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ARAB-ISRAEL WAR OCTOBER 1973

YUM KIPPUR WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. Yum Kippur also called Ramadhan War and October War. War fought between
Israel on one side and Egypt and Syria on the other side, backed by Iraq, Jordan and
supported economically by Saudi Arabia. The war lasted for 3 weeks and started on
October 6, 1973 and ended on October 22 on the Syrian front and on October 26 on the
Egyptian front. The war and its outcome represent a watershed in Middle Eastern history.
It also prompted immediate intervention by the United States, which had supplied
weapons to Israel during the fighting and by Soviet Union, which had supplied the Arab
forces. For the first time, vulnerability on Israeli side evident , both Syria and Egypt
proved their new strength, both military and in organization. It also left Israel with loss of
territory, even if that was not its own, but occupied territory from the Sixth Day War.

2. The name of this conflict stems from the important Jewish Festival of Yom
Kippur, and the Muslim month of Ramadhan, in which the annual fast of Swam is
performed. From a rare moment of flabbiness in Israeli intelligence and in the
government, Israel did not expect any attacks from its neighbours just at this point in
time. The background for this is that too very important religious festivals coincided in
Islam and Judaism, two Festivals in which there was prohibition against warfare. Egypt
and Syria use this laxity to launch a surprise attack on Israel.

3. The goal of the war was to win back lost Arab territory from preceding wars, first
in 1947-49, then 1956 and especially in the last, the Sixth Day War of 1967. Following
these wars there had been no political progress in solving the situation of lost territory
and large groups of Palestinian refugees. A deep frustration had come over the entire Arab
world, which came to motivate strong sentiments and new political orientations in the
populations. At the eve of this war, the Arab nations felt that they had every excuse to
wage war against Israel. The total cost off the war was estimated to US $7 billion on both
Israel and Egyptian side.
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AIM

4. The aim of the paper is to analyse the strategy of Israel and Arab forces during
Yom Kippur War and determine lessons learnt.

SCOPE

5. The scope of this paper consists of the following:

a. Background.
b. The Plan and Preparation.
c. Chronology of war.
d. Conduct of War.
e. Consequence of war.
f. Analysis and Lesson learnt.
g. Conclusion.

BACKGROUND

6. This path leading up to the Yum Kippur War had two major factors. First, there
was a failure to resolve territorial disputes arising from the Arab-Israeli War 0f 1967.
These disputes involved the return of the Sinai to Egypt and the return of the Golan
Heights to Syria. UN resolution 242 and Egyptian President Sadat’s peace initiative failed
to bring peace. Sadat wanted to sign an agreement with Israel provided the Israelis
returned all the occupied territories, but Israel refused to withdraw to the pre-1967
armistice lines. Since no progress was being made toward peace, Sadat was convinced
that to change things and gain legitimacy at home, he must initiate a war with limited
objectives.

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7. The second factor leading up to the war was the assurance Israel’s general staff
felt that Israel was safe from Arab attack for the indefinite future. Therefore, Israel felt no
reason to trade territory for peace. Israel felt this way because of the Israel Defence
Force’s (IDF) strength, the disarray of the Arab world, and the Golan Heights. Thus in
spite of Sadat’s threats of war throughout 1972 and much of 1973, Israel’s commanders
were unprepared for the October attack of Egypt and Syria. They misinterpreted the
build-up of armed forces along the canal as military exercise instead of an attack.

THE PLAN AND PREPARATION

8. Planning for the simultaneous attack on Israel forces on occupied Egyptian Sinai
and occupied Syrian Golan during the autumn 1973 had started a long time ago – in one
form or another from the immediate aftermath of the 1967 defeat. It had, inevitably, taken
different forms according to the partner or partners with whom Egypt was expecting to
operate, and this only finally been determined with the setting up of the unified command
of the armed forces of Egypt and Syria on 31 January 19731.

a. Egpytian.

