Monitoring Ageing CCVTs
Monitoring Ageing CCVTs
Monitoring Ageing CCVTs
Abstract - Ageing Coupling Capacitor Voltage Transformers porcelain fragments and hot synthetic oil within the local
(CCVTs) can pose safety problems and possibly restrain system area (Figure 3). This debris is a real threat to staff safety and
operations. Catastrophic failure of a CCVT could start a wide- to surrounding plant (in a similar incident in a capacitor bank,
spread fault in the substation and/or endanger personnel work- Powerlink Queensland suffered damage to 26 plant items from
ing in a close proximity. The latter becomes a real danger when a capacitor can explosion). In addition, the CCVT is commonly
inspecting a suspicious CCVT or when Live Line work is being located on the substation bus and bus protection will clear
performed. CCVT monitoring becomes more and more impor- the fault. This can result in loss of supply to a large number
tant as the installed population of CCVTs ages with sporadic of customers and possibly incur a penalty from the Energy
incidents of catastrophic failures alerting both field personnel Regulator. Where CCVT supplies degrading voltages to revenue
and dispatching managers regarding safety and liability. metering, the billing data will contain an error. The billing
discrepancy can be substantial if the magnitude or phase error
Microprocessor-based protection relays facilitate cost-efficient is small enough to remain undetected for very long periods of
and broad deployment of CCVT monitoring functions across time, but large enough to accumulate into a significant energy
the organization. measurement error.
First, modern relays allow programming a number of indica- Powerlink is replacing its line protection relays with
tors that alone, or in combination, are reliable enough to raise microprocessor-based protection relays and it is beneficial and
alarms and initiate an in-depth engineering analysis. cost effective to provide VT monitoring within this relay.
Second, these relays can provide data recording and remote Emerging considerations in Australia are the legal requirement
access. This data includes high-resolution data such as oscil- for managers to exercise Duty of Care, especially with respect
lography, and long-term trending such as the magnitude profil- to staff safety [2]. This consideration requires managers to
ing. ensure staff safety in the substation and approved procedures
Third, relay-based CCVT monitoring schemes can be retrofitted exist for staff to safely isolate faulty HV assets.
in the existing installations. In many cases with a simple wiring This paper provides methods of monitoring with
and setting changes, existing relays could provide a solid CCVT microprocessor-based protection relays and providing
health indication. information for safely isolating CCVT assets, in a timely manner
The combination of reliable alarming via protective relays with and thus maintaining security of supply. In addition, novel
remote access yields a cost-efficient, easy to implement, and methods of monitoring a single phase CCVT are presented.
safe to operate, solution.
This paper presents a number of CCVT health indicators that 2. Failure Modes and Consequences
could be programmed on modern relays via logic and simple The failure modes for conventional CCVTs are:
math operands in order to monitor the CCVTs with a minimum
material and labor investment. Failure of one or more capacitor elements in the HV stack
(C1), which is usually oil impregnated. The critical factor is the
increase in voltage and stress upon healthy capacitors as each
1. Introduction capacitor fails, e.g. 275kV CCVT has about 160 capacitors in
CCVTs are widely used in transmission and distribution C1. This can lead to an avalanche failure mode and a possible
substations to provide proportional, secondary single-, or three- explosion.
phase voltages for protection, metering and control functions.
Failure of one or more capacitor elements in the LV grounding
The CCVT has three basic components: a capacitor divider
stack (C2), which is usually oil impregnated. The important factor
made from a group of high voltage capacitors and a lower
is the decrease in secondary voltage. However, this failure mode
voltage grounding capacitor(s), and a voltage transformer/filter
can result in an explosion as experienced in New Zealand when
element which provides the single phase secondary voltage
C2 failed due to a faulty connection.
(Figure 1).
Failure of the intermediate voltage transformer or the series
One common problem in electricity supply is the ageing
reactor, which can result in changes in phase angle and/or
population of CCVTs (Figure 2). Over many decades, the CCVT
voltage.
components will degrade and/or experience overvoltages.
This may result in capacitor element failure and the secondary Failure of the ferroresonance suppression circuit, which can
voltage progressively losing its integrity, but more importantly, produce waveform distortion, changes in phase angle and/
the CCVT can explode if sufficient number of capacitor elements or voltage. It is possible for ferroresonance events to occur
fail. The explosion can rupture the porcelain shell and radiate if the connected burden has too low a knee point voltage in
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its transformer(s). Powerlink experienced an intermittent DMM) in the output voltage. Investigation revealed there was
connection in the CCVTs ferroresonance damping circuit and an open circuited choke in the ferroresonance damping circuit
this fault produced a reasonably stable voltage (64V compared in the CCVT basebox due to an imperfectly soldered joint in the
to 67V on healthy phases) and fluctuating frequency in one wire, within a sleeve in the choke toroid. This open circuit had
phase between 47 to 53 Hz (50Hz nominal; measured with the effect of directly shunting portion of the VT primary winding
Fig. 1.
Construction of a
typical CCVT [1].
