Mun Corp Case 2

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083.

May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest
number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to
the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held
to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati
City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective
office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec.
40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers
to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an
oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government
and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid
or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.
The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere
with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of

respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt
of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. DefensorSantiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Coquilla vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship;
Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras,
Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965,
when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen
after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although
he continued making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A.
No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000,
he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a
voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was
approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for reelection sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two
year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation
as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as
a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections
commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On
July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held

Mun Corp Case 2

on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
two years at the time he filed such certificate is not
true. The question is whether the COMELEC was
justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a
false statement concerning a candidates qualification for
an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying
the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.
The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in
this case is thus fully justified.

Papandayan, Jr. vs COMELEC [381

SCRA 133]
(Municipal Corporation, Qualification of Elective Officials,
Residence)
Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the
position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner
Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor
seeking reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the
disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a
resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a
permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in
1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed
there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an
agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he filed in 1998 his COC for the
position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
declaring him disqualified in a resolution, on the ground that he is not
a resident of Tubaran.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective
official.
Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was
formerly a resident of Bayang, he later transferred residence to
Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence
therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160)
provides that an elective official must be a resident therein
(barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the election
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used
in election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business, pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.
Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2)
an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi.

Torayno vs COMELEC GR No
137329 09 August 2000
Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental
for three terms until 1995 election and his certificate of candidacy
showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14
June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration record
in Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis
Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for
mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the preceding
two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr
filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the
residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed
winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of Emano.
COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency
requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed.
Emano was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de
Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest
will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest
effect. Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while
discharging his duties as governor and even paid his community tax
certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent
the possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of the community from seeing an elective office to serve that
community.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157526. April 28, 2004]
EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157527. April 28, 2004]
SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When a mayoral candidate who gathered the highest number of votes
is disqualified after the election is held, a permanent vacancy is
created, and the vice mayor succeeds to the position.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions for Certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the March 19, 2003
En Banc Resolution issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) in SPA No. 01-272. The Comelec resolved therein to
disqualify Salvador K. Moll from the mayoralty of Malinao, Albay,
and to proclaim Avelino Ceriola as the mayor-elect of the said
municipality. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. It is affirmed that private respondent Salvador K. Moll
is DISQUALIFIED from holding the office of the Mayor of
Malinao, Albay. His proclamation as the winning candidate for such
office is declared VOID AB INITIO. Consequently, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Albay is directed to immediately convene the
municipal board of canvassers of Malinao, Albay and PROCLAIM
petitioner Avelino Ceriola as the Mayor-Elect of the municipality.1[1]
In GR No. 157526, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare seeks the
nullification of the March 19, 2003 Resolution insofar as it authorized
the proclamation of Ceriola as the mayor-elect of Malinao. In GR No.

Mun Corp Case 2

157527, Petitioner Moll prays for the annulment of the entire
Resolution.

2.)
If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should
become the mayor -- Ceriola, the second placer in the mayoral
election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor?

The Facts
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner Moll and Private Respondent Ceriola were candidates for
mayor of the Municipality of Malinao, Albay, during the elections of
May 14, 2001.
Moll obtained the highest number of votes cast for the position while
Ceriola came in second, with a total of nine hundred eighty-seven
(987) votes separating the two. Kare was elected vice mayor in the
same election.
On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a Petition to Confirm the
Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of Dindo K. Moll to Run for Any
Elective Position. The Petition alleged that the latter had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision
correccional, for the crime of usurpation of authority or official
functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
In its May 28, 2001 Resolution,2[2] the Comelec First Division
dismissed the Petition. Ceriola filed his Motion for Reconsideration
with the Comelec en banc which, on August 31, 2001, set aside the
said Resolution. It thereafter directed the clerk of the Comelec to
remand the Petition to the provincial election supervisor of Albay for
hearing and reception of evidence.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
On March 19, 2003, after the provincial election supervisor of Albay
submitted the report and recommendation, the Comelec en banc
issued the questioned Resolution affirming Molls disqualification and
proclaiming Ceriola as the mayor-elect of the municipality.

