Article

European Journal of Social Theory

1–18
Neo-classical sociology: ª The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1368431015590290
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theory today

Alain Caillé
Université Paris-Nanterre, Paris, France
Frédéric Vandenberghe
Rio de Janeiro State University, IESP-UERJ, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Abstract
This article calls for a new theoretical synthesis that overcomes the fragmentation,
specialization and professionalization within the social sciences. As an alternative to
utilitarianism and the colonization of the social sciences by rational choice models, it
proposes a new articulation of social theory, the Studies and moral, social and political
philosophy. Based on a positive anthropology that finds its inspiration in Marcel Mauss’s
classic essay on the gift, it recommends a return to classical social theory and explores
articulations between theories of reciprocity, care and recognition.

Keywords
anti-utilitarianism, care, French theory, general social theory, the gift, Mauss, postcolonial
studies, recognition

Il n’y a pas des sciences sociales, mais une science des socie´te´s.
Marcel Mauss (1969: 51)

Sociology is entering its Second Century. It is a young discipline, but it is growing old.
Our question is whether it was merely, like anthropology, a discipline of the twentieth
century or whether it can continue for another two centuries. The numbers of sociolo-
gists, sociology teachers and sociology students are increasing around the world, but for

Corresponding author:
Frédéric Vandenberghe, Rio de Janeiro State University, IESP-UERJ, 82 Rua da Matriz, Botafogo, 22260-100,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Email: frederic@iesp.uerj.br

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2 European Journal of Social Theory

several reasons, it is not clear that this seemingly favourable situation will last, nor that
the discipline will survive for a long time in its current form. Not that sociology is in
crisis. It is not. All things considered, that is what we find most worrying. With its
increasing professionalism, it courts the risk of becoming irrelevant. There are numerous
investigations of local social problems, from drunken driving in Alabama to bullying on
the Internet and discrimination of Brazilian transsexuals in Paris. About the global eco-
nomic crisis, however, sociology has hardly anything special to say. When its contribu-
tions are not couched in obscure jargon or impenetrable maths that give them a scientific
semblance, its observations remain so close to common sense and everyday life that one
wonders what distinguishes sociology from sociography or even from (realist) literature.
Both in its expert and common-sense versions one finds a lot of moral posturing and
ideological positioning. As if denunciations of global capitalism and sympathy with the
downtrodden could possibly change the system!
In a money-driven world that admits only the measure of immediate profitability,
the usefulness of sociology is indeed challenged. The discipline may not be in crisis, it
nevertheless displays increasing uncertainty about its identity, its project and its legiti-
macy. The ritual invocation of Marx, Weber and Durkheim as ‘founding fathers’ of
sociology does not restrain the disorientation and fragmentation of the discipline.
While it constructs an illusionary continuity between the past and the present, it pre-
cludes an exploration of continuities with the older traditions (natural law, philosophy
of history, the humanities, moral and political philosophy, political economy). The
canonization of the classics checks disciplinary drift, but it only does so by relegating
other authors to the periphery of the discipline. Who still reads Comte, Spencer or
even Parsons?
In this article, we propose a series of integrated reflections on the current state of the
social sciences. Our aim is to contribute to the development of a general social theory
along anti-utilitarian lines. The article contains four sections. In the first section, it opens
with a brief analysis of a quadruple fragmentation within the social sciences: the auton-
omization of theory and research; the fragmentation among theories; the separation of
sociology and the Studies; as well as between the social sciences and moral, social and
political philosophy. As an alternative to the rational choice models of neo-classical eco-
nomics, in the second section, it develops the contours of neo-classical sociology and
calls for a new synthesis of social theory, the Studies and moral and political philosophy.
Through an articulation of metatheory, social theory and sociological theory, in the third
section, it advances a loose integration of theories of social action, order and social
change and spells out the minimal requirements of a pluralist position. Finally, in the
fourth section, in dialogue with theories of care and recognition, it presents and proposes
the gift paradigm as a general social theory that, with a little help from our friends, is able
to translate the other theories. Tentatively, we suggest that it offers the best platform for a
new synthesis within the social sciences.

Four fragmentations
When we look at the current situation of sociology, we see four fragmentations: two
internal ones and two external ones.

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 3

The first fragmentation within sociology is that between teaching and research, theory
and methodology, concepts and techniques, abstractions and operationalizations. On the
one hand, we have the teaching of classical and contemporary sociological theory (SOC
101: Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel; SOC 201: Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas, some-
times also Luhmann, though, granted, his work is definitely more difficult to teach). The
introductory courses are given at the beginning of the curriculum to students who are
generally too young to grasp its significance. The result is rather predictable: Sociology
is identified with a positivist, objectivist and determinist account of society (culled from
the first chapter of Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method), an iron-cage-vision
of modernity (extracted from the final pages of The Protestant Ethic) and a trenchant, yet
stereotyped critique of neo-liberal capitalism (inspired by the Communist Manifesto). On
the other hand, there is hands-on training for empirical research, both qualitative (parti-
cipant observation, interviews, life histories, etc.) and quantitative (multiple regression,
correspondence analysis, geodata, etc.), which is required from both researchers and
research apprentices alike. Increasingly, the access to data defines the identity of its prac-
titioners. In many countries, but above all in France, the USA, less so in the UK, Ger-
many and Brazil, empirical research has become a conditio sine qua non to be even
recognized as a sociologist.
The question, therefore, arises: What or who is a sociologist? He or she is a profes-
sional who practises a cult of commemoration of the ‘founding fathers’, quotes Marx,
Durkheim and Bourdieu, does specialized work in one of the many ‘fields’ of sociology
(sociology of health, education, sports, social movements, etc.), applies research meth-
ods and techniques (participant observation, discourse analysis, factor analysis) to gather
and analyse the empirical data and does not eschew moral and political evaluation of the
social situation that is investigated.
Those who define themselves primarily as empirical researchers (ethnographers and
stats people) are not really bothered by theoretical and conceptual issues anyway. All too
often, theories have a merely decorative use and conceptual issues are quickly resolved
and dissolved through a series of obligatory references to a few contemporary schools of
thought that are far from reaching unanimity within the discipline: critical realism, neo-
Marxism, actor-network theory, pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodol-
ogy, etc. – all these scholarly references function more as ‘badges of identification’
(Berthelot, 2000: 72) than as genuine pointers of conceptual elaboration.
Hence, the second fragmentation. It results from the conflicts and tussles between
anathematizing sociological schools (cultural sociology vs. structural sociology, critical
theory vs. systems theory, rational choice vs. neo-institutionalism) that are unable to
come to a minimum consensus about the very essence of sociology. What we would call
‘multiple paradigmatasis’ has now become so acute that it is hard to see what the nano-
approach of discourse analysis has in common with the mega-approach of world systems
theory. Apart from a nominal adherence to sociology, within the discipline, there is not
even a minimum consensus about the unit of analysis, basic ontology or elementary con-
cepts. At best, there is mutual indifference and tolerance; at worst, confrontation and
agonistics.
To those two divisions within the discipline itself, we should add two others that
emerge at the boundaries of sociology and its environment. The third fragmentation

