Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20651 October 25, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIA PATRICIO, defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

The appeal in case No. 20651 has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac, in case No. 2837 of
said court, finding the appellant, Antonia Patricio, guilty of the offense of parricide, and sentencing her to undergo the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessories, prescribed in article 55 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs of prosecution. The appeal in case No. 20652 has
been brought to reverse a judgment of the same court in case No. 2868, declaring the appellants Jose Malgana and Antonina Manangan
accomplices in the crime of simple homicide, and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for eight years and one day, prision mayor, with
the accessories prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of Bonifacio Malgana in the sum of
P1,000, and severally to pay proportional costs of prosecution.

Both of these prosecutions are based upon the unlawful killing of Bonifacio Malgana, in which offense all of the appellants participated in the
manner and to the extent presently to be described; and both causes have been submitted in this court with combined briefs on the part of
both prosecution and defense. The two cases will therefore be dealt with by us in a single opinion.

It appears in evidence that prior to December 17, 1922, the deceased, Bonifacio Malgana, was living with his wife, the appellant Antonia
Patricio, in the barrio of Balaoang, of the municipality of Paniqui, in the Province of Tarlac. The relations between the two spouses were not
happy; and the wife, of the age of twenty-three years, had established illicit relations with Jose Malgana, of the age of twenty-one, and said to
be her nephew, although probably such only by marriage. As was but natural under these circumstances, Antonia entertained a deep aversion
to her husband, Bonifacio Malgana, a feeling which was shared by Antonia's mother, one Antonina Manangan, likewise an appellant in the
second of the causes now before us; and the two conspired together to procure Bonifacio's destruction. To this end the two women, on a
certain day near the middle of December, 1922, came to the house of Marcelo Miguel, a laborer residing in the same barrio, and called for
Marcelo. He happened to be away at the time but they awaited his return; and upon his arrival Antonia proposed, in the presence and hearing
of Antonina Manangan, to give him the sum of P20 if he would kill her husband. Marcelo refused to entertain the proposition, one reason being
that Bonifacio was Marcelo's uncle, and he says that he naturally had scruples an out killing a kinsman. However, the interview made its
impression upon Marcelo's mind and upon seeing Antonina three or four days later at the house of a friend where a seath had occurred,
Marcelo inquired of her where Bonifacio then was. Antonia replied that he had gone to Camiling to harvest palay. Not altogether reassured by
this statement and fearing that Bonifacio had been foully dealt with, Marcelo communicated his suspicions to Respicio Garbin. The latter told
Bonifacio Ipabiado, who in turn communicated with the officer in charge of a Constabulary detachment then in Paniqui, Tarlac. An investigation
was thereupon made which resulted in the arrest of four persons upon suspicion of murder, namely, Antonia Patricio, Antonina Manangan, Jose
Malgana, and Domingo Bestro presently confessed and revealed the facts connected with the murder. Acting upon this information the proper
authorities went to the house where Bonifacio Malgana had lived and the body of the deceased was exhumed at the spot that had been
indicated by Domingo Bestro as the place of burial in the back yard. Upon this occasion all four of the suspects were present and they all
admitted then, as well as other occasions, the fact that Bonifacio Malgana had been killed by them.

The material facts relating to the commission of the deed are few, and they are these: On the morning of December 17, 1922, which was
Sunday, Jose Malgana and Domingo Bestro left the place where they lived together in the barrio of Balaoang and went to the home of Bonifacio
Malgana, the deceased, where they remained during the day in the company of Antonina Manangan, Antonia Patricio and the deceased. When
night came the deceased lay down and went to sleep, but the other four remained awake until about midnight when they approached and
killed the sleeper. Antonia Patricio began the deadly work by slipping a muffler around the victim's neck, after which she proceeded to
strangulate him by drawing forcibly upon the ends. Meanwhile Jose Malgana violently pulled and mashed the testicles of the deceased, and
Antonina Manangan and Domingo Bestro held his feet and head, respectively. Life was soon extinct, and the body was burried near the house
before daylight, in an improvised grave in which the deceased was placed in a sitting posture. The hole was then filled with dirt and covered
with debris, which was burned. Finally green plants were set around or over the spot in order to remove all signs of disturbance of the ground.
When the body of the deceased was exhumed a week later it was examined by a sanitary officer and showed evident signs of strangulation and
of violent injury to the testicles. 1awph!l.net

In view of the repeated confessions of the several accused, corroborated by the discovery of the body upon information given by Domingo
Bestro, and other circumstances, the guilt of the four accused persons is put beyond the possibility of doubt; and it is equally clear that all four
participated as principals in the killing. Each of the four made written confessions which were acknowledge by them severally before the justice
of the peace. The trial judge quite unnecessarily ruled these confessions out on the ground that they had not been signed by the declarants in
the presence of the justice of the peace as stated in his jurat; but the repeated oral admissions are more than sufficient. Domingo Bestro, who
was used as a witness for the prosecution, and against whom the information was dismissed upon the motion of the fiscal in order that he
might be thus used, naturally minimizes the extent of his own participation in the crime. But we are not here concerned with his case.

The crime committed by Antonia Patricio is that of parricade, in the commission of which are to be appreciated the aggravating circumstances
of known premeditation, treachery, nocturnity and the abuse of superior strength. The crime committed by Antonina Manangan and Jose
Malgana cannot be denominated parricide, though they cooperated as principals in the killing of a person whom they knew to be the husband
of their coaccused, Antonia Patricio; for it is established doctrine that a stranger who participates in the perpetration of parricide is not guilty of
parricide but only of murder or homicide according to the factors present in the offense. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain of March 11,
1887, 3 Viada, 8; 2 Hidalgo, Penal Code, 143.) The crime committed by Antonina Manangan and Jose Malgana is therefore that of murder,
qualified by treachery, in the commission of which are to be appreciated, as to both of these accused, the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity, abuse of superior strength, and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the deceased; and as to Antonina Manangan is
further to be appreciated the circumstance of known premeditation, since she accompanied Antonia Patricio on the mission to hire Marcelo
Miguel to kill the deceased.

We are not unmindful of the fact that, upon a close appreciation of the aggravating circumstances present in this offense, nocturnity might be
considered to be sufficiently appreciated in the circumstance of treachery; but we consider this refinement out of place in connection with one
of the most atrocious crimes that has ever come to out notice. But even if the circumstance of nocturnity were ignored the result would not be
changed.
In view of the character of the acts which are the subject of prosecution in this case and the formidable array of aggravating elements attendant
upon the offense, all of the appellants merit the highest punishment which the law imposes; and the Attorney-General accordingly recommends
that all be sentenced to death. In this view the Chief Justice and Justices Johnson, Street, Avanceña, and Romualdez concur; but inasmuch as
Justices Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns do not approve the imposition of the death penalty, it is necessary to impose on all of the appellants the
appropriate penalty next below that of death, as required by Act. No. 2726 of the Philippine Legislature.

For the reasons stated the judgment in case G. R. No. 20651, sentencing Antonia Patricio to undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories prescribed in article 55 of the Penal Code, will be affirmed with costs; but the judgment in case G. R. No. 20652, adjudging Jose
Malgana and Antonina Manangan to be merely accomplices in the crime of simple homicide will be reversed and in lieu thereof both are
declared to be guilty of murder, and Jose Malgana will be sentenced to undergo the penalty of cadena perpetua, an Antonina Manangan to
undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua, each with the appropriate accessory penalties, and they will be required jointly and severally to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay their respective proportion of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39461 February 24, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORAZON ZAMORA DE CORTEZ, defendant-appellant.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Capiz for the crime of murder and, after due trial, was found guilty only of homicide
and sentenced to suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Maria Bigay in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

Appellant admits having killed Maria Bigay but claims that she committed the deed because she surprised her in the act of adultery with her
husband, Angel Cortez, in the house of Lucia Celis. Her testimony in this respect is fully corroborated by that of Lucia Celis. Appellant's husband,
in his testimony, also admitted that he was surprised by his wife in the act of adultery with Maria Bigay in Lucia Celis' house. While, as a general
rule, the testimony of a husband in favor of his wife should be carefully scrutinized, courts are not justified in rejecting it entirely as proceeding
from a biased source. In the case at bar, no motive for the killing has been established, and granting that proof of particular motive for taking
the life of a human being is not indispensable to conviction for homicide, the absence of such motive is nevertheless important in determining
which of two conflicting theories is more likely to be true.

As declared by this court, in criminal prosecutions, matters of defense, mitigation, excuse, or justification, must appear by a preponderance of
evidence. (People vs. Embalido, 58 Phil., 152, 154.) We agree with the Solicitor-General that the preponderance of evidence in the present case
does not justify appellant's claim that she acted in
self-defense. If sufficiently indicates, however, that she killed Maria Bigay under the circumstances mentioned in article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Upon the foregoing premises, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer six months and one day of destierro, and ordered not to be and remain
within the radius of 25 kilometers from the municipality of Pontevedra, Province of Capiz.

Modified as above indicated, the judgment is affirmed with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Street, Hull, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

[ G.R.No. 31268, July 31, 1929 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIIF AND APPELLEE, VS. GUARDIANO MARQUEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

This is a case of parricide which the trial court considered sufficiently proven against the herein appellant, who was sentenced, in consequence,
to life imprisonment, the accessaries of law, and a P1,000 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, with costs. The defendant admits, that he
killed his wife, Oliva Sumampong; but he alleges that he caught her in the act of adultery, and so took her life.
This allegation of the defendant does not agree with his statements before the justice of the peace during the preliminary investigation.
According to both Exhibit B and the testimony of the justice of the peace who conducted said investigation, the defendant had been fishing on
the night of the crime * * * "and when he came back at midnight, the house was closed; he knocked at the door but his wife did not awake, so
he knocked again, but still she slept on; then he went to the part of the house where his wife usually slept, and knocked on the wall; she awoke
then and opened the door; and when he went up, there was a man who jumped out of the window, and when he asked his wife why there was
a man inside the house, she answered that there was no man, but as he insisted that there had been one, and that he had jumped out of the
window, and as his wife would not tell the truth, for that reason alone he killed her." (P. 13, t. s. n.)

In order that the defendant might be entitled to the benefits of article 423 of the Penal Code, it was necessary for him to prove that he
surprised his wife in the act of committing adultery.

No other inference can be made from the wording of said article.

"Any husband who, having surprised his wife in the act of adultery, shall kill her or her paramour in the act," etc. (Art. 423. Penal Code.)

Once the appellant had admitted that it was he who killed his wife, it was incumbent upon him to completely prove his defense, which is, that
he found her in the act of adultery. The testimony he gave during the hearing of this case in the trial court, noticeably weakened by his
statements before the justice of the peace, cannot be considered sufficient proof of the justification he alleges, and so the fact remains that he
took his wife's life without having proven sufficient justification.

Nevertheless, it was established at the trial that on the occasion of the crime, the defendant saw an unknown person jump out of the window
of his house, and that the appellant's wife begged for his pardon on her knees. The first of these facts, under the circumstances, warrants the
conclusion that the defendant believed his wife to be unfaithful, and was overcome by passion and obfuscation. The second fact leads us to
believe that the wife could not have been wholly unaware of the unknown person's presence in her house on that night, inasmuch as she
considered herself guilty and begged her husband's pardon, which is an undisputed fact in these proceedings. To our mind, such conduct on the
part of his wife, thus inferred from the proceedings, constitutes a sufficient provocation, which must be considered as a mitigating circumstance
in favor of the defendant.

We find no merit in the assignments of error made by the defense, and we conclude that the crime of parricide committed by the herein
appellant is not justified in these proceedings.

But we consider the two mitigating circumstances of immediate provocation, and passion and obfuscation (article 9, paragraphs 4 and 7, Penal
Code) to have been established. And by virtue of these two circumstances, following rule 5 of article 81 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act
No. 2298, and as there was no aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law shall be imposed.

The penalty fixed by law for the crime of parricide is life imprisonment to death, and the penalty next below it in this case is cadena temporal,
inasmuch as the penalty fixed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties (rule 2, article 75, Penal Code).

