the
house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan,
she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the

house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt
with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near
her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and
blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber
he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that
appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her
where her husband was as he had something important to tell him.
Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and
went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and
found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was
open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill
up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found
that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife.
While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold
and rigid.9
88
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out
that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She
called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her
stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a
dead woman was found in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with
fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the
naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant
was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at
approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants,
bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime,
and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50
meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any

knowledge of Kathylynss death,11 however, he was placed under
police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could
relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the
toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!"
(Hes running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through
the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when
Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape
with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant
pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the AntiRape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the
following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH
WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of
witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or

circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or

the significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched
is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are
presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the
same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the
trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light
of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds,
six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on the victims abdomen
and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her
body.18 Rigor mortisof the vicitms body was complete when Dr.
Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According
to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9)
to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other
words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m.
to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within
which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the
attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no
hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal
canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the
introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent
from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual
violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling
in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellants assault on
her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic

acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was
identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms.23 A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not
change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is
the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate
a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left.
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist
immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing
the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration
of justice in every case.

89
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a
crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or
saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene.
Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also
be transferred to the victims body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA
evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the
victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known
samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which
conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence
can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient
DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible
to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were

collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of

the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following
gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal
canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so
we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically,
the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence
based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed
greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA
typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in
the victims vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following
circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in
the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba;

(2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of their
frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn
Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30,
1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly
Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house
of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt
with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of
the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and
again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant
hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching;
(7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming
down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay
naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body
on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained
pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10)
Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina
(Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the
crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide,
Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant
are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was
detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being
indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends
that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were
conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.37 The right against
self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply

where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but

as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant
insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted
to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the
hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation
of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for
blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30,
2000, in the presence of counsel.

90

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the

prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that
resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the
case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility,
relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of
law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative
weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The
forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the
eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawangs house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him
to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with
clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at
the same time, especially in this case where the two places are
located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100)
meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five
minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely
weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the

court a quo committed reversible error in convicting him of the crime
charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable
doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly
established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something
more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters
of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty
conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant
but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court
to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely
harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is
relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain
a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces
and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment
of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances,
taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused,
and no one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present
case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting
the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is
essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the
culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the
victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in the morning of
June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the
appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding
to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days
before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that
"Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the

school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the
appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body
was found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25, 1998.48 In
addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang
Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was
personally present during an argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the
Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your
relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by
appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was
evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive,
being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on
the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently
sealed the victims lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing
her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1)
the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal
knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed
the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the
victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victims hymen is intact
does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by
the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of
rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it
may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse.
Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse
especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is

seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his
wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant
moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100)
meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative by affinity
within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to
have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death
is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide
is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their
position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority
that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual
damages incurred by the family of the victim that have been proved
at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the
civil liability since the crime was not committed
91 with one or more
aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of
Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the
victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in
moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No.
7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
For the fatal stabbing of Carmelita Aguinaldo at Barangay Rizal,
Roxas, Isabela, herein accused-appellant Lindes
Paynor, alias "Jess," was charged with the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 23-285 of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of
Roxas, Isabela.
The factual backdrop of this tragic occurrence, culled from the
records of the trial court and the testimonies adduced therein,
commenced at around 4:00 P.M. of September 18, 1991 when a
middle-aged teacher, Carmelita Aguinaldo, was stabbed and killed
inside her classroom at the Roxas Central Elementary School. A tenyear old pupil, by the name of Fresnaida Magaway, narrated how the
events unfolded.
She testified that in the afternoon of September 18, 1991 she was
assigned as a cleaner and, while sweeping the ground near her
classroom, she noticed a man who was holding a pointed knife, near
the classroom of the victim. The man entered the room of the
teacher, stabbed her, and went out of the room headed west towards
the fence of the school, carrying the pointed bladed weapon in his
hand and passing in front of the witness. Shortly thereafter, Ms.
Aguinaldo emerged from the room saying "Manang, nabagsol na
kon," literally meaning, "Manang, I am stabbed," then she fell to the
ground. 1
The immediate reaction of his young witness was to seek help from
her teachers, so she went into the classroom of her teacher, Ms.
Hermogena Uy, and told her about Ms. Aguinaldo. She then took her
belongings from the classroom and proceeded immediately to where
Ms. Aguinaldo fell down and there she saw Mrs. Leticia Navarro
embracing the victim, with Mrs. Elizabeth Dumlao by their side. A
tricycle came and the teachers rushed the victim to the nearby
hospital. She followed her teachers to the hospital, where Ms.
Aguinaldo was pronounced dead on arrival.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116222 September 9, 1996

Fernando Castillo, a policeman, who had responded to the crime

report, testified that he went to the hospital and inquired whether

someone saw the stabbing. According to him, Fresnaida Magaway

came forward and told them that she saw a man in blue maong pants
and white T-shirt printed in front, using slippers and a brown hat, and
with a green towel wrapped around his neck. He entered the school
yard and went to the room of Ms. Aguinaldo where he stabbed her
with a pointed bladed weapon. She further said that if the man would
be presented to her, she could recognize him. 2
The police investigators then went to the house of the family of the
deceased and asked the family members if they had a suspect in the
killing of Ms. Aguinaldo. The family of the deceased pointed to
appellant, the "jilted boyfriend" of the victim's sister, as a possible
suspect. The policeman then proceeded to the house of appellant,
but they were informed that he was at the Tagalag auto repair shop
having his motorcycle repaired. 3
At the Tagalag auto repair shop, the policemen saw appellant
wearing maong pants. white T-shirt with markings in front, with a
yellow towel wrapped around his neck and a brown hat on his head.
Appellant was invited by them to their station where he was identified
by Fresnaida Magaway as the person who stabbed and killed Ms.
Aguinaldo. On the strength of said positive identification, appellant
was detained at the police station.
An information was filed on September 19, 1991, charging appellant
with the murder of Carmelita Aguinaldo, with evident premeditation
and treachery as attendant circumstances, by the infliction of a fatal
stab wound on her chest, and a committed at the time and on the
date and place earlier narrated. 4
No preliminary investigation having been conducted prior to the filling
of that information, appellant's counsel filed a motion for preliminary
investigation on September 23, 1991 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, at Ilagan, Isabela. On October 18, 1991, presiding Judge
Teodulo E. Mirasol issued an order directing the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Denying appellant's motion for his release from detention in the
meantime, said court issued an order on November 8, 1991 that
. . . the court is of the opinion that the arrest is
lawful, considering that the accused was arrested
immediately after the commission of the offense,
the police officers acting with promptness after a
credible information furnished them by a credible

