July 27, 2011. G.R. No. 168251.

JESUS M. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. VICENTE D. MILLORA,

respondent.

Remedial Law; Judgments; Finality of Judgment; Well-settled is the rule

that a decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.—
At the outset, it should be stressed that the October 27, 1999 Decision of
the RTC is already final and executory. Hence, it can no longer be the
subject of an appeal. Consequently, Jesus is bound by the decision and
can no longer impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a
decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.

Same; Same; Same; Principle of Immutability of Final Judgment;

Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is
void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become
final and executory.—To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC
has already attained finality. “Such definitive judgment is no longer subject
to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment,
the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except
for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the
judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and
executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.”

Civil Law; Debt; Liquidation of Debt; A debt is liquidated when its

existence and amount are determined; A debt is considered liquidated, not
only when it is expressed already in definite figures which do not require
verification, but also when the determination of the exact amount depends
only on a simple arithmetical operation.—A debt is liquidated when its
existence and amount are determined. It is not necessary that it be
admitted by the debtor. Nor is it necessary that the credit appear in a final
judgment in order that it can be considered as liquidated; it is enough that
its exact amount is known. And a debt is considered liquidated, not only
when it is expressed already in definite figures which do not require
verification, but also when the determination of the exact amount depends
only on a simple arithmetical operation x x x.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mario P. Bihag, Jr. and Marla A. Barcenilla for petitioner.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:

When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal, it

must be executed strictly according to its tenor.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Decision2 dated May
19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81075, which
dismissed the petition forcertiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Orders dated September 6, 20023 and October 2, 20034 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98 in Civil Case No. Q-93-17255.

Factual Antecedents

On July 24, 1990, respondent Atty. Vicente D. Millora (Vicente) obtained

a loan of P400,000.00 from petitioner Dr. Jesus M. Montemayor (Jesus) as
evidenced by a promissory note5 executed by Vicente. On August 10,
1990, the parties executed a loan contract6 wherein it was provided that the
loan has a stipulated monthly interest of 2% and that Vicente had already
paid the amount of P100,000.00 as well as the P8,000.00 representing the
interest for the period July 24 to August 23, 1990.

Subsequently and with Vicente’s consent, the interest rate was

increased to 3.5% or P10,500.00 a month. From March 24, 1991 to July 23,
1991, or for a period of four months, Vicente was supposed to pay
P42,000.00 as interest but was able to pay only P24,000.00. This was the
last payment Vicente made. Jesus made several demands7for Vicente to
settle his obligation but to no avail.

Thus, on August 17, 1993, Jesus filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint8 for Sum of Money against Vicente which was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-93-17255. On October 19, 1993, Vicente filed his
Answer9 interposing a counterclaim for attorney’s fees of not less than
P500,000.00. Vicente claimed that he handled several cases for Jesus but
he was summarily dismissed from handling them when the instant
complaint for sum of money was filed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision10 dated October 27, 1999, the RTC ordered Vicente to
pay Jesus his monetary obligation amounting to P300,000.00 plus interest
of 12% from the time of the filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993 until
fully paid. At the same time, the trial court found merit in Vicente’s
counterclaim and thus ordered Jesus to pay Vicente his attorney’s fees
which is equivalent to the amount of Vicente’s monetary liability, and which
shall be set-off with the amount Vicente is adjudged to pay Jesus, viz.:

“WHEREFORE, premises above-considered [sic], JUDGMENT is hereby

rendered ordering defendant Vicente D. Millora to pay plaintiff Jesus M.
Montemayor the sum of P300,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum counted from the filing of the instant complaint on August 17, 1993
until fully paid and whatever amount recoverable from defendant shall be
set off by an equivalent amount awarded by the court on the counterclaim
representing attorney’s fees of defendant on the basis of “quantum meruit”
for legal services previously rendered to plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”11

On December 8, 1999, Vicente filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 to

which Jesus filed an Opposition.13 On March 15, 2000, Vicente filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution14 with respect to the portion
of the RTC Decision which awarded him attorney’s fees under his
counterclaim. Jesus filed his Urgent Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Execution15 dated May 31, 2000.

In an Order16 dated June 23, 2000, the RTC denied Vicente’s Motion for
Reconsideration but granted his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution
of the portion of the decision concerning the award of attorney’s fees.
 Intending to appeal the portion of the RTC Decision which declared him
liable to Jesus for the sum of P300,000.00 with interest at the rate of
12% per annumcounted from the filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993
until fully paid, Vicente filed on July 6, 2000 a Notice of Appeal.17 This was
however denied by the RTC in an Order18 dated July 10, 2000 on the
ground that the Decision has already become final and executory on July 1,
2000.19

Meanwhile, Jesus filed on July 12, 2000 a Motion for Reconsideration

and Clarification20 of the June 23, 2000 Order granting Vicente’s Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Thereafter, Jesus filed on September
22, 2000 his Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.21 After the
hearing on the said motions, the RTC issued an Order22dated September
6, 2002 denying both motions for lack of merit. The Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification was denied for violating Section 5,23 Rule
15 of the Rules of Court and likewise the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution, for violating Section 6,24 Rule 15 of the same Rules.

