King IV Report Draft
King IV Report Draft
King IV Report Draft
on Corporate Governance
for South Africa 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa owns the copyright in all four King Reports and/or Codes on
Governance, including this version namely King IVTM Report. The Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 protects
the IoDSA’s full ownership, rights and title in relation to copyright in the King IVTM Report. For further
details of the copyright visit the IoDSA website on www.iodsa.co.za
KING IV REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA, 2016
PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
South Africa has a proud tradition of corporate governance. Part One explains how this tradition has evolved.
A firm grasp of the concepts, underlying philosophy and approach dealt with in this part is necessary for
effective application of the Code and the Sector Supplements.
Introduction
Leadership and corporate governance go hand in hand and neither exists in a vacuum. Both need to be
relevant to the situation in which they are applied. The drafting of King IV took place in the context of
organisations having to contend with an increasingly dynamic and demanding external environment. In this
environment, good corporate governance is essential if an organisation is to achieve prosperity for itself and
the broader society.
Globally, leadership is being tested on issues as diverse as inequality, globalized trade, social tension, climate
change, population growth, geo-political tensions, radical transparency and rapid technological and scientific
advances. For South Africa, in particular, ageing and inadequate infrastructure, service delivery failures, skills
shortages, corruption, social transformation, poverty and inequality are pressing matters.
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 1 (agreed by all governments in 2015), the Africa 2063
Agenda2 and the (South African) National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) 3 are unanimous in setting out what
needs to be done to achieve growth and sustainable development. Those charged with governance will be
stretched beyond their comfort zones and will need to entrench a broader vision and thinking if they want to be
part of accomplishing this.
Governance is indispensable for growth and prosperity. Every organisation that adopts good corporate
governance contributes to sustainable value creation in South Africa, Africa and ultimately, globally.
1https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwif8ejl28nKAhW
HaRQKHUWpBB4QFggZMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.un.org%2Fsustainabledevelopment%2Fsustainable-
development-goals%2F&usg=AFQjCNECESUopYh1xRqvCcsw2lmV-SGOuQ&sig2=ttujWrtIj61Db1_03-MNvQ
2 Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want, second edition August 2014
http://agenda2063.au.int/en/sites/default/files/agenda2063_popular_version_05092014_EN.pdf
3 National Development Plan – 2030, National Planning Commission
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-
%20make%20it%20work.pdf
Objectives of King IV
This Report is the fourth edition that sets out the philosophy, principles, practices and outcomes which serve
as the benchmark for corporate governance in South Africa. An update of the previous version became
necessary due to various developments in corporate governance since King III came into effect in 2009.
Corporate governance, for the purposes of King IV, is about the exercise of ethical and effective leadership
by the governing body.
Such leadership includes four overarching responsibilities of the governing body: (i) providing strategic
direction; (ii) approving policy to put strategy into effect; (iii) providing informed oversight of implementation
and performance and (iv) disclosing.
Ethical and effective leadership should result in the following beneficial governance outcomes for the
organisation: (i) an ethical culture; (ii) sustainable performance and value-creation; (iii) adequate and effective
control by the governing body, and; (iv) protecting and building trust in the organisation, its reputation and
legitimacy.
Good corporate governance has its foundation in effective and ethical leadership.4 Effective leadership is
about directing performance and it is results-driven. It is about achieving purpose and strategic goals. Ethical
leadership is exemplified by responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. Ethical leadership and
effective leadership should reinforce each other.
King IV is drafted on the premise that leadership starts with each person charged with governance duties, but
in addition, the governing body as a collective must set the ethical example and tone. The governing body
needs to be unified on matters such as the core purpose of the organisation, its culture, the drivers of value,
its key stakeholder groupings and their legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations .
Responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency carry the following meanings in relation to ethical
leadership:
Responsibility: The governing body should assume ultimate responsibility for the organisation, as well as the
protection of resources: financial, manufactured, human, social and relational, and intellectual and natural
capitals.
Accountability: The governing body should be held responsible for its decisions and actions by stakeholders.
Accountability follows from the assumption or designation of responsibility. Governance structures and
arrangements should connect responsibility and accountability. Accountability cannot be delegated or
abdicated, and should be communicated clearly.
Fairness: The governing body should ensure that it balances in its decisions the legitimate and reasonable
needs, interests and expectations of material stakeholders of the organisation, in the best interests of the
organisation.
Transparency: The governing body should ensure that reports and disclosure enable stakeholders to make an
informed assessment of performance, including the impact of the organisation’s activities and its ability to
sustain the creation of value.
Governing ethically includes adhering to the following legal duties:
a. a duty to act with due care, skill and diligence, and
b. a fiduciary duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the organisation.
Governance of ethics
In addition to setting the example with its own ethical behaviour, the governing body should ensure that it
governs the ethics of the organisation. The critical role of ethics cannot be overstated. As King III put it:
“ethics… is the foundation of, and reason for, corporate governance”.5
Ethics includes, but is not limited to, the prevention of fraud and corruption. Ethics refers not only to the
relations between the organisation and its internal stakeholders, but extends to the organisation’s ethical
relationship with society, its responsibility for the ways resources are used and how outcomes are affecting
the economy, society and the environment. Ethics considerations are part of the rationale for regarding the
organisation as an integral part of society, for corporate citizenship, sustainable development and stakeholder
inclusivity.
The governance of ethics refers to the role of the governing body in ensuring that the management of ethics
results in an ethical culture. The governance of ethics in the organisation is the manner in which values are
given expression and implemented. Both the ethics of governance and the governance of ethics should be in
place.
Good ethics is the foundation of good business. Organisations should aim for a strong ethical culture that is
self-policing, as the cost of failure to manage ethics is high.6 The Center for Ethical Business Cultures
maintains that “organizations that build on an ethical culture outperform organizations that don’t and reduce
their exposure to ethical lapses that cause breakdowns”.7 Unethical behaviour can severely damage the trust
stakeholders place in organisations. Trust takes a long time to attain but can be lost very quickly. Loss of trust
threatens the licence to operate, and diminishes or destroys intangible assets such as reputation8 and
intellectual capital.
Cultures: Minneapolis
8 Rossouw, D. & Van Vuuren, L. 2013. Business Ethics (fifth edition). Cape Town: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-155
The intended governance outcome of ethical behaviour, the governance of ethics and corporate citizenship is
referred to in the Code as ‘ethical culture’.
The term, ‘culture’ is well entrenched in the discourse on business ethics and corporate governance, but also
in management disciplines in general. Its essence is: ‘The way we do things around here when no one is
watching’. An ethical corporate culture is therefore an indication of norms that have been established over
time on the way things are done. Ethical benchmarks, as set out in ethics codes, should be the norm for
behaviour before an organisation can claim to have an ethical culture.
‘Character’ is another term that is used in relation to ethics. With character, the emphasis is not in the first
place on the action being right or wrong, but on the moral character of the person (be it a juristic or natural
person) behind the actions. The recommended practices under Principle 1.1 of the Code, which addresses the
decision-making and execution of duties by those charged with governance, invoke this meaning when
referring to ‘ethical characteristics’.
Organisations operate in a societal context, which they affect and by which they are affected. There is an
interdependency between organisations and society; their fates are intertwined. As the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development stated: “Business cannot ultimately succeed in a society that fails”10.
An organisation has its own societies, made up by its stakeholders. But the organisation is also a sovereign
juristic person in the broader society in which it operates. Organisations are dependent on this broader society
to, for instance, provide a conducive operating environment, a customer base and talent. In turn, organisations
contribute to the wider society as creators of wealth; providers of goods, services and employment; sources of
taxes; and developers of skills.
This idea of interdependency is supported by the African concept of Ubuntu, captured by the expression
‘uMuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ - ‘I am because you are; you are because we are’. Ubuntu implies that there
should be a common purpose to all human endeavour (including in the corporate form) which is based on
service to humanity. As a logical consequence of this inter-dependency, one person benefits by serving
another. This is also true for a juristic person, which should serve its own as well as the broader society of
stakeholders.
Corporate citizenship is about an organisation’s status in the broader society. It is an inevitable consequence
of being an integral part of society. As corporate citizen an organisation has rights, but also obligations and
responsibilities towards society.
Corporate citizenship involves how an organisation uses its resources, and how it balances its needs with
those of society, to achieve positive lasting outcomes for the organisation itself, society and the environment.
By being a responsible corporate citizen, the organisation demonstrates recognition that its future is
intertwined with the future of the economy, society and the natural environment.
A responsible corporate citizen responds to changing societal demands. Stakeholders such as customers and
civil society expect to be informed, for instance, about an organisation’s ethics regarding child labour, or the
impact of its activities on the natural environment. This energetic activism of stakeholders extends to the
whole of the supply chain of the organisation.
The Companies Act supports the notion of the company having obligations to society. The approach of the
Department of Trade and Industry in its 2004 Policy Paper was that, in developing new companies’ legislation,
it would be guided by a legislative framework that “reflects the recognition that the company is a social as well
as an economic institution, and accordingly that the company’s pursuit of economic objectives should be
constrained by social and environmental imperatives”. The Act also gives substantially greater rights and
remedies to stakeholders, including minority shareholders, and thus encourages stakeholder activism. It also
includes the obligation for certain companies to establish a social and ethics committee.
The status of an organisation in society means that it is accountable not only for financial performance or for
isolated corporate social initiatives, but for outcomes in the economic, social and environmental context. It is
unethical for organisations to expect society and future generations to carry the economic, social and
environmental costs and burdens of its operations. This wider accountability arises out of the impacts, positive
and negative, on society and the environment and flows from the fast growth in economic power of multi-
national organisations - economic power that rivals those of a number of countries.11
Strategies and policies to achieve responsible corporate citizenship should be planned and integrated across
the organisation. The negative consequences of fragmentation or silo thinking include duplication of effort and
missed opportunities for synergies. For example, an organisation may seek to respond to the pressing
requirements of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment, but fail to integrate these efforts into a broader
performance framework. This inculcates a short-term emphasis on ‘box-ticking’ compliance, thereby
generating a corporate investment with poor social returns and inefficiencies as corporate policies, targets,
and lines of reporting are duplicated or even contradictory12.
Sustainable development, understood as “conducting operations in a manner that meets the existing needs
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs,”13 is a primary ethical and
economic imperative in response to the challenges and opportunities posed by the organisation being an
integral part of society and its status as a corporate citizen.
Organisations should expand their view of success and redefine it in terms of long-term, positive outcomes
for business, society and the environment.14 The essence of sustainable development is an organisation
enhancing its resources and the relationships that it relies on.
According to Tomorrow’s Company, “The survival and success of tomorrow’s global company is bound up
with the health of a complex global system made up of three interdependent sub-systems – the natural
environment, the social and political system and the global economy. Global companies play a role in all three
and they need all three to flourish.”15 Immense environmental challenges increasingly imperil lives - and
livelihoods - across the globe. Yet solutions and opportunities, too, straddle economic, social and
environmental dimensions. The need for an integrated response has never been greater. 16
11 Eccles, Robert G and George Serafeim. Top 1,000 Companies Wield Power Reserved for
Nations." Bloomberg.com (September 11, 2012)
12 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Chapter 1, paragraph 31, 32
13 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development , Our Common Future (also known as the
http://tomorrowscompany.com/sustainability-models-of-business-success-2
15
Tomorrow’s Company, Tomorrow’s Global Company: Challenges and Choices, September 2006,
http://tomorrowscompany.com/sustainability-models-of-business-success-2
16 United Nations Environment Programme, Inquiry: Design of a Sustainable Financial System, October 2015,
Sustainable development, being an integrated response, is not about environmental matters in isolation nor
does it concern only the sustainability of the organisation. It is also not about corporate social responsibility in
isolation from overall business strategy. Rather, it is about developing strategies so that success and
performance can be measured in the economic, social and environmental context. It is about being attuned to
risks and opportunities when defining the purpose and strategic objectives. Consequently, sustainable
development should be embedded in strategy.
King III referred to the ‘triple context’ to denote the three dimensions: the economy, society and the natural
environment. King IV refers to the ‘triple context’ or the combined economic, social and environmental context.
The reference in this Report to ‘context’ is in the singular as these three dimensions are intertwined and
should be viewed as an integrated whole.
The context within which the organisation operates is portrayed by the forms of capital that the organisation
uses and affects. The ‘six capitals’ model17 identifies financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and
relational, and natural capital. The model proposes these categories of capital, but it is at the discretion of
each organisation to identify the important physical and intangible resources that it uses or affects. It is not
necessary that all of these resources are controlled or owned by the organisation. To be relevant to it, they
simply have to be available to be used, transformed or provided.18 The use, transformation or provision by the
organisation of the six capitals is furthermore not static, but a dynamic process that changes over time and
depends on particular circumstances.