Fig. 2. 300
Distribution of CCVTs purchased
by Powerlink (sample plant, all
still in service). 250
200
150
100
50
0
1960-1965
1966-1970
1971-1975
1976-1980
1981-1985
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
2001-2005
< 1960
89
with a capacitive impedance rather than the normal high 50Hz The consequences of CCVT failure could be:
impedance and would have affected the voltage output.
The CCVT can explode if sufficient number of capacitor
Failure of the filter circuit or spark gaps, which are used to elements fail and arcing occurs within it. The explosion can
minimize harmonic and transient voltages in the output voltage. rupture the porcelain shell and radiate porcelain fragments and
Frequent overvoltage events can wear out the spark gap and hot synthetic oil within the local area. This debris is a real threat
the flashover voltage level increases. This will increase the stress to safety of staff and to surrounding plant.
on components in the VT circuit and these eventually fail.
The CCVT is commonly located on the substation bus and bus
External flashover along the porcelain bushing due to pollution protection will clear the fault. This can result in loss of supply
contamination of flashover clearance. The cause is incorrect to a large number of customers, or weakened system integrity
CCVT specification for the local environment when purchasing (stability problems).
the CCVT.
The failure mechanism was due to a generic or age related
Failure of expansion membrane, which results in contamination fault. Thus the remaining CCVTs could be deemed suspect
of oil and capacitor failure. Powerlink has experienced failure and, without monitoring, result in constraints upon system
of the expansion membrane in a magnetic VT because the operations and substation work.
membrane was incompatible with the synthetic oil. This
Progressive failure over a long period of time will cause
eventually resulted in the VT exploding.
incorrect revenue billing because one secondary voltage
was incorrect. Microprocessor revenue meters will alarm if
the voltage exceeds the typical limits of 80% to 115%. CCVT
monitoring can overcome this problem, eliminate the need to
repay/recoup the amount of incorrect billing and maintain a
companys reputation.
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Fig. 4.
New CCVT capacitor stack (left) and CCVT under high-voltage testing (right).
disadvantages are high cost and labour requirements, and its a SCADA communication link (such as DNP 3.0) to annunciate
possible the CCVT could fail between oil samples. CCVT alarms.
The provision of voltage waveforms in real time or as records
4. Attributes for CCVT Monitoring allows staff to investigate the problem and take appropriate
The required attributes for CCVT monitoring are: actions to maintain staff safety and security of supply.
Continuous, reliable monitoring is provided and the alarms The above information is provided by remote interrogation and
are supervised. in a timely manner. Powerlink has developed a 2MB Wide Area
Network (WAN), which connects to the majority of substations
It uses a relative voltage measurement technique so as to and it enables remote interrogation within 5 minutes.
give sensitive monitoring irrespective of unrelated transient
voltages. Microprocessor-based protection relays measure Modern microprocessor-based protection relays provide
zero sequence and/or negative sequence voltages providing many of these attributes and are ideal for performing this
for this attribute. monitoring.
OR
| |VA| - |VB| | > D2 ALARM
Fig. 11. VX
Monitoring single CCVT (VX = A VB | V2 | > D1
phase) with negative-sequence
VC
while using reference voltages (VB
& VC).All expressions are per unit. | VX |
| |VX| - |VB| | > D2
OR
| VB |
| VX | > D4
| VX | TIMER
| |VX| - |VC| | > D2 | VB | > D4
| VC | tPKP
AND
ALARM
| VC | > D4 tDPO
reference VT is healthy
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Frequency difference (D5 threshold): 2.5-3 times the worst- 6.3. Additional Filtering of Alarms
case relay frequency measurement error. For example with a
10mHz worst-case measuring error, one could set the allowable The CCVT monitoring alarm outputs are sent in real time to the
delta-frequency setting to 30-50mHz. network control centre over SCADA for operator investigation.
Normally, all three parameters (magnitudes, angles, and Powerlink has decided to perform post processing by
frequency) are identical. Should any of them divert due to CCVT computer of all alarms received at the control centre. The aims
failure, the synchrocheck permissive flag resets. This opens the are to detect high frequency of plant operation (e.g. tap changer
AND-gate, starts the timer, and sends an alarm if the situation operation of transformer) and to detect fleeting alarms, which
persists. may not be detected by humans.
Quite often the synchrocheck function is available as a CCVT monitoring alarms fall into the second aim and this
standard feature, but is not used on a given IED. This gives an is simple to achieve if a standard alarm naming convention
opportunity to use it as a voltage differential function to monitor is used. This computer filtering provides a safety net in the
a CCVT against a reference voltage. monitoring scheme.
In Figures 12 and 13 the supervision from the reference CCVT Table 1 shows an extracted alarm record of a failing CCVT at a
being healthy is optional. If the monitor triggers an alarm, the control centre.
operators should understand that either of the two CCVT could
have a problem, and both should be checked.
6.4. Additional Features of Microprocessor-based
Method of section 6.1.2 with increased sensitivity could also Relays
be used when borrowing the same phase CCVT for reference.
