Mobile Security Testing Approaches and Challenges: February 2015

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Mobile Security Testing Approaches and Challenges

Conference Paper · February 2015


DOI: 10.1109/MOBISECSERV.2015.7072880

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Mobile Security Testing Approaches and Challenges
Yong Wang Yazan Alshboul
College of Business and Information System College of Business and Information System
Dakota State University Dakota State University
Madison, SD 57042 Madison, SD 57042
yong.wang@dsu.edu yaalshboul@pluto.dsu.edu

Abstract—Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets threat model for mobile security. We present four testing
are widely used for personal and business purposes. A mobile approaches for mobile security: mobile forensic, penetration
device may carry sensitive data and becomes an easy target for test, static analysis, and dynamic analysis. We further
cyber criminals. Mobile security is thus important. Mobile demonstrate a mobile security testing network to evaluate the
security testing targets to detect vulnerabilities and malicious effectiveness of the four testing approaches. Our testing results
apps on a mobile device. In this paper, we present four testing indicate that mobile security testing tools are still in their early
approaches for mobile security: mobile forensic, penetration test, development stages and many efforts are desired to improve
static analysis, and dynamic analysis. A mobile security testing these tools.
network is further demonstrated in the paper to evaluate the
effectiveness of the four testing approaches. Our testing results The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the
indicate that mobile security testing tools are still in their early related work. Section III summarizes mobile threats and
development stages and efforts are desired to improve these tools. attacks. Section IV presents four mobile security testing
We conclude the paper with a summary of mobile security testing approaches. Section V demonstrates a mobile security testing
challenges and future directions. network to evaluate the effectiveness of the testing approaches,
followed by a summary of mobile security challenges and
Keywords—Mobile security, testing approaches, challenges future directions in Section VI. Section VII summarizes the
paper and future works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, have II. RELATED WORK
been widely used for personal and business purposes.
Malware is one of the greatest threats to mobile security
According to a recent report from KPBC, the number of
[2]. Mobile malware falls in three main categories: virus,
smartphone users worldwide has risen above 1.6 billion in
2013 [1]. A mobile device is a data centric device and it may Trojan, and spyware [3]. Trojan and spyware are the dominant
carry sensitive data, such as user name, password, contact list, malware on mobile devices. Mobile malware malicious
credit card account number, etc. [2]. Thus, mobile devices are infections arise through various techniques such as installing
easy targets for cyber criminals. repackaged legitimate apps with malware, updating current
apps that piggy back malicious variants, or even driven by a
Many threats and attacks have been reported on mobile download from an app store. The infections themselves will
devices. These threats and attacks include, but are not limited perform at least one or multiple of the following techniques,
to, virus, sniffing, spamming, spoofing, phishing, etc. [2]. The i.e., privilege escalation, remote control, financial charge, and
first mobile phone virus emerged as early as in 2004. Among information collection, etc. The previous stated techniques
all the threats and attacks, malware is one of the greatest threats
provide a malicious attacker with a variety of options to utilize
to mobile security [3]. Many efforts have been conducted to
a compromised mobile device. TrendLabs estimated that there
prevent malware on mobile devices. Security tools are
developed to prevent malicious apps. However, the testing were 718,000 malicious and high risk Android apps in the
results from the existing mobile security tools are not second quarter of 2013 [6].
encouraging [4]. Unlike a desktop computer and a laptop Mobile security is essential for mobile subscribers. In [4],
computer, a mobile device has many uniqueness features. A the authors examined four representative mobile anti-virus
mobile device is a multiple-entrance open system. It is software: AVG Antivirus Free v2.9, Lookout Security &
platform-oriented, uses central data management, and is Antivirus v6.9, Norton Mobile Security Lite v2.5.0.379, and
vulnerable to theft and lost. Due to this uniqueness, challenges TrendMicro Mobile Security Personal Edition v2.0.0.1294.