The Petition in GR No. 157526 is partly meritorious, but the Petition

in GR No. 157527 has no merit.
First Issue:
Disqualification
Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor,
since his judgement of conviction5[5] -- the basis of his
disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. He contends
that while the said judgment promulgated on May 11, 1999 was not
appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course of the
proceedings, he still filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May
28, 1999 within the reglementary period.6[6] Thus, according to him,
the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.
We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads thus:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may,
upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused
has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
(Italics supplied)
In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:

As earlier adverted to, the Comelec ruled that Moll had indeed been
disqualified from being a mayoral candidate in the May 14, 2001
local election, and that his subsequent proclamation as mayor was
void ab initio. Consequently, he was disqualified from holding that
office.

Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within

fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice
of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal
shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time
the balance of the period begins to run. (Italics supplied)

The Comelec further ruled that the trial courts final judgment of
conviction of Moll disqualified him from filing his certificate of
candidacy and continued to disqualify him from holding office.
Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes,
and Ceriola -- the candidate who had obtained the second highest
number of votes -- was adjudged the winner. Thus, the Comelec
ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim him as the
mayor-elect of the municipality.

It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of

either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll
makes it appear that his filing of a motion for reconsideration should
have stayed the running of the period for filing an appeal. What he
did file, however, was a Motion to Quash the Information; and when
it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial.

Before Ceriolas actual proclamation, Kare filed a Petition before this

Court with a prayer for a Status Quo Order, which was granted on
April 1, 2003.3[3] In this Order, the Comelec, the provincial election
supervisor of Albay, and the municipal canvassers of Malinao
(Albay) were required to observe the status quo prevailing before the
filing of the Petition.
The other Petition was filed by Moll.4[4]
The Issues
After going through the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the
Court has determined that the following are the two issues that have
to be resolved:
1.Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the
position of mayor?

The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within

fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice
of the final order appealed from. It necessarily follows that this
period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
of the judgment or of the final order being appealed.
Neither Molls Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for
Reconsideration was directed at the judgment of conviction. Rather,
they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they
cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in
relation to the conviction.
Moll himself admitted that no regular appeal was filed because he
was still questioning the propriety of the denial of his Motion to
Quash the Information and the propriety of the conduct of the
promulgation of his sentence despite his absence x x x. 7[7] Aside
from not interrupting his judgment of conviction, the motion to quash
was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be filed by the accused

Mun Corp Case 2

at any time before entering a plea8[8] and certainly not on the day of
the promulgation, as Moll did.

obtained the highest number of valid votes, is entitled to be

proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate.11[11]

As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid

because it was done in his absence, we agree with the Office of the
Solicitor General, which argues as follows:

Further, it said:

It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation,

in fact his counsel was present on the day of the promulgation - to file
a motion to quash. Hence, because of Molls unexplained absence, the
promulgation of the judgment could be validly made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his
last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of
Court).9[9]
Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by
Moll, the judgment against him has become final.10[10] Thus, the
Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from
running for mayor, under Section 40(a) of the Local Government
Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
xxx

xxx

x x x As such, this instance constitutes an exception to the general

rule enunciated in the Sunga Case. In the language of the said case,
the foregoing provision of law is a statute which clearly asserts a
legislative policy contrary to the rule that the candidate with the
second highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner, given
that the votes for the disqualified candidate, though of highest
number, are deemed stray and invalid. Consequently, the so-called
second placer shall be declared the winner because he or she in fact
obtained the highest number of valid votes.12[12]
Such arguments do not persuade.
In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount
consideration, and their expressed will must at all times be given
effect.13[13] When the majority speaks by giving a candidate the
highest number of votes in the election for an office, no one else can
be declared elected in place of the former.14[14] In a long line of
cases, this Court has definitively ruled that the Comelec cannot
proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, should the winning candidate be declared ineligible
or disqualified.15[15]
The Comelec, however, asserts that this case falls under the exception
declared by the Court in Sunga v. Comelec,16[16] from which we
quote:

x x x.

Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a
penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective
local position.
Second Issue:

x x x The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to

install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.17[17]

The Lawful Mayor

In allowing Ceriola -- the second placer in the mayoralty race -- to be
proclaimed mayor-elect after the disqualification of Moll, the
Comelec applied Section 211(24) of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), which provides:
Sec. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and
appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid
unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board
of election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in
mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the
voters will:
xxx

xxx

xxx

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified
by final judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be
counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
The poll body interpreted the phrase disqualified by final judgment to
mean disqualification by a final judgment of conviction, which was
the ground upon which Moll was disqualified. It ruled:

According to the Comelec, Section 211(24) of the OEC is a clear

legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the second placer
cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelecs Decision to
declare the second placer as winner in the mayoral race should be
read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof,
as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:
Sec. 72.Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not

11

In this case, the disqualification is based specifically on the final

judgment of conviction by a court against private respondent. This
final judgment disqualified private respondent from filing his
certificate of candidacy in the first instance, and continues to
disqualify private respondent from holding office. Accordingly, the
votes cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes and the general rule
in the Sunga Case does not apply. Consequently, petitioner, having

12

15

16

10

17

13
14

Mun Corp Case 2

declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall
not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office." (Italics
supplied)
When read together, these provisions are understood to mean that any
vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already
been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be
considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by
limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by
conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other grounds for
disqualification.18[18] It escapes us why the Comelec insists that
Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final
judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other
provisions of the election code.
More important, it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that
the Comelec en banc issued Resolution No. SPA No. 01-272. The
Resolution adopted the recommendation of the provincial election
supervisor of Albay to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral
candidate in Malinao, Albay. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the
electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he
was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed to the
subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his
disqualification.
A subsequent finding by the Comelec en banc that Moll was
ineligible cannot retroact to the date of the election and thereby
invalidate the votes cast for him.19[19]
Moreover, Moll was not notoriously known to the public as an
ineligible candidate. As discussed above, the Resolution declaring
him as such was rendered long after the election. Thus, on the part of
those who voted for him, their votes are presumed to have been cast
with a sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, and without
any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, their votes cannot be
treated as stray, void, or meaningless.20[20]
The Comelecs interpretation of a section in the OEC cannot supplant
an accepted doctrine laid down by this Court. In Aquino v. Comelec,21
[21] we said:
x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality
of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are
not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances. 22
[22]
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the
mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise
them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance
and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect
officials of their choice.23[23]

Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a
case, it would be absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate
as the voters choice. Moreover, there are instances in which the votes
received by the second placer may not be considered numerically
insignificant. In such situations, if the equation changes because of
the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, voters preferences
would nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable that the results for
qualified candidates would not be self-evident. 24[24] The absence of
the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead
to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer.25[25]
Where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a majority or a
plurality of the votes, by no mathematical formulation can the
runnerup in the election be construed to have obtained the majority or
the plurality of votes cast.26[26]
We reiterate that this Court has no authority under any law to impose
upon and compel the people of Malinao, Albay, to accept Ceriola as
their mayor.27[27] The law on succession under Section 44 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
would then apply. This provision relevantly states:
SECTION 44.Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor,
vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an

elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it
admits no room for interpretation, but merely for application. 28[28]
Accordingly, when Moll was adjudged to be disqualified, a
permanent vacancy was created for failure of the elected mayor to
qualify for the office.29[29] In such eventuality, the duly elected vice
mayor shall succeed as provided by law.30[30]
For violating the law and the clear jurisprudence on this matter, the
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion. 31[31]
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No 157526 is PARTLY
GRANTED, and the assailed Resolution MODIFIED. Petitioner
Salvador K. Moll is DECLARED ineligible for the position of
municipal mayor of Malinao, Albay. In view of the vacancy created

24
25

18

26

19

27

20

28

21

29

22

30

23

31

Mun Corp Case 2

in that office, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare, the duly elected vice
mayor, shall succeed as mayor, following the rule on succession. The
status quo order of this Court dated April 1, 2003, is made permanent.
Petitioner Kare shall continue discharging the duties and powers of
the mayor of Malinao, Albay. The Petition in GR 157527 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.