This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC-Br.

78, Quezon City, in

Crim. Case No. Q-94-58036 finding accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA
guilty of two (2) separate heinous crimes kidnapping for ransom and murder
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each case and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00
for funeral expenses. 1

On 13 July 1994, at about six-thirty in the morning, an American pastor named

Malcolm Bradshaw was driving his car along EDSA to take his daughter Michelle
to school. At the bus stop between Corinthian Gardens and the corner to White
Plains Avenue, Quezon City, he saw a woman, later identified as the victim
Alicia Abanilla, struggling to break away from the arms of a man known later
to be accused-appellant Benedicto Ramos y Binuyaalias "Bennie." The woman
hailed a passenger bus and then a white car to no avail. Perhaps no one
comprehended the situation she was in. Realizing that the woman was in deep
trouble, Bradshaw stopped his car and blew his horn repeatedly to attract the
woman's attention. She was hysterical and Bradshaw was to her heaven-sent. She
grabbed the opportunity and ran towards Bradshaw's car and hopped in at the
back seat. Unfortunately for her, Ramos caught up with her and squeezed
himself into the same car.

From EDSA Bradshaw turned right towards White Plains Avenue where he was
flagged down by a traffic policeman. As Bradshaw slowed down Ramos pulled out
his gun and ordered him to go straight ahead, which the latter obeyed. As they
cruised along White Plains Avenue, Alicia handed her wallet to Michelle and
asked the latter to look in there for some medicine herself. Later she took
back her wallet and tried to look for her medicine herself. As she went
through the contents of her wallet a receipt fell off and landed on the left
side of Michelle. Alicia then asked the accsused, "Bennie, has Cecil had her
baby?" "No," replied Ramos. "Is she having it by caesarian?" Ramos did not
answer. "Does Cecil know that you are doing this to me . . . . that you are
holding me hostage?" Again Ramos did not answer. 2

Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue in front of Blue Ridge Subdivision, Ramos told
Bradshaw to stop at Rajah Matanda Street, Project 4, Quezon City, where he got
off and pulled Alicia out of the car. She clung to the shoulders of Michelle
muttering, "God bless you. Pray for me and notify my family." Then she placed
her arm around Bradshaw's neck and softly whispered to him, "I will probably
not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." At about ten
of seven, Ramos finally succeeded in pulling Alicia out of the vehicle.

Soon after, Bradshaw discovered the receipt dropped by Alicia Abanilla which
contained her name and residence telephone number. Thus after taking his
daughter to school, he proceeded to his office, called the number in the
receipt and inquired about Mrs. Abanilla. The maid informed him that Mr. and
Mrs. Abanilla had already left for work at Meralco. Later that morning, at the
instance of Bradshaw, one of his employees called up a friend at Meralco to
inquire about Mrs. Abanilla, and the former was told that Mrs. Abanilla was at
that time apparently being held hostage by a man who was demanding ransom for
her release.

Meanwhile, at around seven-fifteen, Alicia called up her boss, Atty. Pastor

del Rosario, for whom she worked as a confidential secretary at Meralco. Atty.
del Rosario was still in bed. She begged him not to ask any question but said
that she needed P200,000.00 in cash immediately, otherwise, she might not be
able to go home anymore. She assured him that she had enough funds in the bank
to repay him. She then requested him to give the money to Inday, a lady
messenger at Meralco, with instruction to deliver the money to her at Glori
Supermart at Sikatuna Village. Atty. del Rosario suggested that the money be
delivered instead by a Meralco security personnel but she refused, saying,
"Please not security, I do not want them to know what happened to me." Towards
the end of their conversation, Alicia entreated, "Sir, you are the only one
who can help me now, I cannot turn to anyone else. Please help me. " 3

Del Rosario hurriedly gathered P200,000.00 in cash, placed the money in a

white envelope and tucked it in a plastic bag. He then ordered his driver,
Serrano Padua, to fetch Inday from Meralco. When Inday arrived, Del Rosario
gave her the money and told his driver to take her to Mrs. Abanilla at Glori
Supermart with specific instruction to give the money to no one else but Mrs.
Abanilla. 4

