SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Motion for Partial Reconsideration denied.

Note.—The rule of substantial compliance may be

availed of with respect to the contents of the certification of
non-forum shopping since the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the certification
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. (Cavile vs. Heirs of
Clarita Cavile, 400 SCRA 255 [2003])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 136409. March 14, 2008.*

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A.

PASRICHA, petitioners, vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY,
INC., respondent.

Actions; Ejectment; Parties; Corporations; The capacity of a

corporation to institute an ejectment suit is not affected by the
subsequent suspension and revocation of certificate of registration.
—We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the
ejectment case. Although the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) suspended and eventually revoked
respondent’s certificate of registration on February 16, 1995,
records show that it instituted the action for ejectment on
December 15, 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced,
its registration was not yet revoked. Besides, as correctly held by
the appellate court, the SEC later set aside its

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

earlier orders of suspension and revocation of respondent’s

certificate, rendering the issue moot and academic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the corporate officer
initially failed to show that she had the capacity to sign the
verification and institute the ejectment case on behalf of the
company, her act of immediately presenting the Secretary’s
Certificate confirming her authority to represent the company may
be considered as substantial compliance and call for the relaxation
of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.—We likewise
affirm Ms. Bautista’s capacity to sue on behalf of the company
despite lack of proof of authority to so represent it. A corporation
has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied from or are
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said
powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized
officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the
purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
directors. Thus, any person suing on behalf of the corporation
should present proof of such authority. Although Ms. Bautista
initially failed to show that she had the capacity to sign the
verification and institute the ejectment case on behalf of the
company, when confronted with such question, she immediately
presented the Secretary’s Certificate confirming her authority to
represent the company. There is ample jurisprudence holding that
subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.
Judges; Inhibition and Disqualification of Judges; It is settled that
a motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of the
court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the
rationale being that “a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on
the action of the court x x x (only to) raise an objection of this sort
after the decision has been rendered”; It is the policy of the Court
not to tolerate acts of litigants who, for just about any conceivable
reason, seek to disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose,
under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.—As to
the denial of the motion to inhibit Justice Reyes, we find the same
to be in order. First, the motion to inhibit came after the appellate
court rendered the assailed decision, that is, after Justice Reyes
had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case. It is
settled that a motion

275
 VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 275

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of the court had

already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale
being that “a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on the
action of the court x  x  x (only to) raise an objection of this sort
after the decision has been rendered.” Second, it is settled that
mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not
enough; there should be evidence to substantiate the suspicion.
Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially when weighed
against a judge’s sacred pledge under his oath of office to
administer justice without regard for any person and to do right
equally to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias
and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source, resulting in
an opinion on the merits based on something other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case. We would like to
reiterate, at this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts
of litigants who, for just about any conceivable reason, seek to
disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose, under a plea
of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Requisites.—Unlawful
detainer cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the
elements to be proved and resolved are the fact of lease and the
expiration or violation of its terms. Specifically, the essential
requisites of unlawful detainer are: 1) the fact of lease by virtue of
a contract, express or implied; 2) the expiration or termination of
the possessor’s right to hold possession; 3) withholding by the
lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or
termination of the right to possess; 4) letter of demand upon
lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the action within one year
from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.
Appeals; It is settled doctrine that in a civil case, the conclusions of
fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by the Supreme Court.—The only contentious issue is
whether there was indeed a violation of the terms of the contract:
on the part of petitioners, whether they failed to pay the
stipulated rent without justifiable cause; while on the part of
respondent, whether it prevented petitioners from occupying the
leased premises except Room 35. This issue involves questions of
fact, the resolution of which

276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

requires the evaluation of the evidence presented. The MeTC, the

RTC and the CA all found that petitioners failed to perform their
obligation to pay the stipulated rent. It is settled doctrine that in
a civil case, the conclusions of fact of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive,
and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court. Albeit
the rule admits of exceptions, not one of them obtains in this case.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Consignation; Interpleader;
Words and Phrases; Not knowing to whom to pay the rentals does
not justify the failure of the lessees to pay because they are not
without remedy—they should avail of the provisions of the Civil
Code on consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader; Consignation shall be made by depositing the things
due at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender
of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.—What was,
instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners’ non-
payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom
payment should be made. However, this did not justify their
failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not
without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment
and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. Article 1256 of the Civil
Code provides: Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of
payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it,
the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the
consignation of the thing or sum due. Consignation alone shall
produce the same effect in the following cases: x  x  x  x (4) When
two or more persons claim the same right to collect; x  x  x  x.
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the
disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of
payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement
of the consignation in other cases.
Consignation; The rationale for consignation is to avoid the
performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor
by reason of causes not imputable to him.—In the instant case,
consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of
the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the
performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor
by reason of causes not imputable to him. Petitioners claim that
they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared
vouchers for their monthly

