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31
B7M
1903
C.I
ROBA
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Tin: r\ i v I;I;SITY OF CHIC voc
THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS
TIIK HATFLK OF KADESH

JAMES in Xi;\ !;
N
I'm. I ) \i. I'rui.ii NS
THE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO
FOUNDED BT JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER
THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS
THE BATTLE OF KADESH

A STUDY IN THE EARLIEST KNOWN MILITARY STRATEGY
BY
JAMES HENRY BREASTED
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF EGYPTOLOGY AND SEMITIC LANGUAGES
PRINTED FROM VOLUME V

33-10
CHICAGO
THE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO PRESS
1903
I)
Copyright 1903
BY THE UNIVKBSITY OF CHICAGO
PRINTED AUOCST 1, 1808

A STUDY IN THE EARLIEST KNOWN MILITARY STRATEGY*
THE beginnings
of military strategy in all books upon the subject are passed over
with a few general remarks. Students of the subject are not orientalists and their
discussions begin with Greek sources. Although the present writer, it is needless to
knowledge of the subject, it has seemed to him that the
say, is totally without special
most notable of the materials from the early Orient should be studied from this point
of view, and made accessible to the student of military history. We shall never
possess sufficient data on the wars of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria to build up a
work like that of Kromayer on the battlefields of Greece, 1 but the surviving materials,
which carry our knowledge of military strategy a thousand years back of Greek times
hare never been employed for this purpose at all and this essay is designed to furnish
;
a beginning, at least, in the explanation of these materials. As it is hoped that this

contribution may be used by many who are not orientalists, I must ask my fellow
Egyptologists to excuse the translation and explanation of some things which, however
obvious to them, must be made clear to those not familiar with Egyptian. For the
same reasons I have also withheld almost all grammatical discussion. It should also
be further said that the following essay does not intend to discuss the political aspects
of this battle, either in the conditions which led up to it, or those which resulted from
it.
My purpose is only to make clear the military maneuvers involved in the battle.
The exact method of deploying troops in action I have also not intended to discuss,
It will be evident from the reliefs that well-disciplined battle lines were maintained,
and that disorganized, hand-to-hand fighting resulted only when the enemy's lines
were broken. This last question needs special investigation.'
The fundamental
difficulty in the study of the military operations of the earlier
pre-Hellenic world is lack of data. How large, for example, were the armies with
which Assyria and Egypt were wont to plunder Syria? What was the disposition of
the armies at the battle of Carchemish ? How did an Assyrian commander marshal
his forces upon the field ? What were the methods of attack ? We cannot answer one
of these fundamental questions. In Egypt, as we shall see, the case is slightly better;
but there are only two battles of which the In all others
dispositions are indicated.
the records are such that we should be
utterly unable to affirm that the commanders
had yet learned the value of clever manipulation of forces.
3
These two battles are
Pa per read before the International Congress of Ori- 'There is, however, much material for studying the
ontalists at Hamburg in September, 1902. larger strategic of a series of campaigns designed to effect
i J. KKOHATEK, Antike SchlacMfelder in Griechenland, the conquest of all Syria As I expect to show in a later
Berlin, 1903. work, the general plan of the Egyptian kings in such cam-
a In Ramses III.'s day the Pnrasat-Philistines are seen paigns was first to secure the sea-coast, and then to operate
fighting by groups of four (CHAMP., Man., 220-220 6i = ROB., against the interior from this coast as a base, having rapid
A/on, stor., 127, 128, and MtlLLER, Asien, pp. 365, 316). nd unbroken water connection with Egypt.
81
THE BATTLE OK KAHI:>H
Megiddo and Kadeeh. At Meîddo. already in tli.- sixti-fiith century

ln-forr Christ,
we find Thutmose III., disposing his troops as in modern times, with a center and two
wings, or "horns" as he calls them, nf
ewh c.f which ho gives the exact location.
His enemy also was drawn up in the same way. But Kadesh is still more in-t:n.-ti\.'.
because here we can follow the shrewd maneuvers of the Asiatics, which preceded the
battle. incident in Eygptian history is so impressed upon the mind of the traveler
No
in Egypt as this battle between the forces of Ramses II. and those of the Hittites at
Kadesh on the Orontes, in the fourteenth century before Christ. The young king's
supreme effort to save himself and his army from destruction is so often depicted and
in suchgraphic pictures upon the walls of the great temples, that no visitor, not even
1
the most blase "globe-trotter" can ever forget it Yet this dramatic event, so
that it attracts the attention of even the most casual visitor over and o\i<r
prominent
again, has never received any exhaustive study. It is the earliest battle in history,
the strategic of which can be largely determined in detail; and yet this has never
been done.
After Champollion's first recognition of the nature of the so-called poem on the
4
battle, the first study of the poem was that of Salvolini in 1835, which was neces-
sarily primitive. Then followed a study of the battle by Lenormant,' in 1858, which
contained fatal errors, due to the exclusive use of the Abu Simbel version. These
errors were immediately exposed by Chabas* with caustic comments, which, addressed
by a wine merchant to an academician, must have been exceedingly galling. But the
admirable Chabas accompanied his remarks by irrefutable data, drawn from the
"Record"' inscription, of which he built up a text by combining the Ramesseum and
Abu Simbel versions in a manner that is almost modern for thoroughness.' Yet oddly
enough, the only elaborate treatment of the battle in a modern history is hopelessly
astray from the same cause which misled Lenormant, viz., the exclusive use of the
Abu Simbel version, the omissions of which were pointed out by Chabas nearly fifty
years ago. But Chabas was necessarily in his day too much occupied with buttressing
his renderings to give any attention to the character of the battle. De Rough's
admirable study of the so-called poem* on the battle to which we owe our first full
knowledge of it was likewise not intended as an investigation of the battle, but pur-
posed only the determination of the text and proper translation. It was a textual and
literary study. Brugsch (Oesch., pp. 491-513) gave an elaborate presentation of the
sources in German, but made no attempt to digest them or follow the details of the
*Oampagne de Kkamitf Ir-Onunt (flaaaef i it) emttrt to >C||ABA* wu
eocueiou* of the thoroughness of his
"
fcMa* Itmrt aUitt. Manturrii hieratiqne ecyptien appar- method, for be *ay (ibid., p. T3S) Je me eroii en me*ure
:
tenant a M. Selltar. Notice or ea mantucrit par FftAigou d'afflrmrr que ma renioo et auui oertaine quo pent
&ALVOUXI. Paris. US. 1'Mre one tradoctioo d'un trite gno ou latin." which wu
*In Ox n admits* (. TO, February, 1*58, td article. puttln* hU cue more >tronly than we ibould do for our-
Iwu viable to procure it. and mj informatioo U drawn telrm today.
fro Cbabu'i accoont of It. I Fir t publUhed wa t ranlation only In 1835.and then
. reJL, XV. pp. STt 8. and T01 8.
taW-M. mnn> full). ilh the txU, by hU wn after E. de
'
ThU aod tke other doouMoUry loareea on the battle death (Her. (.. Ul-IX).
re dliriaml below, pp. H.
JAMES HENBY BBEASTED
battle. Rev. H. G. Tomkins's study of this battle (TSBA., VII, 390 ff.) was unfortu-
nately made without all the data to be gained from the texts,
but shows good use of
what he had. Failure to observe the sequence of events made any clear outline of
movements impossible. Erman (Aegypten, pp. 696-701) purposed only a description
of the incidental occurrences and of the life depicted in the reliefs, rather than a study
of the dispositions of the armies. E. Meyer (Gesch., pp. 288, 289), with his usual
acuteness, indicates in three lines the real nature of the Hittite attack. But he does
not go into the preliminary maneuvers by which the attack was made possible. W. M.
Mailer's brief reference to the battle (Asien und Europa, pp. 215 f.), was evidently not
intended as a study of the battle, but merely to contribute to his investigation of the
lo
geography of Kadesh and vicinity. Finally Maspero in his Struggle of the Nations
(pp. 390-98) offers an elaborate study Already in 1875, in his excel-
of the battle.
lent little Histoire (pp. 220 f.) he had correctly perceived the essential maneuvers
which led up to the battle, and was the first one to perceive them. In his latest study,
however (Struggle, pp. 390-98), his first discussion is either forgotten or intentionally
replaced by totally different results, according to which Ramses is represented as in
camp at Shabtuna, far south of Kadesh, when the battle took place, while his troops
have already left for the north." Yet the sources several times state that Eamses had
12
arrived on the northwest or north of Kadesh, and that he had camped there before
13
the battle (Nos. 1, 2, 13, 14) ; accompanied by an inscription
the relief of the battle is
beginning: "The stand which his majesty made, while he was camping on the north-
west of Kadesh" (No. 16); and one of the divisions, that of Re, which, according to
Maspero, had left the king for the north, fled, when attacked, "northward to the place
where his majesty was" (No. 25). How troops, which had already marched off to the
north from the king's camp, could then flee northward to the king, does not appear.
Thus this study puts Ramses south of Kadesh, while the sources clearly place him on
the north of Kadesh; puts his army on the north, viz., in front of him, while the
it
sources unequivocally place it on the south of, viz., behind him. In short, Maspero's
presentation completely reverses the order of forces as well as of events presented by
the sources and formerly by himself also. The error to which this confusion is due
was pointed out and corrected by Chabas nearly fifty years ago (see above).'*
There is a good deal of misunderstanding regarding these sources, and it will be
necessary, therefore, to offer a brief statement of them here. They are threefold (1) :
The familiar so-called POEM, so long known as the "Poem of Pentaur," until Erman
showed that Pentaur (Pn-f- Wr-t) was only the copyist and not the author of the com-
"' Th i- is
the title of the second volume of the last edi- (Histoire. 1875, p. 221), for he says the attack of the Asiatics
"
tiou of his Histoire in the English edition. was made tandis que le roi (Ramses) etait d6ja au nurd
11 This cnn
only be duo to the exclusive use of the Abu
de la ville."
Simbel version of the "Record/* in which the ancient 13The hieroglyphic passages quoted herein are all
scribe has carelessly overlooked and omitted several pas- translated and numbered, and they will be cited by cam-
sages (see infra, p. 7, n. 21). One of these passages con- ber.
tained the march from Shabtuna to Kadesh. ! u There have been many other modern accounts of the
12 This is recognized by MASPEEO, in his first treatment battle, but they have no independent value.
83
THE BATTLE OF KAUBRH
Ti: we shall ref.-r I., the document us the Poem. CJl A

position (Xeuaeg. Gr,n,,.. p.
brief RECORD" of the campaign, engraved over the t.'in|.i.--r.
li, fs, which d.pict it-
chief events; we shall refer to it as the Record. (3) The TEMPLE-RELIEFS depicting
the campaign, together with the accompanying short explanatory inscriptions.
1. Of the three the most valuable is the POEM, which fortunately
for us is, for the
Bret twenty-five lines, a sober and careful prose account of Ramses's departure from
four divisions to the moment of
Egypt, his march to Kadesh and
the position of his up
the Asiatic attack. The entire so-called Poem does not differ in form from the Record
and the opinion of the present writer, essentially different from the accounts of
is not, in
their victories left by other Pharaohs, such as those of Merneptah and Ramses III.,
all of which, like the Poem," show no poetic form, but in style are poetic, florid,
and
highly colored a style which may be traced in similar proee reports of victories as
far back as the twelfth dynasty. It has survived in two forms; HIEROGLYPHIC and
hieroglyphic form are said by Brugsch" to be found

HIERATIC. The texts of the in
the Ramesseum twice, in Luxor, in Abu

Simbel, and Bet el-Walli. Maspero also says:
"This Epic reappears everywhere in Nubia and in the Said, at Abu Simbel, at Beit
"
It is, however, not found at all in Nubia, nor
Wally, at Derr, at Luxor, at Karnak."
at the Ramesseum, but has survived in three copies: on the temple walls at Luxor,
*
while of the hieratic* text but one 'manuscript is known, a
1
Karnak and Abydoe;

roll which is now in two parts: Papyrus Raifet (Louvre), the beginning; and Papyrus
Sallier III (British Museum), the remainder. As J. de Rough's composite text omita
all reference to the Abydos copy, I arranged all the texts, both hieroglyphic and
hieratic, in parallel columns, and the whole was then exhaustively collated with the
>' Called by de Rone* the flutfrfin. in* his copjr the lower end. of the vertical UBW are covered
,
* MAsrxao's statement " ta the photoeraph.

(Jttraeple, p. 3W> that It 1. a
. without foundation. The A.TDO. cop, on thaw-lb of Ram.es II. . or-
in rhymed stropb-," 1. totally
tnary temple there has prewired only the lower end. of
'
Gtnfr. /rr.. II. O. u,, ! Mt few
.Votiow. p. HI. courses. It was published by MABIKITK (Al^dot, II. 4. 5) ;
1*1. The LCIOB copy ciccapies the lower portion of but had also a collation of the original by BOBCBABDT,
I
the front (north side) of both towers of Ramses M.'s pylon. for which I am again indebted to the Berlin dictionary. Of
There is no seeood copy on the so*** side of the pylons at the above publications, BICOSCH and MAUBTTI are to
Loxor, as stated by J. DE Roco* (Ktr. fg.. III. 130). The incomplete as to be practically unusable; and RofO*.
Inscription was partially cleared by Mariette. which per- while much better, is far from exhaustive.
" la fin des dernieres
itted E. de Roue* to copy all but Papyms Raifet contains only one pace of ten lines,
licnn"(lw.nr. '. It was published in his ion's Ituer, kitrogl., published by E. DC Bouox (Kec. de Trur., I ); Papyrus Sal-
IT. SB-ttj InBuxuri. See., II,-I; and in Rooct's com- |u, r III contains eleven paces, published in the Select
posiu test (see below). The lower ends of the lines. Papyri (I. 54). All these texts, Inclndinc the hiero-
expawd by Utor excavations, were then published by glyphlc, were once combined by E. de Rone* and published
Danmt (Krr. tf., IX. U). .fur his death by J. DC Rooo* (Ker.tg.. III-IX). Althou k-h
Mlie K*AK copy U on the oataide of the south wall writlnc in 8Monc after the publication of MAUXTTI'*
of the crat hypnttyle ball. J. DcRoootf says (Ree.tg.. III. Abfdot, J. de Rouce make* no mention of the Abydc.
UO): -Mot pen. aeailsnt u
mission en Rcypte flt com- The lower portion of the Luxor text was also inaccessible
pletement deblayeroUe muraille. ee qnl permit de copier when he published. The proems of hieratic studies has
rinseriptioo entitm." It was pobUshed in bis Inter. been creat since de Rouce's day. and this fact tog. tl.- r
>(srosy..rV.-l ; in tec.. II. BOwc.
-C; and In MABI- with the ieeeeslon of new material made the compilation
mm. JTeYM*. eS-il 1IM of Asiatic allies also (LD., Text
; of a new oosaposite text Imperative. As a lone pesnce has
ID. ). Both of these texts show frequent and lone been mi.plaeed by the ancient scribe in tli bierstic text.
Isiiuse of the far*a* text I had cood photographs by
. It has been necessary to number the line* from the hiero-
Borehardt. Cur which I am indebted to the Berlin diction- clyphic version, for which tb- Lui..r t. it w.* found moat
ary. B*t as de Bone* Uled in the debris acain after mak- suitable.
84
original of the Sallier Papyrus, now in the British Museum, by Prof. Erman. This
material, which was prepared for the Berlin Dictionary I am able to use here by the
kind permission of Prof. Erman. This collation of the Sallier Papyrus, the intro-
duction of the hitherto unused Abydos text, and the lower ends at Luxor, and the
collation of the Karnak photographs (see notes on texts) have filled a number of
serious lacunae and given us for the first time an almost complete text.
2. The RECORD was
possibly an official report of the campaign. It is not as full
as the Poem on the marches and dispositions of the two armies, but it narrates fully
the inside history, which led Ramses to make his incautious advance to the north of
Kadesh, furnishing an account of the earliest military ruse known in history. On this
last, the Poem is discreetly silent. The Record is preserved in three copies; on the
temple walls at Abu Simbel, the Ramesseum and at Luxor. 21 Many years ago the Abu
Simbel and Ramesseum texts were combined and published by Chabas from the old
publications, but his work seems to have been mostly overlooked. I have made my
own composite text, also, for which I had photographs of Abu Simbel kindly placed at
my service by Steindorff. These and the insertion of the hitherto unused Luxor copy
made a text for the first time practically complete.
3. The RELIEFS furnish many vivacious incidents which enliven our impres-
sions of the battle and some important inscriptions which we shall employ, but the dif-
ferent copies are so totally inconsistent with each other, that the course of the battle
must be determined in independence of them, before they can be safely employed.
This is due well-known inability of the Egyptian artist to preserve the proper
to the
ground-plan relations of the different parts of a scene, demanding a knowledge of
perspective for their proper representation. And not only the actual relations of the
different fields upon the ground, but also those of different moments of time are dis-
regarded, as we shall see later on (pp. 41, 42). As far as we know, these reliefs were
engraved upon the temple walls seven times by the artists of Ramses II. :
Abydos, the
Jil. ABU SIMBEL. In the great rock temple on the pylon. J. DE Rouo, who mistook it for a copy of the Poem
"
north wall of the first hallover the battle reliefs. It was says of it: .... les const ructions des fellahs cachaient,
published by CHAMPOLLION (Afon., 27-9), by HOSKJ.I.INI lorsde notre voyage, la majeure partie de ce texte d'ail-
(Mon. 100-102), and by LEFSIUS (LD., Ill, IHIc-e).
star.. leurs en fort maurais etat: le d6blaiement du temple de
Tho original itself is very careless, the scribe having Louqsor entrepris par M. Maspero, permettra d'en recueil-
"
omitted the lower two-thirds of 1. 7 and beginning of 1. 8 lir les dc'-hris (Rev. (g.. Ill, 150). But these modern build-
(Ramessenm numbering), containing the march from ings of the natives have never been removed, and we have
Shabtuna to Kadesh. Furthermore, in both Champol- only a copy of the visible fragments by BRCGSCH (flee,
lion's and Roscllini's copy, two entire lines (6 and 33 de num., II, 53), who also mistook it for the Poem, an im-
Abu Simbel numbering) are omitted, besides the lower pression which may be understood from the fact that this
nds of 11. 36-41, which were probably sanded up at that Luxor text has in the place of "the land of Naharin and all
time. Lepsius's text is much better, but the photographs Kode" (1. 11), a full list of the Asiatic allies like that in
by Graf QrQnau kindly loaned me by Steindorff, filled the beginning of the Poem. It also adds some poetical
about all of the lacuna) in Lepsius's publication. The phrases in describing the King's valor toward the end (1.
wall has lost some since his time. 24). A publication of this text is very much needed. A
2. RAMESSEUM. Over the battle reliefs on the rear composite of the Abu Simbel and Ramesseum text was
(west) side of the first pylon. It was published by SHAEPE made by CHABAS [Rev. arch., XV (1858-59), 2d part, pp. 573
(Eg. 7nscr.2dpart52),and by LEPSICS (LD., Ill, 153). It ff. and 701 ff.J. A combined text by GCIEY.BSE (flee, de
is the best of all the texts, though Lepsius's copy needs Trow., VIII, 126-131, who has overlooked the Luxor copy, is
some correction. The original omits some unessential unreliable. As the Abu Simbel text is incomplete, and the
phrases in 1. 20. Luxor text mere fragments, it is necessary to number the
3. LCXOH. On the rear (south side) of Ramses II.'s lines from the Ramesseum text.
85
8 THE BATTLE OP KADBSH
Ramesseum Karnak, Luxor, Abu Simbel, and Derr." Those at Aby<lK have
(twice),
almost and Derr completely perished.
those at
All these sources suffer from a common defect, viz., their main object was to j>r-
tray the personal prowess of the king. Only the facts which will serve this purpose
are used and the movements of the army, if referred to at all, are mentioned only as
they serve to lead up to and explain the isolation of the king, which necessitated his
desperate attack upon the enemy. Once this supreme moment is reached, the king
receives the entire attention and the army
only referred to in order to use their
is
flight and cowardice as a foil against which

