Coke Case Study
Coke Case Study
Coke Case Study
1-0000
Coca-Cola India
On August 20, 2003 Sanjiv Gupta, President and CEO of Coca-Cola India, sat in his office
contemplating the events of the last two weeks and debating his next move. Sales had
dropped by 30-40%1 in only two weeks on the heels of a 75% five-year growth trajectory
and 25-30%2 year-to-date growth. Many leading clubs, retailers, restaurants, and college
campuses across the country had stopped selling Coca-Cola 3 and only six weeks into his new
role as CEO, Gupta was embroiled in a crisis that threatened the momentum gained from a
highly successful two-year marketing campaign that had given Coca-Cola market leadership
over Pepsi.
On August 5th, The Center for Science and Environment (CSE), an activist group in India
focused on environmental sustainability issues (specifically the effects of industrialization
and economic growth) issued a press release stating: "12 major cold drink brands sold in and
around Delhi contain a deadly cocktail of pesticide residues" (See Exhibit 1). According to tests
conducted by the Pollution Monitoring Laboratory (PML) of the CSE from April to August,
three samples of twelve PepsiCo and Coca-Cola brands from across the city were found to
contain pesticide residues surpassing global standards by 30-36 times including
lindane, DDT, malathion and chlorpyrifos (See Exhibit 2). These four pesticides were known
to cause cancer, damage to the nervous and reproductive systems, birth defects, and severe
disruption of the immune system. 4
In reaction to this report, the Indian government banned Coke and Pepsi products in
Parliament and state governments launched independent investigations, sending soft drink
samples to labs for testing. The Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Coke) stock dipped by five
dollars on the New York Stock Exchange from $55 to $50 in the six sessions following the
August 5 disclosure, as did shares of Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCA). 5
Pepsi and Coca-Cola called the CSE allegations “baseless” and questioned the method of
testing but the CSE claimed it had followed standard procedures documented by the US
Environmental Protection Agency including Gas Chromatography and Mass Spectrometry.
Pepsi’s own tests conducted at an independent laboratory showed no detectable pesticides
and led Pepsi to file a petition with the high court questioning the credibility of the CSE’s
claims 6 while Coke’s Gupta commented: “The allegation is serious and it has the potential to
tarnish the image of our brands in the country. If this continues, we will consider legal
recourse.” 7
Despite Coke and Pepsi’s early responses denying the validity of the CSE’s claims and
threatening legal action, a survey conducted in Delhi a few days after the CSE
announcement found that a majority of consumers believed the findings were correct and
1
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
agreed with parliament’s move to ban the sale of soft drinks.8 It was clear that the $1 billion
Indian soft drink market 9 was at stake and Gupta had to act.
History of Coke
With the bubbles making the difference, Coca-Cola was registered as a trademark in 1887
and by 1895, was being sold in every state and territory in the United States. In 1899, it
franchised its bottling operations in the U.S., growing quickly to reach 370 franchisees by
1910.10 Headquartered in Atlanta with divisions and local operations in over 200 countries
worldwide, Coca-Cola generated more than 70% of its income outside the United States by
2003 (See Exhibit 3).
International expansion
Coke’s first international bottling plants opened in 1906 in Canada, Cuba, and Panama. 11 By the
end of the 1920’s Coca-Cola was bottled in twenty-seven countries throughout the world and
available in fifty-one more. In spite of this reach, volume was low, quality inconsistent, and
effective advertising a challenge with language, culture, and government regulation all serving
as barriers. Former CEO Robert Woodruff’s insistence that Coca-Cola wouldn’t
“suffer the stigma of being an intrusive American product,” and instead would use local
bottles, caps, machinery, trucks, and personnel contributed to Coke’s challenges as well with
a lack of standard processes and training degrading quality.12
Coca-Cola continued working for over 80 years on Woodruff’s goal: to make Coke available
wherever and whenever consumers wanted it, “in arm’s reach of desire.” 13 The Second
World War proved to be the stimulus Coca-Cola needed to build effective capabilities
around the world and achieve dominant global market share. Woodruff’s patriotic
commitment “that every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola for five cents, wherever
he is and at whatever cost to our company” 14 was more than just great public relations. As a
result of Coke’s status as a military supplier, Coca-Cola was exempt from sugar rationing
and also received government subsidies to build bottling plants around the world to serve
WWII troops. 15
2
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
From the beginning, Coke understood the importance of branding and the creation of a
distinct personality.18 Its catchy, well-liked slogans19 (“It’s the real thing” (1942, 1969),
“Things go better with Coke” (1963), “Coke is it” (1982), “Can’t beat the Feeling” (1987), and
a 1992 return to “Can’t beat the real thing”) 20 linked that personality to the core values
of each generation and established Coke as the authentic, relevant, and trusted refreshment
of choice across the decades and around the globe.