witness. That the police acted with personal

knowledge of facts fed them by a witness who has
no sufficient time to reflect on what she was going
to tell the police (is) indicative of truthfulness in
pointing to the accused as the author of the
stabbing.5
On November 22, 1991, a resolution was issued by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor maintaining the information filed on September
19, 1991. On December 12, 1991, appellant was duly arraigned and,
on his plea of not guilty to the charge for murder the court below
thereafter proceeded with the trial.
The prosecution based its case primarily on the testimony of a lone
eyewitness, and this in the person of a ten-year old girl, Fresnaida
Magaway. Considering that doubts may be entertained in view of her
tender years, and for a graphic illustration and clearer appreciation of
what actually transpired on the afternoon of 18 September 1991 as
seen through the eyes of this eyewitness, we quote the pertinent
transcripts of stenographic notes of her testimony:
Q Do you know the name of that
man92
whom you pointed to the
court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please tell his name if
you know?
A Jessie Paynor, sir.
Q Can you recall the attire and
appearance of the accused
whom you pointed to when he
stabbed Ms. Aguinaldo in her
room on September 18, 1991, at
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A He ha(d) a white t-shirt, denim
pants and he ha(d) a woven hat
and a green towel. (The witness
demonstrating as if the towel
was wrapped around her neck) 6

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you not tell Mrs. Uy that
you saw the man who stabbed
Mrs. Aguinaldo?
A I told her sir, but I did not tell
the name.
Q Do you know the name of the
person at the time you told Mrs.
Uy the identity of the assailant?
A Jessie, sir.
Q Yes, did you mention the
name of Jessie to Mrs. Uy when
you told Mrs. Uy that you saw
that stabbing of Mrs. Aguinaldo?
A No sir.
Q Can you tell this court why you
failed to inform Mrs. Uy your
teacher, the identity of the
assailant?
A I did not tell her sir because I
followed Mrs. Aguinaldo.
Q You did not tell her or you
failed to tell her because you
immediately followed where Mrs.
Aguinaldo was brought to, is that
what you mean?

A Yes, sir. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now how did you notice if it is
true that you recognized for the
third time that he was walking to
and fro in front of your room and
the room of Mrs. Aguinaldo the
identify of the assailant of Mrs.
Aguinaldo?
A Because he was walking to
and fro my attention was
attracted.
Q So when the third time that
you noticed him walking to and
fro, could you tell the court what
special feature of that person
walking to and fro attracted your
attention?
A I saw the face, sir.
Q Is that the only thing that you
saw in that person, his face?
A I saw the apparel, sir.
Q And it was at the fourth time
that he walked to and fro when
he entered the room of Mrs.
Aguinaldo?
A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q Now, that person whom you
identified as Jess, from the way
you testify, you already know
him, is that correct, at the time of
the stabbing?

Q And during that time he was

walking to and fro you already
saw him holding a knife, is that
correct?
A Not yet, sir.

Q At what point in time did you

see him if you saw him h(o)ld a
knife?
A I did not yet see the knife he
used to stab Mrs. Aguinaldo, sir.
COURT:
Q Yes, did you see any knife in
his possession during or after
the incident?
A After Mrs. Aguinaldo was
stabbed I saw him holding the
knife because he was facing me
at that time.
Q So that was the only time that
you saw him, I mean the
assailant, holding a knife when
he passed by you?

93

A Yes, sir.
Q And when the assailant came
out of the room of Mrs.
Aguinaldo how did he leave the
room, he ran, he walk(ed), or
what?
A After ma'am Aguinaldo was
stabbed the assailant ran away,
sir. 8
As earlier stated, both in the police station and then in open court,
the young girl positively identified appellant as the person she saw
on September 18, 1991 who stabbed and killed the victim, Mrs.
Carmelita Aguinaldo.
Appellant denied having been anywhere near the school on
September 18, 1991 and insisted that he was at the Tagalag auto
repair shop, busy having his motorcycle repaired. Testifying in his
defense, appellant blandly declared that he went to the repair shop at

2:10 in the afternoon of that day, to have his motorcycle repaired;

that he had to push his motorcycle to the shop and when they tested
it there it, it would not start; that the owner suggested and he agreed
that the engine be overhauled; that he was at that shop all the time,
helping in the overhauling until 5:00 P.M. when policemen arrived
and invited him to go with them to the police station. 9
The testimony of appellant was corroborated by Cecilio Tagalag who
testified that the former was at their motor shop from 2:00 to 5:00
p.m. on September 18, 1991 and left only when he was picked up by
the police authorities at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon. 10
The trial court rendered judgment on April 21, 1994, finding against
appellant and commending the lone eyewitness for the prosecution,
Fresnaida Magaway. These words of said court therein are worth
repeating, before the dispositive portion that follows:
Cross examined on several occasions, this young
girl stuc(k) to the testimony that it was accused
whom she saw enter the room, then left followed
by the victim shouting for help. During these
gruelling and excruciating cross-examinations, she
never faltered. She never showed any sign of fear.
She never wavered, she stuc(k) to her testimony.
This girl is no ordinary girl. She is made of metal
far better than some adults. For adults are always
mindful of their safety and their families. Even if
they have actually seen a person shot to death,
stabbed to death, or mauled to death, they would
not come out in the open and volunteer the
information that they saw the killing. Either they
keep quiet, or deny having witnessed such
incident. But this girl is different. She volunteered
to describe the attire of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
If only witnesses who see actual killings, have the
guts and the courage of this girl, all unsolved
criminal cases would be solved. This girl shames
the adults, especially those who do not come out
(in) the open when they witness crimes. If only
those witnesses were Fresnaida Magaway, all
crimes would have been solved, and the

