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a r
B
e s
b l citizen, migrated to Hawaii, USA in 1980 and embraced American
1. A, a Filipino

R o Before doing so, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American

citizenship. For purposes of the 2013 mid-term elections, he filed his certificate of
candidacy.
n his American passport and repeated r it on February 14, 2013. He won in the
citizenship and resided in Ilocos Norte. On December 20, 2012, he went to Hawaii
ausing a
h B
s
elections, hence, the losing candidate, P, came to you for advice whether A is eligible
C Explain.
to occupy the position as
e
Mayor. Advice your client and what remedy will you file.

b l
Answer: If I were the o
position as mayor, R
counsel of P, I would advise him that A is not eligible to assume the

for public office,n r is that, he must be a citizen of

as he is not a Filipino citizen. One of the qualifications of a person to run
a a
or to occupy a public office in the Philippines
B
Filipinos h
the Philippines. This is by reason of public policy, that public office is reserved for the
C because it would be incongruous to allow s a foreigner, who owes no loyalty to the
e a public office.
l
Constitution, the laws, and the electorates to hold
b
R
eligible to run for public office or even
o
In this case, when A executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizen, he became
to assume the position of mayor as he had regained

an his other citizenship, he inBeffect ar repudiated the

his Filipino citizenship. Such qualification is continuing, but when A continued to use his

affidavit of renunciationh
American passport after renouncing

resulted in the loss ofC s

of American citizenship and lost his Filipino citizenship. Such act
his qualification to run for mayor.
e
To reacquire Filipino citizenship is not a matter of right.b
l
that there are requirements provided for by law for o
It is a mere privilege especially so
Rits reacquisition. It is not a commodity
which can be displayed when necessary and concealed
rule when he used his American passport a nrenouncing his other citizenship, heais r
after
when it is not. As A violated such
not
qualified to run as mayor. h B
C
Hence, I would advice P to file a petition to prevent the proclamation of A e
s
has been proclaimed, I would advice P to file a petition with the Comelec
l as mayor. If he
b to annul A’s
proclamation. If he has assumed office, I would advice P to o
Rthat P be proclaimed as
file a petition for quo

n r
warranto with the RTC to annul his proclamation, unseat him and
the duly elected mayor as A was disqualified from the inception.
a P was the only candidate,
B a
hence, he should be proclaimed as mayor.
h
C of the First District of Laguna.e s
2. A filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman
He was elected, proclaimed and assumed the office. B, a voter, filed a Petition for Quo
b l
Warranto with the RTC of Laguna, seeking to question A’s eligibility, since he has not
complied with the residence requirement. If you were the judge, how would R o you
an
decide? Explain.

C h
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a r
B
s
Answer: If I were the judge, I would dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of
e
b l
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The HRET has jurisdiction and not the regular courts
because under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests pertaining

R o
to the election, returns and qualification of the members of the House of Representatives.
Sole means exclusive. For the Court to act on the petition would violate the principle of

an a r
separation of powers. My acts would be void ab initio and of no effect.

h 3. In 1970, Napocor constructed B

C Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission e s high-tension transmission lines to implement the
Line Project traversing over a parcel of land

b
belonging to the respondents. lof the
When they demanded for payment, as they were not

o
compensated for the value land, Napocor contended that their claim for just
R 938, 1360 & 1443 prescribing a 5-year period to file any action.
compensation has already prescribed pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of RA 6395 as amended

ancorrect? Why? r
by PD 380, 395, 758,
Is the contention a
Bis enshrined in no less than our Bill of
C h s not be taken for public use without just
Answer: No. The right to recover just
e
compensation
l This constitutional mandate cannot be
Rights, which states that “[p]rivate property shall
b
compensation. ” (Art. III, Sec. 9, Constitution).
o Section
Runder
defeated by statutory prescription. (Napocor v. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August

an to take(Napocor v. Sangkay). It wouldr

24, 2011). The prescriptive period 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to

the property of the ownersa

an action to recover just compensation. be a confiscatory

h
act on the part of the government
B for a public purpose
and deprive them of their
s
Cproceedings within five years from thee time the transmission lines
right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute

were constructed. It was not the duty of the owners to l

inverse condemnation

o b demand for just compensation.

Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before
occupying their property. In the normal course of
enters a private property, it must first file ann
R events, before the expropriating power
action for eminent domain (Rule 67, Sec.r1,

equivalent to the assessed value of theh

Rules of Court) and deposit with the authorizeda Ba
government depositary an amount

however, owners were constrainedC to file inverse condemnation proceedingssto demand

property. (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Due to its omission,

l e invoke the
the payment of just compensation before the trial court. NAPOCOR cannot
b
compensation. (National Power Corporation v. Sps. Saludares, G.R.o
statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses’ constitutional right to just

R No. 189127, April 25,

2012).
a n a r
h
4. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8762 otherwise known as
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 whichC expressly repealed RA 1180 which s
B
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. e
The new law allows them to do so. They contended that R.A. 8762 violatedb
l
the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant
R o and

n
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and provisions of
the Constitution, that the State shall promote a just and dynamic social
a order that

poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, h

will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from

C promote full
l e
b
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 ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

a r
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. Rule
B
on the contention. Explain.

e s
b l
Answer: The contention of the petitioners is not correct. The 1987 Constitution does not
rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage

R o
their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition

an r
that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between

B a
protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.
h
C The s the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of
e
1987 Constitution gives Congress
l
requires. Thus, Congressb
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest

o
can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending

R
on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain

anJr. , G.R. No. 143855, September 21,B2010). ar

industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora,

C h s
e he claimed that his right to due process
5. A person who was subjected to administrative charge requested for a formal
investigation, but the PAGC denied it, hence,
was violated. Is the contention correct? b l
Explain.

Answer: No. Due process, does R

o
not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. It is satisfied whenn a person is notified of the charge againstr
opportunity to explain or a a him and given an

B
h opportunity for the person sso charged to answer the
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of

C
charges and giving reasonable
etheofparties
l
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements due process. More often,
this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that
b submit to present

her interests in due course, said party is not deniedo

their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or
R due process. (Cayago v. Lina, G.R. No.

an r
149539, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 29; Dr. Fernando Melendres v. PAGC, G.R. No. 163859,
August 15, 2012). a
B was
C h s
6. When the police got a call from a concerned citizen that
being conducted in a place, they responded and saw a man examining
an illegal
l ea transparent
drug trade

b
Rhisoperson
plastic sachet containing shabu powder by flicking the same. They arrested him.
When charged with violation of the law, he contended that he was not doing anything
at the time of his arrest, hence, the subsequent search upon
a n
hence, the alleged illegal drugs recovered from him cannot be used against him,
was illegal,
a r
h
otherwise, it would violate his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
B
and seizures. Is his contention correct? Why?
C e s
Answer: No, because he was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committingl
crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers.oAt the
b a

time of his arrest, the police officers were actively performing their duties, sinceR they were
following up a tip that there was an illegal drug trade being conducted in n
athe part of the
the area. This

h
fact, coupled with the overt acts of petitioner, formed sufficient basis on

C e
b l
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 ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

a r
Btothatthea rule
police officers to believe crime was actually being committed. Thus, his case falls

e
within the exception s requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.
Consequently,
b lthe results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to
prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged. (Stephen Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178,
Augusto
R
15, 2011, Peralta, J,).

a7.City r
nKerry Lao Ong filed a petition for anaturalization alleging that he was born in Cebu
h B
of Chinese parents on March 4, 1958. He alleged that he took his elementary and
C Pilipino, religion and the Philippine s Constitution were taught. He obtained a degree
high school education at the Sacred Heart for Boys in Cebu City where social studies,
e
b
of Bachelor Arts in Management l at the Ateneo de Manila in 1978. In 1981, he got
since 1989 with an R o
married with a Chinese and have four (4) children. He has been engaged in business
average annual income of P150,000.00. He alleged his various
residence; hasn rphysical and mental health.
a a
socialized with Filipinos and with sound

h BRepublic appealed alleging that he

failedC
After trial,
s lucrature trade, possession and
the court granted the petition, but the
to prove that he possessed a known
e
occupation. The CA ruled that there waslan appreciable margin of his income over
the expenses as to be able to provide
o b for his family. The Republic contended
Is the contention of the RepublicR
otherwise, considering that he has four (4) children, all studying in exclusive school.

a n correct? Why?
a r
Answer: Yes. Naturalizationh proceedings are imbued with the B highest public interest.
Naturalization lawsC should be rigidly enforced and strictly s
government and against
l e construed in favor of the
the applicant.
The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show
o b full and complete compliance

R
with the requirements of law.