Indian History
India is home to one of the most ancient cultures in the world dating back over 5000 years.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, twenty-six different languages were spoken
across India, 30% of the population knew English, and greater than 40% were illiterate. At
this time, the nation was in the midst of great transition and the dichotomy between the old
India and the new was stark. Remnants of the caste system existed alongside the world’s top
engineering schools and growing metropolises as the historically agricultural economy shifted
into the services sector. In the process, India had created the world’s largest middle class,
second only to China.
A British colony since 1769 when the East India Company gained control of all European
trade in the nation, India gained its independence in 1947 under Mahatma Ghandi and his
principles of non-violence and self-reliance. In the decades that followed, self-reliance was
taken to the extreme as many Indians believed that economic independence was necessary to
be truly independent. As a result, the economy was increasingly regulated and many sectors
were restricted to the public sector. This movement reached its peak in 1977 when the Janta
3
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
party government came to power and Coca-Cola was thrown out of the country. In 1991, the
first generation of economic reforms was introduced and liberalization began.
Coke in India
Coca-Cola was the leading soft drink brand in India until 1977 when it left rather than reveal
its formula to the government and reduce its equity stake as required under the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) which governed the operations of foreign companies in
India. After a 16-year absence, Coca-Cola returned to India in 1993, cementing its presence
with a deal that gave Coca-Cola ownership of the nation's top soft-drink brands and bottling
network. Coke’s acquisition of local popular Indian brands including Thums Up (the most
trusted brand in India 21), Limca, Maaza, Citra and Gold Spot provided not only physical
manufacturing, bottling, and distribution assets but also strong consumer preference. This
combination of local and global brands enabled Coca-Cola to exploit the benefits of global
branding and global trends in tastes while also tapping into traditional domestic markets.
Leading Indian brands joined the Company's international family of brands, including Coca-
Cola, diet Coke, Sprite and Fanta, plus the Schweppes product range. In 2000, the company
launched the Kinley water brand and in 2001, Shock energy drink and the powdered
concentrate Sunfill hit the market.
From 1993 to 2003, Coca-Cola invested more than US$1 billion in India, making it one of the
country’s top international investors. 22 By 2003, Coca-Cola India had won the
prestigious Woodruf Cup from among 22 divisions of the Company based on three broad
parameters of volume, profitability, and quality. Coca-Cola India achieved 39% volume
growth in 2002 while the industry grew 23% nationally and the Company reached break-
even profitability in the region for the first time. 23 Encouraged by its 2002 performance,
Coca-Cola India announced plans to double its capacity at an investment of $125 million
(Rs. 750 crore) between September 2002 and March 2003.24
Coca-Cola India produced its beverages with 7,000 local employees at its twenty-seven
wholly-owned bottling operations supplemented by seventeen franchisee-owned bottling
operations and a network of twenty-nine contract-packers to manufacture a range of products
for the company. The complete manufacturing process had a documented quality control and
assurance program including over 400 tests performed throughout the process (See Exhibit
5).
The complexity of the consumer soft drink market demanded a distribution process to
support 700,000 retail outlets serviced by a fleet that includes 10-ton trucks, open-bay three
wheelers, and trademarked tricycles and pushcarts that were used to navigate the narrow
alleyways of the cities. 25 In addition to its own employees, Coke indirectly created
employment for another 125,000 Indians through its procurement, supply, and distribution
networks.
Sanjiv Gupta, President and CEO of Coca-Cola India, joined Coke in 1997 as Vice
President, Marketing and was instrumental to the company’s success in developing a brand
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
relevant to the Indian consumer and in tapping India’s vast rural market potential. Following
his marketing responsibilities, Gupta served as Head of Operations for Company-owned
bottling operations and then as Deputy President. Seen as the driving force behind recent
successful forays into packaged drinking water, powdered drinks, and ready-to-serve tea and
coffee, Gupta and his marketing prowess were critical to the continued growth of the
Company. 26
With its large population and low consumption, the rural market represented a significant
opportunity for penetration and a critical battleground for market dominance. In 2001,
Coca-Cola recognized that to compete with traditional refreshments including lemon water,
green coconut water, fruit juices, tea, and lassi, competitive pricing was essential. In
response, Coke launched a smaller bottle priced at almost 50% of the traditional package.