malefactors sent to jail. This girl is an epitome of

courage and guts. Fearless and intelligent, she has
done what adults shu(n) to do. 11
xxx xxx xxx
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
provided for and penalized by article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and imposes upon him the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, together with all the
necessary penalties provided by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00
pesos, without however, subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay cost. 12
Appellant now seeks the reversal of that verdict, claiming that the
trial court erred: (1) in giving credence to the testimony of Fresnaida
Magaway in convicting him in spite of the material flaws,
contradictions, and improbabilities inherent in her testimony; (2) in
admitting in evidence the following physical evidence: white T-shirt,
denim pants, green towel, and hat, in spite of the clear violation of
the Miranda doctrine during the custodial investigation of the
accused; (3) in convicting him based on mere circumstantial
evidence from an account of one highly questionable witness; and
(4) in convicting him of the offense charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation. 13
Appellant specifically laments the mode by which Fresnaida
Magaway identified him, theorizing that if the witness really knew
him, she should have mentioned his name the moment she was
asked by the police as to who stabbed the victim; instead of resorting
to a "descriptive identification." 14
He likewise also argues that there was a violation of
the Miranda rights of an accused when he was identified by the
witness while he was seated on a bench of the investigation room.
The manner employed by the investigators in obtaining his T-shirt,
pants, towel, slippers, and hat, according to appellant, was a further
violation of his rights as these items were taken from him in the
absence of his counsel.

The defense also asserts that the lower court relied upon the
testimony of a highly questionable witness in the person of Fresnaida
Magaway, and that the conviction of appellant was based purely on
circumstantial evidence which should not have been taken as proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he really stabbed the victim to death.
The final contention is that the prosecution failed to prove either that
there was treachery employed by the accused in the killing of the
victim or that there was evident premeditation on his part to take her
life.
On the allegation of inconsistency and flaws in the testimony of a
single eyewitness, a thorough review of the transcripts of
stenographic notes, particularly those on the testimony of witness
Fresnaida Magaway, does not reveal any major inconsistency.
Instead, the Court is regaled by the unswerving and consistent
position of the witness that appellant was the only one whom she
saw on that occasion and that he stabbed and killed her teacher,
Mrs. Aguinaldo. Any minor lapses therein tend to butters, rather than
weaken, her credibility since they show that she was neither coached
nor were her answers contrived. 15
The contention of appellant that the expected reaction of the witness
should have been to identify him by name
is an obvious non sequitur.
94
What should be considered as a general or common rule is that
witnesses to a crime react in different ways. In the instant case, the
youthful witness was unable to immediately reveal the name of
appellant to the police as she was evidently scared or confused and,
as she explained, she also failed to name appellant at that time since
her concern and thoughts were of her teacher whom she followed to
the hospital. Surely, we can not fault the young girl for her confusion
and fear, it being her first time to witness such a crime of violence.
The important thing is that when she testified at the trial, she was
firm, spontaneous and categorical in her declaration that it was
appellant whom she saw that afternoon, and that it was he who
entered the classroom of her teacher and stabbed the latter with a
pointed bladed weapon. The witness stood by her declaration,
unshaken throughout the entire trial, and never showed any
hesitation in her testimony.
Another fact worth stressing is that the witness had no motive
whatsoever to fabricate a serious charge against appellant. When
there is no showing that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by an improper motive, the presumption is that he was not
so actuated, and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.16

Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his rights

while under custodial investigation, in light of the Miranda doctrine,
when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously stripped him
of his clothing and personal items, and the same were later
introduced as evidence during the trial. The Court is not persuaded.
The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which is
invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel,
and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel,
and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held
in People vs. Gamboa, 17 this constitutional right applies only against
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription
against testimonial compulsion. 18
The desperate ploy of appellant that the evidence against him was
purely circumstantial does not even warrant refutation. It was
definitely established by the prosecution that appellant was actually
the one who treacherously attacked the victim. Eyewitness Magaway
unequivocally stated and lucidly described how she saw appellant
actually stabbing Mrs. Aguinaldo, 19 and even demonstrated during
the ocular inspection the specific part of the room where the crime
was committed and where she herself was when she witnessed the
dastardly deed. 20 As already explained, the defense failed to show
that the witness had ill motives in testifying against appellant and
there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the witness really had
a personal ill feelings against him. The conclusion that irresistibly
emerges, therefore, is that the witness was just honestly relating
what she really saw on September 18, 1991, and that she so testified
because of her desire for justice and redress for the terrible wrong
against her teacher.
The fourth error assigned by appellant that evident premeditation and
treachery were not proved merits some comment. It is correct that
evident premeditation was not established. There is no evidence or
showing on record when and how appellant planned and prepared
for the killing of the victim. His allegation that there was not
treachery, however, is a different matter. The attack against Mrs.
Aguinaldo was so sudden that, although she was stabbed by
appellant while she was facing him, the unexpected attack in itself

constituted treachery. The victim was caught unaware and did not
have any opportunity to defend herself. Also, from the means and
methods adopted by appellant to commit the crime, it would be
incredible to assume that the same were not deliberately adopted to
insure the consummation of the felony.
Lastly, there can be no sensible debate that appellant's defense of
alibi has to be rejected. It is elementary that for this discredited
defense, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable. 21 In the
present case, the court below found that appellant was then just one
kilometer away from the scene of the crime. 22 Furthermore, the
defense of alibi can not prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by an eyewitness who had no improper motive to falsely
testify. 23
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against accused-appellant Lindes Paynor.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139333

July 18, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent
and independent counsel qualified to assist a person under custodial
investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the
accused with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
Without this confession, the remaining evidence, which is
circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is
inevitable.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated February
12, 1999, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan (Branch 11), finding Crispin Velarde y Bandojo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. 773-M97. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused CRISPIN B.