to contrast the splendid courage of the
king. From this point on, moreover, the Poem is the only full source, and it is from
this point on that sane criticism must declare it a source to be used with the greatest
caution. Further indications of the comparative value and character of the sources
will be found in the course of their use, as we proceed.
The conditions which led up to Ramses II.'s great war with the Hittites have
been cleared up by the discovery and study of the Amarna letters, and cannot occupy
us here. The Hittites have now reached the upper course of the Orontes, in their
advance southward between the Lebanons, and have collected their forces in the vicin-
ity of Lake Horns. Already in his fourth year Ramses had secured the Phoenician
coast on his first campaign as far as the vicinity of Berut, and erected his boundary stela
on the banks of the Nahr-el-Eelb. been stated that this campaign was in
It has often
the year 2. It is true that Ramses II. at the Nahr-el-Kelb is
one of the three stelae of
published by Lepsins as dated in the year 2; but Lepsius himself states that this date
is uncertain (Briefe, p. 403) that of the fourth year is however, certain." Now there
;
cannot have been two campaigns before that against Kadesh in the fifth year, which
is called the second campaign
(No. 1). Hence the uncertain date of the year 2 is to
be rejected with entire certainty, in favor of the year 4. Following up his move of
the year 4, Ramses now prepares to meet the Hittites themselves.
Of the size of his army we have unfortunately no direct data. The Egyptians
occasionally give the exact number of men engaged in less important expeditions, like
HI. A.TDos.-Oo the oouldeof the north, wee*, and . DUB.-NOW destroyed, bat seen by Champollion,
south walls of the temple of Raauee II. Nearly the whole Wfalnann, Atg. QgsrV. VH, n. >.
has perished, a. only the lower courses of the wall, remain. 7. ABC SUMBL. - In the treat temple, first hall, north
The short were published by MABIBTTB
inscription, wall : CBAMF., Jfem.,17 6tS ; JVot. deser., l.M-W; HoetLL.,
Mkwiles.II. pp. W, II), and three scene, from the relief. lion, stor., 87-108; /,/>., IJI. l7c-e.
UV*. daw la amteJtaXe. Plates XXX XXXII and p. 72). Theinscriptions from all these copies hare been com-
They show One execution and a complete publication U bined (from the publications) by QOIBTUB (Bee. dtTrm.,
very aneh needed. Vm,lHM In a convenient form for reference, but it U not
L USCM. PIB*T PTUM.- Ca AMT., KoL Doer., I, reliable. None of the above publication, meet, the require-
W-7S: LD^ III. US i, U7-. menu of modern science in the reproduction of th.
X RAUBMCO. SBCOUD PTUM.-CBAIIF.. Hon.. W-; and an exhaustive publication of the combined oricinals
Wot Deter.. ISV.ta. 114 Boaux., Jron. star.. Ks),
; ltO;ZJ>., U very much needed. For the Inscriptions I bare placed in
HI, Ms. M. and Puss*. But. ate tori tg. parallel columns all the publications of all the original.,
i. KABXAB. -Chiseled out in antiquity; published prodoclna- a fair text but unfortunately thin method can-
;
4s/r, pp. it, stand Plate Til I not be applied to the r.

i, IxrxoB.-Oa B.mm n.; Cmimr.. tton.,
pylon of
'" mla"? lh Itprlin r"16""
SB.OI. *H KJ M. (la* two Incorrectly marked Bam*- I*"* "* thU *'
Mm) t tnawji Mo*, star., Ms-T ; DiDBiQej. fiec. <U Hon.
.
m *"^f*' D<1 flui1 br Ul cl '
*- ' -"' r eertain.
H(inscrlpUoMonly).
H
JAMES HENRY BREASTED 9
those to the mines, or to Nubia but never, in any surviving record of their great wars,
;
have they any statement

left of the size of the army which they put into the field.
The numbers for this expedition given by Diodorus, 400,000 foot and 20,000 horse
(infra, p. 11, n. 39), are of course absurd. The meager data bearing on the question, as
furnished by contemporary documents, are the following. In the Old Kingdom (third
millennium B. C.) the nobleman Una mustered nn army for an expedition into Sinai
and Palestine, of " many ten thousands." This vague and suspicious datum is not
corroborated by subsequent records. For an expedition to Hammamat for quarrying
purposes in the eleventh dynasty (about 2100 B. C.), King Nibtowere-Montuhotep

24
mustered an army of 10,000 men from the southern nomes, and 3,000 sailors from
25
the Delta, making a total of 13,000 men, the largest body of which the exact num-
ber is furnished by the inscriptions. In the same dynasty, King Senekhkere sent to
the same quarries an expedition of 3,000 men. 28 The contingent which a local baron
dispatched to these quarries in the twelfth dynasty (about 2000 to 1800 B. C.) was
27 28
only 200 men, while another, Ameni of Benihasan, sent to the Nubian wars 400 men,
and as a convoy for the gold caravan to Coptos, 600 men. 2* Amenemhet III., of the
same dynasty, sent out an army of 2,000 men to the Hammftmat quarries accompanied
by 30 quarrymen, 30 sailors, and 20 necropolis gendarmes.
80
He likewise dispatched
31
a force of 734 troops to the mines of Wadi Maghara in the peninsula of Sinai. Of
the eighteenth dynasty we have no such data, but in the nineteenth (about 1600 to
1400 B. C.), Ramses II. sent an army to Hammftmat, which was made up entirely of
"
foreign mercenaries in the following proportions: Shardana, 1,900; Kehek, 620;
B
Mashawasha, 1,600; Negroes, 880; total, 5,000."
In Merneptah's Libyan war of his fifth year (thirteenth century B. C.), he slew
" "
9,376 people," and possibly took as many more prisoners. Ramses III. (twelfth
3LD., II, 149d = GoL., Ham., XII: the numeral is in the 5,000 were Egyptians. But there is no such remainder,
present writer's opinion, certain. Golenischeff's text shows and no error of the scribe. The correct numbers were
a finger ( = 10,000) ; the top points wrong, but this is a pecu- read nearly forty years ago by DE Rouo (Rev. arch., 1867',
liarity. of the Hammftmat inscriptions (c/. HI.NT, LD,, II, n. s.XVI, pp. 99 ff.) who showed the incorrectness of
150 a. 1. 7, thrice.'), and is only one of many instances of Chabas's readings, and later by PIKIII, (.\X., 28, 33). I had
the influence of the hieratic in these texts. This partic- read them as above, before I noticed de Rouge's essay
ular peculiarity of the finger-sign occurs frequently also in or Piehl's note, and a glance at the papyrus will convince
the Assiut texts of the same period. anyone of the correctness of their readings. Whether the
>* LD = GoL Ham XI scribe of Anastasi I. was relating actual facts or not does
II 149<i
not affect the use of his data; for he was clearly dealing
M LD., II, loOo = GOL., Ham., XV-XVI1. with casto mal.y a nd usual events whether the particular
'
GOL., Ham., Ill, 3. They brought back a block 20 feet, ones he narrates actually happened or not.
6 inches long. 3D Great Karnak inscription, 1. 58. This is probably the
M Ameni inscription (1. 12). Wlbid., 11. U, 15. total of the slain, Libyan and non-Libyan, for the corre-
30 LD II 13Sc = GOL Ham IX No 1 spending number of the Extract (a short duplicate, 1.17)
"
has before it: fallen of Libya, total number;" the non-
'LD., II 137c = BURTON, xc. hier. XII = CHAMP.,
Libyan foreign ers being thus designated as of the Libyan
cr., II, 689.
party Qf the actua i Libyans slain we have a total of
'2
Pop. Anattasi, I, Plate XVII, 11. 3, 4. The nambers 6,359 (1. 51). and of non-Libyan foreigners at least 2,370 (L
are given by C HA HAS (Voyage, p. 52) as: 1,300,520, 1,500, 56). This makes a total of 8,729, omitting a few hundred
and 080, making a total of 4,000, which was 1,000 short as he non-Libyans who would doubtless bring np the total to 9,376
noticed, but thought it was an error of the scribe. MASFERO as given above (1. 58). But it is possible that this number
(Struggle, p. 212) gives the following numbers: "620 refers only to captives. In this case, as the Extract gives
Shardana, 1,600 KBhok, 70 (sic/) Mashawasha, 880 Negroes." at least 9,300 killed (1. 17), the total of killed and captured
Maspero evidently assumes that the remainder (1,830) of the would be over 18,000 See also MULLER, Alien, 358, n. 5.
1
87
10 THE BATTLE OF KAUESH
century B. C.), in a similar Libyan

war (year 5), slew 12,535 of the enemy;" but
in his second Libyan war (year 11) ho slew only 2,175
and raptured 2,052* (of
whom only 1,211 were men). The same king sent an expedition to the quarries of
Gbel Silaileh, consisting of 3,000 men, of whom 2,000 were soldiers;* but of course
these were not intended for military duty, but only to assist in the work of transpor-
tation, as at El Bersheh in the middle kingdom. Ramses IV. sent an expedition to the
Hammamat quarries, of no less than 8,368 men, of whom 4,000 were soldiers." Here,
also,the troops were expected to aid in the transportation as well as furnish protection
to the expedition. The only other contemporary sources are the Amarna letters, in
which the numbers of the troops mentioned are absurdly small It is only the classic
sources which contain large numbers; but the numbers of such historians as Herodotus
and Diodorus (see below p. 11, n. 39) are of course not trustworthy. For the Ptolemaic
period we possess no data, and the Old Testament numbers cannot be accepted.
It will be seen that the above data, while very limited, show clearly that the
armies of early Egypt were not large. The armies of the invading Libyans, judging
from the numbers of dead and captured, may have been larger than those of Egypt ;
but the maximum army of the Pharaoh, doubtless, did not exceed 25,000 or 80,000 men.
Ramses II.'s army consisted of four divisions, of whom some were Shardana, who
furnished heavy infantry. How
large a proportion of the army they formed it is
impossible to say. Nor of the native Egyptian forces are we able to determine what
proportion were infantry, and what proportion chariotry. Maspero has computed the
forces of the Hittites and their allies as about 20,000 men (StriK/i/lf, p. 212, note 5),
and this total seems to me tolerably certain." Ramses II. could hardly have invaded
the enemy's country with less; and thus his four divisions will have contained about
5,000 men each. If he was able to send 5,000 mercenaries to Haumianiat, he certainly
MTb* inscription unpublished i it U on theooUideof in error. He fin* t,07S killed in this battle, which U an
"
the north wall at Medinet Haba, and the number i cited error for .175 as abore. Then he (ins 2,061 killed in
la BAKDUKB (p. SOS, -Jd seen*"). The number is supported other engagements," which is an error for the prisoners as
by the reliefs in the seenod court (onthwsll,CnAir...sf<m., above. Finally he gives i/OU male and female prisoners,
= RoesxL.. */. sfor.,U; see aim LD., Text III, 177) which comes from adding together the said list of prisoners
showing three beeps rf hands and oneof phalli severed from asgiven in CMASUS'S Arsvtte *ur r at. f. (p. 243). where
" Chabas has made a Mistake of 8) (firing 131 girl* instead o(
thedead. Bach heap bears the Inscription : Bringing up
the captured before his majesty, from the vanquished of 151) and producing a total of 1,081 Maspero has thus
Libya, making men; making S.OOO hands; making
1.000 counted the list twice: once (20 short) as prisoners; and
" "
ajOOO foreskins except that ones (at the top)
; Making again its real total as given by the monument, of which ho
1.000 foreskin*" U omitted (/>.. Text III, 177, not corrobo- makes a second total of killed. Chabu's error was also
rated by the old publication*. . 9. ROULL., Hon. *<*.. US). noted by Kt
OIK-B, AZ. ( UW), pp. 71 .
is certainly uwsalf*, andis contradicted by the total,

