G.R. No. 198356. April 20, 2015.*

 
ESPERANZA SUPAPO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO
SUPAPO, namely: ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD,
RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, all
surnamed SUPAPO, and SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-
SANDIGAN, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO and
SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Accion Publiciana; Accion

publiciana refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of
one (1) year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful

_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.

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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

withholding of possession of the realty.—Accion publiciana is

an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held that
the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise
the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property.—This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs
in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is
not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for
the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a
bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction Courts; Metropolitan Trial Courts;
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691 diversed the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) the exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in
Metro Manila.—Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the
jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession
of real property is plenary. RA No. 7691, however, divested the
RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over actions involving title to

or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed
value.—Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of
real property is now determined by its assessed value. The
assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied
by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.
Same; Same; Same; The complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
—In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of
the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon
to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is
required because the nature of the action and the court with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed
for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein.
Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Acquisitive Prescription;
Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.—In a long line of cases, we have consistently
ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a
claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil
Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529].
Same; Same; Possession; In addition to the imprescriptibility,
the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to
the possession thereof.—In addition to the imprescriptibility, the
person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an
attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this
rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible.
Same; Laches; Burden of Proof; The party alleging laches
must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation.—With
respect to the respondents’ defense of laches, suffice it to say that
the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by
mere allegations

214

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

  in the pleadings. In other words, the party alleging laches

must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court
not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so
since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata;
Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment
as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section
47(c).—Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39,
Section 47(c). “Bar by prior judgment” means that when a right or
fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final
judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those
in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of
action. The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by
prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or order must be
final; (2) It must be a judgment on the merits; (3) It must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) There must be between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The concept of “conclusiveness of
judgment” does not require that there is identity of causes of action
provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.—
The concept of “conclusiveness of judgment” does not require that
there is identity of causes of action provided that there is identity
of issue and identity of parties. Under this particular concept of
res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same. As already explained, there is no
identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-
Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this
reason alone, “conclusiveness of judgment” does not apply. Even if
we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of
parties, “conclusiveness of judgment” still does not apply

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the

criminal case is whether the respondents (accused therein)
committed the crime alleged in the information, while the only
issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a
better right than the respondents to possess and occupy the
subject property.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Cruz, Capule, Marcon & Nabaza Law Offices for
petitioners.
  Anthony R. Inventado for respondents.

 
BRION, J.:
 
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioners Esperanza Supapo and Romeo Supapo2
(Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision3
and August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 111674.
 
Factual Antecedents
 
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion
publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de
Jesus),

_______________

1   Rollo, pp. 8-28. The petition is filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
2   Romeo Supapo is now deceased and substituted by his heirs Rex
Edward, Ronald Troy, Romeo, Jr., Sheila Lorence, all surnamed Supapo,
and Sheryl Fortune Supapo-Sandigan.
3   Rollo, pp. 30-40. Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza penned the
assailed decision, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia
and Florito S. Macalino.
4  Id., at pp. 42-43.
5  Id., at pp. 62-66. The complaint filed on March 7, 2008 was docketed
as Civil Case No. 08-29245 and raffled to Branch 52, MeTC, Caloocan
City.

216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Supapo vs. De Jesus

Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming

rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to
vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City,
described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416
registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo’s names.
The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand
nine hundred eighty pesos (P39,980.00) as shown in the
Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued
by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot.
They also did not employ an overseer but they made sure to
visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in
1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The
houses were built without their knowledge and permission.
They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one
house while Macario occupied the other one.9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents
the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the
dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The
Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman
(certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle
amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against
the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
or the

_______________

6  Id., at p. 327.
7  Id., at p. 328.
8  Id., at p. 63.
9  Id.
10  Id., at p. 329.
11  The case docketed as Criminal Case No. C-45610 was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131.