In South Africa, social transformation and redress from apartheid is a sustainable development matter and an
example of the importance of enhancing human, social and relational capitals. Integrating sustainable
development and social transformation will give rise to greater opportunities, efficiencies and benefits, for both
the organisation and the broader society.19 If the connection between sustainable development and
transformation is not fully understood, it leads to a dissociation between the two.20
Another sustainable development consideration pertinent to South Africa is unemployment which undermines
growth and social stability. According to the World Economic Forum, there is a growing mismatch between the
skills demanded by a fast-changing jobs market and those possessed by unemployed workers.
17 The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
18 WICI Intangibles Framework issued by World Intellectual Assets / Capital Initiative
19 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Introduction and background, p26
20 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Chapter 1, paragraph 32
Businesses are struggling to recruit workers with the necessary skills.21 Organisations should be pro-active in
developing the skills they will need, and not rely only on traditional educational systems.
Innovation, fairness, and collaboration are key aspects of the transition to sustainability: innovation provides
new ways of doing things, including profitable responses to sustainability; fairness is vital because social
injustice is unsustainable; and collaboration is often a prerequisite for large-scale change. Collaboration
should not, however, amount to anti-competitive behaviour.
Current, incremental changes towards sustainable development are not enough. A fundamental shift is
needed in the way organisations and those charged with their governance act and organise themselves. 22
Leadership has to make sustainable development mainstream. Strategy, risk, opportunity, performance and
sustainable development have become inseparable and are treated as such throughout the King IV Report.
It is through responding to the legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations of material
stakeholders and by establishing relationships that an organisation becomes attuned to opportunities and
challenges. Each of the forms of capital has one or more stakeholders with an interest in it.23 Therefore a
stakeholder-inclusive approach to decision-making supports he enhancement of the capitals and therefore
also sustainable development.
Digital communication platforms such as social media enable the rapid spread of information about the
organisation and what it does. This has changed the relationship between the organisation and all
stakeholders. The 2016 Edelman Trust Barometer24 refers to the “inversion of influence” in terms of which
employees and peers are perceived to be more credible than leaders. Accordingly, search and social media
represent two of the most-used sources of information. This has significant implications for the reputation of
21 The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th edition, World Economic Forum, p73
22
King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Introduction and background, p26
23 Robert G. Eccles and Tim Youmans, Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement of Significant Audiences and
an organisation. At the same time these developments offer an opportunity for organisations to demonstrate
accountability by engaging with stakeholders in new ways that win trust and build reputation and legitimacy.
For some organisations, stakeholder relationships have become so important that they appoint an
experienced executive to assume responsibility for these relationships. Whether an employee is appointed in
this role or not, an organisation should understand the business’s value proposition and the interdependence
between the resources used by the organisation, its business model and products, and its stakeholder
relationships.
To whom is a governing body accountable? Corporate governance models differ on the answer. King IV
intentionally follows the tradition of its predecessors. It chooses a stakeholder-inclusive model that requires
the governing body to consider, weigh and balance the legitimate needs, interests and expectations of all
material stakeholders in making decisions in the best interests of the organisation.
For companies, it is recognised that in both the enlightened-shareholder model, as it is referred to, and the
stakeholder-inclusive model of corporate governance, the board must consider not only shareholders but
other stakeholders as well. The difference is that in the enlightened-shareholder model, stakeholders other
than shareholders only have instrumental value; their legitimate needs, interests and expectations are only
considered if it is in the interests of shareholders to do so. In the stakeholder-inclusive model, the board
considers other stakeholders not merely as instruments to serve the interests of shareholders, but as having
intrinsic value for decision-making by the board in the best interests of the company.
In the stakeholder-inclusive model, the best interests of the company are not necessarily equated to the
interests of shareholders, and shareholders do not have predetermined precedence over other stakeholders.
The interests of shareholders or any other stakeholder grouping may be afforded precedence, based on what
is believed to serve the interests of the organisation at a point in time and depending on the circumstances. 25
Value to shareholders is a result of the effective and responsible use of resources and of good relationships
with stakeholders, rather than being the primary objective of the organisation. The best interests of the
organisation should be interpreted within the parameters of sustainable development and of the organisation
being a responsible corporate citizen. This approach means redefining success and performance in terms of
sustainable value creation.
25 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Introduction and background, p23-24
King IV advocates integrated thinking. Manifestations of this include: the organisation being an integral part of
society and its resultant standing as a corporate citizen; sustainable development of the organisation in the
economic, societal and environmental contexts; the six capitals model; and the stakeholder-inclusive
approach.
Integrated thinking is about much more than eliminating silos. Integrated thinking 27 starts with the governing
body making decisions in an integrated manner. Having the value-creation process as a regular agenda item
will drive integrated thinking and reporting. Integrated thinking furthermore presupposes that the governing
body gives regular consideration to how responsive the business model and activities are to changes in the
external environment and expectations of material stakeholders.
With the governing body having set the tone, integrated thinking should be embedded through the integration
of strategy, risk and opportunity, sustainable development, performance and outcomes.
Integrated thinking has particular relevance to the capitals that the organisation uses and affects. It results in
an appreciation of the relationships amongst the capitals - for example, the training of employees diminishes
financial capital but increases the human capital of the organisation. 28 It further leads to an understanding that
capitals which do not belong to the organisation may nevertheless affect the capitals of the organisation itself.
Human rights abuses (diminution of human capital) in the supply chain of an organisation may, for instance,
affect the reputation (diminution of intellectual capital) of the organisation. 29
Having a holistic view of the value-creation process of the organisation reinforces integrated thinking. This
process consists of input in the form of the resources that the organisation uses; the business processes and
activities that convert these resources into output consisting of products and services; which in turn leads to
outcomes that either diminish or enhance the organisation’s resources or capitals; and finally, reporting on
value creation and performance. Chapter 2 of the Code deals with the value creation process by addressing
26 The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
27 Integrated Thinking: An exploratory survey, South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2014
http://www.integratedreportingsa.org/Portals/0/Documents/SAICAIntegratedThinkingLandscape.pdf , p10 - 11
the formulation of core purpose and strategy, use of capitals in the implementation of strategy, oversight of
output and outcomes and reporting.
There are noteworthy benefits to applying integrated thinking. Apart from the efficiencies that are created,
some businesses have, for instance, found that effective management of natural capital through a
conservative and astute use of water and electricity leads to cost reductions and therefore enhanced financial
capital.
Integrated thinking also assists with integrated reporting, which in turn encourages integrated strategy
formulation and implementation.
An integrated annual report should explain the performance of the organisation and should have sufficient
information on how the organisation has positively and negatively affected the economy, society and the
environment. It should show what value the organisation has created (or not) through the enhancement or
diminution of each of the different forms of capital.30.
Finally, integrated reports should look to the future. This enables stakeholders to judge whether the
organisation can sustain delivery of value. The organisation should report on how its business model could
be adapted to enhance the positive effects and eradicate or ameliorate the negative effects on the economy,
society and the environment.
Integrated reporting was introduced into corporate governance in South Africa by King III and has since been
adopted widely, both locally and internationally. King III defines integrated reporting as “a holistic and
integrated representation of the company’s performance in terms of both its finances and its sustainability” 31.
King III replaced the ‘triple bottom-line’ (and its depiction of the three separate bottom lines consisting of the
economy, society and environment) with the intertwined economic, social and environmental ‘triple context’.
The significance of the change was that King III indicated that these aspects were intertwined. Accordingly,
the King IV Code states in Principle 2.1 that “The governing body should lead the value creation process by
appreciating that strategy, risk and opportunity, performance and sustainable development are inseparable
elements”.
30 The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
31 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Chapter 9, Principle 9.1, par 1
The development of integrated reporting took place because traditional reporting did not reflect the reality of
the triple context in which organisations operate. The annual financial statements of an organisation provide
static, historic information. They do not inform on the value of intangibles, and external risks and opportunities.
The annual financial statements also do not reflect how the organisation affects the context in which it
operates.
In recognition of this, organisations issued sustainability reports in addition to or in combination with annual
financial statements. However, financial and sustainability reports are inadequate if not integrated. The two
parts on their own do not indicate how organisations actually function, or show how their capitals are
interconnected and interdependent. The reality is a symphony of resources and relationships. Corporate
reporting must demonstrate integrated thinking and provide a holistic account of organisational performance.
The reporting by the organisation should reflect the reality of the triple context, to enable stakeholders to
assess performance on a properly informed basis.
Although integrated reporting was introduced in King III, it has evolved through the work of the Integrated
Reporting Committee in South Africa and the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). King III refers,
for instance, to a summarised integrated report and also to the possibility of more than one report. This had to
be brought in line with the latest thinking on integrated reporting which is now defined as “a concise
communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context
of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term.”32
The ability to generate an integrated annual report without excessive effort indicates that an organisation has
adopted integrated thinking. Therefore, apart from presenting information in a more meaningful format,
integrated reporting is also a feedback mechanism on the state of integration of business structures and
processes. Should operating and functional units make decisions and act in silos, it will be difficult to generate
a report that is integrated.
Another benefit of integrated reporting is that it drives those charged with governance to apply their minds to
deciding what information is material. Understanding materiality - those matters that could substantively affect
the ability of the organisation to create value over time - is fundamental to the execution of fiduciary duties 33.
King IV relies on the philosophy and terminology that have developed on integrated reporting internationally.
32
The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
33 The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
The practice recommended in the Code is for the organisation to “issue a report annually that presents
material information in an integrated manner and that provides its users with a holistic, clear, concise and
understandable presentation of the organisation’s performance in terms of sustainable value creation in the
economic, social and environmental context”.
The integrated annual report is positioned in King IV as a first reference point for stakeholders who wish to
understand how the organisation creates value. Depending on statutory requirements and the needs of
stakeholders, more detailed information could be provided in reports accessible through electronic platforms.
Financial performance alone can no longer serve as proxy for holistic value creation. As stated by Labrey from
the IIRC: ”Long-term financial performance depends on the efficient and productive management of resources
not currently measured by traditional accounting methodologies – human, intellectual, social and relationship,
and natural capitals. The financial capital market system is insufficient to guard against the multi-faceted and
interconnected risks of the future and hence an inclusive market system should be adopted.”34
The system of donor aid from developed countries to developing countries should be replaced with a change
of thinking in value. The aim of aid should be to drive inclusive capitalism in developing countries for holistic
value creation. The more the organisation positively impacts on society and the environment, the more the
quality of life in developing economies should improve.
Performance in terms of all-inclusive value should also be assessed over the longer term. Therefore the
capital market system must reward long-term decision-making.
The shift from short-termism to long-term thinking arises from the need to create value in a sustainable
manner. The period indicated by long-term or longer term would depend on the strategic objectives of the
organisation and the risks and opportunities presented by its external environment, including its material
stakeholders.
We live in an era of radical transparency. There is a rethink on corporate reporting, in the light of challenges
and opportunities such as inequality, population growth, climate change and natural assets being used faster
than nature can regenerate them. This is evidenced by the European Union movement in governance,
social and environmental reporting, the United Kingdom’s strategic report and the content of reports filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Operating Financial Review in Australia.
The traditional financial reporting system was a revolutionary development when it was instituted, and has
since had to respond to market regulators, standards boards, and ever more complex legislation and the
regulation of accounting and corporate reporting. It is now also accepted that, while fully compliant and duly
audited financial statements are critical, they are insufficient to discharge the duty of accountability.
The move from silo reporting to integrated reporting is consistent with the concept of an inclusive, sustainable
capital market system. It has been given impetus by acceptance of the triple context and the evolution of
integrated thinking.
35
US: NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.00, approved 22 August 2013
36 Australia: Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 3rd edition (2014)
37 United Kingdom: The UK Corporate Governance Code, September 2014
38Company for Economic Cooperation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015
Canadian Code39, OECD Principles40 and local and international legislation affecting practices and reporting 41.
This analysis influenced the content of the King IV Report.
5.2 Tax
Tax has become a complex matter with various dimensions. The governing body and audit committee of an
organisation should be responsible for a tax strategy and policy that are compliant but also congruent with
corporate citizenship and wider stakeholder considerations, and take account of reputational repercussions.
Recent public reaction to organisations shifting profit for tax purposes to jurisdictions other than where they
have their customer base and operational activities has shown that the due payment of taxes is now linked to
corporate citizenship and reputation. It is no longer acceptable to have overly aggressive tax strategies and to
exploit mismatches between the tax regimes of various jurisdictions, even if these actions are legal.
It is critical that governing bodies have a balance of skills, experience, diversity, independence and
knowledge of the organisation. That balance is achieved by taking into account the specific needs of the
organisation. Independence, though important, is but one consideration. The overriding consideration is
whether the governing body is composed so that it is able to fully discharge its duties.
Even though some members of the governing body may be classified as independent and others not, as a
matter of law, an independent state of mind and the responsibility to bring objective judgment to bear are part
of the legal duties of all those charged with governance. This is true whether a person is classified as
executive, non-executive or a non-executive independent member of the governing body.