277
 VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 277

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of

payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would
not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount.
Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be
accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment
may be produced.
Interpleader; An action for interpleader is proper when the
lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made
due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect).
—Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1.
When interpleader proper.—Whenever conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against a person who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them
to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the
lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made
due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Where there is nothing in the
contract which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or
more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease of all the
nine (9) rooms, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to the
corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same.—
Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of Rooms
36, 37 and 38 as a justification for non-payment of rentals.
Although the two contracts embraced the lease of nine (9) rooms,
the terms of the contracts—with their particular reference to
specific rooms and the monthly rental for each—easily raise the
inference that the parties intended the lease of each room
separate from that of the others. There is nothing in the contract
which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or more
rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9)
rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to
the corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the
same. Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals only for
the rooms actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners.

278
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Albert M. Rasalan for petitioners.
  Feria, Feria, La’O, Tantoco for private respondent Don
Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 26, 1998 and its
Resolution2 dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
37739 dismissing the petition filed by petitioners Josephine
and Subhash Pasricha.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners
executed two Contracts of Lease3 whereby the former, as
lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006
M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals, as
follows:

For Rooms 32/35:

From March 1, 1991 to August 31, 1991 – P5,000.00/P10,000.00
From September 1, 1991 to February 29, 1992 –
P5,500.00/P11,000.00

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Quirino

D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 44-62.
2 Rollo, pp. 63-72.
3 The first Contract of Lease covers Rooms 32 and 35, id., at pp. 1034-1042; the
second Contract of Lease covers Rooms 22, 24, 33, 34, 36, 37 and 38, id., at pp.
1043-1050.

279

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 279

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

From March 1, 1992 to February 28, 1993 – P6,050.00/P12,100.00

From March 1, 1993 to February 28, 1994 – P6,655.00/P13,310.00
From March 1, 1994 to February 28, 1995 – P7,320.50/P14,641.00
From March 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996 – P8,052.55/P16,105.10
From March 1, 1996 to February 29, 1997 – P8,857.81/P17,715.61
From March 1, 1997 to February 28, 1998 – P9,743.59/P19,487.17
From March 1, 1998 to February 28, 1999 –
P10,717.95/P21,435.89
From March 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000 –
P11,789.75/P23,579.48 4

For Rooms 22 and 24:

Effective July 1, 1992 – P10,000.00 with an increment of 10%
every two years.5
For Rooms 33 and 34:
Effective April 1, 1992 – P5,000.00 with an increment of 10%
every two years.6
For Rooms 36, 37 and 38:
Effective when tenants vacate said premises – P10,000.00 with an
increment of 10% every two years.7

Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of

electric consumption, water bills and the use of telephone
cables.8
The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize
leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of
the lease contracts.9 While the contracts were in effect,
petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then
General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter,
Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms.
Bautista).10 Petitioners religiously

_______________

4 Rollo, pp. 1034-1036.

5 Id., at pp. 1043-1044.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id., at pp. 1037 and 1045.
9 Records, p. 8.
10 Rollo, p. 901.

280

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.11 After that,

however, despite repeated demands, petitioners
continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent.
Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the
matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on
petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals
amounting to P916,585.58.12 Because petitioners still
refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by
private respondent through its representative, Ms.
Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila.13 The case was raffled to Branch XIX and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 143058-CV.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated
rent for the leased premises starting July until November
1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of
the internal squabble in respondent company as to the
person authorized to receive payment.14 To further justify
their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they
were prevented from using the units (rooms) subject matter
of the lease contract, except Room 35. Petitioners
eventually paid their monthly rent for December 1992 in
the amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that respondent
waived its right to collect the rents for the months of July
to November 1992 since petitioners were prevented from
using Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and 34.15 However, they again
withheld payment of rents starting January 1993 because
of respondent’s refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38.16
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents,
petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers
for their monthly rentals from January 1993

_______________

11 Records, p. 3.
12  Demand letter dated November 2, 1993, through private
respondent’s counsel Feria, Feria, Lugtu and Lao; Records, p. 36.
13 Records, pp. 2-5.
14 Id., at p. 10.
15 Id., at p. 11.
16 Id., at p. 14.