While the joint venture was only marginally successful in its own right, it allowed Pepsi to
gain precious early experience with the Indian market and also served as an introduction of
the Pepsi brand to the Indian consumer such that it was well-poised to reap the benefits when
liberalization came. Though Coke benefited from Pepsi creating demand and developing the
market, Pepsi’s head-start gave Coke a disadvantage in the mind of the consumer. Pepsi’s
5
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
appeal focused on youth and when Coke entered India in 1993 and approached the market
selling an American way of life, it failed to resonate as expected. 31
In 2001, after almost a decade of lagging rival Pepsi in the region, Coke India re-examined its
approach in an attempt to gain leadership in the Indian market and capitalize on
significant growth potential, particularly in rural markets. The foundation of the new strategy
grounded brand positioning and marketing communications in consumer insights,
acknowledging that urban versus rural India were two distinct markets on a variety of
important dimensions. The soft drink category’s role in people’s lives, the degree of
differentiation between consumer segments and their reasons for entering the category, and
the degree to which brands in the category projected different perceptions to consumers were
among the many important differences between how urban and rural consumers approached
the market for refreshment. 32
In rural markets, where both the soft drink category and individual brands were
undeveloped, the task was to broaden the brand positioning while in urban markets, with
higher category and brand development, the task was to narrow the brand positioning,
focusing on differentiation through offering unique and compelling value. This lens,
informed by consumer insights, gave Coke direction on the tradeoff between focus and
breadth a brand needed in a given market and made clear that to succeed in either segment,
unique marketing strategies were required in urban versus rural India.
6
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
soft drink category was undifferentiated in the minds of rural consumers. Additionally, with
an average Coke costing Rs. 10 and an average day’s wages around Rs. 100, Coke was
perceived as a luxury that few could afford. 34
In an effort to make the price point of Coke within reach of this high-potential market, Coca-
Cola launched the Accessibility Campaign, introducing a new 200ml bottle, smaller than the
traditional 300ml bottle found in urban markets, and concurrently cutting the price in half, to
Rs. 5. This pricing strategy closed the gap between Coke and basic refreshments like
lemonade and tea, making soft drinks truly accessible for the first time. At the same time,
Coke invested in distribution infrastructure to effectively serve a disbursed population and
doubled the number of retail outlets in rural areas from 80,000 in 2001 to 160,000 in 2003,
increasing market penetration from 13 to 25%. 35
Coke’s advertising and promotion strategy pulled the marketing plan together using local
language and idiomatic expressions. “Thanda,” meaning cool/cold is also generic for cold
beverages and gave “Thanda Matlab Coca-Cola” delicious multiple meanings. Literally
translated to “Coke means refreshment,” the phrase directly addressed both the primary need
of this segment for cold refreshment while at the same time positioning Coke as a “Thanda”
or generic cold beverage just like tea, lassi, or lemonade. As a result of the Thanda
campaign, Coca-Cola won Advertiser of the Year and Campaign of the Year in 2003 (See
Exhibit 7).
Rural Success
Comprising 74% of the country's population, 41% of its middle class, and 58% of its
disposable income, the rural market was an attractive target and it delivered results. Coke
experienced 37% growth in 2003 in this segment versus the 24% growth seen in urban areas.
Driven by the launch of the new Rs. 5 product, per capita consumption doubled between
2001-2003. This market accounted for 80% of India’s new Coke drinkers, 30% of 2002
volume, and was expected to account for 50% of the company’s sales in 2003. 36
7
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Coca-Cola’s footprint in India was significant as well. The Company employed 7000
citizens and believed that for every direct job, 30-40 more were created in the supply chain. 38
Like its parent, Coke India’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives were both
community and environment-focused. Priorities included education, where primary
education projects had been set up to benefit children in slums and villages, water
conservation, where the Company supported community-based rainwater harvesting projects
to restore water levels and promote conservation education, and health, where Coke India
partnered with NGOs and governments to provide medical access to poor people through
regular health camps. In addition to outreach efforts, the company committed itself to
environmental responsibility through its own business operations in India including39:
40
Ingram, et al. v. The Coca-Cola Company- 1999
In the spring of 1999, 4 current and former Coca-Cola employees, led by Information Analyst
Linda Ingram, filed bias charges against Coca-Cola in Atlanta Federal Court. The lawsuit
charged the Company with racial discrimination and stated: “This discrimination represents a
company-wide pattern and practice, rather than a series of isolated incidents. Although Coca-
Cola has carefully crafted African-American consumers of its product by public
announcements, strategic alliances and specific marketing strategies, it has failed to
place the same importance on its African-American employees.” 41
In the decades leading up to the suit, both internal and external warnings surrounding Coke’s
diversity practices were issued. In 1981, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, director of the
8
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Rainbow/ PUSH coalition instigated a boycott against Coca-Cola challenging the company
to significantly improve its business relationship with the African American community.42
The Ware report, written by Senior Vice President Carl Ware, an African-American
executive at the Company, cited a lack of diversity at the decision-making level, a basic lack
of workplace diversity, a “ghettoization” among blacks who worked for Cola-Cola, and an
overt lack of respect for cultural differences as well as an implicit assumption that African-
American employees lacked the intelligence to meet the challenges of the highest executive
levels.43
Cyrus Mehri, one of the most visible and successful plaintiff advocates in the US, represented
the group and was skilled at leveraging the power of the media, creating a true
crisis for the Coca-Cola Company and exerting tremendous pressure for settlement. In 2000, the
lawsuit was settled for $192.5 million after the company had sent mixed messages and
damaging statements regarding the merit of the suit for over a year. Analysts identified the bias
suit as a prime reason for the $100 billion decrease in Coca-Cola’s stock price between
1998-2000.44
45
Belgium- 1999
On June 8, 1999, thirty-three Belgian school children became ill after drinking Coke bottled
at a local facility in Antwerp. A few days later, more Belgians complained of similar
symptoms after drinking cans of Coke that had been bottled at a plant in Dunkirk, France
and eighty people in northern France were allegedly stricken by intestinal problems and
nausea, bringing the total afflicted to over 250.