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4 European Journal of Social Theory

comes about when empirical work is conducted in response to theoretical perspectives

that are unrelated to sociology as such and have no truck with the discipline, even if they
investigate social life. Sociologists’ work is, indeed, increasingly carried out with impli-
cit or explicit reference to what we will call ‘the Studies’. By this, we mean to refer to the
congeries of anti-disciplinary investigations, such as Cultural Studies, Gender Studies,
Postcolonial Studies, Governmentality Studies, etc. that specialize in the systematic
investigation of the power/discourse connection. The pervasive and perverse influence
at the intersection of class, racial and sexual domination on scientific, philosophical and
common-sense discourses is, supposedly, demonstrated when absences in the texts are
decoded as signs of the presence of power. One of the conspicuous features of the Studies
is that they are largely anti-, inter- or trans-disciplinary. Historians, philosophers, literary
critics, political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists practise them with or without
reference to the sociological tradition. Most of their work derives from so-called ‘French
Theory’ (Cusset, 2005), which was taught on American campuses in the 1970s and 1980s
by Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard & Co. but on American terms and with a tone curiously
unfamiliar in France, where, until yesteryear, social scientists were hardly aware of the
Studies.
The Studies are not only more transdisciplinary, they are also more transnational
than sociology, which, until very recently, practised ‘methodological nationalism’
without acknowledging it did. With very few exceptions (most notably Wallerstein
and Luhmann), it identified society with the container of the nation-state and con-
ceived of the world society as an extension of their own country. Wary of boundaries,
be they national or disciplinary, the Studies deconstruct them and have less difficulty
in scaling up and taking a global turn. But up to now, their endeavours have been
largely negative and critical. In their search for ‘ex-centric’ positions from the Global
South, they behave like academic backpackers, hopping from one intellectual tradition
to another to find an undiscovered critical thinker, say, in Iran (Shariati?), Indonesia
(Alatas?) or Peru (Quijano?) who has contested the coloniality of metropolitan knowl-
edge. The time has now come to join intellectual forces to develop a historically sen-
sitive, anthropologically informed comparative history of civilizations from a
cosmopolitan standpoint – corresponding to Weber’s ‘universal history’, but without
its provincialism.
To these three fragmentations – the double internal fragmentation between theory and
empiricism and between rival schools, and the external fragmentation between sociol-
ogy, history, literary criticism and philosophy – one might add a fourth division, which
overlaps and strengthens the dissipative tendencies: between the social sciences, on the
one hand, and moral, social and political philosophy, on the other. While moral and polit-
ical philosophy has become more social, dealing with issues such as democracy, justice,
equality and identity, sociology has increasingly turned its back on philosophy. The
result is what Alexander and Seidman (2001) call a ‘downwards shift’ in theorizing, a
turn away from generalizing and normative reasoning and a shift towards more prag-
matic and problem-oriented investigations. As the synthetic movement in social theory
started waning and the structure-agency debate became stale and repetitive toward the
mid-1990s, moral and political philosophy became not only more inspiring, but also
more attuned to developments within society.

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 5

To clear the way for investigations that are at the intersection of sociology, the
Studies and philosophy, we will quickly review some developments in contemporary
moral, social and political philosophy. Following the debate between liberalism and
communitarianism of the 1990s, itself a result of the massive international reception
of John Rawls’s landmark publication in 1971 of A Theory of Justice, moral philoso-
phy has sought to move beyond the narrow, formal and procedural framework in
which John Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness and Jürgen Habermas’s discourse
ethics have locked the normative and ethical thinking for almost fifty years. Be it
through a return to Aristotle, Augustine, Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche or Heideg-
ger, philosophers have increasingly explored the ethical questions that Kantian deon-
tology and utilitarian consequentialism had neglected and pushed to the margins:
solicitude (Levinas), care (Gilligan), trust (Baier), empathy (Irigaray), hospitality
(Derrida), authenticity (Taylor) and recognition (Honneth).1 The rehabilitation of
practical philosophy, the rediscovery of virtues and moral sentiments, the ethical turn
within post-structuralism and feminist theory have dislocated the normative emphasis
from the basic structure of well-ordered societies to intersubjectivity, alterity and pri-
mary sociability (Sayer, 2011).
If moral philosophy encounters micro-sociology, macro-sociology encounters critical
theory and social philosophy. Complementing classical theories of modernity with an
investigation of the normative foundations of social critique, social philosophy critically
investigates developmental tendencies of society. It does not hesitate to characterize
them as ‘social pathologies’ when they threaten social integration and jeopardize the
social conditions of the personal realization of the ‘good life’ (Honneth, 2000: 11–69;
Fischbach, 2009). Understood as a systematization of the diagnoses of the present
(Zeitdiagnose) that one finds in the work of Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche or, closer to
us, of Arendt, Castoriadis and Habermas, social philosophy not only analyses social
developments, but it also evaluates and judges them. Joining thus analysis to diagnosis,
social philosophy stands at the intersection of moral and political philosophy.
While contemporary social philosophy remains indebted to the German tradition of
critical theory, contemporary political philosophy has visibly been much more influ-
enced by French post-structuralism and deconstruction. More radical than critical theory,
it weaves post-structuralism and post-Marxism into a heady contentious brew of radical
anti-liberalism. Inspired by a leftist interpretation of Heidegger’s ‘ontological differ-
ence’, the political was introduced as a foundational moment of politics and society
(Marchart, 2007). With the rise of the Global Justice Movement around the turn of the
century and the recent return of radical anti-systemic social movements onto the scene of
world history, late- and post-Marxist philosophers of the cultural left, like Antonio
Negri, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto Laclau or Jacques Rancière have seen in the
‘newest’ social movements in the Middle East (the ‘Arab Spring’), Western Europe (‘los
indignados’) and the United States (‘Occupy’) a rejuvenation of non-representative
forms of democracy. Their revolutionary interpretations of the ontology of the present
are not only in tune with the Zeitgeist; to the extent that their analyses are both relevant
and influential, they have also put sociology in the shadow and recast it as an ‘old
European discipline’ that harks back to foundational texts of the nineteenth century to
understand the challenges of the twenty-first century.

