A A

HCAL 55/2017
B B
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
C HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION C

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

D D
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 55 OF 2017
____________
E E

BETWEEN
F
KWOK CHEUK KIN Applicant
G G
and
H H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE 1st Putative
Respondent
I I

SECRETARY FOR SECURITY 2nd Putative

J Respondent J

K ____________ K

L L
Before: Hon Chow J in Court

M
Date of Hearing: 29 September 2017 M
Date of Decision: 29 September 2017
N N
Date of Reasons for Decision: 19 October 2017

O O
______________________________
P P
REASONS FOR DECISION
Q
______________________________ Q

R R
INTRODUCTION

S 1. On 22 February 2017, the Hong Kong Police Inspectors S

Association and the Junior Police Officers Association held a joint special
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meeting at the Police Sports and Recreation Club. It is not in dispute that
B B
no notification of intention to hold the meeting was given to the
C C
Commissioner of Police pursuant to section 7(1) of the Public Order

D
Ordinance, Cap 245 (the Ordinance)1. D

E 2. The Commissioner (through his representative) and the E

Secretary for Security both publicly expressed the view that the special
F
meeting was excepted from the definition of meeting contained in
G section 2(1) because of its professional or business nature, and G

accordingly no advance notification of intention to hold the meeting was

H H
required to be given to the Commissioner under section 7(1).
I I

3. The applicant contends, however, that the meeting was a

J J
public meeting for the purpose of section 7(1) and notification of
K intention to hold that meeting was required to be given to the K

Commissioner, with the consequence that the meeting was an

L L
unauthorized assembly within the meaning of section 17A(2).
M M

4. In his draft Re-Amended Form 86, the applicant seeks

N N
declaratory relief to this effect, as well as an order of mandamus to require
O the Commissioner to investigate into the conduct of the meeting, O

particularly with respect to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe

P P
that any offence under the Ordinance has been committed.
Q Q

R R

S S
1
In these reasons for decision, unless otherwise expressly indicated, references to
T sections or sub-sections shall be references to the sections or sub-sections of the T
Ordinance.
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5. The application for leave to apply for judicial review came

B B
before this court on 29 September 2017. The putative respondents
C C
objected to leave being granted on the grounds that:-

D (1) the meeting was not a meeting given its purpose; D

E
(2) neither was it a public meeting given its venue; and E

(3) the applicant clearly lacked standing to make the application.

F

G 6. At the conclusion of the hearing, I informed that parties that G

the application was dismissed because it was clear that:-

H H
(1) the place at which the meeting was held was not at the
I material time a place to which the public or any section of the I

public was entitled or permitted to have access, and therefore

J J
it was not a meeting held in a public place, and hence not a
K public meeting, for the purpose of section 7(1); and K

L (2) the applicant did not have a sufficient interest in the matter to L

which the application related,

M M
with detailed reasons to be given later, which I now do.
N N

BASIC FACTS
O O
7. For the purpose of disposing of the leave application, the
P P
following summary of the relevant facts should suffice.

Q Q
8. The Hong Kong Police Inspectors Association (the
R R
HKPIA), previously known as the Local Inspectors Association, was

S
originally established in March 1957. It is a staff association comprising S
about 1,800 members, all being serving police offices at the inspectorate
T T
rank. The aim of the HKPIA is to advocate for the welfare of its members.

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9. The Junior Police Officers Association (the JPOA) was

B B
established on 27 October 1977. It is also a staff association comprising
C C
members who are police officers serving at the ranks of station sergeant,

D
sergeant and police constable (collectively junior police officers) as well D
as retired junior police officers. The aim of the JPOA is to serve as a
E E
bridge of communication between junior police officers and the Force
Management and the Government, and to seek fair treatment of junior F
police officers in terms of welfare, benefits and service conditions.
G G

10. Both the HKPIA and JPOA are registered under the Societies
H H
Ordinance, Cap 151. They are independent from the Police Force and are
I not subordinate bodies of the Police Force. I

J J
11. The Police Sports and Recreation Club (PSRC) is a private
K club offering a range of sports, recreation, catering and conferencing K

facilities for members of the PSRC and members of the Police Officers
L L
Club (POC). General POC membership is available to all serving and
M retired police officers at the inspectorate rank or above, civilian officers of M

equivalent status and qualified retired officers and family members. PSRC
N N
membership is available to all serving regular and auxiliary police officers,
O serving civilian staff attached to the Police Force, and qualified retired O

regular police officers and civilian staff.