In the days following the first outbreak, seventeen million cases of Coke from five European
countries were recalled and destroyed. It was the largest product recall in Coke’s history and
Belgian and French authorities banned the sale of Coca-Cola products for ten days. Germany
placed a temporary import ban on Coca Cola produced in Belgium and the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg banned all Coca Cola products. Health ministers in Italy, Spain, and
Switzerland warned people about consuming Coke products.
Coca-Cola sources explained that the contamination was due to defective carbon dioxide
used at the Antwerp plant and that a wood preservative used on shipping pallets had
concentrated the outside of cans at the Dunkirk plant. The European Commission, however,
believed production faults and contaminated pipes were more likely to be the cause of the
problem.
Though CEO Ivester was in Paris when the news broke, he flew home to Atlanta and kept
silent, waiting over a week to issue his first public statement on the crisis, citing that “Coke
would do whatever necessary to ensure the safety of its products.” A Netherlands-based
toxicologist Coke had hired issued a report on June 29 exempting the company from blame
for the CO2 impurity in Antwerp and the fungicide at Dunkirk. Though the product ban was
lifted, Coke had a tremendous amount of work to do to win back consumer confidence.
9
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
An aggressive PR campaign included vouchers and coupons for free product delivered to
each of Belgium’s 4.4 million homes, sponsored dances, beach parties, and summer fairs for
teenagers, and significant television advertising reinforcing “Today, more than ever, we
thank you for your loyalty.”
The senior communications position at the company, Senior Vice President, Worldwide
Public Affairs & Communication, sat on the company's executive committee and reported to
the Chairman & CEO at the time of the crisis in India. Director-level corporate
communication functions included: Media Relations, Nutrition Communications, Financial
Communications, and Marketing Communications, but the geographic diversity of the
company's businesses required regionally-based communication leaders in addition to the
corporate resources in place. As a result, five regional communications directors serviced
North America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, and Africa with their own teams of
communications professionals (See Exhibit 9).
NGO Activism48
NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) evolved to influence governments but by the
early twenty-first century many realized that targeting corporations and key corporate
constituents such as investors and customers could be an even more powerful way to effect
change. Along with their ability to focus, gain attention, and act quickly was the high level
of credibility NGOs had cultivated with many constituencies. This credibility stemmed in
part from their emotional, rather than fact-based, appeals and the impassioned nature of their
arguments.
10
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
The most common tactic of NGOs was to develop campaigns against business through
which they garnered support from consumers and the media. These campaigns, such as
Greenpeace’s attack on Shell Oil following the company’s decision to dump the Brent Spar
oil rig in the ocean in the 1990s, typically focused on a single issue; targeted companies with
successful and well-known brands such as McDonald’s and Nike; and were augmented by
market trends such as the homogenization created by chains like Wal-Mart and Starbucks.
NGOs realized that anti-corporate campaigns could be far more powerful than anti-
government campaigns. Global Exchange’s attack on Nike for sweatshop labor conditions in
the 1990s, for example, was one of the most highly publicized and also one of the most
successful anti-business campaigns in recent years.
Spurred by the February 2003 report on bottled water and questions like “if what we found
in bottled water was correct, then what about soft drinks?” the CSE’s August 2003 report
claimed that soft drinks were extremely dangerous to Indian citizens based on tests
conducted at the Pollution Monitoring Laboratory (PML). All samples contained residues of
lindane, DDT, malathion, and chlorpyrifos, toxic pesticides and insecticides known to cause
serious long term health issues. Total pesticides in all Coca-Cola brands averaged 0.0150
mg/l, 30 times higher than the European Economic Commission (EEC) limit. PML also tested
samples of Coke and Pepsi products sold in the United States to see if they contained
pesticides and they did not.
Regulations on soft drinks were weak in India, even compared to bottled water, as neither the
Prevention of Food Alteration Act (PFA) nor the Fruit Products Order (FPO), aimed at
regulating food standards in India, addressed pesticides in soft drinks, and there were no
standards to define ‘clean’ or ‘potable’ water. The report called on the government to put in
place legally enforceable water standards and chastised the multi-nationals for taking
advantage of the situation at the expense of consumer health and well-being.