" LD.. III. 2Bo.
ILW, gien on the north wall. Hence, as the four heaps
are In four .up.ris.po-J rows or flelds. It is evident that * Hlttito king first sen t MIOO chariots against Rsnv
The
soese are only repetitions. Taking only the heap of phalli ^^ Later be sent 1,000 more, making MOO in all. Ineach
and caw heap of hands (the two lower rows), and regard- chariot were three men, making a vno chariot
ing the other* as repetition*. obtain a total of 12JJOO wmrrion. He had also 8.000 or ,000 infsntry, making a
aUin.whkh roughly agree, with that on the north wall. total of about 20^100 men. Maspero overlooks the second
On the back of the Brst pylon at Medinet Haba body of 1,000 chariots and gains his total of SO.OOO by con-
(DCH-. HuL fMcar.. I. , 17). the number t/BJ is given by jeetnral estimate. These numbers in the sources are of
t as the total list of prisoners. This total is coarse not wholly trustworthy, and hence we must allow
I (MntflH*. p. ITS) are corioasly for an element of uncertainty.
*^
'
, ..
Û;L
was able to muster 20,000 of all arms for the critical war in Syria ;
but the issue shows
that his force could not much have exceeded
that of the Asiatic allies in strength. I
should estimate his force, therefore, at possibly a little over 20,000 men, and regard
the estimate as very uncertain. Maspero estimates it at about 15,000 or 18,000 men
(Struggle, 212, note 5). p.
About the end of April, in the fifth year of his reign (Poem, 1. 9), Ramses II.
marched out of Tharu, on his northeastern frontier, at the head of the above force, in
four divisions.
39
The division of Amon under the immediate command of the Pharaoh
constituted the advance, while the divisions of Re, of Ptah, and of Sutekh, followed in
the order given. What route they took in Palestine is not known, but when they were
in southern Lebanon they were marching on the sea road, for in the midst of later
events the (1. 18)
Poem
reverts to the fact that "his majesty had formed the first rank
(or the van) of all the leaders of his army, while they were on the shore in the land of
Amor." As Meyer has noted (Aegyptiaca, p. 69, n. 2), the "shore of Amor" is the
Mediterranean coast, which he had secured the preceding year (see p. 8), at some
uncertain point in southern Lebanon, where Ramses left the sea. Somewhere in
this locality a city named after the Pharaoh was reached; for the Poem (1. 11) states:
"Now after many days after this [the departure from Tharu], behold his majesty was
' ' "
in Wosermare-Meriamon, the city of (the conclusion being unfortunately
lost). This city was evidently Ramses's base on the coast, which he had established
for this purpose the year before, and it may have been at or near the mouth of the
Nahr el-Kelb, where his stela of the year before is located. At the end of the above
lacuna is the word "cedars," evidently a reference to the cedars of Lebanon, through,
or beside, which the army was now passing, after leaving the city on the coast. Just
4"
thirty days after leaving Tharu, Ramses was in camp on the south of Kadesh (Record,
11. 1, 2; Poem, 11. 11,
12), having marched northward to that point down the valley of
the Orontes (see Map I)."
We shall not be able to follow Ramses into the battle which awaited him at
Kadesh without looking into the geography of the vicinity in some detail. In such
a study we are immediately confronted with the embarrassing fact that, while the
geography and topography of Palestine have been very fully studied, such researches
are still in their infancy in North Syria. Robinson's above map of fifty years ago,
which serves well enough for the relative location of main points, is totally insufficient
for the details of a limited district like that around Kadesh with which we are to deal.
42
Sachau's map, which adds much to that of Robinson, offers very little for this par-
98 These four divisions were known to Diodoros, for he *oAn average of about thirteen miles a day.
Says : fura &i rbv fl-vAup a TTtpiaruAoi- fii-ai Toy irpOTcpou aioAo-
" Thl * map s tak n <"* f Tom ROBINSON. Later
y.iT,po,, i,
y.,d>.,o..
Tp. T .S,.,
v V AV*
.4* .pi,
&,
i-ripx,,, ,,a,To,
;
5 i. TO;, Bi.Tpo.v
TTTP.;O,T
,Aov ff
i*,,.
rb- .roAô, TO,
,.vpuun,., ;,i
.'*
U Sl o>u-
,
*""
_ .
f^
London
'
K d
1856.
8h .
^j '" P "'"t'neand the Adjacent Beg,
The only change is the add-on of the word
,
over that ' " Laodicea ad Libanum."

P.W, ;, TTTap . 6, B p W <^ 5 Tij $ ,i^ ,TPT,, 4, i^,T, <>
vioOt 0oo-.Ais Tip ^t/uoriav. (1,47; ed.

c'o-xTjKti-ai VooEL, "In his Heine inSyrienund ifeo;><rfamien,Leipzig, 1883.
Vol. I, p. 83 = DlNDOEF-MOLLGB, Vol. I, p. 40.)
89
12 THE BATTLE o? KADERH
ticular region. Until Blanckenhorn's map" appeared in 1891, even the exact location
of so well known a point as Aleppo was uncertain. But his map has done much in
determining the course of the Orontes above and below Kadesh, and is therefore the
chief source for our map of this locality. It is especially useful for its full indication
of elevations (in meters) while for details of topography I have been dependent upon
;
the notes of modern travelers.

In order to understand the maneuvers which preceded the battle we must now
determine the relative location of the points, by means of which the Egyptian docu-
ments locate for us the positions of the two armies and their parts. These points are :
"
The Height South of Kadesh ;" (3) Shabtuna; (4) Aranami.
(1) Kadesh; (2)
1. KADESH. When we remember that Ramses marched northward along the
Orontes to reach Kadesh (Plates I, II, No. 2), and that the name was still attached to
the lake of Horns in Abulfeda's time, it is evident that we must seek the city on the
Orontes in the vicinity of this lake. This has already been done by Brtigsch," follow-
ing Julius Braun, who placed it at Horns. As Muller has shown (Asien, p. 214), the
city could not have been north of Emesa (Horns). It is difficult to understand how
modern students ever came to locate the city in the lake itself, for in addition to the
incongruities noted by Muller (loc. cit.), there is not a scrap of evidence to show that
the lake is older than Roman times. It is an artificial body of water six miles long
and from two to three miles wide, created by a dam at its north end. Conder says:
"The existence of the lakemainly, not altogether, due to the construction of this
is if
fine engineering work." Of the age of the dam he says further: "The general
4
impression obtained, by comparing the masonry with other monuments I have examined
in Palestine, is, that the whole structure is Roman work and the Talmudic story ( Tal.
;
Jer. Kilaim, LX, 5; Tal. Bab. Baba Balhra, 746), which attributes the dam to Dio-
cletian, may perhaps be founded on fact" (loc. cit.}. With this testimony Robinson
"
agrees ; he states The lake is in great measure, if not wholly, artificial being formed
:
;
by an ancient dam or embankment across the stream." Of the age of this dam Sachau
'
that it "hat mir den Eindruck nicht besonders alt zu sein."" Besides
says gemacht,
the testimony of the Talmud cited by Conder above (which I have not verified) there
are only two ancient references to the lake, and possibly only one. Abulfeda, writing
early in the fourteenth century, nearly six hundred years ago, describes the lake
somewhat fully, as follows:
"In GrundzHgeder Oeologie und physikalitchenGeogra- **PEF., Quart. Statement (1881), 172.
phie ran Nord-SV rien, Berlin, 1891; or separate as Kartc u> Later Biblical Researches in Palestine and the
Adja-
<;,n X,,rd-8V ricn im Maasstabe von t: 600,000, nebst Erldu-
cmt Regions, London (1856), p. 549.
terungcn, etc., Berlin, 1891.
" Ceogr.
*' Rene in Synen und Maiopotamicn, Leipzig, 1883.
Intchr., II, 22.
91
14 THE BATTLE OP KADEKH
uUI Ifi. lii JL-JI JJe JiM JfiJ.I c Uj LXjl JuJI

.L+JI ~>^ ^ &-> o-a t
,J>.
"THE LAKE or QADES. Now it is the same as the lake of I.Iom?; its length from north to
south about a third of a day's journey, while its width is the length of the dam which w<- shall
is
presently mention. It (the lake) is artificially constructed upon the river Orontes, for there has
been constructed at the north end of the lake a dam of stone, of ancient workmanship, w hich is
attrilmted to Alexander (the Great). In the middle of the said dam aro two towers of black
tone, and the length of the dam from east to west is 1,287 cubits, while its width i.s 18} cubits.
This it is which holds all those mighty waters, but should it be destroyed, the wat. -r would flow
away and the lake would be destroyed and would become a river. It U in a flat region, and
is distant from JJoms part of a day's journey on the west side of the Fish are caught in
city.
it" [ABDLPEDAE, Tabula Syriae ed. Koehler (Lipsiae, 1786), p. 157.]
He mentions the lake again in describing the course of the Orontes (ibid., p. 151).
The mention of lakes and marshes in the vicinity of Laodicea ad Libanum by
Polybios," even if it refers to this lake, does not
carry the origin of the lake appre-
ciably farther back. Moreover, there are other small lakes and pools in this region at
the present day," to which his remark may refer. There is, therefore, not a shred of
evidence that the lake existed in Ramses II. 's day, 10 a thousand years earlier. Finally,
the only other argument that can be advanced for the location of Kadesh in the lake
isthe fact that in the early fourteenth century it was still called the lake of Kadesh.
Bnt it should be noticed that it was also called the lake of Horns by Abulfeda, and
Horns lies neither in the lake, nor even upon it, but several miles distant from it.
There is, therefore, no occasion to consider the lake at all in our study of this battle ;
bnt its name is useful as showing that Kadesh is to be sought in its vicinity.
Bnt there is classical evidence that the city depicted in Ramses' s famous reliefs
was on a river. In his account of these reliefs Diodorus says u ui KOTO, (lev TOP :
vp&TOV rAi> roi^ttv rbv ftacnXc'a KartaicfvdaQai iro\u>picovvra

irrrb Trorapov
Tti%os ireplp-
fwror. Hecataeus's Egyptian informants, whether they were acquainted with the actual
" or
city of Kadesh not, certainly regarded the city in the reliefs as located on a
river. Furthermore, there is hitherto unnoticed evidence that early in the last century
there was a place still bearing the name Kedes, on the south of the lake. An old
map."
published in 1810, a portion of which is here reproduced (Map II), accompanies an
r *M(ift *n *y*f V AaeK.
) it* Kadeth In the lake (tee infra, p. 43, n. 1S4), and can-
i
T*T ***' a.*f iura >*r* rfc not be adduced u Indicating IU eiUtenoe in hi* time.
'
t. (i
Vol. 1. p. 40).
RamWi eoli Bactiiao*

'* r^T"** ^ l
"'r*"4 **r?-,. *-~. i( -*-
.P')-
"They call
ObwiM
, , eoH^y^
/ UU fan,,
^ .,,. e.^
<d..
jva^j,
ROHUT WALFOLB.
,
. Lnodoo..
IU*TB r- VoL
"5 V" bT
**!' *P'
** ta**i In lhi ngioo.
<
100. accompanjrin* an eway called: "Trarel, throueh
p. rt of Antieot Coelesrria and Syria SaluUri, (from the
"îl* ' 1
paper* of the Lieul^n.nt O.looal Sqnire). See abo reriew
~t of tteraltabbdiMiMiOjacmiMt local- by L^nomiB, in J<mr*. dmBa*. onO).p.n.
92
PLATE II
16 THE BATTLE OF KADESH
account of a journey down the Orontes valley by Lieutenant Colonel Squir.- in 1802.
in drawing the map, for it shows amusing
Squire's data have not been employed
error* on points about which Squire's notes prove that he was fully informed.
The
and was the best which the
map b therefore probably much older than Squire's time,
editor of his papers found available. But the editor offers no hint of the source
whence he obtained the map, or of the data from which it was mad*-.* I am therefore
unable to determine what early Hnglish or other traveler it was, who found on the
south of the lake a of "Quadis," which can be no other than Kedes.
village ^Jjf
Its location on the wrong bank a little too far south is, of course, a trifle of no
moment on a map which makes the lake twenty miles long and separates its lower
ml from the river entirely, besides the most amusing errors in the mountain ranges.
It must not be forgotten that this map was published long before the decipherment of
the hieroglyphic and the resulting knowledge of the city of Eadesh, which later led
scholars to look for it in this locality. Hence Conder's claim that the natives in his
time commonly applied the name Kedee to the south side of the Tell Nebl Mendeh
gains irresistible confirmation.
Conder's use of topographical data is, however, not so fortunate. It is over
three thousand years since the battle which we are to study took place. The topo-
graphical changes wrought in three thousand years by a
stream subject to heavy
freshets in the rainy season are very considerable. These do not seem to have
been at all considered by Conder, who lays the greatest importance on purely
ephemeral topographical features. He seems to base his identification of Kadesh with
Tell Nebl Mendeh largely on the presence of a late dam forming a pool in the Orontes
on the east side of the tell and a small earthen aqueduct, forming with the brook
;
El-Muakdiyeh, a kind of double moat on the west of the tell. Certainly such things
as these, which might be swept away by a freshet any day, offer no substantial basis
for the topography of the place over three thousand years ago. Moreover, when
Conder visited this region, he was supplied with totally inadequate data from the
inscriptions; it was therefore impossible for him to consider all the requirements of
the sources, and he was naturally quite unaware at the time how insufficient were the
data furnished him. But Conder's notes on the place are fuller than those of any
earlier visitor there; they furnishsome exceedingly useful observations; and, as we
shall see
by the observation of more permanent to|Mitrraphirnl features than small and
ephemeral earthen aqueducts, that the city must have been located in this immediate
vicinity, the presence of the name Jedes, and the importance and unrivaled extent
at Tell Nobl Mendeh make Conder's identification very probable.
In modern times the place was firstvisited by Mr. Thomson, who touched it in a
journey from Hamah to Rit.l.-h in 1840. In Robinson 's book," he describes it as

follows:
I oo tb. Mrtory of tb. foe.
of Kocth Byri.
- '
UM Ik* prawal writer m.y know
.
'.-I
JAMES HENBY BREASTED 17
The Tell is on the tongue of land between the Orontes and its tributary, el-Mukadlyeh,
above the junction. A ditch drawn from one stream to the other made the Tell an island.
Around the southern base of this large Tell are spread the remains of an extensive ancient city.
They consist of numerous columns, foundations, and small portions of the original wall the ;
rubble work of which was Roman brick. Mr. Thomson says " I found the people of the Tell :
breaking up the columns to burn into lime and as, in this trap region, limestone is scarce, this
;
process of destruction may have been going on for a thousand years ; and the wonder is that
such a number of columns have escaped their barbarous sledges." 5*
Robinson himself states that Tell Nebl Mendeh ("Tell Neby Mindau") is located
"on the left bank of Orontes, somewhat more than two hours" north of Ribleh," and
68
distant one hour from the lake of Kades. 59 He adds that it was so high as to be
visible from Ribleh, and as he journeyed from Ribleh northwest to Kal'at el-Hosn, it
was visible for several hours. Sachau says of it:
Dieser Htigel, der sich nicht weit vom Sudende des Sees in fruchtbarster Umgebung
erhebt und die ganze Orontes-Ebene weithin beherrscht, ist von ziemlich bedeutendem Umfang,
und konnte eine fur die Verhaltnisse des Alterthums bedeutende Stadt tragen. Ringsum
unseren Lagerplatz war die Erde mit SteinblOcken aller Art bedeckt und Substructionen von
Hausern deutlich zu erkennen. In dem Dorfe selbst sollen auch antike Baureste vorhanden
sein, besonders auf dem Friedhof, auf der Nordseite des Hugels.
80
Conder also remarks on the tell as "remarkably conspicuous from all sides,"" and
describes it as
a great mound without any trace of rock so far as we could see extending about 400 yards
in a direction about 40 east of true north. The highest part is on the northeast, where is a
Moslem graveyard looking down on gardens in the flat tongue between the two streams.62 The
height is here perhaps 100 feet above the water. On the southwest the mound sinks gradually
into the plough land. The village is situated about the middle of the Tell On the
southwest is the Tahunet Kades, a modern mill The principal ruins are on the flat
ground east of the mill.

These evidently which were also noticed by Sachau above, the unparal-
later ruins,
leled size of the mound, and the agreement of its location with the itineraries,
led Robinson to identify it with Laodicea ad Libanum. 63 Robinson says that in
searching for Laodicea in this region he could find no mound "deserving any atten-
tion,except the high mound known as Tell Neby Mendeh."
It will be evident therefore that Tell Nebl Mendeh is the most
prominent and
important mound in this region, where the survival of the name ,jJij forces us to
locate Kadesh. Let us now see how this location is related with the data furnished
w Biblititheca Sacra (1848), p. 691. n Op. cit., p. 166.