281

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 281

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

to January 1994.17 Petitioners further averred in their

Amended Answer18 that the complaint for ejectment was
prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to
the barangay for conciliation.
For failure of the parties to reach an amicable
settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated.
Thereafter, they submitted their respective position papers.
 On November 24, 1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint for ejectment.19 It considered
petitioners’ non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The
court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not
amount to payment of the obligation; petitioners should
have deposited their payment in the name of respondent
company. On the matter of possession of the subject
premises, the court did not give credence to petitioners’
claim that private respondent failed to turn over possession
of the premises. The court, however, dismissed the
complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s alleged lack of
authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.
Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 94-72515,
reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision in this wise:

“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and

set aside and another one is rendered ordering defendants-
appellees and all persons claiming rights under them, as follows:
(1) to vacate the leased premised (sic) and restore possession
thereof to plaintiff-appellant;
(2) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P967,915.80
representing the accrued rents in arrears as of November 1993,
and the rents on the leased premises for the succeeding months in
the amounts stated in paragraph 5 of the complaint until fully
paid; and

_______________

17 Id., at p. 13.
18 Id., at pp. 110-117.
19 Penned by Judge Ernesto A. Reyes; Records, pp. 261-266.

282

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

(3) to pay an additional sum equivalent to 25% of the rent

accounts as and for attorney’s fees plus the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.”20

The court adopted the MeTC’s finding on petitioners’

unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground
for ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in dismissing
the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it
upheld Ms. Bautista’s authority to represent respondent
notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that
effect, since her authority was implied from her power as a
general manager/
treasurer of the company.21
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari.22 On March
18, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion23 to cite Ms.
Bautista for contempt; to strike down the MeTC and RTC
Decisions as legal nullities; and to conduct hearings and
ocular inspections or delegate the reception of evidence.
Without resolving the aforesaid motion, on May 26, 1998,
the CA affirmed24 the RTC Decision but deleted the award
of attorney’s fees.25

_______________

20 Rollo, pp. 302-303.

21 Record, p. 367.
22  The petitioners adopted a wrong mode of appeal. Notwithstanding
the procedural defect, the CA still took cognizance of the case and decided
the same on the merits; CA Rollo, pp. 1-42.
23 Rollo, pp. 346-376.
24 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that the award of attorney’s fees is
deleted.
SO ORDERED (Rollo, pp. 61-62).
25 Supra note 1.

283

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 283

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the

aforesaid decision.26 Thereafter, they filed several motions
asking the Honorable Justice Ruben T. Reyes to inhibit
from further proceeding with the case allegedly because of
his close association with Ms. Bautista’s uncle-in-law.27
In a Resolution28 dated December 10, 1998, the CA
denied the motions for lack of merit. The appellate court
considered said motions as repetitive of their previous
arguments, irrelevant and obviously dilatory.29 As to the
motion for inhibition of the Honorable Justice Reyes, the
same was denied, as the appellate court justice stressed
that the decision and the resolution were not affected by
extraneous matters.30 Lastly, the appellate court granted
respondent’s motion for execution and directed the RTC to
issue a new writ of execution of its decision, with the
exception of the award of attorney’s fees which the CA
deleted.31
Petitioners now come before this Court in this petition
for review on certiorari raising the following issues:

_______________

26 Rollo, pp. 73-116

27 Id., at pp. 377-386.
28 Id., at pp. 63-72. The fallo reads:
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
omnibus motions, motion to inhibit, motion for contempt and
related motions are hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit.
Private respondents’ motion for execution is GRANTED. In the
interest of justice, the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Manila is
directed to issue a new writ of execution of its judgment which we
affirmed, except as to attorney’s fees which we deleted. For this
purpose, the original records elevated to Us are ordered remanded
to the RTC.
SO ORDERED.
29 Rollo, p. 71.
30 Id., at pp. 70-71.
31 Id., at p. 72.