Taking into account the details of the case, and the character of the mitigating circumstances present in the act prosecuted, and availing
ourselves of the discretion granted us by law in cases like the present one (rule 5, article 81, Penal Code) we declare that the penalty to be
imposed upon the appellant is twelve years and one day cadena temporal.

Wherefore, with the provision that the defendant is sentenced to the personal penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal instead of
life imprisonment as held by Ong Chiongchi vs. Judge of 1st Ins. of Oriental Negros the court below, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 34510. August 31, 1931.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BITUANAN (Moro), Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:

Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by Datu Alon according to Moro customs and usages. According to the same customs and usages,
the Datu divorced the couple. Twenty days afterwards, Bituanan caught Sabay and a Moro by the name of Ali Sabpa sleeping on the same bed.
Thereupon, Bituanan attacked Ali Sabpa and Sabay, killing the former and wounding the latter.

In the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Judge of First Instance Natividad found Bituanan guilty of the crime of murder; but taking into
consideration the provisions of section 166 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, sentenced the accused to twelve years and one
day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay
the costs. It is the sole contention of counsel for the accused, on appeal, that the decision of the lower court should be modified by applying
article 423 of the Penal Code to the admitted facts. Said article provides that "Any husband who, having surprised his wife in the act of adultery,
shall kill her or her paramour in the act, or shall inflict any serious physical injuries upon either, shall suffer the penalty of destierro."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion, was valid. (Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee
[1922], 43 Phil., 43.) This is so because of the nature of the provisions of the Philippines, as prescribed by statute, are two only — adultery on
the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband, as determined by a proper court. (Francisco v. Tayao [1927], 50 Phil., 42.)
Granting, without necessarily having to decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were, accordingly, not legally divorced, it only need be said that there is
no evidence in the record showing that Bituanan surprised Sabay and Ali Sabpa in the act of adultery when he killed the latter. The privilege
given in article 423 of the Penal Code extends solely to the case of a husband who surprises his wife in the act of actual adultery, that is, actual
carnal knowledge with her paramour. (5 Viada, Codigo Penal Comentado, 5th ed., pp. 188-190, citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain.)
Judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez, Villa- Real and Imperail, JJ., concur.
[ G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARCIANO GONZALES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:

Marciano Gonzales appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas which found him guilty of parricide and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Sixta Quilason, in the amount of P1,000, and to
pay the costs.
At the trial, the appellant testified that at midday on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the woods, he surprised his wife, Sixta
Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act of adultery, the latter having escaped by jumping through the door of the house. He scolded his wife
for such act, told her that the man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same
faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the act again. Thereafter the accused continued testifying he left the house and went towards
the South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at about five o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he looked for
her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush. When he saw them, his wife was rising up, while
Isabelo, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him,
he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attached her with a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity
on her and took her dead body to his house.

The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife in the afternoon of the date in question, under circumstances indicative that she had
carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code providing: "Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill either of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Italics
ours.)

We do not believe that the accused can avail himself of the aforesaid article, because the privilege there granted is conditioned on the
requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; the accused did
not surprise his wife in the very act of carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such there was, because from the fact that she was rising up
and the man was buttoning his drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act.

We cannot, therefore, entirely accept the defense sought to be established by the accused, first, because his testimony is improbable. It is not
conceivable that the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to repeat committing adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher
measures as is natural in such circumstances, if it were true that he had surprised the two offenders in the act of adultery on returning to his
house at midday on the date in question. Neither is it likely that a woman thirty years of age, like Sixta Quilason, and twenty-five-year-old
Isabelo Evangelio, both of sound judgment as is to be supposed, had dared to have carnal intercourse near the toilet of the offended party's
house, a place which is naturally frequented by some persons. The circumstance that the place was covered by weeds, does not authorize the
conclusion that the offenders could lay concealed under the weeds because the latter do not usually grow to such height as to conceal or cover
two persons committing the guilty act. It seems that under the circumstances it is unnatural that they would execute the act in a place
uncovered and open. We do not want to suppose that the sexual passion of two persons would border on madness. Secondly, because even
assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo already standing and buttoning his drawers, the accused cannot invoke the
privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery,
but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had committed the
carnal act. (3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People vs. Marquez, 53 Phil, 260).

Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention on the part of the accused to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
upon the person of the deceased, and of his lack of instruction, the appealed judgment is modified, and the accused is sentenced to the penalty
of twelve years and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, with the
costs. So ordered.

Villa-Real and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Avanceña and Moran, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
[ G.R. No. 12724, August 10, 1917 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARGARITA FELICIANO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:

Felix Atacador filed a complaint against his wife Margarita Feliciano and one Pedro Velasquez, charging them with the crime of adultery. After a
few witnesses had been called in the separate trial of Velasquez, on motion of the prosecution the case was dismissed. On the trial of Margarita
Feliciano, she was found guilty and sentenced to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with the costs. From this
sentence she has appealed, making four assignments of error.
One assignment of error is that the trial court should have dismissed the case against the accused in view of having dismissed the case against
her coaccused Velasquez. The argument that the charge of adultery, necessarily under one complaint, is indivisible impresses one strongly.
However, there is now no occasion to discuss this point for in the late case of U. S. vs. Topiño and Guzman ([1916] 35 Phil., 901,) citing the
decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 17, 1889, it was expressly held that where a man and a woman are charged in the same
complaint with the crime of adultery the acquittal of the woman does not necessarily carry with it the acquittal of the man, although the
offense is one which can only be committed by two persons. Paraphrasing the language somewhat, it can now be held that under a complaint
for adultery the acquittal of the man does not necessarily carry with it the acquittal of the woman because, among other reasons, the man may
not have known that the woman was married.

Another assignment of error is that the husband was not competent to give testimony as to the pregnancy of the wife. As a general rule, the
husband can testify against the wife in an adultery case because while adultery is in one sense a public crime, it can only be prosecuted with a
few exceptions on the complaint of the aggrieved party. Adultery would therefore come within the provisos of section 383, paragraph 3, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, as an action for a crime committed by the wife against the husband. Whether ,we can stretch the proviso
to cover the testimony of the husband who expresses an opinion as to the pregnancy of the wife is doubtful, which, however, in this instance
can be waived without decision.

The other assignments of error go to the merits of the case. The nature of the crime of adultery is such that it will not be often when it can be
established by direct evidence. Nevertheless, strong circumstancial and corroborative evidence such as will lead the guarded discretion of a
reasonable and just man to the conclusion that the alleged act has been committed is sufficient to sustain a conviction for adultery. (5 Groizard,
C6digo Penal, pp. 24 et seq.; decision of the supreme court of Spain of June 23, 1874; 1. R. C. L., par. 28,) What is the proof, direct or
circumstantial, in the present case?

Margarita Feliciano, the accused, was married to the complainant Felix Atacador on January 15, 1911. She left her husband on February 15,
1916. During the months of May, June, and a part of July of the same year, she lived in a rented house in Manila with Pedro Velasquez. The
owner, who lived in the upper part of the same house, considered them to be man and wife. A photograph shows their intimate relations. A
witness testified to having seen the accused and Velasquez in scant apparel and sleeping together. The woman and her paramour had the
opportunity to satisfy their adulterous inclination. We think that a finding to the effect that Velasquez and the accused had carnal relations is
sufficiently in accord with the probabilities of the case and the proof.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with the addition of the accessory penalties and the costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11021 December 1, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EUFRASIO ALANO Y AGBUYA, Defendant-Appellant.

TORRES, J.:

This cause was instituted upon a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney, on August 1, 1914, charging Eufrasio Alano y Agbuya with the
crime of homicide, and on October 19th of the same year the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to the penalty of
fourteen years eight months and one day of cadena temporal, to the accessory penalties, and to pay the costs. From this judgment defendant
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon of July 27, 1914, Modesta Carballo, a friend and comadre of Teresa Marcelo, who had a store near a
cinematograph on Calle Tennessee of the district of Malate, went to Teresa's house on the same street to make her a present of five tickets for
admission to the said cinematograph. When Maria Remigio, her husband F. M. Gleach, and Maria's sister, Antonina Remigio, returned home
and learned of the present, they got ready to go to the cinematograph; but Tomas Ramos and his wife, Ricarda Garces, who both also lived in
that house, did not do so, because the former was in a billiard hall at the time, and the latter was lying sick in a room of the house. In obedience
to the suggestion of her husband, the defendant Teresa Marcelo did not accompany the party to the cinematograph, as one of her children was
sick, but still a little while afterwards Modesta Carballo approached the house where the defendant was, to call Teresa, who then told Modesta
that she would not go to the cinematograph, for the reason mentioned. Thereupon the defendant Eufrasio Alano and his wife Teresa Marcelo
amused themselves at the card game of "black jack." About half past seven that evening the defendant, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife
remained at the window looking out and a little while afterward told her husband that she would go down for a moment to the Chinese store
near by, which she did.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her in the Chinese store situated
on the corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding her there, went to look for her in another Chinese store near by, with the same
result. He therefore started to return home through an alley where he tripped on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he stopped
that among some grass near a clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they
both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the noise made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at once recognized the woman as his
wife, for whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who immediately started to run. He was wearing an undershirt and a pair of
drawers, which lower garment he held and pulled up as he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he had in his
pocket and pursued Martin Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and, not knowing where he had filed, returned to the
house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act of climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful conduct and immediately
stabbed her several times, although she finally succeeded in entering the house, pursued by her husband and fell face downwards on the floor
near the place where the sick woman Ricarda Garces was lying. The latter on seeing this occurrence, began to scream and started to run, as did
also Teresa Marcelo who had arisen and gone down the stairs out of the house; but her infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she
reached the ground she fell on one of the posts beside the stairs. When the defendant saw her fall, he entered the house, took some clothes
and started out in the direction of Fort McKinley.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Between pages 14 and 22 of the record there are some photographs of the house and the place where the crime was committed and of the
corpse of the deceased, and a sketch of the place where the lovers were caught and the woman assaulted. According to the testimony of the
physician who examined the body of the deceased and performed the autopsy on the afternoon of the following day, July 28, 1914, twenty-four
wounds were found on different parts of the said body, the most serious of them being a mortal wound in the neck which severed the jugular
vein. The body also had several stabs, inflicted by a sharp-pointed instrument which penetrated the thorax into the pleura and caused a profuse
hemorrhage and loss of blood. The point of this instrument was broken off and embedded in the wound in the victim's head. (p. 124, record.)
chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution, relying on the testimony of the house-companions of the deceased and the defendant, nearly all of them relatives of the
former, presented a different statement of the facts, which is absolutely unproven and unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, even
circumstantial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In order to form a correct opinion and rightly judge the killing of Teresa Marcelo by her unfortunate and unhappy husband, Eufrasio Alano, we
deem it indispensable to relate herein certain antecedents which drove the defendants to kill his wife, Teresa Marcelo, whose depraved and
immoral conduct he partly blames on her mother, Maria Remigio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An unkind fate willed that the house opposite the one where the defendant and the deceased, with her mother and other relatives, lived,
should be inhabited by the widower Martin Gonzalez, a brother-in-law of Modesta Carballo, in whose store Martin Gonzalez and Teresa
Marcelo were accustomed to meet, it appears that these two maintained illicit relations with each other even prior to
1913.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