At around seven-thirty, a taxi cab driven by Antonio Pineda passed by. Ramos
and Mrs. Abanilla boarded the cab and took the back seat. They proceeded
towards Anonas Extension in Sikatuna Village near Glori Supermart. Ramos
instructed Pineda to park his taxi in front of the supermarket as they had to
wait for someone. For P700.00 Pineda agreed to wait for them so he could take
them later to Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Driver Serrano Padua and Inday finally arrived at their rendezvous. Pineda,
who was requested by Alicia to receive the money, approached them and asked
about the package for Mrs. Abanilla. However, Inday refused to give the money
saying that she was instructed to deliver it only to Mrs. Abanilla. Pineda
went back to the taxi and informed his passengers of Inday's refusal. Mrs.
Abanilla gave her identification card to Pineda and told him to ask Inday to
face the taxi and show herself through the window. Pineda went back to Inday,
gave Mrs. Abanilla's ID and asked her to approach the taxi to see Mrs.
Abanilla. Inday recognized Alicia so the former handed the money to Pineda.
Thereupon, Ramos told Pineda, "Tara, deretso tayo sa Norzagaray."

On the way to Norzagaray travelling along Commonwealth Avenue, Ramos suddenly

changed his mind and decided to head for Bocaue, Bulacan, instead. During the
entire trip, Pineda noticed Alicia looking very pale, fidgety and apparently
perturbed.

Upon arriving in Bocaue, they went straight to the St. Paul Hospital compound
where they parked. Pineda and Ramos got off to relieve themselves by a fence.
Pineda noticed a revolver tucked in Ramos' waist. Afterwards, Ramos told
Pineda to leave the taxi for a while as he was going to discuss something with
his companion. Obviously, he was interested in counting the money in the
plastic bag. As Pineda waited for his passengers to call him, he observed that
his woman passenger kept opening and closing the rear door of his taxi as if
trying to get out.

Pineda became uneasy. He slowly inched himself towards his taxi. There he saw
Ramos strangling his woman companion. So he told Ramos, "Boss, iba na yata
iyang ginagawa mo ah, baka mapadamay ako diyan!" He boarded his taxi and asked
his passengers to transfer to another vehicle as he did not want to get
involved in what was going on. But Mrs. Abanilla pleaded, "Mama, huwag mo
akong iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na
babae." Ramos retorted, "Hoy! pati iyong isip ng driver nililito mo." Then he
ordered Pineda to take them back to MacArthur Highway where they would take
another ride.

As Pineda drove out cf the hospital compound, Mrs. Abanilla panicked and held
him by the shoulder pleading, "Huwag mo akong iiwanan dito." When Pineda
reached MacArthur Highway near Sto.

Nio Academy in Bocaue he saw a traffic aide, Gil Domanais, who was directing
traffic. He, had a gun on his waist. Upon seeing the armed traffic aide,
Pineda stopped his cab, got of: and told Domanais that his male passenger had
been strangling his female companion. He also narrated that his passengers,
who had been with him since morning, refused to get off his cab and he had not
yet been paid by them. Domanais suggested to him to bring his passengers to
the police station.

Domanais peeped through the window of the taxi and saw Ramos with his left arm
around the shoulders of Alicia. She was crying. She told Domanais that Ramos
was armed with a revolver and was hurting her. At that moment Ramos pulled out
his gun prompting Domanais and Pineda to run away and take cover. Ramos then
transferred to the driver's seat and drove the cab away. In a desperate effort
to free herself, Alicia opened the left rear door and jumped out of the cab;
unfortunately, her blouse was caught in the process. As a consequence, she was
dragged by the vehicle. Ramos suddenly stopped the taxi, and as Alicia
attempted to rise, he aimed his gun at the back of his hapless victim, fired
at her twice, hitting her just above her nape. Domanais, who was armed with
a .38 caliber pistol and witnessing the shooting, fired at Ramos; but he
missed him. Then he called for police assistance as Ramos fled on foot.

On the same day, responding elements of the Bocaue Police Station apprehended
Ramos in a grassy area at the Violeta Metroville Subdivision. The police
connfiscated his .22 caliber Smith and Wesson Magnum with four (4) live
ammunitions and two (2) spent shells, and recovered a bag containing
P138,630.00 consisting of P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills.

Mrs. Abanilla's body was left at the scene of the shooting, lying face down
parallel to the taxi. Dr. Benito B. Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of the
Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy and testified that the cause of
death was "shock due to massive external. . . intracranial. . . . hemorrhage
due to gunshot wound in the head penetrating the skull and the brain
tissues." 5

Thereafter an Information was filed against Benedicto Ramos y

Binuya alias "Benni" charging him with the complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with murder, to which he pleaded not guilty. To expedite the
proceedings, the prosecution and the defense agreed during the pre-trial that
the testimony of their witnesses would be in the form of affidavits which
would be the bases for the cross-examination. Trial on the merits than ensued.

