D.

The Lawyer and the Client

Canon 15 – Candor, Fairness and Loyalty in Dealings with Clients
Llunar v. Ricafort, Adm. Case No. 6484, June 16, 2015
Facts:
In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo Ricafort for
the recovery of a parcel of land owned by the Banez family but which was
fraudulently registered to a different name. The lot was the subject of foreclosure
proceedings, hence, Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of P95,000.00
(partial redemption fee, as filing fees, and attorneys fees). Three years later,
complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case with the RTC of
Legazpi City, hence, she demanded the return of P95,000.00. The latter averred
that there was a complaint for annulment of title filed against Ard Cervantes,
though not him, but by another lawyer. Thus, he was willing to refund the
amount less the P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria. Adelita refused to
recognize the case filed by Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire him as counsel;
also, the complaint was filed three years late and the property cannot be
redeemed from the bank anymore. She also learned that Atty. Ricafort was
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law since 2002 in A.C. No. 5054, thus
she suspected it was the reason why another lawyer filed the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ricafort is guilty of misconduct for practicing law under
indefinite suspension?

Ruling:
Yes. The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings
with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite
suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of
DISBARMENT.
The respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the
complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached
by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer
shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients.” The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of
the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that he could
not and should not practice law.

Villahermosa, Sr. v. Caracol, A.C. No. 7325 (Resolution), January 21, 2015
FACTS:
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had
two sons, Fernando and Efren. When the agrarian reform law was enacted,
emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo
Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to
complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. The Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation
of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it
was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and
affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. Atty. Caracol,
as “Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the
DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the
decision. Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren
Babela.” Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no
authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and
the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized
Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead for
more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain
Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Atty.
Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as “additional
counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go
ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was
a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor. In its Report and
Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and
misconduct.

ISSUE:
Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
YES. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a
presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel

for a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf
without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports
to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance
unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.
If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of
the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.
Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he
filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition.
As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the
Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was retained by the
client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.
Conflict of Interest
Rosacia v. Bulalacao, Adm. Case No. 3745, October 2, 1995
Facts
Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly
registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment against herein
respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of
the IBP found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law .
"On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty.
Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the
name of Tacma Phils., Inc.
"After almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with
Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation
consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal.
Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against
Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission, and appearing in their behalf."
Issue: WON respondent breached his oath of office for representing the
employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their
attorney-client relationship
Held
Yes. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of
office. The Court reiterates that the loyalty an attorney owes to his client subsists
even after the termination of attorney-client relationship. It behooves respondent
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of
clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists.
Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the
people.

Abaqueta v. Florido, Adm.Case No. 5948. January 22, 2003

FACTS: Complainant Abaqueta filed this administration complaint against respondent Atty. Florido for conflict
of interest. Abaqueta engaged the professional services of Atty. Florido in a special proceeding entitled In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta Susana Uy Trazo (1st Case). Atty. Florido was
able to file Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting, registering complainants objection.

Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against complainant Abaqueta in a
case entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Gerona (2nd Case). Respondent Atty.
Florido signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap-Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that Plaintiff
and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain parcels of land. However, the parcel
of land referred to as conjugal party of the complainant and Milagro Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcel of
land in the 1st Case.
In short, respondent lawyer made allegations in the 2 nd Case, which were contrary to and in direct conflict
with his averments as counsel for complainant in the 1st case. Complainant also avered that respondent Atty.
Florido admitted that he was never authorized to appear as counsel for Milagro Yap-Abaqueta in the 2nd case,
and that Atty. Florido failed to indicate n the Complaint the true and correct address of herein complainant,
which Atty. Florido knew as far back as August 2, 1990.

ISSUE: WON Atty Florido violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing
Milagros Yap?

HELD:

YES. The reasons explained by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear representation of conflicting
the fact that the subject matter of the two cases are the same properties could not have escaped the attention of
respondent.

There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera, The
relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery,
should be avoided

Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, Adm. Case No. 5128, March 31, 2005
Facts: Respondent was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family’s
relationship with the respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.

The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant’s counterclaim
in a civil case filed with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform
complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being
deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento was
forced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the subject
property.

In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental. The
Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent.

Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he
heeded respondent’s advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s)
nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the
said property. Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the
former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros
Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant’s nephew

Issue:
W/N there was conflicting interest in the case at bar?

Held/Ruling:

Yes. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
 Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation,
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test to
determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.