"He gives it exactly as two hours and fifteen m i mites ; 62 Orontes and el-Mukadiyeh.
Sachau made it in two hours and twenty minutes (op. cit.,
p. 58). On his map, Robinson gives an hour In his notes Op "'" pp> Ka
'
' 556; bot see also VAN KASTBBEN
(ZDPV., Vol. XVI, pp. 171 ff.), who suggests Liftaya as
as three miles.
possibly the site of this Laodicea. However, the location
Sachau made it in one hour and five minutes. Conder
of this city has no bearing OQ our stud of Kadesh further
gives about four Enghsh miles" (op. cit., p. 165).
than to show the importanc . of TeU Nebl Mendeh in
M Op. cit., p. 555 and n. 1. Op. cit., pp. 58, 59. Robinson's estimation.
95
18 THE BATTLE OP KADESH
by the accounts of Ramses II.'s

campaign against the city. Ramses states that his
last camping place before reaching Kadesh was "on the height south of Kadesh."
His statement is as follows:
>
KHlTi
a
>ii
Behold his majesty was in Zahi*4 on his second victorious the goodly watch
campaign;
(camp), in life, prosperity, and health, in the tent of his majesty, was on the height south
of Kadesh The king proceeded northward his majesty arrived on ; the south of the
city of Shabiuna His majesty proceeded northward and arrived on the northwest of
Kadmh. (Record, U. 1-8, with omissions.)
This same march is stated in the Poem as follows:
Htomajwty proceeded northward and he arrived at the height of Kadesh. Then his
P. Hn marched before He crossed the ford- of the
Orontes, having the
l A on Wlth him Thon nis majesty, L. P. H., arrived fatl the
, city
(Poem, 1. 12, with omissions.)
north and Math li.iu of .!.. L . Although all th. pobllc.tion. of thU
kmr fW-. Bnunrb n-d "ArlD.th;" heoe* the W.TT-
.b8r.rl.tloo of tk* bbrarUtod hi.ro- 1U| I " whkh
rlht in hieratic, h.. beeo truufemd
HrpUc wrltittc oT tk wuh followinc Ik. BMtioB of Uw "^Îniilfct.mad rewl u an by all ooprlrt* bat
" Br^-fc. Tkw, U DO qatlo*. th.fok JTtU ooV
,I fc..!.?!-
It will is advancing northward along the Orontes through the

be seen that he
Buka'a. way On
he camps upon "the height south of Kadesh." This is, we
the
repeat, his last camp before reaching Kadesh. We can, therefore, determine roughly
the distance from the "height" to Kadesh; for on leaving the said "height" he
makes the march to Kadesh and fights the famous battle in one day. But as it is
evident that this day's march was a very rapid one on the Pharaoh's part (see p. 26),
so that his army was unable to keep up with him, and as it is further evident that the
battle was a short one, the distance from the "height" to Kadesh must have been at
least a day's march. Fifteen miles make a good day's march for an army in the
Orient; twelve or thirteen miles are a fair average.
67
A glance at Map I, and the data
of travelers which we shall presently adduce, show that the high valley between the
Lebanons, called the Buka'a, drops gradually as it approaches Ribleh from the south
and ceases entirely at that point. It can only be the northern terminal heights of the
Buka'a, which Ramses means by "the height south of Kadesh." Indeed, it is pretty
68
evident that he has in mind a particular summit. Looking at Map III we see that
the Orontes flows through a narrow rocky gorge several hundred feet deep till it
reaches Ribleh, where the rock walls, after gradual depression, drop entirely. On
either side of these high walls, the heights rise to much greater elevations. On the
east side, where Ramses was marching when he made his last camp, there is a notice-
able elevation, called from a monument on its summit, Kamu'at el-Harmel. This
summit is 733 meters above sea-level, about 600 feet above the river at the neighbor-
ing "Red Bridge" (Jisr el-Ahmar) and some 780 feet above the level of the lake of
IJoms. To the eye of the traveler who has left it behind him as he passes northward,
itforms the last and a very conspicuous elevation at the northern end of the Buka'a.
Robinson calls it "a high mound projecting far out into the great valley from the
69 70
west, and it is thus seen for a great distance in
every direction." Conder says
of it: "The Kamu'a ('Monument')perhaps the most conspicuous landmark in
is
Syria, standing on the summit of swelling downs of black basalt, with a view extend-
"
ing northwards in the vicinity of IJoms, and southward in fine weather to Hermon."
Lebanon ; this course continued would bring him to the tell, but passed it on the west. The universal testimony of
Orontes. The objections of BIBSINO (Stat. Taf., 34) seem those who have visited and examined the tell, as I have
to me groundless. PETRIE'S identification with Harosheth above shown, is that it lies in the extreme angle between
on the Kishon (History, II, 155) is impossible, for the king the two streams. Blanckenhora also places the junction
is already iu the Lebanon and has left the Kishon far of the two streams much nearer the lake than the data of
behind. travelers there warrant. This is evidently due to the fact
" Ramses II. 's army up to this point had marched about that the shores of the lake are variable according to sea-
thirteen miles a day (infra, p. 11, n. 40). Thutmose III. 'a son and the height of the water. The bay into which he
army on his first campaign marched from Tharu to Gaza, represents the river as flowing doubtless disappears at
about 125 miles, in nine days (LD., Ill, 816 = BBUGSCH., low water, in accordance with other maps, as I have indi-
Thes., V, 1153 f., 11. 7-14), or nearly fourteen miles a day. cated by a dotted line across it. Blanckenhorn omits the
68 This
map was drawn from data taken chiefly from island in the lake. I have inserted it according to the
BLANCKENHOEN'S map, modified by data from other travel- other maps, but its exact location is unknown. CONDEB
ers in the vicinity. Blanckenhorn follows Sachauin placing s& ? s ' ' 3 about three-fourths of a mile from the shore and
a village called el QAz in the tongue of land between Orontes perhaps one-fourth of a mile long (op. cit., p. 171). The
and the brook el-Mukadiyeh, with Tell Nebt Mendeh to the figures in Blanckenhorn's map denote elevations in meters,
southwest of it and not on Oroutos. Blanckenhorn did not The monument on its summit.
visitthe place himself, but passed northwestward from non fit n 'on n r^,
Hibleh to Kal'at el-fllosn. Neither did Sachau ascend the
-i
*' "'" P 1*1
'1M '
97
10 THE BATTLE OF KADBSH
Again, in describing the view from the summit of Tell Nebl Mendeh he says: "On
the wrath the plain of the Buka'a is visible, stretching between the Lebanon and
Antilebanon, as far as the ridge or shed on which the Kanift'a stands up against the
"
sky line." The hill of the Kamu'a, therefore, is the most prominent height at tin-
northern termination of the high plain of the Buka'a; from this point northward the
<
/ifr,yrafex*^Tx
it Am.
MAP 111. The OrootH Vllt-> In tbo Vicimljr of Kadc>.li. 1:500,000 (after Blmekwhorn)
country grows lower and lower till on

reaching Ribleh, says Robinson, "a vast plain
"
stretches off in every direction, except the southwest" He further remarks in
going from Kamu'a to Ribleh: "The hills gradually disappeared, and the country
"
grew continually lower as we advanced." The hill of the Kiunfi'a, therefore, as the
first prominent height on the east of Orontes, south of Lake Horns, is certainly
Ramaes's "height south of Kadesh." I think it will be clear that we have here
gained a fixed point in our topography from which we may work with certainty.
Kadesh must now be sought a fair day's march to the north <>f tin- Kamu'a. The lake,
but the Tell Nebl Mendeh, which is

which eighteen miles away, is decidedly too far
is ;
about fifteen miles from the Kamu'a, very strikingly meets the requirements of dis-
tance involved in our problem. We shall further see in the study of the other places
mentioned, how admirably the place fulfils all other conditions.
Kadesh thus occupied a most important position. It commanded the entrance to
the Bukft'a on the south (Map I), and every army advancing southward in inner Syria
would have to reckon with it. Being at the northern terminus of both Lebanons it
commanded also the road from the interior to the sea, through the valley of the
Eleutheros, as well as the road from the Bukft'a, westward around the northern end of
Lebanon, to the sea. It was therefore located at perhaps the most important "cross-
roads" in Syria. We shall understand therefore why every Pharaoh made it an
objective point. It consumed eight years of campaigning before Thutmose III. had
mastered it, and it later formed the center of an alliance against him, after his nearly
twenty years of warfare in Syria an alliance which he only conquered by the capture
of the city, after a serious siege. The Hittites and their allies, when they had pushed
southward from Asia Minor at the close of the eighteenth dynasty, naturally took
possession of it as an advanced post of the greatest strength, and when Ramses II.
advanced upon it in his fifth year, they were ready to stake all on a battle for its
possession.
2. "THE HEIGHT SOUTH OP KADESH." The
location of this point was involved
in the discussion of the location of Kadesh, and settled above as the hill of the
Kamu'at el-Harmel.
75
3. SHABTUNA. The el-Hosn by Conder (follow-
location of this town at Kal'at
ing the Frenchman, Blanche), is so totally at variance with the data from the inscrip-
tions, as will be presently apparent, that we need not discuss it at all. An examination
of Extracts 1 and 2, quoted above, will make it clear that Shabtuna must liejbetween
"the height south of Kadesh" andJKadesh, for on the march from the "height" to
Kadesh, he passes Shabtuna. Moreover, it was either very close to or on the river,
for in the Poem we find the following:
Ci
The division of Re crossed the ford (Orontes) on the south side (variant on the west) of
Shabtuna (Poem, 1. 17).
The road leading down the Orontes valley out of the Bukft'a on the east side of
the river, and sweeping westward around the northern end of Lebanon by Kal'at
el-Hosn to the sea, crosses the Orontes to the west side at Ribleh. There is every
" Op. cit., pp. 169 ff.
THE BATTLE OF KADBSH
why an army marching northward from the Kamu'a should not cross to the
side before reaching Ribleh. The rock-walled gorge of the Orontes, several
hundred feet deep, is practically impassable for chariots above Ribleh. Once over,
there is no road on the other side leading down river, for the river flows close under
the precipitous shelves of the eastern slope of Lebanon. Several tributaries to the
Orontes on the west side, between Jisr el-Abmar and Ribleh, also obstruct the way
(see Map III). It is evident, also, that to go beyond Ribleh is to make an unneces-
sary detour to the east around the eastern

end of a great bend of the Orontes (Map
III ) , involving also the crossing of a considerable tributary at the apex of the bend.
This bend can be cut off by crossing at Ribleh, and all travelers going directly
north (not to Horns) or to Kal'at el-Hoen, or to the sea, cross the Orontes at this
point, as did Robinson, Sachau, Conder,

and Blanckenhorn. Robinson says that the
surface of the ground here is "only six or seven feet above the water." He adds:
The course of the river was here from west to east, apparently a long reach but it soon swept ;
round to the north, in which direction it continues in a winding course. Ribleh is situated at
the elbow Our tent stood near the ford of the river. The bottom is hard ; and such is
said to be the case throughout the region. The water at this time [June 11] hardly came up to
1*
the horse' bellies. There was much crossing in both directions horses and donkeys, old and ;
young, many of them loaded men and women wading through, the latter often with bundles
;
on their heads all going to make up a lively scene."

;
"
Robinson's description shows that the ford was just above Ribleh, that is, trest of it.
One of our inscriptions says that the crossing was west of Shabtnna, and the other
says south of it. "south" is "up river," * a ford
To an Egyptian whose term for
7
which is above a town on the northward-flowing Orontes would naturally be called

"south" of it; while a more accurate scribe would correctly say "west," in this
particular reach of the river. There can be no doubt but that Shabtuna is to be
located at Ribleh," and we have thus gained the earlier name of a place well known
in later Palestinian and Syrian history. It was a strategically important crossing of
the Orontes, and it became the headquarters successively of Necho in 608, and of
Nebuchadnezzar twenty years later.
4. ARANAMI. The location of this town is thus indicated in the inscriptions. In
1
an enumeration of Ramses s forces from front to rear, that is, from north to south, we
find that just after two divisions of the army have crossed the Orontes at Shabtuna,
the division of Ptah is south of Aranami.
K SAOAC, who erosJ here on October 2S, says :

" Wlr On the Tombos stela, as Is well known, the Egyptian
ritteadareh den *MO Fuss breiten, niebt sehr tiefen, scribe speaks of the Euphrates as flowin"ap river " {..
"
Orontes (op. eit,, p. VI}. sooth ward ).
" Of. eU., p. Ml "MAsmmo's location of Bhabtona (Stmeoio of tki
"
"He does not state this la so many words, bat nan Batitmt, p. a little to the soathwwt of Tell Neby
3*0, n. I)
that Ribleh was at the elbow where therirer toned north- Mlodeh." Is Impossible, for In that case the Egyptians
ward, while la front of his teat It Bowed from weft to tart MoM Bot eroeeed the Orontee on the weft of Shab-
Bia teot was therefore oAore Ribleh. A* he adds that the tuna, as stated in the Poem (1. 17. Extract No. S, abore).
tea* was "near the ford," the ford also Is abore Ribleh. " See Borneo*, op. nl.. p. MS.
100
82
The division of Ptah was oil the south of the town of Aranami (Poem, 11. 17, 18).
Later, when the battle began, Ramses hastily summoned this division, as stated
by the Record thus:
Then one gave orders to the vizier

83
to hasten the army of his majesty, while they were
marching on the south of Shabtuna (Record, 11. 18, 19).
This refers to the division of Ptah as is shown by the following note in a relief :
The scout of Pharaoh, L. P. H., coming to hasten the division of Ptah (Abu Simbel
Relief, Champ., Mon. 18 = Resell., Mon. stor., 95).
On their after leaving the hill of the Kamu'a and before reaching
way northward,
Shabtuna, they passed or were south of Aranami, which must therefore lie on the line
of march between the hill of the Kamu'a and Shabtuna. Just where, it is impossible
to determine, but there is a hint in the variant of Extract No. 4 above, where instead
of "south of Aranami" we have "opposite [them?]," probably meaning the division
which crossed the river before them (the division of Ptah). In that case Aranami
will not have been very far south of the ford; otherwise the troops south of Aranami
would have been too far west to be "opposite" their comrades who have just crossed.
But this is uncertain.
In addition to the location of these points, we must call attention to the local
conditions. We have already seen in Robinson's remarks (p. 20) that the level
plain begins at Ribleh and extends northward from it. After leaving Ribleh by the
above described ford, and going northward till he struck the Orontes again (I suppose
near the bridge, Map III) Robinson says " The plain was a dead level the soil hard
,
:
;
and gravelly, and fertile only in the vicinity of the canals led through it from the
84
river, of which we passed several." The plain around Kadesh therefore was the
best possible place for a battle of chariotry such as we are to study. Moreover, a
reference in Extract No. 18 (p. 29 below) shows that there was a forest between
Shabtuna and Kadesh, on the west side of the river, and the skilfully masked
maneuvers of the Hittite king would indicate that there must have been a good deal
"'The variant is of no importance for this point. It "Read ft; the above is a typographical error; the
will bo discussed later. For the context see Extract No. 9. original has t't. M Op. cit., p. 557.
101
J4 THB BATTLE OF KADBSH
of forect in the plain around Kmlesh. We are now prepared to take up the successive
positions of the two armies.
FIRST POSITIONS (Map IV).
After camping on "the height
south of Kadesh," Ramses
marched northward on the east
hank of the river. The disposi-
tion of his troops was probably
not different from that which we
find immediately after, in the
second position (see below), that
is: Raoisca kd the way with the
division of Amon, the other divi-
sions following at intervals. Day
after day his officers had reported
to him inability to gain
their
any knowledge of the where-

abouts of the enemy, and their
impression that he was still far
in the north (Record, 11.
13-15).
As Ramses reached the ford just
above Shabtuna* (No. 1), he
was met by two Beduin who in-
formed him that they had been
sent by their countrymen, now
with the Kheta, to say that they
desired to forsake the Kheta for
the Egyptian cause, and that the
king of the Kheta had retreated

far to the north, to Aleppo, "on
the north of Tunip." This inci-
dent is thus narrated:
JO Km. when the king proceeded north-

ward" and his majesty had arrived
icM
at the locality south of the town of
MAP IV. Fint Portions
RoirsoUMdeeeribM the )onnMT from the gano'st urfic* lo tM**n to diminish, mod thin limited griu wu
el-Harmel to RibUb: " We set off from the Bonnment at occasionally Mao amon* the tufU of fane. At 7 o'clock
4:U[r. *.]; UktixartraUrtiteoaneforRjbUhaeroMthU we deeccoded A elope, and came at oooe upon the flrj*t
MM* desert tract of low hill*. ridgee. and valleys. The hill canal led off from the 'A.y (Orootw) on thii aide
o> which the $*a'a stands U eorerad with loose trap, We crneacil one or two other like treanu, not without
nd the ame eontlaoM lor moeh of the distance makinc
; mm I difteultjr In flndlnc proper fords, as It was now quite
it rr dUBcvJt for the bones to pick their way The dark: and came at 7 : to our teat, already pitched on toe
kffi* crwhrnJIr diMpimtnd, ad tk* WMmtfr rwr eootinn benkofthcOrontes." (Of. cil. pp. MS. Ml.)
rof th > From " the bi<hland south of Kadeah."
102
DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS, V
"
Shabtuna, there came two Beduin to speak to his majesty as follows: Our brethren who belong
to the greatest of the trilxjs of the vanquished chief of Kheta have made us come to his majesty
to say: We will be subjects of Pharaoh, L. P. H., and we will flee from the vanquished chief of
Kheta, for the vanquished chief of Kheta sits
"'
in the land of Aleppo (ffy-r'-bw), on the north
of Tunip (Tw-n-p). He fears because of Pharaoh, L. P. H., to come southward." Now these
Beduin spake these words, which they spake to his majesty, falsely, (for) the vanquished chief
of Kheta made them come to spy where his majesty was, in order to cause the army of his
88
majesty not to draw up for fighting him, to battle with the vanquished chief of
Kheta (Record,
11. 4-6, beginning above in No. 1).
The Record now proceeds to give the real position of the Asiatics, in contrast
with the false information of the two Beduin.
Lo, the vanquished chief of Kheta came .... and stood equipped, drawn up behind
Kadesh, the deceitful, while his majesty knew it not (Record, 11. 6, 7).
"Behind Kadesh" is, of course, with reference to