284

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

I.
Whether this ejectment suit should be dismissed and whether
petitioners are entitled to damages for the unauthorized and
malicious filing by Rosario (sic) Bautista of this ejectment case, it
being clear that [Roswinda]—whether as general manager or by
virtue of her subsequent designation by the Board of Directors as
the corporation’s attorney-in-fact—had no legal capacity to
institute the ejectment suit, independently of whether Director
Pacana’s Order setting aside the SEC revocation Order is a mere
scrap of paper.
II.
Whether the RTC’s and the Honorable Court of Appeals’ failure
and refusal to resolve the most fundamental factual issues in the
instant ejectment case render said decisions void on their face
by reason of the complete abdication by the RTC and the
Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes of their constitutional duty not
only to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which
a decision is based but also to resolve the decisive factual issues
in any given case.
 III.
Whether the (1) failure and refusal of Honorable Justice Ruben
Reyes to inhibit himself, despite his admission—by reason of his
silence—of petitioners’ accusation that the said Justice enjoyed a
$7,000.00 scholarship grant courtesy of the uncle-in-law of
respondent “corporation’s” purported general manager and (2),
worse, his act of ruling against the petitioners and in favor of the
respondent “corporation” constitute an unconstitutional
deprivation of petitioners’ property without due process of law.32

In addition to Ms. Bautista’s lack of capacity to sue,

petitioners insist that respondent company has no standing
to sue as a juridical person in view of the suspension and
eventual revocation of its certificate of registration.33 They
likewise question the factual findings of the court on the
bases of their ejectment from the subject premises.
Specifically, they fault the appellate court for not finding
that: 1) their non-payment

_______________

32 Id., at pp. 19-20.

33 Id., at p. 978.

285

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 285

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

of rentals was justified; 2) they were deprived of possession

of all the units subject of the lease contract except Room 35;
and 3) respondent violated the terms of the contract by its
continued refusal to turn over possession of Rooms 36, 37
and 38. Petitioners further prayed that a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining the CA from
enforcing its Resolution directing the issuance of a Writ of
Execution. Thus, in a Resolution34 dated January 18, 1999,
this Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo
effective immediately until further orders.
The petition lacks merit.
We uphold the capacity of respondent company to
institute the ejectment case. Although the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended and eventually
revoked respondent’s certificate of registration on February
16, 1995, records show that it instituted the action for
ejectment on December 15, 1993. Accordingly, when the
case was commenced, its registration was not yet
revoked.35 Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court,
the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and
revocation of respondent’s certificate, rendering the issue
moot and academic.36
We likewise affirm Ms. Bautista’s capacity to sue on
behalf of the company despite lack of proof of authority to
so represent it. A corporation has no powers except those
expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and
those that are implied from or are incidental to its
existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers
through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized
officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by corporate by-

_______________

34 Id., at pp. 520-521.

35 Id., at p. 1358.
36 Id., at p. 69.

286

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.37 Thus,

any person suing on behalf of the corporation should
present proof of such authority. Although Ms. Bautista
initially failed to show that she had the capacity to sign the
verification and institute the ejectment case on behalf of
the company, when confronted with such question, she
immediately presented the Secretary’s Certificate38
confirming her authority to represent the company.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that subsequent
and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of
the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.39 In Novelty
Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court faulted the
appellate court for dismissing a petition solely on
petitioner’s failure to timely submit proof of authority to
sue on behalf of the corporation. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,41
we upheld the sufficiency of a petition verified by an
employment specialist despite the total absence of a board
resolution authorizing her to act for and on behalf of the
corporation. Lastly, in China Banking Corporation v.
Mondragon International Philippines, Inc.,42 we relaxed
the rules of procedure because the corporation ratified the
manager’s status as an authorized signatory. In all of the
above cases, we brushed aside technicalities in the interest
of justice. This is not to say that we disregard the
requirement of prior authority to act in the name of a
corporation. The relaxation of the rules applies only to
highly meritorious cases, and when there is substantial
compliance. While it is true that rules of procedure are
intended to promote rather

_______________

37  BA Savings Bank v. Sia, 391 Phil. 370, 377; 336 SCRA 484, 488
(2000).
38 Records, p. 100.
39  Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 149793, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 280, 294.
40 458 Phil. 36; 411 SCRA 211 (2003).
41 410 Phil. 483; 358 SCRA 240 (2001).
42 G.R. No. 164798, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 332.