VELARDE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with
Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages."2
The Information3 against appellant dated June 13, 1997, reads as
follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of May, 1997, in the
[M]unicipality of Guiguinto, [P]rovince of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, and
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
one Brenda Candelaria, a minor who is eight (8) years of
age, against her will and consent.
"That on the occasion and by reason of said rape, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
strangle said Brenda Candelaria in the neck which directly
95
caused her death."4
When arraigned on July 1, 1997, appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio,5 pleaded not guilty.6 In due course, he was tried
and found guilty.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence
for the prosecution as follows:7
"On May 11, 1997 at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning,
Brenda Candelaria, an eight year old child, together with her
friend Melanie Sangalang, seven years of age, was on
board a pedicab driven by appellant. Upon reaching the
house of Melanie, said appellant told Melanie to alight on
the pretext that her mother might look for her. Melanie
obeyed leaving Brenda inside the pedicab with appellant
continuing his driving.

"In the afternoon of the same day, appellant and Brenda

were seen together by Flora Bonganay in front of the latter's
store located near the church in Tikay riding the same
pedicab.
"Later on, Angelita Robles while waiting for a ride saw
appellant already alone emerging from a place near Doa
Pilar Homes Subdivision. Angelita noticed something
strange in appellant's actuation as he was uneasy, haggard
looking with his hair disheveled.
"The following day, May 12, 1997, the naked lifeless body of
Brenda Candelaria was found in a grassy vacant lot along
the Cagayan Valley Highway in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto,
Bulacan near the Doa Pilar Homes Subdivision.
Recovered beside her body were a rubber slipper, blood
stained white sando, a blue and white striped t-shirt and a
shoe string.
"Dr. Dominic Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the NBI
assigned at Region III, conducted a post mortem
examination on the body of the victim. His findings revealed
that Brenda Candelaria was raped and strangled to death.
According to the doctor, the victim died of asphyxia by
manual strangulation.
"On the other hand, based on the leads furnished by
witnesses, appellant was tagged as suspect and was
brought to the Malolos Bulacan Police Station for
investigation.
"During his investigation, appellant, after being informed of
his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Danilo
Domingo whom he agreed to act as his counsel, voluntarily
admitted having raped and killed the victim Brenda
Candelaria. Accordingly, his extrajudicial confession was
reduced to writing which was signed by him.
"It was on the bases of the foregoing occurrences that the
corresponding Information for rape with homicide was filed
against appellant with the Regional Trial Court." (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant presents his version of the incident as

follows:8
"Accused Crispin Velarde DENIED having raped and killed
Brenda Candelaria. Thus,
CONT. OF DIRECT-EXAM.
OF CRISPIN VELARDE BY:
Atty. de Leon:
Q
Mr. Velarde, do we understand from you that you did
not rape Brenda?
A

No, sir.

You did not kill Brenda?

No, sir.

Brenda is your first cousin?

Yes, sir.

Q
Your mother and the mother of Brenda are sisters, is
it not?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
If you did not rape Brenda, if you did not kill Brenda
and Brenda is your first cousin, your mother and the mother
of Brenda are sisters, why were you accused of rape and
killing Brenda?
Atty. Villacorta:
Objection, Your Honor, the question calls for an
opinion.
Court:
Never mind, it is a matter of defense.

Witness:

Q
But according to that witness, you were carrying a
basket, is it true?

I was only suspected (n[a]pagbintangan), sir.

I do not know anything about it, sir.

Atty. De Leon:
A
Q
According to some witnesses who testified for the
prosecution, they have seen you and Brenda riding in a
tricycle?

No, sir.

Atty. De Leon:
That's all, Your Honor please.

Atty. Villacorta:
Atty. Villacorta:
No, no, not tricycle, Your Honor, pedicab:
May we be allowed to conduct the cross
considering . . .

Court:
After the incident?

Court:

Atty. De Leon:
No, no, several days before the incident. Not
96
exactly the day of the incident.
I modify the
question by adding several days before the alleged
incident.

(to witness)
Q
Have there been an occasion when Brenda took a
ride in your tricycle you were driving?
A

None, Your Honor.

Witness:

Never?

No, Your Honor.

No, sir, that is not true.

Atty. De Leon:
Q
And, there was a witness who testified here that she
has seen you riding on a jeep perspiring . . . .

Court:
Cross next time?
Atty. Villacorta:

Court:
Give the specific place.
Atty. De Leon:
Q
The witness has seen the accused about to ride the
jeep perspiring as if you have committed a crime is it true?

Yes, Your Honor.

"Accused declared on June 19, 1998 that he has been
detained since May 12, 1997 or more than one (1) year
already because he was told that he was the one who
committed a crime against his cousin Brenda Candelaria.
According to him, on the night of May 11, 1997 he was
arrested while selling balot in Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, by

four (4) Barangay Officials. When said Barangay Officials

asked him where he brought the child Brenda Candelaria,
he told them he 'don't know' [sic]. He did not insist
answering them 'because I don't know what they were
asking about the child'. He just went with them because if
he will not go with them 'di nila lulubayan and pamilya ko'.
He was brought to the Barangay Hall of Barangay Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. He was kicked and mauled by the father
and brothers of Brenda. The father of Brenda is his uncle
and was the one who hurted [sic] him. He was boxed
several times, hitting him in all parts of his body. While he
was being boxed, he told them to stop because he did not
know about the incident. Inside the Barangay Hall he was
'nilusob'), was stabbed by the eldest son (Ruel Candelaria)
hitting him in his right leg. The person who stabbed him
even said: 'Tabla tabla na lang kami' meaning 'manos na
lang kami sa nangyari'. He did not answer because he did
not know anything about the incident. Besides, he was
already 'bugbog sarado', meaning his body was aching and
it was painful. His hands were even tied at his back with a
handkerchief by a former neighbor. After hurting him inside
the Barangay Hall he was made to sign by one of the
Barangay Officials. He signed without reading what he
signed because he cannot read very well. After signing, the
members of the Barangay including the Barangay Captain,
brought him to the Municipal Building on the midnight of
May 12, 1997. Upon reaching the Municipal Building he was
brought to the Provincial Hospital where his wounds were
treated and [s]urtured [sic]. He was not however given
medicine. After one (1) hour he was returned to the
Municipal Building by the Barangay Officials. He was placed
inside the jail where he was mauled by around eight (8)
inmates. They were asking him where the child was, but he
told them he did not know. They were insisting that he admit
or to confess but he answered he did not know anything.
According to him 'marami pong pahirap na ginawa sa akin.
Mayruon pong koriente, mayruon pong saksak sa puwit'. He
could not talk because he was already 'hirap na hirap na'.
Such hurting acts were done several days, six (6) times a
day. His body was even pounded by a piece of wood hitting
him in his back because he was on a sitting position. He
could not speak because of the 'sobrang kirot ng katawan
ko.'
"He further declared that in the morning of May 11, 1997, he
was in the basket ball court watching the game. He came

from their house because it was the birthday of his mother.

