Occena v. Comelec
Occena v. Comelec
Occena v. Comelec
*
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.
No. L-56404. April 2, 1981.*
RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA
MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON B.
MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL
TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; The ruling in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary is
authoritative as to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution whose provisions have
been applied already in several cases before the Supreme Court.—It is much too late
in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it
did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: “This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.” Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there
was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of
January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but
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* EN BANC
Constitutional Law; The Constitution has withheld from the President the power
to propose constitutional amendments. Such power must come from the Interim
National Assembly.—I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power
to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up the
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments
proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister)
as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National
Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence
and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be
discussed and adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the
mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution
must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs.
Comelec that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional
agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National
Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be
convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime
Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
Same; The period of 39 days for the people to deliberate on the proposed
amendments is totally inadequate.—The three resolutions proposing complex,
complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were
considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days
later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day
period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to “sufficiently inform
them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and
to express their will in a genuine manner.”
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VOL. 104, APRIL 2, 5
1981
Occena vs. Comelec
Same; Same.—Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation
that “x x x The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the
mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said ‘A good
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice
or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can
be allowed efficacy. x x x Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit
is certain.’ As Montaign says. ‘All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good
does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse.’ ”
PETITION for prohibition from the resolutions of National Treasurer and
Commission on Elections.
December 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288 and Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Herrera, L-
25232. December 20, 1973, 54 SCRA 312. It may be mentioned that the first of such cases,
Garcia, was promulgated on July 25, 1973 with the writer of this opinion as ponente and the
next case, Buendia, also on the same date, with Justice Teehankee as ponente, both of whom
were dissenters in Javellana, but who felt bound to abide by the majority decision.
14 1976 Amendments, par. 2. The last sentence follows. “However, it shall not exercise
the powers provided in article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.” Article VIII, Section
14, par. (1) reads as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the
National Assembly.”
15 Article XVII, Section 15 of the Constitution reads as follows-“The interim National
Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect
when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.”
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VOL. 104, APRIL 9
2, 1981
Occena vs. Comelec
When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent
body, it acted by virtue of such competence. Its authority to do so is
clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied
in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically
that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. In
Occena v. Commission on Elections,16 filed by the same petitioner,
decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was involved although not
directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by
Justice Antonio in that case: “Considering that the proposed amendment of
Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-
five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement
provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively
discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass
media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.”17
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments
proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of
the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of
the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise
and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice
Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on
Elections18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: “3. And whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic
system, is of no
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I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application
for a temporary restraining order enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for
April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec1 on
the invalidity of the October 1976 amendments proposals to the 1973
Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with
the mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs.
Marcos2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec3, questioning the validity of the
December 17, 1977 referendum—exercise as to the continuance in office
as incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of
the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority
decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to
propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up
the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the
amendments proposals has submission reduces itself not as to power,
which is the concern of the judiciary, but as to wisdom, which is entrusted
to the constituent body proposing the amendments. Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774,
801. The opposingview was set forth by Justice Sanchez.
________________
4 L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702 and Resolution denying motion for
reconsideration dated Nov. 4, 1971.
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14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Occena vs. Comelec
enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an elevenmember Court
prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of
the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec5 and subsequently officially
adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the
Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at
bar. The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical
amendments of our very structure of government were considered and
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-
nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of
the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people
to “sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine
manner.”6
4. “The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can
be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional
amendment” as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his
separate opinion in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: “x x x we take the
view that the words ‘submitted to the people for their ratification,’ if
construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution—a fundamental
charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their
sovereign will—is that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution.
Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They
are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull
over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word ‘submitted’ can only mean that
the government, within its maximum
________________
5 21 SCRA 774.
6 21 SCRA, at page 817.
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VOL. 104, APRIL 15
2, 1981
Occena vs. Comelec
capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of the
provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning,
nature and effects thereof. x x x What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should
put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification
or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and
another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent
or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the
amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the
people decree their own fate.”
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that “x x
x The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had
the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has
said ‘A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary
excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of
the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the
sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be
allowed efficacy. x x x Changes in government are to be feared unless the
benefit is certain.’ As Montaign says: ‘All great mutations shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may
succeed and a worse. ’”
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Notes.—In the performance of this duty to guard against the use and
inclusion of returns prepared under circumstances showing their falsity in
the canvass of election results, the Comelec should not be hampered in the
choice of effective means and methods to fully ascertain the genuineness
and regularity of disputed election returns. (Usman vs. COMELEC, 42
SCRA 667).
The question whether certain returns are falsified or have been
tampered with and should not be included in the canvass
16
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Occena vs. Comelec
must first be raised before the board of canvassers, subject to appeal from
its decision in the Comelec. (Anni vs. Rasul, 46 SCRA 758).
The abrupt cancellation of further hearings and the non-implementation
of the announced examination and analysis of the voting records give
strong weight to the submittal that petitioner was not afforded his right to a
fair and full hearing. (Estaniel vs. COMELEC, 42 SCRA 436).
Where the name of a candidate is written in another space but not
preceded by the name of office for which he is a candidate, the vote is
considered stray vote. (Farin vs. Gonzales, 53 SCRA 237).
In order that the tally in the return may be used as a basis for judicial
recount, it is imperative that the same must be closed by the signatures of
the election inspectors. (Respicio vs. Cusi, Jr., 44 SCRA 392).
Holding of December 17, 1977 referendum is authorized by the
Constitution. (De la Llana vs. Commission on Elections, 80 SCRA 525).
Question of whether the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum
is unnecessary is a political and not justiciable question. (De la Llana vs.
COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525).
Issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA
333).
The President is vested with the prerogative of discretion as to when he
shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333).
The court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that his constitutional
provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly
complied with. (Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477).
Amending process of the Constitution raises a judicial question.
(Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333).
Whether the constitutional provision on amending procedures has been
followed or not is a proper subject of inquiry,
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VOL. 104, APRIL 17
3, 1981
United Democratic
Opposition (UNIDO) vs.
Commission on Elections
not by the people who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333).
——o0o——