In King IV, the criteria for classifying members of the governing body as independent go beyond using a
checklist without exercising judgement. A person is independent who, in reality and appearance, has no
interests or position in, or association or relationship with, the organisation which in the opinion of a
reasonable and informed third party would affect that person’s objectivity and impartiality.
39 Canada: National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines, (15 April 2005); National Instrument 52-110 Audit
Committees (effective 1 January 2011); Form 52-110F1 Audit Committee Information required in an AIF; National
Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of corporate governance practices (effective 30 June 2005); Form 58-101F1 Corporate
Governance Disclosure; Amendment Instrument for National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance
Practices
40 OECD Principles for Corporate Governance, 2015
41 United Kingdom: Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations
2013, the directors' remuneration provisions of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and Companies Act 2006
(Strategic Report and Directors' Report) Regulations 2013; Australia: Corporations Amendment (Improving
Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011
To strengthen auditor independence, King IV recommends that the audit committee discloses the date of first
appointment of the auditing firm or, in the event of a merger or acquisition of audit firms subsequent to first
appointment, the date of appointment of the predecessor firm. In the interest of audit quality, King IV
furthermore recommends that the audit committee discloses significant audit matters that arose from the
audit, and how these matters were addressed by the audit committee.
Auditor independence remains a vital pillar of corporate governance. The recommendation in King IV on audit
committee oversight of auditor independence is aligned with the publication of the rule by the Independent
Regulatory Board for Auditors on 04 December 2015. This rule makes it mandatory that all auditors’ reports
on annual financial statements disclose the number of years for which the audit firm has been the auditor of
the organisation. In King IV the length of audit firm-client relationship, together with significant changes in
management and audit partner rotation during that time, and the extent of non-audit services rendered by the
auditor, are factors to be taken into account by the audit committee when overseeing auditor independence.
Mandatory audit firm rotation and tendering have been introduced in some jurisdictions to reinforce auditor
independence. Although South Africa has not done this, South African organisations operating internationally
may be affected and audit committees may implement the mechanisms voluntarily. In such cases, the
governing body should be mindful of the risks inherent in the learning curve that new auditors go through, and
of the impact that audit firm rotation may have in a group that operates in various jurisdictions.
The oversight of audit quality is another international focus area. Audit committee disclosure on significant
audit matters is the counterpart of the IAASB requirement for auditors to disclose. The intent is that audit
committee and auditor disclosures should provide different but complementary perspectives.
Social and ethics committees were introduced as a requirement for some companies through the Companies
Act, 2008. At the time that King III was launched in 2009, the regulations to the Companies Act which dealt
with the membership and functions of these committees were not yet public.
Now, drawing on the regulations and experience, the Code can expand on the role of the social and ethics
committee, and its integration with broader governing structures. Examples of matters further explored in King
IV are this committee’s direction and oversight of the management of ethics (which is not addressed in the
regulations to the Companies Act), as well as the socially responsible aspects of remuneration policy.
An organisation that is not required to establish a social and ethics committee should nevertheless consider
creating a mechanism that would achieve the aims of such a committee. Where organisations are legally
required to establish social and ethics committees, they must ensure that the intended objectives are achieved
and that the committee does not concern itself only with mindless compliance.
The risk section in the Code has been drafted to reflect these matters, and the term ‘risk and opportunity
governance’ is introduced.
Risks are evolving; they interact and are becoming more systemic due to globalisation and increased
connectivity. It is said that “risks materialise in new and unexpected ways”44 and that “risk management must
respond to the new normal”45. The fast pace of change, including technology developments and impacts on
the natural environment, presents many risks, such as the risk of stranded assets as a result of unanticipated
or premature write-downs, devaluations or conversion to liabilities of assets that are no longer useful. 46
Organisations need to strengthen their ability to analyse complex and often hidden interdependencies and by
building resilience. This is addressed in the Code.
The global financial crisis showed how excessive-risk taking could cause corporate failure. At the same time,
risk is necessarily part of business, and enterprise can be defined as the undertaking of risk for reward. Risk-
taking per se is therefore not to be discouraged, but rather excessive risk-taking. What would constitute
excess is a matter of judgement by the governing body, which it should exercise and clarify by setting the level
of risk appetite and tolerance.
The advances in technologies and digitalisation are revolutionising businesses and societies. The effect is so
profound that it is being referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Technology and information are key
building blocks in the digital business value chain that consists of people, technologies, information and
processes and that delivers the organisation’s output.
Strategically, governing bodies should be pro-active in ensuring that technologies and information are
leveraged for growth. Advances happen quickly and can cause significant disruption, opportunities and risk.
Organisations should strengthen processes that help to anticipate and respond to changes, including
business model innovation.
Digital development such as robotics and artificial intelligence, Nano-technology, 3D printing, genetics and
bio-technology has accelerated technology from being an operational enabler to leading the transformation of
products, services and business models. Technologies have enabled organisations to personalise
engagement with customers, to automate and optimise supply chains, and even to redefine the mechanisms
by which value is generated.
Virtually all aspects of an organisation’s operations are now supported by technology and information
systems. These require further investment, as they are important strategic assets for capturing opportunities
and gaining competitive advantage.
A particular risk and opportunity is that more categories of jobs will be automated. It is estimated that by the
year 2020, nearly half of all current occupations could be affected by advances in robotics and machine
learning.47 Governing bodies need to consider the implications for the organisation, its employees and the
broader society.
Information, like technology, is a growing source of competitive advantage and value-creation for
organisations. Data is turned into information that leads to insight, intelligence and eventually foresight. The
result is that the value of the intellectual capital of an organisation is increased.
47 The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th edition, World Economic Forum, p18, 20
Organisations are faced with numerous and onerous regulatory requirements. Corporate governance
practices should enable those charged with governance to deliver on these requirements, while still allowing
for value creation.
King IV recommends that organisations should be more pro-active in engaging with regulators, legislators,
and industry associations; otherwise, the practices recommended are similar to those in in King III.
This level of disclosure is strengthened by recommending that shareholders be given the opportunity to pass
separate non-binding advisory votes on the policy and its implementation, but with the consequence that
compulsory shareholder engagement is triggered in the event that either the policy or its implementation is
not supported by a vote of at least 75% of the voting shares.
King IV recommends that variable remuneration be measured in accordance with targets relating to
sustainable value created across the whole of the economic, social and environmental context. This is a
departure from measuring financial targets only.
A subtle but important introduction by King IV is that the remuneration committee, social and ethics
committee and governing body should consider and disclose the measures put in place to attain fair and
responsible executive remuneration in the context of overall employee remuneration. This acknowledges the
wage gap between remuneration for executives and those at the lower end of the pay scale.
The remuneration disclosure requirements set out to achieve a disclosure benchmark that enables a
comparative analysis to be done among companies, organisations or entities within the same peer group.
Disclosure is also required on the use of remuneration consultants and the relationship of the consultant to the
organisation or any of its directors or prescribed officers.
Fair and responsible remuneration is now seen as a corporate citizenship matter, to be overseen by the social
and ethics committee in collaboration with the remuneration committee. The governing body has the ultimate
responsibility for remuneration.
Disclosure and voting on remuneration are the subject of attention of many international regulators. The
appropriate means of holding local organisations accountable on remuneration had to be considered, taking
into account that South Africa is a participant in the global investment market but with its own unique set of
circumstances.
King III introduced the combined assurance model, but this concept needs to be developed. King IV expands
the traditional ‘three lines of defence’ to ‘five lines of assurance’ to incorporate all assurance role players.
The model emphasises that assurance is not primarily about defence but rather about having an adequate
and effective control environment and strengthening the integrity of reports for better decision-making.
King IV sets the requirement that: “the audit committee should oversee that implementation of the combined
assurance model results in combining, co-ordinating and aligning assurance activities across the various lines
of assurance, so that assurance has the appropriate depth and reach.” In a combined assurance model,
some of the lines of assurance, such as internal audit, risk and compliance, operate across a broad spectrum
of the business (‘horizontally’); others, such as line managers, geologists or safety assessors, might focus
more narrowly within a specific function of the business, on frameworks, policies, processes, systems and
controls (‘vertically’). The alignment of these activities creates a matrix for an effective control environment
and integrity of reports.
Internal audit as part of the third line of assurance remains pivotal to corporate governance. Its role has
evolved in recent years for it to contribute insight in the business and furthermore, foresight through the use of
pattern recognition, trend assessment, analysis and scenarios. An internal audit function should strive for this
level of excellence.
Integrated reporting has brought challenges regarding independent assurance of this reporting. These include
how materiality should be defined for purposes of inclusion of information, and provision of assurance on
matters for which there are very limited assurance standards in place. The Code requires the governing body
to apply its mind to this.
Shareholders and particularly the institutional investor should hold the board to account on the application of
voluntary codes of governance. There should be an agreement or tacit understanding between the board, the
company and its shareholders on what the creation of value entails and how performance is measured and
rewarded. Having a common understanding on this results in the company and its shareholders working in
unison towards sound corporate governance.
Institutional investors, in addition, carry fiduciary duties to their ultimate beneficiaries - those who contribute to
pension and retirement funds and their dependants. Governing bodies of institutional investors should ensure
that they apply the principles of responsible investment towards long-term, sustainable returns. Responsible
investing practices are set out in the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA), in line with the
United Nations Principles on Responsible Investing.
The previous King reports were written from the perspective of the governing body as the focal point of
corporate governance. This perspective has been broadened somewhat in that King IV requires the
governing body of an institutional investor to ensure that the organisation responsibly manages its rights,
obligations, legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations, as holder of beneficial interest in
the securities of a company.
Increased shareholder activism is encouraging, as shareholders have a key role in promoting good
governance. Corporate governance failures are at least partly due to an absence of active institutional
investors, or otherwise due to a major or sole shareholder illegitimately assuming what are essentially the
functions of the board of the company. Shareholders have no fiduciary duties to the company and when they
usurp the responsibilities of the board it results in a disconnection between responsibility and authority.
On the legal responsibilities of institutional investors, a 2005 report commissioned by UNEP FI from law firm
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer concluded that integrating environmental, societal and governance
considerations into investment analysis is “clearly permissible and is arguably required.”
A report issued in 2015 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century48 states that “failing to consider long-term
investment value drivers, which include environmental, social and governance issues, in investment practice
is a failure of fiduciary duty.” Further support for this is found in the preamble of regulation 28 issued by the
Minister of Finance under section 36 of the Pension Funds Act, 1956 which states that prudent investing
“should give appropriate consideration to any factor which may materially affect the sustainable long-term
performance of a fund’s assets, including factors of an environmental, social and governance character”. In
conclusion, the sustainable development of investee companies should be supported by the institutional
investor, who is thus discharging its legal duty to its ultimate beneficiaries.
In order to address the responsibilities of institutional investors, CRISA was issued in 2011. CRISA
encourages all role players in the investment chain to become aware of their duties, but places accountability
for responsible investing on the owner of the equity, who should regulate and monitor the application of
CRISA.
There is an opportunity to provide a framework, through King IV, for the responsibilities of institutional
investors and majority or sole shareholders to be incorporated in the overall corporate governance system of
checks and balances.
A dispute resolution process should be regarded as an opportunity to not only resolve the dispute at hand,
but also to identify and address actual and potential business and relational challenges. Dispute resolution
becomes a business management tool that is used in the best interests of the organisation to enhance its
social and relational capital.
48 Supported by United Nations Global Compact; United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative; Principles for
Responsible Investment Initiative; Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System initiated by the United
Nations Environment Programme
Since alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were introduced formally in King III, it has become more than
an alternative to judicial process. It is now an established element of good governance.
Resolving disputes expeditiously, efficiently and effectively has gained increased importance in light of labour
strike action becoming protracted and in some cases hostile. Business relationships are a form of capital that
all organisations rely on.
The governing body should ensure that mechanisms and processes are in place to resolve disputes.
King IV advocates that dispute resolution mechanisms and associated processes be adopted and
implemented, as set out in King III.
Part 2
Part 1 Part 3
CONTENT
FOUNDATIONAL APPLICATION OF
ELEMENTS AND
CONCEPTS KING IV
DEVELOPMENT
Part 5
Part 4 Part 6
KING IV CODE
KING IV SECTOR
consisting of
ON A PAGE SUPPLEMENTS
5 Chapters
Part 7 Part 8
Part 9
APPLICATION GLOSSARY OF
KING COMMITTEE
REGISTER TERMS
A primary aim of King IV is to reinforce corporate governance as a holistic and integrated set of
arrangements. The application of practice recommendations should give effect to the principle. The
achievement of principles lead to the realisation of the related governance outcome.