They heard mass in Tikay. He is a Catholic, a Corsilista.
"The accused was candid enough to admit that the
signature appearing in Exh. M is his signature; that Atty.
Domingo is known to him because he was then the Mayor
of Malolos; that he hired or engaged the services of Atty.
Domingo; that he was also candid enough to testify that
'wala akong alam diyan.' His educational attainment was up
to Grade four (4) only. He claims that he does not know the
police investigator who typed the 'Sinumpaang Salaysay'
marked Exh. M." (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found the existence of enough circumstantial evidence
pointing to appellant as the culprit in the crime. It also found his
written extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence. As a
consequence, it convicted him of rape with homicide and imposed
upon him the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.9

97

Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo for the following alleged
errors:10
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in relying merely on the weight and
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution and the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confession of the accused contained in his Sworn
Statement made before the police authorities of Malolos,
Bulacan.
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not relying on the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence presented by the accused in
support of his defense.
"THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the

accused himself was the culprit behind the rape-slay of the
victim Brenda Candelaria, which finding and declaration
were based on surmi[s]es and conjectures.
"FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the
extrajudicial confession of the accused of May 14, 1997
(Exh. H) is admissible in evidence.

"TENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The trial court erred in not ordering the release of the
accused from confinement and detention."
The issues in this case can be compressed into two: (1) whether the
extrajudicial confession of appellant is admissible in evidence, and
(2) whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficiently proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling

"FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The appeal is meritorious.
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was
nothing irregular or objectionable in Atty. Domingo's
representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being
the local chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as
counsel for the accused.
"SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the
confession of the accused is considered valid and binding
upon said accused.
"SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not giving due credence to the
defense of the accused of denial which defense prevails
over and above the alleged circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution.
"EIGHT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentenced him
to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
damages.
"NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused of the
crime charged, with costs-de-oficio.

First Issue:
Extrajudicial Confession
Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of
Malolos arrested appellant while he was selling balut on the night of
May 11, 1997.11 He was subsequently brought to the Malolos Police
Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly
mauled.12 On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos
police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo
Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him.13 Upon the
advice of the mayor, Velarde's written extrajudicial confession was
taken. During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor
as counsel.14 Armed police officers were also present during the
investigation.15
Appellant was investigated by a PNP member of the Malolos Police
Station, SPO4 Edilberto Almazar, who testified as follows:
"Q:
Mr. Witness, you said that you are a police officer
of Malolos Police Station?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Since when have you been connected with that
station?
A:

Since February 9, 1982, sir.

Q:

Up to the present?

A;

Yes, sir.

A:
xxx

xxx

xxx

He was the one assisting Crispin Velarde, sir.16

Yet on cross, appellant stated:

If you know[?]

Q:
What time on May 14, 1997 did you meet that
Crispin Velarde?

Q:
Was Atty. Danilo Domingo the counsel or the lawyer
of the accused when you took his statement?

A:
time.

Court:

In the afternoon, sir. I cannot remember the exact

Co[ur]t:

A:

He was inside the jail, sir.

Q:

Municipality of what?

A:

Malolos, sir.

Q:

This jail, how far was it from the investigation room?

Base on your perception?

Q:

Where did you meet him?

A:

A:

No, sir.

At the Malolos Police Station, sir.

A:
Very near, sir. Just downstair because the police
station is located in the basement and the jail was located
upstairs.

Court:
Q:
Can you tell the Honorable Court the reason why
Crispin Velarde was in the Malolos Police Station?

What do you mean by 'No'

xxx

A:

He is the suspect in a Rape with Homicide case, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

A:

A:

We made investigations in his person, sir.

Q:
When you were conducting who was conducting
the investigation or the questioning?
A:

I, sir.

Q:
And who were the persons present while you were
interrogating or conducting investigation on Crispin
Velarde?
A:

Atty. Danilo Domingo, sir.

xxx

xxx

Q:

xxx

A:

I do not remember, sir.

xxx

Yes, Your Honor.

xxx

xxx

Atty. De Leon:

Atty. Villacorta:

I am asking now, who were present?

If he is not the counsel, what was he doing there?

A:
He learned about the incident that's why he talked to
the accused, sir.
Q:
Did you see Mayor Domingo talking to the accused
at the time this statement was being taken by you?
A:

Q:
Will you please tell the Honorable Court why Mayor
Danilo Domingo was present during the investigation of
Crispin Velarde?

Q:
But no relatives of Crispin Velarde were present
during the investigation?
That's how you can see it at that time?

A:

xxx

He is not the lawyer of Crispin Velarde, Your Honor.

Court:

Q:
What transpired during 98
your meeting with Crispin
Velarde at Malolos Police Station?

xxx

Yes, because the three of us were there, sir.

xxx

xxx

A:

Atty. Danilo Domingo and myself, sir.

Q:

How about other policemen?

A:

And the other police officers, sir.

Q:
Beside you, Atty. Domingo and the accused, there
were policemen present?

xxx

Q:
Before the statement was taken, where did Crispin
Velarde come from?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

How many?

A:
sir.

I cannot remember how many and who were they,

Q:
During the investigation, the policemen were armed
with weapons?
A:

Yes, sir."17

Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confession taken during the

investigation is inadmissible in evidence. We agree.
Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
"Any person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel."
The dead body of Brenda Candelaria was
found in the Municipality of
99
Guiguinto, Bulacan. But appellant, a resident of Barangay Tikay,
Municipality of Malolos was brought to and detained in the Malolos
Police Station, where he was investigated by the Malolos police.
Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as
an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time.
As such, he exercised "operational supervision and control"18 over
the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization
of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the
prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing
of offenders to justice.19
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his
responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and
tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as
counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of
"operational supervision and control" over the police. "What the
Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of
competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of
interest."20 Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place

where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel,

independent or otherwise, of appellant.

appellant. The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the
consequences of an extrajudicial confession.