Jesus filed his Motion for Reconsideration25 thereto on October 10, 2002
but this was eventually denied by the trial court through its Order26 dated
October 2, 2003.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Jesus went to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari27under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court.
On May 19, 2005, the CA issued its Decision the dispositive portion of
which provides:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition
forcertiorari is DENIED and the assailed Orders are AFFIRMEDin toto. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.”28
Not satisfied, Jesus is now before this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINALITY OF THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION OF OCTOBER 27, 1999, AS WELL AS THE ORDERS OF
SEPTEMBER 6, 2002 AND OCTOBER 2, 2003, THE LEGAL ISSUE TO
BE RESOLVED IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER X X X [DESPITE] THE
ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC AMOUNT IN THE DECISION
REPRESENTING RESPONDENT’S COUNTERCLAIM, THE SAME
COULD BE VALIDLY [OFFSET] AGAINST THE SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF
AWARD MENTIONED IN THE DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER.29

Petitioner’s Arguments

Jesus contends that the trial court grievously erred in ordering the
implementation of the RTC’s October 27, 1999 Decision considering that
same does fix the amount of attorney’s fees. According to Jesus, such
disposition leaves the matter of computation of the attorney’s fees
uncertain and, hence, the writ of execution cannot be implemented. In this
regard, Jesus points out that not even the Sheriff who will implement said
Decision can compute the judgment awards. Besides, a sheriff is not
clothed with the authority to render judicial functions such as the
computation of specific amounts of judgment awards.

Respondent’s Arguments

Vicente counter-argues that the October 27, 1999 RTC Decision can no
longer be made subject of review, either by way of an appeal or by way of a
special civil action forcertiorari because it had already attained finality when
after its promulgation, Jesus did not even file a motion for reconsideration
thereof or interpose an appeal thereto. In fact, it was Vicente who actually
filed a motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal, which was
eventually denied and disapproved by the trial court.
Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The October 27, 1999 Decision of the
RTC is already final and executory
, hence, immutable.

At the outset, it should be stressed that the October 27, 1999 Decision of
the RTC is already final and executory. Hence, it can no longer be the
subject of an appeal. Consequently, Jesus is bound by the decision and
can no longer impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a
decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo:30

“Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations,
thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order
by settling justiciable controversies with finality.”31

To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC has already
attained finality. “Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change,
revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for
correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tuncentries which
cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the
judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and
executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.”32
The amount of attorney’s fees is ascer-
tainable from the RTC Decision. Thus,
compensation is possible.

Jesus contends that offsetting cannot be made because the October 27,
1999 judgment of the RTC failed to specify the amount of attorney’s fees.
He maintains that for offsetting to apply, the two debts must be liquidated or
ascertainable. However, the trial court merely awarded to Vicente
attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit without specifying the exact
amount thereof.

We do not agree.

For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in

Articles 1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code, quoted below, must be present.
Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors and debtors of each other. 1278. “ARTICLE
In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary: 1279.
ARTICLE
That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the
same time a principal creditor of the other; (1)
That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
latter has been stated; (2)
That the two debts be due; (3)
That they be liquidated and demandable; (4)
That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,
commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.”
(5)

“A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are determined. It is

not necessary that it be admitted by the debtor. Nor is it necessary that the
credit appear in a final judgment in order that it can be considered as
liquidated; it is enough that its exact amount is known. And a debt is
considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed already in definite
figures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of
the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation x x x.”33
 In Lao v. Special Plans, Inc.,34 we ruled that:
“When the defendant, who has an unliquidated claim, sets it up by way of
counterclaim, and a judgment is rendered liquidating such claim, it can be
compensated against the plaintiff’s claim from the moment it is liquidated
by judgment. We have restated this in Solinap v. Hon. Del Rosario35 where
we held that compensation takes place only if both obligations are
liquidated.”

In the instant case, both obligations are liquidated. Vicente has the
obligation to pay his debt due to Jesus in the amount of P300,000.00 with
interest at the rate of 12%per annum counted from the filing of the instant
complaint on August 17, 1993 until fully paid. Jesus, on the other hand, has
the obligation to pay attorney’s fees which the RTC had already determined
to be equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from Vicente. The said
attorney’s fees were awarded by the RTC on the counterclaim of Vicente
on the basis of “quantum meruit” for the legal services he previously
rendered to Jesus.

