Muria 2019CriminalLaw1 PDF

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
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LECTURE IN CRIMINALBLAW 1
C Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.M.es
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www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
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Concepts o and Principles
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1.
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Concept. Criminal law is that branchs
Ctreats of their nature, and provides fore their punishment.
or division of law which defines crimes,
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Three characteristics. R
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an and (c) prospectivity. Bar
2. Criminal law has three characteristics namely: (a)
generality, (b) territoriality,
h s are well-established in
Exceptions toCthe general application of criminalelaw
3.
law and jurisprudence namely those provided b l in (1)treaties or treaty

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provisions; (2)laws of preferential application; and (3) exemptions under the
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principles of public international law..
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Principleo of Generality of Criminal Law
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C final sentence cannot practiceestheir profession nor engage in
All prisoners whether under preventive
any business or occupation,

b l or hold office, elective or
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appointive, while in detention. Never has the call of a particular
Rrestrained by law (Antonio Trillanes, Jr. v.
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
Oscar Pimentel,a
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others who are validly
a rSCRA 471,
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G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, 556
489).
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Principleoofb Generality of Criminal Law
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a n a r
h B Diplomatic Relations, a
C diplomatic envoy is immune efrom
Under the Vienna Convention on
s criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State for all acts,l whether private or official, and
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hence he cannot be arrested,b prosecuted and punished for any
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offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is
waived. On then other hand, officials of international
a “functional” immunities, thatBis,aronly those
h
organizations enjoy
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necessary for
sPeople, 335 SCRA
the exercise of the functions of the organization
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and the fulfilment of its purposes (Liang v.
125, 154).
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The rule in international law is that R
a foreign armed forces allowed
to enter one's territory is immunen from local jurisdiction, except to r
the extent agreed upon (Nicolasav. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438, 463). a
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The rule in international law is thatsa foreign armed forces allowed
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l efrom local jurisdiction, except to
to enter one's territory is immune
the extent agreed upon (Nicolas
o b v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438, 463).
R Under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) the
n
shall have jurisdiction over United Statesa
Philippine authorities a
Treaties or treaty provisions. r
respect to offensesh B under the
Personnel with
C Meanwhile, the United States emilitary s authorities shall

committed within the Philippines and punishable
have the right to exercise within the Philippines alllcriminal and disciplinary
laws of the Philippines.
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jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law b of the United States over
R 1[a] [b], Art. V, VFA).
United States personnel in the Philippines (sec.
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C general operation of the law. s
Laws of preferential application exempt a person
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eighteen (18) years of age b
1. Sections 58 and 59 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempt persons below
o from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy
R No. 1619 and from any imposition of death
and prostitution under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of
an laws notwithstanding. a r
mendicancy under P.D.
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penalty other special
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2. Republic Act
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C rights, and privileges of dulyeaccredited diplomatic
75 embodies the protection and recognition of the
representatives as enunciated under the lVienna Convention on

immunities,
Diplomatic Relations.
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3. Parliamentary Privilege from arrests R for members of the Congress as
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provided under the 1987 Constitution.
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Principle b l
oof Territoriality of Criminal Law
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a n a r
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C under article 2. s
Recall the extraterritorial application
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Qualified universal jurisdiction of Philippine courts for crimes
punished under the Human
Republic Act 9372). o Security Act (Section 58 of
Rhas similar provision on qualified
an of courts. Section 17 of Republic rAct No.
Republic Act No. 9851
a
B over
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universal jurisdiction
C military or civilian, suspected

9851 provides
s or accused of a
that the State shall exercise jurisdiction
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persons, whether
crime is committed,
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crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the
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Recall the principles of maritime criminal jurisdiction.
Recall the Crimes Committed by
of the Revised Penal Code. a
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PrincipleoofbTerritoriality of Criminal Law
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mankind. It may be punished in s
Piracy B
is a crime not against any particular state but against
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all
country where the offender may l e the competent tribunal of any
b
be found or into which he may be
R o all so may it be punished by all.

carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
territorial limits. As it is against
unlike all other crimes has no
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Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
a a r limits,
B v. Lol-lo
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
h
CNo. 17958, February 27, 1922, 43
though neutral to
sPhil. 19).
war, are not neutral to crimes" (People
and Saraw, G.R
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Crimes which may be committed in relation to public function of Philippine
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employees or officials abroad:
e
(b) Qualified bribery (art. 211-A); b
(a) Direct bribery (art. 210); l
(c) Indirect bribery (art. 211); o
R(art. 212);
n (art. 213);
(d) Corruption of public officers
(e) Fraud against publica a r
B
treasury
(g) MalversationC
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(f) Possession of prohibited interest (art. 216);
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of public funds or property (art. 217);
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(h) Failure to render account (art. 218);
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(i) Illegal use of public funds or property (art. 220);b
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(j) Failure to make delivery of public funds or property (art. 221); and
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(k) Falsification by public officer or employee committed with abuse of public
position (art. 171).
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Transitory crimes may be validly tried
where the offense was s
B in any municipality or
Cterritory e and material acts have been
in part committed. The court
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wherein any of the crime’s essential
b
understood that the firstocourt taking cognizance of the same
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case, it being
R differently, a person charged with a

a n crime may be validly tried
excludes the other. Stated
continuing or transitory
a r in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in B
C h s
part committed
(see Yalong v.
e
People, G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA
195, 205). Republic Act 9208, also knownlas Anti-Trafficking in
Human Person Act of 2008 punishes acts
o b of human trafficking
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committed across national borders which may be considered as
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transitory crimes.
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Principleoofb Prospectivity of Criminal Law
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The principle of prospective operation of penal laws prohibits the enactment of
Cex post facto laws. e s
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An ex post facto law has been defined as one —
R and punishes such action; or

(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was
a n or makes it greater than it was whenacommitted;

innocent when done criminal,
(b) which aggravates a crime r or
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(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed toC the crime when it was committed; or
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and l e s
testimony than the law required at the time of b
receives less or different
o
the commission of the offense
in order to convict the defendant.
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Principleoofb Prospectivity of Criminal Law
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The principle of prospective operation of penalB
CTheh Supreme Court added two (2) more to s
laws prohibits the enactment of
(e) that which assumes to regulate civilerights and remedies only but in effect
the list, namely:
imposes a penalty or deprivation ofb

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(f) that which deprives a persono
a right which when done was lawful; or
R such as the protection of a former conviction or

accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
a n of amnesty (see Salvador v. Mapa,arJr., G.R. No.

which he has become entitled,
acquittal, or a proclamation
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135080, November 28, 2007). B
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b Criminal Law
Theoriesoof
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Classical or juristic theory. The classical B
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Cresponsibility on the actor’s knowledge s
or juristic theory bases criminal
stresses the objective standard of crime e

and free will. The classical theory
b l and imposes a proportionate punishment
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therefor. The classical view imposes responsibility for an act maliciously
perpetrated or negligently performed.
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TheoriesoofbCriminal Law
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Positivist or realistic theory. The positivist or realistic school denies or
C minimizes s
e him to crime. The positivist
the exercise of free volition and considers the criminal as a
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victim of circumstances which predispose
school considers the deed as b
o
secondary and the offender as primary, and
Rand to achieve social defense because it takes the

provides for means of repression to protect society from the actor—to
a n a social and natural phenomenon.

forestall the social danger
view that crime is essentially
a r Positivists
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view the criminal not so much as an object of punishment B or retribution but
as a patientC e s
deserving social consideration for reformation, to the end that
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society may be protected (see Criminal Law, Book l One, Ambrosio Padilla,
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1956, p. 5).
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Crimes ob
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Essentially statutory character of crimes. Since the Philippine
system is Civil Law in origin,scommon law crimes or crimes
Clegal
which are defined and punished e
b l based on customs or usages are
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not dealt with under the Philippine criminal justice system. There
payment of fine for the R

must be a statute providing for a penalty of imprisonment or
may be considered an r
commission or omission of an act before it
a felony or an offense. B a
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Crimes ob
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Nullum crimen nulla sine lege B
s and the telephone service are
C The business of providing telecommunication
e
personal property under Article b
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engaging in ISR is an acto
308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
R Information describes the thing taken as

of “subtraction” penalized under said article.
However, the Amended
a n calls,” and only later mentionsar“stealing the
“international long distance
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business from PLDT” as the manner by which the gain was B derived by the
accused. InC
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order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution l
Amended Information, to clearly state that thebproperty subject of the theft
directed to amend the
are the services and business of respondento

R Web Corporation v. People,
PLDT (Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R.
G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014, n SCRA 18, 43-44).

No. 155076, 576 SCRA 41, 56-57; Worldwide
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Crimesob
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Dual nature of crimes. From the standpoint of its effects, a
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crime has a dual character: (a) as an offense against the State
b
because of the disturbance of the social order and (b) as an
o
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offense against private person injured by the crime unless it
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involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt
a
and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the
B
C h
offender either because there are no damages to be
s
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compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime)
(Nuguid v. Nicdao, 502 SCRA 93, 98).
b l
Under the “threefold liability rule,”
omissions of a public officer mayR
o the wrongful acts or
administrative liability. Even ifnthe Ombudsman may no longer r

give rise to civil, criminal and
a a
Bfile
already resigned or C
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file an administrative case against a public official who has
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retired, the Ombudsman may still
e
lJr., G.R.
criminal and civil cases to vindicate the official’s alleged
transgressions (Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan,
o b
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No. 164679, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 539, 556-557).
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o arising from crimes
Civil liability
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Damages arising from crimes. When death results from the
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commission of a crime, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the
following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
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victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the
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crime; (b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent proved,
or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been
B a
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suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c)
s
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moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was
b l
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (People v.
Parba, G.R. No. 214506, October 19, 2015, 773 SCRA 83, 93).
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Civil liability
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Aggravating circumstances may beBconsidered for purposes
C h s
of
l e Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
determining the amount of exemplary
alleged in the information. Under
damages even if not
exemplary damages may beb

circumstance attended o
granted if at least one aggravating
R for this purpose need not be specifically

the commission of the crime. The
a n and can be either a qualifying

aggravating circumstance
alleged in the information,
a r or
h B
attendant circumstance (People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June
CSCRA 666, 682).
22, 2015. 759
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Civil liability
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When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the
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guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should
award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same
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criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action
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does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
a
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
B
C h
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist
s
e
(Abellana v. People, G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA
683, 689).
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Civil liability
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After a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila rendered a decision dated November 11,
b l
2005 (RTC Decision) acquitting petitioner. The RTC Manila found that while
petitioner admitted that she received the checks, the prosecution failed to
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establish that she was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in payment
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of MCCFs loan. The trial court made this finding on the strength of Mandy's
a
admission that he gave the checks to petitioner with the agreement that she
B
C h
would encash them. Petitioner would then pay ICBC using her own checks. The
s
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trial court further made a finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a
b l
contract of loan. Thus, it held that the prosecution failed to establish an
important element of the crime of estafa—misappropriation or conversion.
R o
However, while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it ordered her to pay the
amount of the checks.
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Held: Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded if there is no act or
C s
Any civil liability arising from the loan takes the nature ofe a civil
omission punished by law which can serve as the source of obligation.
b
liability ex contractu. It does not pertain to the civil actionl deemed
instituted with the criminal case (Dy v. People, G.R. No. o
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G.R. No. 189081,
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August 10, 2016).
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Civil liability
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In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal actionB
h
Cthe s
shall be deemed to include
e tried. This rule was enacted to

corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate
l
cases, only a single suit is filed and
b
because creditors used o
help declog court dockets, which had been packed with B.P. 22
ROctober 5, 2015, 772 SCRA 1, 14-16).

the courts as collectors (Bernardo v.
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People, G.R. No. 182210,
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Civil liability
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Increase in civil indemnity for murder. B Civil indemnity for death
been increased through the syears from the minimum of
Chas e The increases have been
P2,000.00 to as high as P100,000.00.
b l
o
made to consider the economic conditions, primarily the
5, 2016, the Court R

purchasing power of the peso as the Philippine currency. On April
a n whereby it adopted certain