(1) General Ahmed Ismail of Egypt after assessing the capability of

both the Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces compared to Israelis including
all advantages and disadvantages, he thought three conceptual goals for
Egyptian that were surprise, thoroughness and tactical-technical
efficiency2. He also concern about basic operational concept for a joint
strategic offensive in cooperation with Syria. The operation plan base on
strategically on broad front offensive, stretching along the whole length of
the Suez Canal and further South but limited in depth and the air cover
provide by the Surface to Air Missile (SAM). The plan was base on
infantry operations with armour acting in support.
1
Heikal, Mohamed. The Road To Ramadhan, William Collins Son & Co, London, 1975, p 12.
2
Dupuy, Trevor N, Exclusive Victory, The Arab Israel Wars (1949-1974), New York, Harper & Row, 1978,
p.390.
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(2) Egypt envisioned that this operation was a combination of an

assault river crossing and a wide front landing operation on a defended
hostile shore. In the planning stage, the elements of Israeli military
thought and behaviour such as over self-confidence of its capability and
under estimate the Arab forces. On 12 Sep 1973, President Sadat and
General Hafez al-Assad from Syria agreed to launch the operation on 6
October 1973.

b. Syrian. After President Assad agreed and later approved the

offensive planning which he discussed with General Ahmad Ismail and General
Mustafa Tlas, Syrian Defence Minister, Syrian had plan to conduct intensive
attack on a broad front to disperse Israeli defensive near Ahmadiyeh in the North
and near Rafid in the South based on Soviet doctrine. The operation will be
supported by combat aircraft, artillery, tank guns and mortars.

c. Israel. Israel was very confident in its preparations for the

possibilities of an Arab attacked. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and General
Elazarafter given assured by the Director of Intelligence that Arab concentrations
in the north and south were of concern, they have ordered a partial alert to ensure
maximum readiness in case of a surprise attack. Later troops were reinforce to
main the 65 km front and the mobile reserve group. General Hoffi believed that
the Syrians aim to attack Kuneitra from the north, where as Brigade Rafael Eitan
was more concerned about the danger of Syrian main effort across the better tank
country south of Kunietra. Hence, Israel forces on Golan front were at least alert
to the possibility of an attack as compared to their counter part in Sinai front. On
the Sinai front the disposition of Israel troops did not shange for several months
prior to 6 October 1973. When the war broke out a few hours earlier than
expected, Israeli Force were not prepared and in totally disarray.

ORBAT
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9. The ORBAT of Israeli and Arab forces is as at Annexes A while the force balance
between the two forces is as at Annex B.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR

10. The chronology of the war ai as follows:

a. October 6. Surprise attacks are launched on Israel controlled territories

by Egypt and Syria. Egpyt attacks their own territory of Sinai that isunder Israeli
occupation, while Syria attacks their own territory of the Golan Heights that is
also under Israeli occupation. Syria gains several victories during the first day.

b. October 11. After initial victories the Syrian-led troops have lost the
Golan Heihgts, and Israeli troops are now advancing into Syria.

c. October 16. After Egyptian victories in the Sinai, advancing about 10

km into the peninsula, Israel starts getting their first victories, and on this day thay
are crossing the Suez Canal.

d. October 22. UN arranges a cease-fire on the Syrian front, where the two
nations return to prewar borderlines.

e. October 26. Cease fire on the Egyptian front. US-led talks soon results
in a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, and Egypt is left with an
increased territory compared to before the war – full control over both shores of
the Suez Canal is regained, and a strip of land along the first half of the western
coast of Sinai is gained. UN forces are stationed along the Suez Canal to monitor
the agreement.

f. Month of October. Oil embargo by Arab oil producing countries on the

western nations that support Israel starts.
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g. 1974 March. End of the oil embargo – which has resulted in strong
increase in oil prices and many difficulties on western nation.

h. 1974 – 1975. After US-led talks, disengagement agreements are reached

between Syria and Israel. The agreement leaves Syria with a small part of the
Golan Heights, around the town of Quneitra. UN forces are stationed here to
monitor the agreement.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR

11. The Surprise Attack By Arab Forces On 6 –7 October 1973. Egypt and
Syria launched concurrent military attacks against Israel on both fronts at precisely 1405
hours on the 6 October 1973.

a. Egypt Attack On Sinai.