For his part, Ramos denied having kidnapped and killed the victim. In his
Sinumpaang Salaysay 6 he narrated his versio of the incident.

3. Na, ang bintang sa akin na "kidnapping for ransom with murder'

ay walang katotohanan sapagkat ang totoo ay ang mga sumusunod: a.
Ang yumaong si Alicia Abanilla ay aking ninang sa kasal noong
ikinasal kami ng aking asawang si Cecillia Pascual noong 17
October 1993 sa Sta. Rita Parish Church, Quezon City. Bago ako at
ang aking asawa ikasal sa nabanggkit na simbahan ay kasal na kami
sa isang civil marriage noong June 30, 1993 sa City Hall ng
Maynila . . . d. Na, dahilan sa wala akong hanapbuhay mula ng
ako'y tanggalin sa Meralco, ako'y nagsabi sa aking ninang Alice na
ako ay paluwagan ng kaunting halaga ng pera dahil sa ang aking
asawa ay manganganak at wala akong panggastos. Ang una kong sabi
sa kanya ay noong unang linggo ng Hulyo, 1994 sa pamamagitan ng
telepono sa Meralco. Ang sabi niya sa akin huwag akong mag-alala
pagkat tutulong siya sa akin kapag manganganak na ang aking asawa.
Ngunit pinagbawalan niya akong magpunta sa kanilang bahay o kaya
sa kanyang opisina, kaya sa telepono lamang kami nag-uusap . . .
g. Sapagkat ako'y ayaw papuntahin ng aking ninang Alice sa kanyang
at sa kanyang opisina, at ang sabi niya ay abangan mo na lamang
siya sa EDSA kanto ng White Plains, ang ginawa ko siya sa kanyang
rota patungo sa kanyang opisina. Ng kami ay magkita sa EDSA sa may
kantong patungong White Plains, sinabi ko agad sa kanya na
kailangan ko na 'yong ipinangako niyang tulong para sa aking
asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na raw niya ibibigay at doon
din sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi ako pumayag at doon kami
nagtalo, pagkat sabi ko sa kanya pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko
at ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera. Habang kami nagtatalo, may
dumating na sasakyang Toyota Corolla Station Wagon na ang driver
ay Amerikano at pinara ng ninang Alice ko at hinintuan kami ng
kano na napag-alaman ko nitong bandang huli na si Malcolm
Bradshaw, at isinakay si ninang Alice at sumakay na rin
ako . . . . j. Ng kami ay dumating sa St. Paul Hospital Bocaue,
napag-alaman kong wala doon ang asawa ko, kaya't sabi ko kay
ninang Alice tutuloy kami sa Norzagaray, sa bahay ng aking biyenan
at baka nandoon pa si Cecil. Ayaw ng sumama ni ninang Alice sa
 Norzagaray dahil nahihiya daw siya sa biyenan ko, kaya't kami
nagtalo. Gusto kong makumbinsi si ninang Alice na sumama sa
Norzagaray kaya pinakiusapan ko ang driver ng taxi na lumayo muna
sandali pagkat may pag-uusapan kami ng ninang Alice at sumunod
naman ang driver na lumayo sa taxi . . . . k. Sinabi ko kay ninang
Alice na kailangan sumama siya sa akin sa Norzagaray at siya ang
magbigay ng pera kay Cecil upang malaman ni Cecil na ang pera ay
galing sa kanya. Ito sa dahilan na kung ako ang magbibigay ng pera
sa asawa ko, baka itong si Cecil ay magduda na masama ang
pinanggalingan ng pera at matakot, at magkaroon ng shock at
duguin. Ang aking pangamba na baka magduda si Cecil na ang pera ay
galing sa masamang paraan ay dahil sa ako nga ay napagbintangan na
nagpalsifica ng tseke ni Atty. del Rosario at yun din ang dahilan
ng aking pagkakatanggal sa trabaho ko sa Meralco . . . . 1. Hindi
kami nagkasundo ng ninang ko at maya-maya dumating na ang driver
at nagyaya na dahil gutom na raw siya. Pumayag ako na lumakad na
ang taxi at ang plano ko ay ituturo ko sa driver ang daan patungo
sa Norzagaray, ngunit pagdating sa MacArthur Highway, hininto ng
driver ang taxi sa kanang parte ng Highway patungong Maynila at
bumaba ang driver at kinausap yung traffic aide na may baril at
nakatayo sa tabi ng highway. Hindi ko narinig kung ano ang sinabi
ng driver sa traffic aide ngunit ng makapagusap na sila, ang
traffic aide ay lumapit sa taxi na para bagang magiimbestiga. Ng
sumilip ang traffic aide sa bintana ng taxi sa tapat ng driver na
noon ay nakabukas, sinabi ng ninang Alice na may baril ang kasama
ko. Ang traffic aide ay natakot at biglang lumayo at kumuber sa
tabi ng pader at ang driver naman ay tumakbong palayo. Ang ginawa
ko ay lumipat ako sa lugar ng driver at ang plano ko ay ako na ang
magmamaneho patungong Norzagaray pagkat ang driver tumakbo na at
nangagamba ako na baka kung ano na ang nangyayari kay Cecil at
wala sa ospital . . . . m. Ng lumakad na ang taxi, si ninang Alice
na noon ay nakaupo pa rin sa likuran ng driver seat, biglang
tumayo at dinampot ang baril na dala ko na noon ay nasa tabi ko sa
upuan ng driver at biglang binuksan ang kaliwang pinto sa hulihan
at bababa ngunit nahawakan ko ang damit niya ng aking kaliwang
kamay pagkat nakahawak sa manibela ang kanang kamay ko at siya ay
hindi nakababa agad. Sa aming pagbubuno pagkat hinihila ko siya na
mapaupo muli at siya naman ay pilit na bumababa, pumutok ang hawak
niyang baril ng dalawang beses. Maya-maya may pumutok na isa at
biglang tumumba si ninang Alice at bumagsak sa kalsada na ang ulo
ay patungo din sa direksyon ng taxi . . . . n. Ng makita ko si
ninang Alice na bumagsak sa kalsada, bigla akong bumaba at
dinampot ko yung baril na noon ay nabitiwan na ni ninang Alice at
dinampot ko rin ang bag ng ninang ko at tumakbo akong papalayo
pagkat naalala ko yung traffic aide na nakakuber sa tabi ng pader
na noon ay malapit pa sa taxi.