In People v. Taliman,21 we ruled that a mayor cannot be considered

the independent lawyer referred to by the Constitution.

It is significant to point out that, during the cross-examination and

perhaps in total confusion, the investigator even went so far as to
state that Atty. Domingo had not acted as appellant's lawyer. If this
were so, then appellant had absolutely no counsel when his extrajudicial confession was taken.

"Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent

counsel for accused during their custodial investigation.
"In People vs. Culala, we held that the extrajudicial
confession of the accused-appellant was inadmissible as he
was 'assisted' by the incumbent municipal attorney.
In People vs. Bandula, we held that a municipal attorney
could not be an independent counsel as required by the
Constitution. We reasoned that as legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the
mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the maintenance of
peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether
he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused
without running into conflict of interests.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial

statements of the accused, how much more must we do so
now, given that it was the mayor himself, and not just the
provincial attorney, that assisted accused-appellants?"22
Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and
contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the
accused.23 The competent and independent lawyer so engaged
should be present "at all stages of the interview, counseling or
advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and
stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely
gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the
rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired."24
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the
independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution.
He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of

In whatever way we may look at the situation, it is clear that, in

palpable violation of the Constitution, appellant was not assisted by a
competent and independent counsel during the custodial
investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence,
the Court is duty-bound to disregard it.
"This Court x x x will always insist on the observance of
basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua
non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory
powers of government. The admonition given by this Court
to government officers, particularly those involved in law
enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case
of People v. Cuizon, where NBI agents mishandled a drug
bust operation and in so doing violated the constitutional
guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches
and seizures, is again called for and thus reiterated in the
case at bench, to wit:
"x x x. In the final analysis, we in the administration
of justice would have no right to expect ordinary
people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the
full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over
an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime
regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude condones lawbreaking in the name of law enforcement.
Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown
of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and within the

parameters set by the Constitution and the law.

Truly, the end never justifies the means.25
Second Issue:
Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if (a) there
is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences have been derived are proven, and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such that it produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one
another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn
therefrom must be that the accused is guilty. They must create a
solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable, that point
to the accused -- to the exclusion of others -- as the perpetrator of
the crime; and that sufficiently overcome thereby the presumption of
innocence in his or her favor.26
In this case, the prosecution presented the following pieces of
evidence to prove that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.
First, appellant was with Brenda on the morning of May 11,
100Highway between three
1997.27 They were also together on McArthur
and four o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, aboard a pedicab
coming from Industrial City and going south towards Manila.28

based on the circumstantial evidence which, though proven, remains

ambiguous.
The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is too full of
holes. The approximate time of death of Brenda has not been
established, other than that she died less than 24 hours before the
autopsy. Such evidence shows that she could have been killed on
the night of May 11, 1997 or on the early morning of May 12, 1997.
By that time appellant was already in custody and, hence, could not
have been the perpetrator. The records further allude to a tee shirt
found at the crime scene. Yet, the prosecution failed to present it and
have it identified. Had the police officers and the prosecution exerted
more effort in identifying its owner, a more direct link between the
crime and the perpetrator could have been established, and
reasonable doubts on his identity could have been eased.

ASIDE. Appellant Crispin Velarde y Bandojo is ACQUITTED on

reasonable doubt. He is ordered released immediately from custody
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement
this Decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days
from receipt hereof of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145566

March 9, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.

In case of doubt, the scales must be tipped in favor of the accused.

Circumstantial evidence as a basis for criminal conviction should be
weighed and accepted with great caution. Jurisprudence teaches
that it is preferable for the guilty to remain unpunished than for the
innocent to suffer unjustly36 -- in this case, to be sentenced to die by
lethal injection.

DECISION

Without the extrajudicial confession, the circumstantial evidence

becomes utterly insufficient to pass the test of moral certainty.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Second, around five thirty in the afternoon on May 11, 1997,

appellant was seen alone emerging from Jaycee Auto Repair Shop,
just beside Doa Pilar Homes.29 He looked haggard and had
disheveled hair.30
Third, Brenda's naked, lifeless body was found at six o'clock in the
morning on May 12, 1997, on a vacant lot in Doa Pilar Homes.31
The above set of circumstantial evidence is too general. It is also
consistent with the hypothesis that appellant is innocent. He cannot
be faulted for being seen with Brenda on a pedicab, since the
records show that the two of them are first cousins who live in the
same house.32 He cannot be faulted, either, for emerging near Doa
Pilar Homes,33 since the records show that he lives in Barangay
Tikay,34 at the back of which is Doa Pilar Homes.35As Prosecution
Witness Robles testified, she also lived in Barangay Tikay, yet she
waited for a jeepney in front of Doa Pilar Homes. Evidently, it is
natural for residents of Barangay Tikay to emerge in Doa Pilar
Homes and wait for a ride from there. Appellant cannot be convicted

Although the defense of appellant -- mere denial -- is weak, this fact

alone cannot justify his conviction. The burden is on the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on him to prove his
innocence. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the
conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the prosecution.37 The Court cannot
magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution's
failure to discharge the onus probandi.38
Although the prosecution adequately proved the crime of rape with
homicide in this case, it failed to establish the identity of the
perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we cannot sustain
appellant's conviction. The assault on the child is unpardonable, but
this Court must uphold the primacy of the constitutional presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused, when the evidence at hand
miserably falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.39
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 773-M-97 SET

On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the
supreme penalty of death.1
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of
rape with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997, as
follows:2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00
o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay,
Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, moved by lewd design and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal
knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of
age and with mental deficiency, against her will and

consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof,

purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance
of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack,
assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting
upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body
which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not
guilty." Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December
15, 1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some
drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and
the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence
located at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home101
about an hour later. On his
way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo
Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some thirty
meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota.4 Since he was used
to seeing them together on other occasions, he did not find anything
strange about this. He proceeded to his house.5
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family
was informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of
Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw
the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was
devastated by what he saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him
for his failure to protect his niece. He even attempted to take his own
life several days after the incident.6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a
motor launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by
SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of
the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio
during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by
Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao.
Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the
document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed
it.7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge
Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta.
Fe-Bantayan.8 On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted

on the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal

Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal
lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped.10 He
observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her
neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia.11 He
indicated the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to
asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and the
trunk.12
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in
evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in
evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession which he executed on
December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the confession
which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered
into.13 He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised
of his constitutional rights before the confession was taken from
him.14 Hence, his confession, and admissions made therein, should
be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on
custodial investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph
1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what
jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v.
Arizona.15 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and
the ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the
State.