Pacana vs. Pascual-Lopez, Adm.Case No. 8243. July 24, 2009

Facts:
Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent) charging the latter with flagrant violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleges that
respondent commited acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling,
and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from
complainant.
Complainant worked for Multitel and earned the ire of investors after becoming
the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as
trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real
Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of respondent and a lawyer-client relationship was
established between the parties although no formal document was executed. Complainant
learned of the respondent’s clients in Multitel after receiving a demand letter from the
latter. Respondent continued to help complainant through the latter paying an amount and
even transferring property to the former on different occasions to be used in dealing with
the latter’s liabilities. Complainant then went to the US to avoid being arrested while
respondent handles his liabilities.
When complainant returned to the Philippines, respondent informed him that he
has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. Respondent continued that she was willing to
return an amount to complainant after all the accumulated legal fees the former had
earned from settling the liabilities of both complainant and the clients from Multitel.
Complainant accepted the offer of receiving amount but respondent failed to fulfill the
promise.
Soon, complainant noticed that respondent began to avoid communicating with
him. Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting
of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter but respondent failed to
provide a clear audited financial report of all the properties turned over by the
complainant to the respondent. Complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
Issue:
Did the respondent violate Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
responsibility, representing conflicting interests?
Holding:
Yes. Respondent Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing
conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Clearly, respondent established a lawyer-client relationship with the complainant while
aware that respondent also represents clients of Multitel, who are opposed to the
liabilities of the complainant. Moreover, respondent took advantage of the complainant’s
situation by giving him advice, and later on, soliciting money and properties from him
which were used to satisfy clients of Multitel.

Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Funk, Adm.Case No. 9094.

August 15, 2012
FACTS: Hocorma Foundation filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. It alleged
that respondent used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and
trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985. He also served as its counsel in several criminal
and civil cases.

Complainant alleged that respondent filed an action for quieting of title and damages against
Hocorma on behalf of Mabalacat institute using information he acquired while with the
foundation.

As a defense, Atty. Funk contended that he was hired by Mabalacat Institute by Don Teodoro
Santos in 1982 to serve as director and legal counsel. He emphasized that, in all these, the
attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos’
personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.

Santos left for America to get medical treatment. The former and Atty. Funk agreed that the
latter would be paid for his legal services out of the properties that Santos donated or sold to
the Hocorma Foundation. Atty. Funk also claimed that he was authorized to advise Hocorma and
follow up with it Santos’ sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat
Institute. Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma
Foundation out of funds that Santos provided. It was Santos’ intention since 1950 to give the
land to Mabalacat Institute free of rent and expenses.

The foundation later refused to pay Atty. Funk’s fees, thus he severed his ties with Hocorma.
Four years later, he filed a suit against Hocorma. The trial court, CA and SC decided in favor of
the respondent.

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon
15, Rule 15.03 of the (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct
consisting of four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The
CBD recommended Atty. Funk’s suspension from the practice of law for one year. Respondent
moved for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in
violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.
HELD: Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation.
Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on
behalf of another client without the foundation’s written consent.

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires
knowledge of his former client’s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily
not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the
light of their relationship.

Respondent collected attorney’s fees from the foundation. Thus, he had an obligation not to
use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property
under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation.

Anglo v. Valencia, Adm. Case No. 10567, February 25, 2015

Facts:
Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the
respondents for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent the complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon
the agreement of both parties. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against
the complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law which
handled the complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved. Complainant filed disbarment
case against the respondents, alleging that they violated the rule on conflict of
interest.

IBP Commissioner found the respondents to have violated the rule on conflict
of interest and recommended that the respondents be reprimanded.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR?

Held:
Yes. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The Supreme Court found the respondents
guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 are
therefore Reprimanded for said violations, with a Stern Warning that a repetition
of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.

As the records bear out, respondents’ law firm was engaged and, thus,
represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However, after
the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE
Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its
former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical
acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement
a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases assigned to
its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest.

As an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective,

assigns legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm
to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of
coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders
its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in
the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust
and confidence

Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo, Adm. Case No. 10687, July 22, 2015
FACTS:
Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two
opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, the other faction is
called the Lukban Group. It appointed the Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo as its corporate
secretary.

Adeva Group issued a Board Resolution which authorized the Executive Vice
President and Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and the Vice President
for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of
Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of Mabini Colleges, Inc.
Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the
Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly
not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the
complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also
alleged that Mabini Colleges, Inc. was having financial difficulties.

Atty. Pajarillo sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of Mabini College's financial
capacity to pay the loan.

RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order
and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel,
Atty. Pajarillo. Mabini Colleges alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter
that it became aware that Atty. Pajarillo is also the legal counsel of RBP.

Mabini Colleges filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pajarillo
for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor,
fairness, and loyalty.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Pajarillo is guilty of representing conflicting interests when

he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by Mabini Colleges, Inc. against RBP.
RULING:
Yes, he represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in
the same action or on totally unrelated cases.

Atty. Pajarillo represented conflicting interests when he served as counsel for

RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the Mabini College against
RBP.

Gimeno v. Zaide, Adm. Case No. 10303, April 22, 2015

PNB charged Atty. Cedo, former AVP of the Asset Mgt Group of PNB with
violation of CPR by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions
with the latter, in which Cedo during his employment with the said bank has
intervened.

