Sandoval

2/7/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 346
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 485

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation
*
G.R. No. 138298. November 29, 2000.
RAOUL B. DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE

AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
BELLE JAI-ALAI CORPORATION, FILIPINAS
GAMING ENTERTAINMENT TOTALIZATOR
CORPORATION, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 138982. November 29, 2000.
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II and MICHAEL T.

DEFENSOR, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
respondent. JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, intervenor.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdiction;

Injunctions; Supreme Court; It is axiomatic that what
determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction
of the court, are the allegations of the pleading and the
character of the relief sought; Even assuming, arguendo, that
the petition filed before the Supreme Court is an action for
injunction, the Court has the discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.—It is axiomatic that
what determines the nature of an action and hence, the
jurisdiction of the court, are the allegations of the pleading
and the character of the relief sought. A cursory perusal of
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001616c3c4243760d3c3c003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/104
the petition filed in G.R. No. 138982 will show that it is

actually one for Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 for it
seeks to prevent PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and
operating jaialai games. Even assuming, arguendo, that it is
an action for injunction, this Court has the discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. It cannot
be gainsaid that the issues raised in the present petitions
have generated an oasis of concern, even days of disquiet in
view of the public interest at stake.
Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; Parties; Locus Standi; A party
suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.—Respondents’ stance is not
without oven ready legal support. A party suing as a
taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are al-
________________
* EN BANC.
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
lowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of

public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is now settled that a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges

vested by the Constitution in his office.—Be that as it may, in
line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when
a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our
society, we find and so hold that as members of the House of
Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the
petitions at bar. In the instant cases, petitioners complain
that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by
PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant
franchise. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution, so petitioners contend. The contention
commands our concurrence for it is now settled that a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.
Gambling; Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR); Jai Alai; Franchises; The charter of
PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to operate and
manage jai-alai.—After hurdling the threshold procedural
issues, we now come to the decisive substantive issue of
whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the right to
manage and operate jai-alai. The issue is of supreme
significance for its incorrect resolution can dangerously
diminish the plenary legislative power of Congress, more
especially its exercise of police power to protect the morality
of our people. After a circumspect consideration of the
clashing positions of the parties, we hold that the charter of
PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to operate and
manage jai-alai.
Same; Same; Same; Same; History of Jai Alai in the
Philippines.—The game was introduced to the country
during the Spanish colonial period. The first games were
played at a fronton in Numancia Street, Binondo, Manila. In
1917, the games were moved to a larger fronton at the corner
of Taft Avenue and San Luis Street in Ermita where it
gained popularity. From a plain sport, jai-alai became a form
of gambling when the Philippine Legislature issued a
franchise legalizing betting in June 1939. The fronton was
then operated by the Madrigals, a family close to

Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. Devastated by
World War II,
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VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 487
the fronton was rebuilt in 1948. During the term of President

Marcos, the jai-alai franchise was granted to the Romualdez
family. After the EDSA revolution, the Aquino
administration closed down jai-alai. Then, in 1994, during
the term of President Ramos, the Associated Development
Corporation (ADC) revived the games at a new location in
Harrison Plaza, Manila. However, after only a few months of
operation, this Court ruled that a congressional franchise
was required for the games.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Power; Words and
Phrases; A “franchise” is a special privilege conferred upon a
corporation or individual by a government duly empowered
legally to grant it, a privilege of public concern which cannot
be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for
public control and administration, either by the government
directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and
regulations as the government may impose on them in the
interest of the public.—A “franchise” is a special privilege
conferred upon a corporation or individual by a government
duly empowered legally to grant it. It is a privilege of public
concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but
should be reserved for public control and administration,
either by the government directly, or by public agents, under
such conditions and regulations as the government may
impose on them in the interest of the public. A franchise thus
emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently
a legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly
from the state through an agency to which the power has
been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress

prescribes the conditions on which the grant of a franchise
may be made. Thus, the manner of granting the franchise, to
whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the
business, the character and quality of the service to be
rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear
and unequivocal language. In the absence of these defining
terms, any claim to a legislative franchise to operate a game
played for bets and denounced as a menace to morality ought
to be rejected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; It is
abundantly clear from the previous laws, executive orders and
decrees that the legislative practice is that a franchise to
operate jai-alai is granted solely for that purpose and the
terms and conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined
by the grantor.—-It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted
laws, executive orders and decrees that the legislative
practice is that a franchise to operate jai-alai is granted
solely for that purpose and the terms and conditions of the
grant are unequivocably defined by the grantor. Such express
grant and its conditionalities protective of the public interest
are evidently wanting in P.D. No. 1869, the present Charter
of PAGCOR.
488
Thus, while E.O. 135 and P.D. No. 810 provided for the
apportionment of the wager funds or gross receipts from the
sale of betting tickets, as well as the distribution of dividends
among holders of “win” or “place” numbers or holders of the
winning combination or grouping of numbers, no such
provisions can be found in P.D. No. 1869. Likewise, while
P.D. No. 810 describes where and how the games are to be
conducted and bettings to be made, and imposes a penalty in

case of a violation thereof, such provisions are absent in P.D.
No. 1869.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory
Construction; P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard
marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as
those found under P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135; There is no
reason to resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation,
and statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or
privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against
the corporations; and whatever is not given in unequivocal
terms is understood to be withheld.—In fine, P.D. No. 1869
does not have the standard marks of a law granting a
franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under P.D. No.
810 or E.O. 135. We cannot blink away from the stubborn
reality that P.D. No. 1869 deals with details pertinent alone
to the operation of gambling casinos. It prescribes the rules
and regulations concerning the operation of gambling casinos
such as the place, time, persons who are and are not entitled
to play, tax exemptions, use of foreign exchange, and the
exemption of casino employees from the coverage of the Civil
Service Law and the Labor Code. The short point is that P.D.
No. 1869 does not have the usual provisions with regards to
jai-alai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not given
a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons. There is no reason to
resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and
statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or
privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against
the corporations; and whatever is not given in unequivocal
terms is understood to be withheld.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and
Phrases; The phrase “affected with public interest” means that
an industry is subject to control for the public good, and has
been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of
the police power”; Constitutions are widely understood to
withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away
their police power for the power to protect the public interest is
beyond abnegation.—Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of
our subconsciousness, let us not forget that PAGCOR is
engaged in business affected with public interest. The phrase
“affected with public interest” means that an industry is

subject to control for the public good; it has been considered
as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police
power.” Perforce, a
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VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 489
legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public

interest and involves an exercise of police power. The familiar
rule is that laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the
police power of the state are to be construed strictly and any
doubt must be resolved against the grant. The legislature is
regarded as the guardian of society, and therefore is not
presumed to disable itself or abandon the discharge of its
duty. Thus, courts do not assume that the legislature intended
to part away with its power to regulate public morals. The
presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations.
Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from
legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power
for the power to protect the public interest is beyond
abnegation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A statute which
legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly
construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to
limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.—It is
stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to
operate a public utility (such as water, transportation,
communication or electricity)—the operation of which
undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the general public.
What is claimed is an alleged legislative grant of a gambling
franchise—a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute which
legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly
construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to
limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory

Construction; It is widely acknowledged that a statute is
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more
senses.—We reject this simplistic reading of the law
considering the social, moral and public policy implications
embedded in the cases at bar. The plain meaning rule used in
the dissent rests on the assumption that there is no
ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law. The fact,
however, that the statute admits of different interpretations
is the best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous.
It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when
it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in either of two or more senses. In the cases at bar, it
is difficult to see how a literal reading of the statutory text
would unerringly reveal the legislative intent. To be sure, the
term “jai-alai” was never used and is nowhere to be found in
the law. The conclusion that it is included in the franchise
granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory
perusal of and a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain
meaning of the statutory terms used such as “gaming pools”
and “lotteries.” Sutherland tells us that a statute is
“ambiguous,” and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids,
not only when its abstract meaning or the
490
connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is

uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-
situation of the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential
Decrees; Legislative Power; The so-called legislative grant to
PAGCOR did not come from a real Congress and it is
therefore self-evident that there is a need to be extra cautious
in treating this alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the

legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our people, for
plainly it is not.—There is another reason why PAGCOR’s
claim to a legislative grant of a franchise to operate jai-alai
should be subjected to stricter scrutiny. The so-called
legislative grant to PAGCOR did not come from a real
Congress. It came from President Marcos who assumed
legislative powers under martial law. The grant is not the
result of deliberations of the duly elected representatives of
our people. This is not to assail President Marcos’ legislative
powers granted by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution, as the dissent would put it. It is given that in
the exercise of his legislative power, President Marcos legally
granted PAGCOR’s franchise to operate gambling casinos.
The validity of this franchise to operate gambling casinos is
not, however, the issue in the cases at bar. The issue is
whether this franchise to operate gambling casinos includes
the privilege to operate jai-alai. PAGCOR says it does. We
hold that it does not. PAGCOR’s overarching claim should be
given the strictest scrutiny because it was granted by one
man who governed when the country was under martial law
and whose governance was repudiated by our people in
EDSA 1986. The reason for this submission is rooted in the
truth that PAGCOR’s franchise was not granted by a real
Congress where the passage of a law requires a more
rigorous process in terms of floor deliberations and voting by
members of both the House and the Senate. It is self-evident
that there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this
alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the legislature, as a
grant by the representatives of our people, for plainly it is not.
We now have a real Congress and it is best to let Congress
resolve this issue considering its policy ramifications on
public order and morals.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., Separate Opinion:
Gambling; Franchises; Philippine Amusement and

Gaming Corporation; My reading of the charter of the
PAGCOR fails to disclose a grant of a congressional authority
to allow betting on the results of jai alai—all that the
PAGCOR may do is operate and conduct the jai alai, but in

no case can it allow betting on the results thereof without
obtaining a statutory authority for the purpose.—My reading
of the charter of the PAGCOR fails to disclose a grant of a
congressional authority to allow betting on the results
491
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 491
of jai-alai. Accordingly, all that the PAGCOR may do is

operate and conduct the jai-alai, but in no case can it allow
betting on the results thereof without obtaining a statutory
authority for the purpose.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Gaming Corporation; While PAGCOR is allowed under its
charter to enter into agreements in its authorized operations,
that power, upon the other hand, cannot be so construed as to
permit it to likewise grant a veritable franchise to any other
person, individual or firm.—PAGCOR has entered into a
joint venture agreement with Belle Jai Alai Corporation
(“BELLE”) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator
Corporation (“FILGAME”) in the operation and management
of jai alai games. The two firms, under the agreement, would
also furnish the jai-alai fronton facilities. I see in the joint
venture agreement a situation that places BELLE and
FILGAME in active endeavor with PAGCOR in conducting
jai alai games. Without a congressional franchise of its own,
neither BELLE nor FILGAME can lawfully engage into the
activity. Thus, in Lim vs. Pacquing, this Court held that
Associated Development Corporation, having had no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai alai, could not do
so even if it had a license or permit from the city mayor to
operate that game in the City of Manila. While PAGCOR is
allowed under its charter to enter into agreements in its

authorized operations, that power, upon the other hand,
cannot be so construed as to permit it to likewise grant a
veritable franchise to any other person, individual or firm.
DE LEON, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Actions; Supreme Court; Injunctions; The rule that the

Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over original
actions for injunction still holds.—It is clear that no mention
was made in the above-cited rule as to the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain original actions for injunction. In the 1917
case of Madarang vs. Santamaria, we have ruled that the
Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction, in an
action brought for that purpose, to grant the remedy by
injunction pursuant to Section 17 of Act No. 136 which
provided that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus and quo warranto. As in Section
17 of Act 136, Section 1 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has likewise not made any provision for the
granting of the writ of injunction, as an original action, in the
Supreme Court. Hence, the rule that this Court does not
have jurisdiction over original actions for injunction still
holds. This Court may, however,
492
issue preliminary writs of injunction in cases on appeal

before Us or in original actions commenced therein pursuant
to Section 2 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Gaming Corporation; A cursory reading of Section 11 of P.O.
No. 1869 would readily show that the extent and nature of
PAGCOR’s franchise is so broad that literally all kinds of

sports and gaming pools, including jai alai, are covered
therein.—Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869 defining the extent and
nature of PAGCOR’s franchise reads: x x x the Corporation is
hereby granted x x x the rights, privilege, and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other
recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.,
basketball, football, lotteries, etc. x x x [italics supplied]
Contrary to the majority opinion that PAGCOR’s franchise is
limited only to the management and operation of casinos, a
cursory reading of the above-quoted legal provision would
readily show that the extent and nature of PAGCOR’s
franchise is so broad that literally all kinds of sports and
gaming pools, including jai alai, are covered therein.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A sport is
defined as “a game or contest especially when involving
individual skill or prowess on which money is staked,” while
gaming, on the other hand, is defined as “the act or practice of
playing games for stakes.”—A sport is defined as “a game or
contest especially when involving individual skill or prowess
on which money is staked.” Gaming, on the other hand, is
defined as “the act or practice of playing games for stakes.”
P.D. No. 1869 has made express mention of basketball and
football as example of gaming pools. Basketball and football,
however, like jai alai are games of skills. In U.S. vs. Hilario,
the distinction between games of chance and games of skill
was treated in this wise: This distinction between games of
chance and games of skill, making betting upon the former
illegal is quite well treated in State vs. Gupton (30 N.C. 271)
where a game of tenpins was held not to be a game of chance,
but a game depending chiefly upon the skill of players, and
betting thereon consequently not prohibited by a statute
prohibiting bets or wagers upon games of chances.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Considering
that under Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869, games of skill like
basketball and football have been lumped together with the
word “lotteries” just before the word “etc.” and after the words
“gaming pools,” it may be deduced from the wording of the
law that when bets or stakes are made in connection with
games of skill, they may be classified as games of chance
under the coverage of PAGCOR’s franchise; Jai alai,

otherwise known as “game of Basque pelota,”
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VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 493
while in itself is not per se a game of chance, may be

categorized as a game of chance when bets are accepted as a
form of gambling.—Considering that under Section 11 of
P.D. No. 1869, games of skill like basketball and football
have been lumped together with the word “lotteries” just
before the word “etc.” and after the words “gaming pools,” it
may be deduced from the wording of the law that when bets
or stakes are made in connection with games of skill, they
may be classified as games of chance under the coverage of
PAGCOR’s franchise. The meaning of the phrase “et cetera”
or its abbreviation “etc.” depends largely on the context of the
instrument, description and enumeration of the matters
preceding the term and subject matter to which it is applied,
and when used in a statute, the words should be given their
usual and natural signification. Consequently, jai alai,
otherwise known as “game of Basque pelota,” while in itself
is not per se a game of chance, may be categorized as a game
of chance when bets are accepted as a form of gambling. It is
a cardinal rule of statutory construction that when words
and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed
and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Even if the Court is fully persuaded that the legislature
really meant and intended something different from what it
enacted, and that the failure to convey the real meaning was
due to inadvertence or mistake in the use of language, yet, if
the words chosen by the legislature are not obscure or
ambiguous, but convey a precise and sensible meaning
(excluding the case of obvious clerical errors or elliptical
forms of expression), then the Court must take the law as it
finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being

influenced by the probable legislative meaning lying at the
back of the words. In that event, the presumption that the
legislature meant what it said, though it be contrary to the
fact, is conclusive.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the franchise contains
no words either defining or limiting the powers which the
holder may exercise, such holder has, by implication, all such
powers as are reasonably necessary to enable it to accomplish
the purposes and object of its creation.—While there is no
specific mention of jai alai as among the games of chance
which PAGCOR can operate under its franchise, the
language of the law defining the scope of PAGCOR’s
franchise is broad enough to include the operations of jai alai
as a game of chance. Where the franchise contains no words
either defining or limiting the powers which the holder may
exercise, such holder has, by implication, all such powers as
are reasonably necessary to enable it to accomplish the
purposes and object of its creation. It is well recognized that
the principle of strict construction does not preclude a fair
and reasonable interpretation of such charter and fran-
494
chises, nor does it justify withholding that which

