Moral Exam Part 2
Moral Exam Part 2
Moral Exam Part 2
” - David Edmonds
Most people seem to believe that not only is it permissible to turn the train down the spur, but that it
is actually required and morally obligatory. A version of “Spur” appeared for the first time in the
Oxford Review in 1967. To test our moral intuitions philosophers have come up with ever more
surreal scenarios involving often bizarre props (trap doors, tractors..). The train is usually racing
toward five unfortunates and the reader is presented with various means to rescue them, although
the cost of another life. There is no link between the one and the five, and they are innocent
people. Politicians and health officials do have to make decisions that are a matter of life and
death. Whenever a health body is faced with a choice between funding a drug that is estimated to
save X lives, and funding another that would save Y, they are in effect confronted with a variation of
the trolley problem, though these are dilemmas that do not involve killing anybody.
CH.3 - The Founding Mothers
Philippa Foot (Bonsanquet), the founder of trolleyology, believed that there were a right answer to
her train dilemma. Foot was born in 1920 and her ethical outlook was molded by the violence of
WW2. Some of her work was crucial in the re-emergence of normative ethics within analytic
philosophy, especially her critique of consequentialism and of subjectivism. When she began to
teach philosophy at Oxford University in 1947, subjectivism still had a pernicious hold on
academia, according to her. Subjectivism maintains that there are no objective moral truths and
this idea was further expanded by the “Vienna Circle”, a group of intellectuals which developed
“logical positivism”, which claimed that for a proposition to have meaning it must fulfill one of two
criteria. Either it must be true in virtue of the meaning of its terms (ex 2+2=4), or it must be in
principle verifiable through experimentation. All other statements were literally meaningless
(including explicit moral assertions). How then ought we interpret ethical statements? A.J. Ayer’s
answer: Ayer developed what is pejoratively called the boo-hooray theory: emotivism claims that
judgments, rather than being statements of facts, are only expressions of emotion, and are neither
true nor false. Moral judgments are attitudes rather than beliefs. In this way, to say something is
right is to have a favorable attitude toward it and amounts to saying “Hurrah!” To say something is
wrong is to have an unfavorable attitude toward it and is equivalent to saying “Boo!”. But Foot was
radically out of step with ethical emotivism. In addition to their common assault on hooray-boo
meta-ethics, Anscombe, Foot, and Murdoch were preoccupied with the “virtues”. In answer to the
question “How should I behave?” in any particular moral dilemma, (1) one approach emphasizes
moral obligations and duties. (2) An alternative response, utilitarianism, states that what matters
are the consequences of an action, whether for example the action saves the most lives, or
produces the most happiness. (3) Foot, Anscombe, and Murdoch were attracted by a third way of
thinking: inspired by the work of Aristotle and Aquinas and Wittgenstein, they stressed the
importance of character. An action was good insofar as it exhibited the behavior of a virtuous
person. Anscombe was the most deeply transformed by Wittgenstein. Like so many of those who
came in contact with Wittgenstein she began to adopt some of his traits, such as disquieting
silences as she paused for thought in seminars and tutorials, the vise-like holding of her head with
her hands, and the agonized expression during intense philosophical debate. Wittgenstein
persuaded many of his most talented students to abandon the discipline: fortunately for philosophy
Anscombe stuck to her vocation. Anscombe spread the Wittgensteinian gospel to Foot. Foot
published several collections of articles but only one work conceived as a book, Natural Goodness.
Wittgenstein believed that philosophical puzzles were natural, easy to make, and yet arose out of
conceptual confusion, and so dissolvable by an analysis of language. Wittgenstein was skeptical
that philosophy had anything to contribute to ethics. More important the focus on the minutiae of a
hypothetical puzzle, endlessly reexamined through a myriad of distinct scenarios, ran contrary to
his style.
In 1967, Philippa Foot —> “The Problem of Abortion and the doctrine of Double Effect”. In it Foot
rejected the use of the DDE as a weapon to criticize abortion. She explains the DDE as a “based
on a distinction between what a man foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in the
strict sense, he intends”. The distinction between intending and foreseeing is at the car of the DDE.
In Catholic theology, the DDE has been pivotal tot he church’s explanation of why in its view there
are only rare cases in which abortion is acceptable. Most cases involve the intentional killing of the
fetus. But if a pregnant woman has author in her uterus, and a hysterectomy is required to save
her life, the fact that there is also a fetus in the womb is incidental. The DDE is built into law, into
medical practice and into the rules of war. The law draws a distinction between “direct” or
“purposeful” intention on the one hand and “oblique” intention on the other.