(1) The Crossing Operaton. On the Northern Sinai front, the 2

Egyptian Army consisted of the 18 Division, 2 Division and 16 Division
while on the Southern Sinai front was the 3 Egyptian Army consist of 7
Division and 19 Division. Their first effort was to soften the Bara Lev
Line by heavy artillery bombardment. Aircraft were employed to carry
outclose air support to neutralize Israel command post artillery and missile
system, radar site and otheer electronic warfare and communications
systems. While those operations were on, the Engineer group carried out
the task of breaching the embankment using collapsible assault boats and
other means. This was achieved within 15 minutes of H hour.
Simultaneously a massive artillery bombardment opened up on the Israeli
front-line position. In the first minutes of attack about 10,500 shells fell on
the Israeli positions at the rate of 175 shells per second. Israel’s 14
Armoured Brigade whose area of responsibility war narrowed to the
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central suffered their first casualty against the Egyptians who fought
Stubbornly3 (See Annex C).

(2) By 1500 hours it was clear that the Egyptians were staging a major
attack all along the front. By 1600 hours it was evident that the Egyptians
were crossing the Suez Canal in a major amphibious operation. It took
place along the full length of the Bar Lev Line especially at the Northern
sector. The Israeli troops were equipped with various anti-tanks and anti-
aircraft weapon formed the first line of defence for the defence for the
advance of the 2 and 3 Armies. Within 4 hours the Egyptians had landed
over 80,000 troops in 12 waves, East of Suez Canal. This force was
protected by by the advance gurad while they executed thevulnerable
canal crossing.

(3) The assault was supported by the airforce with the total 240
aircraft. This paralysed the Israeli resistance, By midnight on the same day
most of the 2 Army had cross the Suez Canal and followed by the 3 Army
in the South. Initially 500 tanks manage to cross the Suez Canal. By the 9
October more than 800 tanks and 80,000 troops had crossed to the East
bank of Suez Canal. But the control of former Egyptian oilfield at Abu
Rudeis by the Israel located at the far bank Gulf os Suez South of Sinai
remained in Israeli hand. Several Egyptian commando raids by helicopter
failed to capture the oilfield.

(4) Egyptian Forces Building Up Position at East of Suez Canal.

From 6 to 14 October, the egyptian built up this position along a narrow
strip East of the canal with an average width of 5 miles. The 2 and 3
Armies, which had operated well at the canal srossing stage, were
relauctant to advance any further. By doing so their units would have
move beyond the zone defended by the missiles and would have open

3
Ovendale, Ritchie. The Origin of the Arab Israeli War. London Longman, 1985, pl93.
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themselves for attack by the Israel Air Force. Despite the superior position
that the Egyptians have gained on the ground, they did not try to challenge
Israeli air superiority outside the zone defended by the missiles. Within the
missile zone the Israeli Air Force suffered serious losses within the missile
protected zone while attempting to counter the egyptian operation. The
Egyptian infantry began to dig in and to deploy air defence asseta; this
was implified by the mobile character of the vehicle launch SAMs.
However the armoured division preffered to wait until the East bank had
been broadened before launching the second stage of the attack. The
Egyptian did not consolidate their position completely. A gap of 20 to 25
miles wide at the Eastern shores of the Bitter Lakes, remained between the
two army bridgeheads and never protected by the SAM batteries (See
Annex D).

(5) Egyptian Air Force Strike Mission. At H hour, the Egyptian Air
Force with 240 planes crossed the Suez Canal with the mission to strike
three airfields in Sinai, hit the Israel surface to air batteries, three
command post, radar stations, medium artillery position, the
administrations centers and the strong point on the sand bank East of Port
Fuad. But in this battle, and the resistance from the Israeli Air Force
showed that the early phase by the Egyptian Air Force plan was not
particularly successful. Despite of the formindable nature of the missile
weapon, the Israeli air attacks nibbled away at it as well.