In its Decision, the trial court elucidated on how Vicente had established
his entitlement for attorney’s fees based on his counterclaim in this manner:

“Defendant, on his counterclaim, has established the existence of a

lawyer-client relationship between him and plaintiff and this was admitted
by the latter. Defendant had represented plaintiff in several court cases
which include the Laguna property case, the various cases filed by Atty.
Romulo Reyes against plaintiff such as the falsification and libel cases and
the disbarment case filed by plaintiff against Atty. Romulo Reyes before the
Commission on Bar Integration. Aside from these cases, plaintiff had made
defendant his consultant on almost everything that involved legal opinions.
More particularly in the Calamba, Laguna land case alone, plaintiff had
agreed to pay defendant a contingent fee of 25% of the value of the
property for the latter’s legal services as embodied in the Amended
Complaint signed and verified by plaintiff (Exh. 5). Aside from this
contingent fee, defendant had likewise told plaintiff that his usual
acceptance fee for a case like the Laguna land case is P200,000.00 and
his appearance fee at that time was x x x P2,000.00 per appearance but
still plaintiff paid nothing.
 The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was severed because
of the instant case. The court is however fully aware of defendant’s stature
in life—a UP law graduate, Bar topnotcher in 1957 bar examination, former
Senior Provincial Board Member, Vice-Governor and Governor of the
province of Pangasinan, later as Assemblyman of the Batasang Pambansa
and is considered a prominent trial lawyer since 1958. For all his legal
services rendered to plaintiff, defendant deserves to be compensated at
least on a “quantum meruit” basis.”36

The above discussion in the RTC Decision was then immediately

followed by the dispositive portion, viz.:

“WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, JUDGMENT is hereby

rendered ordering defendant Vicente D. Millora to pay plaintiff Jesus M.
Montemayor the sum of P300.000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum counted from the filing of the instant complaint on August 17, 1993
until fully paid andwhatever amount recoverable from defendant shall
be set off by an equivalent amount awarded by the court on the
counterclaim representing attorney’s fees of defendant on the basis of
“quantum meruit” for legal services previously rendered to plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”37 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is therefore clear that in the execution of the RTC Decision, there are
two parts to be executed. The first part is the computation of the amount
due to Jesus. This is achieved by doing a simple arithmetical operation at
the time of execution. The principal amount of P300,000.00 is to be
multiplied by the interest rate of 12%. The product is then multiplied by the
number of years that had lapsed from the filing of the complaint on August
17, 1993 up to the date when the judgment is to be executed. The result
thereof plus the principal of P300,000.00 is the total amount that Vicente
must pay Jesus.

The second part is the payment of attorney’s fees to Vicente. This is

achieved by following the clear wordings of the above fallo of the RTC
Decision which provides that Vicente is entitled to attorney’s fees which is
equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from him by Jesus. Therefore,
whatever amount due to Jesus as payment of Vicente’s debt is equivalent
to the amount awarded to the latter as his attorney’s fees. Legal
compensation or set-off then takes place between Jesus and Vicente and
both parties are on even terms such that there is actually nothing left to
execute and satisfy in favor of either party.
In fact, the RTC, in addressing Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification dated July 12, 2000 had already succinctly explained this
matter in its Order dated September 6, 2002, viz.:

“Notwithstanding the tenor of the said portion of the judgment, still, there
is nothing to execute and satisfy in favor of either of the herein protagonists
because the said decision also states clearly that “whatever amount
recoverable from defendant shall be SET-OFF by an equivalent
amount awarded by the Court on the counterclaim representing
attorney’s fees of defendant on the basis of “quantum meruit” for
legal services previously rendered to plaintiff” x x x.
Said dispositive portion of the decision is free from any ambiguity. It
unequivocably ordered that any amount due in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant is set off by an equivalent amount awarded to defendant in the
form of counterclaims representing attorney’s fees for past legal services
he rendered to plaintiff.
It will be an exercise in futility and a waste of so precious time and
unnecessary effort to enforce satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claims against
defendant, and vice versa because there is in fact a setting off of each
other’s claims and liabilities under the said judgment which has long
become final.”38 (Emphasis in the original.)

A reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision would clearly

show that no ambiguity of any kind exists. Furthermore, if indeed there is
any ambiguity in the dispositive portion as claimed by Jesus, the RTC had
already clarified it through its Order dated September 6, 2002 by
categorically stating that the attorney’s fees awarded in the counterclaim of
Vicente is of an amount equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from
him by Jesus. This clarification is not an amendment, modification,
correction or alteration to an already final decision as it is conceded that
such cannot be done anymore. What the RTC simply did was to state in
categorical terms what it obviously meant in its decision. Suffice it to say
that the dispositive portion of the decision is clear and unequivocal such
that a reading of it can lead to no other conclusion, that is, any amount due
in favor of Jesus and against Vicente is set off by an equivalent amount in
the form of Vicente’s attorney’s fees for past legal services he rendered for
Jesus.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review onCertiorari is DENIED.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 2005 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81075 which dismissed the petition for certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the Orders dated September 6, 2002 and October 2,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98 in Civil Case
No. Q-93-17255, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and

Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—Cases where the rule on immutability of judgment does not

apply. (Heirs of Juan Valdez vs. Court of Appeals, 562 SCRA 89 [2008])