11
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
set a limit of 0.001 parts per million but the Health Secretary admitted, “There are lapses in
PFA regarding carbonated drinks.” 51
Indian law enforcement was minimal with virtually no conviction under PFA. In the absence
of national standards, NGOs such as the CSE turned to the United States and the European
Union for “international norms.” The appropriateness and feasibility of these standards for
developing nations however, remained a question for many. Under EU food laws for
example, milk, fruit, and basic staples such as rice and wheat would need to be imported into
India to satisfy safety standards.
You may have seen recently in the media some allegations about the quality
standards of our products in India. We take these allegations extremely seriously.
I want to reassure you that our products in India are safe and are tested regularly to
ensure that they meet the same rigorous standards we maintain across the world.
Maintaining quality standards is the most important element of our business and we
cannot stand by while misleading and unaccredited data is used to discredit trusted
and world-class brands. Recent allegations have caused unnecessary panic among
consumers in India and, if unchecked, would impair our business in India and impact
the livelihoods of our thousands of employees across the country.
This site is about the truth behind the headlines. It provides some context and facts
on these issues and we hope it helps you understand exactly why you can trust our
beverage brands and continue to enjoy them as millions of Indians do each day.
In the following days, the Delhi High Court asked the governmen t to convene an exper t
commit tee to test and report on the safety of sof t drinks within three weeks and to
revise existing standards to include pesticide norms. Coca-Cola and Pepsi launched
independent campaigns to reassure the public, taking out full-page newspaper
adver tisemen ts and directing consumers to their corporate Web sites to review test
results and safety pro tocol in greater detail (See Exhibits 10 and 11). In spite of these
actions, the public seemed to believe the CSE’s claims and the crisis was far from over
12
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
for the beverage giants. With sales continuing to experience a precipitous drop, one
Delhi medical student’s sentimen ts appeared to be widespread: “For a person drinking at
least one bot tle a day, the repor t came as a rude shock. I haven’ t picked up a bot tle
t oday and most definitely will no t consume sof t drinks in the future. The repor ts of
pesticides and o ther pollutan ts have made soft drinks a strict no-no and we will now stick
t o juices and plain drinking water.” 53
Gupta’s Dilemma
As he contemplated the crisis at hand, Sanjiv Gupta questioned what action if any was
necessary. Coke India was well within the country’s legal guidelines and the crisis had not
been widely reported outside of India. Gupta knew that the Indian public had a short
attention span and had reason to think that it wouldn’t be long before the CSE’s report faded,
just as the Kinley water issue had earlier this year.
On the other hand, he wondered if the situation might offer the company an opportunity to
display higher standards of social responsibility at a time when it needed to differentiate itself
from the competition. Multinationals had slipped in numerous situations of late and were
blamed for not adhering to the same standards in developing countries as in industrialized
nations. The additive effect of this negative press meant that the potential
damage to Coke’s reputation was even greater. Finally, an ineffective resolution would be a
devastating blow to the momentum Coke had gained after three long years of work on the
marketing front.
13
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
This time, it analysed the contents of 12 cold drink brands sold in and around the capital.
They were tested for organochlorine and organophosphorus pesticides and synthetic
pyrethroids — all commonly used in India as insecticides.
All samples contained residues of four extremely toxic pesticides and insecticides: lindane,
DDT, malathion and chlorpyrifos. In all samples, levels of pesticide residues far exceeded the
maximum residue limit for pesticides in water used as ‘food’, set down by the European
Economic Commission (EEC). Each sample had enough poison to cause — in the long term
— cancer, damage to the nervous and reproductive systems, birth defects and severe
disruption of the immune system.
What we found
∞ Market leaders Coca-Cola and Pepsi had almost similar concentrations of pesticide
residues. Total pesticides in all PepsiCo brands on an average were 0.0180 mg/l
(milligramme per litre), 36 times higher than the EEC limit for total pesticides
(0.0005 mg/l). Total pesticides in all Coca-Cola brands on an average were 0.0150
mg/l, 30 times higher than the EEC limit.
∞ While contaminants in the ‘Dil mange more’ Pepsi were 37 times higher than the EEC
limit, they exceeded the norms by 45 times in the ‘Thanda matlab Coca-Cola’
product.
∞ Mirinda Lemon topped the chart among all the tested brand samples, with a total
pesticide concentration of 0.0352 mg/l.
The cold drinks sector in India is a much bigger money-spinner than the bottled water
segment. In 2001, Indians consumed over 6,500 million bottles of cold drinks. Its growing
popularity means that children and teenagers, who glug these bottles, are drinking a toxic
potion.
PML also tested two soft drink brands sold in the US, to see if they contained pesticides.