P P

Q 12. The PSRC is located at No 430, Sai Yeung Choi Street North, Q

Kowloon, which is Government property allocated to the Police Force.

R R
The Social Amenities Council of the Police Force oversees and manages
S the PSRC. Only members of the POC and PSRC, and guests invited by S

members with full escort, are allowed entry into the PSRC. It is not open
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to the public. Prior to entry, a member is required to present his proof of

B B
identity, normally in the form of membership card (PSRC or POC),
C C
warrant card or civilian staff card, for inspection at the main entrance of

D
the PSRC by security staff. D

E 13. A member may normally invite up to no more than three E

guests at any one time to enter the club premises of the PSRC. There are
F
some exceptions to this general rule, which it is not necessary to set out in
G this decision. There are also specific rules requiring a guest admitted to G

the club premises to be accompanied at all times by the member who

H H
invites the guest. Again, there are some exceptions to this general
I requirement which are not relevant for the purpose of this decision. I

J J
14. The events which led to seven police officers being convicted
K of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and, in the case K

of one of them, the additional offence of common assault on 14 February

L L
2017 in District Court Criminal Case No 980 of 2015 are well known, and
M do require recitation here. M

N N
15. Arising out of the aforesaid convictions, on 20 February 2017,
O the JPOA published a letter on their website announcing that they would O

convene a special meeting of the representatives ( ) on

P P
22 February 2017 at 7:00 pm at the PSRC for the purpose of reporting on
Q the work done in support of seven colleagues ( Q

R
). In the letter, it was stated that: (i) one of the purposes of R
establishing the JPOA was to reflect the majority views of colleagues to
S S
the Force Management so that the Force Management would understand

T
the views of the officers at the lower ranks and be able to assess their T

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morale; (ii) the JPOA had done a lot of work to support the seven
B B
colleagues who had been imprisoned, and (iii) the JPOA would report to
C C
the representatives and members of their work, receive the views of the

D
representatives and members, and submit the same to the Force D
Management. The letter ended by stating that apart from the
E E
representatives of the JPOA, all members would be welcomed to attend the
meeting. F

G 16. On or about 20 February 2017, the HKPIA also announced on G

their website that they would convene a special meeting of the members
H H
() at the same time, date and venue as the aforesaid meeting
I I
of the JPOA for the purpose of reporting to members the support and

J
follow up arrangements for staff who were recently involved in a court J
case due to the unlawful Occupy Movement (
K K
). The announcement
L stated that the matter was urgent and called on all brothers and sisters to L

be united.
M M

N 17. The joint special meeting of the JPOA and HKPIA (the N
Special Meeting) were held between 7:00 pm and 9:30 pm on
O O
22 February 2017 at the PSRC, more specifically the Indoor Sports Hall,

P the covered spectators stand (north perimeter), the football pitch (adjacent P

to the said spectators stand) and the rugby pitch extending to the south
Q Q
perimeter, of the PSRC. During that period of time, the catering outlets
R (namely, the Chinese restaurant, main bar, The House of Chivalry, the R

Sportsmans Bar, and BBQ site), training facilities and sporting facilities at
S S
the PSRC such as the lawn bowls green, bowling center, tennis courts, and
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squash courts, remained open for the use of PSRC and POC members as
B B
well as their guests as usual.
C C

18. It was reported in the media that over 30,000 participants

D D
attended the Special Meeting. Some well-known public figures who were
E not current or retired police officers, including a number of legislative E

councillors, were also invited to attend the Special Meeting. They were
F
introduced as observers and seated on the stage alongside various
G speakers. At the meeting, a resolution was passed to the effect that the G

Chief Executive of the Government of the HKSAR would be requested to

H H
promote legislation for the offence of insulting public officers in the
I execution of duties. I

J J
19. Subsequent to the Special Meeting, in response to questions
K on whether the JPOA and HKPIA ought to have notified the Commissioner K

of the intention to hold the meeting in accordance with sections 7 and 8,

L L
both the Commissioner (through his representative) and the Secretary
M expressed the view that because of the professional or business nature M

of the meeting, notification was not required to be given to the

N N
Commissioner under the Ordinance.
O O

20. On 27 February 2017, the applicant filed his Form 86 to seek

P P
leave to apply for judicial review of the Commissioners alleged decision
Q that the JPOA and HKPIA did not have to apply to him for a letter of no Q

objection in respect of the holding of the Special Meeting.