Microprocessor-based protection relays provide additional
| VA |
| |VA| - |VA(REF)| | > D2 functions beneficial for CCVT monitoring. Importantly, these
| VA(REF) | relays provide oscillographic and event recording and data
| V A | > D4 TIMER
logging of voltages; all these can be remotely accessed over a
tPKP communication link by the control centre operator (Figure 14).
AND
| VS | > D4 ALARM
tDPO
be used for this purpose.
X, A, B & C on the same bus
One particular solution uses a universal comparator to
reference (ABC) VT is healthy perform comparison, or rate-of-change monitoring for analog
Fig. 13. signals.
Monitoring single CCVT by comparison with the same phase of
a different CCVT (application of the synchrocheck function). With reference to Figure 15 the universal comparator could
have up to two signals configured as inputs in a differential
mode. These inputs are any signals measured by the relay and
6.2.3 Providing alternate reference VT
include phasor magnitudes and angles, true RMS value, active
and reactive power, magnitudes and angle of symmetrical
These monitoring schemes rely upon a reference VT, and it may
currents and voltages, frequency, power factor, etc. Either two
be required to provide monitoring when the reference VT is de-
signals are subtracted (Figure 16a), a single signal is used (Figure
energized. This is easily achieved by:
16b), a single inverted signal is used (Figure 16c), or a sum of two
A simple armature relay to appropriately select another signals is used by cascading two comparators (Figure 16d).
reference VT;
The comparator could be set to respond to signed or
Within the relay, creating a monitoring scheme for each absolute value of the effective operating (differential) signal.
reference VT and ORing the outputs. (The above monitoring The absolute value allows for symmetric response for positive
methods will not provide an output when the reference VT is and negative values; the signed value allows for monitoring
de-energized.) both the value and its sign. For example, to alarm on low power
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Table 1. DATE ALARM DESCRIPTION DURATION
Sample of SCADA logs 1/10/2003 16:36:32 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:14:39
prompting operators to 31/10/2003 1:59:20 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:12:49
investigate. 31/10/2003 2:14:00 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:10:10
31/10/2003 10:42:05 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:15:41
31/10/2003 13:31:45 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:16:11
31/10/2003 19:24:11 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:30
31/10/2003 20:08:40 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:16:30
31/10/2003 20:41:20 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:18:20
31/10/2003 20:57:02 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:32
31/10/2003 21:40:50 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:10:30
31/10/2003 22:20:28 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:10:50
1/11/2003 9:17:23 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:15:19
1/11/2003 9:42:43 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:10:31
1/11/2003 11:18:13 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:42
1/11/2003 12:00:41 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:10:50
1/11/2003 17:45:30 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:12:52
1/11/2003 18:46:18 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:13:58
1/11/2003 21:02:18 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:21
1/11/2003 22:32:17 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:17:59
2/11/2003 1:21:56 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:30
2/11/2003 1:48:14 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:20
2/11/2003 10:19:10 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:12:10
2/11/2003 11:55:39 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:12:30
2/11/2003 22:23:33 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:11:28
3/11/2003 2:11:43 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:15:20
3/11/2003 4:25:51 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:15:31
3/11/2003 10:52:57 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:13:30
3/11/2003 11:36:58 R-9 H016-RLEA 110KV FDR CCVT VOLTAGE ABNORMAL->NORMAL 0:15:00
Total 28
Maximum Time= 0:25:41
Minimum Time= 0:10:10
Average Time = 0:13:38
Fig. 14.
Example of remote
interrogation of a
microprocessor-based
protection relay.
The site is 1,800km (1,110
miles) away.
97
Fig. 15.
signed/absolute
Operating logic
of the universal
over/under
level/delta
comparator. Input Plus TIMER
Y>C
+ tPKP
-
6 OpSignal
X Y
tDPO
OP
abs(.) x(t)- x(t-T) Y<C
Input Minus PKP
(c)
Off
+
-
6 OpSignal 3
ActivePower
OpSignal 3 = - ActivePower
(d) ActivePower2
+
Off
-
6 OpSignal 5
+
-
6 OpSignal 4
OpSignal 5 = ActivePower2 - (- ActivePower1) =
ActivePower1 + ActivePower2
ActivePower1
OpSignal 4 = - ActivePower1
98
Fig. 17. (a)
Illustration of the
absolute
under
absolute (a) and
level
PowerFactor
signed (b) modes Y>C
+
of operation. Low -
6 OpSignal
X Y
LOW POWER FACTOR
abs(.) x(t)- x(t-T) Y<C
power factor Off
alarm (a), and
low power factor
lagging, and
(b)
leading alarms (b).
absolute
under
level
PowerFactor
Y>C
+
-
6 OpSignal
X Y
LOW PF
LOW &
AND
abs(.) x(t)- x(t-T) Y<C
LEADING PF
Off
signed
level
over
PowerFactor LOW &
AND
Y>0 LAGGING PF
+
-
6 OpSignal
X Y
PF > 0
abs(.) x(t)- x(t-T) Y<C
Off
Fig. 18.
Settings
implementing
the monitoring
logic of Figure 8.
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