satisfactorily appears to have been intended to be conveyed
to the grantee.
Same; Same; Same; The mere granting of a franchise
does not amount to an implied contract on the part of the
grantor that it will not grant a rival franchise to a competing
corporation or enter into a competition itself in reference to
the subject of the franchise—monopoly is not an essential
element of a franchise and the strictly legal signification of
the term franchise is not always confined to exclusive rights.
—The mere granting of a franchise does not amount to an

implied contract on the part of the grantor that it will not
grant a rival franchise to a competing corporation or enter
into a competition itself in reference to the subject of the
franchise. Monopoly is not an essential feature of a franchise
and the strictly legal signification of the term franchise is not
always confined to exclusive rights. An examination of the
provisions of P.D. No. 810 does not give us any indication
that the franchise granted to PJAC to operate jai alai is
exclusive in character. Given the broad language of P.D. 1869
defining the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise, I find no reason
why the operations of jai alai cannot be deemed as included
in its franchise. Besides, the subsequent repeal of P.D. Nos.
810 and 1124 in 1986 by E.O. No. 610 only meant that PJAC
was no longer entitled to exercise its rights under its former
franchise. E.O. No. 610, otherwise known as Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled “An Act Granting the
Philippine Jai Alai and Amusement Corporation a Franchise
to Operate, Construct and Maintain a Fronton for Basque
Pelota and Similar Games of Skill in the Greater Manila
Area,” as amended, and Accordingly Revoking and Canceling
the Right, Privilege and Authority granted therein in itself
did not delimit the scope of the franchise of PAGCOR
especially since E.O. No. 610 was specific enough to identify
the repeal of the law (P.D. No. 810) granting a certain
franchise, i.e. PJAC’s franchise. As regards P.D. No. 1602, it
should be stressed that it did not outlaw the operations of jai
alai. It merely provided for stiffer penalties for illegal or
unauthorized activities related to jai alai and other forms of
gambling.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Statutory Construction; In
the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to
inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body,
except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute
itself.—As regards the issue that it could not have been the
intent of then President Marcos to grant PAGCOR a
franchise to operate jai alai considering that he had already
issued to another corporation which is controlled by his in-
laws a franchise to operate jai alai, suffice it to say that in
the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible
to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative

body,
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VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 495
except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute

itself. It should be stressed that the magnitude of the
consideration, political or financial, which may operate upon
the legislative mind as an inducement for grants and
franchises conferred by statute, do not change the character of
the legislation, or vary the rule of construction by which the
rights of the grantees must be measured.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The powers granted to
PAGCOR is broad enough to include the power to enter into a
joint venture agreement with private corporations relating to
the operation, management and conduct not only of gambling
casinos but also of those relating to jai alai as legalized
gambling.—Clearly, in Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869, the
powers granted to PAGCOR is broad enough to include the
power to enter into a joint venture agreement with private
corporations like BELLE and FILGAME relating to the
operation, management and conduct not only of gambling
casinos but also of those relating to jai alai as legalized
gambling.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; While
jai alai, as a form of legalized gambling, does not promote
good morals, it is expected to provide entertainment to the
public and much needed revenues to the government, and in
balancing these two apparently conflicting interests, courts
are not supposed to pass upon and do not pass upon questions
of wisdom or expediency of legislation, for it is not within
their province to supervise and keep legislation within the
bounds of propriety.—Finally, while on one hand, jai alai, as
a form of legalized gambling under the control and
supervision of PAGCOR, does not promote good morals, on

the other hand it is expected to provide entertainment to the
public and much needed revenues to the government. In
balancing those two apparently conflicting interests, it must
be stressed that courts are not supposed to pass upon and do
not pass upon questions of wisdom or expediency of
legislation, for it is not within their province to supervise and
keep legislation within the bounds of propriety. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. Any
shortcoming of a statute is for the legislature alone to correct
by appropriate enactment.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo

Warranto.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Policarpio, Concepcion, Sison and Mendoza for
petitioners.
Ocampo, Manalo & Ureta for intervenors.
496

Corporation
Herrera, Teehankee & Faylona for Belle Jai-Alai

Corp. and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator
Corp.
The Government Corporate Counsel for
respondent PAGCOR.
PUNO, J.:
These two consolidated petitions concern the issue of

whether the franchise granted to the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai.
First, we scour the significant facts. The Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation is a government-
owned and controlled corporation organized and

existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 which was
enacted on July 11, 1983. Pursuant to Sections 1 and
10 of P.D. No. 1869, respondent PAGCOR requested
for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to
whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to
operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country. In
its Opinion No. 67, Series of 1996 dated July 15, 1996,
the Secretary of Justice opined that “the authority of
PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or
gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or
game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR1
amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose.”
Similar favorable opinions were received by PAGCOR
from the Office of the Solicitor General per its letter
dated June 3, 1996 and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel2
under its Opinion No. 150 dated
June 14, 1996. Thus, PAGCOR started the operation
of jai-alai frontons.
On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar
initially filed in G.R. No. 138298 a Petition for
Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from
managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle
Corporation, on the ground that the controverted act is
patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
________________
1 Annex D, Petition, G.R. No. 138298; Rollo, 171-174.

2 Annex A, id.; Ibid., 23.
497
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However, on June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR

entered into an Agreement with private respondents
Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas
Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will
make available to PAGCOR the required
infrastructure facilities including the main fronton, as
well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai
operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR,
while PAGCOR handles 3
the actual management and
operation of jai-alai.
Thus, on August 10, 1999, petitioner Del Mar filed a
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the
validity of said Agreement on the ground that
PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise,
authority or power to enter into such Agreement for
the opening, establishment, operation, control and
management of jai-alai games.
A little earlier, or on July 1, 1999, petitioners
Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a
Petition for Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 138982,
which seeks to enjoin respondent PAGCOR from
operating or otherwise managing the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games by itself or in joint venture with Belle
Corporation, for being patently illegal, having no basis
in the law or the Constitution, and in usurpation of the
authority that properly pertains to the legislative
branch of the government. In this case, a Petition in
Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging
that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal
because it is not included in the scope of PAGCOR’s
franchise which covers only games of chance.
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval
II, Michael T. Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel
Zubiri, are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as
members of the House of Representatives representing
the First District of Cebu City, the Lone Congressional
District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional
District of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional
District of Bukidnon, respectively.
The bedrock issues spawned by the petitions at bar

are:
________________
3 Annex A, Supplemental Petition, G.R. No. 138298; Ibid., 162-

168.
498

Corporation
G.R. No. 138298
Petitioner Del Mar raises the following issues:
I. The respondent PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or

legislative franchise or acted with grave abuse
of discretion, tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in arrogating unto itself the
authority or power to open, pursue, conduct,
operate, control and manage jai-alai game
operations in the country.
II. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x in executing its
agreement with co-respondents Belle and
Filgame for the conduct and management of
jai-alai game operations, upon undue reliance
on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice.
III. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x in entering into a
partnership, joint venture or business
arrangement with its co-respondents Belle and
Filgame, through their agreement x x x. The
Agreement was entered into through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith (Sec. 3 [e], RA
3019), thus manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government [Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 3019, Sec. 3(g)1.
IV. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x to award to its co-
respondents Belle and Filgame the right to
avail of the tax benefits which, by law, inures
solely and exclusively to PAGCOR itself.
V. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x to cause the
disbursement of funds for the illegal
establishment, management and operation of
jai-alai game operations.
VI. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x to award or grant
authority for the establishment, management
and operation of off-fronton betting stations or
bookies.
VII. The respondent PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or
authority x x x in awarding unto its co-
respondents Belle and Filgame, without public
bidding, the subject agreement.
In defense, private respondents BELLE and FILGAME

assert:
1. The petition states no cause of action and must

be dismissed outright;
2. The petitioner has no cause of action against
the respondents, he not being a real party in
interest;
499
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 499

Corporation
3. The instant petition cannot be maintained as a

taxpayer suit, there being no illegal
disbursement of public funds involved;
4. The instant petition is essentially an action for
quo warranto and may only be commenced by
the Solicitor General;
5. The operation of jai-alai is well within
PAGCOR’s authority to operate and maintain.
PAGCOR’s franchise is intended to be wide in
its coverage, the underlying considerations
being, that: (1) the franchise must be used to
integrate all gambling operations in one
corporate entity (i.e. PAGCOR); and (2) it must
be used to generate funds for the government
to support its social impact projects;
6. The agreement executed by, between and
among PAGCOR, BJAC and FILGAME is
outside the coverage of existing laws requiring
public bidding.
Substantially the same defenses were raised by

respondent PAGCOR in its Comment.
G.R. No. 138982
Petitioners contend that:
I. The operation of jai-alai games by PAGCOR is

illegal in that:
1) the franchise of PAGCOR does not include the

operation of jai-alai since jai-alai is a prohibited
activity under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 1602 which is otherwise
known as the Anti-Gambling Law;
2) jai-alai is not a game of chance and therefore
cannot be the subject of a PAGCOR franchise.
II. A franchise is a special privilege that should be

construed strictly against the grantee.
III. To allow PAGCOR to operate jai-alai under its

charter is tantamount to a license to PAGCOR
to legalize and operate any gambling activity.
In its Comment, respondent PAGCOR avers that:
1. An action for injunction is not among the cases

or proceedings originally cognizable by the
Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to Sec tion
1, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
500

Corporation
2. Assuming, arguendo, the Honorable Supreme

Court has jurisdiction over the petition, the
petition should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy
of courts.
3. x x x Petitioners have no legal standing to file a
taxpayer’s suit based on their cause of action
nor are they the real parties-in-interest entitled
to the avails of the suit.
4. Respondent’s franchise definitely includes the
operation of jai-alai.
5. Petitioners have no right in esse to be entitled
to a temporary restraining order and/or to be
protected by a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Solicitor General claims that the petition, which is

actually an action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court, against an alleged usurpation by
PAGCOR of a franchise to operate jai alai, should be
dismissed outright because only the Solicitor General
or public prosecutor can file the same; that P.D. No.
1869, the Charter of PAGCOR, authorizes PAGCOR to
regulate and operate games of chance and skill which

include jai-alai; and that P.D. No. 1602 did not outlaw
jai-alai but merely provided for staffer penalties to
illegal or unauthorized activities related to jai-alai and
other forms of gambling.
We shall first rule on the important procedural
issues raised by the respondents.
Respondents in G.R. No. 138982 contend that the
Court has no jurisdiction to take original cognizance of
a petition for injunction because it is not one of those
actions specifically mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 56 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, they urge
that the petition should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of
an action and hence, the jurisdiction of the court, are
the allegations4
of the pleading and the character of the
relief sought. A cursory perusal of the petition filed in
G.R. No. 138982 will show that it is actually one for
Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 for it seeks to
prevent PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and
operating jai-alai
________________
4 Times Broadcasting Network vs. CA, et al., 274 SCRA 366

(1997); Estate of the Late Mercedes Jacob vs. CA, et al., 283 SCRA
474 (1997).
501
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 501

Corporation
games. Even assuming, arguendo, that it is an action

for injunction, this Court has the discretionary power
to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant
5
the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that the issues
raised in the present petitions have generated an oasis
of concern, even days of disquiet in view of the public6
interest at stake. In Tano, et al. vs. Socrates, et al.,
this Court did not hesitate to treat a petition for
certiorari and injunction as a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition to resolve an issue of far-
reaching impact to our people. This is in consonance
with our case law now accorded near religious
reverence that rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice such
that when its rigid application tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice,
7
this Court has
the duty to suspend their operation.
Respondents also assail the locus standi or the
standing of petitioners to file the petitions at bar as
taxpayers and as legislators. First, they allege that
petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s
suit because the operation of jai-alai does not involve
the disbursement of public funds.
Respondents’ stance is not without oven ready legal
support. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing8 the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In
essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there
9
is a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
public money
10
is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through11 the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
________________
5 Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et al., 289 SCRA 624 (1998).

6 278 SCRA 154 (1997).
7 Ramos vs. CA, et al., 269 SCRA 34 (1997).
8 Bugnay Construction & Dev. Corp. vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 240
(1989).
9 Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Sanidad
vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Morato,
et al., 250 SCRA 130 (1995).
10 Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980).
11 Philconsa vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966).
502

Corporation
In the petitions at bar, the Agreement entered into

between PAGCOR and private respondents BELLE
and FILGAME will show that all financial outlay or
capital expenditure for the operation of jai-alai games
shall be provided for by the latter. Thus, the
Agreement provides, among others, that: PAGCOR
shall manage, operate and control the jai-alai
operation at no cost or financial risk to it (Sec. 1[A][1]);
BELLE shall provide funds, at no cost to PAGCOR, for
all capital expenditures (Sec. 1[B][1]); BELLE shall
make available to PAGCOR, at no cost to PAGCOR,
the use of the integrated nationwide network of on-line
computerized systems (Sec. 1 [B][2]); FILGAME shall
make available for use of PAGCOR on a rent-free basis
the jai-alai fronton facilities (Sec. 1 [C][l]); BELLE &
FILGAME jointly undertake to provide funds, at no
cost to PAGCOR, for pre-operating expenses and
working capital (Sec. 1 [DHU); and that BELLE &
FILGAME will provide PAGCOR with goodwill money
in the amount of P200 million (Sec. 1 [D][2]). In fine,
the record is barren of evidence that the operation and
management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves
expenditure of public money.
Be that as it may, in line with the liberal policy of
this Court on locus standi when a case involves 12
an
issue of overarching significance to our society, we
find and so hold that as members of the House of
Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file
the petitions at bar. In the instant cases, petitioners

complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an
infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive
power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution, so
petitioners contend. The contention commands our
concurrence for it is now settled that a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the
________________
12 Philconsa vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Civil Liberties

Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona, Jr.
vs. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Osmena vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA
750 (1991); Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Carpio vs.
Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).
503
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 503

Corporation
13
Constitution in his office. As presciently stressed in
the case of Kilosbayan, Inc., viz.:
“We find the instant petition to be of transcendental

importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher than
those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the
remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned online
lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is
expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners

deserves recognition x x x.”
After hurdling the threshold procedural issues, we now

come to the decisive substantive issue of whether
PAGCOR’s legislative franchise 14
includes the right to
manage and operate jai-alai. The issue is of supreme
significance for its incorrect resolution can dangerously
diminish the plenary legislative power of Congress,
more especially its exercise of police power to protect
the morality of our people. After a circumspect
consideration of the clashing positions of the parties,
we hold that the charter of PAGCOR does not give it
any franchise to operate and manage jai-alai.
FIRST. A “franchise” is a special privilege conferred
upon a corporation or individual by a government duly
empowered legally to
________________
13 Philconsa vs. Mathay, supra.