287

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 287

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

than frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift

unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, we
should not insist on strict adherence to the rules at the
expense of substantial justice.43 Technical and procedural
rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of
justice; and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the
rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective, for,
after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for
the existence of courts.44
As to the denial of the motion to inhibit Justice Reyes,
we find the same to be in order. First, the motion to inhibit
came after the appellate court rendered the assailed
decision, that is, after Justice Reyes had already rendered
his opinion on the merits of the case. It is settled that a
motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of
the court had already given an opinion on the merits of the
case, the rationale being that “a litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate on the action of the court x x x (only
to) raise an objection of this sort after the decision has been
rendered.”45 Second, it is settled that mere suspicion that a
judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there
should be evidence to substantiate the suspicion. Bias and
prejudice cannot be presumed, especially when weighed
against a judge’s sacred pledge under his oath of office to
administer justice without regard for any person and to do
right equally to the poor and the rich. There must be a
showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source, resulting in an opinion on the merits
based on something other than what the judge learned
from

_______________

43  Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations
Commission, supra note 39, at p. 294.
44 General Milling Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442
Phil. 425, 428; 394 SCRA 207, 209 (2002).
45 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 451 Phil. 1, 41; 403 SCRA 1, 23
(2003); Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-70987, May 5,
1988, 161 SCRA 83, 97-98.

288

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

his participation in the case.46 We would like to reiterate,

at this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts of
litigants who, for just about any conceivable reason, seek to
disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose, under
a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.47
We now come to the more substantive issue of whether
or not the petitioners may be validly ejected from the
leased premises.
Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. In such
cases, the elements to be proved and resolved are the fact
of lease and the expiration or violation of its terms.48
Specifically, the essential requisites of unlawful detainer
are: 1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or
implied; 2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s
right to hold possession; 3) withholding by the lessee of
possession of the land or building after the expiration or
termination of the right to possess; 4) letter of demand
upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of
the lease and vacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the
action within one year from the date of the last demand
received by the defendant.49
It is undisputed that petitioners and respondent entered
into two separate contracts of lease involving nine (9)
rooms of the San Luis Building. Records, likewise, show
that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners
vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the
demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises.
The only conten-

_______________

46  Soriano v. Judge Angeles, 393 Phil. 769, 779; 339 SCRA 366, 375
(2000); People v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 150, 157; 309 SCRA 705, 710
(1999).
47 People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 44712, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171,
186.
48 Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 62, 72;
Manuel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95469, July 25, 1991, 199 SCRA 603,
608.
49 Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006,
510 SCRA 103, 115-116.

289

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 289

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

tious issue is whether there was indeed a violation of the

terms of the contract: on the part of petitioners, whether
they failed to pay the stipulated rent without justifiable
cause; while on the part of respondent, whether it
prevented petitioners from occupying the leased premises
except Room 35.
This issue involves questions of fact, the resolution of
which requires the evaluation of the evidence presented.
The MeTC, the RTC and the CA all found that petitioners
failed to perform their obligation to pay the stipulated rent.
It is settled doctrine that in a civil case, the conclusions of
fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive, and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court.50 Albeit the rule
admits of exceptions, not one of them obtains in this case.51
To settle this issue once and for all, we deem it proper to
assess the array of factual findings supporting the court’s
conclusion.
The evidence of petitioners’ non-payment of the
stipulated rent is overwhelming. Petitioners, however,
claim that such non-payment is justified by the following:
1) the refusal of respondent to allow petitioners to use the
leased properties, except room 35; 2) respondent’s refusal to
turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3) respondent’s refusal
to accept payment tendered by petitioners.
Petitioners’ justifications are belied by the evidence on
record. As correctly held by the CA, petitioners’
communications to respondent prior to the filing of the
complaint never mentioned their alleged inability to use
the rooms.52 What they pointed out in their letters is that
they did not know to whom

_______________

50 Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA
671, 682; Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA
545, 563; Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 864, 875; 408 SCRA 419,
428-429 (2003).
51 Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, supra, at p. 682.
52 Rollo, p. 54.

