APT vs. CA

VOL.
300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 579

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 121171. December 29, 1998.
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, JESUS S. CABARRUS, SR., JESUS S. CABARRUS,
JR., JAIME T. CABARRUS, JOSE MIGUEL CABARRUS,
ALEJANDRO S. PASTOR, JR., ANTONIO U. MIRANDA, and
MIGUEL M. ANTONIO, as Minority Stockholders of Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation, respondents.
Actions; Arbitration; Judgments; Dismissal of Actions; Words and

Phrases; The term “dismiss” has a precise definition in law—to dispose of
an action, suit, or motion without trial on the issues involved, conclude,
discontinue, terminate, quash.—The use of the term “dismissed” is not “a
mere semantic imperfection.” The dispositive portion of the Order of the
trial court dated October 14, 1992 stated in no uncertain terms: 4. The
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED. The term “dismiss” has a precise
definition in law. “To dispose of an action, suit, or motion without trial on
the issues involved. Conclude, discontinue, terminate, quash.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A court makes a fatal mistake if it dismisses
a case instead of merely suspending it to await the outcome of arbitration
proceedings.—Admittedly, the correct procedure was for the parties to go
back to the court where the case was pending to
_________
* THIRD DIVISION.
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
have the award confirmed by said court. However, Branch 62 made the fatal
mistake of issuing a final order dismissing the case. While Branch 62 should
have merely suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither of the parties
questioned said dismissal. Thus, both parties as well as said court are bound
by such error. It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents do, that
petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge that the “case was merely
stayed until arbitration finished,” as again, the order of Branch 62 in very
clear terms stated that the “complaint was dismissed.” By its own action,
Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction over the case. It could not have validly
reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere motion of one of the
parties. The Rules of Court is specific on how a new case may be initiated
and such is not done by mere motion in a particular branch of the RTC.
Consequently, as there was no “pending action” to speak of, the petition to
confirm the arbitral award should have been filed as a new case and raffled
accordingly to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; As a rule, neither waiver nor
estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances.—The rule is that “Where the
court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of
the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is
neither for the courts nor for the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let
alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.”
As a rule then, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction
upon a court barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances. One
such exception was enunciated in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, where it was held
that “after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s prayer for the setting aside of the
arbitral award is not inconsistent with its disavowal of the court’s
jurisdiction where, from the outset, it has consistently held that the court has
no jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award.—Petitioner’s situation is
different because from the outset, it has consistently held the position that
the RTC, Branch 62 had no jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award;
consequently, it cannot be said that it was estopped from questioning the
RTC’s jurisdiction. Petitioner’s prayer for the setting aside of the arbitral
award was not inconsistent with its disavowal of the court’s jurisdiction.
581
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 581
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; A party aggrieved by an

arbitral award is not precluded from resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 where the court to which the award was
submitted for confirmation has acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.—The aforequoted provision, however, does not
preclude a party aggrieved by the arbitral award from resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
where, as in this case, the Regional Trial Court to which the award was
submitted for confirmation has acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy remedy in
the course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial review of an arbitration is more limited
than judicial review of a trial.—As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot
be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the
facts. Courts are without power to amend or overrule merely because of
disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators.
They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and
will not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators,
since any other rule would make an award the commencement, not the end,
of litigation. Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision of matters
submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an
award fairly and honestly made. Judicial review of an arbitration is, thus,
more limited than judicial review of a trial.
Same; Same; Same; The arbitrators cannot resolve issues beyond the
scope of the submission agreement.—Nonetheless, the arbitrators’ award is
not absolute and without exceptions. The arbitrators cannot resolve issues
beyond the scope of the submission agreement. The parties to such an
agreement are bound by the arbitra-tors’ award only to the extent and in the
manner prescribed by the contract and only if the award is rendered in
conformity thereto. Thus, Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law provide
grounds for vacating, rescinding or modifying an arbitration award. Where
the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039, and 2040 of the Civil Code
applicable to compromises and arbitration are attendant, the arbitration
award may also be annulled.
Same; Same; Same; While a court is precluded from overturning an
award for errors in the determination of factual issues, nevertheless, if an
examination of the record reveals no support whatever for the arbitrators’
determination, their award must be vacated.—It
582
should be stressed that while a court is precluded from overturning an award

for errors in the determination of factual issues, nevertheless, if an
examination of the record reveals no support whatever for the arbitrators’
determinations, their award must be vacated. In the same manner, an award
must be vacated if it was made in “manifest disregard of the law.”
Mortgages; Damages; Where the foreclosure is not a wrongful act of
the mortgagee, it could not be the basis of any award of damages.—The
point need not be belabored that PNB and DBP had the legitimate right to
foreclose the mortgages of MMIC whose obligations were past due. The
foreclosure was not a wrongful act of the banks and, therefore, could not be
the basis of any award of damages. There was no financial restructuring
agreement to speak of that could have constituted an impediment to the
exercise of the banks’ right to foreclose.
Same; Presumptions; It is a disputable presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed and ordinary course of business has been
followed.—Private respondents’ thesis that the foreclo-sure proceedings
were null and void because of lack of publication in the newspaper is
nothing more than a mere unsubstantiated allegation not borne out by the
evidence. In any case, a disputable presumption exists in favor of petitioner
that official duty has been regularly performed and ordinary course of
business has been followed.
Corporation Law; Agency; A corporation exercises its powers,
including the power to enter into contracts, through its board of directors,
and while it may appoint agents to enter into a contract in its behalf, the
agent should not exceed their authority.—As a rule, a corporation exercises
its powers, including the power to enter into contracts, through its board of
directors. While a corporation may appoint agents to enter into a contract in
its behalf, the agent should not exceed his authority. In the case at bar, there
was no showing that the representatives of PNB and DBP in MMIC even
had the requisite authority to enter into a debt-for-equity swap. And if they
had such authority, there was no showing that the banks, through their board
of directors, had ratified the FRP.
Damages; A corporation whose credit reputation is not exactly
something to be considered sound and wholesome cannot be entitled to a
big amount of moral damages; Moral damages include be-
583
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 583
smirched reputation which a corporation may possibly suffer.—Further,

how could the MMIC be entitled to a big amount of moral damages when its
credit reputation was not exactly something to be considered sound and
wholesome. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include
besmirched reputation which a corporation may possibly suffer. A
corporation whose overdue and unpaid debts to the Government alone
reached a tremendous amount of P22 Billion Pesos cannot certainly have a
solid business reputation to brag about.
Actions; Arbitration; An award of damages to one who is not a party
before the Arbitration Committee is a complete nullity.—Civil Case No.
9900 filed before the RTC being a derivative suit, MMIC should have been
impleaded as a party. It was not joined as a party plaintiff or party defendant
at any stage of the proceedings. As it is, the award of damages to MMIC,
which was not a party before the Arbitration Committee, is a complete
nullity.
Same; Corporation Law; Derivative Suits; Parties; In a derivative suit,
the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit
for the corporation’s behalf is only a nominal party—the corporation should
be included as a party in the suit.—Settled is the doctrine that in a
derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the corporation’s behalf is only a nominal party.
The corporation should be included as a party in the suit. An individual
stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate
rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones
to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing
stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real
party in interest. x x x.
Same; Same; If an award is due a corporation from a party who has
equity in such corporation, the same should be given sans deduction in view
of the doctrine that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from its individual stockholders or members.—If at all an award was due
MMIC, which it was not, the same should have been given sans deduction,
regardless of whether or not the party liable had equity in the corporation, in
view of the doctrine that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from its individual stockholders or members. DBP’s alleged equity,
even if it were indeed 87%, did not give it ownership over any corporate
prop-
584
erty, including the monetary award, its right over said corporate property
being a mere expectancy or inchoate right. Notably, the stipulation even had
the effect of prejudicing the other creditors of MMIC.
Same; Same; Derivative Suits; Damages; It is perplexing how the
Arbitration Committee can in one breath rule that the case before it is a
derivative suit and at the same time award moral damages to an individual
stockholder.—It is perplexing how the Arbitration Committee can in one
breath rule that the case before it is a derivative suit, in which the aggrieved
party or the real party in interest is supposedly the MMIC, and at the same
time award moral damages to an individual stockholder.
Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Damages; Where a party’s cause of
action for the seizure of the assets belonging to a corporation, of which he is
the majority stockholder, was ventilated in a complaint he previously filed,
from which he obtained actual damages, he is barred by res judicata from
filing a similar case in another court to ask for moral damages which he
failed to get from the earlier case.—Cabarrus’ cause of action for the
seizure of the assets belonging to IEI, of which he is the majority
stockholder, having been ventilated in a complaint he previously filed with
the RTC, from which he obtained actual damages, he was barred by res
judicata from filing a similar case in another court, this time asking for
moral damages which he failed to get from the earlier case. Worse, private
respondents violated the rule against non-forum shopping.
ROMERO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Actions; Arbitration; If the tested mechanism of arbitration can simply

be ignored by an aggrieved party—one who voluntarily and actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning—it will
destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.—
Petitioner violated several covenants by asking the court a quo to vacate the
arbitration award. First, in paragraph 10 of the Compromise and Arbitration
Agreement, it agreed to abide by the arbitration committee’s decision which
“shall be final and executory upon its issuance upon the parties to the
arbitration and their assigns and successors-in-interest.” Next, the decision
that the arbitrators did render on November 24, 1993 specifically declared
the same to be “final and executory.” Finally, in the court’s confirmation
order of November 28, 1994, the finality of the
585
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 585
award was reiterated by the court. Arbitration, as an alternative mode of

settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad.
If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one
who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the
arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the very
essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.
Same; Same; Republic Act 876; Words and Phrases; The term
“certiorari” in Section 29 of R.A. No. 876 refers to an ordinary appeal
under Rule 45, not the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.—The
term “certiorari” in the aforequoted provision refers to an ordinary appeal
under Rule 45, not the special action of certiorari under Rule 65. It is an
“appeal,” as Section 29 proclaims. The proper forum for this action is, under
the old and the new rules of procedure, the Supreme Court. Thus, Section
2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that, “In all cases
where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.” Moreover, Section 29 limits the appeal to “questions of law,” another
indication that it is referring to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 which,
indeed, is the customary manner of reviewing such issues. On the other
hand, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed
of by a party where there is “no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the course of law,” and under circumstances where “a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.”
PARDO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Judgments; Upon attainment of finality of a dismissal through the lapse

of the reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it
and can no longer make any disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with
such dismissal.—Upon the finality of such order of dismissal, the case could
no longer be revived by mere motion. The trial court had lost its authority
over the case. We cite as squarely applicable the decision where this Court
emphatically said “But after the dismissal has become final through the
lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the only way by which the
action may be resuscitated or ‘revived,’ is by the institution of a subsequent
action through the filing of another complaint and the payment of the fees
prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of
586
finality of a dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the

Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make any
disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.” It is true
that the confirmation of an arbitral award is within the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a regional trial court. Such jurisdiction must be invoked by
proper motion as a special proceedings with notice to the parties filed in the
proper court with the clerk of court (and upon payment of the prescribed
fees).
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.
R.G. Roxas & Associates for private respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to reverse and

set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied due
course to the petition for certiorari filed by the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 62, Makati City. The Makati RTC’s order upheld and
confirmed the award made by the Arbitration Committee in favor of
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) and against
the Government, represented by herein petitioner APT for damages
in the amount of P2.5 BILLION (or approximately P4.5 BILLION,
including interest).
Ironically, the staggering amount of damages was imposed on the
Government for exercising its legitimate right of foreclosure as
creditor against the debtor MMIC as a consequence of the latter’s
failure to pay its overdue and unpaid obligation of P22 billion to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).
587
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 587

The antecedent facts

of the case.
The development, exploration and utilization of the mineral deposits
in the Surigao Mineral Reservation have been authorized by
Republic Act No. 1828, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 2077 and
4167, by virtue of which laws, a Memorandum of Agreement was
drawn on July 3, 1968, whereby the Republic of the Philippines thru
the Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, granted MMIC the
exclusive right to explore, develop and exploit nickel, cobalt and
1
other minerals in the Surigao mineral reservation. MMIC is a
domestic corporation engaged in mining with respondent Jesus S.
Cabarrus, Sr. as President and among its original stockholders.
The Philippine Government undertook to support the financing of
MMIC by purchase of MMIC debenture bonds and extension of
guarantees. Further, the Philippine Government obtained a firm
commitment from the DBP and/or other government financing
institutions to subscribe in MMIC and issue guarantee/s for foreign
loans or deferred payment arrangements secured from the US
Eximbank, Asian Development 2
Bank, Kobe Steel, of amount not
exceeding US$100 Million.
DBP approved guarantees in favor of MMIC and subsequent
requests for guarantees were based on the unutilized portion of the
Government commitment. Thereafter, the Government extended
accommodations to MMIC in various amounts.
On July 13, 1981, MMIC, PNB and DBP executed a Mortgage
3
Trust Agreement whereby MMIC, as mortgagor, agreed to
constitute mortgage in favor of PNB and DBP as mortgagees, over
all MMIC’s assets, subject of real estate and chattel mortgage
executed by the mortgagor, and additional assets described and
identified, including assets of whatever kind,
_____________
1 Rollo, pp. 261-262.

