Persons

7/31/2017 Frivalado vs Comelec : 120295 : June 28, 1996 : J Panganiban : En Banc
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the
rightful governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but
who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who
now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of
Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their
ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of
governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the
ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19,19952 and another Resolution of the
Comelec en bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jun1996/120295.htm 1/22
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95028 praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being
a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following
disposition:6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED
to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said
date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the
candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his
proclamation as the dulyelected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29,
1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene
for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the
province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee
was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of
the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order
(dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12
the ViceGovernor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13
holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be
proclaimed as dulyelected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon";
thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is
hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant
his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G.
Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is
directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on
the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia
directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him
ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as
duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are
also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for
governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of,
among others, Frivaldo.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jun1996/120295.htmThe Facts and the Issue 3/22
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the abovementioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the
period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised,
viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter
to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to
qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so,
from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his
eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that :
said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions,
all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not
rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen
days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this
case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification
for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a noncitizen, it is therefore incumbent
upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization
or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this
case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to
do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his
attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a nonFilipino and
thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third
time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on
Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last
mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor
General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as
counsel for corespondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private
counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree
at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have been
proclaimed as the dulyelected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at
8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes
in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then President
Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a
serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution,"
adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed
them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was
made because then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee did
not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered
without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the
other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the
two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot coexist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment,
for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her lawmaking powers. At best, it could be
treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it
to the first Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she
should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but
on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was
approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious review and
evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the
Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably
the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and resubmitted
the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there
was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during
the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many
others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this
Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself
not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome.
In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual
since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a firsttime entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former naturalborn Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a naturalborn citizen who openly
and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once
more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have
been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to
Public office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether
Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was
NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twentythree (23) years of
age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's
residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and
on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on
June 30, 1995the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his
native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal
(as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in
the case of age and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official"
begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30,
1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose
of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed
by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted
but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation
of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to the effect
that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the
elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a
citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the
law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter
much less a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement
of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The
law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also
stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized
that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not
require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this "qualification." In
other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he "was and
is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by
judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always
been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In
fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and
he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date
of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the
only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an
incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after
proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may
be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation
(8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate
proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judiciallydeclared" alienage. Hence, at such
time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when
the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private
deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of
some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on
conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand,
says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing
existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws,
and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back
to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes
the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens"
and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after
the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be
benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to
Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a
new right to these womenthe right to reacquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture,
which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy
and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to reacquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such
former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization,
but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now reacquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96
Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No.
63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the
rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions
are considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that
the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation
is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the
statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and
civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore
the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect
possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the
evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in
terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo
considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much
later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but
even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if,
as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e.,
situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest
effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law.
That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect
as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to
his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not
to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former
Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenship was,
may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The fact
that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct
prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out
a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and
accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present
in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation
as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all
questions about his possession of the nationality qualification whether at the date of proclamation
(June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy
(March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed
settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August
17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and
even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95
028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and
executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995,
there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's
two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also
become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his
political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for,
and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the
words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and
thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final
judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission
said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee,
was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated
March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future
status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a
preproclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that he
was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5day reglementary period." Hence, according to him,
Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various
petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in
Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no
longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando,
187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This
rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity.
(citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after
Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of
the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy
of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that
petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of
such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due
course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of
this case."
The lastquoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases
a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution
declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995
election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their
ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all,
it is that the vicegovernor and not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to
paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic
teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be
proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division)
dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for
want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by
the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en
banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78
is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide
petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
(Italics supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as
urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic
distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The
existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx
repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter,
the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him
a noncitizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for
the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and
1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation
therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that
Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his
claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11,
1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did
not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try
and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point,
i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless
votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a
petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25day period prescribed therein.
The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition.
And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here,
we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held
that a petition filed beyond the 25day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo)
decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there
is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988
and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status
not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in
international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are the citizens
of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless
and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case
law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three
previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American
was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge.
Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections.
Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during
and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at
the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par.
(a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs.
Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day
or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for
other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus:
that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest nonretroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is
how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of
social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's
conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed
by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office
to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by
reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political
status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give
up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation
of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have
been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our
holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for
and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the
Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to
give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve
the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public
policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could
have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his
failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any
elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only
to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about
his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to
serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during
his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to reassume his nationality of birth despite several legal setbacks speak more loudly,
in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to
reembrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of
lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a
citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, singlemindedly insisted on
returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves
every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over
and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be
governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., J. dissenting opinion
Puno., J. concurring opinion
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.
Melo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
1 Composed of Pres. Comm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring, and
Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.
2 In SPC No. 95317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; Rollo, pp. 110129.
3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. SalazarFernando, Manolo B.
Gorospe and Teresita DyLiaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official
travel at the time of the deliberation and resolution of this case. However, the Commission has reserved to Comm.
Desamito the right to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159171.
4 Rollo, pp. 4649.
5 Rollo, pp. 5055. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedies A. SalazarFernando, ponente; Comm.
Teresita DyLiaco Flores, concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on official business").
6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On
February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. However, the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al, 232 SCRA 785 (June 6,1994),
overturned this grant, and Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and ordered to vacate his office. On the
basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95028.
7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong,
Remedios A. SalazarFemando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. ReyesClaravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy
Liaco Flores; Rollo, pp. 5657.
8. Rollo, p. 60.
9 Rollo, pp. 6167.
10 Rollo, pp. 8687. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as "stray votes," and thus Lee was held as having
garnered the "highest number of votes."
11 Rollo, pp. 8897. This is the forerunner of the present case.
12 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).
13 Rollo, pp. 110128.
14 Rollo, pp. 159170.
15 Rollo, pp. 1617; petition, pp. 1415.
16 Rollo, pp. 1015. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.
17 Rollo, pp. 1617. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.
18 Rollo, pp. 1821. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec Commissioners
19 Republic Act No. 7160.
20 See footnote no. 6, supra.
21 In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo)
really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."
22 Supra, p. 794.
23 Petition, p. 27; Rollo, p. 29.
24 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:
"MEMORANDUM
TO : The Solicitor General
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
The DirectorGeneral
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other executive issuance, and
the derivative administrative authority thereof, poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress
under the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to
cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter
of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws,
and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations.
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino
Manila, March 27, 1987. "
25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.
26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al, G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).
27 Petition, p. 28; Rollo p. 30.
28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:
"MANIFESTATION
The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following
persons have been repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995:
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R000900
2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901
3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902
4. Terry Herrera and
Antonio Ching 903
5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904
6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905
7. Samuel M. Buyco 906
8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907
9. Samuel Villanueva 908
10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909
11. Felicilda Otilla SacnanasChua 910
29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship
unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship
by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to reacquire
Philippine citizenship;
Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall
be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate
forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventyfive. "
30 See footnote no. 6, supra
31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).
32 "The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting
from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, x x x." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
33 96 Phil. 447,453 (1955).
34 The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral argument held on March 19, 1996:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be a citizen at the time of
proclamation?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the time of proclamation and not only that,
at the time that he assumes the office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of
the election?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be reckoned from the date of certificate of
candidacy as in the case of qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53 it says that for purposes of
residence it must be reckoned x x x from the time of the filing of the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the
date of the election. But when we go over all the provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor, there is no qualification
requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we
say that if there is no provision under any existing law which requires that you have to be a citizen of the Philippines on the
date of the filing or on the date of election then it has to be equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified at
the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume the office.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate should also be a registered
voter and to be a registered voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted
in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,
1995.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen
by this Court twice.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling
of the Supreme Court is correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered voter
was likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was a ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by the Regional
Trial Court and he was sustained as a valid voter, so he voted.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your contention that citizenship should be determined as
of the time of proclamation and not as of the time of the election or at the time'of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does
not specify when citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other
local positions should be a voter and to be a voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue here because he was allowed to vote
and . he did in fact vote and in fact, he was a registered voter." (TSN, March 19. 1996.)
35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines," as
amended, provides for the various qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino citizenship
36 Comment, p. 11; Rollo, p. 259.
37 See footnote no. 33.
38 Section 253 reads as follows:
"Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any member of the Congress, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XIV,
Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyally to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or
municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189,
par. 2, 1978 EC)."
39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25,1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals,
128 SCRA 519 (April 2,1984).
40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states:
"Exceptions to Rule. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly
provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in
case of laws creating new rights."
41 id., p. 25.
42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270271.
43 73 Am Jur 2d, sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208,210 (1953).
44 Memorandum, p. 9.
45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.
46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; italics supplied.
47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.
48 Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by Solicitor General, it appears that, excluding the case
of Frivaldo, the longest interval between date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was three months
and ten days; the swiftest action was a sameday approval.
49 "SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship";
50 P. 11; Rollo, p. 259.
51 Resolution, p. 12; Rollo, p. 121.
52 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210
SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).
53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent's
certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
54 Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 21.
55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; Rollo, p. 116
56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L21289, October 4,
1971.
57 Art. IX, Sec. 2.
58 SPC No. 95317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer:
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after due notice and hearing an Oder (sic)
/Resolution/ Decision be issued as follows:
a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for
being contrary to law;
b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;
xxx xxx xxx
59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994).
60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992),
61 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995.
62 Supra, at p. 312.
63 See footnotes 2 and 3.
64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23,1959).
65 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239.
66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the late Senator Benigno
S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld, despite his not being of the required age on the day of the election, although he celebrated his
thirtyfifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in 1990, this Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May
25, 1990) that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmena held an Alien Certificate of Registration as an American citizen, he was still not
disqualified from occupying the local elective post of governor, since such certificate did not preclude his being "still a
Filipino." The holding in Aquino was subsequently nullified by the adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which
specified that the age qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the day of the proclamation
of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991 ) which took effect on January 1, 1992 , provides that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective local position, and effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent possible, and
unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will.
67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994).
68 This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6.

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7/31/2017 Frivalado vs Comelec : 120295 : June 28, 1996 : J Panganiban : En Banc

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

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