When there is an understanding of the benefits of corporate governance and how it can be harnessed in the
interests of the organisation, this understanding allows for application that contributes to performance rather
than detracting from it. The following content elements are differentiated in the King IV Code:
Practices
Principles, and
Governance outcomes.
Governance
outcomes
Principles
Practices
A major challenge in implementing codes of corporate governance is that practices could be mindlessly
adopted as if these were rules, resulting in corporate governance becoming a mere compliance burden.
This inflexibility also leads to an inability to apply codes of corporate governance in a mindful way that takes
account of the size, resources and the complexity of strategic objectives and operations of an organisation.
Practices are recommended at an optimum level of corporate governance and should be adapted - taking
account of the specific size, resources and the complexity of strategic objectives and operations of the
organisation – so that the principle is achieved.
The principle under which a practice recommendation is made in the Code serves as guide to direct
organisations on what they should set out to achieve with implementing the practice. Principles build on and
reinforce one another.
Governance outcomes are the benefits that could be realised in the event that the underlying principles are
fully achieved. Both governance outcomes and principles are phrased so that they hold true across all
organisations.
The chapters in the King IV Code are organised so that the principles and the practices in each support the
realisation of the intended governance outcome for that chapter:
STRATEGY POLICY
OVERSIGHT DISCLOSURE
Directing the core purpose Giving effect to strategy by
approving policy - rules, Providing oversight of Disclosing on the
of the organisation and structures and processes implementation of strategy organisation’s
setting of its short- that define course of action and policy by performance and
medium- and long-term and boundaries within which management sustainable value creation
direction decisions can be made
Sector Supplements
The sector supplements provide the applicable terminology and address the governance challenges and
considerations of that sector. In respect of all categories of organisations and sectors, the essence of the King
IV Code, namely the governance outcomes and principles hold true. The principles and outcomes are
therefore carried forward to each of the supplements with the necessary changes in terminology. It is only at
the level of practices that differentiation is made in respect of the different categories of organisations.
South Africa and the King Committee have received many accolades locally and internationally for the
progressive stance of King III and its predecessors. However, not all organisations are benefiting from this
achievement. Public entities follow a Protocol on Governance which is based on an earlier version of the
King report. Despite King III’s holistic principle-based approach, some non-profit organisations deem it
unachievable due to a lack of resources to meet requirements that are in fact intended for large and
complicated structures. Small and medium-sized companies also generally still share the view that corporate
governance is not applicable to them.
At the same time, the need for collaboration between various sectors in the interests of socio-economic
imperatives is growing, and therefore good governance should be institutionalised across all organisations.
This is why the King Committee decided to clarify how King IV should find application in specific categories
of organisations and sectors. The King IV Report includes sector supplements that provide specific guidance
to the following categories of organisations and sectors, in addition to the traditional audience of listed, public
and large private companies:
SMEs
Non-profit organisations
Public sector organisations and entities
Municipalities, and
Pension funds.
While the principles in King IV are universally applicable, the practices that support their achievement may
differ in certain entities and sectors, without compromising the objectives of good corporate governance. The
sector supplements have been developed to provide specific guidance on practices where appropriate.
For most of the sectors, there are specific governance regulations applying. The supplements provide high-
level direction on reconciling King IV with these regulations, as well as guidance on how to give effect to the
law as far as it pertains to corporate governance. The principles as contained in King IV are intended to be
complementary to laws and regulations.
These supplements are not intended to be used on their own and should be read in conjunction with the
other Parts of the King IV Report.
The drafting of King IV was led by the King IV Project Lead and a task team was appointed by the King
Committee from its membership to oversee the drafting process, with the King Committee itself providing
final approval. The qualification criteria for serving on the task team were strong technical corporate
governance knowledge and experience, and no affiliation to industry or sector bodies. The chairman of the
King Committee, the King IV Project Lead and members of the Task Team collaborated closely in preparing
the various drafts for consideration by the King Committee.
The philosophy, principles and practices in King III were the starting point for content development. The input
from the consultation meetings and the matters that had to be addressed as a result of local and
international corporate governance developments were also considered.
There were no standing working groups or sub-committees set up for development of content. Particular
topics and the governance of organisations in the non-profit, SME, retirement fund and public sectors were
explored through a series of working sessions. The Appreciative Inquiry methodology, which as the point of
departure looks to positives and possibilities to enhance rather than deficiencies, was employed to conduct
these working sessions. Participants in the working sessions were a combination of technical corporate
governance experts and representatives from interest groups or sectors.
With King III being the basis, comments from consultation meetings, local and international developments
and the input from the working sessions were collated and supplemented by a number of ad hoc focus group
sessions, convened to address specific matters and the various sectors in more depth.
The King IV Report was subjected to a formal public comment process which consisted of soliciting public
comments as well as a number of face-to-face interactions.
Drafting convention
The drafting convention agreed by the King Committee encompasses the following:
succinct and concise style
citing of legislation only where necessary for context
non-prescriptive as far as possible
limited reference to specific standards and guidelines
‘must’ denotes legislative provision; ‘should’ denotes recommended practice
limited use of examples
use of cross-referencing instead of repetition to achieve greater integration, and
gender neutrality.
The governance of organisations can apply on a statutory basis as rules, as a voluntary code of principles
and practices, or a combination of the two. The legal status of King IV, as with its predecessors, is that of a
set of voluntary principles and good practices. In South Africa, as in many jurisdictions around the world,
hybrid systems of corporate governance have developed, as some practices of good governance have been
legislated in parallel with the King voluntary codes of good governance. If a conflict between legislation and
King IV exists, the law prevails.
Good governance is not something that exists separately from the law. A court will consider all relevant
circumstances, including what is regarded as the accepted practice in a particular situation. The criteria of
governance codes and guidelines will be relevant to determine what is regarded as an appropriate standard
of conduct for those charged with governance duties. The more established certain governance practices
become, the more likely it is that a court would regard conduct that conforms with these practices as meeting
the required standard of care. Corporate governance practices, codes and guidelines, therefore, set the bar
of what is regarded as appropriate standards of conduct. Consequently, failure to meet an established
corporate governance practice, albeit not legislated, may invoke liability.
There is an important argument against the mandatory ‘comply or else’ framework: a ‘one size fits all’
approach cannot logically be suitable, because the types of business and enterprises carried out by
organisations are so varied. Further, the danger is that the governing body may become focused on
mindless compliance instead of applying its mind to the best governance practice for the particular issue
before it. 1 As outlined above, a corporate governance code applying on a voluntary basis does not mean
that there are no legal consequences.
For directors of companies, adopting good corporate governance practice will be especially important for a
court in considering whether the protection afforded by the business judgement rule as provided for in the
Companies Act applies. In the absence of robust governance structures and processes, it will be difficult if
not impossible for a director to show: that reasonably diligent steps have been taken to become informed;
that material financial interests were absent or dealt with appropriately; and that there was a rational basis
for believing - and that the director did believe - the decision was in the interests of the company.
The King IV Report has been drafted with the aspiration that it should apply to all organisations, regardless of
their form of incorporation. It is a main objective of the King IV Report to broaden acceptance of corporate
governance by making it accessible and fit for application across sectors, organisations and entities of a
variety of sizes, resources and complexity of strategic objectives and operations.
1 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, Introduction and background, p9
That there are supplements for specific categories of organisations does not detract from the King IV Code
having been drafted to be suitable for application by all organisations, even if not provided for expressly in
the Code or the supplements. Principles and intended governance outcomes are phrased so they form
the essence of the Code and can be applied to all categories of organisations with the necessary
adaptation of terminology. The differentiation lies in practices that should be adopted taking into account the
particular sector and proportionality considerations.
The essence of King IV is the principles and the intended governance outcomes which are, subject to the
necessary changes in terminology, applicable to all organisations. King IV was drafted so that differentiation
in the application of corporate governance is accomplished through the practices. The practices as
recommended in the Code are pitched at an optimal level and may not be appropriate for all organisations.
The mindless compliance of a quantitative approach is not the aim. Instead King IV strives to instil a
qualitative approach where recommended practices are considered to achieve the principle and realise the
intended governance outcome. Application of practices should be adapted and varied as appropriate to the
size, resources and complexity of strategic objectives and operations of the organisation.
Practices are meant to be proportionally applied taking the following into account in relation to the
organisation:
size of turnover and workforce
resources, and
complexity of strategic objectives and operations.
The smaller and less complex an organisation, the more it should consider recommended practices
proportionally according to the scale of its operations. Organisations that are by nature and in terms of
objectives of public interest, should aspire to a higher level of application of good governance practices as
recommended in the Code.
The application regime for King IV is ‘apply and explain’ and refers to applying the principles and explaining
how they are being effected.
All principles are phrased as aspirations and ideals that organisations should strive towards in their journey
to achieve good governance outcomes. These aspirations and ideals are basic to good governance and
application of principles is therefore assumed. The explanation that is required is a high level disclosure of
the practices that have been implemented and the progress made in the journey towards giving effect to
each principle.
Explanation should be provided in the form of a narrative account. Reference to recommended or other
practices applied should be incorporated in the narrative to support the explanation of how the principle is
being effected. Specific disclosure recommendations are included with each principle of the King IV Code.
These recommendations are intended as a guideline and starting point for disclosure on the particular
principle. The detail of information to be provided in the narrative should be guided by materiality and should
enable stakeholders to make an informed assessment of the quality of the corporate governance of the
organisation.
There is no need to disclose against each practice as to whether it has been implemented or not, as this is
quantitative and not necessarily adding to the quality of disclosure. There is further no need to disclose
against the outcome as it can be left to the user to draw inferences from the narrative provided.
King III consisted of 75 principles. The King III requirement was that “all entities should apply the principles
in the Code and consider the best practice recommendations in the Report. All entities should by way of
explanation make a positive statement about how the principles have been applied or have not been
applied. This level of disclosure will allow stakeholders to comment on and challenge the board on the
quality of governance”. The main difference between the application regime of King III and King IV is that
application or adoption of the principles is assumed in King IV. Furthermore, the 75 principles in King III
have been replaced with 16 principles in King IV. Finally, while some of the principles in King III were
actually best practices, King IV clearly differentiate principles and practices so that all of the principles result
in good governance.
Attention is drawn to the recommendation in chapter 2: “The governing body should oversee … integration
of reports and integration of disclosure in substance and form and across various reporting media and
platforms.” It falls within the discretion of the governing body to determine where the King IV disclosures
will be made, either in the application register, and/or in the integrated annual report and/or in a
sustainability or corporate citizen report. Duplication of King IV disclosures should be avoided. In order to
do so, it is recommended that cross-referencing to other reports where King IV disclosures have been
should be referred to in the application register. This is demonstrated in the specimen Application Register
included in Part 7 of this Report.
King IV application register should be updated at least annually, formally approved by the governing body
and published on accessible media and communication platforms.
Principle 1.1: The governing body should set the tone and lead ethically and effectively.
Recommended Practices
1. Members of the governing body should in their decision-making and exercise of duties demonstrate the
following individual and collective ethical characteristics:
a. Independence: Members of the governing body should act with independence of mind in the best
interests of the organisation. Conflicts of interest (whether actual or perceived) should be disclosed
to the governing body in full detail at the earliest opportunity, and then managed as determined by
the governing body subject to statutory requirements. Conflicts of interest that cannot be managed
must be avoided.
b. Inclusivity: Members of the governing body should consider and balance the legitimate and
reasonable needs, interests and expectations of all stakeholders in their decision-making in the
best interests of the organisation.
c. Competence: Members of the governing body should individually and collectively assume
responsibility for the continual development of their competence to govern effectively.
d. Diligence: Members of the governing body should be diligent in performing their duties and devote
sufficient time to the organisation’s affairs to exercise well-considered judgement.
e. Informed: Members of the governing body should, in order to discharge their duties, take steps to
ensure that they have sufficient working knowledge of the organisation, its industry, the economic,
social and environmental context in which it operates as well as of the significant applicable laws,
rules, codes and standards. To that end the governing body should ensure that its members have,
subject to following protocol established by the governing body, unrestricted access to professional
advice and the organisation’s information, records, documents, property, management and staff.
f. Courage: Members of the governing body should have and exercise the courage to act with
integrity and honesty in taking risk for reward in all decisions in the best interests of the
organisation.
2. There should be disclosure of the mechanisms by which it is holding itself to account for ethical
governance.
Principle 1.2: The governing body should ensure that the organisation’s ethics is managed effectively.
Recommended Practices
3. The governing body should set the example and tone for an ethical culture in the organisation.
4. The governing body should provide clear strategic direction on the management of the organisation’s
ethics.
5. The governing body should ensure that ethics values and norms are clearly articulated in the
organisation’s codes of ethics and conduct, and in its policies.
6. The governing body should ensure that ethics policy: -
a. encompasses the relationship with both internal and external stakeholders, including the conduct of
organisations within the supply chain, and
b. addresses the particular ethical risk profile of the organisation.