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the

respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds

accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and
MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is
hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
 SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied)

 
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic
Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as “An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772,” which resulted to the
dismissal of the criminal case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal
case became final.16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo
moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability,
praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ
of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the
writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied
the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari to challenge the RTC’s orders denying the
quashal of

_______________

12   Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts dated August 20,

1975.
13  Rollo, p. 335.
14  The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 19538 and raffled to the
8th Division.
15  Rollo, pp. 337-350.
16  Id., at p. 351. As shown in the Entry of Judgment.

218

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

the writ and the respondent’s motion for

reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held
that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the
respondents’ criminal and civil liabilities were
extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari

with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June
5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently
ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its decision
dated March 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.

 
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the
Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now have
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own,
and that it was not intended to compromise the property
rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of violation of
their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be
had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of
possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion
publiciana.20
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set
their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing22 and
argued that: (1) there is another action pending between
the

_______________

17   The case was docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 78649 and raffled to
the 4th Division.
18  Rollo, pp. 353-357.
19   Citing the decision of this Court in Tuates v. Bersamin, G.R. No.
138962, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 458.
20  Rollo, p. 25.
21  Id., at pp. 93-101.
22  Id., at pp. 115-116.

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is

barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses
Supapo’s cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
 
The MeTC’s Ruling23
 
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative
defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that the
arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in
nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the
trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents’ motion
for reconsideration.
From the MeTC’s ruling, the respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the RTC.24
 
The RTC’s Ruling25
 
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two
grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is
possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1)
year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should
be filed before the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED.

_______________

23  Id., at pp. 139 and 147-148.

24   Id., at pp. 149-160. Docketed as C-960 and filed under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.
25  Id., at pp. 276-279. The decision was promulgated on June 30, 2009.

220

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil
Case No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction.
 SO ORDERED.26

 
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses
Supapo emphasized that the court’s jurisdiction over an
action involving title to or possession of land is determined
by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an
exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints for accion
publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot
falls within MeTC’s jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based
on the assessed value of the subject lot, the Spouses
Supapos’ cause of action had already prescribed, the action
having been filed beyond the ten (10)-year prescriptive
period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not
proven when the actual demand to vacate was made, the
RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the
ejectment suit should have been filed is counted from the
time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate
to file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the
complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7,
2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.

_______________

26  Id., at p. 279.
27  Id., at pp. 280-284.
28  Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
x x x x
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article
537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real
right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.

221
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Supapo vs. De Jesus

Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo

appealed to the CA.29
 
The CA’s Ruling30
 
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the
complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged
before the RTC and that the period to file the action had
prescribed.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated

June 30, 2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009 are
AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.

 
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a
reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they came to us
through the present petition.
 
The Petition
 
In seeking reversal of the CA’s ruling, the Spouses
Supapo essentially argue that:
  (1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction
over accion publiciana where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the
property is located in Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of
action is imprescriptible under the Torrens system.

_______________

29  Rollo, pp. 298-310. The Spouses Supapo reiterated in their appeal

arguments previously raised in the RTC.
30  Supra notes 2 and 3.
31  Rollo, pp. 50-60.
32  Supra note 3.

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222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

The Respondents’ Case33

 
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion
publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by
prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.
 
Issues
 
 The issues for resolution are:
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is
barred by res judicata.
 
Our Ruling
 
The petition is meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired
jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and
(3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
 
Accion Publiciana and the Juris-
diction of the MeTC
 
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed
after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action
for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they
based their better right of possession on a claim of
ownership.

_______________

33  Rollo, pp. 361-365.

34  Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA
130, 140.

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in

accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess
the property.35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the
issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is
not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo’s claim
of ownership over the subject property, we will only do so to
determine if they or the respondents should have the right
of possession.
 Having thus determined that the dispute involves
possession over a real property, we now resolve which court
has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of
the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is plenary.38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of
its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Mu-

_______________

35  Id.
36  Id.
37  Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes” approved on August 14, 1981.
38   Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA
420, 424.
39   “An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg.