Under the law, one of the qualifications forn a person to become a Filipino citizenr
a B a by

thousand pesos, Philippine currency, orh

naturalization is that he must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five

or lawful occupation. (Sec. 2, RevisedC

s
must have some known lucrative trade, profession
e
Naturalization Law (RA 473)).
l
The qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawfulb
“not only that the person having the employment gets enough for R o
his
occupation” means
ordinary necessities
in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one ann income such that there is an r
a a
h to work and thus avoid one’s B
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate

becoming the object of charity or a public charge. ” C His income should permit “him and the s
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability

l e
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage ofbour
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing

civilization. ” (In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, 154 Phil. 552 (1974); In theo
R Matter

an
of the Petition of Tiong v. Republic, 157 Phil. 107 (1974); Tan v. Republic, 121 Phil. 643
(1965); Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012).

C h
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a r
8. Atty. Francisco Chavez questioned the constitutionality of the practice of
B
Congress of sending two (2) representatives to the JBC with full separate votes when

e s
the Constitution provides for only one (1) representative. The petitioner contended

b l
that the framers of the Constitution envisioned only seven (7) members but the
practice is different as there are now (8) members. Furthermore, he contended that

R o
the JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and

an r
unconstitutional. The OSG contended that there are two (2) houses of the Congress,
a
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The House without the Senate, is not
B
Ch
the Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that
s
both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
e
bl
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of “a representative from Congress”, it should mean one representative each
o
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
R
an ar
It was contended by the petitioner that the use of the singular letter “a” preceding

B
Ch
representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other

e s
construction. It is indicative that the Constitutional Commission had in mind that
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
bl
R o
Answer: Yes. Constitution is very clear. The Constitution provides for seven (7) members of
n
the JBC including “a representative of the Congress. ”
a a r
leaves no room for C
h
The use of the singular letter B
“a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
any other construction. It is indicative ofswhat the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress e
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention thatb
l may designate only one (1)
more than one (1) representative

provided. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al. , G.R. No.R

from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers o could have, in no uncertain terms, so

n r
202242, July 17, 2012).

a a
Bor the
h
The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
s
House of Representatives is being C
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate

l eet al.a, singular

referred to, but that, in either case, only
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC,
202242, July 17, 2012).
o b G.R. No.

9. The Province of Negros Occidental passed Resolution n

R
a
720-A allocating health care
a r
and insurance benefits to its employees. It was disallowed
h
by the COA contending
B
correct? Why? C
that it violated AO 103 as it was done without approval of the President. Is the COA
e s
b l
Answer: No, because the requirement of prior approval by the President applies only
departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled corporations
R ounderto

supervision (Sec. 4, Article X of the Constitution). The President’s power

a n of general
the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general

h
supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform
C
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B to law. This is distinguished from the President’s power of
e
control which is thes power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
their functions according

l
that of thebsubordinate officer. The power of control gives the President the power to
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over

revise o
R or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of

n 28, 2010).
discretion.
aSeptember r
(Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574,
a
h Bquestioned the constitution of the Presidential
C Electoral Tribunal (PET) as anesillegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article
10. Atty. Romulo B. Makalintal

VIII of the Constitution b l provides that the SC, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
which
judge of all contests o relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Rcreation ofand
President or Vice-President may promulgate its rules for the purpose. He
contended that
a n the the
a r
PET violates the Constitution as the SC created a

h B
body separate and distinct from it. Is the contention correct? Why?

C No. The PET is not a separate andedistinct s entity from the SC, although it has
Answer:
b l in implementation of Section 4, Article VIII
functions peculiar only to it. It was constituted

directive. It is a legitimate progenyo

of the Constitution and it faithfully complies, not unlawfully defies the constitutional
R of the Constitutional provision composed of the
nthe Herculean task of deciding electionarprotests involving
members of the SC, sitting en banc. The constitutional intent is to bestow independence to
a B jurisdiction to
the SC as the PET to undertake
h candidates. The conferment sof additional
presidential and vice-presidential
the SC, with the dutyC
e
characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means necessary to
l The abstraction of the PET
from the explicit grant of power to the SC, given b
carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.

Ro
the abundant experience, is not
unwarranted.