(6) Egyptian Naval Force Conducted Blocked and Support

Operation. As for the Naval battle, the Israeli and Egyptian Naval force
conducted operations with difference tactics. The Egyptian realized that
the Israel Naval superiority only limited their objective in conducting
blockade and support of the army at sea to shore bombardment. The Israeli
Navy had little or no experience and furthermore some shhips were still

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under construction. With the outbreak of the war, the Egyptian declared a
naval blockade in the Red Sea.

b. Syria Attack On Golsn Height.

(1) TheOffensive Attack. The offensive also began with the

intensive artillery and air bombardment along the 65 km front. Under this
covering fire three infantry divisions and two armoured divisions the 1 and
3 Armoured Division comprising a total of 1,200 tanks launch on the 6
October. The 7 Division struck Westward and Southwestward through
Ahmadiya south of Tel El Syihiba. The 5 Division focused through North
of Juhada and the 9 Division attacked westward between Kudum and
Kuneitra. The 5 and 7 Division initially moved in two parallel columns as
a spearhead, striking directly into the Israeli line of defence. The Imperial
Guard Division covered the route to Damascus. The Syrian attack with the
element of surprise was initially successful. Mount Hermon wa attacked
by Syrian commandos using fourhelicopters and one being lost in action
(See Annex E).

(2) By the 7 October, the Syrian advanced approximately 10 km and

fought successfully against Israeli counter attack similar to that on the
Sinai front. The Syrian made good used of portable SAGGER missile
(antitank) which they had a large numbers and their RPG bazookas. The
Syrian armor outnumbered theIsraeli and furthermore the Syrian vheicles
were equipped with night vision equipment and both factors enhance the
success.

12. Israel Defensive Counter Attack. The Israeli counter attack began at 0830
hours on the 8 October on the Golan Height. The main effort was to be along the El Al
Rafid route, with 19 Reserved Brigade leading and the 20 Brigade ready to follow trough.
The 70 Reserve Brigade was to follow, mopping up and protecting the right flank above
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the Ruqqad. To the left of the main effort, the 14 Reserve Brigade was to advance along a
line leading from the Gamla Rise at Givat Yoav through Mazrat Kuneitra via Nahal
Geshur to Husniyah. By October 10, the 20 Brigade held the Rafid crossroad and by thee
afternoon, the Syrian left the Golan Heights. The retreating force left behind 867 tanks,
some of which were among the most modern T62 type. By October 22, Mount Hermon
was again in Israel hands and to Israeli, Mount Hermon is the eyes of the State of Israel
and they know they had to take it whatever cost. The Syrian attack across the Golan
Heights on the 6 October threatened to break through in the heart of Irael. After the heavy
fighting, the Israeli halted the Syrian armoured thrust and counter attacked, retaking the
Mount Hermon and drove deep into town of Sassa.

13. The Offensive Counter Attack By Israel.

a. Encirclement of Egyptian 3 Army. Israeli forces had opted to wait for

several days before deiding to cross the West of Suez Canal through the gap
between 2 and 3 Army. The planning and the battle appreciation were ugly and at
the great length. Finally the Israeli 14 Armoured Brigade and 243 Armoured
Brigade decided to cross the Suez Canal at the Northern part of Great Bitter Lake
on 16 October. Egyptian reserve armour moved from the West to East but was
destroyed in the offensive. The Israel commander was taking advantage of the
Egypt losses in the offensive to cross the Suez Canal. On the night of 15 and 16
October, Israeli paratroopers and tanks re crossed the Suez Canal. Fierce tank
battles took place as the Egyptian tried to counter the attacking force of Major
Gen Sharon. However, Israeli force encircled the Egyptian and destroys their
fighting cohesion. By the 18 and 19 October the Israeli forces moved west
without resistance. The advance party destroyed SAMs and AAA sites enabling
the Israeli Air Force to provide air cover. The operation was a successful with the
encirlement of the Egyptian 3 Army from the West of the Suez Canal. By the 20
October, the Egyptian 3 Army realized that the strategic purpose of Israeli
penetration to the West Bank was to cut their lines of communications and
supplies.
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b. Israel Air Force Close Support. As in the Air Force battle, first phase
of the Israel Air Force was unable to attack as planned and was obliged to take
considerable risks giving close support to ground forces. Moshe Dayan as the Air
Force Chief to concentrate all their air support at dawn 7 Ocotber to block the
Syrian advance. As the Israeli ground force succeeded in destroying part of Syrian
missile capability. The Israeli Air Force was extensively witihn the Syrian air
space, attacking strategic target, oil installations, power plants, bridges and other
Syrian infrastructures.