The method of trolleyology involves conjuring up various trolleyesque scenarios and taking note of
the strong intuitions that they elicit. The DDE is one possible candidate for a principle that explains
our intuitions. In exploring the validity of the DDE in er article, Philippa Foot describes several
imaginary thought experiments. A fat man is stuck in a hole in a cave. His head is out of the cave
so he can breathe, but a party of potholers is behind him and unable to escape. According to Foot
the right thing to do is to sit down and wait until the fat man grows thin; but philosophers have
arranged that flood waters should be rising within the cave. You have a stick of dynamite. Can you
use it to blow up the fat man? Foot compares her scenario with a twin set of cases. Imagine we
could either save a patient with a massive dose of drug, or save five patients who only need a fifth
each of this drug: what should we do? Once again it would be permissible according to Foot to
save the five though one will die. Now take the transplant case. Suppose there are five seriously ill
patients, all in urgent need of organs transplant. Two requires kidneys, two need lungs, one needs
a heart. An innocent healthy young man walks in for his annual checkup: should the surgeon bump
him off so that his organs can be farmed out to the five at risk? We are expected to find this
proposal abominable.
Foot believed that we do not need to resort DDE to explain our intuitions in these scenarios. She
proffered an alternative explanation. We have both negative and positive duties. Negative duties
are the duties not to interfere in other people’s lives. Positive duties are the duties to help others.
In Spur, her dilemma is faced by the driver and since her driver presumably started the train, his
terrible choice is between killing one or five. In a subsequent article Foot went on to highlight what
o her was a crucial point. In Spur one is merely redirecting an already existing threat. But in the
hospital case we have introduced a whole new threat.
In the search for a formulation of the principles that should govern how we can and can't treat
people, Kamm offers some principles (of alternate reason, of contextual interaction, of ethical
integrity, of instrumental rationality, of irrelevant goods, of irrelevant rights, of irrelevant need) and
doctrines —> the Doctrine of Triple Effect. It has a third distinction in addition to the two that are
familiar from the DDE, namely effects that are intended and effects that are foreseen. She explains
it through what she calls the Party Case.We intend to throw a party in order to have fun. We
foresee though that this will result in a big mess, and we will not have a party if we will be left to
clean up that mess by ourselves. However, we foresee that if we throw the party, our friends will
feel indebted to us and this will cause them to help clean up. Hence, we have the party because
we believe that our friends will feel indebted and because we will not have a mess to clean up.
However, we do not give the party in order to make our friends feel indebted or to clean up for us.
There’s distinction between doing something because it will cause the hitting of a bystander, and
doing it intending to cause the hitting of a bystander. This distinction can assist in various trolley
scenarios.
Figure 5. Six Behind One: you are standing on the side of the track. A runaway trolley is hurtling
toward you. Ahead are five people tied to the track. If you do nothing the five people will be run
over and killed. You are next to a signal switch, turning this switch will send the out-of-control
trolley down a spur. On the spur you see one person tied to the track and changing direction will
inevitably result in this person being killed. Behind the one person are six people also tied to the
track. The one person if hit will stop the trolley. What should you do?
There is one final complication with the concept of intention, unearthed by a new philosophical
movement, called “experimental philosophy”. Joshua Knobe —> Knobe Effect. He is well-known
for his experimental work looking at how we interpret a person's actions depending on linguistic
context. The idea underpinning his approach is that we can better understand philosophical
concepts if we look at how people use and respond to them in practice. Many of these
experiments focus on intentionality : i.e., in what contexts do we say that a person acted
intentionally, and in what contexts unintentionally? Based on these findings, Josh wants to claim
that he has discovered something 'deep' about the nature of theory of mind, intentional action, and
moral judgment.
CASE 1: a vice president of a company goes to the chairman of a board and says ”we’ve got a
new project. It’s going to make oodles of money for our company, but it’s also going to harm the
environment”.The chairman says “I realize the project’s going to harm the environment. I don’t care
at all about that. All I care is making as much money as possible. So start the project”. The project
starts and the environment suffers.
CASE 2: a vice president of a company goes to the chairman of a board and says ”we’ve got a
new project. It’s going to make oodles of money for our company, and it’s also going to have a
beneficial impact on the environment”.The chairman says “I realize the project’s going to benefit
the environment. I don’t care at all about that. All I care is making as much money as possible. So
start the project”. The project starts and there is a beneficial impact on the environment.