14 The game was introduced to the country during the Spanish
colonial period. The first games were played at a fronton in
Numancia Street, Binondo, Manila. In 1917, the games were moved
to a larger fronton at the corner of Taft Avenue and San Luis Street
in Ermita where it gained popularity. From a plain sport, jai-alai
became a form of gambling when the Philippine Legislature issued a
franchise legalizing betting in June 1939. The fronton was then
operated by the Madrigals, a family close to Commonwealth
President Manuel Quezon. Devastated by World War II, the fronton
was rebuilt in 1948. During the term of President Marcos, the jai-
alai franchise was granted to the Romualdez family. After the EDSA
revolution, the Aquino administration closed down jai-alai. Then, in
1994, during the term of President Ramos, the Associated
Development Corporation (ADC) revived the games at a new location
in Harrison Plaza, Manila. However, after only a few months of
operation, this Court ruled that a congressional franchise was
required for the games.
504

Corporation
15
grant it. It is a privilege of public concern which
cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be
reserved for public control and administration, either
by the government directly, or by public agents, under
such conditions and regulations as the government 16
may impose on them in the interest of the public. 17
A
franchise thus emanates from a sovereign power and
the grant is inherently a legislative power. It may,
however, be derived indirectly from the state through
an agency to which18
the power has been clearly and
validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes
the conditions
19
on which the grant of a franchise may
be made. Thus, the manner of granting the franchise,
to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the
business, the character and quality of the service to be
rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in
clear and unequivocal language. In the absence of these
defining terms, any claim to a legislative franchise to
operate a game played for bets and denounced as a
menace to morality ought to be rejected.
SECOND. A historical study of the creation, growth
and development of PAGCOR will readily show that it
was never given a legislative franchise to operate jai-
alai.
(2.a) Before the creation of PAGCOR, a 25-year
right to operate jai-alai in Manila was given by
President Marcos to the Philippine Jai-Alai and
Amusement Corporation then controlled by his inlaws,
the Romualdez family. The franchise was granted on
October 16, 1975 thru P.D. No. 810 issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers. On
that very date, the 25-year franchise of the prior
grantee expired and was not renewed. A few months
before, President Marcos had issued P.D. No. 771
dated August 20, 1975, revoking the authority of local

government units
________________
15 City of Oakland vs. Hogan, 106 P.2d 987, 994, 41 Cal. App.2d
333.
16 Central Pac. R. Co. vs. People of State of California, 16 S.Ct.
766, 778, 162 U.S. 91, 40 L Ed. 903; Hamill vs. Hawks, CCA. Okl., 58
F.2d 41, 44.
17 People ex rel. Foley vs. Begole, 56 P.2d 931, 933, 98 Colo. 354.
18 City of Helena vs. Helena Light and R. Co., 207 O. 337, 63
Mont. 108.
19 Beekman vs. Third Ave. R. Co., 47 N.E. 277, 153 N.Y. 144.
505
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 505

Corporation
to issue jai-alai franchises. By these acts, the former

President exercised complete control of the sovereign
power to grant franchises.
(2.b) Almost one year and a half after granting the
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a 25-
year franchise to operate jai-alai in Manila, President
Marcos created PAGCOR on January 1, 1977 by
issuing P.D. No. 1067-A. The decree is entitled
“Creating the Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, Defining Its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds therefor20
and for Other Purposes.” Its
Declaration of Policy trumpeted the intent that
PAGCOR was created to implement “the policy of the
State to centralize and integrate all games of chance
not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law x x x.” One of its whereas clauses
referred to the need to prevent “the proliferation of
illegal
21
casinos or clubs conducting games of chance x x
x.” To achieve this objective, PAGCOR was
empowered “lo establish and maintain clubs, casinos,

branches, agencies or subsidiaries, 22
or other units
anywhere in the Philippines x x x.”
(2.c) On the same day after creating PAGCOR,
President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1067-B granting
PAGCOR “x x x a Franchise to Establish, Operate, and
Maintain Gambling Casinos on Land or Water Within
the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines.” Obviously, P.D. No. 1067-A which created
the PAGCOR is not a grant of franchise to operate the
game of jai-alai. On the other hand, Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1067-B provides the nature and term of PAGCOR’s
franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a
franchise to operate jai-alai), viz.:
“SECTION 1. NATURE AND TERM OF FRANCHISE.—

Subject to the terms and conditions established in this
Decree, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another 25 years, the right, privilege, and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs
and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming
pools, i.e., basketball,
________________
20 Section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-A.

21 See third whereas clause.
22 See Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1067-A.
506

football, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial

jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.”
Section 2 of the same decree spells out the scope of the

PAGCOR franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not
a franchise to operate jai-alai), viz.:
“SEC. 2. SCOPE OF FRANCHISE.—In addition to the right

and privileges granted it under Sec. 1, this Franchise shall
entitle the franchise holder to do and undertake the
following:
(1) Enter into operator’s and/or management contracts

with duly registered and accredited company
possessing the knowledge, skill, expertise and
facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling
casinos; Provided, That the service fees of such
management and/or operator companies whose
services may be retained by the franchise holder of
this Franchise shall not in the aggregate exceed ten
(10%) percent of the gross income.
(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for
the importation of equipment, facilities and other
gambling paraphernalia indispensably needed or
useful to insure the successful operation of gambling
casinos.
(3) Acquire the right of way, access to or thru public
lands, public waters or harbors, including the Manila
Bay Area; such right to include, but not limited to,
the right to lease and/or purchase public lands,
government reclaimed lands, as well as land of
private ownership or those leased from the
government. This right shall carry with it the
privilege of the franchise holder to utilize piers,
quays, boat landings, and such other pertinent and
related facilities within these specified areas for use
as landing, anchoring, or berthing sites in connection
with its authorized casino operations.
(4) Build or construct structures, buildings, coastways,
piers, docks, as well as any other form of land and
berthing facilities for its floating casinos.
(5) To do and perform such other acts directly related to
the efficient and successful operation and conduct of
games of chance in accordance with existing laws and
decrees.”
(2.d) Still on the day after creating PAGCOR,

President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1067-C amending
P.D. Nos. 1067-A and B. The amendment provides that
PAGCOR’s franchise to maintain gambling casinos “x x
x shall become exclusive in character, subject
507
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 507

Corporation
only to the exception of existing franchises and games

of chance theretofore permitted by law, upon the
generation by the franchise holder of gross revenues
amounting to P1.2 billion and its contribution
therefrom of the amount of P720 million as the
government’s share.”
(2.e) On June 2, 1978, President Marcos issued P.D.
No. 1399 amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A and 1067-B. The
amendments did not change the nature and scope of the
PAGCOR franchise to maintain gambling casinos.
Rather, they referred
23
to the Composition of the Board 24
of Directors,25
Special Condition26
of Franchise,
Exemptions, and Other Conditions.
(2.f) On August 13, 1979, President Marcos issued
P.D. No. 1632. Again, the amendments did not change
a comma on the nature and scope of PAGCOR’s
franchise to maintain gambling casinos. They related
to the allocation of the 60% share of the government
where the host area27
is a city or municipality other than
Metro Manila, and the 28
manner of payment of
franchise tax of PAGCOR.
(2.g) On July 11, 1983, President Marcos issued
P.D. No. 1869 entitled “Consolidating and Amending
P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632
Relative to the Franchise and Power of the PAGCOR.”
As a consolidated decree, it reiterated the nature and
scope of PAGCOR’s existing franchise to maintain
gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate jai-alai),

thus:
“SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise.—Subject to the

terms and conditions established in this Decree, the
Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25)
years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the
rights, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement
places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football,
lotteries, etc., whether on
________________
23 See section 5 of P.D. No. 1067-A.

24 See section 3 of P.D. No. 1067-C.
25 See section 4 of P.D. No. 1067-B.
26 See section 5, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B.
27 See section 1 of P.D. No. 1632.
28 See section 2 of P.D. No. 1632.
508

land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic

of the Philippines.
SEC. 11. Scope of Franchise.—In addition to the rights
and privileges granted it under the preceding Section, this
Franchise shall entitle the corporation to do and undertake
the following:
(1) Enter into operating and/or management contracts

with any registered and accredited company
casinos; provided, that the service fees of such
services may be retained by the Corporation shall not
in the aggregate exceed ten (10%) percent of the gross

income;
gambling paraphernalia indis-pensably needed or
casinos;
(3) Acquire the right of way or access to or thru public
land, public waters or harbors, including the Manila
Bay Area; such right shall include, but not be limited
to, the right to lease and/or purchase public lands,
government reclaimed lands, as well as lands of
private ownership or those leased from the
Government. This right shall carry with it the
privilege of the Corporation to utilize piers, quays,
boat landings, and such other pertinent and related
facilities within these specified areas for use as
landing, anchoring or berthing sites in connection
with its authorized casino operations;
(4) Build or construct structures, buildings, castways,
piers, decks, as well as any other form of landing and
boarding facilities for its floating casinos; and
(5) To do and perform such other acts directly related to
the efficient and successful operation and conduct of
games of chance in accordance with existing laws and
decrees.”
(2.h) Then came the 1986 EDSA revolution and the end
of the Marcos regime. On May 8, 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169
repealing P.D. Nos. 810, 1124 and 1966 thus revoking
the franchise of the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation controlled by the Romualdezes to operate
jai-alai in Manila. PAGCOR’s franchise to operate
gambling casinos was not revoked. Neither was it given
a franchise to operate jai-alai.
509
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 509


Corporation
THIRD. In light of its legal history, we hold that

PAGCOR cannot maintain that Section 10 of P.D. No.
1869 grants it a franchise to operate jai-alai. Section 10
provides:
“SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise.—Subject to the

Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25)
years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the
rights, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement
places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football,
lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.”
(3.a) P.D. No. 1869 is a mere consolidation of previous

decrees dealing with PAGCOR. PAGCOR cannot seek
comfort in Section 10 as it is not a new provision in
P.D. No. 1869 and, from the beginning of its history,
was never meant to confer it with a franchise to
operate jai-alai. It is a reiteration of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1067-B which provides:
“SECTION 1. Nature and Term of Franchise.—Subject to the

Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for
another 25 years, the right, privilege, and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other
recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, i.e.,
basketball, football, etc., whether on land or sea, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.”
(3.b) Plainly, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B which was

reenacted as Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 is not a grant
of legislative franchise to operate jai-alai. P.D. No.
1067-B is a franchise to maintain gambling casinos
alone. The two franchises are as different as day and
night and no alchemy of logic will efface their

difference.
(3.c) PAGCOR’s stance becomes more sterile when
we consider the law’s intent. It cannot be the intent of
President Marcos to grant PAGCOR a franchise to
operate jai-alai because a year and a half before it was
chartered, he issued P.D. No. 810 granting Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a 25-year
franchise to oper-
510

Corporation
ate jai-alai in Manila. This corporation

29
is controlled by
his in-laws, the Romualdezes. To assure that this
Romualdez corporation would have no competition,
President Marcos earlier revoked the power of local
governments to grant jai-alai franchises. Thus,
PAGCOR’s stance that P.D. No. 1067B is its franchise
to operate jai-alai, which would have competed with the
Romualdezes’ franchise, extends credulity to the limit.
Indeed, P.D. No. 1067-A which created PAGCOR made
it crystal clear that it was to implement “the policy of
the State to centralize and integrate all games of
chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises
or permitted by law” which included the Philippine Jai-
Alai and Amusement Corporation.
(3.d) There can be no sliver of doubt that under P.D.
No. 1869, PAGCOR’s franchise is only to operate
gambling casinos and not jai-alai. This conclusion is
compelled by a. plain reading of its various provisions,
viz.:
“SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared to

be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all
games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the

following objectives:
x x x x x x
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for
amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of
amusement and recreation including games of chance, which
may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not
totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that
are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government
involvement.
x x x x x x
TITLE IV GRANT OF FRANCHISE
SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise.—Subject to the

Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-
five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five
________________
29 See Dissenting Opinion in Lim v. Pacquing, et al., 240 SCRA

649 (1995), pp. 720 and 729.
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(25) years, the rights, privileges and authority to

operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming
pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on
land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 11. Scope of Franchise.—In addition to the rights and

privileges granted it under the preceding Section, this
Franchise shall entitle the Corporation to do and undertake
the following:
(1) Enter into operating and/or management contracts

with any registered and accredited company
casinos; provided, that the service fees of such
services may be retained by the Corporation shall not
in the aggregate exceed ten (10%) percent of the gross
income;
gambling paraphernalia indispensably needed or
casinos;
(3) Acquire the right of way or access to or thru public
land, public waters or harbors x x x. This right shall
carry with it the privilege of the Corporation to utilize
x x x such other pertinent and related facilities
within these specified areas x x x in connection with
its authorized casino operations;
(4) Build or construct structures, building castways,
piers, decks, as well as any other form of landing and
boarding facilities for its floating casinos;
xxxxxx
SEC. 13. Exemptions.—
(1) Customs duties, taxes and other imposts on
importations.—All importations of equipment, vehicles,
automobiles, boats, ships, barges, aircraft and such other
gambling paraphernalia, including accessories or related
facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of the casinos, the
proper and efficient management and administration thereof,
and such other clubs. Recreation or amusement places to be
established under and by virtue of this Franchise shall be
exempt from the payment of all kinds of customs duties,
taxes and other imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, or

charges of any kind or nature, whether National or Local.
Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be
imported by any corporation having existing contractual
arrangements with the Corporation, for the sole and exclusive
use of the casino or to be used to service
512

the operations and requirements of the casino, shall likewise

be totally exempt from the payment of all customs duties, x x
x.
(2) Income and other taxes.—(a) x x x
(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings
derived from the operations conducted under the franchise x
x x shall inure to the benefit of and extend to corporation(s) x
x x with whom the Corporation or operator has any
contractual relationship in connection with the operations of
the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise
x x x.
(3) Dividend Income.—x x x The dividend income shall not
in such case be considered as part of beneficiaries’ taxable
income; provided, however, that such dividend income shall
be totally exempted from income or other forms of taxes if
invested within six (6) months from date the dividend income
is received, in the following:
(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate
activity that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the
Corporation or any other corporation with whom the
Corporation has any existing arrangements in connection
with or related to the operations of the casino(s);
x x x x x x
(4) Utilization of Foreign Currencies.—The Corporation
shall have the right and authority, solely and exclusively in
connection with the operations of the casino(s), to purchase,
receive, exchange and disburse foreign exchange, subject to
the following terms and conditions:
(a) A specific area in the casino(s) or gaming pit shall be

put up solely and exclusively for players and patrons
utilizing foreign currencies;
(b) The Corporation shall appoint and designate a duly
accredited commercial bank agent of the Central
Bank, to handle, administer and manage the use of
foreign currencies in the casino(s);
(c) The Corporation shall provide an office at casino(s)
for the employees of the designated bank, agent of the
Central Bank, where the Corporation will maintain a
dollar account which will be utilized exclusively for
the above purpose and the casino dollar treasury
employees;
x x x x x x
(f) The disbursement, administration, management and
recording of foreign exchange currencies used in the casino(s)
shall be carried out in accordance with existing foreign
exchange regulations x x x.
SEC. 14. Other Conditions.—
(1) Place.—The Corporation shall conduct the gambling
activities or games of chance on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
When conducted on water, the Corpora-
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VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 513

tion shall have the right to dock the floating casino(s) in any
part of the Philippines where vessels/boats are authorized to
dock under the Customs and Maritime Laws.
(2) Time.—Gambling activities may be held and

conducted at anytime of the day or night; provided,
however, that in places where curfew hours are
observed, all players and personnel of gambling
casinos shall remain within the premises of the
casinos.
(2) Persons allowed to play.—x x x

(4) Persons not allowed to play.—
x x x x x x
From these are excepted the personnel employed by the
casinos, special guests, or those who at the discretion of the
Management may be allowed to stay in the premises.
TITLE VI EXEMPTION FROM CIVIL SERVICE

LAW
SEC. 16. Exemption.—All position in the Corporation,

whether technical, administrative, professional or
managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed
only by the personnel management policies set by the Board
of Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services
shall be classified as “Confidential” appointees.
TITLE VII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 17. Transitory Provisions.—x x x