They didn’t.
14
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
The question, therefore, is: how can apparently quality-conscious multinationals market
products unfit for human consumption?
CSE found that the regulations for the powerful and massive soft drinks industry are much
weaker, indeed non-existent, as compared to those for the bottled water industry. The norms
that exist to regulate the quality of cold drinks are a maze of meaningless definitions. This
"food" sector is virtually unregulated.
The Prevention of Food Adulteration (PFA) Act of 1954, or the Fruit Products Order (FPO)
of 1955 — both mandatory acts aimed at regulating the quality of contents in beverages such
as cold drinks — do not even provide any scope for regulating pesticides in soft drinks. The
FPO, under which the industry gets its licence to operate, has standards for lead and arsenic
that are 50 times higher than those allowed for the bottled water industry.
What’s more, the sector is also exempted from the provisions of industrial licensing under
the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. It gets a one-time license to operate
from the ministry of food processing industries; this license includes a no-objection
certificate from the local government as well as the state pollution control board, and a water
analysis report. There are no environmental impact assessments, or citing regulations. The
industry’s use of water, therefore, is not regulated.
Source: CSE Press Release, “Hard Truths about Soft Drinks,” 8/5/03.
15
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Source: CSE Press Release, “Hard Truths about Soft Drinks,” 8/5/03.
16
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
17
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
18
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
1 Water 71
3 CO2 50
4 Sugar 13
5 Syrup 17
6 Packaging Material 25
7 Container Washing 17
8 Finished Product 18
9 Market Samples 15
TOTAL 441
19
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
1998-1999 5670
1999-2000 6230
2000-2001 6450
2001-2002 6600
2002-2003 10000
20
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
21
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Wherever Coca-Cola does business, we strive to be trusted partners and good citizens. We
are committed to managing our business around the world with a consistent set of values that
represent the highest standards of integrity and excellence. We share these values with our
bottlers, making our system stronger.
These core values are essential to our long-term business success and will be reflected in all
of our relationships and actions - in the marketplace, the workplace, the environment and the
community.
Marketplace
We will adhere to the highest ethical standards, knowing that the quality of our products, the
integrity of our brands and the dedication of our people build trust and strengthen
relationships. We will serve the people who enjoy our brands through innovation, superb
customer service, and respect for the unique customs and cultures in the communities where we
do business.
Workplace
We will treat each other with dignity, fairness and respect. We will foster an inclusive
environment that encourages all employees to develop and perform to their fullest potential,
consistent with a commitment to human rights in our workplace. The Coca-Cola workplace
will be a place where everyone's ideas and contributions are valued, and where responsibility
and accountability are encouraged and rewarded.
Environment
We will conduct our business in ways that protect and preserve the environment. We will
integrate principles of environmental stewardship and sustainable development into our
business decisions and processes.
Community
We will contribute our time, expertise and resources to help develop sustainable
communities in partnership with local leaders. We will seek to improve the quality of life
through locally-relevant initiatives wherever we do business.
Responsible corporate citizenship is at the heart of The Coca-Cola Promise. We believe that
what is best for our employees, for the community and for the environment is also best for
our business.
22
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
SVP WW Pu blic
Affairs &
Communications
Assistant VP & Director, Health & Director, Financial Director, Marketing Director, North Director, Asia
Director, Media Nutrition Communications Communications America Communications
SouRreclaetio: nC
s
ase wrCiotmemr udn eicartiivones d from Coca-Cola Company Web sCoitmemunications
Senior Manager,
Public Affairs &
Comm, C-C India
23
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Exhibit 10: Myths and Facts from Coca-Cola India Web site
Since August 5, 2003 the quality and safety of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo products in India
have been called into question by a local NGO, the Centre for Science and Environment
(CSE). The basis of the allegations are tests conducted on products of Coca-Cola and
PepsiCo by CSE’s internal unaccredited laboratory, the Pollution Monitoring Laboratory.
In India, as in the rest of the world, our plants use a multiple barrier system to remove
potential contaminants and unwanted natural substances including iron, sulfur, heavy metals
as well as pesticides. Our products in India are safe and are tested regularly to ensure that
they meet the same rigorous standards we maintain across the world.
The result of these allegations has been consumer confusion, significant impact on the sale
of a safe and high-quality product, and the erosion of international investor confidence in the
Indian business sector. This situation calls for the development of national sampling and
testing protocols for soft drinks, an end to sensationalizing unsubstantiated allegations, and
co-operation by all parties concerned in the interests of both Indian consumers and
companies with significant investments in the Indian economy.
The facts versus the fiction False statements made in recent weeks have led to false
perceptions by Indian consumers:
My th Coca-Co la pro d ucts in In d ia co n tain pest icide resid ues that are abo ve E U norms.