Jugueta (G.R. No. 202124),
a rguidelines
promulgated its decision in People v.
h B
on fixing the civil liabilities in crimes resulting in the death of the
C
victims taking into proper consideration the stages
e s of execution
and gravity of the offenses, as well as thelnumber of victims in
composite crimes. Other factors were weighed
o b by the Court. In the
perpetna, the Court has thereby R

case of murder where the appropriate penalty is reclusion
damages, P75,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P75,000.00 for r

n fixed P75,000.00 for moral
a civil liabilities,- in additionBtoa
civil indemnity as the essential
others as the records ofC
h s we
each case will substantiate. Hence,
l e
each count of murder (People v. Oandosan, Jr., G.R. b
impose herein the same amounts for such items of damages in
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No. 194605,
June 14, 2016).
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b of Penal Statutes
Interpretation
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Pro reo principle. The fundamental
criminal laws is s
B principle in applying and
C intheinterpreting e When in doubt, rule for the
to resolve all doubts in favor of
l
accused. In dubio pro reo.
b
o
accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional
and until his guilt isR

guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless
a
Intestate Estate of
a r
nManolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong
established beyond reasonable doubt (see
v.
People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010, 612B
C h s
SCRA 272).
Principle of lenity. Intimately related to l e

b
the in dubio pro reo
o
principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is
that is prejudicial to the accusedR

faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one
to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation r

n and another that is favorable
which is more lenient toh

a
the accused (see Intestate EstateB
a
s No.
of
Manolita Gonzales vda. C de Carungcong v. People, G.R.
e
181409, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 272).
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Interpretation
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of Penal Statutes
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Principle of presumption of innocence.
panoply of state authority s
B The defendant faces the
Cfull e In a manner of speaking, he
with all "The People of the
l
Philippines" arrayed against him.
goes to bat with all the basesbloaded. The odds are heavily against
o
R by presuming the innocence of the
him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the
a n is able to refute the presumption

prosecution and the defense
accused until the state
a r by proof
h B
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Tempongko, G.R. No.
C 2, 1986, 144 SCRA 583, 592). es
69668, October
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Felonies b l
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1. Concept. Acts and omissions punishableBby law are felonies (delitos).
h
C means s
l e when the act is performed with
Felonies are committed not only by means
of fault (culpa). There is deceit
of deceit (dolo) but also by
deliberate intent and there is b

o
fault when the wrongful act results from
R
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill (Art. 3, RPC).
2. General elements ofn crimes. Every crime has two elements:r

a B a the act or
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omission (actus reus) and the mental element which is commonly
Cintent (mens rea). s
referred
to as criminal
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Felonies b l
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For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, B there must be a confluence of both an
evilC
No. 165842, November 29, 2006, 476 SCRAe
act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, s nisi mens sit rea (Manuel v. People, G.R.
b l 461, 479)
o
refer to the requirements ofR
1. Mens rea. Mens rea is the mental element of a crime. In crimes by dolo, mens rea will
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freedom, intelligence and intent while doing the act or
omitting to do the act.
B a
C h s
2. Criminal intent.
e
In criminal law, intent means a state of mind which willingly consents
to the act that is done, or free will choice, or volition inlthe doing of the act; it means that
the act is voluntary, and that it proceeds from a mindb
o
free to act (22 CJS 1).
Rcircumstances in the Revised Penal Code

to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder n Law indicates quite clearly that mens rear
a. The application of mitigating and extenuating
a B a is an
element of plunder since the degree
C h s November
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent (Joseph Ejercito
e
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560,
l
b
19, 2001, 369 SCRA 395, 452).
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Felonies ob
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In crimes by culpa, the mental element of theB crime refers to the requirements of
C intelligence, lack of foresightesor skill, and the voluntariness of the
freedom,
act.
b l
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a. Setting on fire the infected
owounds of a girl to cure her which resulted to
n of the accused had not been torcause an evil but
rather intended as aaremedy (see US v. Feliciano Divino, a G.R. No.L- 4490,
burn injuries. The actions
h B
C 12 Phil. 175).
December 4, 1908,
e s
b l
other accused, proceeded to subject the o
b. With the permission of the victim’s parents, accused, together with the
R boy to a “treatment” calculated to
a n
drive the “bad spirit” from his body.
a r
Unfortunately, the strange procedure
h Bthe cure.
resulted in his death. The liability arises from their reckless imprudence
C
because they ought to know that
e s
their actions would not bring about
They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resultinglin homicide and
o
not of murder (People v. Eutiquia Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, b March 26, 2001,
355 SCRA 267, 279).
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Felonies ob
R
a n a r
h B act and lawful act
No felony or criminal liability arises from involuntary
C e s
l
a. Killing his wife and injuring his father
b
while the accused was sleepwalking (People
o
v. Potenciano Taneo, G.R. No. 37673, March 31, 1933, 58 Phil. 255, 257)
R
r (with malice).
n3, the act is performed with deliberateaintent
a. Injuring an assailant in the act of defending the victim from aggression is a lawful
a
act. In the language of Art.
h B
The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to
to another. In culpable felonies, the act orsomission of the offender is
cause an injuryC e person is “unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performedb
l
not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another
o
without malice.” As stated in Art. 3,
Absent the malicious intent to injure or kill R

the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
a n a
the intentional crime of homicide cannot be sustained (see Rollie Calimutan v. People, r
the victim, the conviction of the accused for
h B
s
G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006).
C e
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Mistake of
o fact
R
a n a r
h
Mistake of fact which would relieve an accusedB of criminal liability has the
Cfollowing s
as the accused believed them to be; (b)eThe intention of the accused was not
elements: (a) The act done would have been lawful had the facts been
b l
o
unlawful; and (c) There was no fault or negligence. A mistake of fact contradicts
R
the presumption of criminal intent for acts which would otherwise be considered
as unlawful.
a n a r
Remember: An act may be justified under the mistake of fact B
accused had C
h s
doctrine only if the
no time or opportunity to make further
l e inquiry and if the
b
circumstances pressed him to act immediately.
See U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, Marcho

Pambaya Bambayabao, G.R. No. L-29481, R
19, 1910, 15 Phil. 489; People v.
17, 1915, 31 Phil. 308 and People v. Delaar

n October 31, 1928, 52 Phil. 309; U.S.
v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-10678, Augusta
h B
s
Cruz, G.R. No. L-41674, March 30, 1937
C e
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Mistake of b l
o factR
a n a r
While mistake of fact relieves the accused B
Ctheh s
of criminal liability, mistakes in
consequences of one’s act does noteexempt the accused from criminal

identity of the victim (error in personae) or mistake in the legal
b l
o
liability.
R
r 29,
n Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842,aNovember
See People vs. Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27,
a
1943, 74 Phil. 25; Eduardo
h
2005, 476 SCRA 461) B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Lack of intelligence
b l and lack of freedom as
exemptingocircumstances
R
a n a r
h
Exempting circumstances for lack of intelligence. B Under the Revised Penal Code the
C s
e 1)
lack of intelligence of the accused exempts him or her from criminal responsibility:
b
(2) Children fifteen years old and under
l
(1) Insane and imbecile persons (Art. 12, par.
(Republic Act 9344)
(3) Children over fifteen years oldo
R
and under eighteen who acted without discernment
an mistake of fact. r
(Republic Act 9344)
(4) Persons who acted through
a
Bhave acted without
C h s
Exempting circumstances for lack of freedom.
l e
Those
freedom are always deemed exempt from criminal responsibility:
who
o b
(1) Compulsion of an irresistible force (Art. 12, par. 5)
R
(2) Impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury (Art. 12, par. 6)
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Mala inseovis-à-vis mala prohibita
R
a n a r
Good faith is not defense in crimesB
h
C v.SCRA s
mala prohibita (see Garcia
e
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006, 484
617).
Lascivious conduct punished b l
o
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610
September 21, 2007,R

is malum prohibitum (Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733,
a n cannot be absorbed by a malum

Reckless imprudence
533 SCRA 643).
a r
h B
prohibitum (Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10,
2006. 482 C SCRA 194).
e s
The anti-hazing law is malum prohibitum
b l (Dungo v. People,
o
G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, 761 SCRA 375).
R G.R. No. 149995,

Motive for the issuance of a bad check is not a defense for
September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA

a n296).
violation of BP 22 (Palana v. People,
a r
The act of transporting ah
prohibitum because itC is punished as an offense under a s
prohibited drug is a malum B
l e
b
special law (Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October
o
19, 2011).
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Mala inseo
vis-à-vis mala prohibita
R
a n a r
h lacked that specific intent to B
The Supreme Court said that with the loss of his self-control, the
Cthe intrinsic worth and dignity of s
accused debase, degrade or demean
was so essential in the crimelof e child abuse. It is not trite to
a child as a human being that
doubt is resolved in favoro

b
remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every
R
of the petitioner as the accused. Thus,
the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor
an a r
(Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013).
The Bongalon h
Bv. People, G.R.
C 15, 2016 e
doctrine was reiterated in Jabaldes
No.195224, June
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
bybomission
Felonies o
R
a n a r
h B
Felonies by omission are also voluntary acts such as the following:
C finds in an uninhabited place woundede s or in danger of dying (Art.
a. Anyone who fails to render an assistance to any person whom he
275, par. 1). b l

b. Any officer entrusted witho
R by law (Art. 213, par. 2b).
collection of taxes who voluntarily fails
n allegiance to the Philippines, withoutarbeing a

to issue a receipt as provided
a
c. Every person, owing
Bsame to the
government,h
foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against the
C who does not disclose and make known
e s the
proper authority (Art. 116).
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Motive ob
R
a n a r
h B of a felony committed by
s power which impels one to
While criminal intent is an essential element
C dolo, motive is not. Motive is theemoving
action for a definite result. It isl
b the purpose to use a particular means to
Ro
effect such results.
a
Mere proof of motive,n no matter how strong, is notarsufficient to
h
support a conviction B
if there is no other reliable evidence from which it
C deduced that the accused ewass the malefactor (see
may be reasonably
People v. Macatangay and Cunanan, 107 Phil.
b l 188).
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Criminal o
Liability
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Criminal o
Liability
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
Persons criminally liable. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
shall be incurred:
o b
R
(1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
an r
different from that which he intended.
a
(2) By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
B
C h
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
s
e
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
b l
R o
a. Inapplicability to culpable crimes. Article 4 applies only in crimes
committed by dolo. It has no application in crimes committed through culpa
a n
or through negligence or reckless imprudence.
a r
b. Inapplicability to injuriesharising from a lawful act (see People v.B
C August 28, 1951, 56 Phil. 15). es
Donato
l
Bindoy, G.R. No. L-34665,
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Criminal o
Liability
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
Criminal liability for unintended consequences of criminal conduct. The intended
b
felony of the offender may not come about because of (a) mistake in the identity of the
o
R
victim (error in personae); (b) mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending
an r
to do an injury to one person actually inflicts it on another (aberratio ictus); or (c) when
a
the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended
B
C h
(praeter intentionem).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Criminal o
Liability
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
Error in personae. See People vs. Gona, G.R. No.L- 31962, March 15, 1930, 54 Phil.
605).
o b
R
Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow). See People v. Ramon Mabug-at, G.R. No. L-
an
25459, August 10, 1926, 51 Phil. 967, 969).
B a r
C h s
Praeter intenionem (greater injury). See People v. Jaime Tomotorgo, G.R. No. L-
l e
47941, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 238, 246; Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 171951, August
29, 2009, 597 SCRA 392, 407
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Criminal liability
o R
a n a r
h B
Restatements of the principle of criminal liability
CFirst, for an accused to be criminally liable
e sfor the unintended consequences of a
b l
felony has been committed, ando
criminal act, the following requisites must be present (1) that an intentional
logical consequences of the R

(2) that the wrong done be the direct, natural and
Phil. 310, 319; People n v. Noel Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October r
felony committed by the offender (U.S. v. Brobst, 14
a B a 3, 2011, 658
h
SCRA 367, 377; People v. Aniceto Martin, G.R. No. L-3002,
C G.R. No.205228, July 15, 2015, 763 eSCRA
People v. Adriano, s 70).
May 23, 1931;
l
Second, the rule is that if a man creates in anotherbperson's mind an immediate
sense of danger, which causes such person to try o
R a state of mind is responsible for
to escape, and, in so doing, the
a n Page, G.R. No. 3707, June 7, 1977,ar

latter injures himself, the man who creates such
the resulting injuries (see People v. William
77 SCRA 348, 355; People vs. h Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, G.R. No.B
SCRA 17; People v. Calixto Valdez, G.R. s
L-
27097, January 17, 1975, 62 C
l e No. L-
b
16486, March 22, 1921, 41 Phil. 49).
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Criminal liability
R
a n a r
Third, for an accused to be held responsible B
h
Cmust s
to the resulting injury, the felony
cause, which, in natural and continuous

l e sequence, unbroken by any efficient
be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that
have occurred (see Bataclan v.o

b
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
R 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 458; Filomeno Urbano v.

Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186; People v. Gerardo
a n G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988,ar

Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May
Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 1;
h B
People v. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011).
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Criminal liability
R
a n a r
Proximate cause. For an accused to be held B
Ctheh s
responsible to the resulting injury,
l e sequence, unbroken by any efficient

felony must be the proximate cause of the
that cause, which, in natural and continuous
resulting injury. Proximate cause is
o b
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
R
have occurred (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186).
Remember:
a n a r
h B
To hold the accused responsible for the resulting death of the victim,
1. it should C
e s
be medically established that tetanus developed from the injuries
inflicted by the accused and
b lfrom the time injuries had
o
2. the possibility of an efficient intervening cause
R
been inflicted until death ensued is remote.
(See People v. Gerardo Cornel, G.R.a nL-204, May 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 458;ar
No.
Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediateh Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, JanuaryB7,
1988, 157 SCRA 1; People v. C
e s 7,
Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September
2011).
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Criminal liability
o R
a n a r
h
When felony not deemed proximate cause B of the injury. The felony
Ccommitted s
e felony committed and the resulting
is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when (a) there is an
l
active force that intervened between the
b
felonious act of the accused; oro
injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
act of the victim (see Luis B.R

(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional
an r
Reyes, 2012 Ed., p. 272).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Impossible
o Crime
R
an B a r
C h s
e
Impossible crime. The following are the requisites of impossible crime:
l
(1) That the act performed would be an offense against persons or
b
o
property
R
(2) That the act was done with evil intent
an r
(3) That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means
employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.
B a
C h
(4) That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another
s
provision of the Revised Penal Code.
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Impossible
o Crime R
an B a r
C h s
e
Legal impossibility. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts,
b l
even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would
apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is
R o
to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
an r
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4)
a
the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
B
C h
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category (Intod
s
e
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 57).
b l
o
Factual Impossibility. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
R
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
an r
consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
B a
C h
and finds the pocket empty (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
s
October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 58).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
ImpossibleoCrime
l
R
an B a r
C h s
e
In the Intod case, the fact that the victim was not in her house at the time of
b l
the assault is a factual impossibility which prevented the consummation of
the crime. On the other hand, the extraneous circumstance of the check being
R o
unfunded prevented the crime from being produced in the Jacinto case (See
an r
Sulpicio Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215
a
SCRA 52; Gemma Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 209, 592
B
SCRA 426).
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Stages of Commission
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Stages of o
Commission
R
a n a r
hDistinguish attempted and frustratedBfelonies. The distinctions
s are summarized as follows:
C between frustrated and attempted efelony
b l
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
whereas in attempted R
o
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
r
n directly by overt acts and does notaperform
felony, the offender merely commences the
all the acts ofh

a
commission of a felony
execution. B
2.) In frustrated
e s
C felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
b l perpetrator; on the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the
o
other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of
R than the offender’s own
an r
the crime is a cause or accident other
spontaneous desistance.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Stages ofocommission
R
a n a r
h
Overt act. An overt act is some physical B activity or deed, indicating
Cthe intention to commit a particularescrime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carriedl
o b
its natural course, without being
to its complete termination following
frustrated by external obstacles nor
R
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
n
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense (see Rait v. r
a
a 566 SCRA 285; People v. AurelioBLamahang, People, GR
No. L-43530,C
h
180425, July 31, 2008,
s
G.R.
August 3, 1935, 61 Phil. 703).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R
a n a r
In determining whether the felony is attemptedB
Cthehnature of the offense, (2) the elementss
or frustrated or consummated, (1)
the manner of committing the same mustebe considered (see Luis B. Reyes, 2012
constituting the felony, as well as (3)
b l
Ro
Ed., p. 114).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Stages ofo
commission
R
a n a r
h
Attempted Homicide B
C If the wound/s sustained byesthe victim were not fatal or
b l
o
mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or
165483, SeptemberR
attempted homicide (Rujjeric Palaganas v. People, G.R. No.
Emeliano Trinidad, n r SCRA 51;

12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533, 551; People v.
a a
G.R. No. 79123-15, January 9, 1989, 169
B
C h
People v. Fernando Costales, G.R. No. 141154-56, January
s
15, 2002, 373
SCRA 269).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R
a n a r
h
Attempted Rape B
C For the accused to be convictedesof the crime of attempted rape,
b l
o
he must have already commenced the act of inserting his
R
sexual organ in the vagina of the victim, but due to some
he wasn’t able to
a neven slightly penetrate the victim
cause or accident, excluding
r (People v.
his own spontaneous desistance,
a
h B
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 735; People v.
G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1999, 184sSCRA 10; People v.
C
Ceilito Orita,
eSCRA 270).
b l
Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R
a n a r
h
Consummated Theft B
C It is immaterial to the productesof the felony that the offender,
b l
able or unable to freelyo
once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is
R owner alone has already ensued from

dispose of the property stolen since the
n (Valenzuela v. People, G.R.aNo.

deprivation from the
a
such acts of execution r 160188,
June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 306); reiterated B
h
C No. 206442, July 2, 2015, 761eSCRA
People, G.R.
in Canceran v.
s 293).
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R
an B a r
h
Arson
C e s
b l
The rule in cases of arson is that if a portion of the building
begins to burn, however small it may be, it is consummated. If
R o
all the acts necessary to burn the building have already been
an r
performed, as when the defendant has started a blaze by burning
a
rags soaked with gasoline placed near the building but the fire is
B
C h s
put out before any part of the building has started to burn, it is
l e
frustrated. If the overt act directly connected with the burning
o b
but not all the acts of execution have been performed, as when a
person has poured gasoline under the house of another and he
R
an r
was about to strike the match to set the house on fire when he
was apprehended, even if actually there was no blaze, the crime
B a
h
is attempted arson (see Padilla, 1959 Ed., p. 88).
C s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R
an B a r
Forcible abduction. The rule in cases of abduction is that if the offended girl is
C h s
carried away against her will with lewd designs, the felony is consummated even
e
if there are no sexual intercourse. If the act of carrying her away is prevented by
l
o b
some cause independent of the will of the accused, it is frustrated. If the offender
merely started to carry her away but failed due to some cause or accident other
R
than his spontaneous desistance, it is attempted (see Padilla, 1959 Ed., p.95).
an B a r
h
Attempted abduction. Accused forcibly dragged a girl almost 20 meters
C s
away until the act was interrupted by the neighbors who responded to
e
l
her cries. The man was a rejected suitor. Is he guilty of frustrated or
o b
attempted abduction? The trial court characterized the crime as
frustrated abduction. In an occurrence of this nature it is extremely
R
difficult to draw the line between the attempted and the frustrated
an a r
crime. It seems, however, that this court in various cases has held facts
h B
similar to those now before us to constitute a mere attempt, and it is the
C s
opinion of the majority that this criterion be adopted in the present case
e
l
(see U.S. v. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 176).
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R
an B a r
Estafa. Estafa consists of two elements—an act of deceit to defraud another and
C h s
injury or damage caused thereafter. Hence, estafa is not consummated unless the
e
two elements co-exist-fraud and damage. If the offender has not realized the
l
o b
damage because of a cause independent of his will, even if he has done the
fraudulent act, it is frustrated. If he has not performed all the acts necessary to
R
defraud, it is attempted. (see Padilla, 1959 Ed., p. 100; U.S. v. Isaac Dominguez,
an r
G.R. No. L-17021, February 23, 1921, 41 Phil. 409).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Conspiracy and Proposal
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Conspiracy
R
a n a r
h B
Conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
C it. e s
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
Proposal. There is a proposal whenb lthe person who has decided to commit
R o
a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons.
a
Examples of conspiracy nand proposal a r
Conspiracy to h
B
Conspiracy to commit rebellion, coup d’etat, sedition (Arts. 136, 141)
C commit treason (Art. 115)
e s
Conspiracy in restraint of trade (Art. 186)
Proposal to commit rebellion, coup d’ etat (Art.b l
136)
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Conspiracy
R
a n a r
h
Conspiracy must be proven as convincingly B as the criminal act itself - like
C any
beyond reasonable doubt (People v.e
s
element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof
b l Amar, G.R. No. 194235, June 8, 2016;
o
People v. Pepino and Gomez, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016).
R
a
inferred from their conduct
a r of the
n before, during, and after their commission
Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be
h
crime that they acted with a common purpose and design. B (see People v.
Renato LagatCy Gawan, G.R. No. 187044, Septembere14,s 2011
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Conspiracyb l
o R
a n a r
h B
Wheel conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single
person
e s typically interacts with the hub
Cpersons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other
rather than with another spoke. l

b In the event that the spoke shares a
ounconcerned with the success of the other

common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the
R
instances when each spoke is
148965, February 26, n r Arroyo v.

spokes, there are multiple conspiracies (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
a 2002, 377 SCRA 538; Gloria Macapagal
B a
C h
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 220598-220593, July19, 2016).
s
l e
S
o b
R
s aH n s a r
h B
C e s
s b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Conspiracy
o R
an a r
Chain conspiracy. Chain conspiracy exists when there is successive
B
C h
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
s
e
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
b l
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves individuals
linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective (see
R o
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA
538; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 220598-220593,
an r
July19, 2016).
B a
C h H s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
S S
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Conspiracy
R
a n a r
h
Conspiracy is legally presumed in hazing. B R.A. No. 8049 presents a
Cnovel e sconcept of conspiracy. Section 4,
provision that introduces a disputable presumption of actual
paragraph 6 thereof provides that l

participation; and which modifies the
b the presence of any person during the
prevented the commission of o

hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he
R the punishable acts (see Dungo v. People, G.R.
an r
No. 209464, July 1, 2015, 761 SCRA 375, 427-431).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b Exempting Circumstances
Justifyingoand
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Justifyingocircumstances
R
a n a r
h B exempting circumstances. In
circumstances, there is neither ascrime nor a criminal and hence there
Distinguish justifying circumstances from
Cjustifying e circumstances, there is a crime
is neither criminal or civil liability. Inlexempting
but no criminal, and hence there is b
Ro
still civil liability.
a
Self-defense is inherentlyn a weak defense because, as aexperience r has
demonstrated, it ish B
s evidence the
easy to fabricate and difficult to prove. Thus, for this defense
to prosper, theCaccused must prove with clear and convincing
l e
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. bEven if the evidence of the
elements of self-defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
prosecution is weak, it cannot be disbelieved