Gimeno alleged that she was a former client of Atty. Zaide. She engaged the
services of his law firm ZMZ Law Offices in an annulment case involving her
husband and her parents-in-law. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship,
Atty Zaide appeared against her before the Ombudsman. Thus, Zaide violated
the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients’ interests. Atty
Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire
her as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously
worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno was Atty Zaragosa, one of
ZMZ’s partners.

Issue: Whether there was a conflicting interests when Zaide appeared as counsel
against Gimeno before the Ombudsman?

Ruling:
NO. we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno,
his former law firm's client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when
Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services
is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the
complaint filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman. The prior case where
Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the
annulment of a land title. The case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno
involved complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds
entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the
Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express

conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when,
in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose.

Privileged Communication
Revised Penal Code, Art.209

Canon 16 – Shall Hold in Trust Moneys and Properties of Client

Civil Code, Art. 1491
Licuanan v. Melo, Adm. Case No. 2361, February 9, 1989

In 1979, Licuanan won a case against her tenant Aida Pineda whereby Pineda was ordered
to pay the rents due to Licuanan. Pineda complied and she started paying the rents to
Licuanan’s lawyer, Atty. Manuel Melo. So for 12 months, Melo received the rental
payments but he did not turn over the said payments to Licuanan. Licuanan did inquire
about said payment but Melo withheld information about the fact that Pineda was actually
paying. As a consequence, Licuanan filed a case against Pineda. Pineda in turn filed a
damage suit against Licuanan as she claims that the case filed by Licuanan against her is
groundless – as she was in fact paying her rents.
Eventually, Licuanan find out that Melo failed to deliver to her the rents. Licuanan then
filed an affidavit complaint against Melo. Melo in his defense said that he withheld
information about the rent payments for a year because he merely wanted to surprise
Licuanan about the success of the collections. The Solicitor General subsequently
recommended the suspension of Melo for not less than one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Melo should be suspended.
HELD: No. As ruled by the Supreme Court, he should be disbarred. Melo’s retaining of
Licuanan’s money for more than a year breached his oath and transgressed the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Such action did not merely deprive Licuanan of the use of her
money but also caused her to file a groundless suit against Pineda and on top of that,
Licuanan had to defend herself in a damage suit filed against her in turn by Pineda. In all,
Melo’s actuations make him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He
has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to
delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and
has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
He deserves the severest punishment of disbarment.

Dumadag v. Lumaya, Adm. Case No. 2614. May 21, 1991

Facts:
According to complainant, he asked his then counsel, herein respondent, to
prepare and file the appropriate motion for execution; however, the latter failed to
do so. It was through the assistance of the court stenographer, Mr. Eleuterio
Catubig, that complainant himself signed and filed the motion and later obtained
the writ of execution.

When the writ of execution was issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon,
according to the complainant, instead of serving the same on the Avellanosas,
connived with respondent attorney by selling a one (1) hectare portion of the land
subject of Civil Case No. 148 to one Eleonora Astudillo to satisfy complainant's
claim out of the proceeds of the sale, without however Dumadag's knowledge
and consent.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Lumaya is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the CPR?

Ruling: Yes. “[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his

former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver
the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of
the canons of professional responsibility.

Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing, Adm. Case No. 9390. August 1, 2012

Emilia Dhaliwal was having some legal issues in purchasing a parcel of land from Fil-Estate
Development, Inc. Their case reached the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). She then engaged the services of Atty. Abelardo Dumaguing in the year 2000.
Atty. Dumaguing was given P342,000.00 for him to consign with the HLURB. With the
consignment, he filed a petition with the HLURB to compel Fil-Estate to deliver the title to
Dhaliwal. However, a week later, Atty. Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB the amount
of P311,819.94.
In 2003, Dhaliwal terminated the services of Atty. Dumaguing. In the same year, Dhaliwal
lost in the HLURB case. She then demanded Atty. Dumaguing to return her the
P311,819.94 he earlier withdrew. Atty. Dumaguing refused to return said amount. Dhaliwal
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Dumaguing.
In his defense, Atty. Dumaguing said that the reason why he deemed it not proper to return
the said amount to Dhaliwal is that he filed a motion for reconsideration with the HLURB
but the latter had not yet acted on it. Atty. Dumaguing attached a copy of the said motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. It was established that the attached motion for reconsideration was a mere
fabrication because it did not contain proof that the same was filed with the HLURB nor
was there proof that the other party was notified.
Atty. Dumaguing is in violation of Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states, among others, that: “A lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” A lawyer’s
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. Atty. Dumaguing was suspended for 6 months.

Sps Concepcion v. Dela Rosa, Adm. Case No. 10681, February 3, 2015

Facts:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint
filed by complainants Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S.
Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer
A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for violating,
among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent
served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled
many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others,
the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said
business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact that complainants had
money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006,
called Henry to borrow money. The checks were personally encashed by
respondent. Demanded the return of payment but failed to do so. Respondent
denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the
real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect
from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP concluded that
respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal profession and clearly
violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to
appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the
IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to
complainants, with stipulated interest.

