Is There A Bilingual Mind?
Is There A Bilingual Mind?
Is There A Bilingual Mind?
Since the very beginning of the study of human cognitive development, language
has been closely associated with almost all aspects of human condition. Many
linguistic formulations have repeatedly pointed out the importance of naming
or the power of logos (word) as the process by which reality and other
impressions become organized into units of systems, concepts, or categories.
Indeed, the process of naming, which is one of the important aspects of language,
transforms the world of sense impression, which the animals also possess, into
a mental world, a world of ideas and meanings (Cassirer, 1953, p. 28). Once
accomplished, the individual is able to transcend the limitation of time and space
(Ginsburg & Opper, 1969; Piaget, 1980) and venture into the world of thoughts
and mental creations.
We see this transforming process in operation from the very beginning in the
lives of children while learning to code their experiences, beginning with an
unintelligible, nonsense babbling to a defined utterance. We are reminded of the
tremendous joy experienced by parents when hearing the first utterance from
their childdada, mom, baby, chair, spoon, the doggy, milk. It
is quite an awesome experience to observe very young children attempting to
communicate even nonverbally and, judging from Figure 2.1, quite effectively.
It demonstrates the powerful and ingenious ways the intention to communicate
finds expressions even when verbal skills are still at an embryonic stage.
At a later point, more complex sentences are uttered and the childs increasing
awareness of complex sentence construction becomes evident. According to
Clark (1978), children provide evidence of linguistic awareness at a very early
age. First, they are able to repair their own speech, then they are able to correct
the utterances of others, and finally they are able to provide an explanation as to
why certain sentences are possible and how they should be interpreted (Galambos
& Goldin-Meadow, 1990). According to these authors, this ability to verbalize
metalinguistic judgments is not accomplished until the age of 6. By age 4,
however, children already show sensitivity to linguistic markers in spontaneous
repairs of their own speech (Galambos & Goldin-Meadow, 1990; Karmiloff-
Smith, 1986). The progressive development of metalinguistic awareness observed
in children reflects the increasing sophistication and maturation of brain
functioning and the childs enormous capacity for the organization of perception
and experiences of various kinds. The development of categories and complex
memories are then possible, leading to abstract concept formation. It is then
possible for experience to be organized and internalized, to become, later on, a
point of reference for the understanding and the processing of future experiences
21
22 2. Is There a Bilingual Mind?
(Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975; Sullivan, 1953). The resulting enduring
patterns of organization of these experiences along linguistic dimensions become
part of the individuals cognitive structure that then guide the individuals overall
function throughout its life.
The importance of this cognitive progression is highlighted, among others,
by Piaget (Ginsburg & Opper, 1969; Piaget, 1980, 1995) and Vygotsky
(1962) in their theories of cognitive development. According to Vygotsky, for
instance, the abstract and symbolic aspects of language (the world of ideas and
meanings) make possible the systematization and organization of experiences
into categories. It is a verbal mediation position that views language as deter-
mining, mediating and thought-producing (Bucci, 1997). Following this line of
thinking, Luria and Yudovich (1968) suggested that the most refined expression
of the organizing and regulatory effects of language is observed in the way
language tends to regulate and categorize the persons behavior. But language
also tends to express and reflect the quality of internal organization. It was in this
context that assessing the individuals internal cognitive, emotional, and belief
patterns became essential in Albert Elliss work on the individuals belief system
(2001) and in Freuds analysis of linguistic contents (1940).
Underlying Luria and Yudovichs formulations is the idea that different catego-
rizations and organizations of the experience may take place with different
languages. That is, different cognitive and affective activities may be activated
by or may be associated with different languages, depending upon the inherent
qualities of these languages. Such formulation found some validation in the works
of Whorf (1956), Ervin, (1964), Marcos, Alpert, Urcuyo, and Kesselman (1973)
The Bilingual Process in the Context of the Cognitive Development 23
and others. Whorf, for instance, concluded from his comparative study between the
Hopi and European languages, including French and English, that the qualities of
a language have a determining effect on the way people organize their perception
and interpret the world around them. Thus, he discovered that the language of the
Hopi processes the idea of time and space very differently than does the English
language. He, then, concluded that these linguistic differences must have a direct
bearing on the way the speakers of these languages perceive and interpret the world
(Weltanschauung). This is what is known as the SapirWhorfs hypothesis. It is
a linguistic determinism but with a dialectical paradigm that suggests that as one
thinks so one feels and as one feels so one thinks. Once words have been created
to refer to an experience (e.g., time, space, different kinds of snow) these concepts
then acquire an organizing power that guides the individuals cognitive process.