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6 European Journal of Social Theory

Neo-classical social theory

The question is now if all that theoretical effervescence in the social sciences that is
largely happening outside of the discipline of sociology – in the Studies as well as in
moral, social and political philosophy – though having important repercussions on it,
could somehow be considered part of sociology? Is it possible to work towards a new
synthesis of social theory, the Studies as well as moral and political philosophy? And,
if so, could sociology be at the forefront of the new synthesis? One could say that, from
an intellectual point of view, it does not really matter.2 As long as thought and society
move forward, labels are not important. But, for better or for worse, the organized and
institutional transmission of knowledge needs labels that allow one to define the curri-
culum, to monitor pedagogical progress and to formulate criteria of validation. All the
official talk about the importance of inter- and transdisciplinary talk should not hide,
however, that the sciences, universities and teaching are still largely organized around
the same disciplinary lines that were institutionalized along national lines in the nine-
teenth century (Stichweh, 2000: 103–45).
Another important consideration, of a more strategic and metapolitical nature, is that
if the social sciences do not find a unified riposte to the colonization of their territories by
economics and rational choice theories, they are bound to lose the ‘science wars’ and are
poised to become irrelevant. If economics is so powerful, it is not only because it has
been able to combine parsimony (simplicity of its fundamental concepts) with sophisti-
cation (the complexity of its mathematical models,), but also because it has succeeded in
imposing a standard curriculum universally. From Chicago to Rio de Janeiro, Mumbai to
Shanghai, Paris to Dakar, economics is taught in the same way, with the same canonical
texts and the same econometric techniques. Among economists one finds a large variety
of ethical and political positions. Within the discipline, there is also a rather strong
schism between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. But in all universities over the world, the
‘dismal science’ is basically taught and transmitted in uniform fashion. The existence
of a strong disciplinary identity explains, at least partly, why its worldwide influence
on people’s minds continues almost unabated. The strength of its hegemony can be
gauged by the fact that even the economic crisis has not succeeded in denting the dom-
inance of neo-classical theory within economics and of economics within the social
sciences. It should be granted, however, that rational choice has made fewer inroads
in sociology than in political science and even less in anthropology and history.
From the very beginning, the sociological project has been shaped by its opposition to
utilitarianism (Parsons, 1937; Caillé, 1986, 1988, Revue du MAUSS since 1982).3 Unlike
economics, which analyses the social order as a spontaneous order – a ‘catalaxy’ (Hayek,
1979: II: 107–32) – that emerges out of the uncoordinated pursuit of private interests,
sociology has always foregrounded the normative and ideational elements that make
social life possible and that allow the actors to coordinate their actions on the basis of
a shared vision of the world. Although sociology does not ignore self-interest and fully
acknowledges the role of power (see Weber) and property (see Marx) in social life, it has
always emphasized the constitutive role of ideas, values and norms in social life, even
when the latter are considered ideological reflexes of antagonistic social relations in
society at large or its fields and subfields. To the extent that sociology self-

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 7

consciously continues moral philosophy by different means, it does not separate social
and moral life (Chanial, 2011; Vandenberghe, forthcoming). It rather seeks to investigate
their relation not only conceptually, but also empirically. Given its differentiation from
economics, it stands and falls with its opposition to utilitarianism. For a long time,
sociology was able to think of itself as the other of economics, and simultaneously also
as its extension, its critique and its Aufhebung. If sociology were to fall apart, an entire
field of thought – that which refuses the transformation of the world into a vast market –
would likewise disappear, condemning us to theoretical, ethical and political
powerlessness.
Hence, in order to organize a rationalized transmission of the achievements of modern
reflexivity, and to counter the imperialism of economics and its tendency to ‘colonize’
the social and political sciences (Archer and Tritter, 2000), there is a pressing need to
find a common denominator among all of the above-mentioned schools and streams
of thought. At this point, we would like to advance our main argument and suggest two
things (we cannot do more than suggest).
First, as an alternative to neo-classical economics, we plead for the development of
‘neo-classical sociology’ as a common platform for the dialogical synthesis of sociology,
the Studies, as well as social, moral and political philosophy. We call it neo-classical
sociology, because we believe that the contemporary understanding of sociology is much
narrower than what the founders of sociology had in mind.4 They knew that foundational
work borders on the philosophical. Their foundation of a new science and their principled
rejection of utilitarianism were inseparable from their appeal for a renewal of society. As
Durkheim famously said in his second Preface to De la division du travail social: ‘Sociol-
ogy would not be not worth a single hour’s effort if it had no more than speculative interest’
(Durkheim, 1986: xxxix). We sincerely believe that if we go back to the initial inspiration
of sociology, we can perhaps ‘re-found’ the social sciences and reformulate its remit so as
to make it more cosmopolitan, ecumenical and inclusive, so inclusive that it can integrate
sociology and anthropology, the Studies, and moral, social and political philosophy into a
common project. That, we submit, is the task of social theory, which we understand in the
broad and inclusive sense as the general theory of the social sciences or, to say the same
thing in slightly different words, the theory of societies in general.5
Moreover, and though we realize that the following affirmation may be slightly less
consensual, we also would like to suggest that the missing common denominator of the
social sciences is to be found in what we and our friends from the MAUSS (Mouvement
Anti-Utilitariste en Sciences Sociales) call the ‘gift-paradigm’.6 Indeed, thirty years of
collective, interdisciplinary reflection on the phenomenon of the gift as a total social fact
have convinced us that the concept of social relations one can deduce and extract from
Marcel Mauss’s Essai sur le don (Mauss, 1950) can and should be extended beyond the
immediate field of ethnology to all social sciences. From this foundational perspective,
Mauss’s discovery of the triple obligation of the gift – ‘to give, to accept and to return the
gift’ (Mauss, 1950: 205–14) – appears to be the basis of social life in general. The
mechanism of reciprocity, which is the motor of sociability, produces, and continues
to produce, society. Without reciprocity, no society; without generosity, neither econom-
ics, nor politics or sociology are possible. The focus on the individual and collective
capacity to initiate, create and sustain social relations allows us also to move beyond the