R R

S S

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21. On or about 25 April 2017 and 18 September 2017

B B
respectively, the applicant applied to amend and re-amend his Form 86.
C C
The decision under challenge has now been reformulated as (inter alia)

D The statement(s) made by the 1st Respondent in or around 23rd D

to 24th February 2017 and by the 2nd Respondent on 27th February
E 2017 to the effect that no notification has to be given under the E
Public Order Ordinance (Cap.245) with respect to [the Special
Meeting].
F

The relief now sought by the applicant is summarised in paragraph 4

G G
above.
H H

THE SPECIAL MEETING WAS NOT A PUBLIC MEETING

I I

22. By section 7(1)(a), a public meeting may take place if, but
J J
only if, inter alia, the Commissioner is notified under section 8 of the
K intention to hold the meeting. Under section 2(1):- K

(1) the expression public meeting is defined to mean any

L L
meeting held or to be held in a public place; and
M M
(2) the expression public place is defined to mean any place to
N which for the time being the public or any section of the N

public are entitled or permitted to have access, whether on

O O
payment or otherwise, and, in relation to any meeting,
P includes any place which is or will be, on the occasion and for P

the purposes of such meeting, a public place.

Q Q

R 23. The combined effect of the above provisions in the Ordinance R

is that the notification requirement under section 7(1) applies only to a

S S
meeting held or to be held in a public place as that expression is defined
T in section 2(1), ie, a place to which for the time being the public or any T

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section of the public are entitled or permitted to have access, whether on

B B
payment or otherwise. No notification of intention to hold a meeting in a
C C
place other than a public place is required to be given to the

D
Commissioner under section 7(1). On the other hand, a meeting held in D
private premises may nevertheless be a meeting held in a public place if,
E E
on the occasion and for the purposes of that meeting, the public or any
section of the public are permitted to have access to the relevant private F
premises. In short, the critical question is whether the meeting is open to
G G
the public or any section of the public, and not whether the meeting takes

H
place in public or private premises, although the fact that the meeting takes H
place in private premises would obviously be relevant to the former
I I
question.

J J
24. The meaning of the expression public place in the context
K K
of the Ordinance has received judicial consideration on a number of

L
occasions. In Lam Shine-Chow v The Queen, HCMA 183/1985 (21 March L
1985), the question before the court was whether the common corridor on
M M
the 12th floor of a private building was a public place for the purpose of

N
the offence of fighting in public under section 25 of the Ordinance. N
Deputy High Court Judge Cruden held that it was not, for the following
O O
reasons:-

P 10 I now turn to consider the definition of public place in the P

Public Order Ordinance, in the light of those authorities.
Q The undisputed evidence is that No. 37 Belcher's Street is a Q
private building. The individual private premises of the
appellant and his neighbour are situate on the 12th floor of
R that building. I infer that the other floors are similarly R
occupied. The building is supplied with a caretaker. I also
infer that as commonly occurs in Hong Kong in the case of
S S
multi-occupied private buildings access to the individual
premises of the occupiers is obtained by corridors, staircases
T and lifts within the building which are shared in common T
with the occupiers.

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11 Access to the building is not, of course, limited to the

B occupiers but lawful access would also be available to their B
licensees and invitees. However, persons other than the
C occupiers, who may lawfully enter the premises are neither C
members of the public or any section of the public. Their
legal right to access does not arise from being members of
D the public but solely by virtue of their status as licensees or D
invitees of the occupiers.
E E
25. R v Chan Chu Shi, HCMA 1596/1989 (13 February 1990) also
F
concerned the offence of fighting in public, and the question there was

G
whether the World Trade Centre Carpark was a public place. The appeal G
was ultimately disposed of on the basis of lack of evidence regarding the
H H
status of the carpark. Nevertheless, Ryan J agreed with the above

I
statement of principle by Deputy High Court Judge Cruden and also I
referred to the following judgment of Bridge LJ (as he then was) in
J J
Edwards (1978) Cr App R 228 at 231:-