The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial
investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can
and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to
talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel
present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda
doctrine was based on the leading case of People v.
Galit16 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,17 rulings subsequently incorporated
into the present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the 1987
Charter took on a modified form where the right to counsel was
specifically qualified to mean competent and independent counsel
preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel
likewise provided for stricter requirements compared to its American
counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of
counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial
investigation has evolved to provide for more stringent
standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona.
The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation
as the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems
to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal
suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the
suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial investigation to
elicit a confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23,
1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to
Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional
requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in
evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was
undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the
Constitution.18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself
expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such
rights.19 As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified
that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was
requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist
appellant.20 Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty.
Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that
before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement
taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio
even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood
freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer.21 Atty.
Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of
the present case.

Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of

appellant within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence
was presented to negate his competence and independence in
representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover,
appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice
of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation
is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest.22
We ruled in People v. Continente23 that while the choice of a lawyer
in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot
afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not
available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect
has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any
objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity
24
of the statement before the swearing officer.
102
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay,25 this Court held:
The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they
were properly apprised of their right to remain silent and
right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional
guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused
proceeded to the office of Atty. Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All
of the three accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay,
subscribed and swore to their respective written
confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot
reminded the three accused of their constitutional rights
under the Miranda doctrine and verified that their
statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also
translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan
dialect, to ensure that each accused understood the same
before signing it.

No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify

falsely against the accused. Their participation in these
cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties
as officers of the court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay's
allegation to the contrary, being self-serving, cannot prevail
over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested
witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically
cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied. These factors are clear indicia
that the confessions were voluntarily given.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are
such that they could not have been concocted by one who
did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of
maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is
unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists
showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the
confession is admissible against the declarant. There is
greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary
where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails
with the essential facts contained in such confession.
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each
of the accused gave the same detailed narration of the
manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This
clearly shows that their confessions could not have been
contrived. Surely, the three accused could not have given
such identical accounts of their participation and culpability
in the crime were it not the truth.
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon
appellant's apprehension by the police authorities violated
the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present;
and (2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the December 23,
1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant's confession
should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods were used at
the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid
confession later on by properly interrogating the subject under
different conditions and circumstances than those which prevailed
originally.26
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely,
voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in
full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par.
1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2

Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation,

explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect,
notably Cebuano, a language known to the appellant, viz:27
PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) : Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos
sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin ikaw gituhon nga adunay
kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong
paglugos kaniya. Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw
adunay katungod sa pagpakahilom ning maong
inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug
katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga
motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba
nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby
reminded that you are under investigation in which you were
suspected about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO.
Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent
about this investigation on you now and you have also the
right to have counsel of your own choice to assist you in this
investigation now. Have you understood everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Human ikaw sayri sa imong
katungod ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod sa
pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining
inbestigasyon karon kanimo? (After you have been apprised
of your rights under our Constitution to remain silent, do you
want to proceed this investigation on you now?)
TUBAG (QUESTION) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Gusto ba usab nimo ug
abogado nga makatabang kanimo ning maong
inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this
said investigation?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as
counsel of the affiant.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Ako usab ikaw
pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti karon dinhi
magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba
nimo kining tanan mo nga mga katungod nga walay
naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba ug
ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all
your statements now will be used as evidence against or in
your favor in any court of justice. Have you understood all

your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling

or promising a reward in the end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo (Yes.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Andam ka nga mohatag ug
libre ug boluntaryo nga pamahayag? (Are you now ready to
give your free and voluntary statement?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)

xxx

xxx

x x x.

The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he

was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his
right to counsel, as contained in such confession.28 Appellant was
properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial
confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and
acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan103
and Madredijos. Judge
Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the
extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He
subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his
statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of
Court were present as well as other people.29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the
rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is
admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving
credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was
threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial
confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession
which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses
the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
30

In People v. Pia, we held that "where appellants did not present

evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons;
where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged maltreatment; where there appears no marks of
violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves

examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these

should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions." The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing
officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly
maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of his confessions.31 To hold otherwise
is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation
of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any
proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another
indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession
which could have been known only to the declarant.32
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is
tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his
claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving
claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly
executed.33 Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the
presumption.34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether
the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed.35 In
cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of
voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine
the probative weight of the confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's
confession remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent
evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement
officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of
his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the
paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective
administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to
the Mirandadoctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by
police authorities is central to the criminal justice
system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without
exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional
requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in
evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability
made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous
tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.

Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite
the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his
Brief, he argues that the evidence against him is insufficient to
warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape,
coupled with the corpus delicti as established by the Medico-Legal
Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other
conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco
on December 15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty and must
therefore be sustained.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant
admitted to killing the victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a
homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical
evidence further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the
victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum of proof required by
law for conviction. No estimated time of death was given, which is
essential in making a connection with the appellant's story that he
went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the victim
were headed towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of
December 15, 1996 until the time when the victim's lifeless body was
found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a time
variance of between six to seven hours. Although the circumstances
may point to the appellant as the most likely perpetrator of the
homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken chain of events
which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant was
guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the
reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the death of
Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the victim when she
shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was
cardio-respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries;
she was strangled to death and left on the seashore as manifested
by the frothing in her lungs. No physical, scientific or DNA evidence
was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the
victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have determined who
committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape
with homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence which
thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special
complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory
rape, the victim Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old. The
sexual assault was necessarily included in the special complex crime
charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the
victim. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded upon

the finding of the fact of rape.36 Moral damages in the amount of

P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof in accordance with current jurisprudence.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dindo Mojello is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199877