2 Id., at 262-263.
3 CA Rollo, p. 130.
588

nature or description, which the mortgagor may acquire whether in

substitution of, in replenishment, or in addition thereto.
Article IV of the Mortgage Trust Agreement provides for Events
of Default, which expressly includes the event that the
MORTGAGOR shall fail to pay any amount secured by this
4
Mortgage Trust Agreement when due.
Article V of the Mortgage Trust Agreement prescribes in detail,
and in addition to the enumerated events of defaults, circumstances
by which the mortgagor may be declared in default, the procedure
therefor, waiver of period to foreclose, authority of Trustee before,
during and after foreclosure, including taking possession of the
5
mortgaged properties.
In various requests for advances/remittances of loans of huge
amounts, Deeds of Undertakings, Promissory Notes, Loan
Documents, Deeds of Real Estate Mortgages, MMIC invariably
committed to pay either on demand or under certain terms the loans
and accommodations secured from or guaranteed by both DBP and
PNB.
By 1984, DBP and PNB’s financial exposure both in loans and in
equity in MMIC had reached tremendous proportions, and MMIC
was having a difficult time meeting its financial obligations. MMIC
had an outstanding loan with DBP in the amount of
P13,792,607,565.92 as of August 31, 1984 and with PNB in the
amount of P8,789,028,249.38 as of July 15, 1984 or a total
Government exposure of Twenty Two Billion Six Hundred Sixty-
Eight Million Five Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Seven Hundred6
Seventy and 05/100 (P22,668,537,770.05), Philippine Currency.
Thus, a financial restructuring plan (FRP) designed to reduce
MMIC’s interest expense through debt conversion 7to equity was
drafted by the Sycip Gorres Velayo accounting firm. On April 30,
1984, the FRP was ap-
____________
4 Rollo, p. 264.
5 Ibid.
6 Id., at 261.
7 Id., at 265.
589
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 589

8
proved by the Board of Directors of the MMIC. However, the
proposed FRP had never 9
been formally adopted, approved or ratified
by either PNB or DBP.
In August and September 1984, as the various loans and
advances made by DBP and PNB to MMIC had become overdue
and since any restructuring program relative to the loans was no
longer feasible, and in compliance with the directive of Presidential
Decree No. 385, DBP and PNB as mortgagees of MMIC assets,
decided to exercise their right to extrajudicially foreclose the
10
mortgages in accordance with the Mortgage Trust Agreement.
The foreclosed assets were sold to PNB as the lone bidder and
were assigned to three newly formed corporations, namely, Nonoc
Mining Corporation, Maricalum Mining and Industrial Corporation,
and Island Cement Corporation. In 1986, these 11
assets were
transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
On February 28, 1985, Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., together with the
other stockholders of MMIC, filed a derivative suit against DBP and
PNB before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, for Annulment of
12
Foreclosures, Specific Performance and Damages. The suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. 9900, prayed that the court: (1) annul the
foreclosures, restore the foreclosed assets to MMIC, and require the
banks to account for their use and operation in the interim; (2) direct
the banks to honor and perform their commitments under the alleged
FRP; and (3) pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
In the course of the trial, private respondents and petitioner APT,
as successor of the DBP and the PNB’s interest in MMIC, mutually
agreed to submit the case to arbitration by
__________
8 CA Rollo, p. 134.
9 Id., at 149.
10 CA Rollo, pp. 134-135.
11 Id., at 135-136.
12 Rollo, p. 266.
590

entering into a “Compromise and Arbitration Agreement,”

stipulating, inter alia:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises

and the mutual covenants contained herein, the parties agree as follows:
1. Withdrawal and Compromise. The parties have agreed to withdraw

their respective claims from the Trial Court and to resolve their
dispute through arbitration by praying to the Trial Court to issue a
Compromise Judgment based on this Compromise and Arbitration
Agreement.
In withdrawing their dispute from the court and in choosing to resolve it

through arbitration, the parties have agreed that:
(a) their respective money claims shall be reduced to purely money

claims; and
(b) as successor and assignee of the PNB and DBP interests in MMIC
and the MMIC accounts, APT shall likewise succeed to the rights
and obligations of PNB and DBP in respect of the controversy
subject of Civil Case No. 9900 to be transferred to arbitration and
any arbitral award/order against either PNB and/or DBP shall be
the responsibility of, be discharged by and be enforceable against
APT, the parties having agreed to drop PNB and DBP from the
arbitration.
2. Submission. The parties hereby agree that (a) the controversy in

Civil Case No. 9900 shall be submitted instead to arbitration under
RA 876 and (b) the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 9900 shall,
with the approval of the Trial Court of this Compromise and
Arbitration Agreement, be transferred and reduced to pure
pecuniary/money claims with the parties waiving and foregoing all
other forms of reliefs which they prayed for or should have prayed
13
for in Civil Case No. 9900.
The Compromise and Arbitration Agreement limited the issues to
the following:
5. Issues. The issues to be submitted for the Committee’s resolution shall be:
(a) Whether PLAINTIFFS have the capacity or the personality to institute
this derivative suit in behalf of the
____________
13 CA Rollo, pp. 109-110.
591
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 591

MMIC or its directors; (b) Whether or not the actions leading to, and
including, the PNB-DBP foreclosure of the MMIC assets were proper, valid
14
and in good faith.
This agreement was presented for approval to the trial court. On

October 14, 1992, the Makati RTC, Branch 62, issued an order, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court orders:
1. Substituting PNB and DBP with the Asset Privatization Trust as

party defendant.
2. Approving the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement dated
October 6, 1992, attached as Annex “C” of the Omnibus Motion.
3. Approving the Transformation of the reliefs prayed for [by] the
plaintiffs in this case into pure money claims; and
15
4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
The Arbitration Committee was composed of retired Supreme Court

Justice Abraham Sarmiento as Chairman, Atty. Jose C. Sison and
former Court of Appeals Justice Magdangal Elma as Members. On
November 24, 1993, after conducting several hearings, the
Arbitration Committee rendered a majority decision in favor of
MMIC, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Since, as this Committee finds, there is no foreclosure at all as it was not

legally and validly done, the Committee holds and so declares that the loans
of PNB and DBP to MMIC, for the payment and recovery of which the void
foreclosure sales were undertaken, continue to remain outstanding and
unpaid. Defendant APT as the successor-in-interest of PNB and DBP to the
said loans is therefore entitled and retains the right, to collect the same from
MMIC pursuant to, and based on the loan documents signed by MMIC,
subject to the legal and valid defenses that the latter may duly and
seasonably interpose. Such loans shall, however, be reduced by the amount
which APT may have realized from the sale of the seized
____________
14 Id., at 111-112.
15 Id., at 111.
592

assets of MMIC which by agreement should no longer be returned even if

the foreclosures were found to be null and void.
The documentary evidence submitted and adopted by both parties
(Exhibits “3,” “3-B”; Exhibit “100”; and also Exhibit “ZZZ”) as their
exhibits would show that the total outstanding obligation due to DBP and
PNB as of the date of foreclosure is P22,668,537,770.05, more or less.
Therefore, defendant APT can, and is still entitled to, collect the
outstanding obligations of MMIC to PNB and DBP amounting to
P22,668,537,770.05, more or less, with interest thereon as stipulated in the
loan documents from the date of foreclosure up to the time they are fully
paid less the proportionate liability of DBP as owner of 87% of the total
capitalization of MMIC under the FRP. Simply put, DBP shall share in the
award of damages to, and in the obligations of, MMIC in proportion to its
87% equity in the total capital stock of MMIC.
x x x.
As this Committee holds that the FRP is valid, DBP’s equity in MMIC is
raised to 87%. So pursuant to the above provision of the Compromise and
Arbitration Agreement, the 87% equity of DBP is hereby deducted from the
actual damages of P19,486,118,654.00 resulting in the net actual damages of
P2,531,635,425.02 plus interest.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the Marinduque Mining and

Industrial Corporation, except the DBP, the sum of
P2,531,635,425.02 with interest thereon at the legal rate of six per
cent (6%) per annum reckoned from August 3, 9, and 24, 1984,
pari passu, as and for actual damages. Payment of these actual
damages shall be offset by APT from the outstanding and unpaid
loans of MMIC with DBP and PNB, which have not been
converted into equity. Should there be any balance due to MMIC
after the offsetting, the same shall be satisfied from the funds
representing the purchase price of the sale of the shares of Island
Cement Corporation in the amount of P503,000,000.00 held under
escrow pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April 22, 1988 or
to such subsequent escrow agreement that would supercede [sic] it
pursuant to paragraph (9) of the Compromise and Arbitration
Agreement;
593
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 593

2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the Marinduque Mining and

Industrial Corporation, except the DBP, the sum of P13,000,000.00,
as and for moral and exemplary damages. Payment of these moral
and exemplary damages shall be offset by APT from the
outstanding and unpaid loans of MMIC with DBP and PNB, which,
have not been converted into equity. Should there be any balance
due to MMIC after the offsetting, the same shall be satisfied from
the funds representing the purchase price of the sale of the shares of
Island Cement Corporation in the amount of P503,000,000.00 held
under escrow pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April 22,
1988 or to such subsequent escrow agreement that would supercede
[sic] it pursuant to paragraph (9) of the Compromise and
Arbitration Agreement;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, Jesus S. Cabarrus,
Sr., the sum of P10,000,000.00, to be satisfied likewise from the
funds held under escrow pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated
April 22, 1988 or to such subsequent escrow agreement that would
supersede it, pursuant to paragraph (9) of the Compromise and
Arbitration Agreement, as and for moral damages; and
4. Ordering the defendant to pay arbitration costs.
This Decision is FINAL and EXECUTORY.

16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Motions for reconsideration were filed by both parties, but the same
were denied.
On October 17, 1994, private respondents filed in the same Civil
Case No. 9900 an “Application/Motion for Confirmation of
Arbitration Award.” Petitioner countered with an “Opposition and
Motion to Vacate Judgment” raising the following grounds:
1. The plaintiff’s Application/Motion is improperly filed with this

branch of the Court, considering that the said motion is neither a
part nor the continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 9900
which was dismissed upon motion of the parties. In fact, the
defendants in the said Civil Case No. 9900 were the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank (PNB);
__________
16 Id., at 168-172. Italics in the original.
594

2. Under Section 22 of Rep. Act 876, an arbitration under a contract

or submission shall be deemed a special proceedings and a party to
the controversy which was arbitrated may apply to the court having
jurisdiction, (not necessarily with this Honorable Court) for an
order confirming the award;
3. The issues submitted for arbitration have been limited to two: (1)
propriety of the plaintiffs filing the derivative suit and (2) the
regularity of the foreclosure proceedings. The arbitration award
sought to be confirmed herein, far exceeded the issues submitted
and even granted moral damages to one of the herein plaintiffs;
4. Under Section 24 of Rep. Act 876, the Court must make an order
vacating the award where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite
17
award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.
Private respondents filed a “REPLY AND OPPOSITION” dated

November 10, 1984, arguing that a dismissal of Civil Case No. 9900
was merely a “qualified dismissal” to pave the way for the
submission of the controversy to arbitration, and operated simply as
“a mere suspension of the proceedings.” They denied that the
Arbitration Committee had exceeded its powers.
In an Order dated November 28, 1994, the trial court confirmed
the award of the Arbitration Committee. The dispositive portion of
said order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the light of the parties [sic]

Compromise and Arbitration Agreement dated October 6, 1992, the
Decision of the Arbitration Committee promulgated on November 24, 1993,
as affirmed in a Resolution dated July 26, 1994, and finally settled and
clarified in the Separate Opinion dated September 2, 1994 of Committee
Member Elma, and the pertinent provisions of RA 876, also known as the
Arbitration Law, this Court GRANTS PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION AND
THUS CONFIRMS THE ARBITRATION AWARD, AND JUDGMENT IS
HEREBY RENDERED:
___________
17 Id., at 287-288.
595
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 595
(a) Ordering the defendant APT to pay to the Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (MMIC), except the DBP, the sum of
P3,811,757,425.00, as and for actual damages, which shall be
partially satisfied from the funds held under escrow in the amount
of P503,000,000.00 pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April
22, 1988. The balance of the award, after the escrow funds are fully
applied, shall be executed against the APT;
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay to the MMIC, except the DBP, the
sum of P13,000,000.00 as and for moral and exemplary damages;
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay to Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., the sum of
P10,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the herein
plaintiffs/applicants/movants the sum of P1,705,410.22 as
arbitration costs.
In reiteration of the mandates of Stipulation No. 10 and Stipulation No. 8

paragraph 2 of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement, and the final
edict of the Arbitration Committee’s decision, and with this Court’s
Confirmation, the issuance of the Arbitration Committee’s Award shall
henceforth be final and executory.
18
SO ORDERED.
On December 27, 1994, petitioner filed its motion for

reconsideration of the Order dated November 28, 1994. Private
respondents, in turn, submitted their reply and opposition thereto.
On January 18, 1995, the trial court handed down its order
denying APT’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for
having been filed out of time. The trial court declared that
“considering that the defendant APT, through counsel, officially and
actually received a copy of the Order of this Court dated November
28, 1994 on December 6, 1994, the Motion for Reconsideration
thereof filed by the defendant APT on December 27, 1994, or after
the lapse of 21 days, was clearly filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period prescribed or provided for by law for the filing
of an appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or
decisions of
____________
18 CA Rollo, pp. 51-52.
596
any court in all cases, and by necessary implication for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration thereof.”
On February 7, 1995, petitioner received private respondents’
Motion for Execution and Appointment of Custodian of Proceeds of
Execution dated February 6, 1995.
Petitioner thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari with temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction dated February 13, 1996 to annul and declare
as void the Orders of the RTC-Makati dated November 28, 1994 and
January 18, 1995 for having been issued without or in excess of
19
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. As ground
therefor, petitioner alleged that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NOT VALIDLY ACQUIRED

