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This is a civil action filed by William M. Schmalfeldt, Sr., a pro se litigant proceeding in
forma pauperis (Plaintiff). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule
73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such
pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff, a South Carolina resident, brings suit against four persons, each of whom
resides in a different state, for problems he has allegedly been experiencing as the result of
Defendants internet activities. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, both jointly and separately, have
used cyberstalking behavior against him and that they harassed and libeled him. Plaintiff seeks
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made
of the pro se First Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C.
1915.1 The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The First Amended Complaint in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. 1915, which
permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the
administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this
privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C.
legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
at 97, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe,
449 U.S. 5 (1980). The mandated liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the
court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail,
it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a pleading to conjure up questions never
squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.
1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear
failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal
district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under
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On May 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed this case by submitting a Complaint. ECF No. 1. Before initial
review was conducted on that pleading, on May 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint. ECF No. 8. The First Amended Complaint is now the operative pleading and it is
the document upon which initial review was conducted.
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this less stringent standard, however, the pro se First Amended Complaint under review in this
III. Discussion
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint includes several counts against all Defendants. ECF No.
8. Count I of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it seeks civil relief for
alleged cyberstalking or harassment. As this is a case within this courts diversity jurisdiction
and Plaintiff does not rest his claims on any federal law, the tort law of South Carolina governs
Plaintiffs claims. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Limbach Co., LLC v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 396 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2005; McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271,
1279-80 (D.S.C. 1974). South Carolina has criminal statutes prohibiting stalking and harassment,
S.C. Code 16-3-1700, 16-3-1710, but those statutes do not provide a private right of civil
action. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sci. Applications Intl Corp., No. 2:11-cv-2928-PMD, 2013 WL
764664, at *10 (Feb. 7, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 754834 (D.S.C.
Feb. 27, 2013) (citing Ray v. Bowers, No. 08-cv-3512, 2009 WL 4893209, at * 5 (D.S.C. Dec.
17, 2009) (claims of stalking and harassment dismissed because 16-3-1700 is a criminal
statute and does not provide a private civil remedy.); White v. Stacher, No. 05-cv-1737, 2006
WL 1207857, at * 6 (D.S.C. May 1, 2006) (finding no civil action for stalking)). In light of the
authority cited, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for cyberstalking or harassment and Count
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court partially dismiss the Amended
Complaint in this case without prejudice to the extent that it seeks relief for alleged cyberstalking
or harassment under Count I. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also
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IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and
Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of
the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.
[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review,
but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to
accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service
of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be
accomplished by mailing objections to:
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation
will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based
upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.
1984).