Fact Throu gh o u t all of our o peratio n s in In d ia, strin gen t q uality monitorin g takes p lace
coverin g b o th the so urce water we u se as well as o ur fin ished pro duct. We test for traces
of pesticide in gro u n d water to the level of parts per b illio n. This is eq u ivalen t to one
dro p in a bill io n dro p s. For compariso n ’ s sake, th i s w o u ld also be eq u ivalen t to
measuring one seco n d in 3 2 years, or less than one perso n in the entire p o p u latio n in
Ind ia. These test s req u ire specialized eq u ipment at accred ited lab s to have accurate
resu lts. E ven at these strin gen t min iscu le levels we are well w it h in the in ternatio nally
accep ted safety norms.
My th Coca-Co la pro d ucts so ld in In d ia are "toxic" and unfit for human con sumptio n.
24
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Coca-Co la has d ual stan dard s in the pro d uctio n of its pro d ucts, o ne h ig h standard for
My th
western co un tries, ano ther for Ind ia.
Fact The soft drin k s manufactured in Ind ia co nform to the same h igh stan dard s of quality as in
the USA an d E urope. Thro ug h our g lo bally accep ted an d validated manufacturin g
processes an d Q uality Management sy stems, we en sure that o ur state-of-the-art
manufacturin g facilities are eq u ip ped to pro v ide the con sumer th e hig hest q uality
beverage each time. We strin gen tly test o ur soft drin k s in In d ia at in depen den t,
accred ited an d world-class lab oratories b o th locally an d in ternatio nally.
Fact There are no standard s for soft drin k s in the US, the E U, or Ind ia. In Ind ia, water u sed for
beverage manufacture must conform to drin k in g water standard s. The water u sed by Coca-
Cola co nforms to b o th BIS and E U stan dard s for drin k in g water and our pro d uctio n
pro toco ls en sure th is thro u g h a focu s o n process con tro l and tes tin g of the water u sed in
o ur manufacturing process and the final pro d uct q uality.
My th Coca-Co la has p u t o u t resu lt s for K in ley water on ly and no t for their soft drin k s.
Fact The resu lt s of pro d uct tests co n ducted b y TN O N u tritio n an d Fo o d Research Lab oratory
in the Netherlan d s is co nclu siv e and is availab le o n The Science Behin d O ur Q uality
web page.
My th In ternatio nal compan ies like Coca-Co la are “co lo n izin g” In d ia.
Fact The Coca-Co la bu sin ess in Ind ia is a local b u sines s. Our beverages in Ind ia are pro d uced
locally, we emplo y tho u san d s of Ind ian citizen s, our prod uct ran ge an d marketin g reflect
Ind ian tastes an d lifesty les, an d we are deep ly inv o lved in the life of the local
commun ities in w h ich we o perate. The Coca-Co la b u sin ess sy stem directly emplo y s
approximately 1 0,0 0 0 local peo p le in In d ia. In ad d itio n, in depen den t stu d ies have
d ocumented that, by pro v id in g o pp ortu n ities for local en terprises, the Coca-Co la
b u sines s also generates a sig n ifican t emplo yment “mu lt ip l ier effect.” In In d ia, we
in d irectly create emplo yment for more than 1 2 5,0 00 peo p le in related in d u stries thro u g h
o ur vast procurement, su p p ly an d d is trib u t io n sy stem.
Farmers in In d ia are u sin g Coca-Co la an d o ther soft drin k s as pest icides b y spray in g
My th
them on their crop s.
Fact Soft drin k s d o n o t act in a similar way to pesticides w hen ap p lied to the gro u n d or cro p s.
There is n o scien tific basis for th i s and the u se of soft drin k s for th is p urp o se w o u ld be
25
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
to tally ineffective.
In In d ia, as in the rest of the w orld, our pro d ucts are world class and safe and the treated
water u sed to make our beverages there meets the h ig hest in ternatio nal stan dard s.
26
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Bibliography
Argenti, Paul A.. Collaborating with Activists: How Starbucks Works with NGOs.
California Managemen t Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, Fall 2004.
Argenti, Paul A. and Nymph Kaul. Interview of Sanjiv Gupta, President and CEO of
Coca-Cola India, June 2004.
Bhatia, Gauri. Multinational Corporations: Pro or Con? Outlook India, October 29,
2003.
Business Week Online, Things Aren’t Going Better with Coke, June 28, 1999
Centre for Science and Environmen t (CSE): Analysis of Pesticide Residues in Soft
Drinks, August 5, 2003.
Coca-Cola India. Marketing: Questioning Paradig ms, Internal Company Presenta tion.
Dawar, Niraj and Nancy Dai. Cola Wars in China: The Future is Here. HBS Case, August
21, 2003.