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8 European Journal of Social Theory

impasses of individualism and collectivism, liberalism and socialism, market and state.
When the dynamics of reciprocity are fully worked out into a relational, associational
and interactionist theory of society, the anthropology of the gift emerges as a fully-
fledged ‘third paradigm’ (Caillé, 2000, 2014) between individualism and holism. We
think that it not only offers an alternative to the social sciences, but also to society.
As the crucible of society, the political is the continuation of the gift by other means.
It is carried forward by non-governmental organizations, civil associations and social
movements that seek to uphold the moral economy against both the market and the state.
Such associations do not aim to abolish the state or the market; rather, moving beyond
the lib/lab formations of social democracy, they contribute to the realization of Mauss’s
dream of a cooperative or associative socialism.
We have not sufficiently recognized that through its professionalization and specia-
lization, sociology has gradually become very different from what its founders had orig-
inally envisaged it. With the exception of Georg Simmel, who developed his formal
sociology along narrow lines, all of the founders conceived of sociology as a general sci-
ence. They did not think of sociology in a narrow sense, but developed it as a general
science of society and its subsystems. From the beginning, sociology was thus more than
sociology. It was both a specialized discipline (sociology) and a generalizing discourse
(social theory); it was, as Habermas (1991: 184) says in a remarkable reflection on Wei-
mar sociology, ‘at once discipline and superdiscipline, sociology and theory of society’.
The founders envisioned their sociology as a kind of federative metadiscipline that
would unify the various social sciences (history, anthropology, sociology, political sci-
ence, political economy) under a single heading. None of them thought of it as a mere
accumulation of field surveys; rather, they devised it as an empirical social, moral and
political philosophy that would integrate social and historical research into a systematic
presentation and interpretation of the evolution of societies. The ambitions of the inven-
tor of the name, Auguste Comte, were clearly aimed at a ‘positive’ (scientific and
Romantic) philosophy of history that would investigate the empirical conditions of moral
order and progress. Was Marx an economist, a sociologist, a historian, an anthropologist
or a philosopher? Let us not forget that Max Weber, a lawyer by training, whose first
research was in history, had long regarded himself as an economist. Simmel conceived
of himself as a philosopher and considered sociology a pastime. For Durkheim, as for his
friends and collaborators of L’Anne´e sociologique, sociology was clearly intended to
unite all the specialized disciplines of the social sciences: ethnology, science of religion,
science of education, history, economy, etc. And that, with the clear ambition of giving
better answers to the questions raised by moral and political philosophers.
With Comte, we think that it is high time to overcome fragmentation and specializa-
tion through further specialization and differentiation. We need to ‘transform the study
of scientific generalities into one more grand specialty’ (Comte, 1949: 57). We need to
train and form a new class of social scientists who are interdisciplinary and not narrowly
attached to their own discipline, who study the different branches of the social sciences
and explore connections and relations between them, in order to find out what they have
in common.
Let us assume, then, that within all the disciplines that make up the humanities and the
social sciences, there are two slants: a specialized slant, centred on itself and its own

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 9

disciplinary problems, and a general slant, open to interdisciplinary dialogue and

exchange with the other sciences, disciplines and discourses in its environment. If we
represent the divisions in spatial terms of centre and periphery, we would find sociolo-
gical sociology, anthropological anthropology, political politicology, etc. at the outer
limit and a philosophical sociology, a philosophical anthropology and a philosophical
political science at its core. Our suggestion is that general social theory is at the very
heart of the social sciences and that it represents a synthesis of anthropological, socio-
logical and political theory.
Contemporary sociology has failed to compensate for its tendency to specialize with a
countervailing tendency to generalize. To move forward, we need to go backwards and
seek inspiration once again from the classics, real or putative, who identified sociology
with a general social science. Not to become Marxologists, Durkheimologists or Weber-
ologists, but to rejuvenate sociology and thereby guarantee its relevance and its future,
we need to develop a neo-classical sociology. With Marcel Mauss, but we find similar
positions in Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons or Bourdieu, we assume that ‘there are
no [separate] social sciences, but [only] one science of societies’ (Mauss, 1969: 51) and
we propose to name the general theory of the science of societies ‘social theory’ – a
denomination which, ironically, does not exist as such in France.

