A.

Background

Islamic ethics as a discipline or a subject does not exist at the present. We do

not have works that define its concept, outline its issues, and discuss its problems.
What we have, instead, is a discussion by various writers philosophers, theologians,
jurisprudents, sufis and political and economic theorists in their particular fields of
some issues that are either part of, or relevant to, Islamic ethics.

The study of Islamic ethics, whether philosophical or theological, grew out of

early discussions of the questions of predetermination (qadar), obligation (taklif) and
the injustices of temporal rulers, particularly the caliphs. Early writers on ethics from
the Mu'tazila school were probably influenced by Greek philosophy. By the third
century ah (ninth century ad) a clearly discernible current of philosophical ethics
began to take shape, with strong influences from Greek ethics including Stoicism,
Platonism and Aristotelianism.

Al-Kindi, the first genuine philosopher of Islam, appears from his extant ethical
writings to have been particularly influenced by Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic.
Other classical influences can be seen in the work of Platonists such as Abu Bakr al-
Razi, who followed Plato's division of the parts of the souls, and Neoplatonists such
as al-Farabi, while Aristotelian influences can be seen in al-Farabi, who also
discussed the problem of evil, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd. Ibn Sina developed a theory
of the conjunction of the soul with the active intellect; with this conjunction is bound
up the ultimate perfection of the soul which has attained the highest degree of
wisdom and virtue.

Neoplatonism again surfaces in the work of Ibn Miskawayh and his followers, to
whom we owe the groundwork of a whole ethical tradition which flourished in Persia
well into the twelfth century ah (eighteenth century ad) and beyond. Onto Plato's
threefold division of the soul, Ibn Miskawayh grafts a threefold division of virtue into
wisdom, courage and temperance. His views were elaborated upon by al-Tusi and al-
Dawwani, among others. A blend of philosophical and religious ethics is
characteristic of the work of some later writers such as al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi, in which the road to moral and spiritual perfection has mystical overtones.

B. Theological Works
Theologians did not enter into normative questions of Islamic ethics. They
discussed the source of ethical knowledge, the basis of moral obligation and the
meaning of ethical terms. Besides these epistemological and meta-ethical questions,
they also discussed the questions of human freedom and responsibility, and Divine
justice. They took different positions on these questions. The determinists, for
instance, upheld the absoluteness of Divine power, denied the reality of human
freedom and responsibility, and did not try to justify Divine justice.

Another group of theologians, the Mu´tazilite free-willers, asserted that man

has power and freedom to choose and act, and that this limits the omnipotence of
God. Without acceding it, one can justify neither human responsibility nor Divine
justice. They said that although a category of things, such as prayer, fasting and
sacrifice, is known to be good only through revelation, other goods are known
through reason. This includes things that are pleasant or useful, as well as those that
are morally good. We know through our reason that truthfulness, justice, and
generosity are good; and lying injustice, and miserliness are evil. Further, things are
good in themselves; revelation does not make them so__it only confirms an ethical
fact. They also said that moral obligation is rational; we know before any revelation
may come that it is our duty to tell the truth, keep our promise, and shun lying and
injustice. The pronouncements of reason, they said, are binding not only on man but
also on God. He must reward the righteous and punish the wicked. This is what they
called Divine justice.
 Ash´arite theologians opposed the Mu´tazilah on all these counts, but they
also did not side with the determinists. They tried to work out a via media between
absolute determinism and the self-sufficiency of human will. This was their doctrine
of kasb or acquisition. But the way they stated the doctrine appeared to many
theologians of the Ahl al Sunnah to be a kind of qualified determinism. I am referring
here to such theologians as Ibn Hammam7 (d. 861/1475) of the Maturidi school and
Ibn Taymiyah8 (d. 728/13270) among the Salafis. These theologians admitted with
the Mu´tazilah that to justify human responsibility and Divine justice one must
affirm the efficacy of human will, and, to that extent, restrict Divine activity. This
does not mean, however, compromising Divine omnipotence, for the limitation on the
activity of God, they said, is not placed by anyone else, but by God Himself. It is he
who limits the exercise of His unlimited power and allows man to act, and gives man
the will and the power for the purpose.

On the question of ethical knowledge, the Ash'arites were of the opinion that
revelation is the only way to know the good and the right. They did not accord any
role to reason except in knowing what is pleasant or unpleasant, useful or harmful.
Nothing is obligatory, they said, unless revelation commands it. Reason is not the
basis of obligation. Some like Abu al Ma´ali al Juwayni (d. 478/1085) and al
Shahristani (d. 548/1153) even went to the extent that when we say "X is good" or "Y
is a duty," it simply means that "X is approved by the Revelation" or "Y is
commanded by the Shariah."9 These words mean nothing else. It follows from this
position that nothing can be said to be obligatory on God, and that His actions are not
the subject of ethical judgment.

The Maturidis and the Salafi Ibn Taymiyah did not take this position.
Agreeing partly with the Mu´tazilah, they said that reason does reveal things that
are good, bad, right, or wrong in the ethical sense. But there is a limit to it; there are
things that are known to be good and bad only through Revelation. They held a
similar view about the basis of obligation. Part of obligations is both rational and
revelatory; others are only revelatory. However, no none will be punished by God on
his defaults unless he is first warned by a Revelation10. As to the question whether
anything is obligatory on God, Ibn Taymiyah said that both the Qur´an and the
Hadith affirm it, but only in the sense that God has imposed it on Himself, not in the
sense that someone else has obliged Him.11 The Qur´an, for instance, says that "He
(i.e., God) has imposed mercy on Himself" (6:12)

Ibn Taymiyah has also pointed out that if something is right or wrong for
human beings, it is not necessarily so for God. The proposition that rational
judgments are true for every rational being, including God, is not true.12 Some rules,
such as speaking the truth and keeping promises, are true for men as well as God. But
some things, such as causing death, pain or suffering to creatures, that are wrong for
man are not wrong for God.

C. Other Theological Arguments of Islamic Ethics

When it comes to Islamic ethics, S. Parvez Manzoor makes it clear, “There is

no division of ethics and law in islam”.

Ram Swarup explains how the actions and judgment of Muhammad recorded in the
Hadith are perceived by Muslims:

The Prophet is caught as it were in the ordinary acts of his life—sleeping,

eating, mating, praying, hating, dispensing justice, planning expeditions and
revenge against his enemies. The picture that emerges is hardly flattering,
and one is left wondering why in the first instance it was reported at all and
whether it was done by admirers or enemies. One is also left to wonder how
 the believers, generation after generation, could have found this story so
inspiring.

The answer is that the [Muslim] believers are conditioned to look at the
whole thing through the eyes of faith. An infidel in his fundamental
misguidance may find the Prophet rather sensual and cruel—and certainly
many of the things he did do not conform to ordinary ideas of morality—but
the believers look at the whole thing differently. To them morality derives
from the Prophet’s actions; the moral is whatever he did. Morality does not
determine the Prophet’s actions, but his actions determine and define
morality. Muhammad’s acts were not ordinary acts; they were Allah’s own
acts [i.e., acts empowered, guided and approved by Allah].

It was in this way and by this logic that Muhammad’s opinions became the
dogmas of Islam and his personal habits and idiosyncrasies became moral
imperatives: Allah’s commands for all believers in all ages and climes to
follow.

We will detail some of these traditions regarding Muhammad’s life and teachings in
other articles.

The Islamic view of ethics, like the Christian view of ethics, affirms ethical absolutes.
Whereas the Bible grounds morality in God’s essential character, the Qur’an teaches
that God cannot ultimately be known. Certain actions are good not because they
derive from God’s character, but because God chooses to call them good. God could
have decreed a different set of moral principles. Therefore, Muslims know moral
goodness by God’s decree. Islam and Christianity agree to some of the same moral
standards although significant differences exist.
Hammudah Abdalati summarizes Islamic morality as follows:

The concept of morality in Islam centers around certain basic beliefs and principles.
Among these are the following: (1) God is the Creator and Source of all goodness,
truth, and beauty. (2) Man is a responsible, dignified, and honorable agent of his
Creator. (3) God has put everything in the heavens and the earth in the service of
mankind. (4) By His Mercy and Wisdom, God does not expect the impossible from
man or hold him accountable for anything beyond his power. Nor does God forbid
man to enjoy the good things of life. (5) Moderation, practicality, and balance are the
guarantees of high integrity and sound morality. (6) All things are permissible in
principle except what is singled out as obligatory, which must be observed, and what
is singled out as forbidden, which must be avoided. (7) Man’s ultimate responsibility
is to God and his highest goal is the pleasure of his Creator.

D. Conclusion
When viewing Islamic ethics, Muslims see Muhammad as the exemplary
human being, the one all people should seek to imitate. Along with more general
virtues, the Five Pillars of Practice form a core of Islamic ethics. In addition to many
motivations for ethical behavior, anticipation of final judgment is the strongest.
 REFERENCE

http://www.afghanvoice.com/islam/general/islamic-ethics-concept-and-
prospect.html

http://www.allaboutworldview.org/islamic-ethics.htm

http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H018.htm#H018SECT1