When asked about the first scenario most people say “yes the harm was intentional”. But did the
chairman in the second scenario intentionally help the environment? Most people thought not; this
is odd since the two cases are almost identical. The only difference is that in the first scenario the
chairman has done something bad, while in the second he has done something good. Kobe
believes this shows that the concept of intention is inextricably bound up with moral judgments.
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Vilfredo Federico Damasco Pareto —> Pareto Principle: 80% of effects come from 20% of
causes.
Pareto is credited with another principle: in economics, a state of affairs is said to be Pareto
efficient (or Pareto optimal) when there could be no reallocation of goods that would make one or
more individuals better off without making anyone else worse off.
Case of Captain Tom Dudley: on July 25, 1884 Captain Dudley stabbed, killed and ate his cabin
boy, and his sentence was established for 6 months of jail. It was an unusual case and one still
cited in courts. Dudley had openly admitted to the killing, and was stunned as well as indignant that
it should be considered a crime; in fact 20 days before the murder he and three other men had
been in the middle of the Atlantic en route from England to Australia. They were over a thousand
miles from land when a terrible storm erupted and their watch rapidly began to sink. They
clambered into a lifeboat. Dudley and Stephens decided to sacrifice the young cabin boy who was
dying and had no children nor wife. For four days they ate Parker’s carcass. Brooks, despite his
denunciation of the crime, joined in.
With Stephens, Dudley had murdered an innocent boy and in normal circumstances murder is
unconscionable. But although Dudley was tried and found guilty on the crime, this case tend to
evoke mixed feelings. While some will think murder unacceptable whatever the circumstances,
others will have considerable sympathy for Dudley’s predicament, recognizing a rationale, a moral
rationale to moving from a Pareto inefficient to a Pareto efficient state of affairs. The lot was
improved and no one was made worse off.
The Nazi Thought Experiment: the subject was asked to imagine that she was among a group of
people hiding from the Nazis: her child was whimpering. Unless she smothered the child the entire
group would be discovered and murdered. Roughly 50% believe that it is acceptable to throw
someone overboard in the lifeboat case, or for the mother to kill her child, but many fewer women
than men think this.
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There has been a plethora of studies showing that our ethical behavior appears to be linked to
countless irrational factors. Although we like to fool ourselves into believing that we freely make
decisions in the light of informed and reasoned reflection, the growing evidence from
experimentation is that reason often takes a back seat to unconscious influences.
Although there are an infinite number of factors that might potentially influence our behavior and
moral judgements, a consensus is emerging that there are two broad processes, and the balance
of power between them is contested territory. David Hume —> “Reason is and ought only to be
slave of the passions” VS Immanuel Kant —> morality must be governed by reason.
Trained in both philosophy and psychology, Greene was the first person to throw neuroscience into
the trolley mix. He began to scan subjects while they were presented with trolley problems: the
scanners picked up where blips in the resulting brain activity took place. Greene described the
trolley cases as triggering a furious bout of neural wrestling between the calculating and emotional
bits of the brain. The emotional recoiling that typically occurs when people contemplate killing the
fat man is made up pf two components. The first is an up-close-and-personal effect: there is
something about the physicality of pushing, the direct impacting on another person with one’s
muscles, that makes us flinch. The evidence suggests that this is even the case if the pushing
does not directly require contact with hands. The effect can be tested in the Trap Door case.
Figure 10. The Trap Door: the runaway trolley is heading toward five people. You are standing by
the side of the track. The only way to stop the trolley killing the five is to pull a lever which opens a
trap door on which a fat man happens to be standing. The fat man would plummet to the ground
and die, but his body would stop the trolley.
Subjects asked about the trolley cases are more willing to send the fat man to his death when it
involves the killing with a switch rather than killing with a push. Still, whether it requires a switch or
a push, most people still believe that killing the fat man is worse than changing the train’s direction
in Spur. Greene has a compelling evolutionary explanation for the moral distinction people
subconsciously draw between engaging muscles and turning switches. We have a particular
revulsion to harms that could have been inflicted in the environment of our evolutionary adaption.
We evolved in environments in which we intercede directly with other human beings. Using
muscles to show another person is a cue that there’s violence and for obvious reasons violence is
generally best avoided. Some of our moral instincts are inappropriate for our age, an era in which
people live in large anonymous groups in an interconnected world.
The typical ethical outlook of the typical human being relies on a balance of neural systems.
Joshua Greene initially saw the opposition as one between emotion and calculation, Haidt between
emotion and reason, Daniel Kahneman between fast and slow systems.
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