Metatheory, social theory, sociological theory

To depict with more precision what we understand by social theory, we will bring in a
supplementary distinction between metatheory and sociological theory and position
social theory in between both (Vandenberghe, 2009: 290–303). As always, the distinc-
tions are fluid, but what matters here are not the distinctions themselves, but the way they
are articulated, integrated and overcome in a general theory of societies that cross-cuts
the disciplinary cleavages within the social sciences, as well as between the social
sciences, the Studies and philosophy. As in the Indian story of the turtles, theory goes
down (and up) all the way. Explicit philosophical visions become metatheoretical pre-
suppositions of social theory, which, in turn, become presuppositions of sociological the-
ory, which, in turn, inform empirical research.7
First, metatheory is theory about social and sociological theory and, as such, it usually
proceeds through commentary and critique of the classics. At its most basic, metatheory
consists in a mapping exercise of the general presuppositions and assumptions (Wel-
tanschauungen, world hypotheses, paradigms, knowledge interests, pre-judgements,
etc.) of social and sociological theory (Alexander, 1982–1983). For teaching purposes,
sociologists distinguish different principles of vision and division within the history of
sociology and classify them in terms of polarities: individualism vs. holism, action vs.
structure, micro vs. macro, idealism vs. materialism, functionalism vs. dialectics, con-
sensus vs. conflict, Erklären vs. Verstehen, etc. The mapping exercise is not an end in
itself, however, but a prolegomenon to theory construction. The aim is to develop a gen-
eral, synthetic and encompassing social theory that is in continuous dialogue with the
sociological tradition, covers all its angles and incorporates its fundamental insights in
a coherent framework of interrelated concepts.

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10 European Journal of Social Theory

Second, while metatheory explores the philosophical (transcendental) presupposi-

tions of the social sciences, social theory actually tries to elaborate a systematic view
of the social world based on certain metatheoretical positions. As a preamble to the anal-
ysis of social life, social theories work out coherent systems of interrelated concepts
(such as communicative action, life-world and system; field, habitus and practices or
power/knowledge, discourses and practices) that purport to give a single answer to three
fundamental questions that any social science has to raise: What is the nature of social
action? How is the social order possible? What determines social change? (Joas and
Knöbl, 2004: 37–8). The point of social theory consists not only in giving an answer
to each of these questions separately, but to answer them all in such a way that the
answers are internally consistent and cumulative. When the concepts are well ordered
and systematically integrated, they add up and form a general theory of society.
As regards the nature of action, our position is clear: while we distinguish various
motives of action, most notably interests and sympathy (along the utilitarianism–anti-
utilitarianism axis), creativity and tradition (along the individualism–holism axis), which
are irreducible to one another and have to be thought about together to make sense
(Caillé, 2009), we strongly reject the interest paradigm that reduces all types of action
to one: instrumental-strategic action (i.e. Weber’s zweckrationale Handlung). Our posi-
tion regarding the concept of action entails a definite conception of order. Our defence of
the non-rational (symbolic, normative, expressive) dimension of human behaviour
necessarily implies a reference to the symbolic order. And as the symbolic order always
precedes, predates and conditions agency, our position is necessarily a holistic one. With
an important proviso: the emphasis on the political and performative aspects of the gift
implies that the symbolic order that precedes action has to be continuously regenerated
and reproduced through action. Even more, what distinguishes sociology qua sociology
and differentiates it from both economics and politics, is precisely its holism and its sym-
bolism. This holism expresses itself paradoxically in the defence of moral individualism.
Sociology is anti-utilitarian in principle. It represents a definite choice against Mande-
ville and Hobbes – a ‘counter-Hobbes’ (Revue du Mauss, 2008a) – though via the Marx-
ist and Weberian legacies that stress the material constraints on action, the strategic side
of social life is brought back to the fore.
Finally, if social theory is concerned with the systematics of the social sciences,
sociological theory bears on the historical dynamics of society. Sociology emerges when
the social order becomes problematic, both for individuals and collectives, and the auto-
matic reproduction of traditions is no longer guaranteed. At the same time as society
becomes conscious of its own existence, it captures the political moment that is consti-
tutive of the social and disrupts its reproduction. As an expression of crisis and transition,
sociology comes into being as a critical reflection on the contingency of the social order.
Its central theme, from Spencer and Durkheim to Marx and Weber, is and remains mod-
ernity – its genesis, structure, development and diffusion as well as its promises, chal-
lenges and global transformations. As a kind of reflexive analysis on the historical
conditions of emergence (and disappearance?) and of application of the social sciences,
sociological theory is more historical and more comparative than social theory. If social
theory is synthetic and tries to overcome inherited antinomies (agency, structure and
social change; meta, micro and macro) in a systematic fashion, sociological theory is

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 11

more resolutely macro and also more diagnostic in its basic approach. Given that it tries
to ‘capture its own time in concepts’ (Hegel), it comes as no surprise that it bears the
imprint of its time and is, consequently, more dated. Think about modernization theory
of the 1960s, dependency theory of the 1970s, postmodernism of the 1980s, globalization
theories of the 1990s and post-colonialism of today.
We consider that it will be easier to reach a consensus on a metatheoretical basis than
on a theoretical one. The ‘heterodox consensus’ will most probably be a normative one.
The intellectual alliances between theoretical positions will be of an ethical and political
nature. Assuming we can agree on the metatheoretical foundations of the social sciences,
we can then try to elaborate a general social theory that offers a coherent framework for
the analysis of social action, order and change. On this basis, we can then proceed, in
collaboration with the Studies, to the formulation of a historical grand narrative about
the emergence, development and global diffusion of modernity that does not remain tied
to the nation-state, but takes the world as a single unit of analysis. This analysis of the
global present will not only be descriptive, but also normative. It will be cosmopolitan
and critical, analytic and diagnostic, propaedeutic and reconstructive.

Constellations of intersubjectivity and interdependence

To develop a general theory of social change that is no longer indebted to the interest
paradigm, we need to ground the social sciences in a normative theory of symbolic action
and interaction. Although we recognize that a general social theory also needs to give a
macro-sociological account of the systemic and structural dimensions of society (capit-
alism, the state, the crisis, etc.) and that this presupposes an engagement with the legacy
of Marxism, we will focus in the remainder of the article on ‘social integration’ (as
opposed to ‘systemic integration’) and social change. We have suggested that the social
sciences find their common ground in their opposition to utilitarianism, instrumental
rationalism and rational choice. Unlike economics, which finds its rationale in the cal-
culus of interests, the social sciences bet, as it were, on symbols and expressions, ideas
and ideals, norms and moral sentiments that motivate action, make interaction possible
and trigger social change. With its insistence on the sources of sociability and the logics
of reciprocity, sociology honours its etymology: it privileges the interactions with the
socius and investigates the logos that animates these interactions, coordinates them and
integrates them in society. If we generalize the insights of sociology beyond sociology to
all the social sciences, we can circumscribe their common ground and locate it in their
opposition to utilitarianism.
Anti-utilitarianism is not a negative doctrine, however, but an eminently positive one.
As an explicit alternative and counter to the desolate visions of Man that one finds in
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bourdieu, it is grounded in a philosophical anthropology that
underscores the principles of common humanity, sociability and reciprocity. Our posi-
tive anthropology, which is based on Marcel Mauss’s (1950) classic essay on the gift and
considers the human actor as homo donator reciprocans, is compatible with different
approaches to alterity, intersubjectivity and sociability. We are thinking here in the first
place about the whole gamut of theories of dialogue, care and recognition. Like the the-
ory of the gift, which is multiple and contains many strands, those theories refer, in fact,