SEC. 18. Exemption from Labor Laws.—No union or any
form of association shall be formed by all those working as
employees of the casino or related services whether directly or
indirectly. For such purpose, all employees of the casinos or
related services shall be classified as “confidential”
appointees and their employment thereof, whether by the
franchise holder, or the operators, or the managers, shall be
exempt from the provisions of the Labor Code or any
implementing rules and regulations thereof.”
From its creation in 1977 and until 1999, PAGCOR

never alleged that it has a franchise to operate jai-alai.
Twenty-two years is a long stretch of silence. It is
inexplicable why it never claimed its alleged franchise
for so long a time which could have allowed it to earn

billions of pesos as additional income.
514

Corporation
(3.e) To be sure, we need not resort to intellectual jujitsu to

determine whether PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-
alai. It is easy to tell whether there is a legislative grant or
not. Known as the game of a thousand thrills, jai-alai is a
different game, hence, the terms and conditions imposed on a
franchisee are spelled out in standard form. A review of some
laws and executive orders granting a franchise to operate jai-
alai will demonstrate these standard terms and conditions,
viz.:
(3.e.l) Commonwealth Act No. 485 (An Act to Permit Bets
in the Game of Basque Pelota)—June 18, 1939
“Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines: SECTION 1. Any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding, it shall be permissible in the game
of Basque pelota, a game of skill (including the games of
pala, raqueta, cestapunta, remonte and mano), in which
professional players participate, to make either direct bets or
bets by means of a totalizer; Provided, That no operator or
maintainer of a Basque pelota court shall collect as
commission a fee in excess of twelve per centum on such bets,
or twelve per centum of the receipts of the totalizer, and of
such per centum three shall be paid to the Government of the
Philippines, for distribution in equal shares between the
General Hospital and the Philippine Anti-tuberculosis
Society.
SEC. 2. Any person, company or corporation, that shall
build a court for Basque pelota games with bets within
eighteen months from the date of the approval of this Act,
shall thereunder have the privilege to maintain and operate
the said court for a term of twenty-five years from the date in
which the first game with bets shall have taken place. At the
expiration of the said term of twenty-five years, the buildings

and the land on which the court and the stadium shall be
established, shall become the property of the Government of
the Philippines, without payment.
SEC. 3. The location and design of the buildings that shall
be used for the same games of Basque pelota, shall have
prior approval of the Bureau of Public Works and the
operator shall pay a license fee of five hundred pesos a year
to the city or municipality in which the establishment shall
be situated, in addition to the real-estate tax due on such
real property.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
ENACTED, without Executive approval, June 18, 1939.”
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Corporation
(3.e.2) Executive Order No. 135 (Regulating the

Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of
Frontons and Basque Pelota Games [Jai-Alai])—May 4,
1948
“By virtue of the powers vested in me by Commonwealth Act

No. 601, entitled An Act to regulate the establishment,
maintenance and operation of places of amusements in
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts, the
following rules and regulations governing frontons and
basque pelota games are hereby promulgated:
SECTION 1. Definitions.—Whenever used in this Order
and unless the context indicates a different meaning, the
following terms shall bear the meaning indicated herein:
(a) ) ‘Basque pelota game’ shall include the pelota game

with the use of pala, raqueta, cesta punta, remonte
and mano, in which professional players participate.
(b) ‘Fronton’ comprises the court where basque pelota
games are played, including the adjoining structures
used in connection with such games, such as the

betting booths and galleries, totalizator equipment,
and the grandstands where the public is admitted in
connection with such games.
(c) ‘Pelotari’ is a professional player engaged in playing
basque pelota.
(d) ‘Professional player’ is one who plays for
compensation.
SEC. 2. Supervision over the establishment and operation

of frontons and basque pelota games.—Subject to the
administrative control and supervision of the Secretary of the
Interior, city or municipal mayors shall exercise supervision
over the establishment, maintenance and operation of
frontons and basque pelota games within their respective
territorial jurisdiction, as well as over the officials and
employees of such frontons and shall see to it that all laws,
orders and regulations relating to such establishments are
duly enforced. Subject to similar approval, they shall appoint
such personnel as may be needed in the discharge of their
duties and fix their compensation which shall be paid out of
the allotment of one-half per centum (1/2%) out of the total
bets or wager funds set aside and made available for the
purpose in accordance with Section 19 hereof. The Secretary
of the Interior shall have the power to prohibit or allow the
operation of such frontons on any day or days, or modify their
hour of operation and to prescribe additional rules and
regulations governing the same.
516

Corporation
SEC. 3. Particular duties of city or municipal mayors

regarding operation of basque pelota games and frontons.—In
connection with their duty to enforce the laws, orders, rules
and regulations relating to frontons and basque pelota
games, the city or municipal mayor shall require that such

frontons shall be properly constructed and maintained in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
485; shall see that the proper sanitary accommodations are
provided in the grandstands and other structures comprising
such frontons; and shall require that such frontons be
provided with a properly equipped clinic for the treatment of
injuries to the pelotaris.
SEC. 4. Permits.—In the absence of a legislative franchise,
it shall be unlawful for any person or entity to establish
and/or operate frontons and conduct basque pelota games
without a permit issued by the corresponding city or
municipal mayor, with the approval of the provincial
governor in the latter case. Any permit issued hereunder
shall be reported by the provincial governor or city mayor, as
the case may be, to the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 5. License fees.—The following license fees shall be
paid:
(a) For each basque pelota fronton, five hundred pesos

(P500) annually, or one hundred and twenty-five
pesos (P125) quarterly.
(b) For pelotaris, judges or referees and superintendents
(intendentes) of basque pelota games, eighteen pesos
(P18) each annually.
The above license fees shall accrue to the funds of the city
or municipality where the fronton is operated.
SEC. 6. Location.—Except in the case of any basque pelota
fronton licensed as of December 8, 1941, no basque pelota
fronton shall be maintained or operated within a radius of
200 lineal meters from any city hall or municipal building,
provincial Capitol building, national Capitol building, public
playa or park, public school, church, hospital, athletic
stadium, or any institution of learning or charity.
SEC. 7. Buildings, sanitary and parking requirements.—
No permit or license for the construction or operation of a
basque pelota fronton shall be issued without proper
certificate of the provincial or city engineer and architect
certifying to the suitability and safety of the building and of
the district or city health officer certifying to the sanitary
condition of said building. The city or municipal mayor may,

in his discretion and as circumstances may warrant, require
that the fronton be provided with sufficient space for parking
so that the public roads and highways be not used for such
purposes.
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SEC. 8. Protest and complaint.—Any person who believes

that any basque pelota fronton is located or established in
any place not authorized herein or is being operated in
violation of any provision of this order may file a protest or
complaint with the city or municipal mayor concerned, and
after proper investigation of such complaint the city or
municipal mayor may take such action as he may consider
necessary in accordance with the provisions of section 10
hereof. Any decision rendered on the matter by the city or
municipal mayor shall be appealable to the Secretary of the
Interior.
SEC. 9. Persons prohibited admission.—Persons under 16
years of age, persons carrying firearms or deadly weapons of
any description, except government officials actually
performing their official duties therein, intoxicated persons,
and persons of disorderly nature and conduct who are apt to
disturb peace and order, shall not be admitted or allowed in
any basque pelota fronton: Provided, That persons under 16
years of age may, when accompanied by their parents or
guardians, be admitted therein but in no case shall such
minors be allowed to bet.
SEC. 10. Gambling prohibited.—No card games or any of
the prohibited games shall be permitted within the premises
of any basque pelota fronton; and upon satisfactory evidence
that the operator or entity conducting the game has tolerated
the existence of any prohibited game within its premises, the
city or municipal mayor may take the necessary action in
accordance with the provisions of section 11 hereof.
SEC. 11. Revocation or suspension of permits and licenses.

—The city or municipal mayor, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, may suspend or revoke any license
granted under this Order to any basque pelota fronton or to
any official or employee thereof, for violation of any of the
rules and regulations provided in this Order or those which
said city or municipal mayor may prescribe, or for any just
cause. Such suspension or revocation shall operate to forfeit
to the city or municipality concerned all sums paid therefor.
SEC. 12. Appeals.—Any action taken by the city or
municipal mayor under the provisions of this Order shall
stand, unless modified or revoked by the Secretary of the
Interior.
SEC. 13. Books, records and accounts.—The city or
municipal mayor, or his duly authorized representative, shall
have the power to inspect at all times the books, records, and
accounts of any basque pelota fronton. He may, in his
discretion and as the circumstances may warrant, require
that the books and financial or other statements of the
person or entity operating the game be kept in such manner
as he may prescribe.
518

Corporation
SEC. 14. Days and hours of operation.—Except as may

otherwise be provided herein, basque pelota games with
betting shall be allowed every day, excepting Sundays, from
2 o’clock p.m. to not later than 11 o’clock p.m.
SEC. 15. Pelotaris, judges, referees, etc. shall be licensed.—
No person or entity operating a basque pelota fronton,
wherein games are played with betting, shall employ any
pelotari, judge or referee, superintendent of games
(intendente), or any other official whose duties are connected
with the operation or supervision of the games, unless such
person has been duly licensed by the city or municipal mayor
concerned. Such license shall be granted upon satisfactory
proof that the applicant is in good health, know the rules and
usages of the game, and is a person of good moral character
and of undoubted honesty. In the case of pelotaris, such
license shall be granted only upon the further condition that
they are able to play the game with reasonable skill and with
safety to themselves and to their opponents. The city or
municipal mayor may further require other reasonable
qualifications for applicants to a license, not otherwise
provided herein. Such license shall be obtained yearly.
SEC. 16. Installation of automatic electric totalizator.—
Any person or entity operating a fronton wherein betting in
any form is allowed shall install in its premises within the
period of one year from the date this Order takes effect, an
automatic electrically operated indicator system and ticket
selling machine, commonly known as totalizator, which shall
clearly record each ticket purchased on every player in any
game, the total number of tickets sold on each event, as well
as the dividends that correspond to holders of winning
numbers. This requirement shall, however, not apply to
double events or forecast pools or to any betting made on the
basis of a combination or grouping of players until a
totalizator that can register such bets has been invented and
placed on the market.
SEC. 17. Supervision over sale of betting tickets and
payment of dividends.—For the purpose of verifying the
accuracy of reports in connection with the sale of betting
tickets and the computation of dividends awarded to winners
on each event, as well as other statements with reference to
the betting in the games played, the city or municipal mayor
shall assign such number of auditing officers and checkers as
may be necessary for the purpose. These auditing officers
and checkers shall be placed in the ticket selling booths,
dividend computation booths and such other parts of the
fronton, where betting tickets are sold and dividends
computed. It shall be their duty to check up and correct any
irregularity or any erroneous report or computation that may
be made by officials of the fronton, in connection with the
sale of tickets and the payment of dividends.
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Corporation
SEC. 18. Wager tickets and dividends.—The face value of the

wager tickets for any event shall not exceed P5 whether for
“win” or “place,” or for any combination or grouping of
winning numbers. The face value of said tickets, as the case
may be, shall be the basis for the computation of the
dividends and such dividends shall be paid after eliminating
fractions of ten centavos (P0.10); for example: if the resulting
dividend is P10.43, the dividend that shall be paid will be
only P10.40.
SEC. 19. Distribution of wager funds.—The total wager
funds or gross receipts from the sale of the betting tickets
shall be apportioned as follows: a commission not exceeding
ten and one-half per centum (10 1/2%) on the total bets on
each game or event shall be set aside for the person or entity
operating the fronton and four and one-half per centum (4
1/2%) of such bets shall be covered into the National
Treasury for disposition as may be authorized by law or
executive order; and the balance or eighty-five per centum
(85%) of the total bets shall be distributed in the form of
dividends among holders of “win” or “place” numbers or
holders of the winning combination or grouping of numbers,
as the case may be: Provided, however, That of the ten and
one-half per centum (10 1/2%) representing the commission
of the person or entity operating the fronton, an amount
equivalent to one-half per centum (1/2%) of the total bets or
wager funds shall be set aside and made available to cover
the expenses of the personnel assigned to supervise the
operation of basque pelota games and frontons, including
payment of salaries of such personnel, purchase of necessary
equipment and other sundry expenses as may be authorized
by competent authority.
SEC. 20. Supervision over the conduct of games;
enforcement of rules and regulations.—The city or municipal
mayor is authorized to place within the premises of the
fronton such number of inspectors and agents as may be
deemed necessary to supervise the conduct of the games to
see that the rules of the games are strictly enforced, and to
carry out the provisions of this Order as well as such other
regulations as may hereafter be prescribed.
SEC. 21. Rules governing the games and personnel of the
fronton.—The rules and regulations that have been adopted
by any fronton to govern the operation of its games and the
behavior, duties and performance of the officials and
personnel connected therewith, such as pelotaris, judges,
referees or superintendents of games (intendentes) and
others, shall be the recognized rules and regulations of such
fronton until the same are altered or repealed by the
Secretary of the Interior; and any fronton may introduce any
type or form of games or events, provided they are not
contrary to the provisions of this Order or any rule or
regulation hereafter issued by the Secretary of the Interior.
520

Corporation
SEC. 22. Regulations governing pelotaris.—Any rule or

regulation adopted by any established fronton governing the
conduct or performance of pelotaris to the contrary
notwithstanding, the following regulations shall be observed:
(a) The pelotaris who are participating in the games

shall not be allowed to communicate, talk or make
signs with any one in the public or with any official or
employee of the fronton during the games, except
with the judges or referees or the superintendent
(intendente) in charge of the games;
(b) The program of games or events, as well as the line-
up or order of playing of the pelotaris in each event
shall be determined by the superintendent of the
games (intendente), subject to the approval of the city
or municipal mayor, or his authorized
representatives;
Pelotaris shall be in good physical condition before

(c) participating in any game and shall be laid off from
playing at least two days in a week. Every pelotari
shall once a month secure a medical certificate from a
government physician to be designated by the city or
municipal mayor concerned certifying to his physical
fitness to engage in the games; and
(d) The amount of dividends computed for any event
shall not be posted within the view of the pelotaris
participating in the event until after the termination
of said event.”
(3.e.3) Presidential Decree No. 810 (An Act Granting

the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a
Franchise to Operate, Construct and Maintain a
Fronton for Basque Pelota and Similar Games of Skill
in the Greater Manila Area)—October 16, 1975
“WHEREAS, by virtue of the provisions of Commonwealth