One day in March, 1913, Teresa Marcelo disappeared from the house in which she lived with her husband, without advising him for her
departure or asking him permission. The husband therefore notified the chief of police of her flight and subsequently learned that she had gone
with her mother to the Island of Corregidor. She did not return home until the 15th of July of that year, and then her husband noticed that her
abdomen was enlarged and that she had been pregnant for several months, and in fact on the 30th of the following December she gave birth to
a child, which her husband suspected she had conceived by another man for he testified that he had had no carnal intercourse with her just
prior to her departure for the Island of Corregidor as she was then menstruating. Afterwards the defendant was surprised on his return from
work one day to find that a festival was going on, which turned out to be in celebration of the baptism of the newly-born girl, named Nena, the
godmother of whom was the said Modesta Carballo, who therefore became the comadre of the defendant's wife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant used to be away from his house at work during the day and on his return home often found his wife conversing with Martin
Gonzalez in Carballo's store, where the witness Candido de Vera also had seen the woman and this paramour of hers treating each other with
great familiarity. On other occasions, when the husband returned from work he had found his wife, her mother, Martin Gonzalez and others
playing panguingue in his house. The defendant also testified that he had observed that his wife used to be at the window of her house very
early in the morning at a time when Gonzalez would be at the window of his house situated opposite, and that when Gonzalez would prowl
about the defendant's premises, his wife, the deceased, would become nervous and uneasy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
One day in March, 1914, the defendant went to Baguio, accompanying his employer, Mr. Shearer, and remained there three months. During his
stay in that city he received a letter from one of his friends in Manila, informing him of the disgraceful conduct of his wife, Teresa Marcelo, and
Martin Gonzalez. After taking note of the contents of this letter, the unhappy husband sent it to his wife, in order that she might know that he
was aware of her evil conduct. This letter was not recovered by the defendant afterwards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

One evening on or about the 15th of June, 1914, after the defendant's return to Manila from Baguio, he bade his wife good-by, telling her he
was going to see his employer. On leaving the house between seven and eight o'clock he went to a Chinese store on the corner of Calles
Tennessee and Dakota and remained there until about eight o'clock that same evening, when he saw Martin Gonzalez alight from a street car;
therefore, instead of going to Pasay, he returned to his house, the door of which he found closed, and on pushing it open saw his wife and
Martin Gonzalez lying down together. When they saw him and heard the insult he addressed to them, they immediately arose and while the
woman in tears was embracing her husband and promising him that she would never again do what he had seen, Gonzalez, who also begged his
pardon, on seeing Alano seize a bolo made his escape by jumping to the ground from an opening in the kitchen. On this occasion the husband
took pity on his wife, for with tears flowing the begged his forgiveness on her knees and he warned her that if she again did what she had done,
he would kill both her and her paramour wherever he found them. Nobody learned of this occurrence, and the next day the defendant bought a
knife which he showed to his wife to frighten her, and from then on carried it in his pocket.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded guilty, but denied the acts ascribed to him by the witnesses for the prosecution. One of these, Tomas
Ramos, was away from the house in a billiard room at the time Teresa, pursued by the defendant, entered the house; the only witness who was
present therein and saw her enter the living room where this witness was lying down and fall beside her was Ricarda Garces. For these reason
no credence can be given to the testimony of the other witnesses, who were relatives and house companions of the deceased, because at the
time of the occurrence they were all away, attending a cinematograph performance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Aside from the contradiction of the witnesses for the prosecution, Maria Remigio, the deceased's mother, the latter's sister Antonina Remigio,
and her husband Frank M. Gleach, it is undeniable that, as they were away from the house in a cinematograph at the time of the occurrence,
they could not have witnessed the assault made by the defendant upon the deceased. Nor was Tomas Ramos, Ricarda Garces' husband, present
at the assault. As stated above, he was then in a billiard room, and this fact was affirmed by the witness Candido de Vera, who testified that
when he inquired of Ramos about what had happened, the latter told Vera that he knew nothing about it because he was in the billiard room
when it occurred. When Ramos made this statement to the witness Vera, Antonina Remigio was present and, though the latter heard Vera's
testimony on this point, she did not contradict him. Therefore, as these witnesses did not see what occurred, they could not in good faith have
testified in the way they did. Ricarda Garces, the only person who was lying down in the room of the house and who saw Teresa only when she
entered the room, pursued by her husband, did not see the beginning of the assault on the stairs of the house, nor did she see Teresa fall on the
ground near the foot of the stairs, and if the blood stains noticed by the police, extending from the place where she was first assaulted, confirm
the statement of facts made by the defendant, the detail of the absence of mud stains on the tapis exhibited by the prosecution does not prove
in the slightest that it is not true that she was caught while lying on the ground in illicit intercourse with Martin Gonzalez, inasmuch as the
record does not show that it was ascertained whether, when Teresa Marcelo left the house that night to meet Martin Gonzalez in the place
where they were caught by the defendant, she was wearing the said tapis exhibited in evidence or some other, for the tapis she wore would
necessarily be stained with blood, in view of the many wounds she received, some of them in her back and in parts of her body below her waist;
so, if the deceased was then wearing a tapis, it was not the one exhibited at the trial. Furthermore, the record does not show whether or not it
was ascertained that she lay down on wet ground, and, as there was grass in the place where she lay, it is hardly probable that her clothes
would be stained with mud or even soiled with earth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But one witness, a woman, saw a part of the assault made by the defendant upon the deceased, and when Teresa Marcelo and Martin Gonzalez
were caught in carnal intercourse no witnesses were present other than the wronged husband and the seducer, the latter of whom endeavored
to establish an entirely unfounded alibi; and though the record discloses no evidence at all, even circumstantial, to contradict the frank and free
declaration of all that occurred on the evening of the said 27th of July, 1914, the defendant's reasonable and simple testimony contains an
individual confession of the crime committed by him and of the motive which impelled him to commit it. That confession, made at the trial
before a competent judge, is not susceptible of division. We cannot admit only the part thereof unfavorable to the defendant, and reject that
part of it which favors him. In rigorous and strict justice, his frank confession with all his explanatory statements in his own defense must be
considered and admitted in their entirety, and as they do not appear to have been contradicted or refuted by any evidence, even circumstantial,
there is no reason why they should not be considered as the truth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of May 8, 1875, laid down the following principle: "When the defendant's confession is accepted to
find him guilty, without setting forth other grounds, it must be admitted in its entirety, as well in respect to what is prejudicial to him as to what
is beneficial; and if it unquestionably appears therefrom that the crime was attended by the extenuating circumstance of prior and immediate
provocation by the injured party, this circumstance must be taken into consideration." chanrobles virtual law library

When such a circumstance as alleged by the defendant in his confession appears to be intimately connected therewith in such wise that the
circumstance and the confession form but one complex fact, so that the crime confessed is essentially conditioned by the circumstance alleged,
in which case the defendant's confession is qualificative and individual, as that made by the defendant Eufrasio Alano, then, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, such confession must be accepted in all its parts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Far from there being any reason even to doubt the truth of what the defendant testified and confessed, the record affords convincing proof
that he had always conducted himself well and that there had never been the least complaint against him on the part of the several public
officials and army officers whom he had served as a servant and a cook, while on the other hand, the deceased had for some time past been
unfaithful to her husband and had maintained illicit relations with her neighbor Martin Gonzalez; and if nothing occurred when this man and
Teresa Marcelo were caught lying together on night in the husband's house, it was perhaps because the husband was unarmed and took pity on
the woman who wept and embraced him while her paramour jumped out of the house and fled, and the defendant pardoned his wife upon her
promise that she would not again commit a similar act of infidelity, a promise she did not keep.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Hence, prior to the acts performed in the evening of July 27th, and for several years before, there had existed illicit relations between the
deceased and Gonzalez; these relations came to be known by the husband, and the adultress was aware that he knew of them; and as the
woman and her paramour persisted in maintaining such relations, despite the threat of the wronged husband, whose patience was such that he
pardoned his unfaithful wife, it is not strange that these illicit relations should some day have terminated fatally.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
From the record it appears, then, to have been fully proven that, because the defendant caught his wife, Teresa Marcelo, in the act of
committing adultery with Martin Gonzalez, after he had unsuccessfully pursued the latter, who succeeding in escaping and hiding himself, he
assaulted the adultress and inflicted upon her twenty-four wounds which produced her death a few moments afterwards. This crime is provided
for in article 423 of the Penal Code, and no valid objection to his finding lies in the circumstances that the unfaithful wife was not killed in the
very place where she was caught, for the reason that the wronged husband preferred first to attack the despoiler of his honor and afterwards
the adulterous wife who succeeded in getting away from the place where she was caught with her paramour. The assault upon the woman
must be understood to be a continuation of the act of the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had the good fortune to escape
and immediately get away from the place of the crime. Consequently, although the deceased did not fall dead in the place where she was
caught, but in another place near by, logically it must be understood that the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said articles 423 of
the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the proper imposition of the penalty prescribed by law, account must be taken of the extenuating circumstance that the defendant acted
upon an impulse of passion and obfuscation, and also of the special circumstance provided in article 11 of the Code, as amended by Act No.
2142; and, as there is no aggravating circumstance to offset these extenuating ones, the penalty of destierro (banishment) should be imposed
upon him in the minimum degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed and Eufrasio Alano y Agbuya should be sentenced, as he is hereby, to the
penalty of six months and one day of banishment ( destierro) from the district of Malate, and he shall not reside or enter within a radius of
twenty-five kilometers from the church of the said district during the period of this sentence. The costs of both instances shall, furthermore, be
charged against him, without prejudice to his being furnished a certified copy of this decision and placed at the disposal of the Court of First
Instance, so that he may be released from custody in order to serve out the said sentence of banishment ( destierro). So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1053. May 7, 1903. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. MAMERTO VARGAS, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

Simeon Alberto on May 20, 1902, was attacked and severely wounded. To the persons who went to his assistance he stated that the defendants
had assaulted him. He said nothing of the motive. He died the next day. There was not other evidence for the Government. Manalastas was
acquitted by the court below. The defendant Vargas testified that, on returning to his house on the day in question, he found Alberto lying with
his (the defendant’s) wife; that he drew his bolo; Alberto wife; that he drew his bolo; Alberto escaped through the window; that he, the
defendant, pursued him, overtook him, and killed him. There was evidence that the relations existing between Alberto and the wife of the
defendant had been the subject of common talk in the barrio.

The judge below apparently believed the testimony of the defendant, but, being of the opinion that article 423 of the Penal Code was not
applicable, sentenced the defendant to eight years of prision mayor.

We agree with the court as to the facts, but not as to the application of said article 423.

This article fixes the penalty of destierro when the husband kills the offender "in the act." In this case the discovery, the escape, the pursuit, and
the killing were all parts of one continuous act.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the defendant Vargas is condemned to the penalty of destierro for the term of two years four
months and one day, to pay the heirs of the deceased 1,000 pesos, and in case of insolvency to subsidiary destroy for a term which can not
exceed one-third of the above penalty, he being prohibited from entering in a radius of 25 kilometers from the barrio of Santa Monica, in the
pueblo of Floridablanca, in the Province of Pampanga, during the term aforesaid, with costs to the Appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.

McDonough, J., did not sit in this case.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48768 December 4, 19471
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CIRILO CORICOR, defendant-appellant.

PERFECTO, J.:

Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs,
having been found by the lower court guilty of murder committed on September 15, 1941.

The evidence for the prosecution was presented on October 20 and 21, 1941, and the evidence for the defense on October 21 and 22, 1941. Six
witnesses testified for the prosecution and their testimonies are in substance as follows:

1. Dr. Gregorio Peñalosa, 30, identified Exhibit A as written and signed by him which is a certification of the post-mortem examination he
made on the body of Pedro Lego on September 12, 1941, 3 p.m. He presented Exhibit B, a diagram of a human body, where the wounds
mentioned in Exhibit A are indicated by circles in red pencil. Wound No. 6 was fatal, while Nos. 10, 11 and 12 were serious. The wounds were
caused by a sharp cutting instrument, such as a pointed cutting bolo. Wounds Nos. 5, 6, and 9 could have been inflicted while the victim had his
back turned towards the aggressor. Death certificate Exhibit C was issued by the witness. He performed the autopsy about 15 to 20 hours after
the death of Pedro Lego, which took place at 3 p.m. on September 16, 1941. Exhibit D is a certificate of the wounds of Catalina Regis who
suffered superficial wounds, none of which being serious.