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the
CPR.

Held: YES. Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from
borrowing money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a

lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any
natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the
lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.
The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability
to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. A lawyer’s act of
asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes
within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Champertous contracts
Bautista v. Gonzales, Adm. Matter No. 1625. February 12, 1990
Facts:
Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty.
Gonzales agreed to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of
50% of the value of the property in litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and
the Forunados is valid

Held:
No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the
Fortunados. However, the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the
Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of
litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation,
the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty.
Gonzales and Fortunados does not provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales
of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to
pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such
agreements are against public policy. The execution of these contracts violates
the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former
must incur administrative sanctions.

Lien for Attorney’s Fees

Tanhueco v. De Dumo, Adm. Case No. 1437, April 25, 1989
Facts: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de
Dumo for his refusal to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to
return documents entrusted to him as a counsel in certain collection cases.
Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may be able to collect from
debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of what he
may be able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not turn
over the P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his
attorney’s fee.

Issue: Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive.

Held: De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than
half of the total amount due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be
fraudulent because he took advantage of his client who is an old and sickly
woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to be unconscionable or
unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of the court
has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties,
and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Thus, De Dumo is
suspended from the practice of law for six months and the attorney’s fee is
reduced to 15% of the total amount collected by him. He is also ordered to return
the P 10, 200.00 net amount of the P 12, 000.00 he collected and entitled of 15%
attorney’s fee in case he made any other collection from Tanhueco’s debtors

Canon 17 – Fidelity to Client’s Cause

Manalang, et al. v. Angeles, Adm. Case No. 1558, March 10, 2003

FACTS:
Manalang and Cirilo (petitioners) filed a case against their employer, Philippine
Racing Club Restaurant, for their overtime and separation pay before the NLRC
and Francisco Angeles (respondent) was their counsel.

They obtained a favorable judgment and their employer was asked to pay Php
6,500. However, Atty. Angeles compromised and was only able to collect Php
5,500 and it was allegedly obtained without the consulting his clients.

OSG conducted several hearings but respondent only appeared 3 times. It was
then transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Neither party
appeared despite prior due notice. The Committee issued a resolution
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 2
years.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law
because of grave misconduct related to his clients’ fund?

RULING:
YES. A lawyer must possess standards for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Also, the respondent exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his
clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights
(violating Canon 17). Moreover, he consistently failed to appear at the hearings
and more importantly, failed to deliver upon the demand of Php 4,550 (minus
fees) intended for his clients. This demonstrated lack of integrity and propriety

Solatan v. Inocentes, Adm. Case No. 6504, August 9, 2005

FACTS:
Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The
Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito,
owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed under
sequestration by the PCGG.

They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan
and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito
Apartments. Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the
apartment to Solatan and other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment
for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in
a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises.

Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment

cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty.
Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the
entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and costs of
suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half
of the attorney’s fees.

Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with
Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in
the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to
release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment.
Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of
ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove
was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of
the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.Complainant filed the
instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and
Atty.Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano
from the practice of law for 1 yearand to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising
command responsibility.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Camano violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.
 An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person
without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the
instant case.

The advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the
rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his duty
as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with the
interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The
act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing
proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of
double dealing and betrayal.

Villafuerte v. Cortez, Adm. Case No. 3455, April 14, 1998

Facts:
Complainant Arsenio Villafuerte seeks for the disbarment of Atty. Dante H. Cortez
because he perceived that the respondent, Atty. Dante H. Cortez neglected the
handling of his cases despite receiving P 1,750.00 acceptance and retainers fee.
Complainant went to the office of respondent lawyer to discuss his case for
"reconveyance".
During their initial meeting, complainant reconstructed the incidents of the case
merely from memory so the respondent lawyer asked him to return another day
with the records.
Complainant requested respondent to accept the case, paying the sum of
P1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer
fee.
Respondent averred that he accepted the money reluctance and only upon the
condition that complainant would get the records of the case as well as secure the
withdrawal of appearance of Atty. Jose Dizon, the former counsel of complainant.
Allegedly, Complainant never showed up thereafter until he went to the office of
respondent but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in the civil case, a case
for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never priorly mentioned to him
by complainant. Respondent said he had never entered his appearance in the
case.
IBP-CBD concluded that the facts established would just the same indicate
sufficiently a case of neglect of duty on the part of respondent.
The IBP-CBD recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for three months with a warning

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Lawyer should be suspended from the practice
of law?

Held:
YES. The Court is convinced that a lawyer-client relationship has already arisen
between respondent and complainant. His acceptance of the payment effectively
bars him from altogether disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them. It would not matter really whether the money has been
intended to pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or to include Civil Case No.
062160-CV, there being no showing, in any event, that respondent lawyer has
attended to either of said cases.

It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find out what might have
happened to his client's cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires
him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is
mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the
interests of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility has stated that a
"lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence” decreeing further that
he "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."