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12 European Journal of Social Theory

to complete, loosely articulated and overlapping paradigms. To underscore their inner

plurality, we will describe them as constellations within the firmament. While the image
of constellations evokes a scattering around a given asterism (dialogue, care, gift and rec-
ognition) and a clustering around a major star that catches the eye (Habermas, Tronto,
Mauss, Honneth), we would also like to suggest that the constellations can be intercon-
nected and interarticulated. Due to lack of space, we will not explore all the interconnec-
tions here, but through a reformulation of Hegelian theories of recognition in terms of
Mauss’s gift paradigm, we will try to develop a platform that will allow us to integrate
sociology and anthropology, moral and political philosophy and the diaspora of the Stud-
ies, into a coherent framework for the analysis of contemporary struggles.
Let us start, however, with a quick glance at the sky and compare the constellations.
What they all share is an insistence on intersubjectivity, interaction and sociability, or, in
short: interdependence. What matters is the in-between, the inter-human, the inter-
connection, the relation that is ontologically prior to the elements it interconnects and
constitutes as distinctive elements that are what they are in and because of the relation.
Moreover, they all bask in a certain atmosphere of benevolence and have a sympathetic
aura. None of the constellations contains theories that are monadic (though phenomen-
ological theories of intersubjectivitiy do not always avoid solipsism). They are all inter-
subjective and presuppose an opening towards the other and an other-directedness that is
directly at odds with egotistical models of the self that consider the other as an immediate
threat to the self. It should also be noted that they all concentrate on primary sociability
and consider the encounter with the concrete other as the primary scene of ethics. The
transitions between the normative and the empirical, the philosophical and the social, are
quite fluid. Through an application of ethical principles to concrete practices in social
situations that cry for repair and redress, the social and the normative, the descriptive and
the diagnostic, are naturally imbricated. As a form of applied ethics, the critical descrip-
tions of concrete situations of injustice (exploitation, humiliation, disrespect) find an
easy extension in calls for social politics and public policies at the societal level. Finally,
it may be of interest to observe that the constellations come in two versions, a secular
(symbolic) one and an epiphanic (hyperbolic) one. The latter is usually indebted to the
‘theological turn’ within post-Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology (Janicaud,
1991) and focuses on something primordial, fused, beyond duality that precedes, founds
and transcends ordinary intersubjectivity. Think about the reversal between conversation
(Gadamer) and conversion (MacIntyre), communication (Habermas) and communion
(Derrida), giving (Mauss) and donation (Marion), care (Tronto) and solicitude (Levinas),
recognition (Honneth) and rebirth.8
Now that we have considered some ‘family resemblances’ between the constellations
of intersubjectivity, let us look at the inner plurality of each of our four constellations:
communication and care, gift and recognition (with the former two privileging consen-
sus, the latter two conflict). The dialogical constellation contains a multiplicity of the-
ories of symbolically mediated encounters with the other (Theunissen, 1965). Buber’s
philosophy of the interhuman, Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Jaspers’s existential communi-
cation, Arendt’s concepts of action as praxis and lexis, Mead’s symbolic interactionism,
all these dialogical approaches have faded somewhat with the publication of Habermas’s
Theory of Communicative Action in 1981. Yet, the different approaches that have since

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 13

seen the light and tried to correct some of Habermas’s Enlightenment rationalism with an
insistence on the concrete other (Benhabib), recognition (Honneth), solidarity (Brun-
khorst), reflexivity (Ferrara), dialogue (Kögler), etc. belong to the dialogical constella-
tion, even if they drift off towards the neighbouring constellations.
Within the constellation of care, we do find at least three strands (Van Sevenant,
2001): Theories of ‘care of the self’ (Foucault, Hadot, W. Schmidt), existential philoso-
phies of ‘care in itself’ (Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida) and the ‘care for the other’, asso-
ciated with feminism and the ethics of care (Tronto, Gilligan, Held, Kittay).9 What all
these theories and philosophies of care, solicitude and compassion have in common is
a junction between a moral disposition to overcome indifference (care for oneself), to
decentre oneself and depersonalize one’s relation to the world (care in itself) and to
assume responsibility for the suffering of the other (care for the other). Unlike liberal-
masculine visions of the self that underscore autonomy, feminist ethics of care value and
cultivate relations of interdependence between people.
The emphasis on interconnection and reciprocity is also at the centre of the various
theories that make up the constellation of the gift, all of which find their inspiration in
Marcel Mauss’s fabulous essay on the gift.10 Readers of Mauss will remember that the
gift is in no way a simple thing. First, it is not a thing, but a triple process of obligations
(to initiate, accept and return the gift) that ties persons and collectives in communities
of exchange. Second, it is not simple, but complex. It fuses contradictory motives
(obligation and spontaneity, interest and generosity, peace and conflict) into a system
of actions and interactions that are at the root of sociability and community (Caillé,
2000, 2009). Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the reception of Mauss has
been complicated as well, with various interpretations, from Lévi-Strauss to Bourdieu,
Bataille to Baudrillard, Derrida to Marion, Sahlins to Strathern, Lefort to Caillé, that
are at odds with each other. Where some (like Bourdieu) would only see hypocrisy that
masks the tit-for-tat of exchange, others (like Derrida) would go to the other extreme
and consider the asymmetric, unilateral, hyperbolic gift with no return possible as the
only real gift. Similarly, while some (like Lévi-Strauss) see the gift as a system, others
(like Lefort) see it as action. Some (like Ricoeur) identify it as peace, others (like
Bataille) as agonism, etc.
The theory of recognition has by now sprawled into an academic cottage industry
(Guéguen and Malochet, 2012). Philosophers have offered new interpretations of the role
of Anerkennung in Hegel’s writings (from the early Realphilosophie to the Phenomen-
ologie des Geistes), though Fichte, Adam Smith and Rousseau have also been hailed
as predecessors. Without going back to the notion of anagnôrisis in Aristotle and Sopho-
cles, it is remarkable how various currents in contemporary moral and political philoso-
phy (critical theory with Honneth and Fraser, hermeneutics with Taylor and Ricoeur,
deconstruction with J. Butler and J. Tully, psychoanalysis and social psychology with
J. Benjamin and Todorov), have been able to latch onto the concept of recognition and
make it into a major asterism. The repercussions of Axel Honneth’s (1992) work and his
debate with Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2003) suggest that the category of rec-
ognition (and its negation: invisibility, humiliation, alienation) taps into an unnamed
reservoir of diffuse suffering among the population that deserves attention and repair
if solidarity is to be maintained.