7. The governing body should ensure that the necessary structures are in place to give effect to the
organisation’s ethics values and norms, including safe reporting mechanisms and appropriate oversight
and resources for ethics management.
8. The governing body should oversee that there are processes in place to ensure that employees, business
associates, contractors and suppliers are familiar with the organisation’s ethics norms as set out in codes
of ethics and conduct - for example, incorporating these in employment and supply contracts.
9. The governing body should oversee that adherence to the organisation’s ethics norms by employees,
business associates, contractors and suppliers is monitored and assessed periodically.
10. The governing body should oversee that recruitment processes, promotion criteria and performance
evaluations of employees recognise adherence to ethics norms as set out in codes of ethics and conduct
and that sanctions are in place for the contravention thereof.
11. There should be disclosure of:
a. the structures and processes that have been put in place for ethics management
b. key focus areas during the reporting period, and
c. mechanisms for monitoring and assessing effectiveness.
Principle 1.3: The governing body should ensure that the organisation is a responsible corporate citizen.
Recommended Practices
12. The governing body should provide strategic direction for the organisation to be a responsible corporate
citizen and to respond appropriately to the economic, social and environmental outcomes of its activities.
13. The organisation’s corporate citizenship considerations should include the following:
a. sustainable development
b. human rights
c. impact on communities in which the organisation conducts its activities and distributes its output
d. protection of the natural environment and responsible use of natural resources
e. fair labour practices
f. fair and responsible remuneration
g. employee wellbeing and development
h. employee and public health and safety
i. compliance with legislation related to economic, social and environmental responsibility
j. prevention, detection and response to fraud and corruption
k. economic transformation, including employment equity and broad-based Black economic
empowerment
l. fair treatment of customers
m. fair competition with industry peers
n. fair treatment of associates, suppliers and contractors as well as holding them to account on their
responsible citizenship practices according to the organisation’s supply chain code of conduct, and
o. responsible tax policies.
14. The governing body should oversee that the organisation’s performance as a corporate citizen is
monitored against approved targets and assessed periodically.
15. There should be disclosure of:
a. the structures and processes that have been put in place for managing corporate citizenship
b. key focus areas during the reporting period, and
c. mechanisms for monitoring and assessing effectiveness.
Recommended Practices
1. The governing body should approve a strategy by which the core purpose of the organisation is identified
and its short-, medium- and longer-term direction is set.
2. The strategy should steer choices and priorities towards the creation of value in a sustainable manner in
the economic, social and environmental context in which the organisation operates.
3. When considering the strategy, the governing body should consider the following:
a. risks and opportunities posed by the economic, social and environmental context that could affect
the achievement of the organisation’s stated purpose, its intended strategic objectives and its ability
to create value in a sustainable manner
b. utilisation and reliance on resources as represented by the various forms of capital, including:
financial, manufactured, human, intellectual, social (including relational) and natural capitals
c. the legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations of stakeholders
d. the organisation’s ability to support strategy through resources, business structures and processes
e. the potential effect (increase, decrease or transformation) of the organisation’s operations on
resources and relationships as represented by the various forms of capital and stakeholders, and
f. the interconnectivity and inter-dependence of all of the above matters.
4. The governing body should oversee that policies and plans are developed to give effect to the approved
strategy and that they:
a. drive the deployment of resources, structures and processes
b. define the course of action and scope or spheres within which decisions can be taken, and
c. provide the criteria and measures against which the governing body can oversee management’s
performance.
5. Performance criteria should be:
a. set measures across the whole of the economic, social and environmental context, and
b. formulated by taking a holistic view of the measurement of the contribution of operating and
functional units to overall performance, so that integrated decision-making and functioning are
encouraged.
6. The organisation should continually assess and appropriately respond to the actual short-, medium- and
long-term outcomes of its operations.
7. As part of its oversight of performance, the governing body should consider business rescue proceedings
or other turnaround measures as soon as the organisational performance is distressed.
8. There should be reporting on performance as provided for under Principle 2.2.
Principle 2.2: The governing body should ensure that reports and other disclosures enable stakeholders to
make an informed assessment of the performance of the organisation and its ability to create value in a
sustainable manner.
Recommended Practices
9. The governing body should provide strategic direction so that reports and disclosure inform on the
performance of the organisation and its ability to create value in a sustainable manner.
10. The governing body should determine the reporting frameworks and standards to be applied taking into
account legislative requirements, industry standards, the purpose of each report and its target audience.
11. Materiality of information for inclusion in reports should be determined by the governing body. This
determination should be entity-specific and dependent on audience and time-frame, while including the
following considerations:
a. challenges and opportunities that may significantly affect the ability of the organisation to create
value
b. priority of relevant matters based on relative significance, and
c. the particular information to be disclosed about material matters.1
12. The governing body should oversee:
a. the integrity, also expressed as the reliability and usefulness, of all its reports
b. integration of reports and disclosure in substance and form and across various reporting media and
communication platforms.
13. The organisation should issue a report annually that presents material information in an integrated
manner and that provides its users with a holistic, clear, concise and understandable presentation of the
organisation’s performance in terms of sustainable value creation in the economic, social and
environmental context.
14. Regardless of reporting frameworks and standards adopted, the organisation should as a minimum deal
with the following in its integrated annual report2:
a. scope and basis for determining materiality of information
b. overview of the context within which the organisation operates
c. the formal strategy by which the organisation’s core purpose is identified and its longer-term
direction set
d. critical dependencies, challenges and opportunities that materially affect the organisation’s
achievement of its core purpose and strategic objectives, as well as how these factors are
connected and inter-dependent
e. overview of the business structures and processes that support delivery of strategy
f. the response to changes in the internal and external environment in terms of products and
services offered, and related innovation
g. positive and negative outcomes of business activities and operations
h. performance in terms of the stakeholder value that it has delivered or diminished, and of trade-offs
among stakeholder interests
i. the extent to which remuneration and incentives have been aligned to performance and
sustainable value creation, and
j. the organisation’s ability to maintain the creation of value in a sustainable manner.
15. The governing body should ensure that the integrated annual report is supported with more detailed
reports, as guided by an assessment of stakeholders’ information needs and made available through
publicly accessible media and communication platforms.
16. The governing body should ensure ongoing disclosure of pertinent organisational information, including
through publicly accessible media and communication platforms:
a. disclosure required in terms of this Code
b. governance and management structures
c. integrated annual reports and annual financial statements
d. JSE and other public announcements, and
e. notices of meetings of shareholders and any accompanying documents.
1 The International <IR> Framework”, The International Integrated Reporting Council, Guiding Principles 3.18, p.
2 Adapted from The International <IR> Framework”, The International Integrated Reporting Council
Recommended practices
1. The governing body should serve as the focal point and custodian of corporate governance in the
organisation. This broad leadership role includes:
a. providing direction and strategy
b. giving effect to strategy by approving policy, including plans, frameworks, structures and
procedures
c. providing oversight of implementation, and
d. demonstrating accountability and transparency through disclosure.
2. The governing body should ensure that its role, responsibilities and membership requirements are
documented in a charter that guides and drives its effective functioning.
3. The responsibilities of the governing body should include the following in relation to the organisation, as
expressed in the principles of this Code:
a. Ethics
i. Setting the tone and lead, ethically and effectively.
ii. Ensuring that the organisation’s ethics are managed effectively.
iii. Ensuring that the organisation is a responsible corporate citizen.
b. Performance and value creation
i. Leading the value creation process by appreciating that strategy, risk and opportunity,
performance and sustainable development are inseparable elements.
ii. Ensuring that reports and other disclosures enable stakeholders to make an informed
assessment of the performance of the organisation and its ability to create value in a
sustainable manner.
c. Governing body structures and delegation
i. Ensuring that in its composition, the governing body comprises a balance of the skills,
experience, diversity, independence and knowledge needed to discharge its role and
responsibilities.
ii. Considering creating additional governing structures to assist with the balancing of power
and the effective discharge of responsibilities, but without abdicating accountability.
iii. Ensuring that the appointment of, and delegation to, competent executive management
results in the effective exercise of authority and responsibility.
iv. Ensuring that performance evaluations of the governing body, its structures, its chair and
members, the CEO and the company secretary or corporate governance professional result
in continued improved performance and effectiveness.
Composition
Recommended practices
8. The governing body should provide strategic direction for its composition to be balanced.
9. When determining the appropriate number of members of the governing body, these factors should be
considered:
a. evolving circumstances, the needs of the organisation and the nature of its business
Appointment procedures
Recommended practices
15. Procedures and recommendations for appointment to the governing body should be formal and
transparent.
16. Appointments should be considered by the governing body as a whole, assisted by its committee
responsible for nominations.
17. Before recommending a candidate for appointment or election, the governing body should consider:
a. the collective skills, knowledge and experience required on the governing body
b. the apparent ethical integrity and reputation of the candidate
c. the existence of actual or perceived conflicts of interest
d. the skills, knowledge and experience of the candidate
e. the capacity of the candidate to dedicate the necessary time to discharge duties, and
f. diversity.
18. A candidate for appointment or election as a non-executive member should be requested to provide
details of other commitments and a statement of time available to fulfil responsibilities. This should be
balanced against the advantages obtained from an individual serving on more than one governing body,
or on more than one committee of a governing body, or both.
19. Prior to their appointment, candidates’ backgrounds should be investigated.
20. After a member has retired on rotation, the governing body should recommend re-election, only after
taking into consideration past performance and contribution, in addition to the considerations in
paragraph 17.
21. A brief CV of each candidate standing for election at the annual general meeting (AGM) should
accompany the notice of the AGM, together with a statement by the governing body on whether it
supports election or re-election.
22. The terms and conditions of appointment as member of the governing body should be formalised in a
letter of appointment.
23. The governing body should oversee that incoming members are inducted so they are able to make the
maximum contribution as quickly as possible.
24. New members of the governing body with no or limited governing experience should be developed
through mentorship and training.
25. A programme of professional development and regular briefings on legislative and regulatory
developments, risks and changes in the environment, relevant to the business of the organisation, should
be adopted for members of the governing body.
Independence
26. All members of the governing body, whether they are classified as executive, non-executive or
independent non-executive, have a duty to act with independence of mind in the best interests of the
organisation.
27. Non-executive members of the governing body classified as “independent” would need to be regarded as
such by a reasonable and informed third party. This classification refers to the absence of any interest,
position, association or relationship which is likely to unduly influence or cause bias in decision-making.
Below are indicators that may lead to a conclusion of a lack of independence. It is not an exhaustive list,
nor does it detract from the obligation of the governing body to consider the combined effect of all
relevant factors on a substance-over-form basis, when making an assessment of independence for
purposes of classification:
a. being a shareholder, or an officer or employee of a shareholder, who has the ability to control or
significantly influence management or the governing body
b. being a shareholder where the holding is material to the personal wealth of the member of the
governing body
c. having been in the employ of the organisation or the group in any executive capacity during the
preceding three financial years
d. being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has been during the preceding
three financial years, employed by the organisation or the group in an executive capacity
e. having been the auditor responsible for performing the statutory audit for the organisation, or a key
member of the audit team of the external audit firm, during the preceding three financial years
f. having been an external legal adviser for an extended period during the preceding three financial
years
g. being a significant professional adviser to the organisation or the group, other than as a member of
the governing body
h. being a member of the governing body or an executive of a material customer of, or supplier to, the
organisation, or
i. being entitled to remuneration contingent on the performance of the organisation.
28. Independent non-executive members of the governing body may continue to serve, classified as
independent, for longer than nine years if, after an assessment by the governing body, there are no
relationships or circumstances likely to affect, or reasonably be perceived to affect, the member’s
objectivity and judgement.
29. There should be disclosure of the following with regards to the governing body:
a. its composition
b. classification of each member as executive or non-executive
c. classification of non-executive members as independent or not; and, if classified as independent
despite some indicators of lack of independence as set out above, the reasons for this
classification
d. the qualifications and experience of members
e. the mix of skills, experience, diversity, independence and knowledge of the organisation and its
sector that that the governing body currently has in its membership, or is looking to achieve
f. the length of service and age of members
g. other significant positions of each member
h. where a member has been serving for longer than nine years, details of the assessment and
findings regarding independence
i. reasons for removal, resignation or retirement of members from the governing body, and
j. the number of meetings held, and attendance at those meetings.
e. The chair may be a member of the social and ethics committee and may also be its chair.
36. The board should ensure there is a succession plan for the chair.
See principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of the chair.
General
Recommended practices
38. The governing body should consider and direct the establishment of standing or ad hoc-committees and
delegation of responsibilities to these committees to assist it in fulfilling its obligations.
39. Subject to law and considerations of proportionality, the governing body should consider establishing
committees to assist in the areas set out below, and in additional areas as deemed necessary:
a. audit
b. risk and opportunity
c. remuneration
d. nomination, and
e. social and ethical outcomes.
