Best Vers of Budhsen Vs State of U
Best Vers of Budhsen Vs State of U
Best Vers of Budhsen Vs State of U
P on 6 May, 1970
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
These two appeals by special leave arise out of a joint trial of the present
appellants and Jagdish and Sugriv. All the four accused were convicted
by the trial court; the present appellants were sentenced to death under S.
302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and Jagdish and Sugriv to life imprisonment
under S. 302 read with s. 109, I.P.C. They challenged their conviction by
separate appeals to the Allahabad High Court. By means of a common
judgment the High Court dismissed the appeal of the present appellants
and allowed that of their co-accused Jagdish and Sugriv. The sentence
of death imposed on the present appellants under s. 302, I.P.C. for the
murder of Lala Hazarilal was confirmed.
The trial court came to the conclusion that Jagdish and Sugriv had
abetted the murder of Hazarilal, and appellants Naubat and Budhsen had
committed the murder. Naubat and Budhsen were, therefore, sentenced
to death and Jagdish and Sugriv to life imprisonment.
It is undoubtedly true that under Art. 136 this Court does not ordinarily
interfere with conclusions of fact properly arrived at by the High Court
on appreciation of evidence on the record except where there is legal
error or some disregard of the forms of legal process or a violation of the
principles of natural justice resulting in grave or substantial injustice. In
Tej Narain v. The Stale of U.P. (1) this Court, after examining its
previous decisions in which this Court had not accepted concurrent
findings or had re-examined the evidence for itself, said "The above
cases show that this Court has not accepted concurrent findings of fact if
there is no evidence for the finding or if there has been an omission to
notice material points while appreciating evidence or to bear in mind
relevant considerations which swing the balance in favour of the accused.
It has also on occasions reexamined the evidence in view of the fact that the case
against the accused was based on circumstantial evidence and it was of an
extraordinary nature. In the case before us, as we will show presently, the High
Court appears to have completely overlooked the variation in certain important
aspects by P.W. 3, while deposing at the trial from what he had stated earlier and
consequently the High Court could not apply its mind to their significance. In view
of this infirmity in the judgment and other considerations which will be pointed out
later we are satisfied that this is one of the exceptional cases in which we should
undertake the examination of the entire evidence and appraise it."
Before us the entire case depends on the identification of the appellants and this
identification is founded solely on test identification parades. The High Court does
not seem to have correctly appreciated the evidentiary value of these parades
though they were considered to be the primary evidence in support of the
prosecution case. It seems to have proceeded on the erroneous legal assumption
that it is a substantive piece of evidence and that on the basis of that evidence alone
the conviction can be sustained. And then that court also ignored important
evidence on the record in regard to the manner in which the test identification
parades were held, and other connected circumstances suggesting that they were
held more or less in a mechanical way without the necessary precautions being
taken to eliminate unfairness. This is clearly an erroneous way of dealing with the
test identification parades and has caused failure of justice.
In our opinion, though this factor is relevant it cannot serve as a substitute for
reliable admissible evidence required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The evidence in regard to identification having been discarded
by us as legally infirm and which does not connect the appellants with the alleged
offence it cannot by itself sustain the conviction of the appellants. These appeals
are allowed and the accused acquitted.