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14 European Journal of Social Theory

Although we have framed the theoretical galaxy of constellations with reference to

primary sociability, the theories in question do not remain at the level of family, friends
and peer groups. They are easily extendable from the circles of ‘primary sociability’
(socialite´) that one finds in all societies to the ‘secondary sociability’ of institutions in
modern societies and even to ‘tertiary sociability’ of the world society (Caillé, 2000).
The theories of action and interaction they propose are pitched from the very beginning
as theories of social change. Their impetus comes from the idea that societies always find
their moral sources in the relations between persons and that institutions of the nation-
state and the world society need to be ‘re-embedded’ in the life-world. This idea of a liv-
ing dialectics between life-world and system, state and societal community, market and
civil society is nothing new. One finds it in all classical sociologists and modern political
philosophers. It is what animates Durkheim’s corporatist interpretation of the state and
Marx’s appeal to a Gemeinwesen. But beyond the appeals to primordial unity, there is
also a recognition of the necessity of social struggle, which brings us back to Marx,
Weber and Bourdieu.
At the root of social conflict lies a struggle of or for recognition. Post-Marxists like
Bourdieu and Honneth understand the strictly economic conflict as a modality and a par-
ticular case of a more general struggle for symbolic representation. The class struggle,
the struggle for material interests and redistribution of material goods, is a modality and
a particular case of considerable importance, and increasingly so today, but a modality
and a particular case nonetheless of a struggle to have one’s gifts recognized and valued
as contributions. We have tried to suggest elsewhere (Caillé, 2007: 185–208) that it is on
these grounds that the convergence between the authors of the sociological tradition
(Marx, Weber, Durkheim, but also Tocqueville, Parsons and Bourdieu), takes place.
What they analyse, each in their own way, even if not expressed in the same terms, is
the struggle of the social subjects, individual or collective, to have their value recog-
nized.11 This question of valuation and valorization is at the heart of the discourses that
structure social struggles and contemporary debates, and, of course, of theories of recog-
nition. But it is at the core of all the other theories as well. What theories of care proble-
matize is the non-recognition of the gift of caring as a gift. Somehow, care, which aims at
abetting human frailty, is made invisible when the subaltern, the women or migrant
workers from the Global South give it. Similarly, against elite-centred, official, moder-
nist histories of the anti-colonial struggles, Subaltern Studies want to exhume the history
of unrecognized contributions and invisible gifts of the dominated, illiterate masses.
Postcolonial Studies seek to bring to light not only what has been extorted from the per-
iphery by the colonial powers by force. It also wants the gifts and contributions of the
former colonies to be recognized and valued by the metropolitan centres.
However, these convergences between sociology, moral and political philosophy and
the Studies should incite us to go further and ask a question: What do the diverse social
groups want to have recognized through their struggles? The answer is not unexpected:
they want their human and social value to be recognized. Love, respect, self-esteem (to
use the categories proposed by Axel Honneth (1992), following Hegel’s suit) are only
different aspects of the value attributed to the subject who benefits from recognition.
As a result, we see that within the social and human sciences the great dividing line runs
between economics, on the one side, and sociology (broadly understood), on the other.

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 15

Economics investigates what determines the value of goods and, correlatively, also the
value of subjects as either owners or producers of goods endowed with a certain value.
Sociology asks – though often without knowing it – what determines the relative value of
various social groups, independent of their ability to produce or own goods.
When asked what determines the economic value of goods or merchandise, the eco-
nomic tradition has provided two main answers: their utility (i.e. their relative scarcity),
or the average working time necessary for their production. What determines the value of
social groups and individuals? The very language we have used to describe the core
issues of the major schools of contemporary thought sufficiently indicates the direction
in which we must seek the answer. What social groups in conflict (women, former colo-
nies, subalterns, care providers, etc.) want to have recognized is the value of the gifts
they have given (or of what has been taken from them). Let us generalize: the value
of individuals and social groups comes from the recognition of the gifts they have actu-
ally given or they could potentially give and/or from the relation they maintain to some-
thing more primordial and sacred (donation (Ergebnis/Gegebenheit), grace (charisma)
and gratuity that explain why there is something rather than nothing).