Ramses's present position at Shabtuna that is, the Asiatic ;
allies are stationed somewhere north of Kadesh. Their

exact position as given later was on the "northwest of
Kadesh" (No. 11).
SECOND POSITIONS (Map V). Completely misled by
the failure of his scouts to find the enemy and by the
false report of the Beduin, Ramses immediately sets for-
ward for Kadesh. This is stated by the Poem (already
partially quoted above, No. 2, p. 18) thus:
8.
AAAAAA
AA/NAAA
I AVSAAA
Then his majesty, L. P. H., marched before He

crossed the ford 89 of the Orontes, having the first division of
Amon with him (Poem, 1. 12);
" So Abu Simbel ; Ramesseum has "
is." The former omits "
the land of."
"That is, to keep the Egyptians in marching order, that he might attack
them in this unprepared state, as he afterward succeeded in doing.
SM.
89 This can only be the ford at Shabtuna, mentioned below, for the crossing
MAP V. Second Positions happened just after Ramses was on the south of Shabtuna.
103
THE BATTLE up KADBSH
then follows the position of the Asiatics as below, No. 10 ;

and then that of Ramses's
southern divisions, thus:
Var.
Var.
Lo, his majesty was alone by himself, without another with him (Var.: [without] his fol-
lowers): the division of Amon was marching behind him; the division of Re was crossing over
M
the ford on the south (Var. west) side of the town of Shabtuna at the distance of an iter from
the [division of AmonT];" the division of Ptah was on the south of the town of Aranami (Var.
opposite [them 7]); the division of Sutekh was marching on the road (Poem, 11. 17, 18).
It will be seen that pushing rapidly forward. Even th.- division of

Ramses is
Amon can no longer keep pac with him, and he is accompanied mil v by his jxTsoiml
attendants." The other divisions are already far outdistanced ; there is a gap of about
a mile and a half between the division of Amon and that of Ptah, while the rear of
the column, the division of Sutekh, is straggling so far behind that the author of the
document, not knowing where it was, can only say it was marching somewhere "oa
the road."
Meantime the position of the enemy has not essentially changed, and is
given by
* rariabl* m*aor* of dlitanee. which doM not * zaetly Indicated by th* eroaiinc alone, and th* only oncer-
OMdllmll**. tain dbtano* which the tcribe might naturally add, U that
"Th* artiel* U maMMlIn*, as It ihovld be. and th* from th* dirliion of Amon. The restoration U, therefore,
muenliM noon in Uw eootezt U th on* raowtd la
ool j exceedingly probable, if not altocether certain.
"
UM (Mtoratioa. Tk dUtane* horn UM dlrUioo ol Amoo "The phraa* : alone by hlnuelf. without another with
U what woold b. xpMtod. for DO town woold take th* him " U a constant refrain In th* document* on th* battle.
*Dd tb*rinrboatof UwqoMtioo. athd!TUion
irticlo. Ai will later b* een. It mart b* taken with eon*id*rabl*
of B U Jiut RMBln* it. lu own podtion U, tfccWot.
1"!
the Poem with greater exactness than before. Following the statement of Ramses'a
crossing of the Orontes (No. 8) it says:
10.
Si I I
3
Lo, the wretched, vanquished chief of Kheta came' (Poem, 1. 13).
Enumeration of his allies follows; then:
11.
] I \\ I
s< 11
*
and stood drawn up for battle, concealed on the northwest of the city of Kadesh (Poem, 11.
16, 17).
THIBD POSITIONS (Map VI). Ramses had evidently
determined to reach and begin the siege of Kadesh that
day, for he pushed rapidly and boldly on until he reached
the city. The Poem refers by anticipation to his arrival
long before the course of the narrative actually brings him
there :
lie
12. n
A/VWW AAAAAA Jll
His majesty arrived at the city (Poem, 1. 12);
then follow Nos. 10 and 11. In the proper sequence of

the narrative (after No. 11) it is
again stated thus by the
Poem:
13.
AVSAAA
V AA/ÂA^ j
I I
Lo, his majesty had halted on the north of the city of

Kadesh, on the west side of the Orontes (Poem, 1. 21).
The same facts are stated briefly and clearly by the

Record after the incident of the spies on the south of
MAP vi. Third Positions Shabtuna and the position of the Asiatics (No. 7) :
"This coming is here stated in connection with not change from the first position (Map IV) until Ramses
Ramscs's arrival at Kadesh, which is mentioned by antici- reached the city.
pation; for the narrative then goes back to the position of MThis is repeated by the Poem (1. 20), the hieroglyphic
the Egyptians as the division of Re was crossing the river. " "
texts having behind Kadesh," and the hieratic on the
So that it is evident that the position of the Asiatics did northwest of Kadesh."
105
THE BATTLE op KADEKH
His majesty proceeded northward and arrived at the northwest of Kadesh; the army of his
majesty [camped T]* there, and his majesty seated himself on a throne of gold (Record, 11. 7, 8).
Where the Poem states that Ramses "halted" on the "north of the city," the
"
Record states that he "arrived on the "northwest of the city" and that he "camped
there," a slight discrepancy which only increases our confidence in the two sources by
showing that they are independent of each other. The reliefs depict both the inci-
dents mentioned in the last two phrases; the arrangement of the camp (Plate I) is
accompanied by the words:
O \\D
"
The first division of Amon, (called) He Gives Victory to Wosermare-Setepnere (Ramses
1 1 .
i. Given Life," with which Pharaoh, L. P. H was, in the act of setting up camp * (Plate I,
..
over lion).
In the same relief Ramses shown

on the throne of gold (Plates I, IV, and
is sitting
VI). Later on, after the beginning of the battle reference is made in an inscription
1
over the relief of the battle to Ramses a location in camp:
The stand which his majesty made while he was sitting on the northwest of Kadesh."
This again corroborated by a remark in an inscription over newly arrived infantry

is
(Plates I, IV, and VI), to which are added other important statements:"
Tk* mutant of determinate of a bnildlnc ll *

Ramaaenm, flnt and xcood pylon*. Infra, PUtoi
rWbU >flw tb* Unma, hMirn UM nvtontioo U almoM II and III.
certain. In rtew of U* fact that UM oUwr KOTOM pror* w So. 17 U omitted.
that b camped her*.
Rameawam, LD., III. IB; HUM at Aba Bimtwl, hot
**rj Inoanwi.
106
\(t=]
18.
His majesty was camping alone, no army with him: his and his troops had [not yet T]
arrived, and the division with which Pharaoh, L. P. H., was" had not finished setting up the
camp. Now the division of Re and the division of Ptah were (still) on the march; they had
not (yet) arrived and their officers were in the forest of Baui (B'wy).
These statements hardly need any comment. Kamses, with the division of Amon, has
101
passed along the west side of Kadesh and gone into camp early in the afternoon on
the northwest of Kadesh. Of his other three divisions the Egyptian scribe only knows
that Re and Ptah are somewhere on the march, with their officers evidently separated
from them in the forest south of Kadesh while of Sutekh he knows nothing. He ;
does not refer to it again, nor do any of the other documents, so that it no longer
102
plays any part in the problem, being evidently too far away. It is evident that
Ramses's rapid march left them all far behind Re has reached the city later when the ;
battle begins, but the others are still south of Shabtuna at the time of the Asiatic
attack. Ramses evidently kept in touch with Re and was able to hasten its march,
but Ptah and Sutekh were far beyond his immediate commands. The positions of all
three on Map VI are only approximate.
Ramses has himself now occupied the very position held shortly
Meantime, as
before by the Asiatics, it is evident that
they have removed their army to some other
point. This move and the proximity of the enemy Ramses himself now learns in the
following manner, as narrated by the Record: "There arrived a scout who was in the
following of his majesty, and he brought two scouts of the vanquished chief of Kheta"
(Record, 11. 8, 9). noted in the reliefs in a short inscription: "The
Their arrival is
arrival of the scout of Pharaoh, L. P. H., bringing the two scouts of the vanquished
108
chief of Kheta before Pharaoh, L. P. H." They are being 1 âten to cause them to
10*
tell where the vanquished chief of Kheta is. This preliminary, graphically depicted
"This clause shows that th statement that the Pha- dent haste to reach Kadesh makes a rate of two miles an
made just before, is to be taken with the
raoh was alone, hour not excessive. Starting at 7 A.M., he would have
greatest reserve; and wherever this statement, so often reached his camp by Kadesh by 2:30 P.M.
made, occurs, we are to understand only that his army as a IOJ MASPERO'S statement
(Struggle, 394) that the division
"
whole was not with him. of Sotkha " reached the field and took part in the battle,
100 Abu Simbel
CHAMP., Man., 32 = ROSEI.L., Man. ttor.,
: has no documentary support.
97 = LD., Ill, 187; Ramesseum: LD., Ill, 155; Luxor: "one
103
Literally, is beating them."
CHAMP., ifon., 327 = RosELL.,.Mon.stor., 107. Infra, Plates. 104
Inscription by the scene of the beating; infra, Plates
101 This is a march of about fifteen miles. Ramses's ovi- I, IV, and TI.
107
in the relief (to which the Record makes no reference), being over, the following
conversation occurs:
His majesty said to them: "What are yet" They said: "As for us, the vanquished chi.-f
ofKheta has caused that we should come to spy out where his majesty is." Said his majesty to
them: "He! Where is he, the vanquished chief of Kheta 7 Behold, I have heard that he is in
the laud of Aleppo."
19.
I
O Illl M o '
- a
A 553
:
Said they: "Sec, the vanquished chief of Kheta is stationed

together with the many countries which he has brought with
him See, they are stationed drawn up for battle behind
"
Kadesh, the Deceitful (Record, 11. 10-12).
The phrase, "behind Kadesh 11 is, of course, used with

relation to Ramses's position"* on the northwest of Kadesh,
which would put the Asiatics on the southeast of the city.
This position accords exactly with the position from which
they presently emerged to attack the advancing division
of Re (No. 21), and there can be no doubt of its correct-
ness. As Ramses and the division of Amon marched
northward along the west side of the city, the Asiatics
have quickly shifted their position across the Orontee,
and southward along the east side of the city. They
' 1
have literally played "hide and seek with Ramses
around the city. * They have gained a most advantageous
1
position on his right flank (for we must regard him as

facing northward), and all too late he now learns of the
fatal snare into which he has fallen.
FOURTH POSITIONS (Map VII). The instant has now

come when the Hittite king must take advantage of the
position which ho has gained. The sources recount the
catastrophe very clearly. They first indicate the nature
MAP VII. Fourth Po.llk*. of the attack; it was to be executed by the chariotry:
>Tht UM phraM "bblod Kbah" U thai to b, > How far UM forwt of Baal aabled tb. Hittito kin
explained. U
prorod by UM nnt la UM Poem (1. 20), to mask hit moT.monU U U impooibla Uxtnt.; but tb.
wben UM himtl jphlc toiU kan " behind Kmdwb." wbll* laUr attack on UM dlrUion of K. would wcm to bar* ba*a
i.iad by UM proUetioo of fonat.
politico *l UM lio va. itb o< lUdMb. Thu. behind "
t at noile^lj UDOOTWM from tb
optiu pU ol rtow.
JAMES HENRY BBEASTED 31
AAAAW n AAA/W\
ICi \\
Behold, the wretched chief of Kheta was stationed in the midst of the army which was
with him; he went not forth to fight, for fear of his majesty; but he made to go the people of
the chariotry, an exceedingly numerous multitude like the sand (Poem, 11. 18, 19).
The show the Asiatics using chariotry alone, and it is here clearly stated that the
reliefs
Hittite king employed only chariotry. The reliefs, as we shall later notice more fully, cor-
roborate the statement of the Poem that the Hittite king did not go into the action him-
self, but remained in the midst of his "army," a word which may here be equally well
rendered "infantry."
21.
-^ n ^ v-ik-Mruî
i
The Poem then proceeds with the
i<^>VjJS>x^ Jrs- iv IXvl

attack of the chariotry thus:
inn
I M I
(2
They came forth from the south side of Kadesh and they cut through the division of He
in its middle, while they were on the march, not knowing, nor being drawn up for battle (Poem,
11. 20, 21).
The same facts, with some important additions, are given by the Record, follow-
ing the Pharaoh's interview with the scouts:
22.
i i
32 THE BATTLE OP KADESH
Then the vizier was ordered"" to hasten the army of his majesty, while they were march-
ing on the south of Shabtuna, in order to bring them to the place where his majesty was. Lo,
while his majesty sat talking with his nobles, the vanquished chief of Khcta came, top-th- r with
the many countries which were with him. They crossed the ford on the south of Kadesh,
and they charged into the army of his majesty, while they were marching and not knowing.
(Record, 11. 18-21.)
Immediately following the interview with the scouts,
Ramses had bitterly eluded his officers for their inability
to inform him that the enemy was near (Record, 11. 12-
18). The reliefs (Plates I, IV, VI, VII) show his dis-
comfited officers bowing in his presence during this
rebuke. It is this address to his officers which is referred
to in the above remark: "while his majesty sat talking
with his nobles." This is important, as showing that the
attack of the Asiatics, the discovery of their real position,
and the dispatch of the messenger southward, were all
three practically simultaneous. The messenger sent by
the vizier is shown in the reliefs'" (Plates and VI), V
after he has made his way successfully around the inter-
vening lines of the attacking enemy, southward to the
division of Ptah. He is accompanied by the words:
"The scout of the army of Pharaoh, L. P. H., going to
hasten the division of Ptah, saying: 'March on! Pharaoh,
'"" In addition to
L. P. H., your lord, stands
this messenger, it is
probable that the vizier, realizing
the gravity of the danger, himself went in a chariot to
meet and bring up the division of Ptah. In any case,
SKm.
the reliefs show another messenger in a chariot ;
and as
5M.
we
shall later see, the vizier eventually brings up the
MAP VIII. Fifth Positions
reinforcements in person.
Ramses has not yet grasped the desperate character of the situation. It should
be noted that he orders the vizier to hasten his forces which are still on the south of
w Literally, "one ordered the rlsier" (read rdytw).
LgJUuC UVLV.O from which it appears that the
"Luxor: CBAKT., Hon., 3Z1 RoaaXL.. lion, ttor., lot; post horsemen in the days of Blbars carried letters between
AbuBimbel: CBAatr., Hon., U - Rouu... Hon. star., 6. Cairo and Damascus in four days, a daylight speed of
l*K>AMT^.Vo..U-RoasLL..Js\>ii.*tor..;theaQeln- seren or eight miles an bonr. Hence oar meseenger riding
ion Is lost. We may allow him an boor for bis dangerous on such an errand through essentially the same country as
mission. For Ibn Ay4s says (Awou>. Crs.arab., p. 61) : Blbars's horsemen, could certainly haTe made the neces-
sary fire or six miles In an hour. Granting that be was
dispatched a half-hour after Ramses reached camp (2:30
r. .i. namely 3:00 r. .. his ride would bare brenflTeor
six miles long. For in the hoar and a half since Ramses
reached camp, the dlrlsion of Ptah, then south of Shab-
tnna. will bare aiUanced possibly two miles north of it.
lea Ting the messenger between UT and six miles to ride in
reaching them. It would then be four o'clock when the
reinforcements receded their orders to "hasten."
Shabtuna; he evidently has no suspicion but that the division of Re is within a half-
hour of his camp, ready to be called into instant service. In other words, he thinks
his available force consists of half his army. As a matter of fact, the division of Re
is at that moment and cut to pieces, as it marches north-
being totally disorganized
ward in Ramses's footsteps, past the southwest corner of Kadesh. The reliefs at the
Ramesseum (Plate II, upper right-hand corner) and at Abu Simbel (Plate VI), show
the Asiatic chariotry crossing the river south of the city for the attack, though
probably at a little later stage in the battle."