290

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

payment should be made, whether to Ms. Bautista or to

Pacheco.53 In their July 26 and October 30, 1993 letters,
petitioners only questioned the method of computing their
electric billings without, however, raising a complaint
about their failure to use the rooms.54 Although petitioners
stated in their December 30, 1993 letter that respondent
failed to fulfill its part of the contract,55 nowhere did they
specifically refer to their inability to use the leased rooms.
Besides, at that time, they were already in default on their
rentals for more than a year.
If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of
the nine (9) rooms subject of the contract of lease, and
considering that the rooms were intended for a business
purpose, we cannot understand why they did not
specifically assert their right. If we believe petitioners’
contention that they had been prevented from using the
rooms for more than a year before the complaint for
ejectment was filed, they should have demanded specific
performance from the lessor and commenced an action in
court. With the execution of the contract, petitioners were
already in a position to exercise their right to the use and
enjoyment of the property according to the terms of the
lease contract.56 As borne out by the records, the fact is
that respondent turned over to petitioners the keys to the
leased premises and petitioners, in fact, renovated the
rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of the
premises and they had the right to the use and enjoyment
of the same. They, likewise, had the right to resist any act
of intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property,
even as against the lessor itself. Yet, they did not lift a
finger to protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation
of the contract by the lessor.

_______________

53 Id., at p. 1051.
54 Id., at pp. 1053-1056.
55 Id., at p. 1058.
56 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 621, 641; 335 SCRA 308, 325
(2000).

291

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 291

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence

was petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly
they did not know to whom payment should be made.
However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if
such were the case, they were not without any remedy.
They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of
the Rules of Court on interpleader.
Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:

“Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has

been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall
be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or
sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the
following cases:
x x x x
(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;
x x x x.”

Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at

the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender
of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.57
In the instant case, consignation alone would have
produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale
for consignation is to avoid the performance of an
obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason
of causes not imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that
they made a written tender of payment and actually
prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was
insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even
assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not
constitute payment for want of con-

_______________

57 Civil Code, Art. 1258.

58 Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil.
232, 264; 282 SCRA 553, 580 (1997).

292

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

signation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that

tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in
order that the effects of payment may be produced.59
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“Section 1. When interpleader proper.—Whenever conflicting

claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against
a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves.”

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper

when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property
(or on the right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to
protect a person against double liability but to protect him
against double vexation in respect of one liability.61
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies,
petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.
Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery
of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as a justification for non-payment
of rentals. Although the two contracts embraced the lease
of nine (9) rooms, the terms of the contracts—with their
particular reference to specific rooms and the monthly
rental for each—easily raise the inference that the parties
intended the lease of each room separate from that of the
others. There is nothing in the contract which would lead to
the conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to
be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9) rooms.
Accordingly, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to
the corresponding

_______________

59  State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90676,
June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 390, 399.
60 Ocampo v. Tirona, supra note 48, at p. 76.
61 Id.

293

VOL. 548, MARCH 14, 2008 293

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same. Notably,

respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the
rooms actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners.
It may also be mentioned that the contract specifically
provides that the lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 was to take
effect only when the tenants thereof would vacate the
premises. Absent a clear showing that the previous tenants
had vacated the premises, respondent had no obligation to
deliver possession of the subject rooms to petitioners. Thus,
petitioners cannot use the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and
38 as an excuse for their failure to pay the rentals due on
the other rooms they occupied.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has
every right to exercise his right to eject the erring lessees.
The parties’ contracts of lease contain identical provisions,
to wit:

“In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment of rental on the

fifth (5th) day of each month, the amount owing shall as penalty
bear interest at the rate of FOUR percent (4%) per month, to be
paid, without prejudice to the right of the LESSOR to terminate
his contract, enter the premises, and/or eject the LESSEE as
hereinafter set forth;”62

Moreover, Article 167363 of the Civil Code gives the

lessor the right to judicially eject the lessees in case of non-
payment

_______________

62 Rollo, pp. 1036 and 1044.

63  The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following
causes:
 (1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the
duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the
contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or
service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof;

294

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.

of the monthly rentals. A contract of lease is a consensual,

bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the
owner temporarily grants the use of his property to
another, who undertakes to pay the rent therefor.64 For
failure to pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain
in the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED and the Status Quo Order dated January 18,
1999 is hereby LIFTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37739 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Quisumbing,**

Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—The idea that a judge can preside over his own

case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such
was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor
covered by Section 1 of Rule 137. (Oktubre vs. Velasco, 434
SCRA 636 [2004])
A judge’s failure to inhibit himself when his son-in-law
appeared as counsel in a case he was trying is a patent
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of
Court. (Ortiz vs. Jaculbe, Jr., 461 SCRA 361 [2005])
——o0o——

_______________

or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657,

as regards the use thereof.
 The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by
special laws.
64 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56, at p. 640; pp. 323-324.
** Additional member in lieu of Justice Reyes, who took no part.

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.