40. The terms of reference of each committee should, as a minimum, cover the following:
a. composition and rotation of membership
b. overall role and associated responsibilities
c. delegated authorities, including the extent of power to make decisions and recommendations
d. tenure
e. resources and access to information, and
f. meeting procedures.
41. The roles and responsibilities, as well as the membership, of committees as set out in the terms of
reference should be considered holistically by the governing body and co-ordinated so that:
a. the functioning of committees is integrated, and effective collaboration and support are in place
with minimal overlap or fragmentation, and
b. there is a distribution and balance of power in how membership across governing body structures
is composed so that no individual(s) has the ability to dominate decision-making and there is not
undue reliance on a particular individual(s).
42. The governing body should ensure that each committee’s members collectively has the skills and
capacity to fulfil its mandate.
43. Members of the executive and senior management should be invited to attend committee meetings or
part thereof to provide information and insights in their areas of responsibility.
44. The governing body should determine the protocol to be followed if its committees or any member of its
committees needs to obtain independent, external professional, expert advice at the cost of the
organisation.
45. Every member of the governing body is entitled to attend any committee meeting as an observer.
However, unless that member is also a member of the committee, the member is not entitled to
participate without the consent of the chair; does not have a vote; and is not entitled to fees for such
attendance, unless otherwise agreed by the governing body and shareholders.
46. The terms of reference of committees should be regularly reviewed and any changes should be approved
by the governing body.
47. Any delegation to a committee or a governing body member will not of itself constitute discharge of the
governing body’s accountability. The governing body needs to ensure oversight of delegated authority.
48. A committee of the governing body should ensure that the reports it receives establish a basis for rational
decision-making and execution of duties, including that:
a. reports are complete in that they contain pertinent and material information
b. standard reports are provided against pre-determined performance objectives or other criteria, and
c. reports have been assured by the appropriate line(s) of assurance as is appropriate for its purpose.
49. The should be disclosure regarding each committee as follows:
a. role and functions
b. composition
c. any external advisers who regularly attend committee meetings
d. key areas of focus, and
e. whether the committee has satisfied its responsibilities for the year in accordance with the terms of
reference.
Audit Committees
Recommended practices
50. For some companies, an audit committee is a statutory requirement. However, as a matter of good
practice, the governing body of any organisation which issues audited financial statements should
establish an audit committee. Its role should be to provide independent oversight of:
a. audit and assurance requirements
b. independence of the auditor and other assurance providers
c. audit quality, and
d. integrity, also known as the reliability and usefulness of reports.
51. The audit committee carries ultimate decision-making power and accountability for statutory duties. If
differences of opinion should arise between the governing body and the audit committee where the audit
committee’s statutory functions are concerned, the audit committee’s view prevails.
52. In addition to being a statutory committee, the audit committee may serve as a committee of the
governing body with assigned responsibilities beyond its statutory duties. The governing body is
ultimately accountable on such matters.
53. Where the governing body assigns the oversight of risk governance to the audit committee, the audit
committee’s responsibility should be identical to that of a separate risk committee.
54. Regardless of whether oversight of risk has been assigned to the audit committee, the audit committee
should in any case oversee financial and other reporting risks.
55. The audit committee should consist of at least three members. All members should be independent non-
executive members of the governing body.
56. The governing body should appoint an independent non-executive member as the chair of the audit
committee.
57. The audit committee should periodically meet with assurance providers without management present, so
as to create an opportunity for views and concerns to be raised that may not be appropriate in an open
forum.
See Principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of governing body committees.
58. In addition to the general disclosure regarding committees of the governing body in terms of this Code
and its statutory disclosures, there should be disclosure on:
a. whether the audit committee is satisfied that the auditor is independent of the organisation, with the
disclosure having reference to:
i. the nature and extent of non-audit services rendered
ii. audit firm tenure and, in the event of the audit firm having been involved in a merger or
acquisition, the tenure of its predecessor, and
iii. audit partner rotation and significant management changes during the course of audit firm
tenure.
b. the arrangements in place for the finance function and internal audit, and the audit committee’s
views on their effectiveness.
c. the arrangements in place for a combined assurance model, and the committee’s views on its
effectiveness
d. the audit committee’s views on the effectiveness of internal financial controls and the nature and
extent of material weaknesses in the design, implementation or execution of internal financial
controls that resulted in material financial loss, fraud, corruption or material errors.
e. significant matters that the audit committee considered in relation to the external assurance over
reports, and how these were addressed by the committee.
See Principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of committees of the governing body.
See paragraph 49 above on disclosure in respect of committees of the governing body.
See Principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of committees of the governing body.
See Principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of committees of the governing body.
69. The responsibilities of the social and ethics committee should include its statutory duties (if applicable)
and any other responsibilities assigned by the governing body.
70. The social and ethics committee should consist of at least three members of the governing body or
prescribed officers, at least one of whom should be a non-executive director.
See Principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of committees of the governing body.
See principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of the CEO.
Delegation
Recommended practices
78. The governing body should provide direction on the powers reserved for itself, and those delegated to
management, without abdicating accountability.
79. The governing body should ensure that it approves a delegation-of-authority framework that articulates its
direction on reservation and delegation of power.
80. The governing body should ensure that it is consulted on executive appointments other than the CEO,
with the CEO finally approving executive appointments.
81. The governing body should oversee that the delegation-of-authority framework is implemented.
82. The governing body should oversee that responsibilities for functional areas such as ethics, risk and
opportunity, technology and information, compliance, human resources, assurance, finance, stakeholder
relationships and others, are:
a. managed with the necessary experience, expertise and qualifications, and at the appropriate level
of seniority, to discharge the role effectively and with the necessary gravitas
b. appropriately resourced, and
c. sufficiently defined so that there is role clarity, but at the same time providing for structures that
facilitate integrated decision-making and execution.
83. The governing body should ensure that the competence and ability of management of functional areas
are assessed regularly, and where necessary, due to the level of technical knowledge required,
supplemented by an independent assessment of skills and competence.
84. The governing body should oversee that there is a succession plan for executive and senior
management.
85. There should be disclosure of:
a. the powers that the governing body has reserved for itself, and
b. the organisation’s executive and senior management structure, including the role and relevant
qualifications, skills and experience of each.
89. The governing body should finally approve the appointment and removal of the company secretary or
corporate governance professional.
90. The governing body should apply its mind to appointing as company secretary or corporate governance
professional, a person with the necessary experience, expertise and qualifications, as well as at the
appropriate level of seniority to discharge the role effectively and with the necessary gravitas.
91. The company secretary or corporate governance professional should be a trusted advisor and functionary
of the governing body, but should maintain an arms-length relationship with the governing body and its
members, and therefore should not be a member of the governing body.
92. The company secretary should report functionally to the chair of governing body and administratively to
the CEO.
93. The responsibilities of the company secretary or corporate governance professional should include the
statutory duties, if applicable, as well as other responsibilities assigned by the governing body.
See principle 3.5 which deals with the performance evaluation of the company secretary or corporate
governance professional.
94. There should be disclosure of the arrangements in place for access to company secretarial or
professional corporate governance services, as well as the mechanisms for assessing effectiveness.
95. The company secretary or corporate governance professional should formally approve the disclosure of
membership and the key roles and responsibilities of the governing body and its structures, as well as the
number of meetings and attendance at each meeting.
Recommended practices
96. The governing body should provide clear direction on evaluation of performance.
97. The governing body should appoint an independent non-executive member to lead the evaluation of the
chair’s performance.
98. The governing body should evaluate the performance of the CEO, and of the company secretary or
corporate governance professional, at least once a year.
99. The governing body should determine the methodology and frequency of evaluations of the performance
of the governing body, its structures, its chair and members. These performance evaluations should be
conducted at least every three years.
100. There should be disclosure on:
a. arrangements for the evaluation the performance of the governing body, its structures, its chair and
members, the CEO and company secretary or corporate governance professional
b. whether such performance evaluations have been undertaken during the reporting period, and the
reason for any exceptions
c. whether the performance evaluations were performed in-house or facilitated externally, with
reasons if necessary
d. an overview of evaluation results and remedial actions, and
e. the governing body’s views on whether the evaluation process is effective in improving
performance.
Recommended practices
The governing body should provide clear strategic direction for the taking and managing of risk and
opportunity.
Consideration of risk and opportunity should be integrated by the governing body in its decision- making
and execution of duties.
The governing body should approve the nature and extent of the risks and opportunities that the
organisation should be willing to take, and particularly:
a. the risk and opportunity appetite, namely the propensity to take appropriate levels of risk and
opportunity in pursuit of strategic objectives, and
b. the limit of the potential loss that the governing body is prepared and has the capacity to tolerate.
Approval by the governing body of the nature and extent of the risks and opportunities to be taken in the
pursuit of its strategic objectives should be a dynamic process, to be reviewed periodically and in
response to changes in the risk –for-reward analyses.
The governing body should ensure that it approves policy that articulates its strategic direction on taking
and managing risk and opportunity.
The policy should provide for the adoption of the appropriate standards and framework to give effect to
the policy.
The governing body should delegate to management responsibility for implementing policy on enterprise-
wide risk and opportunity management, and for embedding it into the day-to-day, medium and long-term
decision-making, activities and culture of the organisation.
The governing body should oversee the adequacy and effectiveness of risk and opportunity management,
including:
a. capturing of opportunities offered by developments in the external environment
b. implementation of a fraud risk management framework that prevents, detects and responds
incidents of fraud
c. processes to understand and deal with complexity and hidden interdependencies in the external
environment that could affect the organisation
d. assessment of the vulnerabilities of the organisation and its critical dependencies on its capitals
and relationships, and
e. assessment of plans to withstand and recover from volatility and acute shocks and the capacity to
build resilience against risks.
The governing body should oversee that a formal review is conducted periodically of the risk and
opportunity management function as indicated by the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control
systems and other risk and opportunity responses.
There should be disclosure of the nature and extent of the risks and opportunities the organisation is
willing to take, including how this is communicated to the organisation and embedded into its day-to-day,
medium and long-term decision making, activities and culture.
There should be disclosure of:
a. arrangements for managing risk and opportunity
b. key focus areas during the reporting period
c. mechanisms for monitoring and assessing adequacy and effectiveness of risk and opportunity
management, and
d. how past performance, current operations and future strategic objectives are affected by
uncertainties.
Recommended practices
The governing body should provide strategic direction for management of technology and information.
The governing body should approve policy that articulates strategic direction on the use of technology
and information.
The policy should provide for adoption of the appropriate standards and framework to give effect to the
strategy.
The governing body should delegate to management responsibility for implementing policy on enterprise-
wide technology and information management, and for embedding it into the day-to-day, medium and
long-term decision making, activities and culture.
The governing body should oversee the adequacy and effectiveness of technology and information
management, including:
a. exploitation of opportunities offered by technology and digital developments
b. ethical and responsible use of technology and information
c. information management that creates and enhances intellectual capital in the organisation
d. integration of people, technologies, information and processes in the digital business value chain
e. assessing return on investment
f. risk oversight of outsourced services and the supply chain for the acquisition of goods and
services, and
g. compliance with relevant laws.
The governing body should oversee the management of cyber-security risk, including:
a. integration of cyber-security risk into risk and opportunity management
Recommended practices
The governing body should provide strategic direction for compliance.
The governing body should approve policy that articulates its strategic direction on compliance.
The policy should provide for adoption of the appropriate standards and framework to give effect to the
policy.
The governing body should delegate to management responsibility for implementing policy on enterprise-
wide compliance management and for embedding it into the day-to-day, medium and long-term decision
making, activities and culture.
The governing body should oversee management of compliance with laws and adherence to non-binding
rules, codes and standards, and specifically the following:
a. compliance is understood not only for the obligations it creates, but also for the rights and
protections that it affords
b. compliance management takes a holistic view of how applicable laws, non-binding rules, codes
and standards relate to one another
c. management has strategic relationships with regulators and professional bodies, in order to
understand the environment and trends, while creating the ability to influence that environment,
and
d. compliance management is responsive to changes in the regulatory environment.
The governing body should periodically undertake a formal review the adequacy and effectiveness of the
organisation’s compliance function.
There should be disclosure of:
a. structures and processes for compliance management
b. key focus areas during the reporting period, and
c. mechanisms for monitoring and assessing adequacy and effectiveness of compliance.
There should be disclosure of material or repeated regulatory penalties, sanctions or fines for
contraventions of, or non-compliance with, statutory obligations - whether imposed on the organisation, or
on members of the board or officers.
Remuneration policy
Recommended Practices
The governing body should provide strategic direction for fair, responsible and transparent remuneration
on an enterprise-wide basis.
The governing body should approve policy that articulates and gives effect to its strategic direction on fair,
responsible and transparent remuneration.
The remuneration policy should be designed to attract, motivate, reward and retain high-quality talent and
support delivery on strategy without encouraging undue risk taking.