Canon 18 – Competence and Diligence

Reontoy v. Ibadlit, Adm. Case CBD No. 190, January 28, 1998
FACTS:
An adverse decision was rendered by the trial court against the client of Atty.
Ibadlit. He did not appeal the decision because of his opinion that to appeal
would be futile. An administrative complaint was later filed by Atty. Ibadlit’s client
against him for failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether a lawyer may refuse to file an appeal on behalf of his client
when in his opinion to make an appeal would be futile.

HELD: No. It was highly improper for him to have adopted such opinion since a
lawyer is without authority to waive his client’s right to appeal and his failure to
appeal within the prescribed period constituted negligence and malpractice.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 0f the CPR “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.”

Moton v. Cadiao, Adm. Case No. 5169. November 24, 1999

FACTS:
On August 14, 1990, when the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, the
complainants counsel, Atty. Raymundo D. Cadiao, failed to appear, hence, the
court dismissed the case. On August 15, 1990, Atty. Cadiao filed with the trial
court an entry of appearance for the complainant and a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the case.

Acting on the motion, the court set aside the August 14, 1990 order of dismissal
and reset the pre-trial conference on May 5, 1991.
On August 2, 1991, Atty. Cadiao filed a motion to reset the hearing from August
13, 1991 to August 26, 27, 28 or 29, 1991, for the reason that he had to attend a
scheduled hearing in Antique.
At the hearing of the motion on August 9, 1991, respondent was absent because
he had left for Antique. Therefore, the court denied the motion to reset hearing. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration with prayer to set case for reception of
evidence was similarly denied.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Cadiao violated Canon 18 of the CPR?

RULING:
YES. Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by
reason of Atty. Cadiaos negligence, actual loss has been caused to his client
Elmo S. Moton. He should give adequate attention, care and time to his
cases. This is why a practising lawyer may accept only so many cases that he
can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he agrees
to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he
should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyers oath.
In light of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, declaring
respondent liable for negligence in the handling of complainants case.
Hernandez v. Padilla, Adm.Case No. 9387. June 20, 2012

Facts: This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her
lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices,
for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

In a Decision dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge

Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be
cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan),
attorney’s fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the
Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose
respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed
by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he
acted with “deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law.”

Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never
informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked
respondent “several times” about the status of the appeal, but “despite inquiries he
deliberately withheld response to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.

Issue: Whether or not Rules 18.02 and 18.04 were violated?

Ruling: YES. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not
complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse
him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not
have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by
complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the
Appellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the
proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to “beat the
deadline set by the Court of Appeals.”

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the
wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered
by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he was under
the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because
he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latter’s Memorandum of
Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent’s actions. Respondent, as counsel, had the
duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a
violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Edquibal v. Ferrer, Adm. Case No. 5687, February 3, 2005

FACTS:
Edquibal charged Atty. Ferrer with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.
Edquibal engaged the services of Ferrer to assist his mother Ursula in cases she
filed against his sister Delia involving a certain property. In one of the cases, the
trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother.

Atty. Ferrer then advised complainant to appeal to the CA and that the cost
involved is P4,000. When complainant Edquibal informed respondent Atty. Ferrer
that he does not have enough money, Atty. ferrer said P2,000 is sufficient.
Edquibal followed up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was
dismissed for failure to file the required appellant’s brief. Respondent Atty. Ferrer
denied that he filed an appeal. He claimed that he never agreed to handle
the appeal.

ISSUE:W/n Atty. Ferrer is guilty of professional misconduct, thus violating

Canon 18 of the CPR?
HELD: YES. Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for
Edquibal. The resolution of the CA clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel
for defendants-appelants requiring him to file appellants brief wihtin 45 days from
receipt thereof, was received by him...".

However, respondent failed to file the appellants' brief despite receipt of such
notice. Sec 2 rule44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the counsel of
the parties in the court of origin shall be considered their counsel in the CA. If it
were true that Atty. Ferrer did not agree to represent Edquibals, why did he not
file with the CA a motion to withdraw as their counsel? The practice of law does
not require extraordinary diligence. All that is required is ordinary diligence
expected of a bonus pater familias.

Barbuco v. Beltran, Adm. Case No. 5092, August 11, 2004

Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent Beltran for

malpractice of law. Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, which adverese
to the complainants interest. On the same day, complainant, through Benito B.
Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.

However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant's brief.
The brief was only filed by respondent 43 days after the deadline of submission
of the same.

When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade liability by alleging that he

met a vehicular accident, which incapacitated him for several days, thus he
cannot finish the appellants brief. Moreover, he sustained injuries in the head,
which as a result respondent lost track of schedules of hearings and deadlines
for submitting briefs.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent's failure to file appellant's brief warrants sanctions.

Held:
Yes. the SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers states:A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY
THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered
physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his
pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of
not just one lawyer. As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in
the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for
Extension of Time to file the said pleading.

A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the
responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best
efforts to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of the law. The Code
of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him.

Suarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993

Romina M. Suarez was charged twice in a crime for a violation of B.P. 22 or the
Anti-Bouncing Check Law. Suarez pleaded “not guilty” to all informations against
her and posted bail in all the cases and was granted a provisional liberty. She did
not appear in court despite of the notices sent to her. Her counsel de parte, Atty.
Vicente San Luis appeared in her behalf from the time of the prosecution’s
presentation of its evidence at the time of the defense’ presentation of evidence.
Hearing was postponed because of the absence of the private prosecutor and
the continuation of the hearing was reset.

Copies were sent to Suarez and her counsel. Suarez was represented by Atty.
Zamar at the reading of the sentence. Suarez was arrested and detained. Suarez
represented by a new counsel de parte filed 3 motions which RTC denied.
Suarez appealed to the Court of Appeals only to affirm RTC’s decision. Suarez
filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Prosecutor is liable under the CPR?

HELD:
Yes, Atty. San Luis, counsel de parte of Suarez failed to discharge his duties as
counsel. Suarez’ counsel was negligent in abandoning the conduct of the case
without formally withdrawing or at least informing her that he would be
permanently staying in the USA so that Suarez could appoint another counsel.
Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

Atty. San Luis was unquestionably negligent in the performance of his duties to
his client Suarez. His negligence consisted in failure to attend the hearings of the
case, failure to advise his client that he was going to stay abroad and failure to
withdraw properly as counsel for Suarez.
As a general rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and
mistakes in handling the case during trial, but as an exception, a new trial may be
granted where the incompetency of counsel is so great that the accused is
prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his defense.

Perea v. Almadro, Adm. Case No. 5246, March 20, 2003

Facts:
Complaint for disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea against Atty. Ruben Almadro
for gross neglect of his duties as lawyer of herein complainant.

Respondent was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 99) where he (complainant Perea) is being charged with the crime of
Frustrated Homicide. On February 26, 1996, the said RTC issued an order
granting Atty. Almadros motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence within ten
(10) days from said date. All the while, complainant thought that respondent filed
said demurrer and the case against him dismissed.

Complainant suffered financially and emotionally due to respondents neglect of

his duties. Respondent has not attended any of his hearings which led
complainant to plead with respondent to withdraw formally as his counsel so he
could hire another lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadros neglect, complainant is
now facing the loss of his freedom and livelihood.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Almadro is liable of violating Canon 18 of the CPR?

RULING:
YES. It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer failed to submit a
demurrer to evidence for which he had earlier asked permission from the trial
court and which his client, herein complainant was relying on. More than that, he
failed to contact his client and to apprise the latter about the developments of the
case leaving complainant completely surprised and without any protection when
years later, he received summons from the trial court asking him to present
evidence in his defense and, not long after, the trial court issued a warrant for his
arrest.
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a
serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to
delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, September 5, 1967

FACTS
 Atty. Agustin Arcangel, respondent, volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza and
Maria Passion, complainants, in their respective pension claims in connection
with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they
handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on
blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had
lost interest in the progress of their claims and refused to surrender the papers
when asked by the complainants six years later.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance.

RULING:

No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking
of disciplinary action against respondent. But the Court cannot but counsel
against his actuations as a member of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and
positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal
technicalities of the statute. As a man of the law, he is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional
services.

Nonato v. Fudolin, Jr., Adm. Case No. 10138, June 16, 2015

Facts:

The father of the complainant, the late Restituto Nonato, was the owner of
real property at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The property became a subject of
ejectment proceedings before the MTC of Hinigaran. Restituto was represented
by Atty. Garcia but was replaced by Atty. Fudolin during the pre-trial stage.

The complainant alleged that Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance
fees but no formal retainer agreement was executed and did not issue any
receipts for the acceptance fees paid. The respondent alleged that he received
the minimal acceptance fee of P20,000 and appearance fee of P1,000, and that
he engaged his services to Restituto because they were relatives.

During the pendency of the case he failed to inform Restituto of the status
and developments in the case, Restituto could not contact him, and he failed to
furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with
the court. MTC dismissed Restituto’s complaint.
 Issue:
Whether or not the respondent could be held liable for negligence in the
performance of duty.

Held:

The Supreme Court adopted the findings of IBP except for the recommended
penalty. The respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as
Restituto's counsel and his alibis were unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought.
Respondent is then suspended for 2 years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18, and Canon 17 of the Code. He is also warned that the
commission of similar acts will be dealt more severely and is directed to formally
Manifest to the Court the date of receipt which shall be the starting point of his
suspension

Canon 19 – Represent With Zeal Within Bounds of Law

Ong v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for
malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to

comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the
latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat
and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant.
They, however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client,

The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone
who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would
have leverage in his actions against the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Unto’s acts constitute malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates

lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule
19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate, or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding

Canon 20 – Charge Only Fair and Reasonable Fees

Nature of attorney’s fees
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 86100-03,

Facts:

Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner should pay the certain amountbased on the
charging lien on the civil case filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In
the dismissed case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees,
based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an exchange of arguments
between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private
respondent, Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent countered and
attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, but the
negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:

Whether or not: (1) respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging

lien for payment of its attorney’s fees;

RATIO:

No. Charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s

fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution
in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client

The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney’s fees have the
right to be heard upon the question of their propriety or amount. Hence, the
obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

Right to compensation
Albano v. Coloma, Adm. Case No. 528, October 11, 1967

FACTS:

A proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano

against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In his
letter complaint, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation he and
his mother retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in
a civil case. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after
the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and
termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by
another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened
in the case to collect her attorney’s fees. It was then alleged that during the
hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document
showing that they as well as their co/plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her
a contingent fee of whatever could be recovered in damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a lawyer may be removed for her failure to comply with her
obligations as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the
best of her knowledge and capacity?

RULING:

No, a lawyer cannot be removed without just cause. The Solicitor General could
thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case, it is
complainant and his co/plaintiffs who, after benefiting from the valuable services
of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment
of the latter’s contingent attorney’s fees by dismissing her as their counsel after
she had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness
of their written agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Counsel, any
counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his
services.

Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980

Aquino v. Casabar, G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015

FACTS:
- June 27, 2002, Atty. Domingo (now deceased) verbally contracted petitioner
to represent him in an agrarian case on a contingency fee basis
- The case was for the determination of just compensation for the
expropriation and taking of Atty. Domingo’s ricelands consisting of 60.5348
hectares in Guimba, Nueva Ecija by the DAR pursuant to PD 27
- Meanwhile, on September 30, 2007, Atty. Domingo died
- Petitioner filed a Manifestation dated December 11, 2007 of the fact of Atty.
Domingo's death and the substitution of the latter by his legal heirs, Ma. Ala
F. Domingo and Margarita Irene F. Domingo (private respondents)
- He then requested her to inform the Land Bank of the segregation of
petitioner's thirty percent (30%) contingent attorney's fees out of the
increase of the just compensation for the subject property, or thirty percent
(30%) of the total increase
- Petitioner executed an Affidavit dated August 10, 2009, attesting to the
circumstances surrounding the legal services he has rendered for the
deceased Atty. Domingo and the successful prosecution of the Agrarian case
ISSUE
WON atty lien can be demanded?
 RULING
Yes. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the
very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate
action.

The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s fee
is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending,
through counsel, his cause in court.

In the instant case, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner is the
compensation for professional services rendered, and not an indemnity for
damages. Petitioner is claiming payment from private respondents for the
successful outcome of the agrarian case which he represented. There is no valid
reason why public respondent cannot pass upon a proper petition to determine
attorney's fees considering that it is already familiar with the nature and the
extent of petitioner's legal services.

Power of Court to fix attorney’s fees

Mendoza-Parker v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109219, March 11, 1994

FACTS
On December 18, 1989, private respondents Tan Ng and Teresita S. Riosa,
represented by Atty. Efren Barangan, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Quezon City, an action for collection of a sum of money with foreclosure of real
estate mortgage against Demetrio G. Alcaras and Julieta Alcaras (Civil Case No. Q-89-
4287).

On July 29, 1990, while the case was still at the pretrial stage, Atty. Barangan
withdrew his appearance and petitioner took over the case as substitute counsel.

On January 19, 1991, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
granted and judgment was rendered on May 23, 1991 in favor of private
respondents. The trial court also awarded private respondents the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fee

ISSUE: W/N the Court can fix the attorney’s fees?

RULING:

YES. A lawyer, being an officer of the court, is placed under judicial control with
regard to the reasonableness of the amount of the attorney's fees demanded by
him from his client
The determination of the attorney's fees depends on various factors like: the
amount and character of the services rendered; the responsibility imposed; the
amount of money or the value of the property involved in the controversy; the skill
and experience called for in the performance of the services; the professional
standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the payment of
the fees is contingent or absolute

Retainer’s fee
Research and Services Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124074,
January 27, 1997

Attorney’s fees as contract and as award for damages

Trader’s Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, G.R. No.
120592, March 14, 1997
FACTS:
 Petitioner and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz entered into a retainer
agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of
P3,000.00 in consideration of the undertaking to render the services enumerated in their
contract.
 During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the
claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer,
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). A complaint was filed by petitioner. NLRC favored the
employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end
bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the SC. The SC deleted
the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday
pay differential.
 After private respondent received the decision of the SC he notified the petitioner union, the
TRB and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of
holiday pay differential, he filed a motion before LA for the determination of his attorney’s
fees, praying that 10% of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at
P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney’s fees, and that
petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him.
 Petitioner opposed said motion. LA favored private respondent. Petitioner appealed to NLRC
but NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. Hence the petition at bar.

ISSUE:
 Is the private respondent entitled to Atty.’s fees aside from his retainer fee?