After trial, the court a quo convicted Ramos of two (2) separate crimes
kidnapping for ransom and murder instead of the complex crime charged in
the Information. It held that there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped
for the purpose of killing her so as to make the offense a complex crime.
Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be merely an afterthought making
accused-appellant liable for two (2) separate offenses.

In this petition, accused-appellant imputes to the trial court the following

errors: First, the lower court erred in concluding that his guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt; Second, the lower court erred in disregarding vital
pieces of evidence in his favor; and, Third, the lower court erred in finding
him guilty of the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder.

Specifically, accused-appellant argues that kidnapping was never sufficiently

established. He maintains that all throughout the incident the victim was not
under detention at any moment nor was she deprived in any manner of her
liberty; that if there was some kind of pressure or force employed upon the
victim, such pressure or force did not amount to a deprivation of liberty but
was merely a matter of persuasion that moved the victim to go with him
voluntarily.

We resolve. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized

under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 8 of RA No.
7659, 7 is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with an
indubitable proof of intent on the part of the malefactor to effect such
restraint on the offended party' liberty. The term "actual deprivation of
liberty" consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure but also of
detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 8

In the instant case, actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from
the moment she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant from going to work
at Meralco and taken instead against her will to Bulacan. Her freedom of
movement was effectively restricted by her abductor who, armed with a .22
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver which instilled fear in her, compelled her
to go with him to Bulacan. This is clear from the testimonies of witnesses
Bradshaw and Pineda, thus

Bradshaw:

4. On 13 July 1994, at around 6:30 a.m., I was driving from my

home in Wilson St. to the Marcos Highway, to bring my seventeen
(17) year old daughter, Michelle, to school. I was driving a 1981
Toyota Corolla station wagon, with plate no. PAZ 395. Between the
gate of Corinthian Village and the right turn towards White Plains
Avenue, at the bus stop, I saw a lady, struggling and breaking
away from an unidentified male (the "male").

xxx xxx xxx

25. The male got down and started to pull out the lady from the car. The lady
held on to my daughter and in a quiet voice, whispered to her, "God bless you,
please tell my family my situation." The male kept trying to pull her out. As
she was about to be pulled out of the car, she then held on to me with her
right arm and in a quiet voice, whispered to me, I will probably not get out
of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." I asked her, "How can we?
We don't even know your name." 9

Pineda:

Q54: Habang nasa biyahe kayo ay wala ka bang nakitang

takot o tanda ng pangamba sa panig ng babae?