c. Israel Naval Force Support Weapon. At the beginning of the war,

the was a lull period in the Syrian-Israeli naval war as the Syrians on the other
hand acknowledged Israeli superiority in air surveillance attack potential and thus
avoided action. The Syrian Navy also recognized the effectiveness of the Israel
GABRIEL missile and developed a new tactic by develoying among the merchant
ships. However the Israeli efficiency in the employment of Electronic Warfare
manages to destroyed a number of Syrian vessels. The Syrian Armed Forces.
During the battle of Latakiva, three Syrian vessels had been sunk and the battle
won by the Israeli Navy without loss.

14. Cease Fire and Disengagement.

a. Israel’s threat to eradichte the Egyptian 3 Army prompted United State

secretary of state Henry Kissanger to visit Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire
resolution with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

b. On October 22, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 which

also called for direct negotiations between the Israelis and Arabs. According to the
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Resolution, “The Security Council (1) callsupon all parties to present fighting to
cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately……;(2) Calls upon
all parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire implementation of
Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts (3) Decided that,
immediately and concurrently with the cease fire, negotiations starts between the
parties concerned under appropriateauspices aimed at establishing a just and
durable peace in the Middle East”.

c. Israel and Egypt both broke the terms of cease fire, and Israel continued its
encirclement of the Egyptian 3 Army. Brezhnev, viewing an Egyptian defeat as
potentially destabilizing to Sadat’s government, implied in communications with
United State President Richard Nixon that Israel’s failure to halt military actions
would prompt a Soviet response, including intervention to preserve the Third
Amry. In response, Kissinger asked for and received Nixon’s permission to put
American troops on nuclear alert. Both the Soviets and the Americans almost
immediately stepped back from a confrontation. A final cease-fire took effect on
October 25.

CONSEQUENCE OF THE WAR

15. Altough the war yielded no immediate territorial concessions, it had many far-
reaching effects on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. While Arab casualties were far greater
than Israel, both sides claimed victory (See Annex F). The Arab forces had proven that
they could launch a successful coordianted attack. With their initial gains, they shattered
the myth of Israel’s invincibility that had persisted since the 1967 war. Meanwhile,
despite significant early loses, Israel had successfully regrouped in a matter of days,
pushing the Arabforces back beyond the 1967 borders.

16. While the war did not affect Syria’s close alignment with the Soviet Union and
strong opposition to the United States and Israel, it initiated drastic changes in Egypt’s
foreign relations. Kissinger’s newly developing relationship with Sadat reduced Soviet
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influence over Egypt and brought the country closer to the United States. Each successful
agreement also generated trust between Israel and Egypt. Both of these developments
establish the foundation for the United States – brokered Camp Davis Accords in 1978,
which le to a peace teraty between Egypt and Israel also led to its separation from inter-
Arab affairs in the 1980s. Menawhile, the diplomatic successes of guarantor of Arabs and
Israelis alike in future negotiations.

17. The 1973 war also marked the first successful use of oil as a political weapon the
Arab-Israeli conflict. From October 1973 to November 1974, the oil producing Arab
countries maintained an embargo on oil exports to Western nation friendly to Israel,
causing gasoline shortage and inflated oil prices. The embargo had a particularity
negative effect on the United States economy.

18. Finally, the war caused enternal problems in Israel. The Israel military’s lack of
readiness called into question the capabilities of the countries leaders. The results of an
ensuing investigation were highly critical of the military, prompting the resignations of
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Mosche Dayan.