224

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

nicipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro
Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise

known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to

read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x x
 (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession

_______________

129, Otherwise Known as the ‘Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.’”

Approved March 25, 1994.

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed

value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

 
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is now
determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value
of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.41
 In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:

[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of

possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its
denial of petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA —
that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies
with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property — no longer holds true. As things now stand, a
distinction must be made between those properties the
assessed value

_______________

40   See Ouano v. PGTT International Investment, 434 Phil. 28; 384

SCRA 589 (2002); Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327; 457 SCRA 815
(2005); Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, 618 Phil. 395;
603 SCRA 395 (2009); Padre v. Badillo, G.R. No. 165423, January 19,
2011, 640 SCRA 50, 66.
41   Hilario v. Salvador, id.; BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No.
173351, July 29, 2010, 220 SCRA 220, 229.
42  557 Phil. 650, 657; 531 SCRA 104, 111 (2007).

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226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus
 of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila;
and P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis supplied)

 
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action. This is required because the nature of the
action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of
the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff,
and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the
assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila,
is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration45
issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity
of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the
jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of
Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint
for accion publiciana.
 
The cause of action
has not prescribed
 
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion
publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states:

Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

_______________

43  Id.
44  Id.
45  Supra note 7.

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

x x x x
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of
Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the
lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

 
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed
the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or
more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action
was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents
contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover
possession of the subject property, the complaint having
been filed beyond the period provided by law.
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses
Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property, and
assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and
indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right
to recover possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed
the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten (10)
years after the certificate to file action was issued.
Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is
imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and
titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo’s position is legally
correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land
registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo
acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979.46
Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the
existence, authenticity and genuineness of the
Supapo’s TCT.47

_______________

46  Supra note 6. The Registered of Deeds of Caloocan issued the TCT

on October 15, 1979.
47  Rollo, pp. 96-97 (pages 3 and 4 of Spouses de Jesus’ answer to the
complaint for accion publiciana). The respondents merely note

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228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the

fact that they have allegedly been in actual, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject
property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The
respondents contend that they built their houses on the
subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot
for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no
longer be disturbed in their possession.48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the
respondents’ contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that
lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held
that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the
land involved is a registered land because of Article 112649
of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a
panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The most
essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section
47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
_______________

that there is allegedly a pending case in which the Republic of the

Philippines filed an action against the Spouses Supapo’s predecessor-in-
interest to annul the latter’s derivative title.
48  Id.
49  Article 1126 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property,
ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to
the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also
recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
50   Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of
Property and for Other Purposes, dated June 11, 1978.
51  Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil. 751,
763; 466 SCRA 136, 149 (2005).

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions.—No

title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

 
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who
holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the
land is an attribute and a logical consequence of
ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder
of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.54
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed
that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the of
other persons’ occupation of the property, regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all.56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because
of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we still rule
in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant
cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly
registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or
sale.

_______________

52  Supra note 34.

53  See Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code.
54  Bishop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA
636, 641.
55  Id.
56  See Arroyo v. BIDECO, G.R. No. 167880, November 14, 2012, 685
SCRA 430; Labrador v. Perlas, G.R. No. 173900, August 9, 2010, 627
SCRA 265; Tolentino v. Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, February 22, 2012, 666
SCRA 561; Ungria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011,
654 SCRA 314. See also Tuason v. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106 (1954); Vda. de
Recinto v. Inciong, No. L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196; and J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41233, November 21, 1979,
93 SCRA 146.

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230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave

greater probative weight to the plaintiff’s TCT vis-à-vis the
contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants.
Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents
did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses
Supapo’s TCT. With more reason therefore that we uphold
the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses
Supapo’s title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility
of the Spouses Supapo’s TCT, this Court merely recognizes
the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of
real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens
System, viz.:

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its

being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a
piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair
to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in
the system and will force land transactions to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and
proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land
conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.58

 
With respect to the respondents’ defense59 of laches,
suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings.60 In other

_______________

57  490 Phil. 118, 135; 449 SCRA 220, 238 (2005).