FIFTH POSITIONS (Map VIII). The following movements complete the appall-
ing disaster which faces Ramses. He is totally cut off from the mass of his army
and surrounded by the enemy, as the documents graphically depict. Following the
statement of the Asiatic attack (No. 21) the Poem has the following:
A/WWX AAAAAA
na r
<=> c=^=,^. li i i
The infantry and chariotry of his majesty, L. P. H., fled before them (Poem, L 21).
Then follows the location of Ramses:
Lo, his majesty had halted on the north of the city of Kadesh, etc. (No. 13);
after which the Poem states:
24.
Then went one to tell it to his majesty, L. P. H. (Poem, 1.
21).
This messenger sent by some officer of the division of Re must have reached Ramses
after his dispatch of the messengers to the southern divisions, else he would not have
been obliged to torture the Asiatic scouts in order to learn the location of the 1
enemy."
Ramses has now learned the full extent of the disaster which his rashness and credulity
have brought upon him. Opposite him, on the other side of the river, he could see
the Hittite king drawing up 8,000 infantry to cut off his retreat in that direction.
Furthermore, the messenger from the division of Re had certainly not long reached
his lord's tent, when Ramses received ample corroboration of his message; for the
Record says, in continuation of the Asiatic attack on the division of Re (No. 22) :
25 -
I I l-fl ^1 ISSS . (SSS O fffff*-^ , Q n ^5\ AWM

\\'
no In modern times there is a ford took place while Ramses was still rebuking his officers for
forty minutes south
of Tell Nebl Mendeh. their neglect, at which time his messengers to the southern
'"This is also evident from the fact that the attack divisions were already dispatched.
Ill
34 THE BATTLE OF KADEKH
Then the infantry and chariotry of his majesty fled before them, northward, to the place
where his majesty was. Lo, the foe (ftrw) of" the vanquished chief of Kheta surrouixlixl the
attendants of his majesty, who were by his side. (Record, 11. 21, '22. )
The division of Re, all unprepared as it was, was struck so hard by the Asiatic chariotry
that it crumbled before them. The southern portion or rear of their column must
have been scattered in the neighboring forest, with the loss of many prisoners, chariots,
and weapons. Some may have escaped to the division of Ptnli. But of this roar of
the column the sources say nothing. They are more interested in the front of the
column, which, broken and disorganized, having of course lost many prisoners and all
their equipment, fled in a rout northward to Ramses' 8 camp, where they must have
arrived upon the very heels of the messenger, who brought Ramses the news of the
disaster. They are hotly pursued by the Asiatic chariotry, who on reaching Ramses's
camp spread out and infold it within their extended wings. The Record states that
only Ramses and his "attendants" were thus surrounded; Ramses, moreover, after the
" It is
battle, rebukes his army for having forsaken him in his hour of need.
1
certain,
therefore, that the fleeing horde from the division of Re carried with them in a com-
mon rout the division of Amon, which was camping with Ramses. The reliefs have
preserved one incident of this pursuit by the Asiatic chariotry, which is important
because it shows at what point the pursuit struck the camp. They all show the most
notable of the pursued bursting through the barricade of the camp with the Hittite
chariots'" in hot pursuit; but as at present published the incident is intelligible only
in the Ramesseum reliefs (Plate I, upper right-hand corner). Here we see that the
fugitives are no less than two royal princes, each in his chariot, a royal sunshade-
bearer, and a fourth important official. The name and titles of the first are lost;
those of the second are given as: "Fan-bearer at the king's right hand, king's scribe,
general of his majesty, Prehirunamef.""* This general was the fourth"* son of
and the " first " '
Ramses, charioteer of his majesty ;" his presence in this battle has been
heretofore unnoticed, and very strikingly confirms the remark of Diodorus, that
Ramses's sons were appointed by him as commanders of this army (tSv airdvrtav viovs rov
iytnovtav, supra, p. 11).
ftafftXeax; iayr)icevai TTJV Over the fourth of the fugitives is an
inscription which seems to belong to the whole group; it begins: "The arrival of
the of Pharajoh, L. P. H., and of" the royal children, together with the
[
of the
divine mother." Then after a short lacuna, follows:
" "
in Of '
meaninc beloncinc to," or of the party of." lit Limes.
Knntgth., No. US. Hence Ramie* already
I" Poem, 11. MB.; It refers Mreral time* U> their flight, had at lean four Kin> uld f>nouh to accompany him inbat-
II. 14, . 1L . 7 and yet coin. I.
; gain. I. hii char- ; tie, in hi. fifth year. Ramm wai therefore probably at
ioteer aUo says - For, we stand alone, in the midst of
: lo. least thirty yean of ago at this time.
the foe: lo. the Infantry and chariotry hate forsaken us." in Luior inscription, Kee., XIV, name also, ibid., SI.
;
Set! I.'s son was also first charioteer of bis majesty " (see
(Po*". L ** )
"
"'They may be reeonlsed by the three men in each DsMosoAX. Cat.d* Hon.. I. 20, No*. 12S and 124; bad errors
chariot (Ecrptians have bat two), and by their lone robes, in publication I)
reaehiac below the calf of the le* iuiu.d a second trr. t The mn4 sip. is of coarse the
TheralsclMrlrnnlaesatUMlowerendsofU.l.*.and4, eacleof th* plural article.
asi*en In the rrabliratinn.and the lacuna of 1.3 shoo Id there-
fora be shorter. In L iooly tbedeterainatiTe is wanting.
112
l.i v IK RELIEFS; THE

-
,
/ .-
Fleeing on the west side of thecainp ? before (?) the foe.
The pursuit therefore entered the camp

from that side the first comers, as the relief
;
(Plate I) vividly shows,

were received by the Pharaoh's heavy infantry guard, stationed
around the camp, who pulled them from their chariots and dispatched them with short
swords and spears. Taken with but short shrift for preparation, Kamses hesitated not
an instant in attempting to cut his way out, and to reach his southern columns. With
only the household followers and officers
who happened to be at his side,"" he mounted
120
his waiting chariot, and boldly charged into the advance of the Hittite pursuit as it
into his camp on the west side. This is narrated by the Poem (following No.
pushed
24) thus:
27.
-fiPWia
Var.
A
J\.
^ y$ i i
k
I I
I I
His majesty halted in the rout, 121 then he charged into the midst of the foe of the van-
quished of Kheta, while he was alone by himself, without another with him. When his majesty t
L. P. H., went to reconnoiter behind him, he found that 2,500 spans of chariotry had surrounded
him on his way out, being every warrior of the vanquished of Kheta. (Poem, 11. 22-4.)
n'Ramses speaks (Poem, 1. 72) of " the sewers (*'>) of "i This rendering is not quite certain it follows the
;
the council chamber who wore at my side." variant, which is from the hieroglyphic text yr.n being
;
120 Shown in Plates I,

IV, and VI. from the hieratic.
113
M THE BATTLE OP KADESH
His unexpected onset thus brought him an instant's respite, during which he patched
m or south of his
out a few paces on the west camp, perceived how he was infolded by
the enemy's wings and must have instantly understood that further onset in that
direction was hopeless. The enemy, strong at this jH.int fW that very purpose, must
have immediately driven him back again, when he, of course finding the eastern wing
of the enemy's chariots much thinner than the center which he had just assaulted,
turned his assault eastward toward the river. The Record, which omits all refereno' to
his attempt on the enemy's center, makes short work of the whole battle thus (follow-
^
ing No. 25):
When his majesty saw them, he was enraged against them like his father. Montu, lord of
Thebes. He seized the adornments of battle, and arrayed himself in his coat of mail. He was
like Baal in his hour. Then he betook himself to his horses, and led quickly on, Ix-ing alone by
himself. He charged into the foe of the vanquished chief of Kheta, and the numerous coun-
tries which were with him. (Record, 11. 22-4.)
The result of this charge, as the Record continues, was that:
I I /w^v^
His majesty hurled them down headlong, one after another, into the waters of the Orontes
11. 24, 25).
(Record,
The inscription over the battle likewise, besides showing clearly where the struggle
took place, states little beyond the fact
given in the Record. It is as follows:'"
I I I lo III
www 11 BM
|)4 l i ^^
The stand which his majesty made while he was camping '" on the northwest of Kadesh.
He charged into the midst of the foe of the vanquished of Kheta while he was alone, without
m Which ide UM
KcTPtiaa coo*ldr*d u UM front " According to UM publications thU inscription U
of hi* camp, we do ant know, bati Banuee'i front dor- found only at UM BimawMam Fint Pylon, /./>.. : 1 1 1
ln UM reemlniUf of the batUe w. rajt. UM narrator, U - CIAUP. Xut. dner., IR: Second Pylon, CHAMP.. Him..
eeia It lone afUrward. wmi probably thinking of thU m-W-.Vo. itorr.. 186-9, (71, 114 - BOCBU... Jfott. itor.. 10.
fact, wkwa Wuld -behind him," imanlnc wvtward. 110- LD.. III. l4. 1.
Aceordin* to Raauw'* past adrance. loath would b* " be- m Liu-r.ll>.
"
-. tt in.- the term aim tued for
"
beie
hind Urn." in," which may be the meaninc here.
114
another with him, and he found that 2,500 spans of chariotry had surrounded him in four m
bodies on his every side
la>
He hurled them down, one upon another, into the waters of
the Orontes.""
Had enemy now quickly pressed in upon him from the west he must inevitably
the
have been likewise pushed back upon the river. He certainly had not more than a few
hundred troops, but these were the best of his army, and with these he repeatedly
had of course fallen into
charged impetuously down to the river. Meantime his camp
the hands of the enemy, as we shall see (No. 30), and it was certainly this which saved
him. The weakness of oriental armies in the matter of plunder is well known. Thut-
mose III. would have captured Megiddo on the day of his battle there, as he himself
says, had his troops not been lured
from the pursuit by the plunder on the field.
Mohammed would have won the battle of Ohod, had his troops not thrown discipline
to the winds and given themselves to the pillaging of the enemy's camp, which they
had taken at the first assault. Such occurrences are legion in oriental history. The
battle of Kadesh is but another example. While Ramses's unexpected and impetuous
offensive has swept the enemy's right into the river, their center is diverted by the rich
of the battle to which
plunder of the camp. It is the offensive of Ramses at this stage
the reliefs give so much attention. They depict him at the moment when he drove
the enemy's right into the river, with great vivacity and realism, introducing lively
128
incidents which would here delay us too long to discuss.
it
A body of troops, which it is difficult to connect with any of the four divisions,
now unexpectedly arrives and begins Ramses's rescue. They are the first infantry
which plays any important part in the battle, but they have also chariotry they are ;
depicted in all the reliefs, arriving at the camp in perfect discipline, with the follow-
1TO
ing inscription over them :
30.
n AAAAAA AAAAAA
&
(3
I I 1/vwA^ I I
o
I I
\\\_t
UJ
'>' Ramses himself
himself makes a similar statement in the
;
repeats this statement, Poem, 1, 88.
Poem (11. "I found that the 2,500 spans of char-
35, 38) : i" They will be taken up later in the discussion of the
iotry, in whose midst I was, were prostrated before my reliefs.
"
horses and again in 1. 54.
;
Abn Simbel CHAMP., Man., 32 = ROBBLL., Man. stor.,
l :
l*>The omitted portion is rather conventional descrip- 97 = -,!>.,

Ill, 187; Ramessnum: LD., Ill, 155; Luxor:
tion : "He slaughtered them, making them heaps beneath his CHAMP., Mm., S27 = Ro8ELL., Man. itor., 107. I had also
horses. He slew all the chiefs of all the countries, the allies Grflnau's photographs of Abu Simbel. See infra. Plates I,
of the vanquished chief of Kheta, together with his own IV and VI.
nobles, his infantry, and his chariotry. He overthrew them
prostrate upon thoir faces; he hurled them, etc ." as above.
115
N THE BATTLE OP KADESH
The Pharaoh, L. P. H., from'" the land of Amor. They

arrival of the recruits'" of
1U
found in that
the vanquished of Rheta had surrounded the camp of Pharaoh L. P. H., on
his (or its) west side,"* while his majesty was camping alone, without an army with him.
.... (portion omitted = No. 18). The recruits cut off the vanquished, wretched foe of Kheta,
while they were entering into the camp. The officers of Pharaoh, L. P. H., slew them, and
Their '* heart was filled '" with the great valor of Pharaoh,
117
let not one of them escape.
L. P. H., their good lord.
These troops do not belong to the divisions of Re or Ptah, for they are clearly
distinguished from them in the section above omitted (see No. 18)."* They are
possibly a portion of the fugitive division of Amon, now returning on finding
that
they are no longer pursued by the enemy. In this case it is difficult to understand
why they should be designated as just arriving "from Amor," farther south. They
arrived just as the enemy were taking possession of the abandoned camp of Ramses
from the west Taking the now dismounted Asiatic chariotry, at the moment when
they were beginning the pillage of the camp, the "recruits" surprised and easily cut
them to pieces. They would, of course, immediately reinforce Ramses, and together
with the rallying fragments of the division of Amon, which might now come in on
the west, considerably augment his strength." Seeing this the Hittite king made
, "jonths." nrn'- i* The variant U supported only by Luxor while Aba
UlTh* preposition unquestionably to be so ren-

(at) Is
Slmbel and Ramraw-um have first form. Since above wu
dered br (not" in"). Thii the uoal idiom for" arrive
" stereotyped Grnnan's photo (how* the (L in nA ami that
"
or return from." Thus in the tomb of Hui (/./)., Text III.
'
should be removed. But it make* absolutely no MOM,
while the variant fit* to perfectly. Hence I am inclined to
n) o**r the arrival of Ethiopian envoys, we And : "Arrival
think tha flrnt form a corruption in the acribal
frosa <r ) Ku*h .... landin* at the Soalbern City."
Or aa the suU of Ykwdfdt ( Berlin, lit*. Atuf. Tars., p. W) Photo ahowa m. i Photo shows m(t.
"leaavs fro*>Tbe4M*"(toAbydos); aodsooftan. Heno* I" Photo shows'' 1
.
ED. M KTXB U richt la his coutcatlon {Atnptiaea. Fmttcitr. '