The Constitution grants authority to the Supreme

a n Court sitting en banc. Althougharthe
h
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified BCourt's
in the
provision, the grant of power does not
C e sand vice-
contain any limitation on the Supreme
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential
b
presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of l exercise of the
the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.o Thus, the subsequent
directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its R for the purpose. "
rules
n
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, asaa PET, is equivalent to the full a r
authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals h B
C and the House of Representativese
of the Senate and the House of
s
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions. (Makalintall
Representatives, i.e. , the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)

PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011).
o b v.

R
11. In connection with the impeachment cases filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez,
she contended that the filing of the second complaint violated Sec. 3(5) a nArticle XI of
the Constitution which provides that “No impeachment proceedings h shall be initiated
Cyear. ” She reckoned
against the same official more than once within a period of one
l e
b
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a r
B
the 1-year ban from the filing of the first complaint on July 22, 2010 or before the

e s
opening of the sessions on July 26, 2010. She contended that no impeachment
complaint can be accepted and referred within that period.

b l
R o
On the other hand, public respondent contended that the initiation starts with the
filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee,

an r
following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends
a
somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of
B
Ch
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Is her contention correct? Explain.

e s
bl
Answer: No. The term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an

R o
action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action

an ar
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
B
Ch
Justice. (Francisco v. House of Representatives, et al. , 460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the
s
initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has
e
bl
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
o
et al. , G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).
R
an r
12. Rosalinda Penera filed her certificate of candidacy but she was charged with

B a
premature campaigning since there was a motorcade that immediately took place in

Ch s
the locality after the filing of her certificate of candidacy. No speeches were however
e
made, instead, there was only marching music in the background and a

bl
grandstanding for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the

Ro
motorcade. Is she disqualified to run for mayor considering that she conducted
premature campaigning? Explain.

a n she was not yet a candidate. Theamere

Answer: No, because at the time of the motorcade, r
filing of her certificate of candidacy did not make her a candidate because she canB
C h s
only be

eapplicable to
considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which she filed her

a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaignl
certificate of candidacy. (Sec. 13(3), RA 9369). The unlawful acts or omission
b period. (Sec. 13).
Hence, the election offenses may be committed by a candidate only
R o
campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
upon the start of the
offenses cannot be
committed. (Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC, et al. , G.R. No.n r
a 181613, November 25, 2009

B a
h
citing Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114).

CAmerican citizenship. Later on hee s

l
13. Nardo Velasco, a Filipino citizen acquired
became a dual citizen. He applied for registration as a voter but his application was
b
the petition. The RTC on appeal reversed the order, hence, he appealed to theo
denied, hence, he filed his petition for inclusion as voter with the MTC which granted
RfiledCA but
the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the meantime, he
certificate of candidacy for Mayor, hence, Panlaqui filed a petition to a
n
deny due course
his

to and/or cancel his COC based on gross misrepresentation as

C h to his residency,

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hence, disqualified to vote. He won in the elections and took his oath. Finding
material misrepresentations, the COMELEC nullified his proclamation hence,
B
Panlaqui moved for proclamation. Can he, as second placer, be proclaimed as the
winner? Why?
e s
b l
Answer: No. Since the disqualification of Velasco had not yet become final and executory

R o
before the elections, the COMELEC properly applied the rule on succession. Cayat v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 does not apply because Cayat was

an ar
disqualified in a final and executory judgment before the elections. As the only candidate
B
Ch
Palileng, who numerically lost in the elections, he was not a second placer. On the contrary,
s
Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine in the rejection of the
e
bl
second placer which triggers the rule on succession does not apply. (Panlaqui vs.
COMELEC, et al. , G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010).

R o
14. A teacher was dismissed because of failure to comply with the certain

an r
requirements like submission of final test questions to his program coordinator for

B a
checking or comment; non-compliance with the standard format (multiple choice) of

Ch s
final questions and failure to encode modular grade reports required by the school.
She was dismissed. Is the dismissal proper? Why?
e
l of the school. It is the prerogative of the
b
o for its teachers since quality education is a
Answer: Yes, because of the academic freedom

R
school to set high standards of efficiency

a n to set them aside. Schools cannot aberrequired to adopt

mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not
arbitrary, courts are not at liberty
h B itself the terms
standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition. The same
C s
leprotectedlimitations
academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for and
conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching under the
Labor Code. The authority to hire is likewise coveredb and by its management
prerogative – the right of an employer to regulateo all aspects of employment, such as
hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, R working methods, process to be

an supervision of their work, lay-off

followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees,

B a r
and

h
discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers.

