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    Empirical Evidence:: Application

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    penelopegerhard
    This document discusses social insurance programs and their potential moral hazard effects. It examines empirical evidence on moral hazard in unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and workers' compensation. It also analyzes the costs and benefits of social insurance programs for firms, including how experience rating affects layoffs and costs. The document concludes by discussing implications for reforming programs, such as adjusting benefits generosity, targeting, experience rating, and the potential for worker self-insurance.

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    Empirical Evidence:: Application

    Uploaded by

    penelopegerhard
    32 views1 page
    This document discusses social insurance programs and their potential moral hazard effects. It examines empirical evidence on moral hazard in unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and workers' compensation. It also analyzes the costs and benefits of social insurance programs for firms, including how experience rating affects layoffs and costs. The document concludes by discussing implications for reforming programs, such as adjusting benefits generosity, targeting, experience rating, and the potential for worker self-insurance.

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    Public Finance

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    p19

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    This document discusses social insurance programs and their potential moral hazard effects. It examines empirical evidence on moral hazard in unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and workers' compensation. It also analyzes the costs and benefits of social insurance programs for firms, including how experience rating affects layoffs and costs. The document concludes by discussing implications for reforming programs, such as adjusting benefits generosity, targeting, experience rating, and the potential for worker self-insurance.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    32 views1 page

    Empirical Evidence:: Application

    Uploaded by

    penelopegerhard
    This document discusses social insurance programs and their potential moral hazard effects. It examines empirical evidence on moral hazard in unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and workers' compensation. It also analyzes the costs and benefits of social insurance programs for firms, including how experience rating affects layoffs and costs. The document concludes by discussing implications for reforming programs, such as adjusting benefits generosity, targeting, experience rating, and the potential for worker self-insurance.

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    14.3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance Programs . . . . . .

    398
    Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance 398
    Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance 400
    Evidence for Moral Hazard in DI 402
    Evidence for Moral Hazard in WC 403
    Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of DI 404
    Empirical Evidence: Kruegers Study of Workers Compensation 405

    14.4 The Costs and Benefits of Social Insurance to Firms . . . . . 406


    The Effects of Partial Experience Rating in UI on Layoffs 406
    The Benefits of Partial Experience Rating 408
    Application: The Cash Cow of Partial Experience Rating 408
    Workers Compensation and Firms 409

    14.5 Implications for Program Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410


    Benefits Generosity 410
    Targeting 410
    Experience Rating 411
    Worker Self-Insurance? 411
    Application: Reforming UI 412

    14.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413

    Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413

    Questions and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

    Advanced Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

    APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 14 Advanced Quasi-Experimental Analysis . . 416

    CHAPTER 15 Health Insurance I: Health Economics


    and Private Health Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
    15.1 An Overview of Health Care in the United States . . . . . . . 421
    How Health Insurance Works: The Basics 422
    Private Insurance 423
    Medicare 427
    Medicaid 427
    TRICARE/CHAMPVA 428
    The Uninsured 428
    Empirical Evidence: Health Insurance and Mobility 430

    15.2 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Patients? . . . . . . . 432


    Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Health Insurance for Patients 432
    Moral Hazard Costs of Health Insurance for Patients 433
    Application: The Problem with McAllen, Texas 436

    xvii

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