2. Catalina Regis, 38 widow of Pedro Lego. — On the morning of September 15, 1941, she was with her husband in the house of Severino
Regis in barrio Lukay, municipality of Alangalang, to attend a novena for the souls in purgatory. Pedro Lego "came later at 11 a.m. of the same
day which was the last day of the novena. On Monday morning September 15, Cirilo Coricor went to the place." The witness and her husband
had been in the house of Severino "since Friday yet, at 4 p.m." The accused is the aunt of my husband Pedro Lego." Cirilo arrived at 7 a.m. "to
invite us to his house to give advice to his wife Isabel Regis." Cirilo said: "Tatay Pedro, before you return to Jaro, please pass by our house to
give advice to my wife, because she does not mind me, does not obey me." At 11 o'clock of the same morning, Cirilo returned saying: "I return
to invite you again, because I feel impatient waiting for you at home." After lunch, in which Cirilo partook, he said: "Tatay Pedro, I am going
ahead because you are to take rest for a while as I am afraid that Isabel might go away and you may not reach her at home." Cirilo went away
with the corn which witness and Pedro Lego were to take with them, to compel them to go to his house." At 3 in the afternoon we went away in
the direction of Jaro and we passed by the house of Cirilo." Question as to their arrival at the house of Cirilo, the witness answered: "About half
past two, I believe , no, I believe after three. Esperanza Coricor came along with us to the house. When we arrive he offered us places to sit and
I sat on a bench near the door. Cirilo was sitting on the floor and my husband Pedro Lego sat on a bench near the window, at the side of a post."
Cirilo "was cutting roast pig and placing the pieces in a plate. There was a glass and one liter of tuba in a container of bamboo. At that moment
he offered me tuba and gave me part of the roast pig. I drunk and Cirilo faced Pedro Lego, squatting, put the tuba in a glass which he placed on
a bench, and faced me and took the bolo which was before me and then placed it in front of himself and then said: "Tatay Pedro, take tuba,'
and Cirilo took the bolo and with it he cut a piece of roast pig. While Pedro Lego was drinking the tuba from the glass which he lifted to his
mouth, Cirilo gave him a thrust with the bolo." He took the bolo from the floor. The bolo was big and it had a horn handle. Pedro Lego was hit in
the abdomen. "My husband covered the wound with his hand and jumped from the house, and Cirilo pursued him to the other side of the road,
which was an abaca plantation. I went down immediately after them, going to the road to have a sight of them. They reached the abaca
plantation. I could not see them, because they were screened by shubbery. I heard a noise of blows. My children were shouting and crying. I
was intending to go to the side of my husband, or else flee, but I could not because of my children. When Cirilo Coricor came out from the abaca
plantation, after killing Pedro Lego, I heard him saying: 'Where is Catalina I am going to kill her too.' I felt I was held. When I moved my face I
saw her sister holding him by the hand which was carrying the bolo. When I disengaged myself from him, I took my son and went running at full
speed, but he reached me and stabbed me in the head. I felt dizzy. I believe he did not stab me with the sharp edge because I was not wounded.
I fell down on my back. He mounted me and attempted to give me a thrust in the abdomen, but I was able to take hold of the bolo and pushed
it up while he was trying to push it down, and then my hands were wounded, the same as my face. I felt bad due to my wounds and I swooned
and said to Cirilo: 'Ay, I am going to die.' He left me unconscious. When I opened my eyes I tried to stand up. I felt very weak and I went to the
house of Severino Reyes, almost crawling. As soon as I laid down in the room of Severino Regis I heard Cirilo shouting: 'Where is that Catalina.
So she is still alive. I will kill her.' Cirilo was then in the road. The witness saw him through a cranny. When Cirilo arrived at the house, he asked
whether Catalina Regis went there. Severino and Esperanza told him that Catalina was not there, and Cirilo went away. The witness was treated
by Dr. Peñalosa. Her wounds took thirty-three days to heal. The bolo Exhibit E was the one used by Cirilo.lawphil.net

At the time of the incident there were in the house of Cirilo, his wife Isabel, Esperanza, and a son and a daughter of the witness. Esperanza sat
down in the same bench with Pedro. Esperanza did not see when Pedro was attacked by Cirilo because at that moment Esperanza had already
gone down the stairs of the house of Cirilo to return home. The floor of the house was less than one meter high from the ground. The stairs had
only two steps. There was a sleeping room. When Cirilo requested Pedro Lego and his wife to come to his house, he wanted his uncle to give
advice to his wife Isabel, because he was noticing that she had a paramour, which was Saturnino Caaya. The witness suspected that Cirilo had a
grudge against Pedro Lego, because the latter "sent him away from our land and he had to transfer to the land of Victorio Alcober" which
happened two years before the incident. Cirilo then said that "we had preferences." At first "he did not talk with us, but later after our frequent
visits to the place we resumed our old friendly relations." The witness saw the cadaver of her husband "at 3 o'clock in the afternoon." After a
few more questions, the witness said that she saw the corpse saw her husband in the municipal building at seven.

On August 14, "Isabel Regis arrived at our house in Jaro because she has a quarrel with her husband." Isabel said that Cirilo was jealous of
Saturnino Caaya. Isabel remained in the house of the witness for four days. Cirilo came to take her, but before going out they quarrelled, Cirilo
saying: "You are courageous because these people are riding with you."

3. Dominga Lego, 7. — Pedro Lego, her father, was interred in the cemetery. He was killed by Cirilo. When requested to narrate the
incident of the killing the witness answered: "I cannot."

Q. But what did you see, did you not see how the accused killed your father? — A. I did not see.

Q. What did you see? — A. Nothing.

Q. What did your father try to do in return? — A. He sat down.

Q. After? — A. They gave him some drink.

Q. Who gave him some drink? — A. Cirilo.

Q. What did he give to drink? — A. Tuba.

Q. After? — A. He gave him a thrust.

Q. What was your father doing when he was given a thrust? — A. Drinking.

Q. Who gave him the thrust? — A. Cirilo.

Q. Afterwards, what did your father do upon receiving the thrust? — A. He ran.

Q. Where to? — A. To the abaca plantation.

Q. And Cirilo, what did he do? — A. He pursued my father.

Q. And you, where did you remain? — A. I remained with my mother.

Q. Where was your mother when Cirilo pursued your father? — A. On the road, in the middle of the way.

Q. Afterwards, where did you and your mother go? — A. We went to the house of uncle Severino.

Q. How did you and your mother go to the house of Severino Regis? — A. I and my younger brother ran there.

Q. And your mother? — A. She was wounded.

Q. When you ran, what did you mother do? — A. She was lying on her back; she was being attacked.

Q. Who was attacking her? — A. Cirilo.

4. Zacarias Ladera, 35. — As Chief of Police of Alangalang, he learned that Pedro Lego was killed about half past four on September 15,
1941. He was notified by a chauffeur of a truck. He went to the house of the accused. Nobody was there. I saw tuba in a container. On the floor
there was tuba and meat. The house was open. On the floor there were stairs of blood. There was a bayong of corn at the door of the house. On
the way from the house to the road there were also stains of blood. The cadaver was found in an abaca plantation at the other side of the road.
It was about twenty meters from the road. The body was seen with face down. The witness was acquainted with the accused and his wife and
they came to se him on September 10, when they asked for help in preparing an affidavit to be signed by Isabel Regis. The spouses came
accompanied by Victorio Alcober. The day before, Alcober came to the house of the witness with a pencil draft of an affidavit, requesting that
the affidavit be prepared to be signed by Isabel Regis, because the spouses were quarrelling and without said affidavit, Isabel Regis would be
killed by her husband. The affidavit stated that Isabel Regis had sexual intercourse with Pedro Lego. A copy of said affidavit is marked as Exhibit
"F." The accused told the witness that he wanted an affidavit to be sure and to have an evidence that his wife had been the paramour of Pedro
Lego. At the time the affidavit of Isabel Regis was made, the justice of the peace was absent, for which reason it was not sworn to before him.
The witness told Cirilo: "I am afraid you may punish or kill your wife for this affidavit", and Cirilo answered: "I love my wife much; I only wanted
to be sure that my uncle Pedro had sexual intercourse with her and that is all."

5. Ruperto Aguirre, 37. — On October 14, 1941, he saw the accused and his wife in the house of Cirilo's mother in Granja, municipality of
Jaro. The witness was invited by a younger sister of the accused to apply a domestic medicine to cure the stomachache of a son. Cirilo arrived
after 2 o'clock, alone. Isabel, his wife, was already there. At 3 o'clock, when the witness and his wife left, Cirilo said to the witness: "Mano Perto,
this is the last time that we shall see each other." The witness asked him: "Why are you going to Manila?" The accused answered: "I am going to
Manila." "What for?" "I am going to kill a man." "Who?" "I will not tell the name; you will know it because he will be from here if he is here or he
will be from there if he is there." (On pp. 66 and 67, on cross-examination by the court, the contradictions of the witnesses were put in
evidence.)

6. Severino Regis, 30. — Pedro Lego and Catalina Regis left the house at 2 o'clock. They were accompanied by Esperanza Coricor, wife of
the witness. Esperanza wanted to ask money from Cirilo Coricor. That same afternoon he saw again Catalina who was wounded. Cirilo arrived at
his house asking for Catalina, saying that he was going to kill her. The witness told him to go away because Catalina was not there. The accused,
who was holding a bolo, left at once.

Catalina Regis ands Pedro Lego remained in the house of the witness "for just one night."

Ignacio Buñales, 50, first witness for the defense testified that on September 15, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Isabel Regis came running to his
house. She said: "Cirilo wounded somebody." The witness saw the accused in front of the house of Victorio Alcober. The witness asked him.
"Why are you covered with blood?" The accused answered: "I kill Pedro Lego" "Why?" "Because I caught him and my wife flagrantly." The
witness said: "Then you should not remain here. Where is your bolo? "It is with Victorio." The bolo was delivered by Sebastian Alcober to the
witness who then invited the accused to present himself to the chief of police. The witness delivered the accused and the bolo to the chief of
police.

Cirilo Coricor, 28, the accused, testified: "On September 15 at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon I went to distill tuba. After distilling in a distant
place, I came to distill tuba from coconut tress near my house. While I was near a coconut tree, before climbing it, I looked at my house and I
saw that the window of my room was being closed, and I felt apprehensive and then I went there to see what was happening, and when I was
approaching the room I heard low voices or persons. I looked through a hole into the room and at the moment I saw Pedro Lego raising his body
which was over that of my wife and I saw his penis in erection. I say my wife naked from the chest down. Upon seeing this I felt bad, as if my
chest would explode and I thought that the peace of my home had been violated. Then I unsheated my bolo. Slowly I went up passing through
the kitchen door. My intention was to kill the two of them inside the room. As I was approaching the door of my room, Pedro Lego came out
and I gave him a thrust, and my wife was able to escape passing through the door of the kitchen. Upon being wounded, Pedro Lego jumped out
of the window, and I pursued him. After passing the threshold of my house, he faced me and made an attack. He was able to take hold of the
blunt edge of the bolo while I was strongly holding it by the handle. After a while Catalina Regis, Pedro Lego's wife, arrived there and tried to
help her husband, taking hold of the bolo in order to wrest it from me. Then we were three struggling for the possession of the bolo, and while
they were exerting force to take it, by pulling it towards them, I was in turn pulling it towards me, and at that time the point of the bolo touched
the end of Catalina's nose. Sometimes we stumble down. After stumbling for the fourth time, Catalina was placed beneath us and the bolo,
touched her face. After a while, as Catalina was hurt, she lost hold of the bolo and ran away and the two of us, Pedro Lego and myself,
remained, and we continued struggling for the possession of the bolo. And he lost hold it and I began stabbing him. From that place he was able
to run to the other side of the road and I followed him and at that place I finished him, because I could not endure any longer the outrage he did
to my home. I love my wife who I brought to the altar."