ANALYSIS AND LESSON LEARNT

19. The Arab offensive of Yom Kippur War achieves every one of its political and
military oebjective. Politically, the Egyptian President “spark” did succeed in setting in
motion the chain reaction wanted in the Middle East. From the strategic view, the Yom
Kippur war refuted Israel’s theory of strategic depth and doctrine of secure borders. By
attacking the Suez Canal and breaching the Bar Lev Line so quickly, Egypt, in fact,
undermined all Israeli arguments about basing security on expansion territory. This war
was considered as one of the most decisive battle from the previous in 1967 war (Six
Days War).

20. The Arab-Israeli struggle is unique. It taken place over many years between the
same belligerents, armed with comparable military waepons and equipement and with
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comparable doctrine, The operation have taken place in the same theatre. Which includes
various types of terrain and different topographical and demographical features. The
theatre also demands the coordinated employment of the four elements of modern
combined arms battle. There are as follows:

a. Land Warfare.
b. Naval Warfare.
c. Air Warfare and Air Defence.

21. The main item in this military analysis of the Yom Kippur War is that the
Egyptian plan for the offensive to assault the Suez Canal and capture five bridgeheads on
the eastern bank of canal realized all its aim, and in a very short time. There is no similar
succes known to us. The reasons and opinion of most who dealt with this war is surprise
and good training on the Egyptian side and the feeling of security on the Israeli side.

22. Besides that and on the other hand, the Israeli strategy of working from the inner
lines was shattered too. This strategy had given Israel many advantages in the previous
rounds because of lack of political and military coordination among the three Arabic
fronts, that is the southern, northern and eastern. It gave Israel the opporturnity to use its
upper hand, as it was calledby the Israeli military establishment, in concentration and
succes against front at a time.

23. Also effected was the Israeli doctrine of deterrence based upon the combat
superiority of Israel’s Air Force and Armoured troops, quick mobilization and the ability
to deploy these detterence weapons rapidly to different fronts. These capabilities will no
longer provide Israel with the superiority it enjoyed previously for strtegically and
tactical reasons clearly demonstrated in the fighting in this war.

24. During this war, it is the first time that the Israel faced the problem of extended
lines of communications (L of C) to different active fronts. Israel suffered from the
tactical and logistical difficulties caused by such dispersion for operational deployment in
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the theatre after the completion of national mobilization. Troops arrived was tired and
disorganized at the confrontations lines, after covering great distances. This was
completely the opposite of what happened in the previous war in 1967 when the Arabs
and the Egyptians in particular, suffered most from this problem. In 1967 the operational
deployment was completed during the second half of the night of June 4. In the 1973
Israeli deployment took three ful days, the sixth, seventh and eight of October, that is
twelve times as long and employing the startegy of working form outside line in the
coordinated simultaneous attack on the northern and southern front.

25. It is agreed that Israel intelligence failed to estimate the militarysituations of the
clear indications and the flow of information from reliable sources about the imminent
Arab offensive. The main cause of this failure as a self deception and complacency of the
Israeli military establishment and the belief by the Israeli hawks of the technological
differences between them and their adversaries.

26. In this war also see the technological standard of advance in military hardware
use by the Arabs. Many new weapons and much new equipment were tried and tested for
the first time such as the Surface to Air Missile (SAMs), new Tank T 62. The rasults, in
addition to their importance, will have great effect on the features of future battles.

27. The Arabs Infantrymen who are successful in hitting the enemy tanks with
portable antitank grenade nd missile launchers to have a very high morale and great
courage to face the consequences. The Arabs also proved to have solved all their
logistical problems, successfully and effectively in the worst and most complicated
fighting conditions.

28. Regarding to the proper adherence to the principles of war, the Arabs, according
to all military sources, succeeded in achieving surprise, initiative, cooperation’s, security,
economy of effort and hig morale4.

4
Maj Gen Hassan El Badri. The Ramadhan War, 1973. T>N. Dupuy Associates Inc. 1978.
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29. Base on the analysis that has been made, among the contributing factors that can
apply in the Principle of War are as follows:

a. Selection of the Maintenance of Aim. The Egpytian Forces aimed

in the Yom Kippur War was to cros the Suez Canal and establish the bridgehead.
They have worked very hard to achieve thid objective. On 6 October 1973, the
Egyptian manage to capture and established the bridgehead at Bar Lev Line. The
selection of the month in October base on the terms, conditons and characteristic
since:

(1) Activities would stop the Israel on that day because it was Yom
Kippur, as well as a Saturday (the Jewish Sabbath).