JURISDICTION MUCH LESS, HAS THE COURT AUTHORITY, TO
CONFIRM THE ARBITRAL AWARD CONSIDERING THAT THE
ORIGINAL CASE, CIVIL CASE NO. 9900, HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
DISMISSED.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS
CONFIRMING THE ARBITRAL AWARD AND DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER OF AWARD.
III
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GROSSLY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION

AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF AND WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN RECKONING THE COUNTING OF THE PERIOD
TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NOT FROM THE DATE
OF SERVICE OF THE COURT’S COPY CONFIRMING THE AWARD,
BUT FROM RECEIPT OF A XEROX COPY OF WHAT PRESUMABLY
20
IS THE OPPOSING COUNSEL’S COPY THEREOF.
____________
19 Rollo, p. 38.
20 CA Rollo, p. 18.
597
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 597

On July 12, 1995, the Court of Appeals, through its Fifth Division,
denied due course and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari imputing to
the Court of Appeals the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

MAKATI REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62 WHICH HAS
PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 9900 HAD LOST
JURISDICTION TO CONFIRM THE ARBITRAL AWARD UNDER THE
SAME CIVIL CASE AND IN NOT RULING THAT THE APPLICATION
FOR CONFIRMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED AS A NEW
CASE TO BE RAFFLED OFF AMONG THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES
OF THE RTC.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER WAS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
ARBITRATION AWARD, WHEN PETITIONER QUESTIONED THE
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC-MAKATI, BRANCH 62 AND AT THE
SAME TIME MOVED TO VACATE THE ARBITRAL AWARD.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EITHER
DISMISSED/DENIED PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ MOTION/PETITION
FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND/OR SHOULD
HAVE CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE MOTION TO VACATE
ARBITRAL AWARD.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING

PETITIONER APT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AS AN APPEAL
TAKEN FROM THE ORDER CONFIRMING THE AWARD.
598

V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE LEGAL
ISSUE OF WHEN TO RECKON THE COUNTING OF THE PERIOD TO
21
FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The RTC of Makati, Branch 62,

did not have jurisdiction to confirm
the arbitral award.
The use of the term “dismissed” is not “a mere semantic
imperfection.” The dispositive portion of the Order of the trial court
dated October 14, 1992 stated in no uncertain terms:
22
4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
The term “dismiss” has a precise definition in law. “To dispose of an

action, suit, or motion without trial on the issues involved.
23
Conclude, discontinue, terminate, quash.”
Admittedly, the correct procedure was for the parties to go back
to the court where the case was pending to have the award confirmed
by said court. However, Branch 62 made the fatal mistake of issuing
a final order dismissing the case. While Branch 2462 should have
merely suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither of the
parties questioned said dismissal. Thus, both parties as well as said
court are bound by such error.
It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents do, that
petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge that the “case was
merely stayed until arbitration finished,” as again,
____________
21 Rollo, pp. 21-22.

22 CA Rollo, p. 11.
23 WEST’S LEGAL THESAURUS DICTIONARY, 1986 ed.
24 Bengson v. Chan, 75 SCRA 112 [1972].
599
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 599

the order of Branch 62 in very clear terms stated that the “complaint
was dismissed.” By its own action, Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction
over the case. It could not have validly reacquired jurisdiction over
the said case on mere motion of one of the parties. The Rules of
Court is specific on how a new case may be initiated and such is not
done by mere motion in a particular branch of the RTC.
Consequently, as there was no “pending action” to speak of, the
petition to confirm the arbitral award should have been filed as a
new case and raffled accordingly to one of the branches of the
Regional Trial Court.
II
Petitioner was not estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of
Branch 62 of the RTC of Makati.
The Court of Appeals ruled that APT was already estopped to
question the jurisdiction of the RTC to confirm the arbitral award
because it sought affirmative relief in said court by asking that the
arbitral award be vacated.
The rule is that “Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of
this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor
for the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer
25
that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.” As a
rule then, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer
jurisdiction upon a court barring highly meritorious and exceptional
26
circumstances. One such exception was enunciated in Tijam vs.
27
Sibonghanoy, where it was held that “after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.”
____________
25 La Naval Drug Co. v. CA, 236 SCRA 78 [1994].

26 Ibid.
27 23 SCRA 29 [1968].
600

Petitioner’s situation is different because from the outset, it has

consistently held the position that the RTC, Branch 62 had no
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award; consequently, it cannot be
said that it was estopped from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s prayer for the setting aside of the arbitral award was not
inconsistent with its disavowal of the court’s jurisdiction.
III
Appeal of petitioner to the

Court of Appeals thru certiorari
under Rule 65 was proper.
The Court of Appeals in dismissing APT’s petition for certiorari
upheld the trial court’s denial of APT’s motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s order confirming the arbitral award, on the ground
that said motion was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period;
consequently, the petition for certiorari could not be resorted to as
substitute to the lost right of appeal.
We do not agree.
28
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 876, provides that:
x x x An appeal may be taken from an order made in a proceeding under

this Act, or from a judgment entered upon an award through certiorari
proceedings, but such appeals shall be limited to questions of law. x x x.
The aforequoted provision, however, does not preclude a party

aggrieved by the arbitral award from resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
___________
28 Entitled “AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE MAKING OF ARBITRATION

AND SUBMISSION AGREEMENTS, TO PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF ARBITRATORS AND THE PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION IN CIVIL
CONTROVERSIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” otherwise known as “The
Arbitration Law.”
601
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 601

of Court where, as in this case, the Regional Trial Court to which the
award was submitted for confirmation has acted without jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy remedy in the course of law.
Thus, Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:
SEC. 1. Petition for Certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or
officer.
In the instant case, the respondent court erred in dismissing the

special civil action for certiorari, it being clear from the pleadings
and the evidence that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and/or
committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of private
respondents’ motion to confirm the arbitral award and, worse, in
confirming said award which is grossly and patently not in accord
with the arbitration agreement, as will be hereinafter demonstrated.
IV
The nature and limits of the

Arbitrators’ powers.
As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere
29
errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts. Courts are
without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement
30
with matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators. They
will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award,
and will not undertake
______________
29 The Hartbridge, 62 F. 2d 72 [1932].

30 Jame Richardson & Sons v. W.E. Hedger Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55 [1938].
602

to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators, since any other
rule would make an award the commencement, not the end, of
31
litigation. Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision of
matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators,
32
are insufficient
to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. Judicial review of
33
an arbitration is, thus, more limited than judicial review of a trial.
Nonetheless, the arbitrators’ award is not absolute and without
exceptions. The arbitrators cannot resolve issues beyond the scope
34
of the submission agreement. The parties to such an agreement are
bound by the arbitrators’ award only to the extent and in the manner
prescribed by the contract and only if the award is rendered in
35
conformity thereto. Thus, Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration
Law provide grounds for vacating, rescinding or modifying an
36
36
arbitration award. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038,
37 38
2039, and 2040 of the Civil Code applicable to compromises
____________
31 General Construction Co. v. Hering Realty Co., 201 F. Supp. 487 [1962].
32 Coleman Company v. International Union, Etc., 317 P.2d 831 [1957].
33 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 100 L ed 199 [1956].
34 Allstate Insurance Company v. Cook, 519 P.2d 66 [1974].
35 Coleman Company v. International Union, Etc., supra; Local 63, Textile
Workers Union v. Cheney Brothers, 109 A. 2d 240 [1954].
36 ART. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of
article 1330 of this Code.
37 ART. 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences which
they might have with each other, the discovery of documents referring to one or more
but not to all of the questions settled shall not itself be a cause for annulment or
rescission of the compromise, unless said documents have been concealed by one of
the parties. But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded if it refers only to one
thing to which one of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly-discovered
documents.
38 ART. 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by a final judgment, a
compromise should be agreed upon, either or both par-
603
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 603

and arbitration are attendant, the arbitration award may also be

annulled. 39
In Chung Fu Industries (Phils.) vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
x x x. It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the
finality of the arbitrators’ award is not absolute and without exceptions.
Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable
to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award
may be annulled or rescinded. Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the
Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating, modifying or rescinding an
arbitrator’s award. Thus, if and when the factual circumstances referred to in
the abovecited provisions are present, judicial review of the award is
properly warranted.
Accordingly, Section 20 of R.A. 876 provides:
SEC. 20. Form and contents of award.—The award must be made in writing
and signed and acknowledged by a majority of the arbitrators, if more than
one; and by the sole arbitrator, if there is only one. Each party shall be
furnished with a copy of the award. The arbitrators in their award may grant
any remedy or relief which they deem just and equitable and within the
scope of the agreement of the parties, which shall include, but not be limited
to, the specific performance of a contract.
xxx
The arbitrators shall have the power to decide only those matters which
have been submitted to them. The terms of the award shall be confined to
such disputes. (Italics ours)
x x x.
Section 24 of the same law enumerating the grounds for vacating an

award states:
___________
ties being unaware of the existence of the final judgment, the compromise may be
rescinded.
39 206 SCRA 545, 553-555 [1992].
604

SEC. 24. Grounds for vacating award.—In any one of the following cases,
the court must make an order vacating the award upon the petition of any
party to the controversy when such party proves affirmatively that in the
arbitration proceedings:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue

means; or
(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or
any of them; or
(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; that one or
more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section
nine hereof, and willfully refrained from disclosing such
disqualifications or any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been materially prejudiced; or
(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted to them was not made. (Italics ours)
x x x.
Section 25 which enumerates the grounds for modifying the award

provides:
SEC. 25. Grounds for modifying or correcting award.—In anyone of the
following cases, the court must make an order modifying or correcting the
award, upon the application of any party to the controversy which was
arbitrated:
(a) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident

mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred
to in the award; or
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted; or
(c) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy, and if it had been a commissioner’s
report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the
court.
x x x.
605
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 605

Finally, it should be stressed that while a court is precluded from

overturning an award for errors in the determination of factual
issues, nevertheless, if an examination of the record reveals no
support whatever for the arbitrators’ determinations, their award
40
must be vacated. In the same manner, an award must be vacated if
41
it was made in “manifest disregard of the law.”
Against the backdrop of the foregoing provisions and principles,
we find that the arbitrators came out with an award in excess of their
powers and palpably devoid of factual and legal basis.
___________
40 Storer Broadcasting v. American Federation of Tel., 600 F. 2d 45 [1979].

41 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S. Ct. 182, 98 L. ed. 168 [1953].
Note: U.S. laws on voluntary arbitration as alternative mode of settling disputes
provide substantially similar grounds to vacate an award as those in Philippine laws.
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, the grounds for vacation of an award are as
follows:
● Procurement by corruption, fraud, or other undue means

● Partiality on the part of an arbitrator appointed as neutral
● Misconduct or corruption of the arbitrators
● Exceeding of powers by the arbitrators
● Refusal of arbitrators to hear material evidence, or to give a postponement where
there was sufficient cause
● Prejudicial misconduct of the hearing
● Lack of a valid arbitration agreement, the issue not having been determined
Similar grounds for vacation of the award are stated in the United States
Arbitration Act:
● Corruption, fraud or undue means.

● Evident partiality or corruption.
● Misconduct in refusal to postpone the hearing or to hear material evidence, or
any other misbehavior prejudicial to the rights of any party.
● The arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final and definite award was not made. [4 Am Jur 2d., 235-236]
606

There was no financial

structuring program;
foreclosure of mortgage
was fully justified.
The point need not be belabored that PNB and DBP had the
legitimate right to foreclose the mortgages of MMIC whose
obligations were past due. The foreclosure was not a wrongful act of
the banks and, therefore, could not be the basis of any award of
damages. There was no financial restructuring agreement to speak of
that could have constituted an impediment to the exercise of the
banks’ right to foreclose.
As correctly stated by Mr. Jose C. Sison, a member of the
Arbitration Committee who wrote a separate opinion:
1. The various loans and advances made by DBP and PNB to MMIC
have become overdue and remain unpaid. The fact that a FRP was
drawn up is enough to establish that MMIC has not been complying
with the terms of the loan agreement. Restructuring simply
connotes that the obligations are past due that is why it is
“restructurable”;
2. When MMIC thru its board and the stockholders agreed and
adopted the FRP, it only means that MMIC had been informed or
notified that its obligations were past due and that foreclosure is
forthcoming;
3. At that stage, MMIC also knew that PNB-DBP had the option of
either approving the FRP or proceeding with the foreclosure.
Cabarrus, who filed this case supposedly in behalf of MMIC should
have insisted on the FRP. Yet Cabarrus himself opposed the FRP;
4. So when PNB-DBP proceeded with the foreclosure, it was done
without bad faith but with the honest and sincere belief that
foreclosure was the only alternative; a decision further explained by
Dr. Placido Mapa who testified that foreclosure was, in the
judgment of PNB, the best move to save MMIC itself.
“Q : Now in this portion of Exh. “L” which was marked as Exh.