S: Meron po. Pag tumitingin ako sa rear view mirror ko

ay napapansin kong maputlang-maputla yung babae na
parang takot na takot.

xxx xxx xxx

Q56: Pag nagsasalita ba yung babae ay may napapansin

ka bang nerbiyos so boses niya?

S: Meron ho.

xxx xxx xxx

Q71: Pagkatapos ay ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?

S: Noong naiinip na ako bumalik na ako sa dalawa at

nagtanog ako ng ganito "ano ba boos?" ang sagot sa
akin ng lalaki ay bigyan ko uli sila ng fifteen minute
na pag-uusap. Ang ginawa ko ay lumayo uli at
nakipagkuwentuhan sa isang driver na gumagawa ng
pintuan ng kaniyang kotse. Pagkatapos tinanong ko ang
kakuwentuhan ko kung anong oras na at ang sabi ay
12:45 p.m. na raw kaya inip na inip na ako. Paglingon
ko sa taxi ay napansin kong bukas-sara iyong pintuan
sa side ng babae at sa wari ko ay parang gustong
bumaba ng taxi, maya-maya ay napansin kong sakal-sakal
na noong lalake iyong babae.

Q72: Ano ang ginawa mo pagkatapos mong makita na

sinasakal iyong babae?

S: Lumapit po ako at sinabi ko sa lalake na "Boss, iba

na yata iyang ginagawa mo ah, baka mapadamay ako
diyan." Pagkasabi ko ay binitiwan noong lalake iyong
babate na parang gustong palabasin parang walang
nangyari. Pumasok ako sa taxi ko at sinabi ko sa
lalake na "lumipat na lang kayo ng sasakyan baka
 mapadamay pa ako diyan." Ang sabi sa akin ng babae
"Mama, mo akong iiwanan dito, dahil papatayin ako ng
lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae. " . . . At
habang inilalabas ko ang taxi ay nagpapanic na ang
babae at kumakapit na sa kaliwang balikat ko at
umiiyak na nagsasabing "huwag mo akong iiwan dito" . .
. 10

From the narration of facts by the prosecution witnesses we note that on at

least three (3) occasions the victim tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to get away
from appellant: the first attempt was at EDSA when she struggled to free
herself from his clutches and hailed a bus and a white car but without
success, and later, when she jumped into the car of Bradshaw to escape; the
second was at St. Paul Hospital, Bocaue, when witness Pineda noticed from a
distance the rear door of his taxi being repeatedly opened and closed by his
woman passenger as if trying to get out; and, finally, at MacArthur Highway
when the victim jumped out of the taxicab but her blouse was caught at the
rear door (although appellant claims he grabbed her blouse and forced her back
into the cab 11). It was during this final attempt to free herself that she
was gunned down from behind by accused-appellant in cold blood. If there
really was no restraint on her person, as appellant insists, there would have
been no reason for her to attempt to escape.

Furthermore, from her statements to witnesses Bradshaw, Del Rosario and

Pineda, the victim clearly hinted at her abduction and the imminent threat on
her life. She whispered to Bradshaw, "I will probably not get out of this with
my life. Tell my family my situation." To Atty. Del Rosario she said, "I need
P200,000.00 in cash immediately, otherwise I might not be able to go home
anymore; Sir, you are the only one who can help me now, I cannot turn to
anyone else. Please help me." And, to witness Pineda, "Mama, huwag mo akong
iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na
babae."

It may be observed at this juncture that the victim kept on repeating she was
going to die. She even exclaimed to Pineda that she would be killed by
accused-appellant. One thing is certain from those statements of the
victim, i.e., that she was virtually at the mercy of her tormentor who at that
moment was already in complete and effective control of her.

The claim of the defense that the force or pressure employed against the
victim was in fact merely a matter of persuasion and not constitutive of
restraint on the victim's liberty, taxes credulity. Definitely, the acts of
forcibly pulling the victim out of the car of witness Bradshaw, strangling her
while inside the taxi of Pineda, pulling her back into the cab when she
attempted to flee, and eventually shooting the victim twice in the head and
hitting her, can hardly be considered as "merely a matter of persuasion." On
the contrary, these circumstances are positive indications of the victim's
detention by appellant against her will.
The victim might have carried occasional conversations with the accused, but
this fact did not negate the existence of kidnapping. Evidently, that was just
the victim's way of mentally and emotionally coping with the harrowing and
dangerous situation she was in. After all, appellant was not a total stranger
to her, she being a principal sponsor at his wedding. She had to start a
conversation not only to calm herself down but also to appease her captor.