K Approaching the matter quite independently of any authority K

and looking simply at the contrasting definitions of public place
L and private premises in the statue, it seems to this Court that it is L
quite impossible to hold that the expression public place can be
construed as extending to the front gardens of private premises,
M simply on the footing on which the learned judge relied that M
members of the public have an implied licence to pass through
those private gardens in order to obtain access to the front doors
N N
of private premises if they have some lawful occasion to do so. It
is not qua members of the public that they thus enjoy access. It is
O qua lawful visitors. Indeed it is certainly only by permission of O
the owner, occupier or leasee of the premises that persons
obtaining access to front doors in the manner referred to are
P entitled to access. P

Q Q
26. In HKSAR v Chau Fung [1998] 4 HKC 652, the question

R
arose whether a closed area near the border between Hong Kong and the R
Mainland which was not owned by any private owner was a public place
S S
for the purpose of the offence of possession of offensive weapon in a

T
public place under section 33(1) of the Ordinance. On the special facts of T

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that case, Woo J (as he then was) held that it was. The following statement
B B
of principle, at 659-660 of the law report, is of note:-
C C
The important point to note from these cases is that whether the
persons who are entitled or permitted to have access to the
D D
particular location or area are so entitled or permitted qua their
being members of the public or members of a section of the
E public. If they have access as a particular class of persons, E
though they may be considered also part of the public, that alone
will not suffice. For example, persons pay for tickets to get into a
cinema to watch a film, and despite the requirement of payment, F
the inside of the cinema that such persons are able to have access
G is a public place, because the persons are members of the public G
and have access qua that status. On the other hand, if contractors
go into a private residential building to perform repair works,
H they are granted the licence by the occupiers or owners to do so, H
but the building cannot be considered a public place because
although the contractors are members of the public, they do not
I I
have access to the building qua their being members of the
public, but by their being invited in by the occupiers or owners.
J J

27. The above authorities show that private premises to which

K K
access is restricted to the lawful occupiers invitees or licensees (in
L addition to, of course, the lawful occupiers themselves) would not L

generally be regarded as public places under the Ordinance.

M M

N 28. In the present case, the Special Meeting was held in the club N

premises of the PSRC, which undoubtedly were private premises. There is

O O
no evidence to indicate that the public or any section of the public were
P permitted to have access to the PSRC to attend that meeting. As earlier P

mentioned, entry into the PSRC is generally restricted to members of the

Q Q
POC or PSRC and up to 3 guests per member. On the day in question
R (according to the evidence of Ho Wai-hung, the Manager of the PSRC), R

everyday access control was implemented at the various entrances of the

S S
PSRC. In particular, members (each bringing no more than 3 guests)
T intending to enter the PSRC were required to show their proof of identity T

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(ie, membership card or, in lieu of that, warrant card or civilian staff card)
B B
for inspection before admission. Security or PSRC staff at the entrances
C C
conducted inspection on the proof of identity shown by each member

D
before he/she, and his/her guests, could gain entry into the PSRC. On D
these facts, it seems to me to be clear that the PSRC, and more specifically
E E
the venue of the Special Meeting in the PSRC, was not on the occasion and
for the purpose of that meeting a place to which the public or any section F
of the public were entitled or permitted to have access. Accordingly, the
G G
Special Meeting was not a public meeting, and no notification of

H
intention to hold that meeting was required to be given to the H
Commissioner under the Ordinance.
I I

29. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Ng argues that the Special

J J
Meeting was a public meeting because the correct test is whether there
K K
was a bona fide selection process for entry to the meeting and the

L
screening mechanism must ensure that only members are admitted, and L
that no members of the public are in fact admitted (see paragraph 12.2 of
M M
Mr Ngs skeleton submissions dated 22 September 2017). In my view,

N
there is no proper basis to question the bona fides of the process by which N
access to the PSRC was restricted to members and up to 3 guests per
O O
member on the day in question. They gained entry into the PSRC as

P
lawful licensees or invitees and not as members of the public or a section P
of the public. The fact that some of the participants of the Special Meeting
Q Q
(including the legislative counsellors and possibly some other guests) were

R
not members of the JPOA or HKPIA (or indeed members of the PSRC or R
POC) did not mean that the PSRC, and more specifically the venue of the
S S
Special Meeting in the PSRC, became, on the occasion and for the purpose

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of that meeting, a place to which the public or any section of the public
B B
were entitled or permitted to have access.
C C