R o if the accused admitted
nSCRA 737).
responsibility for the crime charged (see Fernando Estabas Mahawan v. People,
G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008,a574 a r
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Self-defense
o R
a n a r
Accused and her husband (deceased) had anB
h
Ctoaftercookthirty s
altercation because she failed
minutes. Another altercationeensued and the deceased pointed a

food as she had no money to buy food. The deceased left but returned
knife at her neck. The deceased slapped

b l the accused twice at her face. The
told the deceased not to come o

accused was able to push the deceased to the ground. She took the knife and
R near her. The deceased tried to grab her but
nself-defense. Is the accused justified ain r
she stabbed her once in the chest, which caused his death. Charged of
a B
parricide, she interposed killing her
h
husband? (see People v. Samson, G.R. No. 214883, September
C s
2, 2015, 769
e
SCRA 171)
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Unlawfuloaggression
R
a n a r
h must be actual physical force or B
s real and immediate threat to
There actual use of a weapon. It is
Cpresent only when the one attackedefaces
b
his life. It must be continuous; l otherwise, it does not constitute
o
aggression warranting self-defense (People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847,
R 625, 635-636).
October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Unlawfuloaggression
R
a n a r
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: B
h
C1.aggression; s
(a) actual or material unlawful
e
and (b) imminent unlawful aggression.
Actual or material unlawful l
force or with a weapon, anb
aggression means an attack with physical
intent of the aggressor to o

offensive act that positively determines the
R cause the injury.
a n it must not consist in a mere threatening

the point of happening; a r attitude,
2. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at
nor must ith B

aiming a revolver at another with intentsto shoot or opening a
be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
C
strong (like
e v. Nogas, G.R. No
b l
knife and making a motion as if to attack (People
172606, November 23, 2011; People v. Gamez,
23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625).
R o G.R. No. 202847, October
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Unlawfuloaggression
R
a n a r
h
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude B does not constitute unlawful
Caggression (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340,
e s July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 204,
215). l
1. A mere push or a shove,bnot followed by other acts, has been held
R o
insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression. A playful kick at the foot by way
is not a seriousnor real attack on a person's safety (see People v. r

of greeting between friends may be a practical joke, and may even hurt; but it
a April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 901, 902). Ba Teodoro Sabio,
h
G.R. No. L-23734,
C observation that one of the men was pulling san object from his waist
e
is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggressionl(see People v. Bingky Campos
2. Accused’s
and Danny “Boy” Acabo, G.R. No. 176061, b

116).
R o July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 99, 114-
3. When unlawful aggression ceases,

a nthe defender no longer has any justificationar
h
to kill or wound the original aggressor (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181354,
B
C No. L-162, April 30, 1947, 78 Phil. 366). es
February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 127, 145-146; People v. Dioscoro Alconga and
l
Adolfo Bracamonte, G.R.
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Reasonable necessity
l
of the means employed
R o
a n a r
hThe second requisite of defense meansBthat (1) there be a necessity
C of the course of action taken by ethesperson making a defense, and
(2) there be a necessity of the l
o
(see Luis B. Reyes, 2012 Ed.,b means used. Both must be reasonable
p.183).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Reasonable b l
necessity of the means employed
R o
a n a r
h B
Test: Whether the means employed is reasonable, will depend upon the
C nature and quality of the weapon used s
ecircumstances, and those of the person
by the aggressor, his physical
defending himself, and also the b

condition, character, size and otherl
o does not imply material commensurability
place and occasion of the assault. Reasonable
R
necessity of the means employed
n
between the means of attack and defense.
a a r
h B
s danger to which
What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which
C
will enter as
e
principal factors the emergency, the imminent
b l
the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than reason, that moves
upon the harm done, but rests upon the o

or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend
R imminent danger of such injury
an r
(People v. Enconmienda, G.R. No. L-26750, August 18, 1972, 48 SCRA 522,
534).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Lack of sufficient
o provocation
R
a n a r
h
The third requisite is present when B by the person defending
C himself;
1. No provocation at all was given to
e
the s
aggressor
b l
3. When, even if a provocationo
2. Even if a provocation was given, it was not sufficient;
R was given, it was not given by the person

defending himself;
a n was given by the person defending
4. When, even if a provocation a rhimself, it
h and immediate to the act of aggressionB
s
was not proximate (see Luis B. Reyes,
C
2012 Ed., p.195).
e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Retaliationb l
R o
a n a r
h
Retaliation B
CRetaliation was not the same as self-defense.
e s In retaliation, the aggression that
the victim started already ceased b
l
defense, the aggression was o
when the accused attacked him, but in self-
R still continuing when the accused injured the
a
justify his fatal stabbing n a
by the accused (People v. Dulin, G.R. No. r171284, June
aggressor. As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to
h B
s
28, 2015, 760 SCRA 413, 426-427).
C e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
ofbproperty
Defenseo
R
a n a r
h B
s as the right to life, and defense
Defense property
CThe defense of property is not of such importance
e
of property can only be invoked asb
l
with an attack on the person o
a justifying circumstance when it is coupled
R of one entrusted with said property (People v.
an r
Apolinar, 38 O.G. 2870; see also People v. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-334660-67.
April 20, 1983).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o injury inflicted due to necessity
Damage or
R
a n a r
Requisites: (a) That the evil sought to be B
h
C injury s
avoided actually exist; (b) That the
l e of preventing the evil or injury.

feared be greater than the act done to avoid it; and (c) That there is no
b
other practical and less harmful means
R
1. The evil or injury sought oto be avoided must not be caused by the
an r
negligence or imprudence of the defendant or must not result from his
violation of the law (Padilla, 1959, p. 184).
B a
2. This isC
h s where there is
e
the only case among the justifying circumstances
civil liability (Art. 101, second paragraph) tol
benefited in proportion to their respective b
be borne by the persons
R o benefits (ibid., 185).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Fulfilment
o of duty
R
a n a r
hFor fulfilment of duty to be consideredBjustifying circumstance the
s (a) That the accused acted
C following requisites must be established:
e
in the performance of a duty orlin the lawful exercise of a right or
o
office; and (b) That the injuryb caused or the offense committed be the
necessary consequenceR of the due performance of duty or the lawful
a nor office (see Valcorza v. People, G.R.arNo. L-28129,
exercise of such right
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 143; People v. Felipe Delima, B
C h s
G.R. No. L-18660,
G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2003, 464 SCRA 324). e

December 22, 1922, 46 Phil. 738; SP02 Ruperto Cabanlig v. Sandiganbayan,
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Superioroorder
R
a n a r
h B
To be a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be present in
C following s
elawful purpose; and (c) That the means
a superior order: (a) That an order has been issued by a superior;
b l
(b) That such order must be for some
Ro
used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Exempting Circumstances
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Minority b l
R o
a n a r
h B
Minimum age of criminal responsibility (see sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
C Basis s
22,eRA 9344)
for determination of age (see
Diversion program (see sec. l
sec. 7, RA 9344)
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Minorityob
R
a n a r
h B two distinct thoughts.
CWhile both are products of the mentalesprocesses within a person, the
The terms "intent" and "discernment" convey
former refers to the desire of one'slact while the latter relate to the moral
o
significance that person ascribesbto the said act (Dorado v. People, G.R.
R
No. 216671, October 3, 2016).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o sentence
Suspended
R
a n a r
Suspended sentence is applicable even B
h
Cthe
if the accused who committed
sapplication of RA No. 9344 beyond
e
crime in his minority had reached the age of beyond 21 years old.
The Supreme Court had extended the
b l
the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said
Ro
law (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015, 773 SCRA 518,
543-544).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b offender under RA 9165
First timeo
minor
R
a n a r
h
of Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation s
Probation or Community Service for a First-Time B Minor Offender in Lieu
Cdiscretion, place the accused under l e even if the sentence provided
of the sentence, the court may, in its
under this Act is higher than that b

probation,
impose community service in o

provided under existing law on probation, or
R lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the
n with the Board of Pardons andaParole r and the

supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board
a
through the DOH in coordination
h B
s termination of
Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation,
the Board shallC
e
submit a written report to the court recommending
probation and a final discharge of the probationer, l
b
whereupon the court shall
issue such an order (see section 70, RA 9165).
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Insanity ob
R
a n a r
Insanity exists when there is complete B
h
Ccommitting
deprivation of intelligence in
sthere is complete absence of the
e
the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
power to discern, or that there l

without the least discernment because
b is total deprivation of freedom of the
RoL-33211, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 151).

will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability
(People v. Ernesto Puno, G.R. No.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Tests to determine
o insanity
R
a n a r
Tests to determine insanity. To determineB
h
Cinsane
whether an accused was legally
sthere was a “complete deprivation
e
during the commission of the crime, two distinguishable tests are
b l
used: (a) the test of cognition – whether
of intelligence in committing the criminal act” and (b) the test of volition –
Ro March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654)

whether there was a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” (see People v.
Anacito Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75,
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Feeling of remose l
incompatible with insanity
R o
a n a r
h B
A feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication
C that s
e G.R. No. 172697, September 25,
he was conscious of his acts. He acknowledged his guilt and was sorry
2007, 534 SCRA 147, 153-155).b

l
for his acts (People v. Reynaldo Villanueva,
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Accidentob
R
a n a r
h B
Pursuant to Art. 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential
C requisites s
ecare; (3) he causes an injury to another
of accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is
b l
performing a lawful act; (2) with due
of accident presupposes lacko

by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The defense
R of intention to kill (see People v. Manuelmacal,
150647, Septembera n2004, 439 SCRA 439 ).

29, a r
G.R. No. 2011062, January 13, 2016; Roweno Pomoy v. People, G.R. No.
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o an impulse of uncontrollable fear
Acting under
R
a n a r
hFor such a circumstance to be appreciated B in favor of an accused, the
C following elements must concur: (a) the
(b) that the fear must be real andl
s
e and (c) the fear of an injury is
existence of an uncontrollable fear;
greater than, or at least equal to,bthat committed. For such defense to prosper,
imminent;
the duress, force, fear or o

R intimidation must be present, imminent and
r injury is
n harm if the act be done. A threat ofafuture
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or seriousa bodily
h B 9, 2015).
s
not enough (Manansala v. People. G.R. No. 215424, December
C e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Compulsion
o of irresistible force
R
a n a r
h B
The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a
C mere s
e be present, imminent and impending,
instrument who acts not only without
duress, force, fear or intimidationl
will but against his will. The
b
must
serious bodily harm if theo

and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
R act be done. A threat of future injury is not
r combat
naccused for escape or self-defense inaequal
enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
a
opportunity for the
h B
s
(People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 111,
131). C e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury
R o
a n a r
h as a valid defense should be B
s It should not be inspired by
Duress based on real, imminent, or
Creasonable fear for one’s life or limb.
e
b l
speculative, fanciful, or remote fear. A person should not commit a very
o
serious crime on account of a flimsy
2331, January 10, 1951).R
fear (People v. Quilloy, G.R. No. L-
The requisites of this exempting circumstance
are the following: (a)n r The fear
a a
Existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b)
must be real and imminent; and (c) The fear must be ofB
h
Cequal to that committed. s
an injury greater
than or at least
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b causes
Absolutory l
R o
a n a r
h
1. Spontaneous desistance of the person before B commencing any elements of
C2. the felony.
e s
principals of the felonies (Art. b
l
Accessories exempted from prosecution because of their relationship to the
3. Detention or confinement ofo

20, RPC).
R accused who committed a crime or those
confinement (Art.a nRPC).

124, a r
afflicted by violent insanity or ailments requiring compulsory hospital
h B
s
4. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exception circumstances (Art. 247,
RPC). C e
occupants of the dwelling or a third person, or b
5. Trespass to dwelling to prevent some serious harm l to himself, or to the
humanity or justice (Art. 280, RPC). o to render some service to
Rcrimes against property on

n of the property (Art. 344, RPC). ar
6. Persons exempt from criminal liability for
account of their relationship to theaowners
h B
C s
7. Instigation
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Mitigating circumstances
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Mitigatingocircumstances
R
a n a r
h
Differences between privileged mitigating B and ordinary mitigating
C
circumstances:
e s mitigating, cannot be offset by
l
1. Privileged mitigating, unlike ordinary
aggravating circumstances. b
2. Privileged mitigating mayo
R lower penalty by one or two degrees, while
an r
ordinary mitigating only lowers the penalty to the minimum period.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Mitigatingbcircumstances l
R o
a n a r
h
The privileged mitigating circumstances are:
1.C When the offender, who is over 15 buts
B
RPC).
l e below 18, acts with discernment (art. 68,
b
o because of lack of some conditions required
2. Incomplete defense of self, relative, or stranger (art. 69, RPC).
R
3. When crime is not wholly excusable
4. When there are two n r

in the justifying and exempting circumstances (art. 69, RPC).
a a
or more mitigating and no aggravating circumstances, the
Bby law (art. 64, RPC)
h
Court shall impose
C s
the penalty next lower to that prescribed
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Incomplete b l self-defense
R o
a n a r
h unlawful aggression as a conditionB
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of
C
self-defense,
e s sine qua non must be present. There
b l
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an
unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or
imminent. There must be actualo physical force or actual use of a weapon (People v.
R31, 2013, 703 SCRA 94, 109).
an r
Roman, G.R. No. 198110, July
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Minority andbold age l
R o
a n a r
h
A person under 18 years old or over 70.
B
C e s
b l
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b to commit so grave a wrong
Lack of intention
R o
a n a r
the offender at the particular moment whenB
of h
Paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention
e s
Cact, and not to his intention during the planninghe executes or commits the criminal
b l stage. Thus, while it may be argued

that the agreement was only to rob the victims, the perpetrators' acts at the time of
R o
the incident show that the conspiracy not only contemplated the commission of the
Lascuna, G.R. No. 90626,n r

robbery, but also the elimination of any witnesses to the crime (see People v.
a August 18, 1993, 225 SCRA 386).