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon when the accused left his house, the window of the room was open. He was the one who opened it in the morning.
He remembered seeing it open because he went inside the room. The accused had been a distiller of tuba for more than two years. He used to
make his distillation at about half past two in the afternoon, the time when he saw the window of the room being closed. Of the twenty
coconut trees from which he used to distill, there still remained eight to be distilled. It was about four when he approached the house to find
out what was happening inside the room. Two years before, the witness was residing in his land in Jaro. He transferred to Lukay because of the
wrong that Pedro Lego was doing to his wife. One week after his marriage, Pedro Lego started going to their house while the accused was away
in his work. The accused saw Pedro Lego once sitting on a bench beside his wife. On another occasion he saw him near the door of the room.
The accused heard from neighbors that there was something bad going on between Pedro Lego and his wife and that Pedro Lego would go to
their house when the accused was out. Once, at about half past eleven, Pedro Lego arrived asking if they had any viand. The accused answered
that they had none. Lego said that he brought viand but left it in the house of an uncle, surnamed Coricor, and ordered Cirilo to fetch the viand
because Pedro wanted to eat with the spouses. The accused obeyed. When he returned, he saw Pedro Lego and his wife coming out of the
room. The wife went to the kitchen, pretending to do something with the rice she was cooking. Pedro Lego pretended to be occupied cleaning
the altar, and then said that he was looking for a chisel he placed in the ceiling. The accused then sensed that there was something wrong, as
Pedro Lego had no business to be in the room. As the accused lacked the courage to talk to them, he went to Pedro Lego's wife and told her:
"Inay Taling, please tell Tatay Pindoy that he is doing wrong to my wife and that in case I should catch them in flagrant copulation I would kill
them and I would not recognize him as my uncle." Catalina answered: "Leave it to me. I will tell him." One week later, Pedro Lego returned. The
accused thought that Lego could not stop making love to his wife. So he again went to Lego's wife and said; "Inay Taling, we are going away
from Jaro to avoid trouble. If I remained here and uncle Pedro continues his acts and I catch him in the act I would not consider him as my uncle.
I will kill him." That is the reason why the accused and his wife transferred to Alangalang to the land of Victorio Alcober.

The accused denies having gone to the house of Severino Regis, as testified by Catalina Regis, to invite Pedro Lego and his wife to come to his
house to give advice to his wife in view of the latter's relations with Saturnino Caaya. The accused remained in his house waiting for the time to
proceeds with the distillation. Regarding his relations with Pedro Lego and his wife the accused said: "Since I learned that they were doing
something wrong to my wife I ceased my friendly relations with them." The accused does not even know Saturnino Caaya, and he never
suspected any man having love relations with his wife except Pedro Lego. The accused learned that Pedro Lego and Catalina Regis were in the
house of Severino, because his sister Esperanza told him so, and was the one who invited him to attend the novena. The accused and his wife
refused to attend the celebration, "because I knew that Catalina Regis was the one leading the prayers and her husband Pedro Lego was there."
The accused avoided meeting Pedro Lego, "because I knew what he was doing to my wife." It is not true that the accused offered roast pig in his
house to Pedro Lego and his wife. "We did not even roast any pig that day." The accused denies having gone to Severino Regis' home to look for
Catalina with the intention of killing her. The fact that Catalina Regis was wounded only accidentally when she intervened to help her husband
by trying to wrest the bolo from the accused can be shown by the fact that "if the wounds had been inflicted intentionally the wounds a would
have been big." Regarding the written admission of his wife, the accused had it prepared "in order that my wife would not repeat what she did."
On September 3, the accused not consented to let his wife go to her mother's house to have a massage, promising to return the next day.
Several days passed but she did not return. The accused went to find out the reason for her failure to return. On September 8, the accused went
to her mother's house. He did not find her there and the mother said that Isabel did not come to her house but to the house of Pedro Lego. The
accused requested his mother-in-law to be the one to take his wife, "because if I would be the one to do it, it is possible that Pedro Lego would
be mad at me." After taking Isabel, her mother told the accused that it took some time before Pedro Lego consented to her leaving his house on
the pretext that the child became sick and should be cured. The accused brought his wife to Lukay, where he reprimanded her for going to
Pedro Lego's house. The wife answered that she was brought to the house of Pedro Lego in Jaro by her aunt Catalina. Then the accused said: "I
believe you have copulated with your uncle Pedro. Why should you be there with him?" At first she refused to tell the truth, but upon the
insistence of the accused she could not conceal what happened. Then on September 10, the accused brought his wife to the chief of police of
Alangalang "to be reprimanded and be advised not to do again what she did." Since the accused and his wife transferred to Lukay, the accused
has not been on speaking terms with Pedro Lego and his wife. The accused and his wife never visited Pedro Lego's house again nor has the
latter visited the former at Lukay. After he killed Pedro Lego he went to the town to present himself to the authorities. On the way he met
Ignacio Buñales who asked him why he was covered with blood and the accused said: "I killed somebody. I had a certainty that Pedro Lego and
my wife were doing something wrong." Since the accused transferred to Lukay, he heard that once, in his absence, Pedro Lego came to his
house. Pedro Lego has a piece of land in Lukay and the accused heard that Pedro Lego used to go to said place, but the accused never saw him.
At the time the accused peeped into the room of his house he was already carrying the bolo Exhibit E which he was using for his work. He was
also carrying a sickle which had fallen from his waist when he was pursuing Pedro Lego. The accused did not pay attention as to whether Pedro
Lego had his pants on. He saw his sexual organ, the same as that of his wife, who had the skirts raised. When the accused went to distill tuba,
his wife knew that he had to distill from coconut trees which were located far from their house. Ever since, the accused was detained, he has
not talked with his wife, who failed to visit him even once. The reason was because "she knows that I was also about to kill her. In fact I gave her
a stab but she was not hit." Neither Pedro Lego nor Catalina Regis knew of Isabel's declaration Exhibit F. When Isabel left the house on
September 3, she brought with her eight-months-old daughter and left her two-year-old son in the house of her compadre Francisco Serrano.

A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the defense leads us to the conclusion that appellant's version as to the
circumstance under which Pedro Lego was killed is the more credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino Regis to invite
Pedro Lego and his wife to come to appellant's house so as to advise Isabel, because she had a paramour, one Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by
Catalina Regis, appears not to tally with the fact that, according to the testimony of the accused, not contradicted by the same Catalina Regis,
he went twice to her to complain about the illicit relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel, to the extent that appellant manifested to Catalina
that if he should surprise Lego in flagrant copulation with Isabel, he will kill them and would forget that Lego is his uncle. If appellant was jealous
of nobody else but Pedro Lego, of whose illicit relations with his wife he had ample evidence, including the written confession of Isabel, there is
no reason for him to recur precisely to Lego to give advice to Isabel. The suggestion is too illogical to be entertained by a person in his senses,
and there is no evidence that appellant had lost his. It is unbelievable that he should seek advice for his wife to desist from continuing with an
alleged paramour, Saturnino Caaya, who is not even known to him. After appellant had twice complained to her of the illicit relations between
Lego and Isabel, it is hard to believe that Catalina could have seriously entertained the alleged invitation by appellant to his house to give advice
to Isabel.
Catalina's story to the effect that her husband and herself were regaled by the accused in his house with roast pig and tuba and does not seem
natural. It is a well-known custom among our people in the barrios to prepare roast pig only on important celebrations of gatherings. Roast pig
is considered a delicacy only proper when there are joyous motives. If Lego and his wife were invited just to give advice to Isabel, on an unhappy
domestic matter, it is incredible that appellant should offer roast pig, which is only prepared for merry occasions. The fact that Lego and his wife
we coming from the house of Severino Regis, where the novena which took place must have been an occasion for preparing special dishes, only
serves to make more incredible Catalina's story.

We are of the opinion that the circumstances under which Pedro Lego was killed by appellant were as narrated in the latter's testimony and,
accordingly, the appealed decision must be modified, so as to reduce the penalty to that provided in the following article of the Revised Penal
Code.

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person, who, having surprised his spouse
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or
shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rules shall applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.

In applying the above article we feel that we are performing a duty extremely distasteful, because, with all due respect to a contrary opinion of
the majority, the writer can not conscientiously agree with the philosophy underlying said part of the Revised Penal Code. That philosophy,
acceptable during the immature stages of human evolution, when blind and unreasonable impulses were the law, when reason was swayed by
obscurantism and absurd prejudices, when the Christian and other humanitarian religions had not yet set he tenets upon which modern
civilization and culture have developed, has absolutely no place in the present stage of human society.

Under that un-Christian, barbarous, inhuman philosophy, the offended spouse is given the tremendous power to summarily execute two human
beings, without the benefit of any hearing, trial, or court proceeding. Under our laws, under the democratic system of government established
by our Constitution, the authors of the most heinous and abhorrent offenses, such as treason, piracy, parricide, murder, genocide, mass
massacre, the criminals whose misdeeds place them in the category of moral monsters, are protected by a bill of rights, by an elaborate system
of administration of justice, by a number of fundamental guarantees intended to insure that no the shall be deprived of the due process of law
and that the equal protection of the laws shall be effective to everybody. Under the savage philosophy in question, those who should happen to
be surprised violating the conjugal fidelity can be killed like vexatious insects or wild animals.

Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her paramour is punished, as adultery, by article 333 of the Revised Penal Code with from
4 months to 6 years of imprisonment, and the one committed by a husband and his mistress, as concubinage, by article 334, with imprisonment
from 6 months and 4 years and 2 months for the erring husband and banishment for the mistress. Under article 334, not all cases of conjugal
infidelity committed by a husband is punishable. The great majority of them are left unpunishable. No fiscal will think of prosecuting the
husband who should indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet mistresses or with prostitutes. For such acts of conjugal infidelity, some
punishable with short terms of imprisonment, others with simple banishment, and still others not punishable at all, article 247, in effect, confers
to the offended spouse the power to inflict the supreme penalty of death. The banishment provided for the killer is intended more for his
protection than as a penalty. Such a twisted logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high time to relegate article 247 to where it
properly belongs, to the memory of the sins that humanity promised to herself never to commit again. The majority of the Court, however,
opines otherwise.

For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant is found guilty of the offense of having killed Pedro Lego as punished by
article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and, accordingly, is sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of banishment, and to indemnify the heirs of
Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000.

Paras, and Pablo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the
complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.

The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of
death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he
wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the
case by way of an appeal.

The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite),
M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of
which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented
their death. 1

xxx xxx xxx

On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:

Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the
accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65,
tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).

On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores,
Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the station in the
afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then
proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at
around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).

Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).

The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30
p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He
proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where
Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn,
Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17,
1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold
Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent
P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2

On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to
death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila;
that the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived
him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts. Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of
executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.

SO ORDERED. 3

xxx xxx xxx

The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:

I.

IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE;

II.

IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4

The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in full:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or
shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised
his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of
passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of
the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest
act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external
factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.

It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:

xxx xxx xxx

As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or
grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent
who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering
the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide,
parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held
in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries
other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly
lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the
exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the
prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a
mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . .
constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the
accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of
the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)

That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423)
was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute
that as part of the general provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx

Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8

It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either
aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.

The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who
were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder
against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado
couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. 9

But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an
illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased,
he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365,
that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for
one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was
placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and
maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of
arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore
ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and
for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12629 December 9, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALFREDO ARAQUEL, defendant-appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is an appeal by the Government from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dismissing the information for homicide filed
against the accused Alfredo Araquel on the ground of double jeopardy.

The record shows that on January 30, 1955, the acting chief of police of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, filed with the justice of the peace court of that
municipality a complaint for homicide against Alfredo Araquel accusing him of having hacked and killed Alberto Pagadian with a bolo. More
than a year and a half later, or on July 3, 1956, while said complaint, for reason nor stated, was still pending in the justice of the peace court, the
chief of police of Narvacan moved for the amendment thereof, alleging that upon reinvestigation of the facts he found that the crime
committed by the accused was not homicide as charged in the original complaint but that of homicide under exceptional circumstances as
provided for in article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Finding the motion to be well taken, the justice of the peace court, on July 16, allowed the
filing of the amended complaint which charged the accused with "the crime of HOMICIDE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES defined and
punished under Article 247 of the revised Penal Code." That same day, the accused was arraigned under the amended complaint. And as he
entered a plea of "guilty", the justice of the peace court, also on that same day, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of destierro for a period of
one year to any place not within the radius of at least 25 kilometers from the municipal building of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.