RULING:
 Yes. There are 2 commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid
to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
 Private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the
finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s
complete resolution.
 The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the
services the latter actually rendered before the LA and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As
stipulated in their retainer’s agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration
for the law firm’s commitment to render the services.
  WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby
ORDERED to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees to private

Attorney’s Lien, When & where claimed

Rules of Court, Rule 138, sec.37
Canon 21 – Client Confidence and Secrets
Regala, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996 [read
also dissenting opinion]
FACTS:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the
Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in
the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks
in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG
similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the
ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to
disclose the identities of their clients.

ISSUE
Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced
from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.

RULING
The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a
client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under the first and third exception.

The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication.

Palm v. Iledan, Jr., Adm. Case No. 8242. October 2, 2009

FACTS: Rebecca J. Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Felipe
Iledan, Jr. as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty.
Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach of the lawyer-client relationship occurred during
a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meeting cannot take place
via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the
corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a
breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.
ISSUE: Whether or not (a) respondent violated the Confidentiality of Lawyer-
Client Relationship; and (b) respondent is guilty of representing an interest in
conflict with that of a former client

RULING: No. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not
raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication
to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least
a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed
with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential.
Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting could
not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within the
contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 22 – Withdrawal of Services for Good Cause and Upon Notice

Laput v. Ramotigue, Adm. Case No. 219, September 29, 1962
FACTS :
Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.
REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and
unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer.

In May 1952, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty. Laput to handle
her case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings. Mrs.
Barrera did not countersign both pleadings.

Petitioner found out later that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan.
1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955,
petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barrera’s counsel.

ISSUE : Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of
unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases.

HELD : No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as

counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner
because Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow.

Besides, the petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost
simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to
consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow.

The SC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of
unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance after Mrs. Barrera
had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had
voluntarily withdrawn his appearance

Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr., Adm. Case No. 1954, July 23, 2004
Venterez, et al. v. Cosme, Adm. Case No. 7421. October 10, 2007

Facts:
A complaint filed by complainants against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme,
charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981. They
alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for Reconsideration
or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. Complainant
Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for
Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. However said motion was denied.
On Zenaida C. de Vera, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was filed by the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to
or any comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was
eventually granted.

Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed
his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.wFeeling aggrieved
by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint
against him.c

Issue:

Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants

case, as would warrant disciplinary action.

Ruling:

Yes, respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case, as

would warrant disciplinary action.

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services,

he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the
court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of
record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the
interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the court to protect the
interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client
relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the
interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally.

Domingo v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-28078. April 29, 1971

On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money
claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special
administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from the available funds of the estate the sum of
P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."

Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court of Appeals, insofar as it was
adverse to them, and on January 20, 1967, the appellate court found for respondent as
appellant, and affirmed the lower court's judgment with modifications in favor of
respondent. According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the
appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate
court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate
proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg,
were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by
the appellate court. Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March
9, 1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be
served with a copy of the Judgment," and that Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was
appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that
Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court's judgment and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said
judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special administrator's
counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for re hearing or reconsideration;" and
praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former
joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the appellate court's
decision.
Upon due opposition of respondent on the ground of finality of the judgment, the
appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration per its resolution ofApril
27, 1967.

No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later when on September 23,
1967, after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in
his favor by the appellate court, it filed the present petition. Upon the representations — contrary to the
records — that the appellate court had granted "new or further relief" in favor of respondent by awarding
compound interest on the sum due respondent and that Atty. Unson has ceased to be the estate's lawyer
since May 21, 1963 with the removal of the former administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr. as such, the Court
issued on October 3, 1967, the corresponding summons and required respondents to answer the petition.

The court finds no merit in the petition.

Notice and copy of the appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, were therefore duly served by
registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of record at 307 Trinity Building, San Luis,
Ermita, Manila, in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court. 3 And in accordance with said
Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was
deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first
notice of the postmaster. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to
substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal on May 21, 1963, when she became the
sole administrator (which she previously shared with Luis from December 21, 1961), or to then engage new
counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court. Her very motion for substitution filed on March 9, 1967
with the appellate court after its decision of January 20, 1967 recognized the fact that the appellate court
had already duly handed down its adverse decision and merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a
motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate.
One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has obviously failed to appreciate, wittingly or
otherwise, is that the party in the subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr.
and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The fact that his services were
engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as administrator, did not make him the
personal counsel of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to
represent the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate
as its counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.

It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that the appellate court's decision of January 20,
1967, be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or without jurisdiction or
that this Court send for the records from the appellate court "for purposes of review and thereafter render its
own decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]" notwithstanding its long having become final
and executory, is utterly untenable and without legal justification.

Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition in Pajares vs. Abad Santos, 6
and other cases cited therein, to wit, that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys
is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there
is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly
admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action.'"

WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs.

Obando v. Figueras, G.R. No. 134854. January 18, 2000