58  Casimiro Dev’t. Corp. v. Mateo, G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011, 654
SCRA 676, 686.
59  Rollo, p. 364.
60  Ungria v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56.

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 Supapo vs. De Jesus

words, the party alleging laches must adduce in court

evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a
trier of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since
the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a
valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo’s petition.61 On
the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the
clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right
over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they
brought the dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they
initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3)
finally, they filed the accion publiciana. To our mind, these
acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the
Spouses Supapo’s right to recover possession of the subject
lot is not barred by prescription.
 
The action is not barred
by prior judgment
 
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents
invoke res judicata. They contend that the decision of the
CA in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 78649 barred the filing of the
accion publiciana.
To recall, C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 78649 is the petition for
certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the RTC’s
issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to
vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction
under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the
petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the
respondents’ conviction because their criminal liability had
been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which
they were tried and convicted. It follows

_______________

61  Id., citing Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January

14, 2009, 576 SCRA 70, 87.

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232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

that their civil liability arising from the crime had also
been erased.
The respondents’ reliance on the principle of res judicata
is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment
in Rule 39, Section 47(c).62
“Bar by prior judgment” means that when a right or fact
had already been judicially tried on the merits and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final
judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar
to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.63
  The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of
bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

_______________

62   Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock

Association, Inc., 650 SCRA 50, 56 (2011), citing Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Royal Cargo Corporation, G.R. No. 179756,
October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 545, 557.
63  Estate of Sotto v. Palicte, 587 Phil. 586; 566 SCRA 142 (2008), citing
Heirs of Panfilo F. Abalos v. Bucal, 569 Phil. 582; 546 SCRA 252 (2008);
Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 560 Phil. 499;
534 SCRA 228 (2007); Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan, 556 Phil. 664; 530 SCRA 13 (2007).
64  Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, 565 Phil.
766; 541 SCRA 479 (2007); Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico v. Republic,
563 Phil. 92; 537 SCRA 513 (2007); Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de
Panlilio v. Dizon, 562 Phil. 519; 536 SCRA 565 (2007); PCI Leasing &
Finance, Inc. v. Dai, 560 Phil. 84; 533 SCRA 611 (2007).

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(3) It must have been rendered by a court having

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause
of action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is
obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter,
parties and causes of action between the criminal case
prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil
action for the recovery of the subject property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal
complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was
prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines.
The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and
in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The
criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the
Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an
action to recover possession of the subject property.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action.
The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to
protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting
persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed
the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests
over the subject property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes
of action, the defense of res judicata has still no basis.
The concept of “conclusiveness of judgment” does not
require that there is identity of causes of action provided
that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.65

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65  Supra note 62, citing Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, 26

July 2010, 625 SCRA 472, 479.

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234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supapo vs. De Jesus

Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right,

fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.66
As already explained, there is no identity of parties
between the criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting
law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this
reason alone, “conclusiveness of judgment” does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there
is identity of parties, “conclusiveness of judgment” still does
not apply because there is no identity of issues. The issue
in the criminal case is whether the respondents (accused
therein) committed the crime alleged in the information,
while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether the
Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents
to possess and occupy the subject property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is
baseless.
 
Final Note
 
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is
limited only to the issue of determining who between the
parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is
not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even
third persons to file an action for the determination of the
issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
petition, and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the Feb-

_______________
 66   Id., citing Antonio v. Vda. de Monje, 646 Phil. 90, 99; 631 SCRA
471, 480 (2010).

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Supapo vs. De Jesus

ruary 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution

of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 111674.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and

Leonen, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.

Notes.—Registered owners are entitled to the

possession of the property covered by the title from the
time such title was issued in their favor; As the law now
stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may
be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto. (Beltran
vs. Nieves, 634 SCRA 243 [2010])
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Republic vs.
Ching, 634 SCRA 415 [2010])
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