“L-1,” and we adopted as Exh. 37-A for the respondent, may
I know from you, Dr. Mapa what you meant by “that the
decision to foreclose was neither precipitate nor arbitrary?”
607
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 607

A : Well, it is not a whimsical decision but rather decision arrived

at after weighty consideration of the information that we have
received, and listening to the prospects which reported to us
that what we had assumed would be the premises of the
financial rehabilitation plan was not materialized nor expected
to materialize.
Q : And this statement that “it was premised upon the known fact”
that means, it was referring to the decision to foreclose, was
premised upon the known fact that the rehabilitation plan
earlier approved by the stockholders was no longer feasible,
just what is meant “by no longer feasible”?
A : Because the revenue that they were counting on to make the
rehabilitation plan possible, was not anymore expected to be
forthcoming because it will result in a short fall compared to
the prices that were actually taking place in the market.
Q : And I suppose that was what you were referring to when you
stated that the production targets and assumed prices of
MMIC’s products, among other projections, used in the
financial reorganization program that will make it viable were
not met nor expected to be met?
A : Yes.”
xxx
Which brings me to my last point in this separate opinion. Was PNB and
DBP absolutely unjustified in foreclosing the mortgages?
In this connection, it can readily be seen and it cannot quite be denied
that MMIC accounts in PNB-DBP were past due. The drawing up of the
FRP is the best proof of this. When MMIC adopted a restructuring program
for its loan, it only meant that these loans were already due and unpaid. If
these loans were restructurable because they were already due and unpaid,
they are likewise “forecloseable.” The option is with the PNB-DBP on what
steps to take.
The mere fact that MMIC adopted the FRP does not mean that DBP-
PNB lost the option to foreclose. Neither does it mean that the FRP is
legally binding and implementable. It must be pointed that said FRP will, in
effect, supersede the existing and past due loans of MMIC with PNB-DBP.
It will become the new loan agreement between the lenders and the
borrowers. As in all other contracts, there must therefore be a meeting of
minds of the parties; the PNB and
608

DBP must have to validly adopt and ratify such FRP before they can be
bound by it; before it can be implemented. In this case, not an iota of proof
has been presented by the PLAINTIFFS showing that PNB and DBP ratified
and adopted the FRP. PLAINTIFFS simply relied on a legal doctrine of
42
promissory estoppel to support its allegations in this regard.
Moreover, PNB and DBP had to initiate foreclosure proceedings as

mandated by P.D. No. 385, which took effect on January 31, 1974.
The decree requires government financial institutions to foreclose
collaterals for loans where the arrearages amount to 20% of the total
outstanding obligations. The pertinent provisions of said decree read
as follows:
SEC. 1. It shall be mandatory for government financial institutions, after the

lapse of sixty (60) days from the issuance of this Decree, to foreclose the
collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit, accommodation, and/or
guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on such account,
including accrued interest and other charges, amount to at least twenty
percent (20%) of the total outstanding obligations, including interest and
other charges, as appearing in the books of account and/or related records of
the financial institutions concerned. This shall be without prejudice to the
exercise by the government financial institutions of such rights and/or
remedies available to them under their respective contracts with their
debtors, including the right to foreclosure on loans, credits, accommodations
and/or guarantees on which the arrearages are less than twenty percent
(20%).
SEC. 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be
issued by the court against any government financial institution in any
action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory
foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof, whether such restraining order,
temporary or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third
party or parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the
borrower and admitted by the government financial institution concerned
that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages has been paid after
the filing of foreclosure proceedings. (Italics supplied)
___________
42 CA Rollo, pp. 176-179.
609
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 609

Private respondents’ thesis that the foreclosure proceedings were

null and void because of lack of publication in the newspaper is
nothing more than a mere unsubstantiated allegation not borne out
by the evidence. In any case, a disputable presumption exists in
favor of petitioner that official duty has been regularly performed
43
and ordinary course of business has been followed.
VI
Not only was the foreclosure rightfully exercised by the PNB and
DBP, but also, from the facts of the case, the arbitrators in making
the award went beyond the arbitration agreement.
In their complaint filed before the trial court, private respondent
Cabarrus, et al. prayed for judgment in their favor:
1. Declaring the foreclosures effected by the defendants DBP and

PNB on the assets of MMIC null and void and directing said
defendants to restore the foreclosed assets to the possession of
MMIC, to render an accounting of their use and/or operation of
said assets and to indemnify MMIC for the loss occasioned by its
dispossession or the deterioration thereof;
2. Directing the defendants DBP and PNB to honor and perform their
commitments under the financial reorganization plan which was
approved at the annual stockholders’ meeting of MMIC on 30 April
1984;
3. Condemning the defendants DBP and PNB, jointly and severally to
pay the plaintiffs actual damages consisting of the loss of value of
their investments amounting to not less than P80,000,000, the
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans in such amount as may be
established during the trial, moral damages in such amount as this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises,
exemplary damages in such amount as this Honorable Court may
consider appropriate for the purpose of setting an example for the
public good, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in such
amounts as may be proven during the trial, and the costs legally
taxable in this litigation.
__________
43 Sec. 3 (m) and (q), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
610

Further, Plaintiffs pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in
44
the premises.
Upon submission for arbitration, the Compromise and Arbitration

Agreement of the parties clearly and explicitly defined and limited
the issues to the following:
(a) whether PLAINTIFFS have the capacity or the personality to

institute this derivative suit in behalf of the MMIC or its directors;
(b) whether or not the actions leading to, and including, the PNB-DBP
foreclosure of the MMIC assets were proper, valid and in good
45
faith.
Item No. 8 of the Agreement provides for the period by which the
Committee was to render its decision, as well as the nature thereof:
8. Decision. The committee shall issue a decision on the controversy not

later than six (6) months from the date of its constitution.
In the event the committee finds that PLAINTIFFS have the personality
to file this suit and the extra-judicial foreclosure of the MMIC assets
wrongful, it shall make an award in favor of the PLAINTIFFS (excluding
DBP), in an amount as may be established or warranted by the evidence
which shall be payable in Philippine Pesos at the time of the award. Such
award shall be paid by the APT or its successor-in-interest within sixty (60)
days from the date of the award in accordance with the provisions of par. 9
hereunder. x x x. The PLAINTIFFS’ remedies under this Section shall be in
addition to other remedies that may be available to the PLAINTIFFS, all
such remedies being cumulative and not exclusive of each other.
On the other hand, in case the arbitration committee finds that
PLAINTIFFS have no capacity to sue and/or that the extrajudicial
foreclosure is valid and legal, it shall also make an award in favor of APT
based on the counterclaims of DBP and PNB in an
___________
44 CA Rollo, pp. 76-77. Italics in the original.

45 Id., at 111-112.
611
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 611

amount as may be established or warranted by the evidence. This decision

of the arbitration committee in favor of APT shall likewise finally settle all
issues regarding the foreclosure of the MMIC assets so that the funds held in
escrow mentioned in par. 9 hereunder will thus be released in full in favor of
46
APT.
The clear and explicit terms of the submission notwithstanding, the

Arbitration Committee clearly exceeded its powers or so imperfectly
executed them: (a) in ruling on and declaring valid the FRP; (b) in
awarding damages to MMIC which was not a party to the derivative
suit; and (c) in awarding moral damages to Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr.
The arbiters overstepped

their powers by declaring as
valid the proposed Financial
Restructuring Program.
The Arbitration Committee went beyond its mandate and thus acted
in excess of its powers when it ruled on the validity of, and gave
effect to, the proposed FRP.
In submitting the case to arbitration, the parties had mutually
agreed to limit the issue to the “validity of the foreclosure” and to
transform the reliefs prayed for therein into pure money claims.
There is absolutely no evidence that the DBP and PNB agreed,
expressly or impliedly, to the proposed FRP. It cannot be
overemphasized that a FRP, as a contract, requires the consent of the
47 48
parties thereto. The contract must bind both contracting parties.
Private respondents even by their own admission recognized that the
FRP had yet not been carried out and that the loans of MMIC had
49
not yet been converted into equity.
__________
46 Id., at 102. Italics in the original.

47 Article 1318, Civil Code.
48 Article 1308, id.
49 CA Rollo, p. 140.
612
However, the Arbitration Committee not only declared the FRP

valid and effective, but also converted the loans of MMIC into
50
equity raising the equity of DBP to 87%.
The Arbitration Committee ruled that there was “a commitment
51
to carry out the FRP” on the ground of promissory estoppel.
Similarly, the principle of promissory estoppel applies in the present case

considering as we observed, the fact that the government (that is, Alfredo
Velayo) was the FRP’s proponent. Although the plaintiffs are agreed that the
government executed no formal agreement, the fact remains that the DBP
itself made representations that the FRP constituted a “way out” for MMIC.
The Committee believes that although the DBP did not formally agree
(assuming that the board and stockholders’ approvals were not formal
enough), it is bound nonetheless if only for its conspicuous representations.
Although the DBP sat in the board in a dual capacity—as holder of 36%
of MMIC’s equity (at that time) and as MMIC’s creditor—the DBP can not
validly renege on its commitments simply because at the same time, it held
interests against the MMIC.
The fact, of course, is that as APT itself asserted, the FRP was being
“carried out” although apparently, it would supposedly fall short of its
targets. Assuming that the FRP would fail to meet its targets, the DBP—and
so this Committee holds—can not, in any event, brook any denial that it was
bound to begin with, and the fact is that adequate or not (the FRP), the
government is still bound by virtue of its acts.
The FRP, of course, did not itself promise a resounding success, although
it raised DBP’s equity in MMIC to 87%. It is not an excuse, however, for
52
the government to deny its commitments.
___________
50 In the computation of the award the Arbitration Committee deducted the share
of DBP, thus:
As this Committee holds that the FRP is valid, DBP’s equity in MMIC is raised to 87%. So
pursuant to the provision of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement, the 87% equity of
DBP is hereby deducted from the actual damages x x x. (See Note 16.)
52 Id., at 148-150.
613
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 613

Atty. Sison, however, did not agree and correctly observed that:
But the doctrine of promissory estoppel can hardly find application here.
The nearest that there can be said of any estoppel being present in this case
is the fact that the board of MMIC was, at the time the FRP was adopted,
mostly composed of PNB and DBP representatives. But those
representatives, singly or collectively, are not themselves PNB or DBP.
They are individuals with personalities separate and distinct from the banks
they represent. PNB and DBP have different boards with different members
who may have different decisions. It is unfair to impose upon them the
decision of the board of another company and thus pin them down on the
equitable principle of estoppel. Estoppel is a principle based on equity and it
is certainly not equitable to apply it in this particular situation. Otherwise
the rights of entirely separate, distinct and autonomous legal entities like
PNB and DBP with thousands of stockholders will be suppressed and
53
rendered nugatory.
As a rule, a corporation exercises its powers, including the power to

enter into contracts, through its board of directors. While a
corporation may appoint agents to enter into a contract in its behalf,
54
the agent should not exceed his authority. In the case at bar, there
was no showing that the representatives of PNB and DBP in MMIC
even had the requisite authority to enter into a debt-for-equity swap.
And if they had such authority, there was no showing that the banks,
through their board of directors, had ratified the FRP.
Further, how could the MMIC be entitled to a big amount of
moral damages when its credit reputation was not exactly something
to be considered sound and wholesome. Under Article 2217 of the
Civil Code, moral damages include besmirched reputation which a
corporation may possibly suffer. A corporation whose overdue and
unpaid debts to the Government alone reached a tremendous amount
of P22 Billion Pesos cannot certainly have a solid business
reputation to
___________
53 Id., at 179-180.
54 Article 1887, Civil Code.
614

brag about. As Atty. Sison in his separate opinion persuasively put

it:
Besides, it is not yet a well settled jurisprudence that corporations
are entitled to moral damages. While the Supreme Court may have
awarded moral damages to a corporation for besmirched reputation
in Mambulao vs. PNB, 22 SCRA 359, such ruling cannot find
application in this case. It must be pointed out that when the
supposed wrongful act of foreclosure was done, MMIC’s credit
reputation was no longer a desirable one. The company then was
already suffering from serious financial crisis which definitely
projects an image not compatible with good and wholesome
reputation. So it could not be said that there was a “reputation”
55
besmirched by the act of foreclosure.
The arbiters exceeded their

authority in awarding damages
to MMIC, which is not impleaded
as a party to the derivative suit.
Civil Case No. 9900 filed before the RTC being a derivative suit,
MMIC should have been impleaded as a party. It was not joined as a
party plaintiff or party defendant at any stage of the proceedings. As
it is, the award of damages to MMIC, which was not a party before
the Arbitration Committee, is a complete nullity.
Settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is
the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the
corporation’s behalf is only a nominal party. The corporation should
be included as a party in the suit.
An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf

of the corporation wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate
corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or
are the ones to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such
actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the
56
corporation as the real party in interest. x x x.
__________
56 Gamboa vs. Victoriano, 90 SCRA 40, 47 [1979].
615
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 615