30. In passing, I should mention that in the draft re-amended

D D
Form 86, reference is also made to section 7(2)(b) in support of the
E contention that the Special Meeting was a public meeting. At the hearing E

on 29 September 2017, Mr Ng expressed informed the court that the

F
applicant would not rely on section 7(2)(b) for the purpose of his
G application for leave to apply for judicial review. With or without this G

concession, I consider it to be clear that section 7(2)(b) does not assist the
H H
applicants case. Its effect is to exempt a meeting in private premises from
I the notification requirement where the attendance at the meeting does not I

exceed 500 persons. It does not, however, have the effect of turning what
J J
would otherwise not be a public meeting into a public meeting just because
K K
the attendance at the meeting exceeds 500 persons.

L L
THE APPLICANT LACKS STANDING TO MAKE THE PRESENT
M APPLICATION M

N
31. Order 53, rule 3(7) of the Rules of High Court provides that N
the court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the applicant has a
O O
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.

P P
32. The question of what amounts to a sufficient interest for this
Q purpose was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re Wong Chi Kin, Q

CACV 80/2014 (26 September 2014). At paragraph 11 of the judgment of

R R
Lam VP (on behalf of the Court of Appeal), the following was stated:-
S S
Though the requirement of standing in public law is a liberal
one, an applicant must still have some interest in the matter to
T T
warrant leave being granted to him to challenge a public

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decision Leave would not be granted to a meddlesome

B busybody. Standing goes to jurisdiction and it has to be B
considered in the legal and factual context of the whole case.
C Merits are important. But there are other factors as well: the C
importance of vindicating the rule of law, the importance of the
issue raised, the existence and absence of any other challengers
D who have a greater interest in the matter, the nature of the breach D
of duty against which relief is sought.
E E
33. His Lordship referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court
F
of the United Kingdom in AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate

G
[2012] AC 868, in particular the following statements of principle:- G

(1) Lord Hope DPSC at paragraph 63

H H

I would not like to risk a definition of what constitutes

I standing in the public law context. But I would hold that the I
words directly affected which appear in rule 58.8(2) capture the
essence of what is to be looked for. One must, of course,
J J
distinguish between the mere busybody, to whom Lord Fraser of
Tullybelton referred in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p
K National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd K
[1982] AC 617, 646, and the interest of the person affected by or
having a reasonable concern in the matter to which the
L application related. The inclusion of the word directly provides L
the necessary qualification to the word affected to enable the
court to draw that distinction. A personal interest need not be
M M
shown if the individual is acting in the public interest and can
genuinely say that the issue directly affects the section of the
N public that he seeks to represent. N

O (2) Lord Reed at paragraph 170 O

P For the reasons I have explained, such an approach cannot be P

based upon the concept of rights, and must instead be based upon
the concept of interests. A requirement that the applicant
Q demonstrate an interest in the matter complained of will not Q
however operate satisfactorily if it is applied in the same way in
R all contexts. In some contexts, it is appropriate to require an R
applicant for judicial review to demonstrate that he has a
particular interest in the matter complained of: the type of
S interest which is relevant, and therefore required in order to have S
standing, will depend upon the particular context. In other
situations, such as where the excess or misuse of power affects
T T
the public generally, insistence upon a particular interest could

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prevent the matter being brought before the court, and that in
B turn might disable the court from performing its function to B
protect the rule of law. I say might, because the protection of
C the rule of law does not require that every allegation of unlawful C
conduct by a public authority must be examined by a court, any
more than it requires that every allegation of criminal conduct
D must be prosecuted. Even in a context of that kind, there must be D
considerations which lead the court to treat the applicant as
having an interest which is sufficient to justify his bringing the
E E
application before the court. What is to be regarded as sufficient
interest to justify a particular applicants bringing a particular
application before the court, and thus as conferring standing, F
depends therefore upon the context, and in particular upon what
will best serve the purposes of judicial review in that context.
G G

34. I consider the following principles to be applicable in

H H
determining the question of standing in judicial review.
I I
(1) Where the decision affects the applicants personal right or
J interest over and above that of the general public or a section J

of the public, the applicant should have little difficulty in

K K
showing a sufficient interest in the matter to which the
L application relates. L

M
(2) Where, however, the decision does not have such effect and M
the applicant is effectively pursuing the application as a
N N
representative of the public interest, the court adopts a holistic

O
approach by taking into account a host of relevant O
considerations including the merits of the application, the
P P
importance of vindicating the rule of law, the importance of

Q
the issue raised, the existence and absence of any other Q
challengers who have a greater interest in the matter, and the
R R
nature of the breach of duty against which relief is sought.