Dey, Saikat. In terview on Indian history and econom ic liberalization. January 10, 2005.
h t tp://www.coca-cola.com/flashIndex1.h tml
h t tp://www.coca-colaindia.com/
h t tp://www.indiaresource.org/
h t tp://www.killercoke.org
h t tp://www.myenjoyzone.com/press1/truth.h tm
“Global Brand Scorecard 2003: Special Report.” Interbrand, as seen in Business Week
8/04/03.
27
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Keller, Kevin Lane. Strategic Brand Manage ment. P ren tice Hall, 1998.
Pendergrast, Mark: For God, Country and Coca-Cola. Charles Scribners, 1993.
Srivastava, Amit: Coke with a New Twist: Toxic Cola, India Resource Cen ter, February
15, 2004.
The Corporate Web Site as an I mage Restoration Tool: The Case of Coca-Cola
Yoffie, David B. and Yusi Wang, Cola Wars Continue: Coke versus Pepsi in the Twenty-
First Century. HBS Case, January 11, 2002.
Yoffie, David B. and Richard Seet, Internationalizing the Cola Wars: The Battle for
China and Asian Markets. HBS Case, May 31, 1995.
28
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
Endnotes
1 “Toxic effect: Coke sales fall by a sharp 30-40%,” The Economic Times, 8/13/03, p 1.
2 “Controversy-ridden year for soft drinks.” Business Line, New Delhi, 12/30/03, p 6.
3 “Toxic effect.”
4 “Hard Truths About Soft Drinks.” Center for Science and Environment, Press Release, 8/5/03.
5 “No standards for world-wide pesticide residues in soft-drinks.” Business Line, New Delhi, 10/03/03 p 9.
6 “Coke & Pepsi in India: Pesticides in Carbonated Beverages.”
http://www.vedpuriswar.org/articles/Indiancases retrieved 12/7/04
7 “Tests show pesticides in soft drinks, claims CSE,” Economic Times, 8/6/03, p 1.
8 “Coke & Pepsi in India: Pesticides in Carbonated Beverages”
9 http://www.indiastat.com
10 “Coca-Cola India.” Nymph Kaul, 2004. and Coca-Cola Company Website: http://www2.coca-
cola.com/heritage/ and Pendergrast, For God, Country and Coca-Cola. Charles Scribner’s, 1993.
11 http://www2.coca-cola.com/ourcompany/aroundworld.html
12 Pendergrast, 172.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid, 199
15 Ibid, 200-201.
16 “The Top 100 Brands: Interbrand Brand Scorecard 2003.” Interbrand Special Report, as seen in Business
Week 8/4/03.
17 Ibid
18 The World’s Greatest Brands, A Review by Interbrand. Edited by Nicholas Kochan.
19 Strategic Brand Management. Kevin Lane Keller, page 153.
20 http://www.portobello.com.au/portobello/reading/memorabilia_cocacola.htm
21 “Brands of Coca-Cola in India,” Rai University, 11/04.
22 http://www.coca-colaindia.com
23 Sanjiv Gupta Biography, Rai University.
24 “Coca-Cola India to Double Capacity,” Kolkata, 3/8/03.
25 http://www.coca-colaindia.com
26 Gupta Bio
27 http://www.indiastat.com
28 Ibid
29 Ibid
30 “Broken commitments: The case of Pepsi in India.” Kavaljit Singh, PIRG Update, May 1997.
31 Interview with Nymph Kaul, 9/20/04.
32 Coca-Cola India Internal Marketing Presentation
33 Ibid
29
Coca-Cola India no. 1-0000
34 Kaul
35 Kaul
36 Ibid
37 http://www.coca-colaindia.com
38 Ibid
39 Ibid
40 “The Corporate Web site as an Image Restoration Tool.” Nicola K. Graves and Randall L. Waller, 2004.
41 “Coca-Cola accused of a ‘companywide pattern.’” Unger, H, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, p H1,
(1999a, April 24).
42 “The real thing: Truth and power at the Coca-Cola Company.” Hays, C.L., New York: Random House
2004.
43 Ibid
44 “Coke crisis: Equity erodes as brand troubles mount.” MacArthur, K., & Linnett, R., Advertising Age, p. 3,
4/24/00.
45 “Coke & Pepsi in India: Pesticides in Carbonated Beverages,” p. 8
46 “Pure Water or Pure Peril,” CSE press release 2/03.
47 Ibid
48 “Collaborating with Activists: How Starbucks Works with NGOs.” Argenti, Paul A., CMR, Fall 2004.
49 http://www.cseindia.org
50 “Coke & Pepsi in India: Pesticides in Carbonated Beverages,” p. 3.
51 “The Gulp War,” Supriya Bezbaruat and Malini Goyal, India Today, 8/25/03, pp 50-53.
52 http://www.coca-colaindia.com
53 “Shocked Dehlites Stay Away from Soft Drinks,” The Hindu, New Dehli, 8/07/03 p. 1
30