It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a

party because—
x x x. Not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the

present rule that it must be served with process. The reason given is that the
judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the
corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring a subsequent
suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other words
the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that
57
is being litigated and because judgment must be a res ajudicata against it.
The reasons given for not allowing direct individual suit are:
(1) x x x “the universally recognized doctrine that a stockholder in a

corporation has no title legal or equitable to the corporate property;
that both of these are in the corporation itself for the benefit of the
stockholders.” In other words, to allow shareholders to sue
separately would conflict with the separate corporate entity
principle;
(2) x x x that the prior rights of the creditors may be prejudiced. Thus,
our Supreme Court held in the case of Evangelista v. Santos, that
“the stockholders may not directly claim those damages for
themselves for that would result in the appropriation by, and the
distribution among them of part of the corporate assets before the
dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its debts and
liabilities, something which cannot be legally done in view of
section 16 of the Corporation Law x x x”;
(3) the filing of such suits would conflict with the duty of the
management to sue for the protection of all concerned;
(4) it would produce wasteful multiplicity of suits; and
(5) it would involve confusion in ascertaining the effect of partial
recovery by an individual on the damages recoverable by the
58
corporation for the same act.
__________
57 Agbayani’s Commercial Law of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 566, citing

Ballantine, pp. 366-367.
58 Id., at 565-566.
616

If at all an award was due MMIC, which it was not, the same should
have been given sans deduction, regardless of whether or not the
party liable had equity in the corporation, in view of the doctrine
that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
individual stockholders or members. DBP’s alleged equity, even if it
were indeed 87%, did not give it ownership over any corporate
property, including the monetary award, its right over said corporate
59
property being a mere expectancy or inchoate right. Notably, the
stipulation even had the effect of prejudicing the other creditors of
MMIC.
The arbiters, likewise,
exceeded their authority
in awarding moral damages
to Jesus Cabarrus, Sr.
It is perplexing how the Arbitration Committee can in one breath
rule that the case before it is a derivative suit, in which the aggrieved
party or the real party in interest is supposedly the MMIC, and at the
same time award moral damages to an individual stockholder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

x x x.
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr.,
the sum of P10,000,000.00, to be satisfied likewise from the funds held
under escrow pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April 22, 1988 or to
such subsequent escrow agreement that would supersede it, pursuant to
paragraph (9), Compromise and Arbitration Agreement, as and for moral
60
damages; x x x
The majority decision of the Arbitration Committee sought to justify

its award of moral damages to Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr. by pointing to
the fact that among the assets seized by the government were assets
belonging to Industrial Enterprise,
__________
59 See Evangelista vs. Santos, 86 Phil. 387 [1950].

60 CA Rollo, pp. 170-172.
617
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 617

Inc. (IEI), of which Cabarrus is the majority stockholder. It then

acknowledged that Cabarrus had already recovered said assets in the
RTC, but that “he won no more than actual damages. While the
Committee cannot possibly speak for the RTC, there is no doubt that
Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., suffered moral damages on account of that
specific foreclosure, damages the Committee believes and so holds,
61
he, Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., may be awarded in this proceeding.”
Cabarrus’ cause of action for the seizure of the assets belonging
to IEI, of which he is the majority stockholder, having been
ventilated in a complaint he previously filed with the RTC, from
which he obtained actual damages, he was barred by res judicata
from filing a similar case in another court, this time asking for moral
62
damages which he failed to get from the earlier case. Worse,
private respondents violated the rule against non-forum shopping.
It is a basic postulate that a corporation has a personality separate
63
and distinct from its stockholders. The properties foreclosed
belonged to MMIC, not to its stockholders. Hence, if wrong was
committed in the foreclosure, it was done against the corporation.
Another reason is that Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr. cannot directly claim
those damages for himself that would result in the appropriation by,
and the distribution to, him of part of the corporation’s assets before
the dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its debts and
liabilities. The Arbitration Committee, therefore, passed upon
matters not submitted to it. Moreover, said cause of action had
already been decided in a separate case. It is thus quite patent that
___________
61 Id., at 167.
62 Sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court (before its amendment by the 1998 Rules
of Court Procedure) provides:
Sec. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action.—If two or more complaints are brought for
different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of
the other or others, in accordance with section 1(e) of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the merits
in any one is available as a bar to the other.
63 Article 2, Corporation Code.
618

the arbitration committee exceeded the authority granted to it by the

parties’ Compromise and Arbitration Agreement by awarding moral
damages to Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr.
Atty. Sison, in his separate opinion, likewise expressed
befuddlement to the award of moral damages to Jesus S. Cabarrus,
Sr.:
It is clear and it cannot be disputed therefore that based on these stipulated

issues, the parties themselves have agreed that the basic ingredient of the
causes of action in this case is the wrong committed on the corporation
(MMIC) for the alleged illegal foreclosure of its assets. By agreeing to this
stipulation, PLAINTIFFS themselves (Cabarrus, et al.) admit that the cause
of action pertains only to the corporation (MMIC) and that they are filing
this for and in behalf of MMIC.
Perforce this has to be so because it is the basic rule in Corporation Law
that “the shareholders have no title, legal or equitable to the property which
is owned by the corporation (13 Am. Jur. 165; Pascual vs. Oresco, 14 Phil.
83). In Ganzon & Sons vs. Register of Deeds, 6 SCRA 373, the rule has
been reiterated that ‘a stockholder is not the co-owner of corporate
property.’ Since the property or assets foreclosed belongs [sic] to MMIC,
the wrong committed, if any, is done against the corporation. There is
therefore no direct injury or direct violation of the rights of Cabarrus, et al.
There is no way, legal or equitable, by which Cabarrus, et al. could recover
damages in their personal capacities even assuming or just because the
foreclosure is improper or invalid. The Compromise and Arbitration
Agreement itself and the elementary principles of Corporation Law say so.
Therefore, I am constrained to dissent from the award of moral damages to
64
Cabarrus.
From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that, not only did the
arbitration committee exceed its powers or so imperfectly execute
them, but also, its findings and conclusions are palpably devoid of
any factual basis, and in manifest disregard of the law.
We do not find it necessary to remand this case to the RTC for
appropriate action. The pleadings and memoranda filed
___________
64 CA Rollo, pp. 174-175. Italics in the original.
619
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 619

with this Court, as well as in the Court of Appeals, raised and

extensively discussed the issues on the merits. Such being the case,
there is sufficient basis for us to resolve the controversy between the
65
parties anchored on the records and the pleadings before us.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
17, 1995, as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 62, dated November 28, 1994 and January 19, 1995,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the
Arbitration Committee is hereby VACATED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), J., Please see dissenting opinion.

Purisima, J., Concur and also with the separate concurring
opinion of Justice Pardo.
Pardo, J., With separate concurring opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) is impugning the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 36484 dated July 17, 1995,
grounded upon the following assigned errors which it had allegedly
committed:
“1) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the Makati Regional
Trial Court, Branch 62, which had previously dismissed Civil Case
No. 9900, had lost jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award under
the same civil case and in not ruling that the application for
confirmation should have been filed as a new case to be raffled
among the different branches of the RTC;
___________
65 Caneda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 762 [1990]; Quisumbing vs. Court
of Appeals, 122 SCRA 703 [1983]; Board of Liqui-dators vs. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548
[1982].
620

2) The Court of Appeals likewise erred in holding that petitioner was

estopped from questioning the arbitration award, when petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC-Makati, Branch 62, and at
the same time moved to vacate the arbitral award;
3) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the respondent Trial
Court should have either dismissed/denied private respondents
motion/petition for confirmation of arbitration award and/or should
have considered the merits of the motion to vacate (the) arbitral
award;
4) The Court of Appeals erred in not treating petitioner APT’s petition
for certiorari as an appeal taken from the order confirming the
award; and
5) The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling on the legal issue of when
to reckon the counting of the period to file a motion for
1
reconsideration.”
The resolution of these issues will ultimately test the process of

arbitration, how effective or ineffective it is as an alternative mode
of settling disputes, and how it is affected by judicial review. My
esteemed colleagues have taken the view that the petition is
impressed with merit and that the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed. In doing so, I believe they have dealt
arbitration a terrible blow and wasted years, even decades, of
development in this field. I beg to differ and, therefore, dissent.
The controversy is actually simpler than it appears. The
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) obtained
several loans from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) secured by mortgages
over practically all of its assets. As of July 15,
2
1984, MMIC’s
obligation had ballooned to P22,668,537,770.05, and it had no way
of making the required payments. MMIC and its two creditor banks
thus ironed out a complex financial restructuring plan (FRP)
designed to drastically reduce MMIC’s liability through a “debt-to-
3
equity” scheme. This
___________
1 Rollo, pp. 11-36 @ 21-22.

2 CA Rollo, p. 261.
3 Ibid., pp. 31-44 re commitments of PNB and DBP.
621
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 621

notwithstanding, the creditors opted to sell MMIC’s mortgaged

properties through extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, where PNB
4
turned out to be the lone bidder.
Aggrieved by this apparent bad faith on the part of the creditor
banks, private respondents Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., and other minority
5
stockholders of MMIC filed a derivative suit against PNB and DBP
before the Makati Regional Trial Court. They prayed for the
annulment of the foreclosure and for the restoration of the
company’s assets, the recognition by the creditor banks of their
commitments under the FRP, and the payment of damages, as well
as attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. The case was raffled to
Branch 62 and docketed as Civil Case No. 9900.
In the meantime, the rights and interests of PNB and DBP,
including MMIC’s indebtedness, were transferred to petitioner,
created by virtue of Proclamation No. 50, in relation to
Administrative Order No. 14. Hence, petitioner was substituted as
party defendant in Civil Case No. 9900.
On October 6, 1992, the parties entered into a Compromise and
6
Arbitration Agreement providing, inter alia, that they were
withdrawing their respective claims, which would be reduced to
pure money claims, and that they were submitting the controversy to
7
arbitration under Republic Act No. 876. The issues for arbitration
were thus limited to a determination of the plaintiffs’ capacity or
right to institute the derivative suit in behalf of the MMIC or its
directors, and of the propriety of the foreclosure. Of notable import
was the provision on the nature of the judgment that the arbitration
committee might render, viz.:
“10. Binding Effect and Enforcement.—The award of the arbitration

committee shall be final and executory upon its issuance
___________
4 Id., pp. 134-135.

5 The complaint was amended on March 11, 1985; CA Records, pp. 71-77.
6 CA Records, pp. 99-103.
7 Otherwise known as the “Arbitration Law.”
622

upon the parties to the arbitration and their assigns and successors-in-
interest. In the event the award is not voluntarily satisfied by the losing
party, the party in whose favor the award has been made may, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 876, apply to the proper Regional Trial Court for its
enforcement.” (Italics supplied)
Upon motion of the parties, this agreement was presented to the

8
court a quo for its approval. On October 14, 1992, said court issued
an order (a) dismissing the complaint; (b) substituting the creditor
banks with the APT as party defendant; (c) “approving the
Compromise and Arbitration Agreement dated October 6, 1992”;
and (d) “approving the transformation of the reliefs prayed for by
9
the plaintiffs in this case into pure money claims.”
On November 24, 1993, after more than six months of hearing,
10
the arbitration committee concluded that the assailed foreclosure
was not valid and accordingly decided the case in favor of MMIC.
Hence, petitioner was ordered to pay MMIC actual damages in the
amount of P2,531,635,425.02, with legal interest, and moral and
exemplary damages amounting to P13,000,000.00, and to pay Jesus
S. Cabarrus, Sr., the sum of P10,000,000.00 by way of moral
damages, such awards to be offset from the outstanding and unpaid
obligations of MMIC with the creditor banks, which have not been
converted into equity. The committee likewise decreed its decision
11
to be “final and executory.”
Nearly a year later, MMIC filed in Civil Case No. 9900, a
verified “Application/Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration
12
Award.” This was opposed by petitioner on two grounds,
__________
8 Rollo, pp. 93-94.

9 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
10 Composed of retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Abraham Sarmiento, as
Chairman, and former Court of Appeals Associate Justice Magdangal B. Elma,
nominee of the plaintiffs and Atty. Jose C. Sison, APT’s nominee and its lawyer of
record, as members.
11 CA Records, pp. 107-173. Separate Opinions were submitted by Atty. Sison and
Justice Elma.
12 Ibid., pp. 267-284.
623
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 623

namely, that Branch 62 no longer had jurisdiction to act on said

motion after it “dismissed” the complaint in its order of October 14,
1992, and that the award “far exceeded the issues submitted” for
13
arbitration by the parties. Not wanting to be outdone, MMIC filed a
“Reply and Opposition,” arguing that the “qualified dismissal” of
Civil Case No. 9900 was merely intended to expedite the submission
of the controversy to arbitration and was, therefore, “a mere
suspension of the proceedings,” and that the arbitration committee
did not exceed its authority in making the award.
14
On November 28, 1994, the trial court issued an order
confirming the award of the committee in all respects except as to
the award of actual damages to MMIC, which was increased to
P3,811,757,425.00. The order closed with the following declaration:
“In reiteration of the mandates of Stipulation No. 10 and Stipulation No. 8

henceforth be final and executory.”
Petitioner filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” of said order on

December 27, 1994, but this was denied by the court a quo in its
order dated January 18, 1995 for lack of merit and for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period. Thus, it said:
“. . . (C)onsidering that the defendant APT, through counsel, officially and

actually received a copy of the Order of this Court dated November 28,
1994 on December 6, 1994, the Motion for Reconsideration thereof filed by
the defendant APT on December 27, 1994, or after the lapse of 21 days, was
clearly filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period prescribed or provided
for . . . . (by law) for the filing of an appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases, and by necessary
implication, for the filing of a motion for reconsideration thereof.”
__________
13 Id., pp. 287-289.