August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*

104
DECISION

REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA
affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with
homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and
confederating together with one unidentified person who is still atlarge, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money amounting
to P 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied

Services, Inc. represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the

occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Laras plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution
presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1
Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San
Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001
and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount
of P 230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to
defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to
the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio
Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista);
(d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately
left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at
the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara
suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag,
nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag
mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the bag in
Bautistas direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted
from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while
firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up,
he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San
Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the
pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and
saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that
Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when
barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for investigation; (n)
on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig
City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San
Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter
arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob
identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastians money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit
of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55 in the evening of

June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him
that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police
officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw
Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara and
invited him for questioning; (e) at the police station, Lara was placed
in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong,
Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was informed of
his rights and subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal
Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) on May 31,
2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with
three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d)
upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to
respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty
shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his
investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police
station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview
Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the
incident.7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided
at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he
was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo,
was constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in
the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at
around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his
cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara;
(e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked
him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with
them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You
are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another
place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police station
and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was
investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police
that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police
challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived
at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the
following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up holding a name
plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at
uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the following day,
they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.8

To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors,

Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May 31, 2001, while she
was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench
from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon.9 Lara also
presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was
working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with
homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
294 (1) as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the
sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php230,000.00
representing the money carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12

105

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended

his conviction. First, that he was arrested without a warrant under
circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void
all proceedings including those that led to his conviction. Second, he
was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up
to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of
custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who
actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely
presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the
bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that
Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave
during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the
perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his
unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the
money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction
was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in
discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that
they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their
testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve.
While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does
not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.

The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecutions witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified
accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted away the payroll
money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at
around 10:30 oclock in the morning along the corner of Mercedez
and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista
which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As
repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper, an
accused must show he was at some other place for such a period of
time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
at the time of the commission of the crime" (People versus Bano,
419 SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of the distance between
the place of the incident and the residence of the accused where he
allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same
barangay. The positive identification of the accused which were
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial
of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA
259).13 (Emphasis supplied)

The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was supposedly

arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate
the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated
invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest
should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the
accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that
the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside
conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently
establishes culpability:
Appellants avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the
court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant
is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is

estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest since he never

raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the
Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if
illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those
leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor
can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on record point to their culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is
inadmissible as his right to counsel was violated, the CA ruled that
there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police
line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation.
Appellants assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the
time he was identified in a police line-up and therefore had the right
to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule
that an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police
line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial
investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been
the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. In the
case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by
prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the
purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was
interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted
from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to appellants hollow cry that
he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard
fact that during the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet
commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation
sans counsel during the police line-up, it does not in any way affect
his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted
based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions failure to
present a witness who actually saw him commit the crime charged as
follows:

Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the

prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he shot the victim
and took the money.

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag

and ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody shoot a gun?

A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.
x x x x x x"

Q Who was firing the gun?

Such posture is unpersuasive.
A The one who held-up us, sir.
Contrary to appellants assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong
actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim. Sumulong vividly
recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act
was there any other words spoken by this person?

"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or
happened after you stepped down from the Nissan pick-up,
that is correct?

Q By how, do you know his name?

A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.
A No, sir.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to
recognize him?

Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already

proceeding towards that store to call your office by phone,
that is correct?

A Yes, sir.

A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.

Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize

him?

Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra

when you heard this gunfire?

Q Where were you looking when this person approached

you?

A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.

Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court

whether indeed the person you saw holding you up at that
time is in court?

Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the

back of the vehicle, that is correct?

A There was, sir.

Q What did he say?

106
A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?

A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle,

he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.

Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify

him?

Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this

alleged holdup(p)er followed him?

Interpreter:

A Yes, sir.

The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first

bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and black
pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).

Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.

Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the
vehicle and ran away with it, what did the accused do? (sic)

A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.

A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to
him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to
give the money or the bag so I immediately threw away the
bag at the back seat, sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person standing by
your car window?
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing
money to the back of the vehicle, what did that person do?

Q Around how many shots according to your recollection

were fired?

Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?

Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the
gun because he was holding the gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."

xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to
prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun
at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce
the bag containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the
bag to the victim who
107
was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six
deformed empty shells.16 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Laras alibi failed to convince. Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive
identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent,
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants,
whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.

All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired
and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of
access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed to prove
the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the
time of the perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted that
his house was just a stones throw (about three minutes away) from
the crime scene.17 (Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the
appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua and the
parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs.
Both parties waived their right to do so, stating that they would adopt
the allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Laras conviction for robbery with homicide
gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and
Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Laras supposedly illegal arrest may be raised
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Laras alibi can be given credence so as to
exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through
compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his

voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or

to the court.19 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits
to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and
participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient
ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a
complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.21 As Section
9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i)
of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with counsel when
he was placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings
leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without
the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulongs identification of
Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at
the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to
stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the
custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in
the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of
People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the

accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part

of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police
line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the lineup.23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of
guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial evidence. The CA
allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not
circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of
direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each
other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.24

while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger
seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing the
money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to
Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when
Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of
the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his
gun at Bautistas direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot
wounds; and (g) Bautistas blood was on the crime scene and empty
shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal
property with intent to gain must itself be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It
must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was
robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is
not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob
and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

108
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal
Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs positive

narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at him and demanded
that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara
resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven
by Sumulongs testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the
direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order
to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of

the crime for which he is charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence
is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the
community.25

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of
a street. Thus, where considerations of visibility are favorable and
the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or
her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally
accepted.27

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by

the evidence for the prosecution strongly indicate Laras guilt: (a)
while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding
was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he
appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b)

Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that

Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious motives to impute
upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his
testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is
worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an

accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural

order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of
good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the
former.28
IV
In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA was
correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense.
Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and
difficult to disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough
to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the offense
was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so
far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported
by clear and convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of the crime
wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Laras claim and that of his
witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the
incident, it is possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him
leaving and returning given that the distance between his house and
the place where the subject incident took place can be negotiated,
even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.