Act Numbered 485 the franchise to operate and maintain a
fronton for the Basque pelota and similar games of skill in
the City of Manila, shall expire on October, 1975 whereupon
the ownership of the land, buildings and improvements used
in the same game will be transferred without payment to the
government by operation of law;
WHEREAS, there is a pressing need not only to further
develop the game as a sport and amusement for the general
public but also to exploit its full potential in support of the
government’s objectives and development programs;
WHEREAS, Basque pelota is a game of international
renown, the maintenance and promotion of which will surely
assist the tourism industry of the country;
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Corporation
WHEREAS, the tourism appeal of the game will be enhanced

only with the government’s support and inducement in
developing the sport to a level at par with international
standards;
WHEREAS, once such tourism appeal is developed, the
same will serve as a stable and expanding base for revenue
generation for the government’s development projects.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, hereby decree as follows:
SECTION 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, there is hereby granted to the Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation, a corporation duly
organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines,
hereinafter called the grantee or its successors, for a period
of twenty-five years from the approval of this Act, extendable
for another twenty-five years without the necessity of
another franchise, the right, privilege and authority to
construct, operate and maintain a court for Basque Pelota
(including the games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta, remonte
and mano) within the Greater Manila Area, establish
branches thereof for booking purposes and hold or conduct
Basque pelota games therein with bettings either directly or
by means of electric and/or computerized totalizator.
The games to be conducted by the grantee shall be under
the supervision of the Games and Amusements Board,
hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall enforce the
laws, rules and regulations governing Basque pelota as
provided in Commonwealth Act numbered four hundred and
eighty-five, as amended, and all the officials of the game and
pelotaris therein shall be duly licensed as such by the Board.
SEC. 2. The grantee or its duly authorized agent may
offer, take or arrange bets within or outside the place,
enclosure or court where the Basque pelota games are held:
Provided, That bets offered, taken or arranged outside the
place, enclosure or court where the games are held, shall be
offered, taken or arranged only in places duly licensed by the
corporation; Provided, however, That the same shall be
subject to the supervision of the Board. No person other than
the grantee or its duly authorized agents shall take or
arrange bets on any pelotari or on the game, or maintain or

use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet on
any pelotari or on the game within or without the place,
enclosure or court where the games are held by the grantee.
Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment of not
more than six months, or both in the discretion of the Court.
If the offender is a partnership, corporation, or
522

association, the criminal liability shall devolve upon its

president, directors or any other officials responsible for the
violation.
SEC. 3. The grantee shall provide mechanical and/or
computerized devices, namely: a) electric totalizator; b)
machine directly connected to a computer in a display board,
for the sale of tickets, including, those sold from the off-court
stations; c) modern sound system and loud speakers; d)
facilities that bring safety, security, comfort and convenience
to the public; e) modern intercommunication devices; and f)
such other facilities, devices and instruments for clean,
honest and orderly Basque pelota games, within three years
from the approval of this Act.
The Board shall assign its auditors and/or inspectors to
supervise and regulate the placing of bets, proper
computation of dividends and the distribution of wager
funds.
SEC. 4. The total wager fund or gross receipts from the
sale of betting tickets will be apportioned as follows: eighty-
five per centum (85%) shall be distributed in the form of
dividends among the holders of “win” or “place” numbers or
holders of the winning combination or grouping of numbers
as the case may be. The remaining balance of fifteen per
centum (15%) shall be distributed as follows: eleven and one-
half per centum (11 1/2%) shall be set aside as the
commission fee of the grantee, and three and one-half per
centum (3 1/2%) thereof shall be set aside and allotted to any

special health, educational, civic, cultural, charitable, social
welfare, sports, and other similar projects as may be directed
by the President. The receipts from betting corresponding to
the fraction of ten centavos eliminated from the dividends
paid to the winning tickets, commonly known as breakage,
shall also be set aside for the above-named special projects.
SEC. 5. The provision of any existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the grantee is hereby authorized to hold
Basque pelota games (including the games of pala, raqueta,
cestapunta, remonte and mano) on all days of the week
except Sundays and official holidays.
SEC. 6. The provisions of Commonwealth Act numbered
four hundred and eighty-five as amended, shall be deemed
incorporated herein, provided that the provisions of this Act
shall take precedence over the provisions thereof and all
other laws, executive orders and regulations which are
inconsistent herewith.
SEC. 7. The grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the
usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise permit, or the rights
or privileges acquired thereunder to any person, firm,
company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity, nor
merge with any other person, company or corporation
organized for the same purpose, without the previous
approval of the President of the Philippines.
523
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Corporation
SEC 8. For purposes of this franchise, the grantee is herein

authorized to make use of the existing fronton, stadium and
facilities located along Taft Avenue, City of Manila,
belonging to the government by virtue of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act numbered four hundred and eighty-five.”
It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws,

executive orders and decrees that the legislative practice
is that a franchise to operate jai-alai is granted solely

for that purpose and the terms and conditions of the
grant are unequivocably defined by the grantor. Such
express grant and its conditionalities protective of the
public interest are evidently wanting in P.D. No. 1869,
the present Charter of PAGCOR. Thus, while E.O. 135
and P.D. No. 810 provided for the apportionment of the
wager funds or gross receipts from the sale of betting
tickets, as well as the distribution of dividends among
holders of “win” or “place” numbers or holders of the
winning combination or grouping of numbers, no such
provisions can be found in P.D. No. 1869. Likewise,
while P.D. No. 810 describes where and how the games
are to be conducted and bettings to be made, and
imposes a penalty in case of a violation thereof, such
provisions are absent in P.D. No. 1869.
In fine, P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard
marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai
as those found under P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135. We
cannot blink away from the stubborn reality that P.D.
No. 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the
operation of gambling casinos. It prescribes the rules
and regulations concerning the operation of gambling
casinos such as the place, time, persons who are and
are not entitled to play, tax exemptions, use of foreign
exchange, and the exemption of casino employees from
the coverage of the Civil Service Law and the Labor
Code. The short point is that P.D. No. 1869 does not
have the usual provisions with regards to jai-alai. The
logical inference is that PAGCOR was not given a
franchise to operate jai-alai frontons. There is no
reason to resist the beguiling rule that acts of
incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises
or special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to
be construed strictly against the corporations;
524

Corporation
and whatever is not given 30

in unequivocal terms is
understood to be withheld.
FOURTH. The tax treatment between jai-alai
operations and gambling casinos are distinct from each
other. Letters of Instruction No. 1439 issued on
November 2, 1984 directed the suspension of the
imposition of the increased tax on winnings in horse
races and jai-alai under the old revenue code, to wit:
“WHEREAS, the increased tax on winnings on horse races

and jai-alai under Presidential Decree 1959 has already
affected the holding of horse races and jai-alai games,
resulting in government revenue loss and affecting the
livelihood of those dependent thereon;
WHEREAS, the manner of taxation applicable thereto is
unique and its effects and incidence are in no way similar to
the taxes on casino operation or to any shiftable tax;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and instruct the
Minister of Finance, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and the Chairman, Games & Amusements
Board, to suspend the implementation of the increased rate
of tax winnings in horse races and jai-alai games and collect
instead the rate applicable prior to the effectivity of PD
1959.”
Similarly, under Republic Act No. 8424, or the Tax

Reform Act of 1997, there is an amusement tax
imposed on operators of jai-alai (Section 125) and a
stamp tax on jai-alai tickets (Section 190). There is no
corresponding imposition on gambling casinos. Well to
note, Section 13 of P.D. No. 1869 grants to the
franchise holder and casino operators tax exemptions
from the payment of customs duties and income tax,
except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent which shall
be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied,
established or collected by any municipal, provincial,
or national government authority. No similar

exemptions have been extended to operators of jai-alai
frontons.
FIFTH. P.D. No. 1869, the present Charter of
PAGCOR, is a consolidation of P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-
B and 1067-C all issued on
________________
30 Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., pp. 504-506.
525
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 525

Corporation
January 1, 1977, P.D. No. 1067-A created the PAGCOR

and defined its powers and functions; P.D. No. 1067-B
granted to PAGCOR a franchise to establish, operate,
and maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines; and P.D. No. 1067-C granted PAGCOR the
exclusive right, privilege and authority to operate and
maintain gambling casinos, subject only to the
exception of existing franchises and games of chance
permitted by law.
Beyond debate, P.D. No. 1869 adopted substantially
the provisions of said prior decrees, with some
additions which, however, have no bearing on the
franchise granted to PAGCOR to operate gambling
casinos alone, such as the Affiliation Provisions under
Title III and the Transitory Provisions under Title VII.
It also added the term “lotteries” under Section 1 (b) on
Declaration of Policy and Section 10 on the Nature and
Term of Franchise. It ought to follow that P.D. No.
1869 carries with it the same legislative intent that
infused P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B and 1067-C. To be
sure, both P.D. No. 1067-A and P.D. No. 1869 seek to
enforce the same avowed policy of the State to
“minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils,

malpractices and corruptions that normally are found
prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling
clubs and casinos without direct government
involvement.” It did not address the moral malevolence
of jai-alai games and the need to contain it thru
PAGCOR. We cannot deface this legislative intent by
holding that the grant to PAGCOR under P.D. Nos.
1067-A and 1067-B to establish, operate, and maintain
gambling casinos, has been enlarged, broadened or
expanded by P.D. No. 1869 so as to include a grant to
operate jai-alai frontons. Then and now, the intention
was merely to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate
gambling casinos, no more, no less.
SIXTH. Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our
subconsciousness, let us not forget that PAGCOR is
engaged in business affected with public interest. The
phrase “affected with public interest” means that31 an
industry is subject to control for the public good; it
has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the
________________
31 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502.
526

Corporation
32
exercise of the police power.” Perforce, a legislative
franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public
interest and involves an exercise of police power. The
familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to
exercise a part of the police power of the state are to be
construed strictly33 and any doubt must be resolved
against the grant. The legislature is regarded as the
guardian of society, and therefore is not presumed to
disable itself or abandon the discharge of its duty.
Thus, courts do not assume that the legislature

intended 34
to part away with its power to regulate public
morals. The presumption is influenced by
constitutional considerations. Constitutions are widely
understood to withhold from legislatures35
any authority
to bargain away their police power for the power to
protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.
It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a
franchise to operate a public utility (such as water,
transportation, communication or electricity)—the
operation of which undoubtedly redounds to the benefit
of the general public. What is claimed is an alleged
legislative grant of a gambling franchise—a franchise
to operate jai-alai. A statute which legalizes a
gambling activity or business should be strictly
construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved
to limit the 36
powers and rights claimed under its
authority.
The dissent would like to make capital of the fact
that the cases of Stone vs. Mississippi and Aicardi vs.
Alabama are not on all fours to the cases at bar and,
hence, the rulings therein do not apply. The perceived
incongruity37
is more apparent than real.
Stone involves a contract entered into by the State
of Mississippi with the plaintiffs which allowed the
latter to sell and dispose
________________
32 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 1053.
33 People v. Chicago, 103 N.E. 609; Slaughter v. O’Berry, 35 S.E.
241 48 L.R.A. 442.
34 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814.
35 Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 244.
36 Aicardi v. Alabama, 22 L.Ed. 215; West Indies, Inc. v. First
National Bank, 214 P.2d 144.
37 101 U.S. 1079.
527
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 527

Corporation
of certificates of subscription which would entitle the

holders thereof to such prizes as may be awarded to
them, by the casting of lots or by lot, chance or
otherwise. The contract was entered into by plaintiffs
pursuant to their charter entitled “An Act
Incorporating the Mississippi Agricultural,
Educational and Manufacturing Aid Society” which
purportedly granted them the franchise to issue and
sell lottery tickets. However, the state constitution
expressly prohibits and legislature from authorizing
any lottery or allowing the sale of lottery tickets.
Mississippi law makes it unlawful to conduct a lottery.
The question raised in Stone concerned the
authority of the plaintiffs to exercise the franchise or
privilege of issuing and selling lottery tickets. This is
essentially the issue involved in the cases at bar, that
is, whether PAGCOR’s charter includes the franchise
to operate jai-alai frontons. Moreover, even assuming
argu-endo that the facts in the cases at bar are not
identical, the principles of law laid down in Stone are
illuminating. For one, it was held in Stone that:
“Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling

are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with
the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are
confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests
the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches
every class; it preys upon the hard earnings
38
of the poor; and
it plunders the ignorant and simple, x x x”
The verity that all species of gambling are pernicious

prompted the Mississippi Court to rule that the
legislature cannot bargain away public health or public
morals. We can take judicial notice of the fact that jai-
alai frontons have mushroomed in every nook and
corner of the country. They are accessible to everyone
and they specially mangle the morals of the

marginalized sector of society. It cannot be gainsaid
that there is but a minuscule of a difference between
jai-alai and lottery with respect to the evils sought to
be prevented.
In the case of Aicardi vs. Alabama, Moses & Co. was
granted a legislative franchise to carry on gaming in
the form specified
________________
38 Ibid., at p. 1080.
528

Corporation
therein, and its agent, Antonio Aicardi, was indicted

for keeping a gaming table. In ascertaining whether
the scope of the company’s franchise included the right
to keep a gaming table, the Court there held that “such
an Act should be construed strictly. Every reasonable
doubt should be so resolved as to limit the powers and
rights claimed under its authority. Implications and
intendments should have no place except as they are
inevitable from the language or the context.”
The view expressed in the dissent that the
aforequoted ruling was taken out of context is perched
on the premise that PAGCOR’s franchise is couched in
a language that is broad enough to cover the
operations of jai-alai. This view begs the question for
as shown in our disquisition, PAGCOR’s franchise is
restricted only to the operation of gambling casinos.
Aicardi supports the thesis that a gambling franchise
should be strictly construed due to its ill-effects on
public order and morals. SEVENTH. The dissent also
insists that the legislative intent must be sought first
of all in the language of the statute itself. In applying a
literal interpretation of the provision under Section 11

of P.D. 1869 that “x x x the Corporation is hereby
granted x x x the rights, privileges, and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming
pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc. x x x,” it
contends that the extent and nature of PAGCOR’s
franchise is so broad that literally all kinds of sports
and gaming pools, including jai-alai, are covered
therein. It concluded that since under Section 11 of
P.D. No. 1869, games of skill like basketball and
football have been lumped together with the word
“lotteries” just before the word “etc.” and after the
words “gaming pools,” it may be deduced from the
wording of the law that when bets or stakes are made
in connection with the games of skill, they may be
classified as games of chance under the coverage of
PAGCOR’s franchise.
We reject this simplistic reading of the law
considering the social, moral and public policy
implications embedded in the cases at bar. The plain
meaning rule used in the dissent rests on the
assumption that there is no ambiguity or obscurity in
the language of the law. The fact, however, that the
statute admits of different interpretations is the best
evidence that the statute is vague and
529
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 529

Corporation
39
ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute
is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed
40
persons in either of two or
more senses. In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see
how a literal reading of the statutory text would
unerringly reveal the legislative intent. To be sure, the
term “jai-alai” was never used and is nowhere to be
found in the law. The conclusion that it is included in

the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on
a mere cursory perusal of and a blind reliance on the
ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms
used such as “gaming pools” and “lotteries.”
Sutherland tells us that a statute is “ambiguous,” and
so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when
its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is
uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its
application 41to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the
case at bar.
Similarly, the contention in the dissent that:
“x x x Even if the Court is fully persuaded that the

legislature really meant and intended something different
from what it enacted, and that the failure to convey the real
meaning was due to inadvertence or mistake in the use of the
language, yet, if the words chosen by the legislature are not
obscure or ambiguous, but convey a precise and sensible
meaning (excluding the case of obvious clerical errors or
elliptical forms of expression), then the Court must take the
law as it finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without
being influenced by the probable legislative meaning lying at
the back of the words. In that event, the presumption that
the legislature meant what it said, though it be contrary to
the fact, is conclusive.”
cannot apply in the cases at bar considering that it has

not been shown that the failure to convey the true
intention of the legisla-
________________
39 Marathon Le Tourneau Co., Marine Division v. National Labor

Relations Board, 414 F. Supp 1074 (1976).
40 Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Nagle-Hart, Inc., 234 NW2d 350
(1975); Allen v. Juneau County Forest Withdrawal Appeal Review
Committee, 295 NW2d 218 (1980); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 320 NW2d 5 (1982).
41 Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2A, 5th ed., 1992
Revision, p. 713.
530

Corporation
ture is attributable to inadvertence or a mistake in the

language used.
EIGHTH. Finally, there is another reason why
PAGCOR’s claim to a legislative grant of a franchise to
operate jai-alai should be subjected to stricter scrutiny.
The so-called legislative grant to PAGCOR did not
come from a real Congress. It came from President
Marcos who assumed legislative powers under martial
law. The grant is not the result of deliberations of the
duly elected representatives of our people.
This is not to assail President Marcos’ legislative
powers granted by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution, as the dissent would put it. It is given
that in the exercise of his legislative power, President
Marcos legally granted PAGCOR’s franchise to operate
gambling casinos. The validity of this franchise to
operate gambling casinos is not, however, the issue in
the cases at bar. The issue is whether this franchise to
operate gambling casinos includes the privilege to
operate jai-alai. PAGCOR says it does. We hold that it
does not. PAGCOR’s overarching claim should be given
the strictest scrutiny because it was granted by one
man who governed when the country was under
martial law and whose governance was repudiated by
our people in EDSA 1986. The reason for this
submission is rooted in the truth that PAGCOR’s
franchise was not granted by a real Congress where
the passage of a law requires a more rigorous process
in terms of floor deliberations and voting by members
of both the House and the Senate. It is self-evident that
there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this
alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the
legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our
people, for plainly it is not. We now have a real

Congress and it is best to let Congress resolve this
issue considering its policy ramifications on public
order and morals.
In view of this ruling, we need not resolve the other
issues raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Respondents PAGCOR, Belle Jai Alai Corporation and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator
Corporation are ENJOINED from managing,
maintaining and operating jai-alai games, and from
enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that
purpose.
531
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 531