14 Id., pp. 42-52.
624

Instead of appealing such denial, petitioner filed on February 15,

1995, an “Appeal by Certiorari . . . . under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court” before the Court of Appeals,
praying for the nullification of the trial court’s orders dated
November 28, 1994 and January 18, 1995. It argued that the trial
court had no jurisdiction or authority to confirm the arbitral award,
“considering that the original case, Civil Case No. 9900, had
previously been dismissed,” and that the trial judge “acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders confirming
15
the award and denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.”
On July 17, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
16
lack of merit. From this dismissal, petitioner elevated its cause to
this Tribunal for a review, raising the issues stated at the outset.
I find it distressing that, in reaching the outcome of this
controversy, the majority has emasculated the process of arbitration
itself. This should not be the case for after all, the decision of the
arbitration committee is no longer the one being attacked in these
proceedings, but the judgment of the Court of Appeals which herein
petitioner found to be erroneous. The Court has had occasion to
trace the history of arbitration and to discuss its significance in the
17
case of Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
“Allow us to take a leaf from history and briefly trace the evolution of
arbitration as a mode of dispute settlement.
Because conflict is inherent in human society, much effort has been
expended by men and institutions in devising ways of resolving the same.
With the progress of civilization, physical combat has been ruled out and
instead, more specific means have been evolved, such as recourse to the
good offices of a disinterested third party, whether this be a court or a
private individual or individuals.
___________
15 Id., pp. 3-30.

16 Penned by Martinez, Jr., J.; Ramirez and Morales, JJ., concurring.
17 206 SCRA 545 (1992).
625
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 625
Legal history discloses that ‘early judges called upon to solve private
conflicts were primarily the arbiters, persons not specially trained but in
whose morality, probity and good sense the parties in conflict reposed full
trust. Thus, in Republican Rome, arbiter and judge (judex) were
synonymous. The magistrate or praetor, after noting down the conflicting
claims of litigants, and clarifying the issues, referred them for decision to a
private person designated by the parties, by common agreement, or selected
by them from an apposite listing (the album judicium) or else by having the
arbiter chosen by lot. The judges proper, as specially trained state officials
endowed with (their) own power and jurisdiction, and taking cognizance of
litigations from beginning to end, only appeared under the Empire, by the
so-called cognitio extra ordinem.’
Such means of referring a dispute to a third party has also long been an
accepted alternative to litigation at common law.
Sparse though the law and jurisprudence may be on the subject of
arbitration in the Philippines, it was nonetheless recognized in the Spanish
Civil Code; specifically, the provisions on compromises made applicable to
arbitrations under Articles 1820 and 1821. Although said provisions were
repealed by implication with the repeal of the Spanish Law of Civil
Procedure, these and additional ones were reinstated in the present Civil
Code.
Arbitration found a fertile field in the resolution of labor-management
disputes in the Philippines. Although early on, Commonwealth Act 103
(1936) provided for compulsory arbitration as the state policy to be
administered by the Court of Industrial Relations, in time such a modality
gave way to voluntary arbitration. While not completely supplanting
compulsory arbitration which until today is practiced by government
officials, the Industrial Peace Act which was passed in 1953 as Republic Act
No. 875, favored the policy of free collective bargaining, in general, and
resort to grievance procedure, in particular, as the preferred mode of settling
disputes in industry. It was accepted and enunciated more explicitly in the
Labor Code, which was passed on November 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree
No. 442, with the amendments later introduced by Republic Act No. 6715
(1989).
Whether utilized in business transactions or in employer-employee
relations, arbitration was gaining wide acceptance. A consensual process, it
was preferred to orders imposed by government upon the disputants.
Moreover, court litigations tended to be time-consuming, costly and
inflexible due to their scrupulous obser-
626

vance of the due process of law doctrine and their strict adherence to rules
of evidence.
As early as the 1920’s, this Court declared:
‘In the Philippines fortunately, the attitude of the court towards arbitration
agreements is slowly crystallizing into definite and workable form . . . The rule now
is that unless the agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts
against the parties, which agreement would be void, the courts will look with favor
upon such amicable arrangements and will only with great reluctance interfere to
anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator.’
That there was a growing need for a law regulating arbitration in general
was acknowledged when Republic Act No. 876 (1953), otherwise known as
the Arbitration Law, was passed. ‘Said Act was obviously adopted to
supplement—not to supplant—the New Civil Code on arbitration. It
expressly declares that “the provisions of chapters one and two, Title XIV,
Book IV of the Civil Code shall remain in force.’ ”
x x x x x x x x x
In practice nowadays, absent an agreement of the parties to resolve their
disputes via a particular mode, it is the regular courts that remain the fora to
resolve such matters. However, the parties may opt for recourse to third
parties, exercising their basic freedom to ‘establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.’
In such a case, resort to the arbitration process may be spelled out by them
in a contract in anticipation of disputes that may arise between them. Or this
may be stipulated in a submission agreement when they are actually
confronted by a dispute. Whatever be the case, such recourse to an
extrajudicial means of settlement is not intended to completely deprive the
courts of jurisdiction. In fact, the early cases on arbitration carefully spelled
out the prevailing doctrine at the time, thus: ‘. . . a clause in a contract
providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
arbitrators and to them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the
courts of jurisdiction.’
But certainly, the stipulation to refer all future disputes to an arbitrator or
to submit an ongoing dispute to one is valid. Being part of a contract
between the parties, it is binding and enforceable in court in case one of
them neglects, fails or refuses to arbitrate. Going a step further, in the event
that they declare their intention to refer
627
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 627

their differences to arbitration first before taking court action, this

constitutes a condition precedent, such that where a suit has been instituted
prematurely, the court shall suspend the same and the parties shall be
directed forthwith to proceed to arbitration.
A court action may likewise be proper where the arbitrator has not been
selected by the parties.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . . It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the
finality of the arbitrator’s award is not absolute and without exceptions.
18
Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040
applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the
arbitrators’ award may be annulled or rescinded. Additionally, under
Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating,
modifying or rescinding an arbitrator’s award. Thus, if and when the factual
circumstances referred to in the above-cited provisions are present, judicial
review of the award is properly warranted.
What if courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the factual milieu of an
arbitrator’s award to determine whether it is in accor-
___________
18 “Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,

undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this
Code.
However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other if the latter,
by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already commenced.”
“Article 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences which they might
have with each other, the discovery of documents referring to one or more but not to all of the
questions settled shall not itself be a cause for annulment or rescission of the compromise,
unless said documents have been concealed by one of the parties.
But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded if it refers only to one thing to which one
of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly-discovered documents.”
“Article 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by a final judgment, a compromise
should be agreed upon, either or both parties being unaware of the existence of the final
judgment, the compromise may be rescinded.
Ignorance of a judgment which may be revoked or set aside is not a valid ground for
attacking a compromise.”
628

dance with law or within the scope of his authority? How may the power of
judicial review be invoked?
This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It is to be borne in mind, however, that this action
will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. For
‘the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and that certiorari
jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. In a special civil
action of certiorari, the Court will not engage in a review of the facts found
nor even of the law as interpreted or applied by the arbitrator unless the
supposed errors of fact or of law are so patent and gross and prejudicial as to
amount to a grave abuse of discretion or an exces de pouvoir on the part of
19
the arbitrator.’
So, what are the issues that need to be addressed in this action?
Certainly not the capacity of the plaintiffs below to file the
derivative suit in behalf of MMIC nor the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure conducted by PNB and DBP. These were
the issues submitted for arbitration by the parties and resolved with
finality by the arbitration committee upon agreement of the parties
themselves. The issues, therefore, all stemming from the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, may be narrowed down to three: (1) Was it
right in upholding the trial court’s authority to confirm the
arbitration award considering that said court had earlier dismissed
the complaint? (2) Was it correct in finding that herein petitioner was
estopped from questioning such award? (3) Was it justified in not
treating petitioner’s petition for certiorari as an appeal from the trial
court’s order confirming said award?
(1) Petitioner overly stresses the fact that in the trial court’s
order of October 14, 1992, the complaint was “dismissed”
upon approval of the Compromise and Arbitration
Agreement between the parties. Such dismissal, however,
far from finally disposing of the controversy as the term
denotes, simply “suspended” it during the period of
arbitration. It is, as a colleague pointed out during the
deliberation of this action,
__________
19 Citations omitted.
629
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 629

a mere “semantic imperfection.” Here is a situation where

the intent of the tribunal was obviously not to end the case
with finality, but to place the proceedings in abeyance while
the parties breathed life into an alternative mode of settling
their differences in the most expeditious manner.
Arbitration is not a self-enforcing process. It focuses the
direction of the hearing and the reception and appreciation
of evidence by assigning these tasks to a group of persons
chosen by the parties themselves. By this, a circuitous and
time-consuming court trial is avoided, leaving the court
with the singular duty of confirming the arbitrators’
decision, and allowing it to devote more of its time to
resolving other cases. As the appellate court correctly
pointed out:
“. . . (T)he dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 9900 was not
intended by the parties and by the court a quo, despite the phraseology in
Item No. 4 of the dispositive portion of the Order of October 14, 1992, as a
dismissal that would put an end to the case. Rather, it was simply a
pronouncement for the cessation of the proceedings in the court and the
commencement of the arbitration proceedings. It was for all intents and
purposes a stay of the civil action until an arbitration has been had or
pending the return of the arbitral award. This is evident since the parties
submitted to the court below not only an agreement to arbitrate but also a
compromise which is always submitted to the court for approval and as a
20
basis for a judgment. x x x”
Regarding the trial court’s authority to confirm the decision of the

arbitration committee, suffice it to say that such was not merely its
right but its duty as well. Under Section 22 of R.A. No. 876, upon
application or motion of any party to arbitration, the court has the
obligation of confirming the arbitrators’ award absent any specific
ground to vacate, modify or correct the same. Herein private
respondents did apply for such confirmation on February 7, 1995.
This was even opposed by petitioner on the ground that the
judgment had not yet become final and executory, in complete
disregard of
___________
20 Rollo, pp. 50-51.
630

paragraph 10 of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement and the

very decision of the arbitration committee.
The award itself was properly made since it was not vacated,
modified or corrected upon any of the grounds enumerated under
Sections 24 and 25 of R.A. No. 876, to wit:
“Section 24. Grounds for vacating award.—In any one of the following
cases, the court must make an order vacating the award upon the petition of
any party to the controversy when such party proves affirmatively that in the
arbitration proceedings:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means; or
(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or
any of them; or
(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; that one or
more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section
nine hereof, and willfully refrained from disclosing such
disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been materially prejudiced; or
(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted to them was not made.
Where an award is vacated, the court, in its discretion, may direct a new
hearing either before the same arbitrators or before a new arbitrator or
arbitrators chosen in the manner provided in the submission or contract for
the selection of the original arbitrator or arbitrators, and any provision
limiting the time in which the arbitrators may make a decision shall be
deemed applicable to the new arbitration and to commence from the date of
the court’s order.
Where the court vacates an award, costs, not exceeding fifty pesos, and
disbursements may be awarded to the prevailing party and the payment
thereof may be enforced in like manner as the payment of costs upon the
motion in an action.”
Section 25. Grounds for modifying or correcting award.—In any one of
the following cases, the court must make an order modi-
631
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 631

fying or correcting the award, upon the application of any party to the
controversy which was arbitrated:
(a) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident

mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred
to in the award; or
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted; or
(c) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy, and if it had been a commissioner’s
report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the
court.
The order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent
thereof and promote justice between the parties.” (Italics supplied)
Petitioner utterly failed to prove the existence of any of these

grounds. Its strongest argument, that the arbitration award “far
exceeded the issue submitted for arbitration,” apart from being
unsubstantiated, does not go into the merits of the award, which is
the only way its modification or correction could be justified under
the terms of Section 25, aforequoted.
Furthermore, petitioner violated several covenants by asking the
court a quo to vacate the arbitration award. First, in paragraph 10 of
the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement, it agreed to abide by
the arbitration committee’s decision which “shall be final and
executory upon its issuance upon the parties to the arbitration and
their assigns and successors-in-interest.” Next, the decision that the
arbitrators did render on November 24, 1993 specifically declared
the same to be “final and executory.” Finally, in the court’s
confirmation order of November 28, 1994, the finality of the award
was reiterated by the court. Arbitration, as an alternative mode of
settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and
abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an
aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and
actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in
consensual contracts.
632

2) Petitioner claims that it is not estopped from questioning

the arbitration award probably because, notwithstanding its
tenacious quest for affirmative relief, it did not translate this
pursuit into positive action. The Court of Appeals
succinctly puts it in this wise:
“. . . The record shows that on its motion, petitioner APT was able to
postpone the hearing on therein plaintiffs’ application/motion for
confirmation of arbitral award to a date and time that it chose. However,
when said matter was called for hearing, only counsel for therein plaintiffs
showed up. Nonetheless, respondent Judge gave APT a period of seven (7)
days from notice within which to comment on the application/motion for
confirmation. At no time did petitioner APT ask for a hearing to present its
evidence. While petitioner APT repeatedly sought to vacate the arbitral
award, it made no concrete move to pursue its cause. In fact, at the hearing
on its motion for reconsideration, both parties through their respective
counsels gave oral arguments and thereafter agreed to submit the motion for
reconsideration for resolution. If petitioner APT honestly believed that the
respondent Judge erroneously took cognizance of plaintiffs’
Application/Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award, then it should
have limited itself to challenging the jurisdiction of said court. The fact
remains that petitioner APT repeatedly sought affirmative relief from the
respondent Judge in the same Civil Case No. 9900. Under the
circumstances, petitioner APT may not be heard now to complain that it was
deprived of its right to question the award made by the Arbitration
21
Committee.” (Italics supplied)
3) The final issue which, to my mind, has particular relevance

to the case at bar, pertains to the alleged error of the Court
of Appeals in not treating APT’s petition for certiorari as an
appeal from the trial court’s confirmation order.
Petitioner’s counsel received a copy of the confirmation order dated