are also encountered when developing security solutions for
These security software products use different approaches in
mobile devices. These challenges include, but are not limited
to, inefficient security solutions, limitations of signature-based their design and implementations. However, the testing results
mobile malware detection, lax control of third party app stores, are not encouraging. Out of all 1260 malware samples from 49
and uneducated or careless users, etc. [5]. malware families, Lookout detected 1003 malware samples in
39 families; TrendMicro detected 966 in 42 families; AVG
Mobile security testing targets to detect vulnerabilities and detected 689 samples in 32 families; and Norton detected the
malicious apps on a mobile device. In this paper, we focus on least samples 254 in 36 families [4]. It is apparently that more
mobile security testing approaches and challenges. We efforts need to be conducted on mobile security.
summarize threats and attacks on mobile devices and present a
Mobile security solutions can be divided into two malicious sites. This technique is great for the apps that are
categories: client-side solutions and server-side solutions. downloaded through the Google Play Store, but is
Signature-based malware detection is one of the current main disadvantageous for the users who use third party app stores.
malware detection techniques used on client-side. By
A cloud-based mobile malware detection framework is
analyzing known malware results, this approach prevents
proposed in [10]. The benefit of having a cloud-based
installation of known malicious apps on a mobile device. The
detection approach will place all of the work outside of the
issue with signature-based detection is that apps could change
mobile device. It will prevent mobile device from scanning the
through updated code or modified just enough to throw off the
apps on the client side and instead push the scanning onto
signature for the anti-malware application to detect. This
more powerful and efficient systems. The framework utilizes
approach catches known malware, but fails to stop new or
both static analysis and dynamic analysis to detect malware.
unknown variants in the wild.
Samsung released a security system known as Samsung
KNOX for Samsung Android mobile devices [7]. KNOX III. MOBILE THREATS AND ATTACKS
addresses platform security with a comprehensive three- A mobile device usually includes the following elements:
pronged strategy to secure the system: Customizable Secure x It comes with a pre-installed modern mobile
Boot, ARM TrustZone-based Integrity Measurement operating system such as iOS, Android, or Windows
Architecture, and a kernel with built-in security enhancements Mobile.
for Android. In addition, KNOX also includes an application x It supports a carrier’s networks (2G/3G/4G), Wi-Fi
known as Samsung KNOX container. These security networks and Bluetooth networks.
enhancements help to protect data on a mobile device. x It may be also a NFC device and can talk to another
However, KNOX does not provide malware detection. The NFC device.
approach is also device specific and does not help to protect x It is able to access the Internet. Internet accessibility
mobile devices from other vendors. is provided through either a carrier’s networks or a
In [8], the authors propose TaintDroid to track the flow of local Wi-Fi network.
sensitive data on a mobile device. TaintDroid provides real x It is capable of running third party applications
time analysis by introducing tracking information in downloaded from mobile app stores through the
Android’s virtualized execution environment. Using Internet.
TaintDroid, it is able to identify malicious apps which misuse x It supports MMS messages and has embedded
sensitive data on a mobile device. D2Taint also uses sensors inside.
information flow tracking to identify apps which may cause
A. Threats and Attacks
data leakage on a mobile device [9]. Both TaintDroid and
D2Taint are client-side solutions. They require customized Mobile devices are vulnerable to various threats and
images to be loaded on a mobile device. attacks. These threats and attacks are summarized in Table 1.
Mobile threats and attacks are usually carried out by malware
Google has introduced a method of detecting malicious that disguises itself as normal mobile apps such as games, a
apps before they hit the Google Play Store. Bouncer is a security patch, or other desirable applications and is then
server-side solution which is able to scan mobile apps and downloaded to a mobile device.
detect new mobile malware before they hit the app market [9].
Bouncer has the approach to take newly developed B. Threat Model
applications and determine if they attempt to send SMS out to A mobile device threat model can be divided into three

