Verger Et Al GEP - Introduction PDF
Verger Et Al GEP - Introduction PDF
Verger Et Al GEP - Introduction PDF
Introductory Framework
[Chapter 1 in: Verger, A., M. Novelli and H. K. Altinyelken (eds.). Global Education
Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and Policies.
Continuum, London]
The case studies collected in the volume reflect, on the one hand, on the
capacity of international organisations and other political actors to shape
education agendas and disseminate education polices globally. On the other,
they analyze the complex process of the re-contextualisation of global policies
at the country level, and their effects on educational governance. India, Brazil,
South Africa, Turkey, Kenya, Uganda and Central-America are some of the
locations in which the case studies have been developed. In the different
studies, authors look at the globalisation-education relationship from multiple
theoretical perspectives, including neo-institutionalism, constructivism,
international political economy and social movements theory, and by applying
different methodological approaches, mainly qualitative, such as comparative
analysis, the vertical case study or discourse analysis. Despite their diversity,
all chapters in this volume converge on the idea that processes of
globalisation have drastically altered the education policy landscape across
the world and, more particularly, in developing country contexts.
To a great extent, this book focuses on the developing world due to the
particular nature and intensity of global influences therein. Developing
countries, especially Less-Developed Countries, are often highly dependent
on foreign expertise, information and financing (Rose 2007). In fact, in low-
income contexts, there is a bigger presence of external actors including
international NGOs, donor agencies and international organisations (IOs) that
have a great capacity – both material and ideational - to set agendas and
country priorities. In this sense, these countries’ policy landscapes are much
more penetrated than countries in more industrialized societies (although the
current financial crisis and the way it is being managed in many European
countries is challenging this premise). Furthermore, from the point of view of
policy transfer, developing states are not only the object of a more intense
flow of external pressures, but also depend on hindered capacities to mediate
supranational policy pressures (Grek et al. 2009).
In the following sections we explore how the GEP literature has dealt with
these questions and, in particular, the way the case studies included in this
book addresses them.
There are two main macro approaches that address the nature of the effects
of globalisation in education. We refer to, on the one hand, neo-institutionalist
approaches, represented by the ‘World Society’ theory, and, on the other,
international political economy approaches, represented by the ‘Globally
Structured Agenda for Education’.
World society theorists argue that a single global model of schooling has
spread around the world as part of the diffusion of a more general culturally-
embedded model of the modern nation-state (Anderson-Levitt 2003). The
need for nation-states to conform to an international ideal of the rationalized
bureaucratic state has led to a process of institutional isomorphism and
convergence (Drezner 2001). First and foremost, nation-states expand
schooling as part of a broader process of adherence to world models of the
organisation of sovereignty (the modern state) and the organisation of society
as composed of individuals (the modern nation) (Meyer et al. 1997). In this
process, education is a key area for governments to demonstrate to the
international community that they are building a modern state.
Carney (2009), for his part, elaborates the concept of ‘policyscape’ to provide
a similar argument. A policyscape is an ensemble of policy ideas and visions
(managerial practices, conceptions of the role of the state in education, the
functions of education, etc.) that are shared by a range of political actors
operating on multiple scales and affects the way these actors think and decide
about education policy. According to him, a transnational policyscape,
grounded on the principles of hyperliberalism, is contributing to ‘standardizing
the flow of educational ideas internationally and changing fundamentally what
education is and can be’ (p. 68). He shows very convincingly how this
policyscape has effectively contributed to shaping education reform in
countries as different as Denmark, Nepal and China.
For her part, Jakobi in this volume shows how different African countries are
implementing notions of lifelong learning by aligning themselves to the global
discourses disseminated by several IOs in the continent. As the World Society
theory would predict, these countries are engaging with the worldwide
discourse on lifelong learning even when it does not fit within their particular
needs and when they have only scarce resources for implementing it.
The World Society model has an implicit theory of the state in which
legitimation, both internally and externally, is the main problem to be
addressed by the state. In contrast, for the GSAE, apart from providing the
basis of legitimation, the core problems of the state include supporting the
regime of accumulation and providing a context for its reproduction
(Robertson et al. 2002). These problems cannot all be solved together, and
solutions to them tend to be rather contradictory. These contradictions provide
the dynamic of educational systems and frame the state educational agenda.
Globalisation has significantly altered the nature of the core problems
confronting nation-states as well as the nature of their capacity to respond to
them (Dale 2000). As we develop below, economic globalisation needs to be
seen as a political force with great capacity to structure a global education
agenda.