For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept
within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. It is enough that,
as in the instant case, she was in any manner deprived of her liberty, unable
to move and get out as she pleased. 12

Accused-appellant next contends that there was no proof he demanded or

received money from anybody, since it was the victim herself who asked money
from Atty. Del Rosario, and her statement that "she needed P200,000.00
immediately, otherwise, she might not be able to go home anymore," does not
suggest that someone was demanding money from her or that she was being
kidnapped; that if his intention was to kidnap the victim for the purpose of
extorting ransom, then he could have just left the victim and brought the
money with him; that, in fact, when the victim gave the money to him after it
was delivered to her by Pineda who received it in turn from Inday, he
(appellant) just dropped the money on the floor of the taxi and it was the
victim who picked it up and placed it in her bag.

The arguments are as puerile as they are untenable. The statement of the
victim that "she needed P200,000.00 immediately otherwise she might not be
able to go home anymore," should not be interpreted in isolation. Rather, its
true meaning should be ascertained in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances. When the victim called up Atty. Del Rosario, she was already
being held hostage against her will by the accused who; armed and violent, had
no qualms in maltreating his Ninang and subsequently shooting her twice and
killing her.

By his own admission, accused-appellant really did ask for money from the
victim although he tried to impress upon the trial court that it was merely a
loan. Consider the following statement of accused-appellant

. . . sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangnn ko na 'yong pinangako

niyang tulong para sa aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na
raw niya ibibigay at doon din sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi
ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo, pagkat sabi ko so kanya pupunta
ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera. 13

The tenor of the foregoing statement unmistakably shows that accused-appellant

was not merely borrowing but was actually demanding money from the victim,
reminding her of her supposed promise to lend him money for his wife's
delivery. Common experience tells us that when borrowing money, persuasion is
used, for debt implies a favor, a request. Thus, the words of accused-
appellant "hindi ako pumayang," "doon kami nagtalo," and "ngayon din kailangan
ko ng pera," are inconsistent with his excuse that he was just borrowing money
from the victim.

Moreover, while the records do not disclose that accused-appellant specified

the exact amount he needed, the victim was nevertheless explicit in her plea
to Atty. Del Rosario to procure for her P200,000.00 in cash immediately. The
nagging questions are: Why P200,000.00? Why not just, say, P50,000.00 or even
P100,000.00, which was more than enough to cover the hospitalization expenses
of appellant's wife? Why "loan" a hefty sum to a person who had been out of
work for quite sometime due to a previous misconduct likewise involving money,
and whose capacity to pay was doubtful?

Nonetheless, the explanation of the accused that what happened was just a
simple case of borrowing money coupled with a request that the victim
accompany him to Bulacan so his wife would believe the money was really
borrowed and did not come from an illegal source, was too lame and anemic, and
disproved by subsequent events. Indeed, it hardly conforms to human nature
that after appellant was loaned a considerable amount he would suddenly turn
vicious toward his own benefactress, strangle her and shoot her to death for
no sane reason than that she refused to go with him to Bulacan.

From all indications, therefore, no other logical meaning can be ascribed to

the victim's statement to Atty. Del Rosario than that the money was intended
as ransom, i.e., as consideration for her release from captivity.

While it may be true that it was the victim, not accused-appellant, who made
the call and asked for the money, it must be stressed nonetheless that actual
demand for ransom by the accused from the relatives or friends of the victim
is not necessary, much less essential, as the demand may be made directly on
the victim herself. This convenient method commonly resorted to by kidnappers,
more often, proves to be very effective not only in compelling the relatives
and friends of victims to pay ransom but also in concealing the identities of
the malefactors.

The fact also that the money was delivered to and received by the victim
personally did not make it any less a ransom prize. After it was handed to the
victim, she gave it to accused-appellant, who was seated beside her at the
back seat of the taxi. Clearly, accused-appellant, who was in total control of
the situation, obtained actual and constructive possession of the ransom money
when it was delivered to the victim. 14

On his conviction for murder, accused-appellant points out contradictions in

the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Pineda and Gil Domanais
concerning their positive identification of appellant as the one who shot the
victim. According to accused-appellant, Antonio Pineda testified on direct
examination thus
 Q: Sinabi mo kanina na nakita mong binaril ng dalawang
beses sa ulo yung sakay mong babae noong kasama niyang
lalaki, nakita mo ba ito?