Corporation
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-

Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Please see Separate Opinion.
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Quisumbing, JJ., We
join the opinion of J. De Leon, Jr.
Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join in the Separate Opinion of
Vitug, J.
De Leon, Jr., J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In my Separate Opinion in G.R. No. 115044 (Alfredo

Lim vs. Hon. Felipe Pacquing) and G.R. No. 117263
(Teofisto Guingona vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes), 240 SCRA

649, 685, I reiterated my prior view in a supplemental
concurring opinion I submitted in the earlier case, G.R.
No. 115044 that jai alai is not a game of chance, but a
sport based on skill. Betting on the results thereof can
only be allowed by Congress, and I am not aware of
any new law authorizing such betting.
I said therein, thus:
It follows then that the Mayor’s Permit ordered by the trial

court to be issued to the private respondent is not a license or
authority to allow betting or wagering on the results of the
jai-alai games. Jai-alai is a sport based on skill. Under
Article 197 of the Revised Penal Code, before it was amended
by P.D. No. 1602, betting upon the result of any boxing or
other sports contests was penalized with arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Article 2019 of the Civil
Code provides that “[b]etting on the results of sports, athletic
competitions, or games of skill may be prohibited by local
ordinances.”
P.D. No. 483, enacted on 13 June 1974, penalizes betting,
game fixing or point shaving and machinations in sports
contests, including jai-alai. Section 2 thereof expressly
provides:
532

Corporation
SECTION 2. Betting, game fixing, point shaving or game

machinations unlawful.—Game fixing, point shaving, machination,
as defined in the preceding Section, in connection with the games of
basketball, volleyball, softball, baseball, chess, boxing bouts, “jai-
alai,” “sipa,” “pelota” and all other sports contests, games or races;
as well as betting therein except as may be authorized by law, is
hereby declared unlawful.
The succeeding Section 3 provides for the penalties.
On 11 June 1978, P.D. No. 1602 (75 O.G. No. 15, 3270),
Prescribing Stiffer Penalties on Illegal Gambling, was
enacted to increase the penalties provided in various
“Philippine Gambling Laws such as Articles 195-199 of the
Revised Penal Code (Forms of Gambling and Betting), R.A.
No. 3063 (Horse Racing Bookies), P.D. No. 449 (Cock-
fighting), P.D. No. 483 (Game Fixing), P.D. No. 510 (Slot
Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos. 33 and 97 of the
Ministry of Justice, P.D. No. 1306 (Jai-alai Bookies), and
other City and Municipal Ordinances on gambling all over
the country,” Section 1 thereof reads:
xxx
Both P.D. No. 483 and P.D. No. 1602 were promulgated in
the exercise of the police power of the State.
Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 483, which was not
repealed by P.D. No. 1602 since the former is not
inconsistent with the latter in that respect, betting in jai-alai
is illegal unless allowed by law. There was such a law, P.D.
No. 810, which authorized the Philippine Jai-Alai and
Amusement Corporation as follows:
SECTION 2. The grantee or its duly authorized agent may offer,

take or arrange bets within or outside the place, enclosure or court
where the Basque pelota games are held: Provided, That bets
offered, taken or arranged outside the place, enclosure or court
where the games are held, shall be offered, taken or arranged only
in places duly licensed by the corporation. Provided, however, That
the same shall be subject to the supervision of the Board. No person
other than the grantee or its duly authorized agents shall take or
arrange bets on any pelotari or on the game, or maintain or use a
totalizator or other device, method or system to bet on any pelotari
or on the game within or without the place, enclosure or court
where the games are held by the grantee. Any violation of this
section shall be punished by a fine or not more than two thousand
pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or both in
the discretion of the Court. If the offender is a partnership,
corporation or association, the criminal liability shall devolve upon
its president, directors or any officials responsible for the violation.
533
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 533

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However, as stated in the ponencia, P.D. No. 810 was

repealed by E.O. No. 169 issued by then President Corazon
C. Aquino, I am not aware of any other law which authorizes
betting in jai alai. It follows then that while the private
respondent may operate the jai-alai fronton and conduct jai-
alai games, it can do so solely as a sports contest. Betting on
the results thereof, whether within or off-fronton, is illegal
and the City of Manila cannot, under the present state of the
law, license such betting. The dismissal of the petition in this
case sustaining the challenged orders of the trial court does
not legalize betting, for this Court is not the legislature
under our systems of government.
My reading of the charter of the PAGCOR fails to

disclose grant of a congressional authority to allow
betting on the results of jai-alai.
Accordingly, all that the PAGCOR may do is operate
and conduct the jai-alai, but in no case can it allow
betting on the results thereof without obtaining a
statutory authority for the purpose.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Gambling, universally regarded to be a threat to the

moral fiber of any society, is aptly a prohibited activity
in the Philippines. The Revised Penal Code, as well as
succeeding amendatory laws, makes “betting, game-
fixing, point-shaving or game machination”
1
on games
of chance or skill unlawful. The Civil Code
additionally states that “betting on the result of sports,
athletic competitions, or games 2
of skill may be
prohibited by local ordinances.”
An exception to the rule was introduced by the

former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he, in the
exercise of his legislative powers under the 1973
Constitution, created the 3
Philippine Amusement
Games Corp. (“PAGCOR”) and granted it franchise to
“operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recrea-
________________
1 Sections 195-197, Revised Penal Code, Pres. Decree No. 483,

Pres. Decree 1602.
2 Article 2019, New Civil Code.
3 P.D. NO. 1067.
534

Corporation
4
tion or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, x x x.”
PAGCOR was authorized to implement, among other
things, an objective “to establish and operate clubs and
casinos for amusement and recreation, including
games of chance, which (might) be allowed by law 5
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.”
The ponencia views the law to be broad enough to
authorize PAGCOR to operate all kinds of sports and
gaming pools, inclusive of jai alai, in the country. Such
does appear to be the case, and a statute which is
sufficiently clear and free from serious ambiguity can
only be given its literal meaning and simply be applied.
Quite a different matter, however, submits itself with
regard to PAGCOR’s power to enter into joint venture
agreements in the operation and management of such
games.
PAGCOR has entered into a joint venture
agreement with Belle Jai Alai Corporation (“BELLE”)
and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator
Corporation (“FILGAME”) in the operation and

management of jai alai games. The two firms, under
the agreement, would also furnish the jai alai fronton
facilities. I see in the joint venture agreement a
situation that places BELLE and FILGAME in active
endeavor with PAGCOR in conducting jai alai games.
Without a congressional franchise of its own, neither
BELLE nor FILGAME can lawfully6 engage into the
activity. Thus, in Lim vs. Pacquing, this Court held
that Associated Development Corporation, having had
no franchise from Congress to operate the jai alai, could
not do so even if it had a license or permit from the city
mayor t& operate that game in the City of Manila.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter
into agreements in its authorized operations, that
power, upon the other hand, cannot be so construed as
to permit it to likewise grant a veritable franchise to
any other person, individual or firm.
Indeed, the grant of a franchise is a purely
legislative act that cannot be delegated to PAGCOR
without violating the Constitu-
________________
4 Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1869.

5 Sec. Kb), P.D. No. 1869; People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191
(1996) citing Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269 (1994) and
Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163 (1994).
6 240 SCRA 649, 674 (1995).
535
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Corporation
7
tion. The thesis rests on the maxim potestas delegata
non delegari potest. Any constitutionally delegated
sovereign power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate, the legislature in this
case, through the instrumentality of its own judgment.

A further delegation of such power to PAGCOR would
constitute a negation of this duty in violation of the
trust reposed
8
in the delegate mandated to discharge it
directly Parenthetically, under the 1987 Constitution,
the only instances when the legislature may validly
delegate its assigned powers are those 9
that involve the
fixing of tariff rates to the President and the inherent
powers, i.e., police power, eminent domain and
taxation, that may 10
be delegated but solely to local
legislative units.
The broad authority then of PAGCOR under its
charter to enter into agreements could not have been
meant to empower PAGCOR to pass on or to share its
own franchise to others. Had its charter intended
otherwise, PAGCOR would have been itself virtually
capable of extending franchise rights and thereby be a
recipient of an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
For the foregoing considerations, I vote to grant the
petitions in these cases insofar as they seek to enjoin
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (“PAGCOR”) from operating jai-alai or
Basque Pelota games through respondents Belle Jai
Alai Corporation (“BELLE”) and/or Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (“FILGAME”)
or through any other agency, but I vote to deny the
same insofar as they likewise seek to prohibit
PAGCOR from itself managing or operating the game.
DISSENTING OPINION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of Mr.

Justice Reynato S. Puno granting the consolidated
petitions in these two cases.
________________
7 Secs. 1 and 24, Art. VI, Constitution.

8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 86 (1996).
9 Sec. 28(2), Art. VI, Constitution.
10 Art. X, Constitution.
536

Corporation
An exposition of these two cases would be helpful.

Here are two consolidated cases filed against
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) to
desist from managing and/or operating jai alai or
Basque pelota games, by itself or with the
“infrastructure facilities” of co-respondents Belle Jai
Alai Corporation (hereinafter called BELLE) and
Corporation (hereinafter called FILGAME).
In G.R. No. 138298, Raoul B. del Mar, in his
capacity as member of the House of Representatives
representing the First District of Cebu and as a
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer
for temporary restraining order, against PAGCOR for
conducting jai alai or Basque pelota games. In the said
petition filed with this Court on May 6, 1999, del Mar
alleged that the operation of jai alai games by
PAGCOR is illegal since its franchise does not include
the power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control
and manage jai alai game operations in the country.
Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1869,
PAGCOR’s nature and term of franchise which is
therein contained, is as follows:
SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise.—Subject to the terms

and conditions established in this Decree, the corporation is
hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights,
privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling

casinos, clubs, and other recreations or amusement places,
sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc.
whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines.
PAGCOR, in conducting Basque pelota games

otherwise known as jai alai, relied on the Opinion of
the Secretary of Justice dated July 16, 1996 that “the
authority of PAGCOR under its charter to operate and
maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai
alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets
and that the charter of PAGCOR (P.D. No. 1869) 1
amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose.”
________________
1 Opinion No. 67, S., 1996. G.R. No. 138298, Rollo, pp. 171-172.
537
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 537

Corporation
On June 17, 1999, PAGCOR entered into a joint

venture agreement with BELLE and FILGAME
relating to the opening, operation, control and
management of jai alai games operations in the
country. Under the said agreement which is
coterminous with the franchise of PAGCOR, BELLE
and FILGAME will provide technical assistance to
PAGCOR with respect to various aspects of jai alai
operations including the operation of computerized
nationwide network of on-line betting systems. The jai
alai fronton facilities will be provided by BELLE and
FILGAME, on a free-rent basis, to PAGCOR.
PAGCOR, on the other hand, shall consult BELLE and
FILGAME as regards the formulation of the terms of
appointment of their personnel.
On July 1, 1999, Federico S. Sandoval II and

Michael T. Defensor, in their capacity as members of
the House of Representatives representing the lone
district of Malabon-Navotas and the 3rd District of
Quezon City respectively, and as taxpayers, filed a
Petition for Injunctive Relief with Prayer for Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order, with this Court to
compel PAGCOR to refrain from operating and
managing jai alai games. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 138982. Petitioners Sandoval and Defensor
alleged that the franchise of PAGCOR does not include
the operation of jai alai, jai alai being one of the
activities prohibited under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 1602 otherwise known as the
Anti-Gambling Law. Petitioners further averred that
jai alai is not a game of chance and cannot be the
subject of a PAGCOR franchise.
On August 17, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a
motion for leave to file a supplemental petition in G.R.
No. 138298, impleading BELLE and FILGAME as
additional respondents. The said motion for leave was
granted. In his supplemental petition denominated as
“Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Writ”
petitioner questioned the authority of PAGCOR to
enter into an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME
for the opening, establishment, operation, control and
management of jai alai operations. Petitioner alleged
that in entering into the said agreement with BELLE
and FILGAME, PAG-COR has virtually relinquished
its control and management of the jai alai operations
to the said corporations. Petitioner further al-
538

Corporation
leged that assuming that PAGCOR has the requisite

franchise to operate jai alai, it is still under obligation
to conduct an open and fair public bidding to determine
the capability of the parties concerned who may be
interested to provide funds for capital expenditures,
including an integrated computer network system for
fronton and off fronton betting stations and the
infrastructure or facilities of the fronton at Manila.
Petitioner alleged that contracts that require
competitive public bidding relate to infrastructure
projects or public works and the procurement of
equipment, supplies and materials.
On September 24, 1999, Juan Miguel Zubiri, as a
taxpayer and member of the House of Representatives
representing the Third District of Bukidnon, filed a
petition for intervention in G.R. No. 138982. Zubiri
alleged that the legislative power to grant franchises
for the operation of jai alai has not been delegated by
Congress to anyone. By operating jai alai without the
required legislative franchise, PAGCOR has effectively
usurped the authority of Congress to grant franchises
in violation of the Constitution.
Considering that BELLE and FILGAME were
impleaded as additional respondents in G.R. No.
138298, the Court required BELLE and FILGAME on
March 21, 2000 to file their respective comments.
On April 18, 2000, BELLE and FILGAME, thru
counsel, filed their comment praying for the dismissal
of the petition in G.R. No. 138298 on the ground that it
is essentially an action for quo warranto which may
only be commenced by the Solicitor General.
On July 6, 2000, the Solicitor General filed a motion
to consolidate G.R. No. 138982 with G.R. No. 138298
inasmuch as the issues raised are identical. On August
8, 2000, we granted the said motion for consolidation.
In both G.R. Nos. 138982 and 138298, no temporary
restraining order was issued by this Court.
PAGCOR’s comments, through the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel and the Office of the
Solicitor General, to these consolidated petitions or

cases may be essentially summarized as follows:
539
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 539

Corporation
I. Petitioners have no legal standing to file a

taxpayer’s suit based on their alleged cause of
action nor are they a real party in interest
entitled to the avails of the suit
II. An action for injunction is not among the cases
or proceedings originally cognizable by the
Honorable Supreme Court
III. The franchise of PAGCOR includes its
authority and power to open, pursue, conduct,
operate, control and manage jai alai operations
in the country
In its comment in G.R. No. 138298, PAGCOR further

alleged that:
IV. Per its charter, the corporate authority and

power of PAGCOR to operate and conduct jai
alai games include the express power to enter
into joint venture agreements
V. The joint venture Agreement dated June 17,
1999 entered into by and among PAGCOR,
Belle Jai alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Corporation (FILGAME) does not require any
public bidding for its validity
Respondent PAGCOR maintains that petitioners have

no standing to file a taxpayer’s suit since there is no
showing that these cases involve expenditure of public
funds.
2
2
In Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato we have
categorically stated that taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens and legislators, as such, may bring suit only
(1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2)
under certain conditions. Taxpayers are allowed to sue,
for example, where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or where a tax measure is
assailed as unconstitutional. Concerned citizens can
bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is
of transcendental importance which must be settled
early. While herein petitioners and intervenor claim
illegal disbursement of public funds by PAGCOR in the
resumption of the operations of jai alai games, there is
nothing on record to show involvement of any
expenditure of public money on the part of PAGCOR.
In fact, what is essentially raised as an issue is
whether PAGCOR has the requisite franchise to
operate jai alai games and
________________
2 250 SCRA 130, 140-141119951.
540

Corporation
whether it is authorized under its charter to enter into

joint venture agreements with private corporations.
More specifically, under3 the joint venture Agreement
dated June 17, 1999 it is private respondent
corporations BELLE and FILGAME which will provide
infrastructure facilities to PAGCOR on a rent free
basis. I cannot see how the Court could treat the
subject petitions as taxpayers’ suits when there is
nothing, apart from petitioners’ bare allegations, to
prove that the operations of jai alai would involve
expenditure of public funds. Neither does the pivotal
issue raised relate to a constitutional question

inasmuch as only the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise,
and not its validity, is assailed.
This Court is faced, however, with the issue as to
the standing of the petitioners who filed their
petitions, in their capacity as taxpayers and members
of the House of Representatives, alleging infringement
by PAGCOR on the legislature’s sole prerogative in the
granting of a jai alai franchise. Respondents PAGCOR,
BELLE and FILGAME contend, however, that the
pivotal issue raised by petitioners is whether or not
PAGCOR has violated any law or has committed acts
beyond the scope of its franchise when it entered into
the said Agreement with BELLE and FILGAME for
the resumption of jai alai operations. Respondents aver
that petitioners, in consequence, raised an issue which
may be commenced and prosecuted only by the
Solicitor General through a quo warranto action.
In support of their position, respondents cite Section
2, Rule 66 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure governing
quo warranto proceedings against legally incorporated
entities which reads:
Sec. 2. Like actions against corporation.—A like action may

be brought against a corporation:
A) When it has offended against a provision of an act for
its creation.
xxx
D) When it has misused a right, privilege, or franchise
conferred upon it by law, or when it has exercised a right,
privilege or franchise, or franchise in contravention of law.
________________
3 Annex “A,” Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 138298, Rollo, pp.