The remuneration policy for executive members of the board and prescribed officers should be fair and
responsible in the context of overall employee remuneration.
The remuneration policy should address all components of remuneration, including:
a. base salary, financial and non-financial benefits
b. variable remuneration, including:
i. short- and long-term incentives (including deferrals)
ii. loss of office payments
iii. recruitment and retention payments
iv. any other commissions and allowances, and
c. the structuring of the fees of non-executive members of the governing body.
The governing body should oversee that the implementation of the remuneration policy results in the
following:
a. attracting, motivating, rewarding and retaining talent
b. linking variable remuneration with both organisational and individual employee performance
c. measuring variable remuneration in relation to sustainable value created across the whole of the
economic, social and environmental context; and in accordance with enhancement or diminishment
across the capitals that the organisation uses or affects.
The governing body should oversee that the social and ethics committee, if it exists, reviews fair and
responsible executive remuneration practices in the context of overall employee remuneration.
The governing body should oversee that there is regular dialogue with shareholders, to create and
maintain a mutual understanding of what performance and value creation means, in order to properly
evaluate the remuneration policy.
Remuneration report
The governing body should ensure that remuneration is reported on in three parts: (i) background
statement; (ii) an overview of the main provisions of the organisation-wide policy on remuneration; and
(iii) an implementation report which contains details of all remuneration and benefits awarded to individual
members of the governing body and prescribed officers during the reporting period.
The background statement should briefly provide context for remuneration considerations and decisions,
with reference to:
a. internal and external factors that influenced remuneration
b. the focus areas of the remuneration committee, and any substantial changes to the remuneration
policy
c. the opinion of the remuneration committee on whether implementation of the policy achieved stated
objectives, and
d. future considerations.
The brief overview of the main provisions of the remuneration policy should include:
a. the high-level principles in accordance with which remuneration is determined.
b. for executive members of the governing body and prescribed officers:
i. the elements and design principles informing the remuneration system
ii. details of obligations in employment contracts which could give rise to remuneration
payments or payments for loss of office
iii. illustration of the application of remuneration policy under different performance scenarios.
c. in respect of employees other than executive members of the governing body and prescribed
officers, a high-level overview of the elements and design principles informing the remuneration.
d. a statement of how fairness and responsibility in the context of overall employee remuneration was
taken into account when determining remuneration of executive members of the governing body
and prescribed officers.
e. in respect of non-executive directors, the basis of computation of fees
f. justification of benchmarks.
g. reference to an electronic link to the full policy for public access.
The implementation report in the annual financial statements should include all of the following:
a. the total remuneration paid and accrued to each executive member of the governing body and
each prescribed officer, including basic salary, benefits, short-term incentives (including those
deferred), loss of office payments, other allowances and long-term incentives, all reflected at fair
value.
b. details of deferred short-term incentives and long-term incentives awarded but not yet paid or
vested at the end of the financial year in respect of each executive member of the governing body
and prescribed officer.
c. awards realised and paid to each executive member of the governing body and prescribed officer
from deferred short term incentives and long-term incentives.
d. the links between variable remuneration awarded and performance, in terms of sustainable value
created across the economic, social and environmental context; or in terms of the enhancement or
diminution across all capitals that the organisation uses or affects.
e. whether remuneration consultants have been used, and their relationship to the organisation and
members of the governing body or prescribed officers.
4.5 Assurance
Principle 4.5: The governing body should ensure that assurance results in an adequate and effective control
environment and integrity of reports for better decision-making.
Refer to Chapter 3 for recommendations on disclosure by the audit committee in relation to the combined
assurance model.
Internal audit
Recommended practices
The governing body should delegate to the audit committee to provide strategic direction for independent
and objective assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls and risk and opportunity
management.
The audit committee should ensure that internal audit, and other specialists within the third line of
assurance, support the organisation achieving strategic objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined
approach to the independent and objective evaluation, and continuing improvement of risk and
opportunity management and the internal control environment.
The governing body should delegate to the audit committee to approve an internal audit charter that
articulates and gives effect to its strategic direction on independent and objective assurance on the
adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls and risk and opportunity management.
Taking into account proportionality, the audit committee should decide whether an internal audit function
headed by a chief audit executive (CAE) should be established.
If a CAE is appointed, the audit committee should ensure that the CAE has the requisite authority and
independence. For reasons of independence, the CAE should report functionally to the audit committee
chair and administratively to the CEO, with access to the chair of the governing body.
The audit committee should oversee the appointment and performance of the CAE and be responsible for
the dismissal of the CAE, when necessary.
Regardless of the internal audit structuring and arrangements approved by the audit committee, the audit
committee should ensure that the internal audit function, the CAE and other specialists in the third line of
assurance are independent from management that designed and implemented the controls. The CAE and
such other specialists may not be members of the executive, but may be invited to attend executive
meetings.
Where internal audit services are outsourced, in part or in totality, responsibility should be assigned by
the audit committee to a senior manager who is appropriately independent from management who
implemented the controls and who has the necessary level of knowledge, competence and authority to
facilitate effective outsourcing.
The audit committee should oversee that the structuring and arrangements for internal audit has
appropriate skills and resources to address the complexity and volume of risk; and that internal audit is
supplemented as required by the specialist skills of internal forensic examiners, fraud examiners and
auditors, safety and process assessors, and statutory actuaries.
The audit committee should oversee that internal audit: -
a. follows an approved risk-based internal audit plan, and
b. monitors the risk and opportunity profile regularly and proposes revisions to the audit plan
accordingly.
The audit committee should oversee that internal audit and other specialists in the third line of assurance
periodically conduct a formal review of the adequacy and effectiveness of risk and opportunity
management and internal control systems.
Refer to Chapter 3 for recommendations in relation to disclosure on internal audit and the internal
control environment.
Assurance of reports
Recommended Practices
The governing body should delegate to the audit committee to provide direction on assurance that
supports the integrity of reports.
The audit committee should apply its mind to assurance requirements over reports other than financial
statements, including:
a. considering whether to require assurance over the process for the preparation of the report, or the
underlying data, or both
b. determining the reporting boundary or scope
c. determining the appropriate level or extent of assurance depending on the size, resources and
complexity of strategic objectives and operations of the organisation
d. considering the criteria against which reports should be assured, for example: integrity, which
includes reliability (validity, accuracy and completeness) and usefulness (relevance, consistency
and measurability), and
e. determining the assurance required over future-orientated information.
The governing body should delegate to the audit committee oversight of assurance provided over reports
other than financial statements, which includes:
a. the origin of the information and whether it was subject to the oversight of another line of assurance
b. the process by which the information was extracted from original data, and related internal controls
over the process
c. whether there are internal assurance processes in place over the information
d. the competence and objectivity of the assurance provider
e. assurance methodology applied by assurance providers, and
f. possible limitations or scope restrictions.
Reports, other than financial statements, that are published by the organisation should disclose:
a. a description of assurance performed
b. detail of the work of other assurance providers that have been relied upon, and
c. an assurance conclusion.
Stakeholders
Principle 5.1: As part of its decision-making in the best interests of the organisation, the governing body
should ensure that a stakeholder-inclusive approach is adopted, which takes into account and balances their
legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations.
Stakeholder relationships
Recommended practices
The governing body should provide strategic direction for the organisation’s relationships with its
stakeholders.
The governing body should ensure that it approves policy that articulates its strategic direction on
stakeholder relationships.
Policy should provide for the adoption of the appropriate standards and frameworks to give effect to the
policy.
The governing body should delegate to management responsibility for implementing policy on
stakeholder relationships and embedding it into the day-to-day, medium and long-term decision making,
activities and culture of the organisation.
The governing body should oversee stakeholder relationship management, including:
a. effective management of stakeholder relationships that contributes to value creation and achieving
strategic objectives
b. an integrated stakeholder communications plan that includes:
i. the use of digital and other communication platforms as a strategic tool - for marketing, as
a source of intelligence, to influence perceptions about the brand and products, and to
improve transparency and communication
ii. standards and processes for development of content and sharing of information on digital
and other communication platforms, including assigning of decision-making authority on
approval of content and manner of dissemination
iii. systematic gathering and analysis of information emanating from communication platforms,
to assess reputational risks and to develop appropriate responses, and
iv. a plan for addressing communication in crisis situations.
c. measurement of quality of stakeholder relationships as well as appropriate responses to results
d. a dispute-resolution mechanism and associated processes, as part of the standard terms and
conditions of the organisation’s contractual arrangements with employees and other stakeholders.
The governing body should oversee that the organisation assesses and responds to how digitisation and
automation are shaping future workforce requirements, and the possible impact on employees and
society.
The governing body should, as part of the organisation’s growth and innovation strategy, oversee that
skill sets required over the long term are identified and that the organisation invests in continuous
learning, re-skilling and up-skilling of employees.
There should be disclosure of:
The board should provide clear strategic direction for relationships with shareholders.
The board should ensure pro-active engagement and development of relationships with shareholders,
including institutional investors, so as to strengthen their ability to act in accordance with laws and codes
that guide shareholder responsibilities.
The board should oversee that the company encourages shareholders to attend general meetings of the
company. The chair of the board and the chairs of its committees should, where necessary, pro-actively
engage with shareholders on items that serve on the agenda for the general meeting.
The board should oversee that the designated partner of the external audit firm attends the general
meeting.
The board should oversee that there is equitable treatment of all holders of the same class of shares, and
that the interests of minority and foreign shareholders are adequately protected.
Minutes of general meetings should be publicly available and should be sufficiently detailed to express
matters raised by shareholders and how these have been addressed.
Responsibilities of shareholders
Principle 5.2: The governing body of an institutional investor should ensure that the organisation responsibly
exercises its rights, obligations, legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations, as holder of
beneficial interest in the securities of a company.
Recommended Practices
The governing body of an institutional investor should provide strategic direction on responsible
investment.
The governing body of an institutional investor should ensure that it approves policy that articulates its
strategic direction on responsible investment.
The policy should provide for the adoption of recognised responsible investment principles and practices
to give effect to the governing body’s strategic direction.
Where the organisation as institutional investor outsources any of its investment arrangements or
activities, including asset management and voting, to custodians, nominees or other service providers,
the governing body should ensure that a formal mandate is in place that sets out its directions on
responsible investment practices, including how votes are cast and other investment activities and
decisions executed.
The governing body of an institutional investor should delegate to management the responsibility for
implementing responsible investment, in accordance with recognised principles and practices.
The governing body of an institutional investor should oversee that custodians, nominees or other service
providers are held accountable for the casting of votes and execution of other investment activities and
decisions, in accordance with the formal mandate.
The governing body of an institutional investor should disclosure on its investment policy and adherence
to recognised principles and practices.
The board of a holding company should ensure that a group corporate governance framework is in place
to address relationships and the exercise of authority and power amongst the companies within the
group.
All boards within the group should contribute to the development of the group governance framework and
agree to it.
The adoption and implementation by the subsidiary company of policies and procedures of the holding
company is a matter for consideration and approval by the board of the subsidiary company as a
separate legal entity.
The group governance framework should be given effect in the memoranda of incorporation, delegations
of authority, shareholder agreements, board charters, board committee terms of reference, and related
policies and agreements.
The group governance framework should provide for recognition of the separate and independent juristic
personalities of each company within the group, and the legal duties of each director to the company to
which the director is appointed.
The group governance framework should address matters that include:
a. delineation of the rights and role of the holding company
b. if appropriate, delegation of certain responsibilities by the board of a subsidiary to a board
committee of the holding company, without abdicating accountability and subject to agreed
reporting and information-sharing arrangements
c. the extent of adoption of governance and operational policies across the group
d. engagement by the holding company with the boards of subsidiary companies before election of
directors to the board of the subsidiary takes place
e. having structures and procedures in place to address the risk of breach of legal duty in relation to
use of information obtained whilst acting as director.
Each board within the group should ensure that cross-directorships, and managers holding directorships
in companies in the group other than that which they manage, do not affect the robust interrogation of
information that is provided for decision-making and execution of duties.
The board of the holding company should, in terms of its legal duties towards the holding company,
oversee that the agreed corporate governance framework is implemented and adequately maintained
across the group.
There should be disclosure by the holding company of the agreed corporate governance framework
which is implemented across the group, and on the mechanisms by which its implementation is monitored
and assessed.
The delegation to board committees of the holding company, and the extent of the adoption and
implementation of policies and procedures of the holding company by the subsidiary company, should be
disclosed by the subsidiary company.
Sector Supplements will be published and opened for commentary during April 2016.
This document is a template that organisations should use as guidance for the disclosure as required in the King IV Code. It is recommended that
this be posted on the organisation’s website.