Threats and Attacks Description


Sniffing Tapping or eavesdropping, e.g., GSM A5/1 cracked
Spamming Email spam and MMS message spam, e.g., unsolicited MMS
Spoofing Spoof “Caller ID” or MMS “Sender ID”, e.g., spoofed MMS messages from 611
Phishing Steal personal information using a spoofed target mobile application
Pharming Redirect web traffic to a malicious website and followed by more specific attacks
Vishing Voice phishing by utilizing VoIP technique
Data leakage Unauthorized transmission of data, e.g., mobile virus ZitMo
Vulnerabilities of Webkit Vulnerability allowing attackers to crash user applications and execute code, e.g., the Webkit
engine vulnerability revealed by CrowdStrike
Jamming Jamming radio channel
Flooding MMS message flooding attacks and incoming phone call flooding attacks
DoS
Exhausting Battery exhaustion attack
Blocking Use smartphone blocking functions to disable smartphone
Table 1. Threats and Attacks on Mobile Devices
layers, application layer, communication layer, and resource Cellebrite UFED Touch Ultimate can perform logical and
layer as indicted in Figure 1 [2]. physical extraction of data from a wide range of mobile
devices even if the data was deleted. When a device is
Application layer includes all the applications in a
completely opened for scanning, the amount and the type of
smartphone or a tablet. Malware is usually disguised as a
data shown in the extracted data log is extensive. Data
normal application and attracts smartphone subscribers to
collected consists of copies of SMS/MMS messages, emails,
download. Communication layer includes communication
call logs, calendar events, web traffic, bookmarks, pictures,
channels to a mobile device, such as, carrier networks
voice mail messages, location information, app data, etc.
(3G/4G), Wi-Fi connectivity, Bluetooth network, NFC, Micro
USB port, and MicroSD slot. Malware can spread through any B. Penetration Test
of these communication channels. It will also plan an exit to Penetration tests can also be used to test security of a
escape from the mobile device through one of the mobile app. A mobile app penetration test involves a careful
communication channels. Resource layer includes the flash setup of testing environment, launching testing procedures on
memory, camera, microphone, and sensors within a
the mobile device, comparison and analysis of testing results,
smartphone. Since smartphone resources contain sensitive
etc. Many penetration-testing tools can be used. For example,
data, malware targets to control these resources and
Wireshark can be used to monitor the traffic through the Wi-Fi
manipulate data from them.
connectivity. Other tools which can be considered for
An attack on a smartphone forms a loop from malicious penetration tests on mobile devices include nmap, Nessus,
users, through malware, smartphone, premium Metasploit, etc. Kali Linux is a Debian-driven penetration
accounts/malicious websites, back to malicious users. testing platform. It has many preinstalled penetration-testing
Malware prevention aims to break the attack loop by detecting tools. It works well as a mobile penetration testing platform.
the malware, isolating or deleting the malware.

