Supreme Court of the Philippines

447 Phil. 76

THIRD DIVISION
A M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, PETITIONER, VS. EDDIE P. ARQUERO,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo

charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality.

Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a

former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and
respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as
husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan
as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was
born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-
complaint was the girl’s Baptismal Certificate [2] reflecting
the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents.
Also attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of a
marriage contract[3] showing that complainant and Dedje
Irader contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.

By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required

respondent to file an answer to the complaint.[4]

By his Answer[5] of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently

denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is “just a
(sic) mere harassment and a product of complainant’s hatred
and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife.”[6] Attached to the
answer were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of
desistance[7] executed by complainant in favor of his wife
with respect to an administrative complaint he had much
earlier filed against her, and complainant’s sworn
statement[8] dated September 13, 1994 acknowledging
paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents,
respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint
filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by
complainant to harass him.

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991,

complainant likewise instituted a criminal complaint against
him for “adultery” which was, however, dismissed after
preliminary investigation.

Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had

been cohabiting with another woman.

By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the

case to then Executive Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for
investigation, report and recommendation.[9] Judge Vergara
having retired during the pendency of the investigation, the
case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who
was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this
Court to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage
certificate and baptismal certificate submitted by
complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as to the
information contained in the said baptismal certificate and
the circumstances under which it was issued, and such other
verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her
report and recommendation thereon.[10]

In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge

Fernandez recommends that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent
is guilty of the charge.[11] The report focuses on the non-
appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo,
thusly:
xxx

Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and

Dedjie Irader who per reliable information cannot be notified
for reason that subject persons are no longer residing in
their given address and their whereabouts is unknown as
shown by the return of the subpoena dated November 7,
2000, and the inadmissibility of the baptismal certificate
alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the
respondent herein, and for the reason that the same had not
been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of the
entries contained therein, this Court had not received
adequate proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion
that respondent herein could be held liable of the charge
imputed against him, hence, he should be absolved from any
liability.

x x x[12] (Quoted verbatim).

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA,

disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating
Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that
respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be
suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without
pay.[13] Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to
nine (9) months, he a single man maintained relations
with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant,
attended with “sexual union” (TSN dated 23 November
2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his testimony, we observed that
respondent justified his having a relationship with
Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document
purportedly a “Kasunduan” or agreement entered into
by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving
freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to
live with him or her. Being a court employee respondent
should have known that said agreement was void despite it
having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo
was separated from her husband during their short lived
relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter
an immoral relationship with a very much married woman
and a co-court-employee at that is highly improper. It is
contrary to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officials and Employees which provides that public
employees of which respondent is one, xxx “ shall at times
(sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and “sling mud” at
complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated
September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman
other than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent
would want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the
instant case. Respondent would have it appear that a
married man with an extra-marital relation and an
illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife
enters into a relationship with another man.

Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was

executed by herein complainant. However, a cursory reading
of said document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader
Acebedo and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date
of said affidavit is 2 September 1987. Respondent had the
temerity to claim it as evidence in his favor when the instant
complaint was only filed sometime in 1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating
judge if he attended the baptism of the daughter of Dedje
Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and ex-intimate
friend, he answered, “I did not. I’m not sure the child is
mine”. From his answer, we could infer that respondent did
not categorically rule out the possibility that said child might
be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her
paternity.

x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).

While complainant appears to have lost interest in the
prosecution of the present case, the same does not ipso facto
warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have
been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction
to investigate and ascertain the truth thereof.[15] For it has an
interest in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary
and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its
efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the
complainant’s desistance from prosecuting the case he
initiated.[16]

On the merits of the case, the entry of respondent’s name as

father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero
cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot
be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit
relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate
is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein which
concern the relationship of the person baptized.[17] It merely
attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date
thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the
sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the
statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.
[18]
By respondent’s own admission, however, he had an illicit
relationship with complainant’s wife:
Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your
testimony before the Court by your counsel, did the
Court get it correct that there has been a short lived
relation between you and Dedgie Irader, am I correct in
my impression?

A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband
have parted ways already, I jokingly informed her that
she is now being separated, she is now single and is
free to have some commitment. So, I courted her and
she accepted me, so we have a short lived relation and
after that we parted ways.

Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made
mention a while ago?

A: May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.

Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship

from 8 to 9 months, you mean to tell the Court that you
have (sic) a sexual union with this woman?

A: Yes ma’am.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with
complainant’s wife with the spouses having priorly entered
into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was
embodied in a “Kasunduan”, the pertinent portions of which
are reproduced hereunder:
Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER
ACEBEDO, may sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino,
at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Broke’s (sic) Point,
Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-

asawa, at magiging miserable lamang ang aming
 mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang
aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami ay
malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na
bilang mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay
may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang
makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami
maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;

x x x[20] (Italics supplied).

Respondent’s justification fails. Being an employee of the
judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the
Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity
of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1
of the Family Code provides that marriage is “an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” It is
an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.[21]

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct

and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [22]

Although every office in the government service is a public

trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the
judiciary.[23] That is why this Court has firmly laid down
exacting standards of morality and decency expected of
those in the service of the judiciary.[24] Their conduct, not to
mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility,[25] characterized by, among other things,
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public’s
respect and confidence in the judicial service.[26] It must be
free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior
outside the court as private individuals.[27] There is no
dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by
their private morals.[28]

Respondent’s act of having illicit relations with

complainant’s wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an
immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls
for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed
for the second offense.

Since the present charge of immorality against respondent

constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero,

Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke’s
Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he is hereby
SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay
with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with severely.

Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of

respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Corona, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo at 1.
[2]
Id. at 3
[3]
Id. at 2.
[4]
Id. at 4.
[5]
Id. at 5.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 9.
[8]
Id. at 10.
[9]
Id. at 15.
[10]
Id. at 69.
[11]
Report and Recommendation at 3.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Memorandum at 6.
[14]
Id. at 4-5.
[15]
Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690, 702 (1994).
[16]
Id.

Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73, 84-85

[17]

(1980).
[18]
Fortus v.Novero, 23 SCRA 1330, 1340 (1968).
[19]
TSN, November 23, 2000 at 14-15.
[20]
Rollo at 106.

Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil

[21]

Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1990 ed., at 222-223.

Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5,

[22]

August 1, 2002 (citation omitted).

[23]
Legaspi v. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701 (1995).
[24]
Merilo-Bedural, 342 SCRA 593, 599 (2000).
[25]
Merilo-Bedural v. Edroso, 342 SCRA 598.

Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 276 (1995) (citation

[26]

omitted).

Burgos v. Aquino, 249 SCRA 504, 509 (1995) (citation

[27]

omitted).
[28]
Id.

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