(2) That day is comfortable to the tenth of Ramadhan, the moonlight is

propitious and shining from sunset till midnight.

(3) The tide was considered most conenient.

b. Element of Surprise and Decption.

(1) The selection of D-Day on the Yom Kippur War by the Egyptian
was a total secret and the Israeli Chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence
was very favourably commented upon this achievement of surprise. This is
what he said about Egyptian President “surprise” ….he ought to mention
in fairness to his Israeli Military Intelligence that the Egyptian deception
plan was successful not only as far as the Israeli Intelligence was
concerned but also with worlwide intelligence. With that about 95 percent
of the Egyptian officers knew for the first time that this ‘exercise’ would
turn into war only on the morning of 6 October, one or two knew two
days before, but some of very senior officers did not know, even they the

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story of one of their divisional commander who was only told the night
before. The deception plan was entirely a creation for the conception.

(2) The Egyptian deception plan included over formal training which
based on defensive action and offensive. The deception plan also called
for spreading misinformation as well as for action. It was an
overwhelming success and misled foreign intelligence service bodies
including the CIA as well as Israeli Intelligence.

c. Good Planning. The Egyptian had already conducted a very detailed

and thorough planning since 1972. In the planning the preparation include:

(1) A thorough Intelligent Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

appreciation, espsecially assessment the meteorological and environmental
factor.

(2) Building up the Arabs Forces into a formidable force. In this part
the Soviet Union was the supporting country to have a military adviser and
suppliers of the military hardware to the Arabs Forces.

d. Firepower. Another aspect of the crippling firepower was the

concentrated artillery fire, which followed the masive air strike. Egypt used some
3,000 field guns, which also provided firepower in the shape of barrage for the
assaulting troops to follow and to keep direction with. All this was tremendous
and the Egyptian Armed Forces had applied the principle of concentration of
firepower well.

e. Cooperation. In Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian, Syria and other Arab
countries had built up a remarkable relationship. This can be seen in the April
1973, the first organization for cooperation between Syrian and Egyptian fronts
had been set up. The Federal Armed Forces Commander in Chief approved the
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control system over both fronts. October 6 was also a proud landmark on the way
toward serious Arab cooperation. It showed the deep-rooted common origin or the
Araba and the strong tie that so closely bind them. The Arab insistence upon
carrying their share in historical responsibility was confirmed, as was their
readiness to give and to sacrifice untill all territories are liberated, all rights are
restored and victory achieved.

(f) Secrecy. At the outset of the planning stage the pattern was mixed in
a way that would insure absolute secrecy. In ‘successive planning’ method was
choosen by the Egyptian President and his commanders, so that requiremens for
action gradually were shifted from one level to a lower level accordance with a
fixed scheme. Planning was confined on all levels to a certain limited groups of
General Staff Officers. The handling of plan documents was not allowed to any
officers beyond this group.

(g) Maintenance of Morale. This great victory achieved by the Arabs

during the Yom Kippur War was not the end of the struggle against Israel. It is no
more than one more link in its multi-link chain. They still have oncoming stages
for which they should prepare themselves with the same strength and solidarity so
as to attain their ultimate goal.

CONCLUSION

30. Although it brought about no significant changes to territorial boundries, the 1973
war and its aftermath had far-ranging effects on the participant nations and their relations
with world superpowers. Egypt moved steadily away from the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republic (USSR), which had provided military and economic aid to Egypt since the
1950s and into a closer relationship with the United States. Syria emerged form the war
as the staunchest defendeer of Arab rights and the closest Moddle Eastern ally ofUSSR.
In Israel, the war increased criticism of the country’s leaders, who eventually resigned.

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31. Finally, the ar signaled an increased commitment by the United States of negotiate
and guarantee Arab-Israeli agreements. Such agreements would center on the return of
Israeli held to Arab control, in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel and security
guarantees.

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