Figure 1. Mobile Security Threat Model

IV. MOBILE SECURITY TESTING APPROACHES C. Static Analysis


Mobile security testing targets to detect vulnerabilities Static analysis is the process of analyzing an application
and malicious apps on a mobile device. It focuses on security without actual executing the app. Static analysis will review
perspective of a mobile app, e.g., malicious activities, code of an app to find known or suspicious function calls or
vulnerabilities, security risks, etc. Approaches which can be permissions that deem malicious. There are a few client-side
considered for mobile security testing include, but are not applications which could be used to perform static analysis on
limited to, mobile forensic, penetration test, static analysis, an APK file for Android device, e.g., Android Reverse Tools
and dynamic analysis. (ART) and Static Android Analysis Framework (SAAf). Static
analysis depends on decompiling tools to analyze the code.
A. Mobile Forensic Static analysis also depends on individuals who inspecting the
code. The outcomes of static analysis include signatures which
Mobile forensic provides legitimate ways for businesses
could be used by signature-based malware detection software.
and users to retrieve and examine data on a mobile device.
Mobile forensic tools such as Micro Systemation’s XRY and
D. Dynamic Analysis example, using Micro Systemation’s XRY, we conducted
Dynamic analysis is the process of analyzing an forensic analysis on mobile devices such as iPhone 4s,
application while executing the app in a controlled DROID RAZAR, iPad 2, Galaxy Tab 3, etc. When a mobile
environment. Dynamic analysis will monitor network traffic device is accessible (i.e., having the passcode to unlock the
device), the information collected by the forensic tools is
and other communications to catch malicious activity. With a
extensive. We were able to recover WLAN passwords in one
powerful dynamic analyzer, apps that attempt to connect out
of the testing mobile devices. We were also able to retrieve all
to unknown or malicious sites, or send SMS messages without
the instant messages sent through Skype on our testing
authorization will be flagged as malicious and consequently be iPhones. However, mobile forensic tools are not effective
reported as threats. Dynamic analysis is based on the when a mobile device is locked. Interrupting bootloader and
program’s behavior and thus no decompiling tools are temporarily placing proprietary tools on a device may help to
required. It also has the advantages than the static analysis secure data acquisition. However, this approach only works
since malware malicious activities could not be hid. for certain devices and does not work for the new versions of
iOS and Android devices.
V. A MOBILE SECURITY TESTING NETWORK
To further evaluate the effectiveness of these four testing B. Conduct Penetration Tests on Mobile Devices
approaches, a testing network is created in Figure 2 to test We are also able to conduct penetration tests on mobile
security of a mobile device. devices using the Kali Linux station. A penetration test on a
mobile device usually includes three steps, information
gathering, vulnerability assessment, and exploitation. For
example, using nmap in the Kali Linux station, we can start an
information gathering process on mobile devices. nmap works
well for desktop computers and laptop computers. However,
the information collected from mobile devices are limited. For
example, using nmap on an iPhone 6, we are able to collect
the IP address, OS information, open ports, etc. nmap
successfully detected one open tcp port, 62078/iPhone-sync,
on the iPhone 6. However, nmap failed to detect OS version
number.
C. Detect Data Leakage
The 802.11, Bluetooth, and NFC protocol analyzers
provide sniffing tools to monitor the communication channels
on a mobile device. By creating an isolated environment for a
mobile app and monitoring these communication channels, we
are able to track the behavior of a mobile app and look
Figure 2. A Mobile Security Testing Network malicious activities in the traffic logs. This approach provides
The testing network includes six testing stations and two a great way to study the behavior of a mobile app on a mobile
analysis stations. These six test stations are listed in Table 2. device. However, it also faces the challenges when the data is
encrypted.
Item Description
1 FTE 802.11 Protocol Analyzer VI. MOBILE SECURITY TESTING CHALLENGES ANF FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
2 FTE USB Protocol Analyzer
3 FTE Bluetooth Analyzer Mobile security testing is a challenging issue. There are
4 FTE NFC Protocol Analyzer no effective approaches to test mobile security so far.
5 Kali Linux Test Station A. Mobile Security Testing Challenges
6 Micro Systemation XRY Complete Mobile Forensic 1) Signature-based malware detection techniques can be
System spoofed easily.
Table 2 Mobile Security Test Stations Tools such as ART could be used to decompile and
recompile an APK file. A legitimate app could be easily
The testing network is able to support all the testing repackaged by a malicious user to change its signature and
approaches discussed in Section IV. The remaining of the spoof malware detection software. According to [4], most
section discusses three testing cases. existing Android malware (86.0%) were repackaged through
A. Idenitfy Sensitive Data on a Mobile Device other legitimate apps.
2) Mobile forensic tools are ineffective when security
Mobile forensic tools provide a great way to learn about access is enabled on a mobile device.
what data is stored by mobile apps on a mobile device. For
Mobile forensic tools usually need to get access of a 1) Integrate both client-side and server-side security
mobile device before they can scan it. If the device has access solutions to prevent malicious apps
security enabled (passcode, biometric security, pattern code, Client-side mobile security software is certainly essential
etc.), it may not be possible for the mobile forensic tools to to mobile security. However, due to the constraints of CPU,
extract data from the device. In addition, flash memory is also memory, and battery on a mobile device, it is difficulty to
encrypted. Physical scanning or cloning a mobile device flash launch computational and power intensive security software
memory without access code also does not produce much on a mobile device. Server-side security solutions do not have
meaningful data. these limitations and it will be a good compensation for client-
3) Penetration testing tools need to be improved for side mobile security software.
mobile devices. 2) Compensate signature-based mobile security software
Penetration testing is an effective approach to exploit with senstive data monitoring
vulnerabilities on laptop and desktop computers. However, Signature-based mobile security software is easy to be
our tests show that current penetration testing tools are not spoofed. Sensitive data monitoring could be used to
effective on mobile devices. Some challenges we encountered compensate the signature-based mobile security software.
include, but are not limited to, not many open ports available However, any solutions on the client-side must also be power
on a mobile device, not many useful information collected if efficient and meet the constraints on the mobile devices.
using a secured Wi-Fi network, etc.
4) Static analysis requires code to be available and VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
involves many manual processing. Mobile security testing targets to detect vulnerabilities and
Static analysis is less efficient and could be obfuscated by malicious apps on a mobile device. It is essential to all mobile
malware authors. Automatic static analysis is desirable. subscribers. However, mobile security is also a challenging
However, it also faces challenges as the signature-based issue due to the uniqueness of mobile devices. This paper
malware detection software. It is likely that malware authors focuses on mobile security testing and we present four testing
could use repackage techniques to spoof an automatic approaches for mobile security: mobile forensic, penetration
malware static analyzer too. test, static analysis, and dynamic analysis. We also demonstrate
5) Dynamic analysis requires full examines on all mobile a mobile security testing network to evaluate the effectiveness
of the four testing approaches. Our testing results indicate that
resources and is both computational and time extensive.
mobile security testing tools are still in their early development
Dynamic analysis is not suitable as client-side software. stages and many efforts are desired to improve these tools. Our
Dynamic analysis requires a controlled testing environment to future work includes more testing and evaluation of mobile
monitor app behaviors. The desired controlled environment is security using our testing network.
often not available on the client side. Further, monitoring app
behavior is only the first step and detecting malware is the ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
goal.
This work is partially supported by NSF Grant No. CNS-
6) Lack of effective approaches to detect data leakage
1337529. The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for
when data is encrypted
their valuable comments on this manuscript.
Four testing approaches are presented in Section IV.
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