Moreover, they appear loo early in the action to
/. B*r*.. p. ) that Amor did not include Kadesh.
hare belooced to the division of Ptah.
lC*rtinly miseopied from pM. W* bar* her. "The Poem (11.45-54) represent* Ramses as address-
fmfS. as we have fmm/ r* in No*. Z7 and S. S* ing his fleelnc troops, calling upon them to halt, and wit-
(too without m eompUoMnt in Powa. Kar., L 30). Daw his victory, etc. It is probable, therefor*, that they
i
Lauor oaalt* this phras*. did tarn back and support him.
116
another desperate attempt to destroy Ramses before the arrival of the latter's rein-
forcements. It is related by the Poem as follows (11. 38-44) :
Lo, the wretehed, vanquished chief of Kheta stood in the midst of his infantry and his
chariotry, beholding the battle of his majesty, while his majesty was alone by himself, not
having his infantry with him, nor chariotry. He stood turned about for fear of his majesty.
Then he caused to go numerous chiefs, each one among them having his chariotry, and being
equipped with the weapons of warfare: the chief of Arvad, him of Masa, the chief of Yawen
(lonians), him of Lycia, the chief of Dardeny, him of Keshkesh, the chief of Carchemish, the
140
chief of Kerkesh, him of Aleppo, (being) all the brethren of him of Kheta, united in one body,
"'
being 1,000 spans of chariotry.
The Poem then narrates in highly colored language the overthrow of these reinforce-
ments, without indicating where they were thrown in, or how they were used; but
Ramses must now have had sufficient troops to hold his own against them. He must
"
have maintained the unequal struggle in all for about three hours, when he finally led
1
at least six assaults against the enemy, the last of which seems to have been especially
successful; for after the battle has been raging for some time, the Poem says:
Then his majesty advanced swiftly and charged into the foe of the vanquished of Eheta.
At the sixth" 3 charge among them, being like Baal behind them in the hour of his might,
'"
I made slaughter among them, and there was none that escaped me. (Poem, 11. 58, 69.)
While this passage does not at all explain the direction or place of the assaults, it
indicates what was evidently the fact during the long three hours of desperate fight-
was only by prodigies of personal valor that Ramses held his scanty
ing, viz., that it
forces together. Of this three hours' combat we have been able above to follow little
more than those incidents which exhibited the splendid personal courage of Ramses in
his almost single-handed struggle; for, I repeat, it is in these that the sources are
chiefly interested. As soon as the reinforcements arrive, and the action becomes more
general and extended, no longer centering in the Pharaoh's onset, the court narrators,
whose function it is to immortalize the deeds of their lord, have no occasion to record
it. Hence neither the Poem nor the Record makes the slightest reference to the
arrival of Ramses's reinforcements, and we are unable to present any plan of the battle
from this point on.
As far as we know, the Hittite king made no attempt to prevent the division of
Ptah from reaching the field. Neither the Poem nor the Record refer to its arrival
in any way, and the only record of its coming is preserved in the reliefs at Luxor
(Plate V). Among the approaching reinforcements, hastening up in the rear of the
1*0 Omitted by Sallier III, and fragmentary in the excessively inaccurate, has out of habit written 2,500 before
hieroglyphic except at Abydos, which gives complete the frequently recurring phrase " spans of chariotry."
reading. 112 If his
messenger reached the division of Ptah, a mile
I Sallier III has Luxor and Abydos are de- or two north of Shabtuna, by 4: 00 p. M., they could reach
2,500;
the field by a forced march by 6:00 P. H., three hours after
stroyed at this point; Karnak alone shows 1,000. If
Sallier III is correct, the whole incident is but a repetition the battle began.
of the first attack, in which 2,500 chariots were involved. "3 Not eight, as given by MASPEBO (Struggle, p. 393).
But the entire context indicates that we have here a rein- On the rendering of the ordinal, see SETHE, AZ,, 38, 1U.
forcement of the In tin; attack; the papyrus, which is
I 1** The sudden change of person is in all the originals,
117
40 THE BATTLE OF KADF.SH
Hittites,appear the words:"* "Arrival of the vizier to [assist?] tin- army <>f [his
majesty]." The vizier thus leads tin- reinforcements into action."* The Asiatics.
caught between the opposing lines, were driven into the city, probably with consider-
able loss. The Luxor relief shows them fleeing into the city, but none of the other
sources offers the slightest reference to the movements ,f (lie troops at the close of
,
the battle. The Record closes all such narrative by simply averring that Ramses
hurled them all into the river; while the Poem goes on from that i>oint, chiefly to
enlarge upon the Pharaoh's personal prowess, with picturesque and telling incidents.
but gives little of the character of the subsequent battle as a whole. We should have
supposed that rather than allow Ramses to escape from the snare so cleverly l.-iid for
him, the Hittite king would have thrown in every man of the eight thousand infantry
in the midst of which he stood on the east side of the river watching the battle'"
(Plates II, III. and V, and p. 43). But with the exception of the incidents in the
camp the entire battle was one of chariotry and as we know nothing of the relative
;
or comparative effectiveness of infantry and chariotry at this early j>eriod, there may
have been reasons why the Hittite king could not employ his foot against the Egyptian
chariots. So
clever a strategist as the Hittite leader had shown himself to be would
not have held back a great body of infantry without what seemed to him a good
reason, however might seem to ns.
it
When evening drew on the enemy took refuge in the city, the battle was over, and
Ramses was saved. The Poem 14* goes on to describe how the scattered Egyptian
fugitives crept back and found the plain strewn- with the Asiatic dead, especially of the
personal and official circle about the Hittite king. This was undoubtedly true; the
Asiatics must have lost heavily in Ramses's camp, on the river north of the city, and at
the arrival of the division of Ptah; but Ramses's loss was certainly also very heavy.
and in view of the disastrous surprise of the division of Re, probably much greater
than that of his enemies. What made the issue a success for Ramses was his salva-
tionfrom utter destruction, and that he eventually also held possession of the field
added little practical advantage.
In conclusion we must note briefly, but more fully than was possible above, the
more important characteristics of the reliefs, as bearing upon the questions of place
and time above discussed. As I have already stated, we much need an accurate ami
exhaustive publication of these scenes. The drawings of Weidenbach are so out of
proportion that they cannot be joined, and I have been obliged to separate the different
plates by an interval The earlier publications, though the plates fit together more
accurately, are much more inaccurate than Weidenbach. But they are all sufficiently
accurate to determine the movements of troops, as far as
they are represented in these
"CBAr.. V<m B4 (lo publication incorrectly oom-
. M A. we mentioned abors. It U possible that the ritlrr
beredJU). Our Luxor relief (iVra. Plate V)UUken from himwlf went tooth to brio* up the diiion of Pub.
IU-.lUnl.wkobuof.ltUd till Uucriptioa. HbrfoniUi "'The portion which I hare Mdgned to thi. lof.ntrr
PUU V Mot, Ue EcrptUa harlot conulain*- two MO, on H.p VIII U bued on the relief., which .how tb.t they
erra .UDdard-Wren in the upper were ported on the rirer opposite the point toward which
Ramie, wu charging. i- I.I. 19 ff
US
XXV I XXIV xxm
XXXII XXXI.
Lir* *t JC, ffl t>; rtC
scenes. A careful examination shows that these reliefs ignore entirely or consider only
loosely relations both of time and place. Those of time are so disregarded that the
become progressive, representing successive incidents, like those found in later
pictures
European painting," as late as the seventeenth century. But our reliefs become very
9
confused at this point, because they also neglect relations of place. This may be best
seen at Abu Simbel (Plate VI). In the lower half are the camp and accompanying
incidents; while the upper half contains the scene of Ramses charging. At the right
end of the camp (before the words: "The Record, con.") we have the pursuing
Hittites driving in the royal princes (see above pp. 34, 85). At the other end (before
the words: "The Arrival, etc.") are the incoming "recruits" who later in the battle
slew the Hittites in the camp. Now both these incidents took place at the west end
of the camp as the accompanying inscriptions show; in order to represent them cor-
rectly, the artist would have been obliged to make two drawings of the camp: one, the
earlier, showing the fugitive princes at the west end ; and another, the later, showing
the incoming "recruits" likewise at the west end. But the artist does not do this.
He draws the camp and describes it in a short inscription as in process of erection.
This is the earliest instant. He then adds the other successive incidents: at the right
the Pharaoh's session with his officers and the beating of the Asiatic scouts then, ;
also at the right, and coming from nowhere apparently, the princes fleeing into the
camp; and finally the arrival of the "recruits," at the other end, the only place where
he had room. Thus, with but little regard for time or place, various incidents are
loosely grouped about some more important center. As is of course well known, this
is only in accord with the fundamental characteristic of Egyptian drawing: inability
to represent things or their parts, in their proper local relations to each other. So
complicated a scene as that of a moated city on a river, with a battle raging about it,
comes out remarkably enough when depicted after this manner. At one end is Ramses
receiving prisoners and trophies after the battle; at the other end he charges the
enemy's right early in the action. As in the lower row we can only affirm that these
two incidents took place near the city. The charge we know from the inscriptions was
north of the city, and the reception of prisoners in all probability likewise took place
there. Under a priori clear that safe topographical conclu-
these circumstances it is
sions can hardly be made from the reliefs. But let us nevertheless make the attempt.
According to the inscriptions, Ramses was northwest of Kadesh when the battle took
place. Looking at the Abu Simbel reliefs (Plate VI) we shall see, then, that the left
end is therefore the north. This coincides, too, with the direction of the messenger
(extreme right) as he goes southward to bring up the southern reinforcements, and
also with the position of the advance lines of the division of Ptah. This is also in
accord with the direction of the river. The north and south axis is apparently all in
order; but not so the east and west axis; for Ramses is here shown on the east of the
"9 For example, a progressive painting of the incidents of Christ's death and resurrection, Berlin No. 1222, Schule
von Socat, about 1470 to 1500 A. D.
119
U THE BATTLE OP KAOESH
river, whereas the sources clearly state that his camp was on the west side of the river
(No. 13) and by his camp these charges of Ramses took place.
, Or granting that he
is on the west of the river, he would then be south of the city, which is again directly
contradicted by the inscriptions. The topography of the relief therefore cannot

be harmonized with the data of the inscriptional documents. But more than this: the
reliefs flatly contradict each other. Looking at the Luxor relief (Plate V), we see
Ramses charging on the right of the city. If he is here north of the city, as he must
be to accord with the inscriptions, he is then on the west of the river." Or granting
that he is on the south of the city, he is then on the east of the river. In either case
his position is diametrically opposite to that shown in the other reliefs. It is out of
the question to suppose that Abu Simbel and the two Ramesseum reliefs represent a
and a different position from that shown at Luxor. The
different stage of the conflict
Luxor relief shows Ramses surrounded by four bodies of Asiatic chariotry, a situation
which arose <it his camp early in the battle; the other reliefs all depict exactly the
same situation and therefore the same place. In all, Ramses is in or beside his camp.
The cause of the contradiction is not far to seek. The artist was obliged by his own
limitations to begin by laying down the river horizontally along the middle of his
horizontal field. This done and the city located, he was ready to put in Ramses and
the combatants. When we remember that Ramses hurled his foes down into the river, 111
there is Ramses except OVEB the river. Otherwise, in such primitive

no place to put
drawing, theenemy him would have had to fall up into the river. Hence
before
whether Ramses is placed on the right or the left of the city, he must necessarily be
placed above the river, and his position on that side of it has no topographical
1
significance whatever."
Bearing in mind these facts we may now rapidly note just what important
moments in the progress of the battle the reliefs show. They show us first the camp
(Plates I, IV, and VI) with its rectangular barricade of shields. We cannot stop to note
the animated scenes of camp within, but the reader should notice the large rec-
life
tangular pavilion of Ramses in the middle. Several smaller tents of the officers are
1
grouped about that of Ramses. On the right" (Luxor, left) is Ramses, sitting, as the
Record "upon a throne of gold." This scene is, of course, supposed
states (No. 14)
Before him are his courtiers and officers, near
to take place in the Pharaoh's tent
whom (below) the unfortunate Asiatic spies are being beaten. Around them are
grouped Ramsee's heavy guard of foot, consisting of Egyptians (round-topped shields)
*Tba drawing of the rim la quite incomplete tn the Plate III; or hii amasing feat* of anatomy in drawing the
Luxor publication (Plate V). lu upper line ahonld be human form (Kan AN, Lift in Annmt Kmpt. p. 3W) or the ;
continued downward and toward the right under Bamaaa drawing of the facade of a temple, .showing the facade
(a. the photograph abowa). ao that Bamaea ia abore the viewed from a point in front, combined with a rii-w of iu
rirer. u in all the other relief*. accompanying eoloaal from two aidea, tboae on the right
"'Literally, "canaed them to go down (or fall) into the from the right ilde, and tlioae on the 1-fi fr..m tbe left
waten." aide thus introducing three Tiew-poinU into one drawing.
;
If anroae doubt, the Egyptian'. .rtonUhln. nneon- Q,, PUt4) , thu ,. ha. bei taken from the right,
adounôf
the proper relation, of place In a drawing, let
him look at the nalr. drawing of Ramaee'i drawn bow, on
. nd ^ lnto the Uftâod corner to aar. .pace,
120
JAMES HENKY BBEASTED 43
and Shardana mercenaries, with round shields and horn-crested helmets. Near at
hand is Ramses's war chariot, with his charioteer, awaiting his commands. It was
during this scene that the division of Re was attacked, and it was thus employed that
the messenger announcing the disaster found Ramses. Following closely upon the
arrival of this messenger, of whom the reliefs make no mention, is the arrival of the
fleeing princes who camp at the west side (upper right-hand corner
burst into the ;
Luxor, upper left). Ramses's guards are seen pulling their pursuers from their
chariots and slaying them (especially Plate I). On the left (Luxor, right) are the
newly arrived chariotry and infantry of the "recruits," who began Ramses's rescue
(pp. 37, 38) .But this is in slight anticipation and did not occur until after Ramses
himself was in action. The artist, having exhausted this horizontal field, must take
another in which to depict Ramses's desperate defense, the scene for which the reliefs
chiefly exist. He shows the moated city, bearing the words: "City of Kadesh" (Plate
Below it the river is swelled and widened, perhaps by a dam, which backs
III) .
up the
water " from below, with the intent of strengthening the city's defenses. The line of
1
155
water at the bottom may be the brook of El-Mukadiyeh. Especially at Luxor the
enemy may be seen surrounding Ramses "in four bodies, on his every side" (No. 29),
though this situation is evident in them all. At Abu Simbel (Plate VI) and the
Ramesseum (Plate II) the Asiatic chariotry may be seen still crossing the river south
(to the right) of the city, though the stage of the conflict ia much later than the
attack on the division of Re, for which purpose the enemy first crossed there. Before
Ramses the plain is strewn with the slain, among whom the accompanying inscriptions
furnish the identity of a number of notable personages, among them several com-
manders, beside the scribe, the charioteer, the chief of the body-guard of the Hittite
king; and finally even his own royal brother, who falls at the river's brink. On the
opposite shore, their comrades draw the more successful fugitives from the water, and
a tall figure held head downward, that he may disgorge the water he has swallowed, is
accompanied by the words: "The wretched chief of Aleppo, turned upside down by
his soldiers, after his majesty hurled him into the water." In the midst of heavy
masses of infantry on the same bank stands the Hittite king in his chariot, whom the
15* "
Egyptian scribe characterizes in these terms: The vanquished, wretched chief of
Kheta, standing before his infantry and chariotry, with his face turned round, and his
heart afraid. He went not forth to battle, for fear of his majesty, after he saw his
majesty
prevailing [against the vanquished chief] of Kheta and all the chiefs of all the countries
[who] were with him." The scribe has indicated at the Ramesseum that this infantry
numbers 8,000; but Abu Simbel has: "Other warriors (tw-hl-r' ) before him, 9,000." li7 1
isi The
absurdity of identifying this backed-up water i&&In both scenes at the Ramessenm (Plates II and
with the lake of .in; is evident at the first glance.
1.1
.
It III). It is also at Abydos.
is filled with escaping men and horses, whom we are to IMThe same incident is also narrated in the Poem (U.
imagine as swimming across a lake two or three miles 38 If .); luprn, p. 40.
wide I We see chariotry galloping around it to surround 1*'I had no photograph of this inscription, and the old
Ramses, and we are to imagine they are doing it around a publications (CHAMP., .Von., and ROSELL., Hon. ttor.) may
lake six miles long and two or three miles wide I easily be in error.
121
44 THE BATTLK OP KADESH
"Other" is, of coarse, in contrast with those fighting in the battle. Abydos merely
has: of the vanquished chief of Khetn, very numerous in men an<l
"[The army?]
hones." Meanwhile, as only Abu Simbel shows (Plate VI) the Pharaoh's messenger ,
has reached the division of Ptah in the south and their arrival is noted at Luxor (see
;
above, p. 82).
Luxor and the Ramesseum (Plate II) also show a line of Egyptian
chariots attacking the enemy in Ramses's rear. These may be the chariotry of the
division of Amon, now rallying to his support.
These reliefs effectually dispose of one fairy tale frequently attached to the battle,
viz., that Ramses was accompanied and
assisted in the action by his tame lion. So,
for example, Maspero says: "The tame lion which accompanied him on his expeditions
did terrible work by his side, and felled many an Asiatic with his teeth and claws.'"
The story goes back to classic times, for in a description of the battle scene in the
11*
Ramesseum reliefs Diodorus says:
KOI Kara, ftiv rov *ptarov riav roi\<av rov /3o<rtXca <carO-va<r0cu iroXioptcovvra rTô VJTO worapav
npippvrov KCU wpofivovvivovra. vpos nvat &vTtTTay/jLtvov* fi.no. AC'OITOS, o-vmyanajo/ic'vov fov Orjpiav
ic virip ou ru>v i^rfyovftcviay ol ptv I<pa<Tav irpos AX-ffOitav xiipoyQr) \iovra. rpttfrofitvov vuro
ovymroWcvcir aiTp Kara Tas /iaâ? KOI rpOTn)v iroitiv rutv Ivavrtiav 8a TTJV a\Kyv Tim
o' on KaO' iirtpPo\i)ir Avoplio? uy icai <opriKi? ioivrov Sto T^s TOV
urropow iyKutfitd^ftv /JouA.o/iO'ov,
Xcorrot cixoVot rrjv buiBifJiv iavrov T
The only explanation 1 "