Cas amended by RA 9520 enjoy preferential s

treatment. The members of the coop were being made to pay taxes.l
15. Cooperatives, under RA 6938 e tax

as they should likewise be exempted. The BIR contended otherwise, b They protested
othe members. If you
hence, they filed
a petition contending that the tax preferential treatment include
R
were the Court, how would you decide? Explain.
a n a r
Answer: I would rule in favour of the members of theh B
s
cooperative. Under Article 2 of RA
6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy C of the State to foster the creation and
e
growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing l
b to
encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conduciveo
people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus,

growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, oneR
to their

providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

a n of which is

C h
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Cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the
B
vital role they play in the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus,

e s
although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the State’s power to tax must give way

b l
to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani
A. Cruz: “The power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be

R o
subordinated to the demands of social justice. ” (Dumaguete Credit Cooperative v. Com. Of

an r
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010; Rep. v. Judge Peralta, 234 Phil. 40
(1987).
B a
h
C he was administratively changed, s but he was re-elected. The charges against
16. Petitioners were appointed by X, a duly elected mayor. During his incumbency,
e
l they filed a motion to dismiss contending that the
o b
petitioners continued, hence,
doctrine of condonation to coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively R charged along with re-elected official/appointing authority with

ancorrect? Why? a rterm should apply to them. Is

infractions allegedly committed during their preceding

h
the contention
B
Answer:CNo. Election expresses the sovereignewillsof the people. Under the principle of vox
l official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannotbbe said of a re-appointment to a non-career
populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public

position. There is no sovereign will o

R of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed

Office of the Ombudsman, et a n, G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010 citing
respondent Sojor to the post of university
al. a rCSC v. Sojor, 554
president. (Atty. Vicente Salumbides, et al. v.

SCRA 160 (2008)). h B

C s
e to appointed officials
Is not the non-application of the doctrine of condonation
violative of the equal protection clause? Why? b l
R o
n law. The electorate’s condonation of r
Answer: No. The non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does

a
not violate the right to equal protection of the
a
Buphold
the

the reappointed coterminous employees, h

previous administrative infractions of the re-elected official cannot be extended to that of
C the ballot. In other words, there s
the underlying basis of the rule being to
the will of the people expressed through
l espeakisof,neither
case of reappointed coterminous employees.
o b
subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to in the

It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person whon
R
a
happens to be the appointing
a r
authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability.
appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate ofh
Since petitioners hold
B
be charged with the presumption of full knowledge C of
the electorate. The people cannot
the life and character of each and
e s
every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
b l
The unwarranted expansion of the doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as ito
R would,

from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in then
provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity
a bureaucracy.
(Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010).
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a r
17. Resolution No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas dated July 9, 1972
approved the subdivision of certain properties for residential purposes from
B
agricultural. Petitioners Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. and the DAR

e s
sought to include the same under the coverage of the CARP Law contending that the

b l
LGU has no power to reclassify the land; only the national legislature can do it. Is the
contention correct? Why?

Answer:
o
RshallNo,nobecause a parcel of land reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15,

an
1988 longer be
a r land under the CARP.
considered agricultural

h When city and municipal boards andB

e s
C district in their cities or municipalities
councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or

l as residential, commercial or industrial zone,

b the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the
pursuant to the power granted to them under, they were, at the same time, reclassifying

R o
any agricultural lands within
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality
nof subdivision ordinances and regulations. r The approval by city and
behind such a presumption is more evident when considering the approval by local
a a
boards and councils of an application B
legislative bodies
municipalh
s of the reclassification of the land,
for subdivision through an ordinance
shouldCalready be understood to include approval e
covered by said application, from agricultural l
b application would serve no practical effect; for
to the intended non-agricultural use.

as long as the property covered by o

Otherwise, the approval of the subdivision

R for non-agricultural use.