B a
h s
Sales, G.R. No.C e
See People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116324, January 18, 1996, 252 SCRA 31; People v.
177218, October 3, 2011, 658 SCRA 367)
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Sufficient provocation l
R o
a n a r
h Banyone. In order to be mitigating,
Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended
Cprovocation must be sufficient andeshould

party
s immediately precede the act.
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating
b l
Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
immediately precede the actR

o
which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. That the provocation must
n r
means that there should not be any interval of time
crime by the persona a January 30,

between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the
h B
provoked (Oriente v. People, G.R. No. 156094,
C 366).
2007, 513 SCRA 348,
e s
See People v. Marquez, G.R. No. L-31268, July 31,b l 51 Phil. 260
1929,
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Passion and
o obfuscation
R
a n a r
h B naturally result from a quarrel or
For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from
lawful
s or excitement in the mind of a
Cfight should not be confused with theesentiment
feelings. The turmoil and unreason that
person injured or offended to such l

self-control. The excitement o
b a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and
which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and
come to blows does not R
n far removed from the commission of r
constitute obfuscation. Moreover, the act producing
considerable length aof time, during which the accused mighta

obfuscation must not be the crime by a
h B have regained his

C e s
normal equanimity (People v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 130010, May 26, 1999, 307
SCRA 613, 623-624).
b l
Real, G.R. No. 93436, March 24, 1995, 242R
See U.S. v. Hicks, G.R. No. L-4971, Septembero 23, 1909, 14 Phil. 217; People v.
an r
SCRA 671)
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b grave offense
Vindication of
R o
a n a r
h B
The insult must be of some serious weight and extends to close relatives
Cby affinity within the same degrees.eThe

mentioned
s vindication brother
in the law—spouse, ascendants, descendants, or sister, relatives
b l need not be immediate,

although the Revised Penal Code uses this term. It is enough that it be proximate,
R o
because the law may allow some lapse of time from the insult to its vindication.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b grave offense
Vindication of
R o
a n a r
h Bhim for several times in spite of his
After eloping with the Salome Diokno, the accused was sought for by her brother
Cpleas for mercy. The victim was brought

and
sto the hospital where he died. Later, the
father. When they found him, they stabbed
e
two accused were convicted themlof murder. Is the accused entitled to any
b
Ro
mitigating circumstance?
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Vindication ofb grave offense
R o
a n a r
h B of a grave offense to said
Held: The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of article 13 of the
Caccused, may be taken into consideration

Revised
s in favor of the two accused, because
Penal Code, that is, immediate vindication
e
b
although the elopement took place onl January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the
remained unknown and herR

o
7th of said month and year, the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts
n the time the offense was committed tor

marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there
a to a family of old customs to whomBathe elopement of a

was no interruption from the vindication
daughter with ah
thereof. Accused belong
C e sat the same time spreads
man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes
uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the membersb l thereof (See People v.
disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home and
Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno, G.R. o

R
No.L-45100, October 26, 1936, 63
an r
Phil. 601)
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Voluntary Surrender
R
a n a r
h B to a person in authority or the latter’s
The requisites of voluntary surrender are (a) that the offender had not actually been
C
arrested;
s (People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-
(b) that the offender surrendered himself
e
b
32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47, 56). l
agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary
R obe spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to

n to the authorities either because (a)r
A surrender to be voluntary must
submit himself unconditionally
B a incurred in his
asave them the trouble and expense necessarily acknowledges his
search and captureh

guilt or (b) he wishes to
C e s
(People v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 130010, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA
613, 627).
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Voluntary Surrender
o R
an B a r
C h s
e
In order that he could be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
b l
surrender, it must be shown that the intention of the accused was to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or because
R o
he wished to save them the trouble and expense in looking for him and capturing
an r
him. In the case at bar, accused's purpose in going to the police station was not to give
a
himself up but to clear himself of involvement in the killing because he was not guilty
B
C h
(People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 84332-33, May 8, 1996, 256 SCRA 611, 625).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Physical illness
o R
an B a r
C h s
Physical defect is a mitigating circumstance when the offender is deaf and dumb,
l e
blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
b
action, defense or communication with his fellow beings.
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Illness whichbdiminishes will power
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
Illness which diminishes will power. For illness to mitigate the criminal
b
liability of the offender, it must be such illness as would diminish the
o
R
exercise of will power of the offender without however depriving him of
an r
consciousness of his acts.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Similar or analogous l
circumstances
R o
an B a r
C h s
Similar or analogous circumstances. These would refer to circumstances
l e
which could be considered to have the effect of mitigating the criminal
b
liability of an accused but which are not specifically mentioned in the list
o
R
of mitigating circumstances.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Similar or analogous l
circumstances
R o
an B a r
C h s
Other circumstances which mitigate the criminal liability of an
l e
accused. (a) The purpose of concealing dishonour of the mother is
b
mitigating in infanticide (Art. 255) and in abortion (Art. 258); (b) The
o
R
voluntary release within three days without attaining the purpose and
an r
before criminal prosecution is mitigating in slight illegal detention (Art.
B a
263); and (c) The abandonment of the spouse without justification is
C h
mitigating in adultery (Art. 333).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Aggravating Circumstances
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Aggravating circumstances
R o
a n a r
Aggravating circumstances are based on theB
C h s
greater criminal perversity of the
e of offender, and which, if not offset

offender as shown by the means employed, the time, place and occasion of such
l
commission, and the personal circumstances
b
Ro
by any mitigating circumstances, will increase the penalty to its maximum period.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Aggravatingbcircumstancesl
R o
a n a r
The four kinds of aggravating circumstances B
h
C and s
are:
e
1. Generic—those that can generally apply to all crimes such as dwelling, nighttime
recidivism.
b l
o
2. Specific—those that apply only to particular crimes such as treachery and cruelty
3. Qualifying—those thatR
in crimes against persons, and ignominy in crimes against chastity.
qualifies homicide ton murder, unlawful entry which makes the r

change the nature of the crime such as treachery which
a B a taking robbery, and
C h
abuse of confidence which makes theft qualified.
s
4. Inherent—those
have the effect of increasing the penalty such asl e
that are already a part of the commission of the felony and do not
and the breaking of wall or unlawful entry inbrobbery committed by force upon
abuse of public office in bribery,
things.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b taken of public position
1. Advantage be
R o
a n a r
Advantage be taken of public position. In orderB
C h s
for this aggravating circumstance to
ewhich such office gives him as the means

exist, it is necessary that the person committing the crime be a public official and that
l
he uses the influence, prestige or ascendancy
b
inquiry, “Did the accused abuse hiso
by which he realized his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in this
R
office to commit the crime? (US v. Rodriguez, 19
Phil. 150).
a n a r
See People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-3080, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRAB138; US v. Torrida,
G.R. No. 7450, 7451
h
C 7452, September 18, 1912 es
and
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
ofbor with insult to public authorities
2. Contempto
R
a n a r
h
Contempt of or with insult to public authorities. B The circumstance of contempt of or
insult to public authorities is consideredsaggravating if (1) the person in authority is
C
with
e (2) he is not the person against whom the
l
engaged in the exercise of his functions and
b
o
crime is committed.
R
a n of the offense, or where the offended
who is injured by the commission
a r party is an agent
This is not applicable when it is the public authority himself who is the offended party or
h
of person in authority. B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
3. Disregard ofbrespect and dwelling
R o
a n a r
Disregard of rank, age, sex, or if committedBin dwelling. There are two aggravating
C h s
e in the dwelling of the offended party.
circumstances here namely (1) disregard of respect on account of the rank, age, or sex of the
l
offended party, and (2) that the crime is committed
b
Dwelling is the place of abodeo
R To be aggravating, the crime must be committed not only
where the offended party resides and which satisfies the
in a dwelling but in then r that the latter has

requirements of domestic life.
a a
dwelling of the offended party, provided
B
C h
not given provocation.
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
3. Disregard of respect
R
and dwelling
a n a r
h
Dwelling is aggravating in the following cases:
1. CWhen the deceased was fired upon in his s
B
e
house when he had his back turned (People v.
Ambis, 68 Phil. 635).
l
2. Though the aggressor did not go upbor enter the interior of the house yet the fact that he
entered the ground of the same o
R in death, it is obvious that there was present in the
and went under the house to inflict on the offended party
commission of the crimen r was committed in

the very severed wound resulting
a a
the aggravating circumstance that the same
B
Macarinfas, 40C
h
the dwelling of the offended party (People v. Bautista, 79
s
Phil. 652; US v. Moro
Phil. 1).
e
3. Murder committed on the foot of the staircase of thelhouse (People v. Alcala, 46 Phil.
739).
o b
R January 31, 1957).
4. Dwelling is aggravating if the deceased was dragged from his house to be killed in the
an r
open field (People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-7030,
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
3. Disregard ofbrespect and dwelling
R o
a n a r
hDwelling is not aggravating in the commissionB of the offense in the following
C cases: e s shared the dwelling.
1.
l
If both the offended party and offender
Dwelling does not belongb
o
2. to the offended party.
R
3. The offended party gave provocation.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
4. Abuse of confidence
l
or obvious ungratefulness
R o
a n a r
Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.B
C h In order for this aggravating circumstance
present in the commission of a crime, itsis essential that the confidence must be a
e crime, the culprit taking advantage of the
to be
means of facilitating the commission of the
b l
There must be a relation of trust or o
offended party’s belief that the former would not abuse the confidence reposed in him.
R and that the former make use of such relation to

confidence between the person committing the crime and
an 19 Phil. 150). r
the one against whom it is committed
commit the crime (US v. Rodriguez,
B a
C h s
See People v. Bautista,
e
et. al., G.R. No. L-38624, July 25, 1975,
Nismal, G.R. No. L-51257, June 25, 1982, 114 SCRA 487.l
65 SCRA 460; People v.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
5. Place of commission
o of the crime
R
a n a r
Place of the commission of the crime. The place B
C h of the commission of the crime such
palace of the Chief of Executive, officessof persons in authority, or churches, is
ereligious functions are being held at the
as the
l
aggravating regardless of whether official or
time of the commission of the crime. b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
6. Nighttime, uninhabited
R
place, or by a band
a n a r
h
Night time, uninhabited place or by a band. B The circumstances of nighttime,
C
uninhabited
e s
place or by a band, if they concur jointly in the commission of a felony may
b l
be accidents of only one aggravating circumstance but this does not exclude the
o
possibility of their being considered separately when their elements are distinctly
R
perceived and can subsist independently revealing a greater degree of perversity.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
6. Nighttime,ouninhabited place, or by a band
R
a n a r
h B
In construing the provision of the Penal Code relating to nocturnity, it was repeatedly held
C
that
e s
nocturnity would be considered as an aggravating circumstance only when it appeared
that
b l
o
1. it was especially sought by the offender or
R
2. that he had taken advantage thereof in order to facilitate the commission of the crime
or
a n (see People v. Matbagon, G.R. No.
3. for the purpose of impunity
a rL-42465, November
h
12, 1934, 60 Phil. 887). B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
6. Nighttime, uninhabited
l
place, or by a band
R o
a n a r
Nighttime is that period of darkness beginning B
h s
C be considered aggravating when theecommission
cannot
at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. It
of the crime began at daytime.
Uninhabited place is aggravating when b l

help to the victim is difficult and o
the crime is committed in solitary place, where
R of, to facilitate the commission of the offense.