S (3) In such a situation, the applicant is not to be regarded as S

having a sufficient interest merely because the issue raised by

T T

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him is of public interest. As observed by Dyson LJ (as he

B B
then was) in R (Feakins) v Secretary of State for Environment,
C C
Food and Rural Affairs [2004] 1 WLR 1761, at paragraph 23,

D
if a claimant has no sufficient private interest to support a D
claim to standing, then he should not be accorded standing
E E
merely because he raises an issue in which there is,
objectively speaking, a public interest. F

(4) Equally, the applicant should not be regarded as having a

G G
sufficient interest merely because of the strong merits of the
H proposed challenge. As pointed out by Lord Reed in his H

judgment in AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate

I I
quoted above, the protection of the rule of law does not
J require that every allegation of unlawful conduct by a public J

authority must be examined by a court, any more than it

K K
requires that every allegation of criminal conduct must be
L prosecuted. L

M (5) Although there has undoubtedly been a trend to liberalize the M

requirement of standing in judicial review, the need to show a
N N
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates

O remains, in my view, an important filter to keep judicial O

review within its proper bounds and to prevent abuse of the

P P
courts process, particularly having regard to the explosive
Q increase in the number of applications for judicial review and, Q

more importantly, the complexities of the applications seen in

R R
recent years in Hong Kong.
S (6) Where the applicant does not have a personal right or interest S

in the subject matter of the judicial review but claims to make

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the application in a representative capacity, the court ought to

B B
be vigilant in examining whether he is a genuinely advancing
C C
a public interest in making the application or is motivated by

D
other reasons. In R (Feakins) v Secretary of State for D
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Dyson LJ stated,
E E
immediately following the sentence quoted above, the
following F

As Sedley J said in R v Somerset County Council, Ex p Dixon

G G
[1997] JPL 1030, when considering the issue of standing, the
court had to ensure that the claimant was not prompted by an ill
H motive, and was not a mere busybody or a trouble-maker. Thus, H
if a claimant seeks to challenge a decision in which he has no
private law interest, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in
I which the court will accord him standing, even where there is a I
public interest in testing the lawfulness of the decision, if the
J
claimant is acting out of ill-will or for some other improper J
purpose. It is an abuse of process to permit a claimant to bring a
claim in such circumstances. If the real reason why a claimant
K wishes to challenge a decision in which, objectively, there is a K
public interest is not that he has a genuine concern about the
decision, but some other reason, then that is material to the
L L
question whether he should be accorded standing.

M M
35. In the present case, Mr Ng argues that the applicant has both

N personal standing and representative standing to bring the present N

application. With respect to his personal standing, this is based on the
O O
applicants frequent participation and assistance in organising assemblies

P in the past and his intention to do so in the future (see paragraph 5 of P

Mr Ngs supplemental skeleton submissions dated 26 September 2017). It
Q Q
is apparent, however, from the evidence of the applicant that the sort of

R assemblies that he has participated or assisted in is very different in nature R

from the Special Meeting that the court is concerned with in the present
S S
application. In particular, none of those assemblies took place in private
T premises, or excluded participation by the public. They all involved public T

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A A

meetings or public processions in public places. Indeed, in paragraph 4(a)

B B
rd
of his 3 affirmation, the applicant says that he is a frequent participant of
C C
public procession, public marches and protests as well as public meetings

D
in Hong Kong, and in paragraph 4(e) of the same affirmation, he says that D
it is his intention to continue to participate and/or assist in organising
E E
public meetings and/or protests of a similar kind and magnitude in future.