Furthermore, most political and economic actors, including state actors (Cerny
1997), aim to raise their competitiveness and perceive education and
knowledge as key competitive assets for this purpose (Brown et al. 1996
Carnoy et al. 2002). This is also the case of individuals that increasingly
conceive education as a ‘positional good’ (Marginson 2004) in a highly
competitive and dualized labor market. These beliefs have spread to the point
that most countries and regions in the world aspire today to become
‘knowledge economies’. The knowledge economy idea works as a powerful
economic imaginary (Jessop et al. 2008), or a ‘political condensation’ (cf. Ball
1998), that frames the preferences of political actors and guides the way they
intervene in society. This imaginary puts education at the centre of the
economic strategies of governments due to its crucial contribution to the
formation of knowledge-intensive manpower, applied research and knowledge
transfer (Barrow et al. 2004). The knowledge economy ideal is often
associated with an educational reform jargon based on the principles of
quality, learning, accountability and standards (Carney 2009).
The two approaches described above focus on the structural conditions that
favour the selection and retention of particular policies. However, GEP studies
are also attentive to the more micro-level types of analysis concerning how
policies are settled in global agendas and by whom. As we show in this
section, there is a range of research that looks at the structuring capacity of
particular actors and focuses on decision-making dynamics in multi-scalar
political systems.
The literature on global agenda setting usually refers to the key role of IOs.
According to the World Society approach, IOs contribute to policy
convergence in education by spreading the Western system of political
organisation and state authority around the world (Meyer et al. 1992a).
However, this approach seems to put all IOs, including international NGOs, in
the same package of Western modernizing agents. Certainly, IOs might
represent Western modernity broadly speaking, but when we look at them in
more detail we observe that they express divergent and even rivalling
education agendas. For instance, Robertson (2005) analyzes the different
meanings of the ‘Knowledge economy’ label that the OECD and the World
Bank are trying to fix, and shows how the latter favours the market and
individualism as the means for developing knowledge economies, while the
OECD favours a more institutionally embedded liberal approach to knowledge
production. Edwards and Klees, in this volume, reflect on the way political
actors, including IOs and international aid agencies, operating at a range of
scales compete to promote different meanings of participation policies in
education. They demonstrate the way participation in educational governance
is ‘predominantly neoliberal–instrumentalist in purpose, limited in nature, and
imbued with market ideology’. See also Mundy (1998, 1999), Chabbott
(2003), Jones (2006) or King (2007) on the competition between IOs such as
UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank to frame and dominate the education
for development field.
IOs are forums of cooperation and struggle between nations. However, they
are more than the aggregate of the interests of their member states. Even if
they are usually instrumentalized by the most powerful states, they are not
simply the extension of particular national interests (Dale 2005). A range of
scholars, often based on constructivist approaches, conceive IOs as relatively
autonomous sources of power. To them, IOs, and specifically, their
bureaucracies are not exclusively at the service of member-states. They count
on sufficient autonomy to interpret and redefine the broad political mandate of
the organisation, and to exercise power over members, even when they do
not have formal political power. The main sources of power of IOs
bureaucracies relies on, first, the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority that
they represent and, second, their control over information/data and technical
expertise (Finnemore 1996).
Beyond IOs
International actors other than IOs, by using norms and ideas as tools of
power, play an important role in global education politics as well. Educational
scholars, among others, have focused on the role and impact of epistemic
communities (Chabbott 2003), transnational civil society networks (Mundy et
al. 2001), networks of international consultants and policy entrepreneurs (Ball
2007; Robertson et al. 2012, forthcoming) or international foundations
(Srivastrava et al. 2010). These pieces of work show that, under some
circumstances, different types of non-state actors can mould state
preferences over various policy options or help states to identify their
interests, above all in moments of uncertainty. At the same time, they also
show how these new actors are becoming an integral part of emerging forms
of global governance and count on an increasing capacity to provoke
processes of policy transfer and learning, or to introduce issues into global
policy agendas.
New actors have very different interests and reasons to become involved in
the global education field. However, they have in common that are
knowledge-intensive entities, and that their main power source relies on
knowledge and ideas (TNCs being an exception to this premise due to the
huge material power they also count on). Thus, most of them are gaining
authority in global governance structures because of the scientific knowledge
they posses, their track record for problem solving and, in the particular case
of civil society networks, their principled-oriented views to the problems they
deal with (Keck et al. 1998; Haas 2004).
However, being knowledge actors does not mean that international players
are continuously innovating and/or producing new policy alternatives. Most of
the time, policy entrepreneurs sitting in international foundations, think-tanks
or IOs act more as brokers and framers, than as pure theorizers. They usually
take already existing policy practices, re-label them and sell them around.