162-170.
541
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 541

Corporation
Respondents maintain that although Section 2 of Rule

66 was not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, an action for quo warranto may still be
commenced by the Solicitor General before the Court
based on the aforesaid section.
Quo warranto literally means: “By what authority.”
It is an extraordinary legal remedy whereby the State
challenges a person or an entity to show by what
authority he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise. It is commenced by the Solicitor General in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a
usurper or against a corporation, on the proposition
that the State is the aggrieved party. The Solicitor
General institutes the action when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon a complaint
or otherwise, he has good reason to believe that any of
the cases specified under the law exists to warrant the
institution of a quo warranto proceedings. Quo
warranto proceedings against corporations are
instituted to demand the forfeiture of their franchise or
charter.
It is clear that Section 2 of Rule 66 of the old Rules
of Court governing quo warranto proceedings against
legally incorporated entities, is not reproduced in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Proceedings against
legally incorporated entities, alleging misuse of its
rights, privileges and franchises granted by law, at the
time the subject petitions before this Court were filed
in May and July 1999, respectively, up to the time the
last pleading was filed on July 7, 2000, were governed
by Section 5 (b) of P.D. 902-A which vested the
Securities and Exchange Commission
4
(SEC) with full
jurisdiction over the same. However, P.D. 902-A was
superseded by R.A.
________________
4 Section 5 (b) of P.D. 902-A reads: Section 5. In addition to the

regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of
associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing
laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving:
xxx
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations between and among stockholders, members or associates;
between
542

Corporation
5
8799, which took effect on August 8, 2000.
The difficulty of the issue posed by petitioners is
that, in the cases at bar, the Solicitor General together
with the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
is the counsel for respondent PAGCOR.
This is not to say, however, that this Court cannot
take cognizance of the instant cases before us. While
petitioners allege unlawful operation of jai alai games
by PAGCOR, what is ultimately and mainly at issue in
these cases is the interpretation of PAGCOR’s
franchise which defines the scope of PAGCOR’s rights,
privileges and authority. While the Executive branch
of the government, through the Secretary of Justice
and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel have
interpreted respondent PAGCOR’s franchise to include
the operation of jai alai, the petitioners, in their
capacity as members of the House of Representatives,
allege a different interpretation. Whether or not
PAGCOR has in fact committed acts beyond the scope
of its franchise hinges upon the interpretation of
PAGCOR’s franchise. Considering that said pivotal
issue involves the interpretation of the law defining
the scope of PAGCOR’s rights, privileges and
authority, this Court may rightfully take, as in fact it

has taken, jurisdiction over the subject petitions. It is
well-settled that the duty and power to interpret a
________________
any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association

of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
and between such corporation, partnership or association and the
state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist
as entity.
5 Sec. 5.2 of RA. 8799, otherwise known as “The Securities
Regulation Code” which took effect on August 8, 2000 reads: The
Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases under Section 5 of P.D. 902-
A is hereby transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court
in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial
Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over cases pending cases
involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution
which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of
this code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000
until finally disposed.
543
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 543

Corporation
statute belongs to the Judiciary. While the legislative

and/or executive departments, by enacting and
enforcing a law, respectively, may construe or interpret
the law, it is the Supreme Court6
that has the final
word as to what the law means.
Having ruled that this Court can take cognizance of
the subject petitions, I come back to the question as to
whether petitioners, in their capacity as members of
the House of Representatives, have the requisite
standing to file these two related suits. Respondent

PAGCOR contends that petitioners who instituted
these suits in their capacity as lawmakers cannot
validly claim that they are suing in behalf of Congress.
Respondent PAGCOR contends that the issue as to
whether or not it has the authority to operate and
manage jai alai games does not violate petitioners’
rights as members of Congress nor can it be deemed as
impermissibly intruding into the domain of the
legislature.
The issue as to whether a member of Congress may
bring suit in his capacity as a lawmaker, alleging
impairment of any of the powers, rights and privileges
belonging to Congress, is not novel. 7
Citing the
American cases8 of Coleman vs. Miller and Holtzman
vs.
9
Schlesinger we declared in Philconsa vs. Enriquez
that “to the extent that the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution.”
A more careful scrutiny is warranted, therefore,
with regard to the issue as to whether the powers and
rights of petitioners, as members of Congress, are in
any way impaired by respondent PAGCOR’s act of
operating and maintaining jai alai games.
There is no dispute that the power to grant
franchises rests within the legislative branch of
government. In a legal or narrower sense, the term
“franchise” is more often used to designate a right or
privilege conferred by law. The view taken in a number
of cases is that to be a franchise, the right possessed
must be such as cannot be exercised without the
express permission of a sovereign
________________
6 Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil. 696, 700-702 (1953).

7 307 U.S. 433 [1939].
8 484 F. 2d 1307 (1973].
9 235 SCRA 506, 520 [1994].
544

Corporation
power, that is, a privilege or immunity of a public

nature which cannot10
be legally exercised without
legislative grant. Having the prerogative to grant
franchises, Congress also has the power to revoke or
repeal or alter franchises. Considering that whatever
judgment may be rendered in the interpretation of the
law defining the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise would
have a bearing on petitioners’ prerogative, as members
of Congress, to consider whether to modify, amend,
alter, or repeal, through legislation, PAGCOR’s
franchise, I believe, that in limited sense, that
petitioners have the requisite standing to bring these
suits at bar.
Respondent PAGCOR, nevertheless, insists that an
action for injunction is not among the cases or
proceedings originally cognizable by the Supreme
Court. In support of its contention,
11
PAGCOR cites the
cases of Diokno
12
vs. Reyes and Garcia Gavires vs.
Robinson where it was held that an application for
preliminary injunction will not be entertained by this
Court unless the same is prayed for in connection with
some other remedy or in an action actually pending
before Us.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing
a particular act. It may be an action in itself brought
specifically to restrain or command the performance of
an act or it may be just a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action which may be for other
reliefs. The action for injunction should not be confused
with the ancillary and provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only
as an incident of an independent action or proceeding.
In a main action for permanent injunction, a party

may ask for preliminary injunction pending the final
judgment.
Section 1, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable.—Only petitions for

certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary
and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors,
________________
10 36 Am Jur 26, Franchises §1.

11 7 Phil. 385, 387 [1907].
12 8 Phil. 332, 333 [1907].
545
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 545

public ministers and consultants may be filed originally in

the Supreme Court.
It is clear that no mention was made in the above-cited

rule as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
original actions for injunction.
13
In the 1917 case of
Madarang vs. Santamaria, we have ruled that the
Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction, in
an action brought for that purpose, to grant the
remedy by injunction pursuant to Section 17 of Act No.
136 which provided that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus and quo
warranto. As in Section 17 of Act 136, Section 1 of Rule
56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has likewise
not made any provision for the granting of the writ of
injunction, as an original action, in the Supreme Court.
Hence, the rule that this Court does not have
jurisdiction over original actions for injunction still
holds. This Court may, however, issue preliminary

writs of injunction in cases on appeal before Us or in
original actions commenced therein pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the
appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the
petitions filed before Us, however, this Court can take
primary jurisdiction over the said petitions in view of
the importance of the issues raised. In some instances,
this Court has even suspended its own rules and
excepted a case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so demanded.
It is helpful, in the discussion of the merits of these
consolidated cases, to review the history of the law
creating PAGCOR.
On January 1, 1977, the then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative powers
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution,
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A creating
the Philippine Amusement Games Corporation
(PAGCOR). PAGCOR was created and mandated to
implement the following state policy:
________________
13 37 Phil. 304 [19171.
546

Corporation
Section 1. DECLARATION OF POLICY.—It is hereby

declared to be the policy of the state to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law to obtain the following
objectives:
To centralize and integrate the right and authority to

1.
operate and conduct games of chance into one
corporate entity to be controlled, administered and
supervised by the government;
2. To establish and operate clubs and casinos, sports
gaming pools (basketball, football, etc.) and such
other for amusement and recreation, including games
of chance, which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines which will
(1) generate source of additional revenue
infrastructure and socio-economic projects, such as
flood control, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers/Nutritional
Programs, Population Control and such other
essential public services; (2) create recreation and
integrate facilities which will expand and improve the
country’s existing tourist attractions; (3) minimize, if
not totally eradicate the evils, malpractices and
corruptions that normally are found prevalent in the
conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos
without direct government involvement.
On the same day, PAGCOR was granted by the then

President Marcos under P.D. No. 1067-B the “franchise
to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
land and water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s franchise was
further amended under P.D. No. 1067-C for the
purpose of specifying that “The franchise shall become
exclusive in character, subject only to the exception of
existing franchises and games of chance heretofore
permitted by law.” P.D. No. 1067-A and P.D. No. 1067-
B were again amended by P.D. Nos. 1399 and 1632
relative to the provisions on Board of Directors,
exemptions and allocation of fund, among others.
On July 11, 1983, President Marcos issued P.D. No.
1869 for the purpose of consolidating and amending
P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632,
relative to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR.
Under P.D. No. 1869, PAGCOR is mandated to
implement the following state policy—
xxx
(b) to establish and operate clubs and casinos, for
amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools
(basketball, football, lotteries,
547
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 547

etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation

including games of chance which may be allowed by law
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and
which will (1) generate sources of additional revenue to
infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control
programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects,
Tulungan ng Bayan centers, Nutritional Programs,
population control and such other essential public services;
(2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will
expand and improve the country’s existing tourist
attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the
evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally in the
conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without
direct government involvement.”
It is the petitioners’ contention that PAGCOR’s

franchise is limited to the management and operation
of games of chance. They point out that P.D. No. 810
and Executive Order No. 169 have characterized jai
alai as a game of skill and consequently, the operation
and management of jai alai or Basque pelota games
cannot be said to have been included in PAGCOR’s
franchise. Jai alai as defined in Webster’s dictionary is
a game of Basque origin resembling handball and
played (as in Spain and Latin America) on a large
walled court by usually two (2) or four (4) players who
use a long curved wicker basket strapped to the right
wrist to catch and hurl the ball against the front wall
to make it rebound in such a way that the opponent
cannot 14
return it before it has bounced more than
once.
Respondent PAGCOR, on the other hand, citing the
cases
15
of Lim vs. Pacquing and Guingona vs. Reyes, et
al., claims that while jai alai in itself is not a game of
chance, it may be characterized as a game of chance
when bets are accepted as a form of gambling.
The object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the
legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced.
This meaning and intention must be sought first of all
in the language of the statute itself. For it must be
presumed that the means employed by the legislature
to express its will are adequate for the purpose and do
express that will cor-
________________
14 Websters Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged),

1993 Ed.
15 240 SCRA 649, 674-675 [1995].
548

Corporation
rectly. If the language is plain and free from obscurity,

it must be taken as meaning exactly 16
what it says,
whatever may be the consequences.
Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869 defining the extent and
nature of PAGCOR’s franchise reads:
x x x the Corporation is hereby granted x x x the rights,

privilege, and authority to operate and maintain gambling
casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places,
sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc. x
x x [italics supplied]
Contrary to the majority opinion that PAGCOR’s

franchise is limited only to the management and
operation of casinos, a cursory reading of the
abovequoted legal provision would readily show that
the extent and nature of PAGCOR’s franchise is so
broad that literally all kinds of sports and gaining
pools, including jai alai, are covered therein.
A sport is defined as “a game or contest especially
when involving individual
17
skill or prowess on which
money is staked.” Gaming, on the other hand, is
defined 18as “the act or practice of playing games for
stakes.” P.D. No. 1869 has made express mention of
basketball and football as example of gaming pools.
Basketball and football, however, like 19
jai alai are
games of skills. In U.S. vs. Hilario, the distinction
between games of chance and games of skill was
treated in this wise:
This distinction between games of chance and games
of skill, making betting upon the former illegal is quite
well treated in State vs. Gupton (30 N.C. 271) where a
game of tenpins was held not to be a game of chance,
but a game depending chiefly upon the skill of players,
and betting thereon consequently not prohibited by a
statute prohibiting bets or wagers upon games of
chances.
________________
16 H.C. Black, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 45 (2nd Ed., 1971).
17 See note 14, supra.
18 Ibid.
19 24 Phil. 392, 399 [1913].
549
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 549

Corporation
Considering that under Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869,

games of skill like basketball and football have been
lumped together with the word “lotteries” just before
the word “etc.? and after the words “gaming pools,” it
may be deduced from the wording of the law that when
bets or stakes are made in connection with games of
skill, they may be classified as games of chance under
the coverage of PAGCOR’s franchise. The meaning of
the phrase “et cetera” or its abbreviation “etc.” depends
largely on the context of the instrument, description
and enumeration of the matters preceding the term
and subject matter to which it is applied, and when
used in a statute, the words should 20
be given their
usual and natural signification. Consequently, jai
alai, otherwise known as “game of Basque pelota,”
while in itself is not per se a game of chance, may be
categorized as a game of chance when bets are
accepted as a form of gambling. It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that when words and phrases of
a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. Even if the Court is fully persuaded that the
legislature really meant and intended something
different from what it enacted, and that the failure to
convey the real meaning was due to inadvertence or
mistake in the use of language, yet, if the words chosen
by the legislature are not obscure or ambiguous, but
convey a precise and sensible meaning (excluding the
case of obvious clerical errors or elliptical forms of
expression), then the Court must take the law as it
finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without
being influenced by the probable legislative meaning
lying at the back of the words. In that event, the
presumption that the legislature meant what21 it said,
though it be contrary to the fact, is conclusive.
Notably, even the literal application of the word
“etc.” does not run counter to the reason for the
enactment of the statute and the purpose to be gained
by it. P.D. No. 1869, the law amending and
consolidating P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399

and 1632, Relative to the Franchise and Powers of
PAGCOR, was issued by the then President Marcos,
pursuant to the observation that PAG-
________________
20 Wright vs. People, 181 P.2d 447, 450, 116 Colo. 306,
21 H. Black, op. Cit, note 16 at 53.
550

Corporation
COR’s operation has enabled the government to

identify potential sources of additional revenue for the
government provided all games of chance are managed
and made subject to the close scrutiny, regulation,
supervision and control by the government. The
operation and management of jai alai can and will
undoubtedly generate more funds for PAGCOR as a
source of additional and much needed revenue for the
government.
It is alleged that there is no specific mention of jai
alai among the games which PAGCOR can operate
under its franchise. Hence, pursuant to the principle
that a franchise is a special privilege that should be
construed strictly against the grantee, PAGCOR
cannot claim that it is authorized to conduct the
operation of jai alai games.
While there is no specific mention of jai alai as
among the games of chance which PAGCOR can
operate under its franchise, the language of the law
defining the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise is broad
enough to include the operations of jai alai as a game
of chance. Where the franchise contains no words
either defining or limiting the powers which the holder
may exercise, such holder has, by implication, all such
powers as are reasonably necessary to enable it to

accomplish the purposes and object of its creation.” It
is well recognized that the principle of strict
construction does not preclude a fair and reasonable
interpretation of such charter and franchises, nor does
it justify withholding that which satisfactorily appears
to have been intended to be conveyed to the grantee.”
It is claimed that jai alai operations is beyond the
scope of PAGCOR’s franchise inasmuch as jai alai is
not allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines; and that at the time of the passage of
P.D. No. 1869, the operations of jai alai was already
the subject of a grant to the Philippine Jai Alai and
Amusement Corporation (PJAC) by virtue of P.D. Nos.
810 and 1124; and that the subsequent repeal of P.D.
Nos. 810 and 1124 in 1986 al-
________________
22 36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises $26 citing Russell vs. Kentucky