The application register should be used together with other means of disclosure such as the organisation’s annual integrated report. Duplication should be
avoided by cross referencing. As per the practice recommendation in chapter 2 of the King IV Code: “The governing body should oversee … integration of
reports and disclosure in substance and form and across various reporting media and communication platforms.”
The detail of information to be provided in the application register should be guided by materiality and what has already been disclosed elsewhere. It should
enable stakeholders to make an informed assessment of the corporate governance at the organisation and the extent to which effect has been given to the
principle.
The specimen Application Register is meant to provide an indication of the approach that could be followed in regards to the required disclosures.
PRINCIPLES, the application of which is assumed EXPLANATION on the practices that have been implemented and the progress made in giving
effect to the principle
Principle 1.1: The governing body should set the Specimen disclosure
tone and lead ethically and effectively. As governing body members we are holding one another accountable for decision-making and acting in a
way that displays the ethical characteristics stated in King IV. The chair of the governing body has been
tasked to monitor this as part of her duties. We furthermore undertook an assessment of the performance
of individual members of the governing body which included peer evaluation of the ethical characteristics
demonstrated by each member of the governing body. As a result of the evaluation the governing body
agreed to make ongoing professional development of its members a priority for the coming year so that
governing body members are able to fully demonstrate the characteristic of being informed.
Corrective measures have been implemented as a result of the recommendations emanating from the
audit. Employee wellness and skills development was another area of focus driven by the specialist skills
shortages. For more detail on how the organisation addressed responsible citizenship, refer to the
organisation’s sustainability report on www.organisation.co.za/reports . Users of this report will note that
the organisation’s performance as corporate citizen is monitored against targets approved by the social
and ethics committee.
Principle 2.1: The governing body should lead the Specimen disclosure
value creation process by appreciating that To view the organisation’s core purpose, our strategic pillars and strategic priorities as well as the
strategy, risk and opportunity, performance and performance in terms thereof, refer to our annual integrated report on www.organisation.co.za/reports.
sustainable development are inseparable elements. The annual integrated report demonstrates that organisational performance is understood as both the
achievement of strategic objectives and the enhancement of the capitals and relationships that the
organisation uses and affects, i.e. value-creation. Sustainable development is seen to be a source of
opportunity and the organisation defines its core purpose, sets and achieves its strategic objectives with
reference to risk and opportunity. The governing body assesses on a continual basis the positive and
negative outcomes resulting from its business model and responds to it as highlighted in the annual
integrated report referred to above.
result in continual improvement of the way that we communicate with our stakeholders through our
reports.
Particular trouble has been taken during the year under review to strengthen our engagement with
shareholders on the nomination process. More detailed information on the process as well as each
candidate is provided so as to enable shareholders to exercise their voting rights on an informed basis.
Mr B has been serving on the governing body for 10 years. Despite this the governing body has, after
conducting an independence assessment, concluded that Mr B is free from relationships or circumstance
that are likely to affect, or that may appear to affect, his objective judgement.
The composition of the committees of the governing body and the distribution of authority between the
chair and other individuals furthermore leads to neither the chair nor any other individual(s) being able to
dominate decision-making within governance structures or cause undue dependency on such
individual(s).
The audit committee is satisfied that the auditor is independent of the organisation as non-audit services
are not performed and the auditor firm has been appointed for 5 years with the designated partner having
oversight of the audit for the same period of time.
A CFO has been appointed as head of the finance function. The CFO has 2 senior managers who are
qualified CA(SA)s reporting to her. Internal audit has been fully outsourced and the CFO is responsible
for overseeing and co-ordinating the effective functioning of the outsourcing arrangement. The audit
committee is in the process of considering whether allocating this oversight responsibility to the CFO is
not affecting the independence of internal audit. A final decision regarding oversight of outsourced
internal audit services will be made and disclosed in the next reporting period.
An assessment of the effectiveness of neither the finance nor the internal audit function has been
performed by the audit committee. This is recognised as having the ability to affect financial reporting as
well as the effectiveness of the internal control environment and it has therefore been placed on the work
plan of the audit committee for the upcoming financial year.
The integrated assurance model has only recently been adopted and therefore its assessment together
with the assessment of the system for internal financial controls will only be conducted towards the end
of the next financial year.
The significant matters addressed by the audit committee during the year under review is addressed in
the report of the audit committee chairman in the annual integrated report
www.organisation.co.za/reports.
The CEO does not have work commitments outside of this organisation. A succession plan for the CEO
is not in place. The governing body plans to address this matter during the upcoming year.
The organisation has appointed a company secretary on a part-time basis as it is not able to afford a full-
time employee with the requisite knowledge, experience and stature. The company secretary’s
performance is assessed by the board every year and corrective steps taken where necessary. No major
issues or concerns have been identified and the governing body is satisfied that the company secretary
and the function that he oversees are performing well. The company secretary does sign off on
disclosure of membership of governing body structures, number of meetings of each and attendance at
each meeting as well as the overall content of the committee information and reporting that are in the
public domain.
The governing body is satisfied that the organisation is appropriately resourced and that its delegation to
management contributes to an effective arrangement by which authority and responsibilities are
exercised.
members and fragmentation, overlap of the functions of the governing body and its committees and
ongoing professional development of members of the governing body were identified as key matters to
address through the previous assessment in 2014. The governing body has developed a preliminary
succession plan which will be finalised after further discussion and consultation and implemented in the
year ahead. The particular development needs of the board and individual members have been identified
and the company secretary has assisted the governing body in designing a professional development
programme that addresses both.
The governing body has furthermore with the assistance of the company secretary undertaken a holistic
review of its charter and the terms of references in order achieve better integration and co-ordinations
amongst the governing body and all committees. This process is still underway.
The risk committee has been tasked to assist the board with the governance of risk. The risk committee
has approved the risk management policy which determines that the COSO enterprise-wide risk
management framework be adopted. As risk management permeates all aspects of the operations of the
organisation, risk is overseen at executive level.
As the risk function is newly established, the risk committee did not formally assess its effectiveness. A
formal assessment will be conducted in the 2016 financial year. Meanwhile the risk committee has used
the interrogation of risk heat maps presented by management and the output of risk-based internal audit
and the other lines of assurance to assess the risk management function.
Access our annual integrated report on www.organisation.co.za/reports for an overview on whether and
how past performance, current operations, and future strategic objectives are affected by uncertainties in
the external environment.
The governing body and the organisation are working towards a mature risk management (including an
effective internal control environment) that will assist the organisation in achieving its objectives.
Refer to disclosure under Principle 3.3 above on the integrated assurance model and internal audit.
Broader forms of address are used in this Report, namely ‘organisations’, ‘governing body’ and ‘those charged
with governance duties’. The use of ‘corporate’ such as in ‘corporate governance’ is meant to refer to the
governance of organisations that are incorporated to form legal entities separate from their founders.
The following words carry the meaning as indicated for purposes of interpreting and applying King IV:
Audit firm tenure The number of uninterrupted financial years that an audit firm has been
appointed as auditor of an organisation, up to and including the
organisation’s last audited financial year.
Board Board means the board of directors of a company if it is used in the context
of a company, but it also includes a council if used in the context of a
municipality and a board of trustees if used in the context of a retirement
fund, as well as the governing body of any other organisation or entity.
Business Business includes enterprise and denotes the operations and range of
activities conducted by companies, organisations and entities regardless of
their form of incorporation.
Business model The business model of an organisation consists of input in the form of the
resources that it uses and the relationships with its stakeholders. These
resources and relationships are subjected to business processes and
activities that convert resources and relationships into output consisting of
products and services. The outputs in turn lead to outcomes which either
diminish or destroy, or enhance the capitals.2
Capitals or six capitals The capitals refer to the various forms of capital that the organisation uses
and affects in the course of its business activities and operations. In
accordance with the six capitals model3 these capitals consist of financial,
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relational, and natural capital.
1 http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/accountability/
2
The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
3 The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
CEO CEO refers to the chief executive officer or the highest ranking employee in
an organization regardless of naming convention.
Corporate Citizenship Corporate citizenship is the recognition that the organisation is an integral
part of the broader society within which it operates. It has a standing as
juristic person in that society with rights but also responsibilities and
obligations. It is also recognition that the broader society is the licensor of
the organisation.
Culture Culture in a business context refers to the established norms of how the
governing body and the internal stakeholders of an organisation conduct
themselves and relate to each other, their work and the outside world 4 in
short – ‘the way we do things around here when no one is watching’.
Effective leadership Effective leadership is results-driven and refers to leading the organisation
towards achieving its core purpose and strategic goals.
Ethics Ethics in the context of business refers to the ethical values and principles
applied to the organisation’s activities, how decisions are made and the
relationship between the organisation and its stakeholders.
Executive management Executive management or the executive is after the governing body the
highest decision-making authority in the organisation. Executive managers
are the members of the executive management team and include those
who exercise general executive control over the whole or portions of the
business and activities of the organisation.
External stakeholders External stakeholders are indirectly affiliated to the organisation and include
creditors, regulators, the media and the society within which the
organisation operates.
Governance outcomes Governance outcomes are the positive effects or benefits of good corporate
governance for the organisation. These positive effects include: (i) an
ethical culture; (ii) sustainable performance and value-creation; (iii)
4 http://geert-hofstede.com/companyal-culture.html
adequate and effective control by the governing body, and; (iv) building and
protecting reputation and legitimacy.
Governing body Governing body is the structure that has the accountability for the
governance, leadership and performance of the organisation. Members of
the governing body are those who are duly appointed to serve on the
governing body.
Integrated annual report An integrated annual report is a holistic and integrated representation of the
organisation’s ability to sustainable value creation within the economic,
social and environmental context in which it operates in clear, concise and
understandable language.5
Internal stakeholder Internal stakeholders are directly affiliated with the organisation and include
its governing body, management, employees and shareholders.
Institutional investor Institutional Investor means any juristic person or institution referred to in
the definition of ‘financial institution’ in section 1 of the Financial Services
Board Act No 97 of 1990, to the extent that these juristic persons or
institutions are the holders of beneficial interest in the securities of a
company. It includes retirement funds and insurance companies as well as
the custodians, nominees and service providers who act under mandate in
respect of any investment decisions and investment activities exercised in
relation to these securities. 7
King III King III Report on Governance for South Africa, 2009
King IV King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, 2016 which
incorporates the King IV Code and all the other Parts.
King IV Code King IV Code refers to the Code included in the King IV Report
King IV Report King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, 2016
Material/ materiality Materiality refers to matters that substantively affect the organisation’s
ability to create value over the short, medium and long term 8
MFMA Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003
5 Adapted from The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
6
The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
7 Adapted from definition in Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa, p9
8 The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, p5
Outputs Output describes the products, services, by-products and waste that are
produced by an organisation. 10
Policy Policy defines the course of action and scope or spheres within which
judgements are exercised, decisions are made and actions are taken. It
includes dealing with the following matters:
objectives
approach and philosophy
responsibilities and ownership, and
standards, methodologies and practices.
Prescribed officer Prescribed officer is as defined in regulation 38 of the Companies Act.
Risk Risk is about uncertainty, its likelihood of occurring and the effect thereof
both positive and negative on the achievement of the organisation’s
objectives.
Risk and opportunity Risk and opportunity management refers to the coordinated activities to
management direct and control an organisation with regard to risk and opportunity and
9 Adapted from The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
10 Adapted from The International Integrated Reporting Council; The International <IR> Framework, 13 December 2013 -
http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
12 https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/responsibility
Shareholders Shareholders are as defined in the Companies Act and include members of
non-profit companies.
Stakeholders Stakeholders are those who are connected to the organisation by contract
or otherwise and who are affected by the outcomes of business activities.
Stakeholders furthermore affect the organisation in that governing bodies
need to take account of and balance the legitimate and reasonable needs,
interests and expectations of an organisation’s material stakeholders in its
decision-making process.
State-owned entities State-owned entities are as listed in schedule 2 and 3 of the PFMA.
Stranded asset A stranded asset is an asset which is no longer useful and which has
prematurely been written-down, devalued or converted to a liability13.
Strategy Strategy deals with the core purpose of the organisation and the setting of
its short- medium- and long-term direction in its endeavour to sustain the
creation of value.
Sustainable capitalism Sustainable capitalism refers to a capital markets system that should
maintain value creation in a sustainable manner.
Trust Trust refers to the faith that stakeholders place in an organisation which
brings about a good reputation, its legitimacy and licence to operate.
Value Value may be positive or negative and describes the results of the value
creation process in terms of the enhancement, diminishment or
transformation of the capitals.
Value creation Value creation describes the value that the organisation has created
through its interaction with the external environment and its sources of
capitals and ongoing stakeholder relationships. It manifests itself in
enhancement, diminishment or transformations of the six capitals.
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stranded_asset#cite_note-1
Values Values are convictions and beliefs which include how internal and external
stakeholders should be treated, the core purpose and objectives of the
organisation, expectations for performing work duties and how stakeholders
should conduct themselves.