Many global education policies have started their journey in this way, being
first formulated and implemented in particular countries. School-Based
Management originated in the UK (Ball 2007), OBM in New Zealand (Spreen
2004), or charter schools in the US (Bulkley et al. 2003). Since most global
policy-entrepreneurs come from the Anglo-Saxon world, it does not come as a
surprise that their policy référentiels come from Anglo-Saxon countries. There
are some exceptions, however. For example, Conditional-Cash Transfers
schemes started being implemented in different localities of Brazil and Mexico
and, later on, they became adopted by the World Bank and other regional
development banks (see Bonal et al. in this volume).
The adoption moment is the other side of the coin of the globalizing policy
phenomenon. For education policies to become effectively globalized, they
need to be adopted in particular contexts by policy-makers. In fact, once a
particular policy programme is being adopted in a critical number of locations,
we can start considering that some sort of policy convergence in education
would be happening. Often, countries adopt GEPs because they are
externally imposed via aid conditionality (see Box 1.1). However, from an
analytical point of view, it is also relevant to understand why it is that local
policy-makers voluntarily adopt GEPs.
A first type of answer to this question would say that local policy makers
implement global policies because these policies ‘work’. In this case, we
would be assuming that policy-makers are well-informed rational actors that
choose the best and internationally tested policy solutions to improve their
education systems. However, interestingly enough, it is not always clear
whether many GEPs work or not, or under what conditions they do so. For
instance, diverse policies such as quasi-markets or Child-Centred Pedagogies
have been extensively criticized for their uneven and even negative impacts,
and this has not prevented them from continuing to be disseminated around
the world (Luke 2003, Altinyelken in this volume).
A more nuanced answer to the GEP adoption question would say that policy-
makers adopt GEP because they perceive these policies work. In this case,
policy-makers would perceive GEP as appropriate policy solutions in their
countries for educational, but also political and economic reasons. The
literature is very rich on explanations and hypothesis related to this line of
argument. Different research places the emphasis on a wide range of
elements, from the persuasive capacity of global agents, to the capacity of
local actors to instrumentalise the global arena to advance pre-established
policy preferences. We explore the most relevant of them in this section.
Framing matters. IOs and, more broadly speaking, global policy entrepreneurs
are very active, and even compete among themselves, to make policy-makers
perceive that their policy ideas work and have an impact (Steiner-Khamsi
2004). In general terms, more than the internal consistency of policy ideas,
the way they are framed and presented affect policy-makers decisions on
whether to buy or not a certain policy (Verger 2011). IOs know this well and
put a lot of resources and effort in dissemination. Global policy ideas are
launched and spread through highly distributed policy briefs, papers and
reports, and in public or private events (seminars, workshops, report
launches, etc.) that are usually well attended by national political leaders and
policy-makers (Ball et al. 2010). Despite IOs use of an apparently neutral and
technical discourse, at the same time, they strongly advocate their proposals
often with great enthusiasm. To frame GEP ideas in an appealing way, IOs
need to present them in a clear and concise manner. Moreover, new policy
ideas are most likely to be taken up if they are perceived as technically
workable, and fit within budgetary and administrative constraints (Kingdon
2002). Not surprisingly, most education policy entrepreneurs highlight the
cost-effectiveness and efficiency gains of the policies they are promoting.
However, framing strategies are often in dispute with scientific rigor. In order
to sell their ideas and frame them in a more convincing way, policy
entrepreneurs might on occasion need to, more or less explicitly, simplify
reality (Ball 1998) and resort to different types of logical fallacy and
argumentative shortcuts (Verger 2011). In fact, beyond their argumentation
strengths and consistency, GEPs often maintain their credibility through
repetition (Ball 2007; Fairclough 2000). Indeed, the international travelling of
education policies has been strengthened by the consolidation of the
evidence-based policy idea (i.e. basing policy decisions on research that
shows what kind of policies ‘work’). In fact, evidence-based policy has been
welcomed by many policy-makers and donors as a superior way of taking
decisions, even when it is well-known that evidence can be easily
instrumentalized to support the adoption of certain policies instead of others
(see how this bias affects the international debate on quasi-markets in
education in Luke 2003 or Verger 2011).iii
Global status and deterritorialisation. As pointed out earlier, all policies have
an origin, which is usually Western and, more precisely, Anglo-Saxon.
Because of this reason, it is useful to think about GEPs as globalised
localisms (cf. Santos 2005). Likewise, once a critical number of countries
borrow a policy, it seems like its particular origins vanish; it becomes global
and is traded as a global model (Steiner-Khamsi 2010). The acquisition of
‘global status’ raises the attractiveness of policies and predisposes policy-
makers to discuss educational reforms guided by them.