The story was therefore questioned even in Hecataeus's time.
for it is the fact that on the side of Ramses's chariot at Abu Simbel, Luxor, and in one
of theRamesseum reliefs (Plate III) there is a decorative figure of a lion. It stands in
the same position on two different chariots at the same time during the council at Abu
Simbel (Plate VI), and a moment's examination will convince anyone that the figure is
purely decorative. Such decorative lions are not uncommon ; thus,
for example, on the
'*
seat of King Harmhab's throne at Silsileh appears a lion's figure in the same way ;
"
and on the sides of Ramses II. 'B throne at Luxor are two lions. It would be absurd
1
to affirm that these were living pets of the king. Ramses really did possess a tame
lion, which he had with him on this expedition. The lion is shown lying with bound
4
in the behind the Pharaoh's tent in all the scenes of the camp;" but
forepaws camp
* There is 1
there is no evidence that he had anything whatever to do with the battle.
>nKwlo/<A JValionj. P.3W. UtCHAMF., I/on.. 111. For other examples MM aUo
Vol. I. p. IS ; ed.
>
Voomu Vol. M, 84 - DnrnoE-
P T"- DecoratiM Art, US.
I. pp.
MCLLE*. Vol. I, p. 40. Bm lo th murk of Tzrrzu, lu DAUMT, Her., 9, 8.
IM At Aba Simbel (PUto VI) it is incorrectly drawn u

<* Diodonu'f alternative explanation of eoane, toIs, , ball or oz.
be coaoaeted with the fraqoeat DM of the lion, both in lit-
ratara and cnlptar*, at a symbol of the Pharaoh. In "Th words "slayer of his enemtos," applied to the
senlpton its mo.t common form was the sphinx.
" * "
"company the sacrifloe of prisoners, and only
indicate that the lion was allowed to slay thnm at the usual
i
Diodoras'i description 1s drawn from Heeataras of sacrifice before toe od. This 1s a long way from the em-
Abdcra. Ou this description see the plan of BoCBUtoirrax ploymentof the lion in battle See following note
(Kcc.. VIII. IK).
122
1 "
absolutely no other basis for the tale,"* and in the scenes cited by Maspero only the J^Q
decorative lion is to be found. f
The battle once over, Ramses has the trophies, the hands cut from the bodies
of the slain, with the prisoners, and spoil brought before him. This is shown in a
small corner of the Abu Simbel reliefs (Plate VI, under messengers), where we see
him standing in his chariot as the severed hands are cast down before him. None of
the other reliefs shows the incident, except Abydos, where it is more fully represented
than at Abu Simbel.The scene is unpublished, but the accompanying inscriptions"8
show that Ramses commanded: "[Bring on] the prisoners which I myself captured,
*
while I was alone, having no army with my 16 majesty, nor any prince with me, nor
any chariotry." Besides these, there were brought also captured "horses, chariots,
bows, swords, and all the weapons of war."
It is unfortunate that th,e Abydos reliefs are unpublished, but they are very still
fragmentary and Mariette gives sufficient description of them to show that they con-
tain the identical scenes found in the others. He says: 170
La muraille exterieure du temple n'a 616 d6blayee quo recemment. Elle est tout entiere
historique et se rapporte a une campagne de Ramses centre les Khe'tas
Les deux armees sont aux prises. Les Kheias, accul6s entre deux bras du fleuve, sont
cern6s et mis en fuite. Ceux qui suivent le bras inf<5rieur ne sont pas atteints. Les autres sont
prScipite's dans les flots. L'armee ennemie est captive avec tous ses baggages (face du Nord).
Une partie des fuyards tombe dans un campement egyptien dont les troupes n'avaient pas
pris part a la bataille. On y voit des soldats indigenes et des auxiliaires composes de Schardanas.
Quelques regiments sont en marche, probablement pour rejoindre le gros du d6tachement deja
camp6 (face de 1'Ouest).
Mariette publishes only the following three scenes:
Plate 30 :
Empty chariot of Ramses held by charioteer and orderlies, as in all the other
reliefs.
Plate 31 : Shardana guard as at Abu Simbel.
Plate 32 : Lower line of chariots and two lines of infantry from the arrival of the
"recruits," as in all the other reliefs.
A hitherto unnoticed relief belonging to this series is on a palimpsest wall at

Karnak (Plate VII). " It is so injured by the later reliefs which Ramses himself
1
had cut over them, that one can only recognize fragments of the scenes already found
in the other reliefs. Comparing it with Luxor (Plate IV), these identical frag-
ments are:
IM Besides being here in the Pharaoh's camp behind '"CHAMP., Mm.., 25; ROSKLL., tton. ttor., 87.
his tout, the lion is found also at Abu Simbel with the
Pharaoh on the march (CHAMP., Man., 15) at Bet el-Walli
, Mar Ab Vo , w , p,,,,^.^ has ..
Ms .,,
;
beside the Pharaoh's throne (ibid., 62); and finally at Derr

17
Voyage dam la haute Kgypte, Vol. I, p. 72.
in two scenes (/./'., Ill, 1836 and 184a, and CHAMP., Not. 1T1 On
the outside of the south wall of the great hypo-
/'.'.;, r.. I, 90), where the king is sacrificing prisoners to style hall. The plate is drawn from a photograph taken
Amonre. In these last scenes he is accompanied by the by Borchardt. More could doubtless be SCCD on the wall
"
inscription : The lion, follower of his majesty, slayer of itself, and doubtless further traces could be found outside
his enemies," and he is biting one of the prisoners. of the limits of this photograph.
123
I'
1
.
AA Egyptian staliliin^ nn A-iatic U-foro Bamaee'a tent.

BB Guard in the council scene, lower row.
OC Beating of the Asiatic scouts.
DD Bowing officials before Ramses.
EE Head and shoulders of Ramses as seated on his throne.
FF Charioteer before him; part of felloe of chariot wheel in skirt of charioteer's
garment.
GO Traces of sunshade-bearers behind Ramses.
HH Legs and feet from line of Shardaua of the guard.
Below is Ramesseum and Abydos. The only

the line of water also found at the
variation from Luxor is that the council scene in the tent was here on the right of the
1
camp, instead of on the left as at Luxor." But it is clear that the same incidents
which we find in all the others, filled this last series. These Kadesh scenes seem to
have commonly suffered alterations. Besides the total erasure of the above Karnak
series, the photographs show that the camp at Luxor was placed over Ramses's charge
1
and the charge on the first pylon at the Ramesseum is cut over an earlier one placed
much higher. It was evidently filled with cement, which has now fallen out, leaving
the original lines so clear and deep that Weidenbach saw and sketched them (in
Plate II), and they are clearly visible in a photograph.
The Poem claims that Ramses renewed the action the next morning (11. 92 ff.),
describes the battle in brief, vague, and purely conventional terms, representing
Ramses as victorious, and then states that the Hittite king sued for peace in a
humble letter to Ramses. Thereupon Ramses assembled his officers, proudly read to
them the letter, and returned in triumph to Egypt. To none of these alleged events
'"
of the next day do the Record or the reliefs make the slightest reference, and the
narrative of them bears all the ear-marks of scribal flattery. The whole incident may
have found its source in the fact that Ramses drew up a body of his troops to cover his
retreat in the morning, and that they may have had to protect the rear from harassing
by Hittite pursuers. However this may be, Ramses's immediate retreat to the south,
admitted by the Poem (1L 87, 88), is clear evidence that he was too crippled to con-
tinue the campaign further. The Hittite king may possibly have proposed a cessation
"
of hostilities, but this is doubtful. To state that in the battle of the second day he
1
I is oo tbo .opposition that the figures AA belong

Thii i: MfLi.M (Alien,
p. as, n. 1) would refer this event to
in the camp by Kamses's tent, u in the other relief*; bat the treaty of peaoe in the year 21. explaining iu preeanee
they might alo be a pair from the hand-to-hand struggle in the Poem by the theory that we bare only a later redac-
In the lower right-hand corner at Luxor (Plata V). In that tinn of the Poem, in which the scribe, overlooking the
ease the arrangement U exactly a at Luxor. interval, hai attached the peaoe compact <lir.-rt!y to n...
M AsrElo's reference (Struggle, p. JM) of the M*oe of
' ' battle of Kadesh. The objection to thin is that there is no
Ramsea'i chart* to the second day's battle Is impossible. statementof a treaty in the letter. The Hittite king's li-iier
ThUeeaa*.** above Doted, shows Ramaes alone, surrounded onl ) vers, *'th the usual oriental flattery, that they are
r
by Aiiatic chariotry, a predicament in which he found tna servants of Pharaoh, and bees him to slay no mor.- ..f
himwlf only in the fint day's battle. To suppose that such his servants. This may be based on a proposal by the llit-
situation occurred la the second day's battle U not only < oeeaatlon of hostilities.
abinrd, but U flatly contradicted by the accompanying
InseripUone, which place it in the flnt day's battle, warn
the southern troops had not yet come up.
1'JI
WALL SHOWING LATER RELIEFS CUT OVER KADESH SEBIES; OUTSIDE SOOTH WALL OF GBEAT HTPOSTTLE, KJ
PALIMPSEST
(From a photograph by Borchardt)
a
t I
JAMES HENRY BBEASTED 47
"was on the point of perishing,"

15
or to refer to "the surrender of Qodshu"
m
(Kadesh) is pure romancing. For the first statement there is
not a particle of evi-
dence; and not even the Poem has the face to claim that Kadesh was captured. For
sixteen years after this battle, Ramses was obliged to maintain incessant campaigning
advance and wring from them a peace on equal
in Syria, in order to stop the Hittite
terms. Meantime he evidently found compensation in the fame which his exploit at
Kadesh brought him, for he had it recorded in splendid reliefs on all his greater
temples and assumed among his titles in his royal titulary the proud epithet:
"Prostrater of the lands and countries, while he was alone, having no other with
177
him."
However confused our knowledge of the latter half of this battle may be, the
movements which led up to it are determined clearly and with certainty. These
movements show that already in the fourteenth century B. C. the commanders of the
time understood the value of placing troops advantageously before battle that they ;
further already comprehended the immense superiority to be gained by clever

maneuvers masked from the enemy and that they had therefore, even at this remote
;
date, made contributions to that supposed science, which was brought to such perfec-
tion by Napoleon the science of winning the victory before the battle.
ADDENDUM
Since I read the above essay at the Hamburg Congress of Orientalists (in Septem-
ber, 1902), Professor Petrie's note on the battle has appeared (PSA., December,
1902, pp. 317 f.). As there has been much delay in the printing of my essay owing
to my absence since the Congress in Europe, I am here able to add Professor Petrie's
note to the bibliography above (pp. 4, 5). I see that we are in agreement on the flank
movement of the Asiatics around the city of Kadesh but the location of the city in ;
the lake is, I think, clearly refuted by the evidence above adduced (pp.
13-21).
There is no evidence that the king turned back to the flying division of Re ; on the
contrary, the sources state that the fleeing division of Re "fled northward to the place
where his majesty was" (No. 25), and the reliefs show the fugitives as they reached
the camp. Again the onset of Ramses is designated: "The stand which his majesty
made, while he was camping on the northwest of Kadesh." He would not have been on
the "northwest of Kadesh," while making this "stand," if he had turned back to the
division of Re. Furthermore, I know of nothing in the sources upon which Professor
Petrie's account of Ramses's pursuit of the
enemy around the southwest end of the
lake, and northeastward to Horns, could be based. It would, in the first place
178
putting Ramses's camp on the northwest of the island (see Map involves III)
I'S M ASPERO, Struggle, p. 394. n Ibid., p. 395. 1" In accordance with Professor Petrie's location of the
l" 7 Around a column in the Kamesseum, SHARPE, Eg. city on the island.
Inscr., Vol. II, p. 53.
125
48 THE BATTLE OK KM-I>U
inarch of twenty -one or twenty-two milee to reach camp, immediately follow. <1 Ky a hard
battle and a pursuit of some nineteen miles all in one day! This physical im| -r-il>i!ity
and the lack of all support for it in the inscriptions,"* force me to differ with my
friend, Professor Petrie, on this point. That my own account of the outcome of the
battle La quite unsatisfying, I am perfectly aware, but for this the sources are respon-
sible; and I do not think that more can be safely drawn from them. But I am glad
to Bee that we at least agree on the important initial flank movement by the Asiat.
" I cmn ouljr suppose that Professor Petrie hu drawn his t hoorjr from the relied.
128
l>i .
I:N\IAL PUBLICATIONS, V PLATE VIII
THE MODERN MODND OF KADESH

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Tin: r\ i v I;I;SITY OF CHIC voc

THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS

TIIK HATFLK OF KADESH

THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS

THE BATTLE OF KADESH

PRINTED FROM VOLUME V

PRINTED AUOCST 1, 1808

a beginning, at least, in the explanation of these materials. As it is hoped that this

Megiddo and Kadeeh. At Me^iddo. already in tli.- sixti-fiith century

Ti: we shall ref.-r I., the document us the Poem. CJl A

hieroglyphic form are said by Brugsch" to be found

the Ramesseum twice, in Luxor, in Abu

Karnak and Abydoe;

* MAsrxao's statement " ta the photoeraph.

ground-plan relations of the different parts of a scene, demanding a knowledge of

flight and cowardice as a foil against which

4s/r, pp. it, stand Plate Til I not be applied to the r.

have they any statement

purposes in the eleventh dynasty (about 2100 B. C.), King Nibtowere-Montuhotep

century B. C.), in a similar Libyan

is certainly uwsalf*, andis contradicted by the total,

over that ' " Laodicea ad Libanum."

vioOt 0oo-.Ais Tip ^t/uoriav. (1,47; ed.

the notes of modern travelers.

uUI Ifi. lii JL-JI JJe JiM JfiJ.I c Uj LXjl JuJI

vp&TOV rAi> roi^ttv rbv ftacnXc'a KartaicfvdaQai iro\u>picovvra

RamWi eoli Bactiiao*

journey from Hamah to Rit.l.-h in 1840. In Robinson 's book," he describes it as

ground east of the mill.

w Biblititheca Sacra (1848), p. 691. n Op. cit., p. 166.

by the accounts of Ramses II.'s

This same march is stated in the Poem as follows:

It will is advancing northward along the Orontes through the

country grows lower and lower till on

but the Tell Nebl Mendeh, which is

sary detour to the east around the eastern

point, as did Robinson, Sachau, Conder,

on their heads all going to make up a lively scene."

which is above a town on the northward-flowing Orontes would naturally be called

K SAOAC, who erosJ here on October 2S, says :

by the Record thus:

Then one gave orders to the vizier

marching on the south of Shabtuna (Record, 11. 18, 19).

any knowledge of the where-

king of the Kheta had retreated

JO Km. when the king proceeded north-

"Behind Kadesh" is, of course, with reference to

allies are stationed somewhere north of Kadesh. Their

Then his majesty, L. P. H., marched before He

then follows the position of the Asiatics as below, No. 10 ;

It will be seen that pushing rapidly forward. Even th.- division of

Enumeration of his allies follows; then:

His majesty arrived at the city (Poem, 1. 12);

then follow Nos. 10 and 11. In the proper sequence of

Lo, his majesty had halted on the north of the city of

The same facts are stated briefly and clearly by the

In the same relief Ramses shown

This again corroborated by a remark in an inscription over newly arrived infantry