22
November 28, 1994, on December 12, 1994. Said order was, for
review purposes, a “final order” because it finally disposed of the
case. Other than executing the confirma-
___________
21 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

22 This date was supplied by petitioner in its “Appeal by Certiorari” filed before
the Court of Appeals.
633
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 633

tion order, there was nothing else that the court was dutybound to
perform. Petitioner’s remedy, therefore, was to question the order, by
appeal on certiorari, not before the Court of Appeals, but before the
23
Supreme Court within the reglementary period of fifteen days
which expired on December 27, 1994. Instead of appealing,
however, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on
said deadline. Unfortunately, this was denied by the court a quo in
its order dated January 18, 1995, a copy of which was received by
petitioner’s counsel on February 1, 1995. Under prevailing
procedural laws, it had just one day to perfect its appeal. On
February 15, 1995, petitioner opted to file with the Court of Appeals
an “Appeal by Certiorari . . . under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court.” The reason is obvious: It could no
longer file a regular appeal from the assailed order because the
period for doing so has lapsed. The Court of Appeals thus made the
following pertinent observation:
“. . . Assuming arguendo that petitioner APT’s counsel received a copy (of
the November 28, 1994, order), as claimed by them, on December 12, 1994,
then the petitioner had fifteen (15) days therefrom or until December 27,
1994, within which to appeal. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was admittedly filed on December 27, 1994, the last day of the reglementary
15-day period, and the order dated January 18, 1995, denying the same was
received by petitioner’s counsel on February 1, 1995. Petitioner APT had
only the following day to perfect his appeal. Instead, it chose to file the
instant special civil action of certiorari on February 15, 1995.”
From the start, petitioner seemed unsure of its position on appeal.

While initially questioning the “order confirming the award” of the
arbitration committee, it later stated that it was raising the issue of
“filing by (herein private respondents) of a Motion for Execution
and Appointment of Custodian of proceeds of Execution dated
February 6, 1995.” The latter recourse is obviously erroneous, for no
appeal under either Rule 45 or Rule 65 may be taken from a
“motion” or the “filing” of one. Under Rule 45, only judgments or
final orders of a court
___________
23 Section 2(c), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
634

or tribunal may be appealed to a higher court, while Rule 65 allows

a special civil action where the acts of a tribunal, board or officer are
under attack for being performed with grave abuse of discretion.
The applicable law, of course, is R.A. No. 876, which provides
for appeals from arbitration awards under Section 29 thereof, viz.:
“. . . (A)n appeal may be taken from . . . a judgment entered upon an award

through certiorari proceedings, but such appeals shall be limited to questions
of law. The proceedings upon such an appeal, including the judgment
thereon, shall be governed by the Rules of Court in so far as they are
applicable.”
The term “certiorari” in the aforequoted provision refers to an

ordinary appeal under Rule 45, not the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65. It is an “appeal,” as Section 29 proclaims.
The proper forum for this action is, under the old and the new rules
of procedure, the Supreme Court. Thus, Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that, “In all cases where
only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45.” Moreover, Section 29 limits the appeal to “questions
of law,” another indication that it is referring to an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 which, indeed, is the customary manner of
reviewing such issues. On the other hand, the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of by a party where there
is “no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
course of law,” and under circumstances where “a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or 24in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.”
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had run out of
options after its motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court in its order dated January 18, 1995. To compound its
negligence, it filed the wrong action with the wrong
__________
24 Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
635
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 635

forum. These, to my mind, are serious procedural flaws. To rule

otherwise, as the majority did, would constitute a grave injustice to
private respondents.
I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PARDO, J.:
I concur. However, I wish to add a few points not particularly

emphasized in the majority opinion.
The petition before the Court is one for review via certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
resolution of the Court of Appeals that denied due course and
dismissed APT’s petition for certiorari to annul the proceedings had
before the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62, in Civil Case
No. 9900, particularly the order confirming the arbitration award,
reading as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the light of the parties

Compromise and Arbitration Agreement dated October 6, 1992, the
Decision of the Arbitration Committee promulgated on November 24, 1993,
as affirmed in a Resolution dated July 26, 1994, and finally settled and
clarified in the Separate Opinion dated September 2, 1994 of Committee
Member Elma, and the pertinent provisions of RA 876, also known as the
Arbitration Law, this Court GRANTS PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION AND
THUS CONFIRMS THE ARBITRATION AWARD, AND JUDGMENT IS
HEREBY RENDERED:
(a) Ordering the defendant APT to pay the Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (MMIC), except the DBP, the sum of
P3,811,757,425.00, as and for actual damages under escrow in the
amount of P503,000,000.00 pursuant to the Escrow Agreement
dated April 22, 1988. The balance of the award, after the escrow
funds are fully applied, shall be executed against the APT;
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay to the MMIC, except the DBP, the
sum of P13,000,000.00 as and for moral and exemplary damages;
636

(c) Ordering the defendant to pay to Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., the sum of
P10,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the herein
plaintiffs/applicants/movants the sum of P1,705,410.22 as
arbitration costs.
In reiteration of the mandates of Stipulation No. 10 and Stipulation No. 8

henceforth be final and executory.
SO ORDERED.”
Originally instituted on February 8, 1985, in the Regional Trial

Court, Makati, Metro Manila, private respondents, Jesus S.
Cabarrus, Sr., et al., a few of the numerous minority stockholders of
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. (hereafter MMIC), filed a
complaint, later amended on March 13, 1985, for annulment of
foreclosure, specific performance and damages against the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) alleging that in 1984, the PNB and DBP effected
illegally the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate and chattel
mortgages constituted in their favor by the MMIC of the latter’s
assets of real estate and chattels, to satisfy an obligation amounting
to P22,668,537,770.05, and that prior to the extra-judicial
foreclosure, PNB and DBP had agreed to a financial reorganization
plan of MMIC to reduce the latter’s indebtedness to P3 billion and to
convert the balance of its obligation into equity.
In their joint answer to the amended complaint, defendants PNB
and DBP denied the material allegations of the amended complaint
but admitted that in August and September, 1984, they foreclosed
extrajudicially the mortgages on MMIC’s assets, with the
qualification that the correct amount of obligation owed by MMIC
as of July 15, 1984, was P22,083,313,168.29; that the foreclosure of
the mortgages was legal and valid as mandated by Presidential
Decree No. 385 and by the provisions of the mortgage trust
agreements between PNB, DBP and MMIC; and, that the plaintiffs
therein, herein respon-
637
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 637

dents Cabarrus, et al., were not entitled to actual and moral damages.
In the course of the trial of Civil Case No. 9900, plaintiffs Jesus
S. Cabarrus, et al. and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), as
successor-in-interest of the DBP and PNB’s interest in MMIC
accounts, entered into a compromise and arbitration agreement dated
October 6, 1992, whereby they “agreed to move for the dismissal of
the case, to transform the reliefs prayed for therein into pure money
claims and to submit the controversy to arbitration under Republic
Act (RA) 876 before a committee composed of three members”
limiting the issues to two, namely:
“(a) whether plaintiffs have the capacity or the personality to institute

this derivative suit in behalf of the MMIC or its directors, and
“(b) whether or not the actions leading to, and including, the PNB-DBP
foreclosure of the MMIC assets were proper, valid and in good
faith.”
Thus, the parties created an Arbitration Committee composed of

three (3) members, one (1) representative of the plaintiff; one (1)
representative of APT; and the Chairman to be agreed upon by both
parties. Consequently, APT nominated Atty. Jose C. Sison, a trustee
of APT and its counsel; MMIC nominated former Justice of the
Court of Appeals Magtanggol Elma; and they selected retired
Supreme Court Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento as Chairman.
After conducting hearings and receiving voluminous evidence,
on November 24, 1993, the Arbitration Committee released what
purports to be its decision penned by the Chairman, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
“DISPOSITION
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
“1. Ordering the defendant to pay the Marinduque Mining and

Industrial Corporation, except the DBP, the sum of
638

P2,531,635,425.02 with interest thereon at the legal rate of six (6%)

per cent per annum reckoned from August 3, 9 and 24, 1984, pari
passu, as and for actual damages. Payment of these actual damages
shall be offset by APT from the outstanding and unpaid loans of
MMIC with DBP and PNB, which have not been converted into
equity. Should there be any balance due to MMIC after the
offsetting, the same shall be satisfied from the funds representing
the purchase price of the sale of the shares of Island Cement
Corporation in the amount of P503,000,000.00 held under escrow
pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April 22, 1988 or to such
subsequent escrow agreement that would supersede it pursuant to
paragraph (9) of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement;
“2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation, except the DBP, the sum of P13,000,000.00,
as and for moral and exemplary damages. Payment of these moral
and exemplary damages shall be offset by APT from the
outstanding and unpaid loans of MMIC with DBP and PNB, which
have not been converted into equity. Should there be any balance
due to MMIC after the offsetting, the same shall be satisfied from
the funds representing the purchase price of the sale of the shares of
Island Cement Corporation in the amount of P503,000,000.00 held
under escrow pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated April 22,
1988 or to such subsequent escrow agreement that would supersede
it pursuant to paragraph (9) of the Compromise and Arbitration
Agreement;
“3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, Jesus S. Cabarrus,
Sr., the sum of P10,000,000.00, to be satisfied likewise from the
funds held under escrow pursuant to the Escrow Agreement dated
April 22, 1988 or to such subsequent escrow agreement that would
supersede it, pursuant to paragraph (9), Compromise and
Arbitration Agreement, as and for moral damages; and
“4. Ordering the defendant to pay arbitration costs.
“This Decision is FINAL and EXECUTORY.

“IT IS SO ORDERED.”
Member Elma submitted a separate concurring and dissenting

opinion reading as follows:
“ELMA, concurring and dissenting:
“I am in complete agreement with the findings of the Decision on the

principal issues submitted for the Committee’s resolution,
639
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 639

viz.: that plaintiffs Cabarrus, et al., have the capacity or the personality to
institute this derivative suit in behalf of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC) and that the actions leading to, and including, the
PNB-DBP foreclosure of the MMIC assets were improper, invalid and/or
not done in good faith. Consequently, there is concurrence on my part to the
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages to MMIC, and moral
damages to plaintiff Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr.
“However, I am unable to agree with and, therefore, regretfully dissent
as to the manner or method of computation and amount of actual damages
awarded to MMIC, particularly set forth in paragraph 1 of the dispositive
portion of the Decision.
xxx
“Considering that under the “Compromise and Arbitration Agreement,”
the parties agreed that their respective claims be reduced to purely
pecuniary/money claims, then MMIC and/or plaintiffs on behalf of all the
other stockholders of MMIC are entitled to actual or compensatory damages
equivalent to the present value of their equity over the MMIC assets, i.e. the
total stockholders’ equity of P20,826,700,952.00 as of December 31, 1992.
Further, since as held in the Decision that the DBP would have an 87%
equity in MMIC as a consequence of the finding that the Financial
Rehabilitation Plan (FRP) is valid (p. 64 of the Decision), then the amount
of P18,119,229,828.24 (equivalent to DBP’s 87% equity) should be
deducted from the total stockholders’ equity of P20,826,700,952.00 leaving
a net amount of P2,707,471,123.76 to be awarded to MMIC (excluding
DBP’s share) as actual or compensatory damages.
“It is to be noted that defendant APT did not present any evidence
rebutting the figures and computations made by witness Pastor. Since the
Decision finds the FRP valid, then the stockholders of MMIC (excluding
DBP) should be placed in the same position that they would have been were
not for the fact that the FRP was improperly and illegally aborted by
PNB/DBP. Accordingly, it is my submission that defendant APT should be
ordered to pay MMIC (excluding DBP) the sum of P2,707,471,123.76 with
legal interest thereon per annum from August 3, 1984 as and for actual
damages.
x x x”
Member Sison submitted a separate opinion reading as follows:
640

“SEPARATE OPINION
“x x x
“It is clear and it cannot be disputed therefore that based on these
stipulated issues, the parties themselves have agreed that the basic
ingredient of the causes of action in this case is the wrong committed on the
corporation (MMIC) for the alleged illegal foreclosure of its assets. By
agreeing to this stipulation, PLAINTIFFS themselves (Cabarrus, et al.)
admit that the cause of action pertains only to the corporation (MMIC) and
that they are filing this for and in behalf of MMIC.
“Perforce this has to be so because it is the basic rule in Corporation Law
that “the shareholders have no title, legal or equitable to the property which
is owned by the corporation (13 Am. Jur. 165; Pascual vs. Oresco, 14 Phil.
83). In Ganzon & Sons vs. Register of Deeds, 6 SCRA 373, the rule has
been reiterated that “a stockholder is not the co-owner of the corporate
property.” Since the property or assets foreclosed belongs to MMIC, the
wrong committed, if any, is done against the corporation. There is therefore
no direct injury or direct violation of the rights of Cabarrus, et al. There is
no way, legal or equitable, by which Cabarrus, et al. could recover damages
in their personal capacities even assuming or just because the foreclosure is
improper or invalid. The Compromise and Arbitration Agreement itself and
the elementary principles of Corporation Law say so. Therefore, I am
constrained to dissent from the award of moral damages to Cabarrus.
“Neither could I agree to the award of moral damages to MMIC. The
acts complained of here in which the Committee based its award of moral
damages to MMIC is the foreclosure of the various real estate and chattel
mortgages. The majority of the Committee believes that these foreclosures
constitute a violation of an agreement forged between PNB-DBP, on one
hand, and MMIC, on the other, regarding the restructuring of the various
past due loans of MMIC to what has been termed as the Financial
Restructuring Program (FRP).
xxx
“In this connection, it can readily be seen and it cannot quite be denied
that MMIC accounts in PNB-DBP were past due. The drawing up of the
FRP is the best proof of this. When MMIC adopted a restructuring program
for its loan, it only meant that these loans were already due and unpaid. If
these loans were restructurable because they were already due and unpaid,
they are likewise
641
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 641

“forecloseable.” The option is with the PNB-DBP on what steps to take.