Apart from the global status of policy ideas, the global prestige of the actors
backing them is similarly important. Usually, the most successful policy
entrepreneurs are based in IOs that are located at the interstices of a range of
influential social and policy networks (Campbell 2004). Indeed, in many
countries, the opinion of a World Bank expert will be more considered than
that of a scholar from a local university, even if they have a similar high-quality
training and propose the same successful or failed policy ideas. The definitive
move for a policy to become globally traded comes when a global institution
that counts on high levels of exposure and good networks adopts it. On
occasions, social networks are key to understanding this type of movement.
For instance, Outcomes-Based Education became a global policy in part
because one of the promoters in New Zealand, Maris O’Rourke became
tenured at the World Bank (Steiner-Khamsi 2004).
In general, those policies that resonate best within the prevailing form of the
capitalist system and the prevailing development policy paradigm will have
more chances of being retained in global agendas and selected in particular
countries (Dale 2000). From a semiotic perspective, neoliberalism and related
policy discourses have become hegemonic, and a sort of common sense.
Ideas such as performance-based incentives, competitive funding, education
as a competitiveness device, etc. have been interiorized by many decision-
makers and practitioners (Carney 2009). As a consequence, this type of
market-oriented principles is shaping the parameters of policy-making in many
countries (Taylor et al. 2000). However, at the same time, governmental
decision-makers often reject hard-privatisation policies. That is why, to make
them more normatively acceptable, most IOs promoting quasi-markets in
education avoid using the ‘privatisation’ concept and use instead more friendly
concepts such as PPPs (Robertson et al. 2012, forthcoming).
Overall, since imported education policies are locally mediated and re-
contextualised through multiple processes, the consequences of transfer
remains unpredictable (Beech 2006). By ignoring differences in contextual
capacity and culture at the national, regional, and local levels, globalisation
has resulted in unintended and unexpected consequences for educational
practice such as the deterioration of education quality (Carnoy et al. 2002).
The development of global education programmes is often questioned for not
taking into account the social context and needs sufficiently (Crossley et al.
2003). In the literature, we find four main arguments that reflect on why the
GEP re-contextualisation can be so problematic, especially in developing
countries. According to their different emphases, we call these explanations
material, political, cultural and scalar.
However, local policy-makers are often aware of the resources available and
the material needs in their countries when engaging with GEP and,
accordingly, adapt global discourses to them. This is for instance the case of
many African countries when embracing worldwide principles on life-long
learning. Under the life-long learning discourse, African policy-makers
basically emphasize adult literacy and basic education, instead of higher
education or alternative qualification frameworks as more industrialized
countries do (see Jakobi in this volume).
Bonal, Tarabini and Rambla in this volume show very convincingly how
technical capacities and, specifically, the final design of global policies are key
mediating factors to understand the outcomes of global policies in the terrain.
They do so by comparing the effects of Conditional Cash Transfers in different
Brazilian locations on the basis of the intensity of the economic transfer, the
targeting criteria and the coverage of the beneficiaries, among other aspects
of the policy design.
According to Taylor et al. (2000), political ideology is one of the main reasons
why nations do not deliver equally in the GEP field. Specifically, they show
that government ideologies (market-liberal, liberal-democratic, and social-
democratic) represent a key filter when it comes to adopting the OECD
recommendations in educational policy. Martens et al. (2010), for their part,
focus on the potential role of national veto players in the implementation and
modification of global policies. By veto players they mean political actors who
have the power to block or hinder legislative initiatives, such as the senate or
the national ministry of education. Although, based on the cases of Bologna
and PISA in several countries, they show that when there is a strong political
consensus and leadership to advance a certain reform, veto players and veto
points can be easily by-passed.
Scalar. The professionals that ultimately have to make new policies work
(teachers, principals, local government officials, etc.) often perceive education
reform as something imposed from above. This problem is more striking in the
case of global education policies that have been designed and negotiated at
supranational scales. Incrementalist approaches tell us that policy changes, to
work out smoothly, need to be grounded on previous practices and advance
progressively. As bigger is the gap between the new policy and the previous
system, implementation processes become more problematic (Rizvi et al.
2009). This ‘gap’ is usually accentuated in relation to policies imported from
elsewhere and initially designed by officials that are unconnected to local
realities.
Concluding remarks
References
i
ALBA stands for Alternativa Bolivariana de las Américas.
ii
The basic rules of the Westphalian State are: 1. Authority can only be
exercised by a state over a defined geographical territory; 2. Each state is
autonomous to develop its own policies; 3. No external actor can direct the
state’s priorities (Yeates 2001).
iii
Accordingly to Pawson (2011), this way of using science and evidence to
legitimate predefined policy preferences, instead of evidence-based policy,
should be called ‘policy-based evidence’.