Thus, the individual is forced to sacrifice whatever variation to the perception that
the agreed-upon word is supposed to elicit in order to ensure some level of commu-
nication with members of its group. An example of this could be the word apple
that could mean a green or a red apple, an apple that is small and bitter or juicy and
sweet, depending on the individuals experience with apples in the context of his or
her cultural and linguistic group membership. Thus, saying that I just ate a apple,
may elicit in the listener only the apple of his or her experience, not necessarily
the intended message of the speaker, unless additional information is provided.
Studies frequently cited in support of SapirWhorfs hypothesis are studies
by Ervin (1964), Kolers (1968), and others. Ervin, for instance, observed in
her study of thematic apperception test (TAT) cards that her FrenchEnglish
subjects responded differently in the two languages. Responses to the TAT cards
in English expressed more achievement themes; responses in French, on the
other hand, contained stories with themes involving verbal aggression against
peers, autonomy, and withdrawal from others. Similarly, Kolers (1968) and
Krapf (1955) observed that different sets of associations, mental representations,
memories, and affective responses were elicited in their subjects depending upon
the language utilized.
its needs (e.g., hunger, physical pain, need for warmth, protection, to have its
surrounding explained) and different feelings (e.g., wonderment, feeling of well-
being, love, happiness, sadness, discomfort) develops specific linguistic modes of
organizing and categorizing these experiences. These organizations and catego-
rizations remain closely connected to the language of the interaction; by that I
mean that the unique linguistic (monolingual) characteristics of the family unit
where the child grows become encoded in the childs language. What happens,
then, when this child now goes to another situation (such as school) where a
different language is now utilized for learning and organizing experiences that
occur in that context? What happens to these linguistic-specific organizations and
categorizations with regard to the whole communication process? Eventually,
the child develops ways to organize the different learnings coming from the
different sources into its cognitive structure.
What is clear is that the categorization of the experience in the
bilingual context and the resulting cognitive structure brings about additional
challenges/opportunities to the bilingual individual, not only at the initial stage
of language learning but throughout his or her dealing with the world. The
understanding of this phenomenon is even further complicated by the fact that
not all experiences can be coded linguistically since some of the experiences
can remain organized at a prelinguistic or presymbolic level. This is particularly
the case for experiences occurring before the symbolic nature of language is
developed and acquires the organizing capacity that is possible under a more
mature neurological/physiological development. We have seen this phenomenon
in operation when a bilingual person is unable to communicate an experience
in either language and is left with a general feeling that there is something that
cannot be totally and fully expressed in any of the languages. We will come
back to this issue when we discuss the role of language in the psychological and
emotional development in Chapter 8.
In her recent manuscript Constructive processes in bilingualism and their
cognitive growth effects Johnson (2000) offers a sophisticated paradigm that
seeks to explain the process referred to above in what pertains to the complexity
of bilingualism in the context of the whole cognitive process. Following
a dialecticalconstructive theory, she suggests that the child organizes its
experiences in knowledge structures that follow very specific organization.
She distinguishes three basic sorts of knowledge structures that organize the
individuals basic cognitive structure: infralogical, logological, and linguistic
structures. Infralogical structures are particular-experiential structures or
structures of the life-world with strong reference to what, I later refer to as,
the first level of experience organization or experience related to the sensory
motor dimension (Figure 2.2). They are the substance of experience and represent
actual objects or things in the environment. According to Johnson, they also
include internal representations for distal objects whether they are organized as
prototypes, scripts, or schemas. These structures organize the world senses or
the concrete physical experiences the child has with its immediate environment.
When the particular-experiential structures (infralogical structures) are
The Bilingual Process in the Context of the Cognitive Development 25
Linguistic Organization:
From Pre-symbolic to Symbolic Levels to Speech
Processing/Organization
of Visual, Auditory,
Tactile, Olfactory,
Gustatory, Cutaneous-
Kinesthetic Information Development of
Non-linguistic
Memories
Categorization of
Experiences along
Sensory-motor Dimension
(Development of Sensory-
Motor Schemes)
Syntactical/Semantic/
Grammatical Ordering of
the Linguistic Content
Narrative Speech
Task executives monitor the individuals interaction with the environment, while
control executives monitor the organismic internal resources or the allocation
of cognitive capacities, such as mental attention. Infralogical executives tend to
be situation-bound while logological executives are more genetic in nature and
hence applicable across contexts.
The importance of Johnsons analysis is that it places linguistic development as
part of the development of more comprehensive cognitive structures that provide
the individuals with the necessary tools to respond to different challenges. As
summarized by Johnson (2000),
of the language sites in the brain, the maturity of the vocal cords and mouth
apparatus, the development of the ability to categorize perceptions of various
kinds, etc. (Fagen & Prigot, 1993; Luria, 1973, 1981). Thus, at the beginning
a child tends to look around its surroundings and eventually begins to babble
and repeat sounds made by those around it. At the end, the child learns to say
specific words and simple sentences related to its immediate survival (milk,
mom, dad, mom, milk, my tomy hurts, etc.) with more and more clarity.
With the locomotor development (kicking response and the capacity to crawl
and then walk), the child develops an array of physical reactions to stimuli in the
environment [the kicking response studied by Fagen (1980) and Fagen and his
team (1984, 1985, 1990, 2001) in response to different presentation schedules
of specific stimuli]. It later starts to venture into other areas that had, up to that
point, only been accessible in the context of its interaction with the mother and
others who would have carried the child from places to places as they went about
their business; and thus begins the process of cognitive/emotional independence
(Mahler et al. 1975). It is at this point that the child, although relying, for the
most part, on infralogical structures to organize its experience, it also begins to
organize its experience in ways that can be stored in memory (object constancy)
and categorized at a more abstract mode. This is what Johnson refers to as
the beginning of experience organization along the dimension of logological
structures. Affects are thus developed in this context and become intimately
interconnected with the cognitive development, becoming part of the progressive
organization of behavior. This process was amply described by Piaget in his
description of the cognitive/affective development of the child (Ginsburg &
Opper, 1969; Piaget, 1954, 1995) and Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975) in
what pertains to the emotional development in the book The Psychological Birth
of the Child.
The role of language in the organization of experience was also eloquently
described by Sullivan (1953) in his description of the nature of the human
experience. His description has some similarities to the one provided by Johnson
discussed above, although he was more interested in a description of experience
in terms of the emotional development and the development of the personality
than a cognitive development. According to Sullivan, experiences are organized
along three basic dimensions: the prototaxic, parataxic and syntaxic modes
(Figure 2.3). Prototaxic refers to an experience that occurs before symbols are
MODES OF EXPERIENCE
the languages pre-wired in the bilingual individual and what parts of the brain
are pre-selected for the operation of the bilinguals two languages? How can
Chomskys formulation explain the findings discussed later in this chapter, that
different parts of the brain are involved in language function in bilinguals as a
function of when in their development the languages were learned and the level
of linguistic proficient acquired? In fact, Chomskys formulation has been criti-
cized as not comprehensive enough to explain all important aspects of language
(Bucci, 1977), and this is particularly the case when referring to bilingualism.
Vygotskys linguistic mediation paradigm (1962) emphasizes, on the other hand,
the more dynamic aspects of language. He suggests that language mediates and
determines human behavior and all cognitive processes. Mental development is
seen as the result of word meanings that come to dominate all human mental
processes (Rieber & Wollock, 1997).
In the final analysis, language can only be the product of an interactive and
dynamic process combining inherent linguistic and cognitive qualities with the
individuals desire to communicate, in the context of the personal and interper-
sonal realm. Or, as further delineated by Bucci (1997), communicative language
arises from application of general cognitive capacities to the function of commu-
nication over vocal and auditory channels (p. 79). And the fact that we have
evidence, in the works of Ervin (1964) and Ervin and Osgood (1954) referred
to earlier, that language also tends to mediate perception, confirms the need to
maintain a view of language that incorporates these different perspectives.
What make language so powerful are the symbolic complexities that are
possible and that eventually result in the transmission of a thought. A thought is a
solidification of an intricate process, resulting in the development of an organized
schema that encapsulates an experience or set of experiences, an idea or set of
ideas, a feeling or set of feelings, etc. According to Bucci (1997), symbols
are entities that refers to other entities and have the capacity to be combined in
rule-governed way, so that infinite array of meaningful units can be generated
from a finite set of elements (p. 77). Once the symbols are generated, they
function as organizing principles of experience. Thus, images, visual stimuli,
and words can then serve as a guiding force for specific experiences (Fagen &
Prigot, 1993; Ginsburg & Opper, 1969; Javier & Marcos, 1989).
In the case of bilingual individuals, the symbolic complexities of language
become even more powerful. We may be able to visualize the complexity of the
bilingual process by imagining a linguistic organization side by side to the one
depicted in Figure 2.2. The one depicted in this figure describes a monolingual
process. In the bilingual process, we assume that two languages are expected to
become involved in the cognitive process, even in the prelinguistic organization
level, but more clearly so from the first level of linguistic organization on. We
suspect that the extent to which the bilinguals languages will operate more or
less independently from one another with regard to these different aspects of
language depicted in Figure 2.2 is a function of when and how the two languages
are acquired and organized, the level of proficiency in the two languages, and
the language function under consideration (Johnson, 2000).
Evidence of the Bilingual Mind? 31
1. Cerebellum
2. Cerebrum
3. Frontal lobes
4. Motor area
5. Brocas area
6. Parietal lobes
7. Sensory areas
8. Occipital lobes
9. Temporal lobes
Published by the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke. Retrieved from
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/brain_basics/know_your_brain.htm on 11/24/2006
Figure 2.4. The architecture of the Brain.
Evidence of the Bilingual Mind? 33
the different parts of the brain that we will be referring to in the context of our
discussion. It is a cross-section showing the left part of the brain.) For instance,
Ojemann and Whitaker (1978) found that the sites in the center of the speech
areas were involved in both languages, while sites in the frontal and parietal
cortex were involved in only one of the languages. These authors employed a
cortical electrical stimulation technique, placing electrodes in the various parts
of the brain for the purpose of assessing the extent of naming disruption in two
bilingual subjects.
They found that the right hemisphere was involved in naming in one of
the subjects. A differential brain localization was also observed in Chinese
English bilinguals by Rapport, Tan, and Whitaker (1983) in a study discussed by
Centeno and Obler (2001). Using cortical electrical stimulation, they observed
that language functions were differentially localized along the left perisylvian
area. Paradis (1993, 2004) later suggested that these findings are suspicious
because the language-specific areas reported only covered the periphery of the
language zone and it might be that the stimulation utilized interfered with
language only some of the times, with the electrode field falling just outside
the language zone at other times. Similarly, it can be said that the findings
reported by Albert and Obler (1978), that different aphasic conditions were
found in their subjects, were a function of a differential recovery pattern. He
explains the different recovery patterns that are observed in aphasic patients as
being a function of two kinds of memories that tend to guide language function:
declarative and procedural memories. Declarative (explicit) memory structure
is more prevalent in second language function and is bilaterally represented.
According to Paradis (1993), the fact that declarative memory is more impacted
by age and some brain deterioration (such as in Alzheimers disease) may explain
the differential language behavior observed in bilingual individuals in these
contexts.
Studies on bilingual memory provide us with important information regarding
the question of the bilingual mind. For instance, some studies on memory
storage in bilinguals indicate that bilingual memory may be represented by two
functionally independent storage and retrieval systems, one for each language
(Kolers, 1963; Tulving & Calotta, 1970). Others support an interdependence
storage and suggest that all information exists in a single memory storage (Lopez
& Young, 1974; Thorson, 1980). A more comprehensive explanation on the
way information is stored was offered by Hines (1978). He concluded from
his study that the situation is far more complex that the interdependent or
independent models would suggest. Within a given persons memory, infor-
mation may be stored in both an independent and an interdependent manner,
depending on the type of memory representation (e.g., orthographic, phonemic,
or semantic) that is being examined .all bilinguals, regardless of the nature
of their second language learning experiences, would share a common memory
structure with semantic representations being interdependent and orthographic
and phonemic representations being independent (pp. 2324). Hines even postu-
lated a unitary common memory structure shared by both languages, with
34 2. Is There a Bilingual Mind?
We can tentatively conclude from all these findings that there is some evidence
supporting the view that a bilingual individual does tend to process information
differently than does the monolingual with regard to different aspects of language
processing (semantic and syntactic). The evidence supporting the view that differ-
ences in processing in language-specific information found among bilinguals are
related to differences in the way a bilingual and a monolingual brain processes
information is less clear.