“The mere fact that MMIC adopted the FRP does not mean that DBP-
PNB lost the option to foreclose. Neither does it mean that the FRP is
legally binding and implementable. It must be pointed that said FRP will, in
effect, supersede the existing and past due loans of MMIC with PNB-DBP.
It will become the new loan agreement between the lenders and the
borrowers. As in all other contracts, there must therefore be a meeting of the
minds of the parties; the PNB and DBP must have to validly adopt and
ratify such FRP before they can be bound by it; before it can be
implemented. In this case, not an iota of proof has been presented by the
PLAINTIFFS showing that PNB and DBP ratified and adopted the FRP.
PLAINTIFFS simply relied on a legal doctrine of promissory estoppel to
support its allegations in this regard.
xxx
“All told, PNB and DBP had the right to foreclose and were justified in
doing so. But were the foreclosure legally done or carried out? Were the
requirements of notice, posting and publication required by Acts 3135 and
1508 substantially complied with?
xxx
“I cannot, however, concur with the Committees for holding that such
minor taint of illegality in the foreclosure is enough to justify the award of
damages amounting to P19,486,118,654.00. “Rules of law respecting the
recovery of damages are framed with reference to just rights of both parties,
not merely what may be right for an injured person to receive, but also what
is just to compel the other party to pay, to accord just compensation for the
injury” (Kennings vs. Kline Ind. 602). Following this universally accepted
rule on damages, I do not believe it is just to compel APT to pay such huge
amount for such a minor technical infraction.
“But while I do not agree with this pronouncement of the Committee, I
nevertheless concur with the result as far as the disposition of the award for
actual damages is concerned. I agree that DEFENDANT APT can, and is
still entitled to, collect the outstanding obligations of MMIC to PNB and
DBP amounting to P22,668,537,770.05 with interest thereon as stipulated in
the loan documents from the date of foreclosure until the time they are fully
paid. The resultant effect of such a disposition is that APT can offset the
said obligation due from MMIC such that ultimately no damages will be due
and payable to MMIC. As there may be damage without
642

injury, there can be injury without damage (15 Am. Jur., p. 388). This case
is a case of “injury without damage.”
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the “decision” of the

Arbitration Committee. In addition, respondents Cabarrus, et al. filed
a motion for clarification and to re-open the case to receive
evidence. In a resolution dated July 26, 1984, with one member
dissenting, the Arbitration Committee denied the motions for
reconsideration of both parties as well as all other pending motions.
On October 17, 1984, respondents Cabarrus, et al. filed directly
with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62, in the same Civil
Case No. 9900, a pleading entitled application/motion for
confirmation of arbitral award.
On November 4, 1994, petitioner APT filed an opposition and
motion to vacate judgment, contending that respondents’ motion
was improperly filed with the same branch of the court in Civil Case
No. 9900, which was previously dismissed, and that the motion
should have been filed as a separate special proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court to be docketed by the Clerk of Court.
Nonetheless, acting on the application/motion, Judge Roberto C.
Diokno, presiding judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62,
on November 28, 1994, issued an order granting plaintiffs’
application confirming the arbitration award, and rendering
judgment as set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion.
On December 12, 1994, petitioner APT received notice of the
lower court’s order. On December 27, 1994, petitioner APT filed a
motion for reconsideration. By order dated January 18, 1995, the
trial court denied the motion. On February 7, 1995, respondents
Cabarrus, et al. filed a motion for execution and appointment of
custodian of proceeds of execution. Petitioner opposed the motion. It
is apparently still unresolved.
On February 15, 1995, petitioner APT filed with the Court of
Appeals an original special civil action for certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc-
643
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 643

1
tion to annul the two (2) orders of the respondent Regional Trial
Court above-mentioned confirming the arbitral award and denying
its reconsideration.
The issue presented in said petition was whether respondent
Judge Roberto C. Diokno, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62,
had jurisdiction to act on private respondents’ application/motion for
confirmation of arbitral award in the same Civil Case No. 9900,
which had been dismissed earlier on motion of the parties, and thus
the court gravely abused its discretion in confirming the arbitral
award.
In its decision promulgated on July 17, 1995, the Court of
Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit. 2
Hence, this petition for review filed on September 07, 1995.
The petition is impressed with merit.
First, the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62, did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the case by respondents’ filing of a
mere motion in the same Civil Case No. 9900 because the case had
been dismissed earlier and such dismissal had become final and
unappealable. As heretofore stated, on October 6, 1992, the parties
entered into a compromise and arbitration agreement expressly
providing that they “have agreed to withdraw their respective claims
from the Trial Court and to resolve their dispute through arbitration
by praying to the Trial Court to issue a compromise judgment based
on this Compromise and Arbitration agreement.”
Clearly, the parties had withdrawn the action then pending with
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62, in Civil Case No.
9900, and agreed that they would submit their dispute to arbitration
and reduce their respective claims to “purely money claims,”
“waiving and foregoing all other forms
___________
1 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36484.

2 On August 28, 1998, the Court granted petitioner an extension of thirty days
from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file a petition for
certiorari.
644

of reliefs which they prayed for or could have prayed for in Civil
Case No. 9900.” The parties “agreed to move for the dismissal of the
case, to transform the reliefs prayed for therein to pure money
claims and submit the controversy to arbitration under Republic Act
(RA) 876 before a committee composed of three members.”
In its order dated October 12, 1992, in Civil Case No. 9900, the
trial court presided over by respondent Judge categorically decreed
that “The complaint is hereby dismissed.” Such disposition3
terminated the case finally and irretrievably disposed of the same.
The term “dismissed” has a definite meaning in law. “A judgment of
‘dismissed,’ without qualifying words indicating a right to take
4
further proceedings, is presumed to be dismissed on the merits.”
The dismissal could not have been a suspension of action provided
for in the arbitration law, Republic Act No. 876.
Upon the finality of such order of dismissal, the case could no
longer be revived by mere motion. The trial court had lost its
5
authority over the case. We cite a squarely applicable the decision
where this Court emphatically said “But after the dismissal has
become final through the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary
period, the only way by which the action may be resuscitated or
‘revived,’ is by the institution of a subsequent action through the
filing of another complaint and the payment of the fees prescribed
by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of a dismissal
through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses
jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make any
disposition in
___________
3 Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 354; Paz Bacabac
vs. Delfin, 1 SCRA 1194; Aquizap vs. Basilio, 21 SCRA 1435.
4 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1951 edition, p. 556.
5 Cf. Isasi vs. Republic, 101 Phil. 405; Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.
645
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 645

6
respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.” It is true that the
confirmation of an arbitral award is within the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a regional trial court. Such jurisdiction must be
invoked by proper motion as a special proceedings with notice to the
parties filed in the proper court7 with the clerk of court (and upon
payment of the prescribed fees).
Second, the Arbitration Committee did not actually reach a valid
decision on the subject controversy.
In the purported decision dated November 24, 1994, penned by
Chairman Sarmiento, the Committee ordered petitioner APT to pay
to MMIC the sum of P2,531,635,425.02, with interest thereon at the
legal rate at 6% per annum from August 3, 9 and 24, 1984, pari
passu as actual damages; to pay MMIC P13 million, as moral and
exemplary damages, and to pay Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr. P10 million,
as moral damages.
In the concurring and dissenting opinion of Member Elma, he
agreed with the finding on the principal issue submitted for
resolution. However, he dissented as to the manner or method of
computation and amount of actual damages awarded to MMIC. He
submitted that APT should be ordered to pay MMIC the sum of
P2,707,471,123.76, with legal interest thereon per annum from
August 3, 1984, as actual damages.
In his separate opinion, Member Sison stated that he concurred
with the result as far as the disposition of the award of actual
damages is concerned. He agreed that APT is entitled to collect the
outstanding obligations of MMIC to PNB and DBP amounting to
P22,668,537,770.05, with interest as stipulated in the loan
documents from the date of foreclosure until fully paid. The
resultant effect is that APT can offset said obligation due from
MMIC such that ultimately no dam-
___________
6 Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco; Dolores V.
Molina vs. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105, 234 SCRA 455
[1994].
7 R.A. No. 876, Sections 22, 23.
646

ages shall be due and payable to MMIC. He was against the award
of moral and exemplary damages to MMIC and Jesus S. Cabarrus,
Sr.
It is obvious that the disposition in Chairman Sarmiento’s award
and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Member Elma do not
tally and, hence, because of the dissent of Member Sison, the
Arbitration Committee did not reach a majority decision constituting
a valid judgment or fallo of the Committee.
“The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by
the individual members separately. Their acts are official only when done by
the members convened in session upon a concurrence of at least a majority
8
and with at least a quorum present.’’
Respondents Cabarrus, et al. considered the disposition as confusing

and incomplete as to the award of damages and thereby requiring the
reception of further evidence as to necessitate the reopening of
hearings on the case. On May 20, 1994, they filed a motion for
clarification seeking answer from the arbitration committee as to the
final amount of actual damages the MMIC is entitled to, and, on
June 9, 1994, they filed a motion to reopen the case and to receive
evidence.
Even the Arbitration Committee’s resolution of the various
motions for reconsideration and other reliefs was conflicting. For
Chairman Sarmiento, respondents’ motion for reconsideration, dated
December 15, 1993, and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
dated January 3, 1984, respondents’ motion for clarification dated
June 8, 1994, and respondents’ urgent motion to re-open the case
and to receive evidence were all DENIED for lack of merit.
Member Elma dissented from the denial of the parties’ motion
for reconsideration, reiterating that MMIC is entitled to actual
damages in the sum of P2,707,471,123.76, with legal interest
thereon from August 3, 1984.
__________
8 42 Am. Jur. 389, Sec. 74, cited in Arocha vs. Vivo, 21 SCRA 532, 540.
647
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 647

Member Azura (substituting Sison) concurred with the Chairman in

denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration, motion for
clarification and motion to re-open the case but favored granting
petitioner’s (APT) motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT 9the petition at bench, reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 62, in Civil Case No. 9900,
vacate the “decision” of the Arbitration Committee dated November
24, 1993, and, finally, ENJOIN the trial court from further acting on
the case.
Judgment reversed and set aside, that of the Arbitration
Committee vacated.
Notes.—In a petition for review of an arbitration award, the

Arbitral Tribunal should be impleaded. (Hi-Precision Steel Center,
Inc. vs. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc., 228 SCRA 397 [1993])
Under the Arbitration Law, the award or decision of the
voluntary arbitrator is equated with that of the Regional Trial Courts.
(Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 [1995])
——o0o——
__________
9 CA-G.R. SP no. 36484, promulgated on July 17, 1995.
648
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

APT vs. CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

APT vs. CA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

APT vs. CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

VOL.

300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 579

ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

Actions; Arbitration; Judgments; Dismissal of Actions; Words and

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 581

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; A party aggrieved by an

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

should be stressed that while a court is precluded from overturning an award

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 583

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

smirched reputation which a corporation may possibly suffer.—Further,

584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

ROMERO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Actions; Arbitration; If the tested mechanism of arbitration can simply

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 585

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

award was reiterated by the court. Arbitration, as an alternative mode of

PARDO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Judgments; Upon attainment of ﬁnality of a dismissal through the lapse

586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals

ﬁnality of a dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to reverse and

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 587

The antecedent facts

1 Rollo, pp. 261-262.

588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nature or description, which the mortgagor may acquire whether in

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 589

590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

entering into a “Compromise and Arbitration Agreement,”

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises

1. Withdrawal and Compromise. The parties have agreed to withdraw

In withdrawing their dispute from the court and in choosing to resolve it

(a) their respective money claims shall be reduced to purely money

2. Submission. The parties hereby agree that (a) the controversy in

13 CA Rollo, pp. 109-110.

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 591

This agreement was presented for approval to the trial court. On

WHEREFORE, this Court orders:

1. Substituting PNB and DBP with the Asset Privatization Trust as

The Arbitration Committee was composed of retired Supreme Court

Since, as this Committee ﬁnds, there is no foreclosure at all as it was not

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

assets of MMIC which by agreement should no longer be returned even if

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the Marinduque Mining and

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 593

2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the Marinduque Mining and

This Decision is FINAL and EXECUTORY.

1. The plaintiff’s Application/Motion is improperly ﬁled with this

16 Id., at 168-172. Italics in the original.

594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED