Phil.

Judges Assn Vs Prado 277 SCRA 703

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-
President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila
ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig,
Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President, REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL
JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in
behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners, Versus. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his
capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

G.R. No. 105371 | 1993-11-11

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here
challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that
should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do
so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable
duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common
cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration
cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every
statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against
its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing that "Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of
the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Power,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow
or exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost
of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. -- All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates
the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its
execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170
Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith." 4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in the
title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as
follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as
an amendment.

These arguments are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected
results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of
the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). 8 The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or
officers. 10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National
Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor);
the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors;
and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 12 Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of
the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance
or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-
mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect,
however, that not enough care (or attention) was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the
major and equal departments of the government. The same observations are made if the importance or
status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed
by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of
justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of
the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government
and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show
that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of
this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of
judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents'
conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege
must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be
extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents)
but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be
allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it
seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippine Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mails as the Judiciary).

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,

was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter, like exemption from taxes, customs and tariff
duties. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail for certain
offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the tax exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege by the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of
judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts
of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial
process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative
and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is allotted
to the Judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to
affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees
of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it
was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law
as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the
equal protection of the laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling
against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through
the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept. As judges,
we cannot even debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as the law imposes
on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds to
all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2,
1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

+++++++++++++++++++

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Bill Of Rights; Equal Protection Clause; Requisites For Valid
Classification

In one case the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 7496 limiting the allowable
deductions from gross income of single proprietorships and professionals. It was held that uniformity of
taxation does not prohibit classification, provided the requirements are complied with.[Tan v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994]

The classification must be reasonable, and in order for it to be reasonable it (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. [People v. Cayat, G.R. No.
L-45987, May 5, 1939]

For purposes of the first requisite, the distinction must me real and substantial. Thus, in a case where
petitioners assailed the validity of DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, which prohibited motorcycles on
limited access highways, the Supreme Court held that there is a real and substantial distinction between
a motorcycle and other motor vehicles. Not all motorized vehicles were created equal, such difference
justify its classification. [Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006] In another case wherein E.O.
No. 1 created the truth commission with the power to investigate graft and corruption during the
Arroyo administration was held to be unconstitutional. Supreme Court ruled that it violates the equal
protection clause for focusing only on what happened during the Arroyo administration. In this regard, it
must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. [Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010] Another example would
be Filipino female domestics working abroad, where the Court held that they are a class by themselves
because of the special risks to which their class was exposed. [Philippine Association of Service
Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988]

Note that in one case where R.A. 7227 was challenged because it grants tax and duty incentives only to
businesses and residents within the ‘secured area’. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does
not require absolute equality among residents. The real concern of the law is to convert the land
formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. The measure was to entice
investors, foreign or local, to invest in the area. [Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20,
1900]

Quezon City issued an ordinance requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be
constructed in business zones, Later on, it was amended to grant exemptions, petitioner was granted
one of them. He now assails the ordinance for violating the equal protection clause. The Court held that,
“we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when
he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an
exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he
was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the
city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of
properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
[Gancayo v. City of Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011]

Note also that, the prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted is not
itself a denial of equal protection. The unequal application to those entitled to be treated alike is not a
denial of equal protection clause in the absence of intentional discrimination. It would be
unconscionable to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity.
[Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, July 30, 2012]

For the second requisite, in one case, petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which deems appointive officials who file a certificate of candidacy as resigned,
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution. The Court held that, substantial distinctions
clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue
of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect
on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of
this classification. [Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003] RA 8189
(Voters’ Registration Act) prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. The classification is germane to the law since the risk sought
to be addressed is cheating during elections. [De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000]
For the third requisite, an ordinance was passed which only taxed Ormoc Sugar Company and none
other. The ordinance was held to be unconstitutional because if fails to satisfy the third requirement.
The Court held that, a perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true,
was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in
terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage
of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
[Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968]

As to the fourth requisite, it must apply to all those similarly situated. Thus, in one case it was held that,
Under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, an accused who underwent preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty with the full period of preventive
imprisonment. Its application to the Articles of War is in accordance with the equal protection clause.
There is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in
nature under military courts and civil courts. [Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,
2012] On the other hand, Sec. 35 of R.A. 7354 which withdrew franking privileges formerly granted to
the judiciary but remained with the executive and legislative departments, was declared
unconstitutional, because the three branches of government are similarly situated. [Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]

Equal Protection Clause, Valid Classification

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

[People vs. Cayat (1939)]

Tests for Valid Classification (Judicial Standards for Review):

(a) The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands
that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in
cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.

(b) When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated
under intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives
intermediate scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important
governmental interest and be substantially related to .that interest, but the justification for the
classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.

(c) The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

[see Mosqueda etc. vs. Pilipino Banana Growers, G.R. No. 189185 and G.R. No. 189305, August 16,
2016]