escape of the accused is easy, provided that solitude was
an r
purposely sought or taken advantage
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o uninhabited place, or by a band
6. Nighttime,
R
a n a r
A band is consists of more than three armed B
C h s
malefactors. When more than three
e
armed malefactors take part in the commission of a crime, it shall be deemed to
have been committed by a band.
b l
o
Requisites:
R
1. There must be at least 4 persons
All of them must n

abe principal by direct participation. Bar
2. At least 4 of them must be armed
3.
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
7. Occasion of public l
calamity
R o
a n a r
Occasion of public calamity. The reason forB
C h form of criminality met in one who,s
this circumstance is found in the
e suffering by taking advantage of their

debased in the midst of a great calamity, instead
l
of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their
b
Ro
misfortune to despoil them (US v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o men
8. Aid of armed
R
a n a r
With aid of armed men or persons who insure B
theC
h
aid of armed men is sufficient for actual s
or afford impunity. Reliance upon
e
aid is not necessary.
b l
Ro
Remember: The armed men or persons must not take direct part in the execution of
the crime.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
9. Recidivismob
R
a n a r
Recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time B
C h s
of his trial for one crime, shall have been
e
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the
Revised Penal Code.
b l
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
9. Recidivism b l
R o
an B a r
h
Distinctions between recidivism and habitual delinquency.
1.
C s
In recidivism, it is sufficient that the accused, at the time of his trial for one crime,
e
l
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced
o b
in the same title of the Code; in habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified,
namely: serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or
falsification. R
an a r
2. Recidivism must be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance if the
h B
essential requisites are present, no matter how many years have intervened
C s
between the previous conviction and the time of the trial for the new crime; while
e
b l
habitual delinquency requires that within a period of ten years from the date of his
release or last conviction of the crimes specified, he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
9. Recidivism b l
R o
an B a r
h
Distinctions between recidivism and habitual delinquency.
C
3.
s
In recidivism, it is sufficient if there has been a final conviction for the second
e
l
offense embraced in the same title; in habitual delinquency, the accused must have
4.
o b
been found guilty the third time or oftener of any of the crimes specified.
As to their effects, recidivism, if not offset by a mitigating circumstance, serves to
R
increase the penalty only to the maximum; whereas, if there is habitual
an a r
delinquency, an additional penalty is imposed.
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
9. Recidivism
R
an B a r
h
Quasi-recidivism. Any person who shall commit a felony or an offense after having
C s
been convicted by a final judgment but before beginning to serve sentence, or while
e
l
serving the same, shall be punished with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
b
by the law for the new felony (art. 160, RPC).
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o or habituality
10. Reiteracion
R
an B a r
h
Reiteracion or habituality. Reiteracion is based on one previous conviction for an equal
C s
or greater felony or more than one conviction for lighter offenses. The felonies need not
e
l
be under the same title, as in recidivism, nor for specified felonies as in habitual
delinquency.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b of price, reward or promise
11. In consideration
R o
a n a r
price, h B the person so induced. When a felony
In consideration of price, reward or promise. The generic aggravating circumstance of
C by one because of the inducement s of another thru price, reward or promise,

reward or promise is taken into account against
e
is committed
b l
both are principals—one by direct participation and the other by inducement.
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b inundation, fire, poison, explosion
12. By meansoof
R
an B a r
h
By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, derailment of
C s
locomotives or any other artifice involving great waste or ruin. The killing of the
e
l
victim by means of such circumstances as inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
b
shipwreck, derailment of locomotives, qualifies it murder.
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
13. Evidento
premeditation
R
an B a r
h
Evident premeditation. In order for this circumstance to be taken into account as
C
aggravating, it is necessary
e s
l
(a) to establish the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
o b
(b) a notorious act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow
R
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o or disguise
14. Craft, fraud
R
an B a r
h
Craft, fraud or disguise. These are three separate aggravating circumstances
C s
1. Craft involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused.
e
l
2. Fraud in contracts is defined as insidious words or machination of one party
not have agreed to.

o b
whereby the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would
3.
R
Disguise includes any device to conceal the identity of the offender in the
an a r
commission of the felony.
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
15. Abuse of superior l strength or means to weaken
the defense ob
R
Abuse ofa
n a r
h B be taken of superior strength
superior strength or means employed to weaken the defense. There are two
C(b) means be employed to weaken the

circumstances
sdefense of the offended party.
involved here, namely (a) advantage
e
l
and
1.
o
The first circumstance dependsb upon the relative strength of the one attacking
Rhave abused such superiority.
and the one attacked. There must be evidence that the accused were
an a r
physically stronger and
h contemplates the use ofB

2.
defense, asC
The second circumstance
e s means to weaken the
or in having made the deceased intoxicated. l

when the offender throws acid or sand into the eyes of the victim
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
16. Treachery b l
R o
a n a r
h B
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are
Cshown: e s
the malefactor employed means,
b l method, or manner of execution affording the
o of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted

person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and
the means, method or manner
R
SCRA 1, 12). an r
by the offender (People v. Canaveras, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013, 711
B a
C h s or where the sudden
Treachery is not
e
present when the killing is not premeditated,
l
infuriation on the part of the deceased as a resultbof a provocative act of the victim, or
attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden
R o
when the killing is done at the spur of the moment (People v. Likiran, G.R. No. 201858,
an r
June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 217, 227).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
16. Treachery b l
R o
a n a r
Treachery cannot be presumed, exceptions. TheBaggravating circumstance of treachery
C h proven as fully as the crime itself.sTreachery cannot simply be deduced from
presumption, except in the following cases: e
should be
Minor children, who by reason ofb

l
o
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
R 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 582, 609).

defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists (People v.
When the victim was tiedn r wounds and his

Umawid, G.R. No. 207990, June
a a
elbow to elbow with his body sustaining many
B
first seized andC
h
head cut off, treachery is considered (US v. Santos, 1 Phil. 222,
s
224-22) or if a person is
slained either by the person who reduced him to l e

bound, with a view to rendering him incapable of defense, and he is then
b
his helpless state or by another,"
o
alevosia is present (see People v. Mongado, G.R. No. L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
642)
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
16. Treachery b l
R o
a n a r
h
Remember: Btreachery must be present in the
1. C
e
When the aggression or attack is continuous, s
beginning of the assault.
2. When the aggression or attack b
l
o
is not continuous, in that there was an
blow was given (see U.S. v. R

interruption, it is sufficient that treachery was present at the moment the fatal
an r
Balagtas)
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
16. Treachery
R
a n a r
h
Treachery may be deemed to absorb: B
C 2. Means to weaken the defensees
1. Abuse of superior strength
b l
o
3. Aid of armed men
R
4. Night time
6. By a band n r
5. Craft
a B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
17. Ignominy b l
R o
a n a r
h B
Ignominy. Ignominy is caused by circumstances which add suffering and humiliation to
Cthe victim. e s
b l
o
There is ignominy when the accused ordered the victim to exhibit to them her complete
R of the crime more humiliating (see People v. Jose, G.R.

nakedness for about ten minutes before raping her that brought about a circumstance
No. L-28232, February 6,n r

which tended to make the effects
a 1971, 37 SCRA 450). B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
18-20. Unlawful lentry, breaking of wall, roof, etc.,
aid of persons o b
15 years old
R
a n a r
h B
18. Unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way
C not intended for the purpose. es
b l
commission of the crime.o
19. Breaking of wall, roof, floor, others. The breaking must be a means to the
R
a
20. With aid or persons r others. This
nunder fifteen or by means of motoravehicles,
h B
contains two separate and distinct aggravating circumstances, namely (1) with the
under 15 years old; or (b) by means ofsvehicles, airships, and other
C
aid of persons
e
similar means
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
21. Cruelty b l
R o
a n a r
h B
Cruelty. For cruelty to be considered an aggravating circumstance, it is essential that
wrong done in the commission of thescrime be deliberately augmented and that
Cthe e
a specific aggravating circumstanceb
l
such wrong is unnecessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the offender. It is
o
in crimes against persons.
R
Requisites:
a
2. That the other wrong n be unnecessary for the execution aof rthe purpose of the
1. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other wrong; and
offender.
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
21. Cruelty b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
e
The test in appreciating cruelty as anlaggravating circumstance is whether the
o b
accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another
R
wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim’s
an16, 2009, 604 SCRA 216, 236-237).Bar

suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse (People v. Bernabe,
G.R. No 185726. October
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Qualifying circumstances
R o
a n a r
1.
h B
Use of unlicensed firearms in the commission of an offense (P.D. 1866, as
C2. amended by R.A. 8294).
e s of a crime by an offender (sec. 25,
l
Use of dangerous drugs in the commission
b
Commission of the crimeo
R.A. 9165).
R
3. by an organized or syndicated crime group (art. 62,
Commission of then r
RPC).
4.
a a
crime with abuse of public position (Art. 148)
B
5.
h
Those listed under Art. 148.
C s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C es
Rules on the lappreciation of mitigating and
aggravating o b
circumstances
R
a n a r

h B
Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially
C punishable s
e not be taken into account for the purpose of
by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
l
prescribing the penalty therefor shall
b
o
increasing the penalty.
the thing (Art. 299,R

Examples: unlawful entry or breaking of doors in robbery through force upon
an r
Art. 302) and abuse of confidence in qualified theft (Art.
310).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Rules on the appreciation of mitigating and
bl
aggravating circumstances
o
R
a n a r
h
The same rule shall apply with respect to any B aggravating circumstance inherent in
Cthe e
crime to such a degree that it must s of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.
b
Examples: relationship in parricide
l
o
(Art. 246); sex in crimes against chastity (Art.
R
333), and abuse of public position in bribery (Art. 210).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Rules on the lappreciation of mitigating and
aggravating o
b
circumstances
R
a n a r
h
Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which B arise from the moral attributes of the
or from his private relationsswith the offended party, or from any other
Coffender, e or mitigate the liability of the principals,
l
personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate
accomplices and accessories as to b
o
whom such circumstances are attendant.
of the offender. MinorityR

Examples: Passion and obfuscation are circumstances arising from the moral attributes
an r
is a circumstance pertaining to cause personal to offender.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Rules on theblappreciation of mitigating and
o
aggravating circumstances
R
a n a r

h B
The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the
C means s
e of them at the time of the execution of the
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability
l
of those persons only who had knowledge
act or their cooperation therein b
o
(see Art. 62, RPC).
R thereof at the time of execution.

Examples: Treachery and cruelty in murder would aggravate the liability of
an r
persons who had knowledge
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Alternative Circumstancesl
R o
a n a r
h B
1. The alternative circumstances of relationship, intoxication, and degree of
Cinstruction s
e its commission.
may be aggravating or mitigating depending on the nature and effects
l
of the crime and the other conditions attending
b
o
2. The nature of the relationship which may either aggravate or mitigate the criminal
Radopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the

liability exists where the injured person is the spouse, ascendant, descendant,
a n rule, relationship is mitigatingainrcrimes against

legitimate or illegitimate or
same degree. As a general
h B
property, and is even exempting in theft, estafa and malicious mischief. It is
aggravating inCcrimes against chastity. e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Alternative Circumstances
R o
a n a r
3.
h B
Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be taken
C
into consideration as a mitigating circumstances
e or subsequent to the plan to commit the
when the offender committed a felony in a
l
state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual
b
aggravating circumstance (Peopleo
said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
R
v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160
4.
SCRA 47, 55).
a n must present proof that he hadartaken a quantity of
The person pleading intoxication
h B
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient
and at the same time, he must prove s
to produce the effect
C
of blurring his reason;
e that not only was intoxication
b
not habitual but also that his imbibing the alcohol drinkl was not intended to fortify his
o
resolve to commit the crime (People v. Laroy Buenaflor, G.R. No. 93752, July 15, 1992,
211 SCRA 492, 500).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Alternative Circumstances
R o
a n a r
Lack of instruction is generally mitigating,B
h
Cchastity. s
except in crimes against property and
l e
Should the accused abuse his educational
circumstances must be considered as aggravating.
attainment to commit a felony, the
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
PersonsbCriminally Liable for Felonies
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Criminal participation
l
R o
a n a r
h
Principals B
s not only in the criminal resolution
CPrincipals by direct participation participate
e
but also proceed to personally take b
l
o
part in the perpetration of the crime.
R
in the criminal resolution, proceed togetherr
those who, participating n
The expression those who take a direct part in the commission of the deed means
a B a to perpetrate
C h
the crime and personally take part in the same end (see People
s
v. Tamayo, 44
Phil. 38).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Criminal participation l
R o
a n a r
h
To be a principal by inducement, it is necessary that B the inducement should precede the
of the offense and be the direct andsdetermining factor thereof.
C
commission
e the person coerced would be exempt
l
If the inducement should amount to violence,
b
o
from criminal liability, if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force (art. 12,
R
par. 5).
nby that aggravating circumstance asaagainst r persons who

If the inducement should consist of a price, reward or promise, the commission of the
a
felony would be attended
h
offered them (art. 12, par. 11). B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
a n a r
h B
To be a principal by indispensable cooperation,
in the criminal resolution, a s
it is essential that there must be
Cparticipation e by performing another act without which it
conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and
l
cooperation in the commission of the offense
would not have been accomplished.b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
a n a r
h
Accomplices B
C e s
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements l
Revised Penal Code, in order that a personbmay be considered an accomplice, namely,
required, in accordance with Article 18 of the
R
(1) that there by community of design; o that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by
n
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
a execution by previous or simultaneous a
r
or moral aid in the execution of the crime inB
(2) that he cooperates in the act, with the intention of
supplying material h
Ca relation between the acts done by theesprincipal and those attributed to
an efficacious way;
(3) and that there be
the person charged as accomplice (People v. Gambao,lG.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013,
706 SCRA 508, 529).
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
a n a r
Criminal liability of second spouse in bigamy.B
C h s
In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
who knowingly consents or agrees to be e

Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or woman,
l married to another already bound in lawful
wedlock is guilty as an accomplice inbthe crime of bigamy.” Therefore, her conviction
o
July 15, 2015, 763 SCRA 54, 63).R
should only be that for an accomplice to the crime (Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233,
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
l
R o
a n a r
h
Liability B
of the wife who fed the victim kidnapped by her husband. The act of
C food by the wife to the kidnapped
giving
e s victim was not essential and
indispensable for the perpetration oflthe crime of kidnapping for ransom by the
o
husband but merely an expression b of sympathy or feeling of support to her
R
husband. Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De
n
a as that of an accomplice Brather
Vera, where it was stressed r
a than that of a
that in case of doubt, the participation of the
C h
offender will be considered
s 2014, 733 SCRA 608,
principal (People v.
e
Yao, G.R. No. 208170, August 20,
l
b
629-631).
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
l
R o
a n a r
h
Accessories B nor cooperate in the commission of
C
An accessory does not participate in the
e
criminals of the crime, he subsequently take part in
design
l
the felony, but with knowledge of the commission
b
o
any of the three ways:
R
profiting by the effects of the crime;
assisting in the escapen r abuse of public

concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime; and
a of the principaal provided he acts with
B a
h
functions, or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder,
the life of theCChief Executive, or is known to be habituallys
or an attempt to take
l e guilty of some other
b
crime.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
l
R o
a n a r
h B
Two types of accessories by harboring or concealing an offender:
C Public e s
officer who abuses his official position in harboring, concealing or assisting
the principal to escape
b l
Private person who harbors, conceals,
o
or assists the principal of the crime of
R
treason, parricide, murder or attempt to take the life of the Chief executive to
an r
escape
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
l
R o
a n a r
h
The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping B for ransom is the fact that an
C
individual has been in any manner deprived s
e person. To prove the corpus delicti,
of his liberty for the purpose of
l
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
it is sufficient for the prosecution tob
o
be able to show that (1) a certain fact has
Rresponsible for the act (People v. SP01 Catalino

been proven — say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and (2) a
Gonzales, G.R. No. 192233,n r

particular person is criminally
a February 17, 2016). B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
l
R o
a n a r
Article 19, paragraph 2 defines "accessories"B
h
Ccommission s
as those who, with knowledge of the
or accomplices, take part subsequent

l e to its commission by concealing or
of the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals
destroying the body of the crime,b

discovery (Padernal v. People, o
its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its
R found the accused liable for obstruction of justice

G.R. No. 18111, August 17, 2015, 766 SCRA 614, 627-
an1829. r
628). Note: The Supreme Court
under Section 1(b) of P.D.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
l
R o
a n a r
h
Exemption from criminal liability
B
Cpenalties prescribed for accessories shall
e snot be imposed upon those who are such
The
b l
with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, illegitimate, and
single exception of accessories R

o
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the
an r
falling within paragraph 1 of Article 19 (Art. 20, RPC).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Anti-Fencing Law (PD
b l 1612)
R o
an B a r
h
C for another, shall buy, receive, possess,eskeep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
Fencing. Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
or shall buy and sell, or in anyb l manner deal in any article, item, object or
other
anything of value which heo
R of the crime of robbery or theft (sec. 2a, P.D. No.
knows, or should be known to him, to have been
an r
derived from the proceeds
1612).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l 1612)
R o
an B a r
h
C (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been scommitted;
e
Elements of fencing. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
b l
(2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft,o
R and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
nof value, which has been derived fromatherproceeds of the

sells or disposes, or buys
a
object or anything
B
(3) the accusedh
crime of robbery or theft;
knew or should have shown that the s
C e of the crime of robbery
said article, item, object or
or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of theb

l
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
accused, intent to gain for himself
or for another (see Francisco v. People, o
R
G.R. No. 146584, July 12, 2004).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l 1612)
R o
an B a r
h
Cor anything of value which has been the ssubject of robbery or thievery shall
e
Presumption of fencing. Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object,
b
be prima facie evidence of fencing l
(sec. 5, P.D. No. 1612).
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l 1612)
R o
an B a r
h
C prima facie presumption of fencing efroms evidence of possession by the accused
Malum prohibitum. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
of any good, article, item, objectborlanything of value which has been the subject
o
R subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove
of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
n r adduced
property. The stolen property
a
fencing. It is merely corroborative
a
of the testimonies and other evidence
B
C h
by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing (see Dizon v. Pamintuan, 234
s
e
SCRA 63).
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l 1612)
R o
an B a r
h
C The words "should know" denote s the fact that a person of
e
Should know standard to determine the mental element of fencing.
b l
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his dutyo
upon assumption thatR
to another or would govern his conduct
an r
such fact exists (see Ong v. People, G.R. No.
190475, April 10, 2013).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Plurality of Crimes
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Plurality of crimes
R
a n a r
sameh individual of different criminal acts uponB
Plurality of crimes. Plurality of crimes consists in the successive execution by the
C e s any of which no conviction has yet
and (2) real or material plurality.

b l
been declared. There are two kinds of plurality of crimes: (1) formal or ideal plurality,
Ro
n r
Complex crimes
a B a
one criminal liabilityh
Article 48 provides for two cases of formal or ideal plurality of crimes. There is but
C in this kind of plurality.
e s
b
In real or material plurality, there are different crimesl in law as well as in the
R o
conscience of the offender. In such cases, the offender shall be punished for each and
an r
every offense that he committed.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Plurality of crimes l
R o
a n a r
h B crimes defined under Art. 48
Plural crimes of the formal or ideal type are divided into three groups:
C of the RPC. s
When the offender commits any of the complex
e
When the law specially fixes alsingle penalty for two or more offenses
b
Ro
committed.
When the offender commits
an r
continued crimes.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
a n a r
h
Complex crimes vis-à-vis composite crimes
B
C e sthe specified combination of crimes is
b l
In a composite crime, the penalty for
specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to
the most serious offense, to beo
R the commission of a complex or compound crime
imposed in the maximum period.
A light felony that accompanies
a
may be made the subjectn of a separate information, but aa rlight felony that
h
accompanies a composite crime is absorbed (People v. Esugon,B G.R. No. 195244,
C
June 22, 2015, 759 SCRA 666, 682).
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
an B a r
h
Complex crimes vis-à-vis composite crimes
C e s

l
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a
b
complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but
R
means to commit the other.
o
generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
an B a r
h
The first kind of complex crime has the following requisites: (1) that only a single act is
C s
performed by the offender; (2) that the single act produces (a) two or more grave
e
less grave felonies.
b l
felonies, or (2) one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies, or (c) two or more
R o
The single act of throwing a hand grenade produces multiple murders and attempted
murders (see People v. Guillen, .G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950, 85 Phil. 307,
318-319).
an B a r
C h
The utterance of a defamatory statement made on a single occasion against a family
s
of lawyers designated by their common surname but not separately mentioned is
l e
only one offense of grave oral defamation (see People v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. L-8777-
79, August 14, 1956, 99 Phil. 713, 716).
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
an B a r
h
An offense is a necessary means for committing the other when the following requisites
C
are present:
e s
at least two offenses are committed;
b l
one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other;
o
both or all the offenses must be punished under the Revised Penal Code.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Plurality of crimes
R
an B a r
h
Rebellion cannot be complexed with a common crime. The Hernandez ruling
C s
remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
e
b l
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
228). R o
rebellion (see Enrile v Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217,
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Plurality of crimes
R
an B a r
h
Continued crime. A continued (continues or continuing crime) is a single crime consisting of
C s
a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.
e
b l
Under sound principles, the act of taking two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in
R o taken belonged to two distinct persons. There is no

the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental
circumstance that the article unlawfully
n
series of acts here for the accomplishment r
a the existence of only one crimeBa(see People v. De Leon,
of different purposes, but only of one which was
49 Phil. 437, 440-441). h

consummated, and which determines
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
an B a r
h
Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery
C s
with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical
e
b l
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a
special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
R o
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Plurality of crimes
o R
an B a r
h
Kidnapping with rape
C e s
b l
No matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these
R o
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty (People v. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Plurality of crimes
R
an B a r
h
Forcible abduction with rape
C e s
b l
Remember: If the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several
times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in
R o
as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the
other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape (see People v. Felipe
an a r
Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011; People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
B
C h
141125, February 28, 2002).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
R o
a n a r
h
Robbery with homicide
B
CWhen a homicide takes place by reasoneofs or on the occasion of the robbery, all those
who took part shall be guilty of thelspecial complex crime of robbery with homicide
o
whether they actually participated
bin the killing, unless there is proof that there was an
R
endeavor to prevent the killing
754 SCRA 214 citing v.n
(People v. Orosco, G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015,
a People v. Baron, 635 Phil. 608, 624).

a r
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
Plurality of crimes
R
a n a r
h at gunpoint inside her house. B
Accused and her companions took from the victim a total amount of
C
P2,701,000.00
s What crime was committed?
ehouse and robbery with violence against or
b
Complex crime of robbery in inhabitedl
o
intimidation of persons (Fransdilla
SCRA 164; R
v. People, G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015, 756
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Plurality of o
crimes
R
a n a r
h
Robbery with rape
B
CFor a conviction of the crime of robberyeswith rape to stand, it must be shown that the
b
robbery shall have been accompanied l with rape. This special complex crime under
R
intent of the accused was to
o
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original
take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to
n
another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an r
a 656 SCRA 579). a accompanying crime
h
(see People vs. Evangelio,
B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
Extinguishment of Criminal Liability
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o extinguishment of criminal liability
Modes of total
R
a n a r
h liability is totally extinguished: B
s
Criminally
C(1) By the death of the convict,;
e
(2) By service of sentence;
b l
o
(3) By amnesty;
(4) By absolute pardon;
R
npenalty; and
(5) By prescription of the crime;
(6) By prescription ofathe a r
h of the offended woman with the offenderB
s
(7) By the marriage (Art. 89, RPC).
C e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Modes of totalbextinguishment of criminal liability
R o
an B a r
h
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
C s
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is
e
l
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
o b
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case (People v. Broca, G.R. No.
R
201447, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 369, 374-376).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
Modes of totalbextinguishment of criminal liability
R o
an B a r
h
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
C s
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
e
l
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
o b
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case (People v. Broca, G.R. No. 201447, August 28,
2013, 704 SCRA 369, 374-376). R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o crimes
Prescription of
R
an B a r
h
1. Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in
C
twenty years.
e s
l
2. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
o b
3. Those punishable by correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years with the exception
of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
R
4. The crime of libel or similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
an a r
5. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
h
6. Light offenses prescribe in two months.
B
C e s
l
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the
article (Art. 90, RPC).