During the service of the sentence by the accused, the acting Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur was informed of the case through the Department of
Justice to which the private prosecutor had lodged a complaint. And after conducting an investigation, the said acting provincial fiscal on
February 16, 1957, filed with Court of First Instance of the province an information against the accused Alfredo Araquel charging him with
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the killing Alberto Pagadian.

On July 9, 1957, the accused moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy, invoking the previous charge against him for
homicide under exceptional circumstances and the subsequent sentence passed upon him by the justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos
Sur. The fiscal opposed the motion, but the trial court, in this order of July 18, 1957, sustained the plea of double jeopardy and dismissed the
information. Hence, this appeal.

The plea of jeopardy made by the accused was, to our minds, erroneously sustained by the lower court.

In order that a defendant may legally be placed in jeopardy, one of the necessary and indispensable conditions is that he should have been tried
before a court of competent jurisdiction. (Sec. 9 Rule 113, Rules of Court.) The court below, in upholding the plea of double jeopardy, held that
the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for "homicide under exceptional
circumstances defined and punished under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code," on the theory that "the act defined" in that article "is a
felony" which is penalized with destierro and, consequently, falls under the jurisdiction of the inferior court, following the ruling laid down in
the case of Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan, et al., (86 Phil., 617; 47 Off. Gaz. No. 12, Supp., p. 233)

There can of course be no question that, under the rule enunciated in the case of Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan et al., supra, offenses penalized
with destierro fall under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts. (See also De los Angeles vs. People, 103 Phil., 295.)
That rule, however, cannot be made to apply to the present case, for it is apparent that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define a
crime distinct and separate from homicide, parricide, or murder, as the case may be, depending, in so far as those crimes are concerned, upon
the relationship of the victim to the killer and the manner by which the killing is committed. The article in question reads:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injuries, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rule shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse, shall not be entitled to the benefts of this article.

This article is found under Section One of Chapter One, Title Eight of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. Title Eight refers to Crimes against
Persons, Chapter One is entitled Destruction to Life and Section One thereof treats of the crimes of parricide, murder and homicide.

As may readily be seen from its provision and its place in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely, provides or
grants a privilege or benefit--amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally marries person or parent who
shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide,
parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held
in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.)And where physical injuries
other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting
circumstances, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at
all. A different interpretation, i. e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which practically
exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and,
incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such and interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an
exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissions . . . constituting the offense" should be
pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an
essential element of the offense charged — but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court — need not be
pleaded.(Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)

That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423)
was found under the General Provision (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute
that as part of the general provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.

We also note that under Republic Act No. 296, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, as enlarged, extends only to
"assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident at the trial."(Section 87 [c]). A fortiori, where the intent to kill is evident — as in cases
of homicide under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code — the case must necessarily fall beyond the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts. An absurb situation would, indeed, be created if the justice of the peace courts could exercise jurisdiction over
a case involving an acting killing, when they lack jurisdiction to try even a case of slight physical injury where the intent to kill was evident. Such
could not have been the intendment of the law.

It may not be amiss to state here that the killing under exceptional circumstances under both the old (Art. 423)and Revised Penal Code (Art.
247) had invariably been tried before the Courts of First Instance under an information charging the accused with either homicide, parricide, or
murder. (See U.S. vs. Vargas, et al., 2 Phil., 194; U.S. vs. Melchor, 2 Phil., 588; U.S. vs. Posoc, et al., 10 Phil., 711; U.S. vs. Alano, 32 Phil., 381; U.S.
vs. Verzola, 33 Phil., 285; People vs. Zamora de Cortez, 59 Phil., 568; People vs. Gonzales, 69 Phil., 66; People vs. Dumon, 72 Phil., 41; People vs.
Coricor, 79 Phil., 672; People vs. Sabilul, 89 Phil., 283; 49 Off. Gaz., 2743.) In all the above-cited cases, the accused merely invoked the privilege
or benefit granted in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code or Article 423 of the old Penal Code.

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned.
Consequently, a complaint or information charging homicide under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 must fall under the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, the offense charged being actually that of homicide. The fact that the exceptional circumstances are
also pleaded — as was done in the amended complaint filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan — would not affect the nature of
the crime charged. For they are not integral elements of the crime charged but are matters which the accused has to prove in order to warrant
the application of the benefit granted by the law. As unnecessary and immaterial averments to the crime charged, they may be stricken out as
surplusage and still leave the offense fully described.

Conformably to the above finding, we hold that defendant was not tried by a court of competent jurisdiction when he was arraigned before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan upon the amended complaint for "homicide under exceptional circumstances" filed against him by the
chief of police of the municipality, and consequently, has not legally been placed in jeopardy in the present case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No special pronouncement
as to costs.

Bengzon, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2228. February 28, 1950.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRUCTUOSO RABANDABAN, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, convicting Fructuoso Rabandaban of parricide.

The evidence shows that appellant and the now deceased Florida Napala were husband and wife living together in a house in one of the barrios
of the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte. Coming home one night from his camote plantation, appellant found his wife lying in bed with another
man. The man was able to escape through the window, but the wife received a severe scolding from her husband and was ordered to leave the
house. Calling her husband names, the wife gathered her clothes and picked up a bolo in the kitchen, and when her husband followed her
there, she attacked him with the bolo, wounding him twice in the abdomen. Wresting the bolo from his wife, appellant stabbed her with it in
the breast. She died from her wound that same night. But appellant, though seriously wounded, survived and is now being made to answer for
the killing of his wife.

We are with the trial court in not giving appellant the benefit of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, it appearing that although he found his
wife in bed with another man, he did not kill her on that account. For her reprehensible conduct he merely unbraided her and bade her leave
the house.

But we think that the trial court erred in not finding that appellant had acted in self-defense. The evidence shows unlawful serious aggression
on the part of the victim without sufficient provocation, and it also seems apparent that there was reasonable necessity for the means
employed to repel the assault. But speculating that appellant could have perhaps saved himself by throwing away the bolo after wresting it
from his wife, the trial court opined that there was no need for him to stab her once she was disarmed. To this we cannot agree. When
appellant got possession of the bolo he already must have been in a precarious condition because of his wounds, one of which was described by
the sanitary inspector as "fatal" since the large intestine came out of it. And appellant, we think, was justified in believing that his wife wanted
to finish him off because, according to the evidence, she struggled to regain possession of the bolo after he had succeeded in wresting it from
her. With the aggressor still unsubdued and showing determination to fight to the finish, it would have been folly on the part of appellant, who
must already have been losing strength due to loss of blood, to throw away the bolo and thus give his adversary a chance to pick it up and again
use it against him. Having the right to protect his life, appellant was not in duty bound to expose himself to such a contingency.

The case for the present appellant is not unlike that of the accused in U.S. v. Molina (19 Phil., 227, 231, 232), where this Court made the
following pronouncement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . It was clearly shown by the testimony of the accused, corroborated by the witness Elseco, that after the commencement of the assault by
the deceased, the struggle between the latter and the accused did not cease for one moment, now each combatant trying to wrest the bolo
away from the other, now the deceased endeavoring to arm himself with the hatchet which undoubtedly was within his reach, until finally the
deceased himself was disabled and could no longer continue to struggle in consequence of the wounds which he received during the affray.
Considering the decidedly aggressive attitude of the deceased from the commencement of this struggle until its termination, it can not be said
that there was a cessation of the danger for the accused, even for a single instant. If, through the various incidents of the struggle, or any
favorable accident whatever, the deceased had succeeded in recovering the bolo or in possessing himself of the hatchet, as he attempted to do
to the last, the result of the combat would probably have been very different; perhaps the accused, instead of being the slayer, would himself
have been killed. The accused certainly was not in duty bound to expose himself to such a contingency, and while the struggle continued, and,
consequently, the danger to his person or to his life subsisted he had a perfect and indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding his
adversary, if necessary, as from the circumstances of the case it was, without any doubt whatever, and even to disable him completely so that
he could not continue the assault. In our opinion, the means employed by the accused were rationally necessary to repel the assault, and as the
latter was in all respects unlawful and was not preceded by any provocation of any kind on the part of the accused himself, we declare the said
accused to be exempt from criminal liability, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code." 1

In view of the foregoing, we think that the appellant should have been declared exempt from criminal liability on the ground of self- defense.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, reversed and appellant acquitted with costs de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47315. April 25, 1941.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERESO DUMON, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

The defendant, Tereso Dumon, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental with the crime of double murder for having shot
and killed, in the municipality of Bacolod, the spouses Manuel Magbanua and Loreto Magalona. On November 23, 1938, the said Court of First
Instance, presided over by Judge Sotero Rodas, in a well-prepared decision, convicted the defendant of double homicide and sentenced him, for
each homicide, to the indeterminate penalty ranging from four years, two months and one day of prision correcional to eight years and one day
of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The court also ordered the confiscation of the defendant’s revolver and ammunition. From this judgment the defendant
appealed to the Court of Appeals and therein recapitulated his contention as follows: That he should be discharged from the information on the
ground that he acted in self-defense; or he should be given the benefit of the exceptional circumstance provided in article 247, in relation to
article 49 of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly sentenced only to destierro in the maximum degree; or he should be convicted only of
homicide through simple imprudence, if it be found that he was guilty of some slight negligence in ascertaining in the identity of the deceased
spouses who were killed purely by accident. On the other hand, the Solicitor-General summed up the Government’s case as follows: "The
crimes committed by the appellant are two distinct and separate murders, there having occurred in the commission of the homicidal acts the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated against the appellant. As we have stated
at the outset, the circumstance of evidence premeditation may be inferred from the chain of facts and circumstances, although not well
marked. The trial court appreciated in favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstances of obfuscation could be appreciated in favor of the
appellant because the now deceased did nothing to make him lose his reason. Even if they were his wife and her supposed paramour, still he
had no reason to be obfuscated because he drove his wife from the conjugal home and expressly ordered her to look for another man with
whom to live and be happy. Disregarding premeditation and offsetting the aggravating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the prescribed
penalty should, therefore, be imposed in its medium period — reclusion perpetua — in each case."cralaw virtua1aw library

On February 27, 1940, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court pursuant to the provisions of section 145-K of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, it appearing that some of its members were of the opinion that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon the appellant for the crime of double murder. The case was argued in this Court on July 26, , when,
acting upon a motion for rehearing filed by the appellant for the purpose merely of permitting him to present as additional evidence certified
copies of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Criminal Case No. 2568 convicting his wife, Felicisima Maramara, and Benito Aguipo
of adultery, and the opposition interposed thereto by the Solicitor-General, it ordered that said motion be attached to the record for
consideration when the case is decided on the merits.

It appears that after thirteen years of more or less stormy and loveless married life during which two children were nevertheless born, the
appellant first suspected and eventually learned from his own wife, Felicisima Mararmara, that the latter was in love and preferred to live with
one Delfin Villaluz. Matters came to a head when, on July 31, 1937, a document (Exhibit O) was prepared and, though intended to be executed
by the appellant and his wife, was signed only by the appellant. In said document the latter and his wife agreed to live apart, and the appellant,
as husband, ordered his wife to look for another man with whom she could live and be happy and, in turn, Felicisima Maramara, as wife,
commanded the appellant to look for another woman with whom he could live. While the ensuing separation was punctuated by occasional
visits of the wife to the conjugal home, sometimes at the instance of the children and sometimes at the instance of the appellant, the spouses
were never again reconciled. On or about August 17, 1938, Felicisima left Cebu and, on the pretext that she was bound for Manila, proceeded to
Talisay, Negros Occidental. There she requested one Silveria Patalinhug de Maramara to accompany her to Bacolod to look for her paramour,
Delfin Villaluz. Unable to find the latter, she stayed in the house of the newly married couple, Manuel Magbanua and Loreta Magalona, at No.
16 Smith Street, Bacolod, where she was seen to have been visited by a man who took her out not infrequently.