Utilities Co., 231 Ky 820, 22 SW2d 289, 66 ALR 1238; Southern
Illinois and M Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo 1, 73 SW 453.
23 36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises §26 citing Russell vs. Sebastian, 233
US 195, 58 L ed 912, 34 S Ct. 517.
551
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29. 2000 551

Corporation
legedly reverted betting on the results of jai alai games

to the status of a criminal act under P.D. No. 1602.
The mere granting of a franchise does not amount to
an implied contract on die part of the grantor that it
will not grant a rival franchise to a competing
corporation or enter into a competition 24
itself in
reference to the subject of the franchise. Monopoly is
not an essential feature of a franchise and the strictly
legal signification of the term franchise is not always
25
25
confined to exclusive rights. An examination of the
provisions of P.D. No. 810 does not give us any
indication that the franchise granted to PJAC to
operate jai alai is exclusive in character. Given the
broad language of P.D. 1869 defining the scope of
PAGCOR’s franchise, I find no reason why the
operations of jai alai cannot be deemed as included in
its franchise. Besides, the subsequent repeal of P.D.
Nos. 810 and 1124 in 1986 by E.O. No. 610 only meant
that PJAC was no longer entitled to exercise its rights
under its former franchise. E.O. No. 610, otherwise
known as Repealing Presidential Decree No. 810,
entitled “An Act Granting the Philippine Jai Alai and
Amusement Corporation a Franchise to Operate,
Construct and Maintain a Fronton for Basque Pelota
and Similar Games of Skill in the Greater Manila
Area,” as amended, and Accordingly Revoking and
Canceling the Right, Privilege and Authority granted
therein in itself did not delimit the scope of the
franchise of PAGCOR especially since E.O. No. 610
was specific enough to identify the repeal of the law
(P.D. No. 810) granting a certain franchise, i.e. PJAC’s
franchise. As regards P.D. No. 1602, it should be
stressed that it did not outlaw the operations of jai
alai. It merely provided for stiffer penalties for illegal
or unauthorized activities related to jai alai and other
forms of gambling.
The majority opinion makes much issue of the fact
that the franchise of PAGCOR under P.D. No. 1869
came from President Marcos who assumed legislative
powers under martial law. He stresses that “the so-
called legislative grant to PAGCOR did not come from
a real Congress.” I would like to point out, however, the
fact that the validity of PAGCOR’s franchise has
already been upheld in the
________________
24 36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises §29.

25 Ibid.
552

Corporation
26
case of Basco vs. PAGCOR. As earlier stated, the
main issue before this Court is the scope of the
aforesaid franchise of PAGCOR and not its validity.
The majority opinion does not dispute that PAGCOR
under P.D. No. 1869 has the requisite franchise to
operate gambling casinos. In the same vein, however,
it is argued that P.D. No. 1869 cannot be held as a
valid legislative grant of franchise for the operation of
jai alai games. President Marcos had legislative power
to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate all other
games of chance including jai alai. President Marcos’
exercise of legislative power, under Amendment No. 6
during the martial law years, has been upheld in a
number of cases by this 27Court, notably that of Legaspi
vs. Minister of Finance, Moreover, Section 3, Article
XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution clearly provides that: “All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instruction and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.” Hence,
unless and until P.D. No. 1869 which is the charter
and franchise of PAGCOR, is amended or repealed by
Congress, it remains valid and effective.
If courts believe that a particular statute is unwise,
a recognition of their own limited sphere forbids them
from amending or rewriting the law in the guise of
strict interpretation to suit their own predilections
28
or
prejudices. The case of Stone vs. Mississippi cited in
the majority opinion saying that courts do not assume
that the legislature intended to part away with its
power to regulate public morals, is misplaced. In the
said case, an Act was passed by the legislature of
Mississippi on January 16, 1867 entitled, “An Act

Incorporating the Mississippi Agricultural,
Educational and Manufacturing Aid Society” which
conceded to the defendants the franchise of issuing and
vending lottery tickets. From 1822 to 1867, without
any constitutional requirement, lotteries were
prohibited by law in Mississippi and those who
conducted them were punished as a kind of gamblers.
In 1868, the people of the State of Mississippi adopted
a new Constitution which contained a provi-
________________
26 197 SCRA 52 [1991].

27 115 SCRA 418, 433 [1982].
28 101 US 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079 [1879].
553
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 553

Corporation
sion stating that “the Legislature shall never authorize

any lottery; nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be
allowed; nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be
permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold.”
The defendants therein insisted that they had
complied with all the conditions imposed by the
charter, and were conducting business in accordance
with its provisions; that the terms of the state
Constitution and the Legislative Act, above set forth,
interfered with their vested rights and violate the
Constitution of the United States, in attempting to
impair the obligation of contracts. The question then
posed was whether in the view of the facts presented,
the legislature of a state can, by the charter of a lottery
company, defeat the will of the people authoritatively
expressed in relation to the further continuance of such
business in their midst. The United States Supreme
Court ruled that no legislature can bargain away

public health or public morals.
Clearly, the issue in the said case is materially
different from the issue in the consolidated cases at bar
where the main question presented is the scope and
not the validity of respondent PAGCOR’s franchise to
operate jai alai as a legalized game of chance. It is not
amiss to note that PAGCOR in the light of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1869 was created, precisely, to “centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized
by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to
attain the following objectives” x x x“to minimize the
evils, malpractices and corruptions that normally are
found prevalent in the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government
involvement.” PAGCOR’s right to operate jai alai
games as legalized games of chance under its
franchise, is in fact a measure which flows from the
legislature’s exercise of police power. In Basco vs.
PAGCOR this Court have so declared that “Public
welfare29
lies at the bottom of the enactment of P.D. No.
1869.”
Reliance in the majority
30
opinion on the case of
Aicardi vs. Alabama that a statute which legalizes a
gambling activity or business should be strictly
construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved
to limit the powers and rights claimed under its
________________
29 197 SCRA 52, 62 [1991].

30 22 L. Ed. 215.
554

Corporation
authority is likewise misplaced. The aforesaid

statement was apparently taken out of context
inasmuch as in the same case, the court declared
“Every reasonable doubt should be so resolved as to
limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.
Implications and intendments should have no place
except as31 they are inevitable from the language or the
context.” As earlier stated, in the case at bar the scope
of PAGCOR’s franchise is couched in a language that is
broad enough to cover the operations of jai alai.
As regards the issue that it could not have been the
intent of then President Marcos to grant PAGCOR a
franchise to operate jai alai considering that he had
already issued to another corporation which is
controlled by his in-laws a franchise to operate jai alai,
suffice it to say that in the interpretation of statutes, it
is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives
which influenced the legislative body, except insofar 32
as
such motives are disclosed by the statute itself. It
should be stressed that the magnitude of the
consideration, political or financial, which may operate
upon the legislative mind as an inducement for grants
and franchises conferred by statute, do not change the
character of the legislation, or vary the rule of
construction33
by which the rights of the grantees must be
measured.
Considering that PAGCOR’s franchise is broad
enough to cover the operation and management of jai
alai games as well as supervised betting activities in
connection therewith, let us come to the question as to
whether PAGCOR may enter into a joint venture
agreement with the private corporations, BELLE and
FILGAME, to operate, manage and conduct jai alai
games as well as super-
________________
31 Id. at 216.
32 H. Black, op. cit., note 16 at 315 citing Home vs. Guy, L.R. 5 Ch
Div. 901; Keyport & M.P. Streamboat Co. v. Farmer’s Transp. Co., 18
N.J. Eq 13; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dill. 443, Fed. Cas. No. 7, 928; City
of Richmond v. Supervisors of Henrico County, 83 Va. 204, 2 S.E. 26;
People vs. Shepard, 36 N.Y. 285; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L.
Ed. 162; Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S.W. 364; Pacific
Coast S.S. Co. v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 36; City of Lebanon v.
Creel, 109 Ky 363, 59 S.W. 16.
33 Ibid. at 116 citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl
448.
555
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 555

Corporation
vised betting activities both at the fronton site and

selected offfronton betting stations.
PAGCOR’s right to enter into management
contracts is not limited to those relating to the efficient
operation of gambling casinos under Section 11 of P.D.
No. 1869 which reads:
Sec. 11. Scope of Franchise.—In addition to the rights and

privileges granted it under the preceding section, this
Franchise shall entitle the corporation to do and undertake
the following:
(1) enter into operating and/or managing contracts with
any registered and accredited company possessing the
knowledge, skill and expertise and facilities to insure the
efficient operation of gambling casinos x x x
A joint venture is an association of persons or

companies jointly undertaking some commercial
enterprise—generally, all contribute assets and share
risks. It requires a community of interests in the
performance of the subject matter, a right, and governs
the policy connected therewith, and duty, which may
be altered
34
by agreement to share in both profit and
losses. In this jurisdiction, a joint venture is a form of
partnership and is thus governed by the law on

partnerships.
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1869 enumerates the following
powers and functions of PAGCOR:
xxx
h) to enter into, make, perform, and carry out contracts of
every kind and for any purpose pertaining to the business of
the corporation, or in any manner incident thereto, as
principal, agent or otherwise, with any person, firm,
association or corporation;
xxx
l) to do anything and everything necessary, proper,
desirable, convenient or suitable for the accomplishment of
any of the purposes or the attainment of any of the objects or
the furtherance of any of the powers herein stated, either
alone or in association with other corporations, firms or
individuals, and to do every other act or thing incidental,
pertaining to,
________________
34 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 144 [1994].
556

growing out of, or connected with, the aforesaid purposes,

objects or powers, or any part thereof.
Clearly, in Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869, the powers

granted to PAGCOR is broad enough to include the
power to enter into a joint venture agreement with
private corporations like BELLE and FILGAME
relating to the operation, management and conduct not
only of gambling casinos but also of those relating to
jai alai as legalized gambling.
Where the language of the statute is clear, it is the
duty of the court to enforce it according to the plain
meaning of the word. There is no occasion to resort to

other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to
interpret what has no need of interpretation, and,
when the words have a definite and precise meaning,
to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to
restrict or extend the meaning. When an act is
expressed in clear and concise terms, and the sense is
manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there can be no
reason not to adopt the sense which it naturally
presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures in
order to find a different meaning 35
is not so much to
interpret the law as to elude it.
Under the rule potestas delegata non delegari potest
a delegated power cannot be delegated. This is based
upon the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation
36
and not through the intervening mind of
another. However, the said rule is inapplicable in the
case at bar. The legislative grant of franchise to
PAGCOR has not accorded unto the latter legislative
powers nor quasi-legislative powers. The joint venture
Agreement was entered by PAGCOR with FILGAME
and BELLE pursuant to the powers granted under
P.D. No. 1869 to PAGCOR to “enter into, make,
perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and for
any purpose pertaining to the business of the
corporation x x x with any person, firm or corporation.”
Under the joint venture Agreement, BELLE and
FILGAME will provide financial requirements
________________
35 H. Black, op. cit., note 16 at 49-50.

36 US vs. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330 [1908].
557
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 557

Corporation
and technical assistance to PAGCOR in connection

with the use of their operational facilities. PAGCOR
however shall still manage, regulate and control all
aspects of jai alai operations. The subject joint venture
Agreement is in consonance with the powers granted to
PAGCOR that it may “do anything and everything
necessary, proper, desirable, convenient or suitable for
the accomplishment of any of the purposes or
attainment of any of the objects or the furtherance of
any of the powers herein stated, either alone or in
association with other corporations, firms or
individuals.”
It should be noted that the joint venture Agreement
entered into by and among PAGCOR, BELLE and
FILGAME, does not involve any infrastructure
contract
37
or project which is governed by P.D. No.
1594. Neither does it involve the sale and furnishing
of supplies, materials and equipment to the
government under E.O. 38
301. In Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, this Court ruled that Section
1 of E.O. 301 denominated as “Decentralizing Actions
on Government Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts
and Records Disposal,” applies only to contracts for the
purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. In the
joint venture Agreement in question, it is BELLE and
FILGAME which will, in fact, provide the financial
requirements and technical assistance to PAGCOR in
connection with the use of their operational facilities.
Hence, there is no necessity for PAGCOR to conduct a
public bidding before entering into the said joint
venture Agreement with BELLE and FILGAME
especially since there is nothing in the provisions of
P.D. No. 1869 which would require that contracts like
the Joint Venture Agreement in question be submitted
for public bidding.
Finally, while on one hand, jai alai, as a form of
legalized gambling under the control and supervision of
PAGCOR, does not promote good morals, on the other

hand it is expected to provide entertainment to the
public and much needed revenues to the government. In
balancing those two apparently conflicting interests, it
must be stressed that courts are not supposed to pass
upon and do not pass upon questions of wisdom or
expediency of legislation, for
________________
37 Entitled “Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and

Regulations for Government Infrastructure Contracts.”
38 See note 2, supra at 151.
558

Corporation
it is not within their province to supervise and keep

legislation within the bounds of propriety. That 39
is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. Any
shortcoming of a statute is for the
40
legislature alone to
correct by appropriate enactment.
In view of all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the
consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 138298 and G.R. No.
138982.
Petitions granted, respondents enjoined from
managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games.
Notes.—Taxpayers may question contracts entered

into by the national government or government-owned
or controlled corporations alleged to be in
contravention of the law. (Bagatsing vs. Committee on
Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 [1995])
If the complaint is not grounded on the impairment
of the powers of Congress, legislators do not have
standing to question the validity of any law or official
action. (Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 246

SCRA 540 [1995])
It must be stressed that the Court retains the power
to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer’s
suit. (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 [2000])
——o0o——
________________
39 Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450 [1968]; Quintos vs. Lacson,
97 Phil. 290, 293 [1955]; People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 [1947];
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 [1936].
40 Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, 470 [1935]; Cornejo v. Naval, 54
Phil. 809, 814 [1930].
559
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2/7/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 346

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 485

RAOUL B. DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE

FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II and MICHAEL T.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdiction;

the petition filed in G.R. No. 138982 will show that it is

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

lowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of

maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges

then operated by the Madrigals, a family close to

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 487

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

the fronton was rebuilt in 1948. During the term of President

been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

conducted and bettings to be made, and imposes a penalty in

“affected with public interest” means that an industry is

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 489

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is

in treating this alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the

DAVIDE, JR., C.J., Separate Opinion:

Gambling; Franchises; Philippine Amusement and

PAGCOR may do is operate and conduct the jai alai, but in

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 491

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

of jai-alai. Accordingly, all that the PAGCOR may do is

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Gambling; Franchises; Philippine Amusement and

allowed under its charter to enter into agreements in its

DE LEON, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

Actions; Supreme Court; Injunctions; The rule that the

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

issue preliminary writs of injunction in cases on appeal

PAGCOR’s franchise is so broad that literally all kinds of

under the coverage of PAGCOR’s franchise; Jai alai,

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 493

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

while in itself is not per se a game of chance, may be

finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

chises, nor does it justify withholding that which

—The mere granting of a franchise does not amount to an

to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 495

Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute

supervision of PAGCOR, does not promote good morals, on

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Herrera, Teehankee & Faylona for Belle Jai-Alai