Conclusion
We understand, therefore, that mutatis mutandis modern struggles for recognition are
contemporary manifestations of the struggles to give – the ‘agonistic’ gift for recognition
– as properly exhumed by Marcel Mauss (1950) in his study of archaic societies. We also
understand that history, sociology, and anthropology are closely related, because the past
informs the present, and the centre informs the periphery. And vice versa. The lesson for
sociology is that it must not only develop sociology experts, but also seek to become, as
quickly as possible, a cosmopolitan public sociology. Sociology has to become once
again a general social science, but this time without provincial blinders. To be faithful
to its heritage, it must reconnect organically with philosophy, history, ethnology and eco-
nomics and draw from it all the institutional consequences for the organization of edu-
cation and research.
To conclude, we can now characterize the contours of neo-classical sociology as we
have sought to develop it in this article. Like its illustrious forebears from Weimar and
Paris, neo-classical social theory fuses theory construction and diagnosis of the present
(Habermas, 1991). This fusion explains the continuity with other traditions of thought
(natural law, political economy, philosophy of history, moral and political philosophy),
for whom modernity itself has become a question; its interest in paradoxes, crises and
pathologies of social development, as well as in social movements and social change;
the unity of sociology and social theory in a general theory of society that gives a coher-
ent answer to the question of social action, order and change; the attempt to develop
sociology as a science of society that systematizes reflections on politics and economics,
law and culture, ethics and psychology and seeks a dialogue with moral, social and polit-
ical philosophy, as well as with the Studies; the attempt to outline a sociological theory
that is both systematic and historical and that throws light on the ontology of the present;
and, finally, the unity of theory and metatheory, not to mention the continuous philoso-
phical, theoretical and methodological self-reflection of all the proposals it puts forward.

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16 European Journal of Social Theory

Notes
1. We will return to these issues in the final section of the article where we will propose a rappro-
chement between neo-Hegelian theories of recognition and a neo-Maussian theory of the gift.
2. Both of the authors are sociologists by training (though Caillé also has a PhD in economics)
and social theorists by vocation. Our particular location within the discipline explains, in part,
why we privilege neo-classical sociology. Although we call for a transdisciplinary synthesis,
we are well aware that our arguments are mainly pitched to sociologists and that our article
would probably not be published in journals of anthropology, history, geography or economics,
though we hope that it will inspire our colleagues from neighbouring disciplines, and will spur
them to take on board our project and write similar articles for slightly different audiences.
3. Technically speaking, we understand by utilitarianism any theory that implicitly or explicitly
subscribes to the ‘axiomatic of interest’ (Caillé, 1986: 99–139). For a long view of the utili-
tarian tradition, from Socrates to Rawls, see Caillé et al. (2001); on the utilitarian tradition,
from Bentham to the Mills, see Halévy’s (1995) classical study of philosophical radicalism.
4. We coined the term neo-classical sociology, but we did not invent it (see Eyal et al., 2003).
Whereas their neo-classical sociology is post-Marxist and neo-Weberian, ours is post-
Marxist and neo-Maussian. Although we welcome the invitation of Eyal and Co. to return
to classical sociology to think through the challenge of a ‘world without socialism’ ironically,
we fail to see that attractions of irony.
5. For a first exploration of the possibility of a general theory of society, see Revue du MAUSS
(2004b), partially translated in European Journal of Social Theory (2007, 10, 2).
6. The Anti-Utilitarian Movement in the Social Sciences was founded by one of the authors and
gathers anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers and heterodox econo-
mists who have a common interest in reciprocity, who feel inspired by Mauss’s seminal essay
on the gift and who publish in the Revue du MAUSS. Alain Caillé, the founder of the MAUSS
and director of its journal, is also the main theorist of the gift-paradigm. Programmatic and
synthetic statements can be found in Caillé, 2000, 2009 and 2015.
7. Let us take an example to make the argument clear: Marxism is unthinkable without
Hegel’s objective idealism. In Marx, dialectics (metatheory) undergirds historical material-
ism (social theory), which informs the theory of the class struggle under capitalism (socio-
logical theory), which orients research on the situation of the working class in Lancashire.
In our case, anti-utilitarianism is our philosophical platform (metatheory) on which we
build the gift paradigm (social theory), which informs our analysis of the role of associa-
tions in contemporary societies (sociological theory). Our argument is that if we can agree
on anti-utilitarianism, we can then work towards a loose integration of social theories (the
gift, care, recognition, etc.) and propose a theoretically informed analysis and diagnosis of
the present. To keep our options open, we develop our position at a higher and therefore
more inclusive level of abstraction.
8. Through a Heideggerian spin, which unfortunately only works in French, we can transform
recognition (reconnaissance) into natality (co-naissance), natality into gratitude (reconnais-
sance), gratitude into rebirth (re-naissance) with, through and thanks to the other’s love
(re-co-naissance: being born again with the other).
9. For an exploration of the ethics of care and its relation to the gift paradigm, see Revue du
MAUSS (2008b).

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Caillé and Vandenberghe 17

10. As a specialized journal that attends to a general public, the Revue du MAUSS is entirely dedi-
cated to the investigation and discussion of the gift in all its facets and in all disciples. While each
issue focuses on a particular theme or aspect related to the gift, some special issues (1993, no. 1;
1996, no. 8; 2010, no. 36) have been entirely devoted to Mauss’s anthropology of the gift.
11. In France, the debate over recognition theory has not been limited to disciples of Honneth
(Renault, Voirol, Haber). It has received a major impetus from the MAUSS. See Revue du
MAUSS (2004a); Caillé (2007); and Caillé and Lazzeri (2009). The contributions in Caillé
(2007) deserve a special mention. The debate is not restricted to conceptual issues, but
includes empirical research by some of France’s major sociologists (Dubet, Thévenot,
Dejours, Heinich).

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Author biographies
Alain Caillé is professor emeritus of the Université Paris-Nanterre. He is the founder of the
Mouvement anti-utilitariste dans les sciences sociales (MAUSS) and chief-editor of the Revue
du MAUSS. His work on the sociology of the gift is very well known in France. His most recent
books are Anti-utilitarisme et paradigme du don. Pour quoi? (2014); La Re´volution du don, le
management repense´ (2014) and La Sociologie malgre´ tout. Autres fragments d’une sociologie
ge´ne´rale. (2015).

Frédéric Vandenberghe is Professor of Sociology at the State University of Rio de Janeiro in Bra-
zil. He has published widely in the field of social theory. His most recent books are What’s Critical
about Critical Realism? Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory (2014) and (with Jean-François
Véran and Alain Caillé) Comentários sobre a sociedade convivial (2015).

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