F
36. In so far as representative standing is concerned, Mr Ng
G submits that the applicant has such standing on behalf of the public G

because the determination of the current issue, the proper construction of

H H
the [Ordinance] and the differential and inconsistent treatment between the
I [Special Meeting] and other assemblies [that the applicant participated in I

the past] will affect more than just the Applicant and there is no potential
J J
claimant that is better placed to bring the matter to Court (see
K K
paragraphs 6.1 and 6.4 of Mr Ngs supplemental skeleton submissions

L
dated 26 September 2017). I do not accept these submissions, for the L
following reasons:-
M M
(1) While I accept that the determination of the issues raised in
N the present application and the proper construction of the N

Ordinance would affect persons other than the applicant, as

O O
earlier mentioned, an applicant is not to be regarded as having
P a sufficient interest because the issue raised by him is of P

public interest.
Q Q
(2) For reasons stated in paragraph 35 above, there can be no real
R R
comparison between the Special Meeting and other

S
assemblies that the applicant previously participated in the S
past. It is thus meaningless to talk about differential or
T T
inconsistent treatment.

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A A

(3) It is plainly incorrect to say that there is no potential claimant

B B
that is better placed to bring the present challenge to the court.
C C
As pointed out by Mr Chan SC, [t]he Applicant is not a

D
Police Officer or staff. Nor is he a member of the PSRC or D
the Police Officers Club who might have been inconvenienced
E E
by the Meeting, and who would have had the use of the
spectators stand, football pitch, rugby pitch and/or Indoor F
Sports Hall at the PSRC but for their being booked by the
G G
Associations for the purpose of the Meeting. Indeed, there is

H
no evidence that he was even in the vicinity of the PSRC at H
the time of the Meeting.
I I

37. It is ironic that in the present application, the applicant would

J J
be seeking an interpretation of the Ordinance by the court which would
K K
impose stricter regulatory constraints upon meetings and assemblies in

L
Hong Kong. As a frequent participant of public meetings and procession, L
one would have thought that the applicant would instead be advocating for
M M
a more relaxed regulatory regime so that he, and other persons in a similar

N
position, would enjoy greater freedom of assembly. By seeking an order of N
mandamus to require the Commissioner to investigate into the conduct of
O O
the [Special Meeting], particularly with respect to whether there are

P
reasonable grounds to believe that any offence under [the Ordinance] has P
been committed, it seems clear that the applicants aim is not to advance
Q Q
any public interest for a greater freedom of assembly, but to put pressure

R
on or force the Commissioner to carry out investigation with a view to the R
organisers and/or participants of the Special Meeting being charged for
S S
having committed criminal offence(s). In my view, the applicant can

T
properly be described as a mere busybody or mere meddler, without it T

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A A

being necessary to label his application as having been actuated by ill

B B
motive or ill-will.
C C

38. Bearing in mind also the obvious lack of merits in the

D D
proposed challenge, I consider it to be clear that the applicant does not
E have sufficient interest in the matter to which the present application E

relates as required by Order 53, rule 3(7) of the Rules of High Court, with
F
the consequence that the application for leave to apply for judicial review
G must be refused. G

H H
39. Having reached the above conclusions, it is strictly not
I necessary for me to consider that the question of whether the Special I

Meeting is excepted from the definition of meeting in section 2(1) as

J J
being a gathering or assembly of persons convened or organized
K exclusively as a conference or seminar bona fide intended for the K

discussion of topics of a professional, business character. Had it

L L
been necessary to do so, I would have considered it reasonably arguable
M that this exception does not, or may not, apply to the Special Meeting M

having regard to the purpose of the meeting, the identity of the persons
N N
being invited to attend the meeting, the matters discussed at the meeting,
O the conduct of the participants at the meeting, as well as the resolution O

passed at the meeting.

P P

Q DISPOSITION Q

R 40. For the foregoing reasons, the applications for leave to amend R

or re-amend the Form 86, as well as the application for leave to apply for
S S
judicial review, are dismissed. Where an application for leave to apply for
T judicial review is dismissed on the ground that the applicant has no T

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A A

standing to make the application, it may properly be regarded as an abuse

B B
of the courts process. Taking into account also the lack of merits in the
C C
proposed challenge and the substantial assistance that the court has

D
received from the putative respondents (including the evidence filed on D
their behalf), I consider that the putative respondents ought to be entitled to
E E
the costs of resisting the various applications (including costs previously
reserved), to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for one counsel. I so F
order.
G G

41. Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for their assistance

H H
rendered to the court.
I I

J J

K (Anderson Chow) K
Judge of the Court of First Instance
L High Court L

M M
Mr Ernest CY Ng, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the applicant
N N
Mr Abraham Chan, SC and Ms Leone Cheung, SGC, instructed by
Department of Justice, for the putative respondents
O O

P P

Q Q

R R

S S

T T

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V V