o b
basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
ofbcrimes
Prescriptiono
l
R
an B a r
h
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
C s
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted
e
l
by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
o b
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall
R
not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Prescription ofbpenalties l
R o
an B a r
h
The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:
C s
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
e
l
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
o b
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of
arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
R
4. Light penalties, in one year (Art. 92, RPC).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
ofbPenalties
Prescription o
R
an B a r
h
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when
C s
the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
e
l
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country
o b
with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription (Art. 93, RPC).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Prescription of l offenses punished under special
law o b
R
arlaws
anperiods of offenses punished underBspecial
h
Prescriptive
C month, or both, prescribe after 1 eyear.s

1. Offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
b
2. Offenses punished by imprisonment l for more than one month, but less than two
3. Offenses punished byR o

years, prescribe after 4 years.
imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years,
anby imprisonment for six years orBmore, arprescribe after 12

prescribe after 8 years.
h
4. Offenses punished
C
years (see Act 3763).
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b Principles of Penalties
Basic
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b
Scale of Penalties l
R o
a n a r
Scaleh B
1.CDeath s
1
l e
2.
3.
Reclusion Perpetua
Reclusion Temporal
o b
4. Prision Mayor
R
an r
5. Prision Correccional
B a
h
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Destierro
C e s
l
8. Arresto Menor
9.
10.
Public Censure
Fine
o b
R
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b
Scale of Penalties l
R o
a n a r
Scaleh B
1.CPerpetual absolute disqualification s
2
2. Temporary absolute disqualificationl

e
b
follow a profession or callingo
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, and the right to
R
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4. Public censure
B a
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5. Fine
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Duration of penalties l
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1. Reclusión perpetua: 20 yrs. and 1 day to 40 yrs.
a a r
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C s
2. Reclusión temporal: 12 yrs. and 1 day to 20 yrs.
l e
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3. Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification: 6 yrs. and 1 day to 12 yrs., except
Ro
when disqualification is an accessory penalty, in which case its duration is that of
the principal penalty.
4. Prisión correccional,a
n a rto 6 yrs., except
is an accessory penalty, in which case its B
suspension and destierro: 6 mos. and 1 day
when suspensiónh
C e s duration is that of the
l
principal penalty.
5. Arresto mayor: 1 mo. And 1 day to 6 mos.

o b
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6. Arresto menor :1 day to 30 days
a n a r
h B is
discretionary on the court. C
7. Bond to keep the peace: the period
s
during which the bond shall be effective
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b l
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b
Accessory penalties l
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Death, when not executed by reason of commutation or pardon: (a) Perpetual absolute
C s
disqualification, and (b) Civil interdiction during 30 years, if not expressly remitted in the
e
pardon.
b l
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Reclusión perpetua and reclusión temporal: (a) Civil interdiction for life or during the
sentence, and (b) Perpetual absolute disqualification, unless expressly remitted in the
an
pardon of the principal penalty.
B a r
C h s
Prisión mayor: (a) Temporary absolute disqualification, and (b) Perpetual special
l e
disqualification from suffrage, unless expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal
penalty.
o b
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C e s
b
Accessory penalties l
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C h s
Prisión correccional: (a) Suspension from public office, profession or calling, and (b)
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Perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, if the duration of imprisonment exceeds
b
18 months, unless expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal penalty.
o
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There is perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, only when the duration of the
an
imprisonment exceeds 18 months.
B a r
C h s
Arresto: (a) Suspension of the right to hold office and (b) the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence.
l e
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IndeterminatebSentence Law (Act 4103)
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C Disqualified offenders: s
l e
1. Those convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life
imprisonment.
o b
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2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason.
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3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition,
espionage.
B a
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4. Those convicted of piracy.
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5. Habitual delinquents
b l
6. Persons who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
7. Those who have been granted pardon but violated the terms thereof.
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8. Those convicted by maximum prison term of one year.
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b l
o Sentence Law
Indeterminate
R
a n a r
1.hCrimes punished under the RPC. TheBmaximum term shall be taken in the
How to determine the maximum and minimum sentences.
C penalty that can be properly imposede sunder the RPC considering the attending
b l
circumstances. The minimum penalty shall be taken within any period of the
R o
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law.
special laws. The maximum term shall not exceed
n by law and the minimum shall not r
2. Offenses punished under
a by the said law.

the maximum fixed
B a be less than the
C h
minimum prescribed
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C es
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l
IndeterminatebSentence Law
R o
a n a r
h
Illustrations:
B
CSupposed the crime committed is ehomicide,s
reclusion temporal.
b l where the proper penalty is
R o will require the fixing of the minimum sentence

Fixing the indeterminate sentence,
n
ashall be:
which must be taken from
a r
the penalty next lower in degree, prision mayor. The
h
indeterminate sentence
B
s in its proper period.
Cin any of its range to Reclusion Temporal
e
Prision Mayor
b l
R o
Remember the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are considered only in
an r
the maximum sentence.
B a
C h s
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IndeterminatebSentence Law
R o
a n a r
h B
Supposed the crime is only frustrated homicide
CLower the penalty for homicide by eones degree first considering the rule in
b l
determining the penalty for frustrated crimes. Thus, the proper penalty will be
prision mayor.
R o
a n
Then fix the indeterminate
a
sentence, following the procedure r in the first
illustration.
h B
C sentence shall be: e s
The indeterminate
b l
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Prision Correccional in any of its range to Prision Mayor in its proper period.
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C e s
b l
o Sentence Law
Indeterminate
R
a n a r
h B
Supposed the crime is a complex crime of homicide with direct assaults
s for complex crime must be the penalty
CConsidering Art. 48 provides that the penalty
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for the graver offense to be imposed
b l in the maximum, the proper penalty shall be
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reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
Article 48 to fix the a

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The indeterminate sentence
a r
must take into consideration also the prescription of
h B
penalty in its maximum period, thus the indeterminate sentence
shall be:
C e s
Prision mayor maximum period in any of its l
o b range to Reclusion Temporal
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maximum in its proper period.
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e ssimultaneous service of
l
Three-fold rule and
b
sentence o
R
a n a r
h
Three-fold rule
B
Cmaximum of the convict’s sentence shallesnot be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of thel
The
o b
which he may be liable shall be inflicted
penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to
after the sum total of those imposed equals the
R period shall in no case exceed forty (Art. 70).
same maximum period. Such maximum
a n a r
h
Simultaneous service of sentence
B
When the culprit C e sserve them simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties permit. Otherwise, the order l
has to serve two or more penalties, he shall
followed (Art. 70). o b of their respective severity shall be
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C e s
Probation (P.D. 1990)
b l
R o
a n a r
h
Purposes of Probation: B of an offender by
s
C providing him with individualizedetreatment;
promote the correction and rehabilitation
1.
provide an opportunity for b

l
o if he were to serve a prison sentence;
2. the reformation of a penitent offender
R
which might be less probable
an of offenses. r
and
B a
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prevent the commission
3.
C e s
b l
R o
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C es
R
a n r
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C e s
Probation (P.D. 1990)
b l
R o
a n a r
hDisqualified offenders: B
1. Those sentenced to serve maximumsterm of imprisonment of more than
C 6 years. e
b l
o
2. Those convicted of subversion or any crime against national security or
R
the public order.
offense punished n r and one

3. Those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
a a
by imprisonment of not less than one month
B
C h
day or fine of not less than 200 pesos.
s
4. Those who
e
have been once on probation under PD 968.
l
b
5. Those who are already serving sentence at the time PD 968 became
6. Those who have perfected an appeal. o

applicable.
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C e s
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Amendment onb the Probation Law
R o
a n a r
h 1. Section 4 of Presidential DecreeB
Camended to read as follows:
SECTION
e s No. 968, as amended, is hereby further
b l
o
“SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
Rby said defendant within the period for perfecting an
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a probationable
an of the sentence and place theBdefendantar on probation

penalty and upon application
for such period h

appeal, suspend the execution
application forCprobation shall be entertained or granted s if the defendant has

and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No
e
b
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: l Provided, That when a
R
reviewed, and such judgment is modified through
o
judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or
the imposition of a probationable
penalty, the defendant shall be allowed n
a becomes final.
to apply for probation based on the
a r
h
modified decision before such decision
B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
Amendment b l on the Probation Law
R o
a r shall be filed in the trial
n for probation based on the modifiedadecision
courth B a non-probationable penalty was
The application
C or in the trial court where suchecase s has since been re-raffled. In a case
where the judgment of conviction imposing
l
rendered,
involving several defendants where some
o
defendants may apply for probation by b have taken further appeal, the other
submitting a written application and attaching
R
thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of conviction.
anreceipt of the application filed, suspend

B a r
the sentence imposedh
“The trial court shall, upon the execution of
C in the judgment.
e s
b
“This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefitl of probation should he
penalty. R o
seek a review of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
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C e s
Amendment b l on the Probation Law
R o
an B a r
h
C“An order granting or denying probationesshall not be appealable (Republic Act No.
10707, November 26, 2015).”
b l
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
Live long and Prosper!!!
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es

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R

law and jurisprudence namely those provided b l in (1)treaties or treaty

any business or occupation,

C Meanwhile, the United States emilitary s authorities shall

representatives as enunciated under the lVienna Convention on

C military or civilian, suspected

R o all so may it be punished by all.

R differently, a person charged with a

R and punishes such action; or

a n or makes it greater than it was whenacommitted;

imposes a penalty or deprivation ofb

R such as the protection of a former conviction or

a n of amnesty (see Salvador v. Mapa,arJr., G.R. No.

stresses the objective standard of crime e

b l and imposes a proportionate punishment

Rand to achieve social defense because it takes the

a n a social and natural phenomenon.

payment of fine for the R

R Information describes the thing taken as

are the services and business of respondento

G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014, n SCRA 18, 43-44).

administrative liability. Even ifnthe Ombudsman may no longer r

exemplary damages may beb

R for this purpose need not be specifically

a n and can be either a qualifying

e tried. This rule was enacted to

ROctober 5, 2015, 772 SCRA 1, 14-16).

5, 2016, the Court R

a n whereby it adopted certain

perpetna, the Court has thereby R

damages, P75,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P75,000.00 for r

and until his guilt isR

 Principle of lenity. Intimately related to l e

that is prejudicial to the accusedR

to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation r

which is more lenient toh

a n is able to refute the presumption

deliberate intent and there is b

2. General elements ofn crimes. Every crime has two elements:r

Rcircumstances in the Revised Penal Code

Absent the malicious intent to injure or kill R

See U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, Marcho

17, 1915, 31 Phil. 308 and People v. Delaar

consequences of one’s act does noteexempt the accused from criminal

September 21, 2007,R

a n cannot be absorbed by a malum

R G.R. No. 149995,

September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA

doubt is resolved in favoro

275, par. 1). b l

n allegiance to the Philippines, withoutarbeing a

logical consequences of the R

a n Page, G.R. No. 3707, June 7, 1977,ar

cause, which, in natural and continuous

have occurred (see Bataclan v.o

R 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 458; Filomeno Urbano v.

a n G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988,ar

l e sequence, unbroken by any efficient

act of the victim (see Luis B.R

Principle of lenity. Intimately related to l e