Shortly before noon on August 24, 1938, the appellant received in Cebu an anonymous letter (Exhibit 4) informing that his wife was staying at
No. 16 Smith Street, Bacolod, Occidental Negros. Armed with a revolver and accompanied by Marcial Hipolito, the appellant hurriedly left for
Bacolod, arriving there at about two o’clock the following morning. Upon finding the premises sought, The appellant, through the window,
entered the room where Manuel Magbanua and Loreta Magalona were lying together in one bed and thereafter shot and killed them. It is
conceded on all sides that the appellant mistook the deceased for his wife and her paramour, and the dispute has reference only to the
circumstances under which the fatal shots were fired. Thus the prosecution claims that the appellant killed the Magbanua spouses while they
were asleep, thereby holding him to the precise tenor of his affidavit (Exhibit B) signed shortly after the fatal occurrence wherein he partly
stated the following: "I looked for the house No. 16. I stepped on a little shack. I peeped on the room through the open window and saw a man
and a woman lying together on the floor inside the mosquito net. I got into the room through the window. The girl looked to me to be my wife
specially because I saw her clothes to be in the room. I shot them." On the other hand, the trial court found, upon the appellant’s testimony,
that after the appellant had entered the room in question had become convinced that the woman lying in bed was his wife was his wife, he
proceeded to lift the mosquito net, whereupon the couple rose from their bed; that it was only after the appellant saw the woman look for
something and after the man had given him blows on the shoulder and had tried to wrest his gun from him that the appellant fired the fatal
shots. After mature reflection, we are inclined to adopt this finding. No eye-witness was presented to contradict in any way the appellant’s
testimony during the trial , and the prosecution relies solely upon the appellant’s affidavit (Exhibit B) and upon the testimony of police sergeant
Roman Pampora to the effect that, shortly after the commission of the homicidal act, the appellant told him that "el disparo contra aquellos
que estaban alla dormidos." It is not improbable that at the time the appellant made his sworn statement and gave the alleged information to
Roman Pampora, he was still upset in mind as to be unable to detail the circumstances of the incident. Moreover, to find flaws in the appellant’s
testimony and to base conviction upon Exhibit B and the testimony of Ramon Pampora, without more, is to find the appellant guilty upon the
weakness of his defense rather than upon the required conclusiveness of the evidence of the prosecution. It results that there is no merit in the
suggestion of the Solicitor-General that the qualifying circumstance of treachery elevates the offense to double murder.

In this instance the Solicitor-General does not insist in the presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and it is merely
urged that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated against the appellant. We agree with the trial court that this
circumstance cannot be considered because the house in which the deceased were killed was not the dwelling place of the appellant’s wife and
her paramour whom he believed to have killed. We also agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be
taken into account, on the ground that the appellant, upon leaving Cebu for Bacolod, did not know the exact time he would arrive at his
destination. On the other hand, the trial court correctly found the presence of the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation and voluntary
surrender.
The appellant, however, argues that he found the deceased couple in the act of carnal intercourse and that, as he mistook them for his wife and
her paramour, he should be sentenced only to destierro, pursuant to article 247, in relation to article 49, of the Revised Penal Code. The trial
court refused to believe that the deceased were found in the act of copulation. We do not find it necessary to pass upon this conclusion of the
lower court in the light of the divided opinion of this Court in People v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 46310, promulgated October 31, 1939; and People v.
Soriano, G.R. No. 46775, promulgated June 28, 1940 (vide, also, People v. Ramiro C.A. XXXIV O.G. 1516), for, even assuming that the deceased
were engaged in the sexual act, article 247 of the Revised Penal Code cannot still be applied, since the appellant had expressly licensed his wife
to commit adultery, in that after the appellant had learned from the very mouth of his wife that the latter was in love and preferred to live with
Delfin Villaluz, he signed Exhibit O wherein he ordered his wife to look for and live with another man. In our opinion, this is consent sufficient,
under article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, to have barred the appellant from instituting a prosecution against his wife if the latter had in fact
committed adultery thereafter. (Cf. People v. Guinucod and Tagayan, 58 Phil., 621-624.) Consequently, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon
the appellant’s motion for rehearing.

There is no basis for the appellant’s further contention that article 365 of the Revised Penal Code may be made applicable and that he should be
convicted only of homicide through simple imprudence, because the act of firing the fatal shots was intentional on his part and even if the
appellant had actually killed his wife and her paramour, he would still be guilty of a felony. Neither is there basis for the alternative contention
that the appellant acted in self- defense, for the reason that, apart from the circumstance that his intrusion constituted sufficient provocation
and the weapon employed by him was not reasonably necessary, the measures taken by the deceased upon finding appellant in their room
cannot be considered unlawful aggression.

The motion of new trial filed with this court by the appellant on July 26, 1940, is denied.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 139576. September 2, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ROGER or ROGELIO PUEDAN, Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

By invoking the defense of surprising his spouse in the very act of sexual intercourse with the victim, the accused admits authorship of the
killing. Having waived his constitutional right to be presumed faultless, he now bears the burden of proving his innocence. Furthermore, his
flight negates his self-righteous proclamation of being the victim of in flagrante adultery. Indeed, if what he claims is true, he should have
reported the incident to the authorities immediately, instead of hiding from them for over three years.

The Case

Rogelio Puedan appeals the June 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Malaybalay (Branch 8) in Criminal Case No.
7482-95, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Rogelio Puedan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery. In
the absence of any other aggravating and/or a mitigating circumstance, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Florencio Ilar the sum of P50,000.00.2cräläwvirtualibräry

The Information3 dated June 20, 1995, charged appellant in these words:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1995, in the morning, at Purok 2, [B]arangay Paitan, Municipality of Quezon, [P]rovince of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill [and] by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, armed with a sharp bladed instrument (flamingo), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault
and stab FLORENCIO ILAR, hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following, to wit:

- Multiple stab wounds

which caused the instant[an]eous death of FLORENCIO ILAR, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of FLORENCIO ILAR in such amount
as may be allowed by law.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon his arraignment on June 9, 1998,5 appellant, assisted by his counsel,6 pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo
rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:

In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his six-year old grandson, Reymark Anthony Ilar, went to the house of
Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet.

Luceno Tulo was fashioning out a mortar (for pounding palay) near his house when Florencio and his grandson arrived.

Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a piglet from him.

Appellant Roger Puedan suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five (5) times, first in the abdomen, with a sharp, pointed knife locally known as
plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents house and
told his mother, Erlinda Ilar, what transpired.

Erlinda Ilar ran swiftly to Lucenos place but Florencio was already dead when she arrived. Florencio was bathed in his own blood and lying by
the side of the rice paddy.

The body of Florencio Ilar remained where it had fallen until the arrival of the police later that day.8 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant contends that he deserves acquittal, because the killing falls under the exceptional circumstance referred to in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. He claims to have surprised his spouse whom he had caught in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person. Appellant narrates his version of the facts in the following manner:

The defense had a different version of the incident that led to the death of Florencio Ilar. To lay the basis of the questionable character of the
deceased[,] [t]he defense presented the testimony of JENNEFER NADELA, who claimed that she was once a househelp in the residence of the
Ilars. During her stay, which lasted only from July 1 to July 30, 1992, the deceased used to fondle her private parts against her will. The deceased
likewise proposed an amorous relationship with her, in exchange for some money, which she declined.

Corroborative of the testimony of Nadela, anent the character of the deceased, was the testimony of witness VINESA QUINTERO. Quinteros
father and the deceased were drinking buddies. Sometime in December 1982, when she took her vacation at her parents house, her father and
Florencio Ilar had a drinking session. When the duo were through drinking, she washed the drinking glasses of their kitchen. Florencio Ilar,
however, followed her inside the kitchen and without warning embraced and kissed her. Ilar then proposed that they go outside in exchange for
some amount of money. She declined the proposition. The incident was repeated during the next weekend when her father and Ilar had
another drinking session. The witness likewise averred that she heard one of Florencio Ilars daughter-in-law, Erlinda, confiding to her mother
that Florencio Ilar was a sex maniac, who was bent on molesting her.
LEAH PUEDAN, the wife of the accused, admitted having an illicit relationship with the deceased, Florencio Ilar. The illicit relationship had been
going on for two years and was known in their barangay, except her husband. On February 21, 1995, at about 8:00 oclock in the morning,
Florencio Ilar came to their house, while she was breastfeeding her child, and was looking for her husband, Roger Puedan. When she retorted
that Roger was out putting the carabao in a shade, Florencio then suggested that they have a quick sexual intercourse, and ordered her to
remove her skirt and panty, while also undressing himself. While they were having sex, Roger suddenly appeared and was stunned by what he
saw. Roger then struck Florencio with his bolo and the two men grappled with each other. She then gathered her young child and ran away
from the house.

Accused ROGER PUEDAN, testifying on his behalf, averred that Florencio Ilar was one of the patrons in the ricefields [where] he works. As such
patron, Florencio usually [brought] him wine and pulutan which they partook at his house. On February 21, 1995, at around 8:00 oclock in the
morning, he brought his carabao to a shade. Upon his return, he heard some noises emanating from their bedroom. His curiosity aroused, he
went inside the room and found the already undressed Florencio having sexual intercourse with his wife. Shaken and dumbfounded by the
revelation, he shouted invectives upon the copulating pair and found a bolo to stab them. The first thrust was parried by Florencio, who
grappled for the bolo and wrestled with him. As they wrestled with each other, they fell to the ground, and his hand was freed from the grip of
Florencio. He then stabbed Florencio and hit him on the stomach. He then proceeded upstairs in search of his wife, who had already fled.9
(Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC opined that the prosecution witnesses were straightforward and candid in relating the incident.10 Moreover, [n]o motive has been
shown, and the court did not find any, why they would fabricate a story.11 They were able to establish the fact that appellant suddenly stabbed
Florencio Ilar, who was then buying a piglet outside Luceno Tulos house.

One of the investigating policemen, SPO4 Antonio B. Inihao, testified that they found Florencios body slumped lifeless on a rice paddy near
Tulos house. This fact, according to the trial court, belied the claim of appellant that it was outside his house where he had killed Florencio. The
body remained where it had fallen, unmoved and untouched, until the policemen arrived a few hours later. It was properly clad in a shirt and a
pair of buttoned pants. Had appellant really surprised his wife having sexual intercourse with him, Florencio would not have had the
opportunity to put on and button up his pants, parry the immediate bolo thrust of appellant then grapple with him.

Appellant thereafter fled and was finally arrested on March 16, 1998, or about three years after the killing. The trial court observed that his
flight was a strong indication of his guilt.

Conformably, the RTC overruled the contention of appellant that the killing should be treated under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. It
further said that treachery qualified the killing to murder.

Hence, this appeal.12

Issues

In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:

The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant, Roger or Rogelio Puedan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

II

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder despite the clear failure of the prosecution to establish the
particulars leading to the stabbing incident.13cräläwvirtualibräry

In short, appellant argues that (1) Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied in his favor, and (2) treachery should not be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

First Issue

Exceptional Circumstance

By raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his defense, appellant admits that he killed the victim. This provision reads as follows:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or
shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. x x x

By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence and bears the burden of proving the
following:

1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person.

2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.

3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse.14cräläwvirtualibräry
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man
during or immediately thereafter. However, all that appellant established was Florencios promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the killing.
What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically opposed to the convincing accounts of Prosecution Witnesses
Luceno Tulo, Reymark Anthony Ilar, Erlinda Ilar and Policeman Inihao.

Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by alleging that Tulo was not at the crime scene when the stabbing occurred.
Without elaborating on the particulars that led to the incident, appellant claims that Reymark and Erlinda merely underscored the fact that
Florencio had been stabbed. Thus, appellant argues that these witnesses were not able to contradict his defense.