the application remains classified as agricultural, it

n
could not be subdivided and developed
a a r
h B and councils, as to
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards
include the power to accordingly reclassify the lands within theszones, would be in accord
C e Act of 1959, which was to
with the avowed legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy
increase the autonomy of local governments. (Buklod nang b lMagbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos,
Inc. v. E.M. Ramos, Inc. , G.R. No. 131481; DAR v. E.M.
16, 2011). R oRamos, Inc. , G.R. No. 131624, March

n
a of candidacy for Mayor of theBCity arof
Dapitan, Zamboanga del Sur for theh
18. Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. filed his certificate

C 2010 s material
elections. His opponent Agapito Cardino
e
misrepresentation in his certificate when he declared under oath thatlhe was eligible
filed a petition to deny due course and cancel his COC due to a false

when he has been convicted of the crime of robbery and sentenced

o b to prison mayor
R was fraudulently
by the RTC. Jalosjos contended that he was granted probation where the COMELEC
found out that the certificate of compliance with the requirement
issued. He has not yet served his sentence. The penaltya
n
of prision mayor carries with a r
h B
s
it perpetual special disqualification to hold public office. Is the COMELEC’s ruling
correct? Why? C e
Answer: Yes. The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A b
l
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that exited at the time of theo
void

R to valid
filing of

a n
the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less
votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the

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 ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

a r
B
start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the
s
election is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid
e
b l
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’
ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of

R o
his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections -- Cardino –
n who received the highest number of votes.
aSection a r
h 74 requires the candidate to B
s is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office.
state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he
C isIf eligible e
for said office. " A candidate
a candidate is not actually l
b office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal

R o
case from running for public
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false

COMELEC, et al.n , G.R. No. 193237; Cardino v. Jalosjos, etr

material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. (Jalosjos, Jr. v.
a B a al. , G.R. No. 193237, October 9,
2012).
C h s
19. A resolution was issued by Samar IIeElectric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II)
Board of Directors removing a certain b lSetudo, Jr. as a member of the Board of
Directors. A petition for prohibition
Why? R o was filed with the RTC. Is the petition proper?

ar under the
an Electrification Administration hasBjurisdiction,
C h The NEA has the power of supervision
Answer: No, because the National
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
s and control over
electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No. 1645, hence,ethe resolution removing the
Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no
b l jurisdiction (Samar II Electric
o
Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo, Jr. , G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta, J).
R
n of the claim requires the resolution
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
a a rof
B to beof
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement
issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
an administrative agency. In such C
hhas been placed within the special competence
s
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such l eissues to the
a case, the court in which the claim is sought

dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al. ,o

administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly b disadvantaged,

R G.R. No. 18487, August

15, 2011).
a n a r
h
20. Cong. Jonathan Dela Cruz filed House Bill No. 59 seeking to increase the voting
who are below 21 are so s
B
C
immature to vote. A filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the bill. If you e
age to twenty-one (21) years old claiming that voters

were the judge, how would you decide? Explain.

b l
Answer: If I were the judge, I would dismiss the petition on the ground that it isR
o
premature
as the issue is not ripe for judicial determination. Well-settled is the rule that n
a with:
before the

h
constitutionality of a law may be raised, the following requisites must be complied

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 ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

a r
B
e s
b l
R o
an a) ar
there must be an actual controversy;
B
Ch
b) the person raising the constitutionality must have locus standi;
c)
e s
timeliness of the petition;
d) l
necessity to decide the issue of constitutionality of the law.
b
adversely affected,R
While A may have the olocus standi to raise the issue as he is a taxpayer who may be
Congress. Thus,n r More importantly, there is no
yet, the petition is still premature as there is only a proposal before the

right has been violated bya

a thereyet,isasnononecessity yet to decide the issue.
B
h
actual controversy
C that judicial review cannot be exercised
be enacted
the proposed bill. The bill has yet to
s in vacuo. For as defined by the
into law. Unless and until it is enacted into law, no right would be violated. It is a
rule that e
ldetermine legally demandable rights. In this
constitution judicial power is the power to
o b
case, there is no demandable right yet. Hence the petition should be dismissed.
R
powers. Congress is vested a
Furthermore, to act on the petition n r
awhatantheissuelawthat
at this stage would violate the principle of separation of

h
with the power to legislate. To determine
B is for

not yet ripe for judicial

be interfered with, by the courts
s
Cdetermination. The courts can only acteon an issue raised before it if
Congress to do which cannot by deciding is

there is a violation of the rights of a party.

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