A: Oo, po. 15

And on cross-examination Pineda testified

Q: But you did not see the person who fired the shots?

A: No, sir.

Q: And you ran away, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir. 16

The same witness also gave two (2) places of his birth, namely, tubo sa
Baclaran and tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at Bicol ang ina)

T: Ano ang iyong tunay na pangalan, edad, tirahan at

ibang bagay hinggil sa iyong pagkatao?

S: Antonio Pineda Jr. y, Lirio, 22 taong gulang,

binata, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila at
nakatira/stay-in taxi driver sa No. 65 Matahimik St.,
Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang aking mga
magulang ay may permanent address sa Block F-28, Lot
9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas, Dasmarias,
Cavite. 17

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Pakisabi ang iyong buong pangalan at iba pang mga

bagay-bagay na maaaring mapagkakilalan sa iyo?

S: Ako po si Antonio Pineda Jr. y Lirio, 22 taong

gulang, binata, tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at
Bicol ang ina) at stay-in taxi driver sa No. 65
Matahimik St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang
aking mga magulang ay may permanent address sa Block
F-28, Lot 9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas,
Dasmarias,
Cavite. 18

Moreover, according to appellant, Pineda gave two (2) different versions as to

who caused the taxi to stop at MacArthur Highway
 S: . . . Tuloy-tuloy po ako ng pagtakbo ko at
pagdating ko sa kanto ng MacArthur Highway na malapit
sa Petron station at Sto. Nio Academy ay may nakita
akong traffic aide na nakauniporme ng khaki at may
sukbit na baril. Ang ginawa ko ay bigla akong nagpreno
sa tabi sabay labas ng taxi at nilapitan ko iyong
traffic aide. 19

T: Ano ang ginawa ninyo sa Highway kung mayroon?

A: Pinatigil po ni Bennie yung taksi at nagtalo silang

dalawa ng biktima. 20

On the part of witness Gil Domanais, appellant draws our attention to the
witness' statement to the police that appellant shot the victim twice in the
head, while on cross-examination the same witness declared

Q: But since you are (sic) at the back, your position

was at the back of the taxi, you did not know who
fired the gun, is that right?

A: I know, sir.

Q: Why do you say you know?

A: Because the shots came from inside the taxi, sir.

Q: But you did not know who actually fired the shots?

A: I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the
gun, sir.

Court: Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

A: I saw it sir.

Q: But you did not hit him because actually you cannot
(sic) see him when you fired your gun, is that
correct?

A: I saw him and it was the upper shoulder that was

showing, sir. 21

Accused-appellant stresses that witness Domanais was merely presuming it was

accused-appellant who fired at the victim. Thus, insofar as the murder is
concerned, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
We disagree. The shooting of the victim took place in the presence of and
within the auditory perception of witness Pineda who was just ten (10) meters
away from the scene. He heard the shots from the taxi whose lone occupant at
that time was accused-appellant. In addition, witness Pineda explained that he
earlier saw appellant attempting to kill the victim by strangulation; thus, he
concluded, and rightly so, that it was appellant who shot the victim to death.

With respect to Pineda's supposed inconsistent statements on where he was

born, this was sufficiently explained by him during his cross-examination

Q: Mr. Pineda, you gave your statement to the police

on July 13, at about 11:40 in the evening, and you
were asked about your name and other personal
circumstances. Your answer is (sic) You are Antonio
Pineda, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Now
in your second statement given to Atty. Abad on the
26th of July, you were asked the same question and you
answered you are (sic) Antonio Pineda, tubong Bisaya.
Now will you explain to us why in your first statement
you said that you are (sic) tubong Paraaque and then
in your second statement, you are (sic) tubong Bisaya,
which is correct?

A: My father is a Visayan and my mother is a Bicolana

and I was born here in Manila, sir.

Q: In other words, you were not born in the Visayas?

A: No sir. 22

By saying therefore that he was "tubong Bisaya" despite the fact that he was
born in Manila, Pineda was merely disclosing his Visayan origin on his
father's side.

The other alleged inconsistencies in Pineda's sworn statements as to who

caused the cab to stop along the highway refer to minor details which cannot
impair his credibility. On the contrary, such consistencies even guarantee
that his testimony was not a product of perjury. 23 As succinctly observed by
the trial court

. . . although the testimonies of the two (2) prosecution

witnesses, namely, Antonio Pineda, driver of the taxi cab wherein
accused and the victim rode from Quezon City up to Bocaue,
Bulacan, and Gil Domanais, the traffic aide, contained minor
inconsistencies, the same even bolstered their credibility showing
that their testimonies were unrehearsed. So, also, prosecution
witnesses testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and frank manner. 24
As for the allegation that Domanais was merely presuming it was accused-
appellant who fired at the victim, suffice it to state that Domanais
categorically testified that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim in
the head. On cross-examination, he gave a detailed account of how the shooting
took place

Q: But since you are (sic) at the back, your position

was at the back of the taxi, you did not know who
fired the gun, is that right?

A: I know, sir.

Q: Why do you say you know?

A: Because the shots came from inside the taxi cab,

sir.

Q: But you did not actually saw (sic) who fired the
shots?

A: I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the
gun, sir.

Court: Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

A: I saw it, sir.

Court: Where were you?

A: I was on the side of the taxi, sir.

Court: I thought you ran and took cover on the wall.

A: The wall where I hid was only low, sir, that is why
when I stood up, I could easily see, sir. 25

As can be seen from the foregoing dialogue, the trial court clarified the
matter with witness Domanais who positively identified accused-appellant as
the assailant. Moreover, in his sworn statement Domanais categorically stated

. . . . Sakay po siya ng isang taxi at siya po ay tumalon ngunit

nakawit po sa pinto ang damit niya kaya po siya nakaladkad ng taxi
ng kaunti at ng ihinto po ng suspect ang taxi dahilan po sa bago
nangyari ito ay tumakbo po ang driver ng taxi ay dinukwang na lang
po ng suspect ang biktima at binaril nga po ng dalawang beses sa
ulo. 26
The suggestion that it was witness Domanais' shot which hit the victim is
belied by the evidence. The medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim
testified that the entry wound at the back of the victim's head measured 0.75
centimeters and that based on the character of the wound the bullet causing it
was fired from a .22 caliber gun similar to that confiscated from accused-
appellant. Therefore, the fatal shot could not have come from witness
Domanais' .38 caliber pistol. 27 Moreover, witness Domanais affirmed that it
was only after he saw accused-appellant shot the victim twice in the head that
he opened fire at accused-appellant.

The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is

well-settled. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court, which had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and was in a better
position to gauge their credibility and appreciate properly the relative
weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties. 28

In the present case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the judgment of the
trial court giving credence to the declarations of prosecution witnesses
Pineda and Domanais who positively identified accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, the accused anchored his defense on bare
denial. Certainly, this negative assertion cannot prevail over the unimpeached
testimony of the prosecution witnesses describing in sufficient detail how
accused-appellant shot the victim. In the face of the clear and positive
declaration of witnesses, the defense of denial hardly assumes probative value
and goes even farther down the drain in the absence of any evidence of ill
motives on the part of the witnesses to impute so grave a wrong against
accused-appellant. 29

Thus when accused-appellant suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning, shot

the victim from behind twice after the latter failed in her attempt to escape
but was dragged instead by the cab where she was held captive, and while in a
pitiable state of utter helplessness, the crime committed cannot be any less
than murder qualified by treachery.

Considering the evidence extant on record, we agree with the trial court that
victim Alicia Abanilla was indeed kidnapped for ransom and then murdered by
accused-appellant. But the kidnapping for ransom and murder should not be
treated as separate crimes for which two (2) death penalties must as a
consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA No. 7659, accused-appellant should be convicted of the special
complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER and impose upon him the
maximum penalty of DEATH.

Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule
was that where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor,
the crime committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder
under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, 30 or two (2) separate crimes of
kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the
purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime
committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The
Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of
committing the murder. 31 On the other hand, where the victim was kidnapped
not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as an
afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed. 32

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto a last paragraph which provides

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the

detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of

"special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those
cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by
the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently,
the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.

Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of the aforequoted
provision of Art. 267, as amended. Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom
was already consummated with the mere demand by the accused for ransom even
before the ransom was delivered the deprivation of liberty of the victim
persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was killed by
accused-appellant while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may
be considered "a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom."

Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the
separate opinions expressed inPeople v. Echegaray 33 that RA No. 7659 insofar
as it prescribes the penalty of DEATH is unconstitutional, nevertheless,
accede to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "BENNIE" is found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
No. 7659, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of victim Alicia Abanilla
in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for burial expenses.

Conformably with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 25 of RA

No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of the case be
forwarded forthwith to the President of the Philippines for the exercise at
his discretion of his power to pardon the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.