Well-settled is the rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, because it
had the opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand. For this reason, its findings on
such matters, absent any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court
and will not to be disturbed on appeal.15cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses to be credible and convincing. It observed that Tulo, Reymark and Erlinda were candid and
straightforward in relating their versions of the stabbing incident. Tulo narrated that he was outside his house fashioning a mortar when
Florencio -- accompanied by his then five-year-old grandson, Reymark -- arrived in order to buy a piglet. Standing about a meter away, Tulo
recounted that appellant suddenly appeared and stabbed Florencio on the abdomen with a knife. Tulo testified thus:

Q Yes, you said that Roger Puedan stabbed Florencio Ilar, did you see him [stab] Florencio Ilar?

A That was the time when I turned my head as I was making a mortar.

Q You mean, that was the time you saw Puedan [stab] Ilar?

A Yes.

Q Now, at the time you were making a mortar, where was this incident [happening], at your front, at your back or at your side?

A On my side. (Witness referring to his right side).

Q How far were you [from] them when this incident happened?

A Just more than a meter.

COURT: (to witness)

Q You mean, while Florencio Ilar was there to buy [a] piglet you continued to work on your mortar?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Before Roger Puedan actually stabbed Florencio Ilar, did you see him coming?

A He came suddenly, he passed this way.

(Witness pointing to his front side).

Q He passed by in front of you or by your side?

A On my front, as I was making a mortar.

Q Was he running, walking fast or was walking naturally?

A He was walking fast.

Q Did you hear Puedan say anything when he stabbed Florencio Ilar?

A No, Your honor.

Q What did he use in stabbing Florencio Ilar?

A A knife. (plamingco).

Q Where was Florencio Ilar hit?

A On his abdomen.

Q What was the position of Florencio Ilar when he was stabbed?

A He was standing on my side.16cräläwvirtualibräry

After witnessing the knife thrust, Tulo out of fear immediately ran to his neighbors house. He explained:

Q Now, after you saw this Puedan [stab] Ilar, what did you do?

A I ran away.

Q How many times did you see Puedan stab Ilar?

A Only once.

Q And you said you ran away, towards where?

A To my neighbor.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Minutes later, Tulo with some other people went back to the crime scene and found Florencio already dead, lying several meters away from the
formers house.18cräläwvirtualibräry

Similarly, young Reymark testified that appellant had stabbed his grandfather Florencio five times. He testified thus:

Q How many times [was he] stabbed by Roger?

A Five (5) times.

Q What instrument did Roger use in stabbing your Lolo?

A A knife.

Q Where did Roger Puedan stab your Lolo, in what place?

A In the rice paddies.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Were you able to see all the incident?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q You were at the rice paddies also?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Why were you there?

A Because he asked me to accompany him.

Q Who asked you?

A Lolo.19cräläwvirtualibräry

There had been no untoward incident between appellant and Florencio immediately before the stabbing, as shown by Reymarks testimony:

COURT: (to witness)

Q Were you and your Lolo able to reach the house of Ceno before he was stabbed?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So your Lolo was able to talk with Ceno?

A No.

Q Why?

A Because [he] was stabbed.

Q So he was still walking towards Ceno before he was stabbed?

A Not yet.

xxx

Q Did Roger Puedan and your Lolo have a fight before your Lolo was stabbed?

A No.

Q Did they have [an] argument?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Who arrived at Cenos place first, your Lolo or Roger?

A Lolo.

Q Where was your Lolo hit the first time he was stabbed?
A On his abdomen.20cräläwvirtualibräry

Reymark at first stated in his testimony that, before being stabbed, his grandfather had not been able to talk to Tulo. From the boys statement,
appellant concludes that Tulo was not at or even near the crime scene.21 This inconsistency was clarified when the trial court again questioned
Reymark, who this time stated that his grandfather had indeed been able to see Tulo on that fateful morning.22 As posited by the prosecution,
such inconsistency in the testimony of Reymark may be explained by the fact that he was very young when the incident happened -- only five
years of age -- and was still very young when he testified on the witness stand three years later. Nonetheless, it was established that he and his
grandfather were at Tulos place to buy a piglet, that the boy himself saw his Lolo stabbed by appellant, and that Tulo was there but disappeared
immediately after the first knife thrust.

Even assuming arguendo that Tulo was not at the crime scene, Reymarks testimony is sufficient to prove that appellant actually stabbed
Florencio.

Appellant further alleges that Erlinda, who was the first to arrive at the locus criminis, did not see Tulo anywhere. This allegation, however, is
consistent with the testimony of Tulo that he ran to his neighbors house right after the first knife thrust.

Furthermore, the physical evidence shows that Florencio lay dead near Tulos -- not appellants -- house. Erlinda testified that his body remained
unmoved and untouched where it had fallen until the policemen came.23 In addition, SPO4 Antonio Inihaos testimony on the attendant
circumstances inspires belief. He testified that the body lay 80 meters away from appellants house and only about 15 meters away from
Tulos.24 This statement contradicts the claim of appellant that he and Florencio grappled outside the formers house, where the latter fell and
was subsequently killed.

When found, the body of Florencio was fully clothed in a shirt and a pair of pants, all its buttons intact.25 We agree with the RTC that had the
victim been caught by surprise while engaged in the sex act, he would not have had the opportunity to put on his pants, parry the forthcoming
bolo thrusts, and then grapple with appellant.

Appellants Flight

Further eroding the defense of appellant is the fact that he immediately fled from the crime scene right after the stabbing incident. He hid for
about three years26 until he was arrested by the authorities on March 16, 1998.27 His flight betrays his defense, because he could have easily
relayed his story to the proper authorities, if he had indeed caught his wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto.

Through flight, one impedes the course of justice by avoiding arrest, detention, or the continuance of criminal proceedings.28 As with self-
defense, the exceptional circumstance provided under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code may not prevail in the face of the flight of
appellant from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident.29 Flight bespeaks guilt and gives credence to the
version of the prosecution in this case.30

Second Issue

Treachery

Similarly without merit is appellants contention that treachery did not attend the killing. For treachery to be present, the means, methods or
forms of execution should give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. And it must be proven that such means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted without danger to appellant.31cräläwvirtualibräry

In the present case, the RTC correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing. Appellant came from nowhere and suddenly stabbed the
unsuspecting Florencio five (5) times. He deliberately and consciously adopted his mode of attack by lunging at the victim with his knife without
any warning whatsoever, giving the latter no opportunity to defend himself.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), and Corona, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128593 - August 14, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ZENAIDA MANALAD @ EDENG TOMBOY, Accused-Appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Zenaida Manalad @ Edeng Tomboy, in alleged conspiracy with four unidentified persons who were named in the information
as John, Peter, Charlie and Sonny Doe, were charged with the murder of one Herman Miclat under an information1 which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of January 1993, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above-named accused conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation and with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack and stab one HERMAN MICLAT, JR., y SADI @ BONG on the
vital of his body with a fan knife, which the herein accused was then provided, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which
caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Only accused-appellant Zenaida Manalad was arraigned since her co-accused were at large. She pleaded not guilty. The case thereafter
proceeded to trial.

At about 3:00 in the morning of January 31, 1993, Gerry Orbino, a fish vendor, was on his way to the fishport at Dagat-dagatan, Navotas on
board a pedicab. On the corner of Tilapia Street, he saw accused-appellant, Zenaida Manalad @ Edeng Tomboy, stab someone twice with a ten-
inch bladed weapon. He was about fourteen to fifteen meters away and the area was lighted by an electric lamppost. Thereafter that, accused-
appellant and her four male companions scampered away. Orbino got a good look at accused-appellant because she passed in front of him. The
victim, who turned out to be Herman Miclat, Jr., also ran away holding his bloodied chest.2

The victim was brought by his sister to the Ospital ng Kalookan, where he later expired. The autopsy report stated that the victim sustained
several stab and incised wounds, hematoma, abrasions and lacerated wounds.3 The stab wound at the back was the most fatal because it
pierced the liver and the lungs.4

According to Myrna Miclat Avila, a sister of Herman Miclat, the latter's common-law wife, Gloria Miclat, is accused-appellant's sister; and that
Herman Miclat had a dispute with accused-appellant and the latter's mother, Diega Manalad, over a parcel of land.5 The victim's daughter,
Crisanta, testified that one week prior to the killing, Diega approached her and said, "Antang, wala ka ng nanay, mawawalan ka pa ng tatay."6

In her defense, accused-appellant denied the killing. She alleged that she was asleep in her house, which was located at 51 Guido III, Maypajo
Street, Caloocan City, at 5:00 a.m. of January 31, 1993.7 Gloria Manalad, accused-appellant's sister, and a certain Rosario Diodin, testified that
the eyewitness, Gerry Orbino, knew the victim and his sisters even before the incident.8 Their testimonies were presented to refute Orbino's
statement that he did not know the victim, Herman Miclat, when he witnessed the killing.

On December 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
murder, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ZENAIDA MANALAD (a.k.a. Edeng Tomboy) is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of the victim FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for actual and compensatory damages, funeral expenses in the amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P13,000.00), and moral damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to pay the costs of the suit.9

Accused-appellant interposed the present appeal, raising the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT GERRY ORBINO'S IDENTIFICATION WAS CATEGORICAL AND ACCURATE THAT IT WAS THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO STABBED AND KILLED HERMAN MICLAT, JR.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, MORE PARTICULARLY
ORBINO IS CLOUDED WITH UNCERTAINTIES AND IMPROBABILITIES, THUS, UNWORTHY OF BELIEF THAT THE TRIAL COURT IS DUTY BOUND TO
DISREGARD.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF DR. ZALDARIAGA, THE MEDICO LEGAL EXPERT WHO CONFIRMED
THE AUTOPSY REPORT THAT THE RELATIVE POSITION OF THE ASSAILANT IN RELATION TO THE DECEASED AT THE TIME OF THE STABBING WAS
THAT THE ACCUSED WAS AT THE BACK OF THE DECEASED.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THERE IS NO MOTIVE FOR THE ACCUSED TO KILL THE DECEASED, THUS, ITS
ABSENCE ENTITLED THE ACCUSED TO ACQUITTAL.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT IS UTTERLY UNBELIEVABLE FOR THE WITNESS ORBINO TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE
INCIDENT ON THE DATE AND TIME THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED.

VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN A GENERAL AND SWEEPING STATEMENT WAS DECLARED THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION POINTS TO THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED ZENAIDA MANALAD WITH MORAL CERTAINTY.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SUDDENLY DISAPPEARED FROM HER RESIDENCE AFTER THE
KILLING.

VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE THAT THE LONG SILENCE OF JERRY ORBINO TO REPORT WHAT HE SAW ON 31 JANUARY
1993 RENDERED HIS TESTIMONY BIASED, IF NOT FABRICATED, THUS, UNWORTHY OF CREDENCE.

IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.10

Most of the errors assigned by accused-appellant relate to the credibility of the eyewitness, Gerry Orbino. In this connection, the oft-repeated
rule is that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. As this opportunity is denied
the appellate court, the lower court's findings of fact and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are generally binding on this Court absent a
clear showing that they were reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts or substance of value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.11

In the case at bar, the trial court found that Orbino was categorical in his identification of accused-appellant as the person who stabbed the
victim, Herman Miclat, Jr. It even noted that Orbino's identification was accurate as he was only fourteen to fifteen meters away and the scene
of the crime was well-lighted by a streetlamp. We also pored over the transcripts of Orbino's testimony and affirm the findings of the trial court.
Indeed, Orbino was straightforward in his narration of the events. He did not waver even during cross-examination by defense counsel.
Significantly, the questions propounded by the cross-examiner failed to destroy or even impair the credibility of the eyewitness.

The fact that Orbino was the only eyewitness presented does not diminish the probative value of the prosecution's evidence. The testimony of a
lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. Witnesses are to be weighed,
not numbered. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality and not quantity. Therefore, it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the
basis of the testimony of the lone witness. For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence,
preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of
a single witness.12

Accused-appellant invokes peripheral issues to impeach Orbino's credibility, such as his choice of route. Specifically, the defense argues that it
was improbable for Orbino to be on Tilapia Street because the most accessible and convenient route from his residence to the Navotas Fishport
was via the C-3 Road. As correctly ruled by the trial court:

Be that as it may, it is not for the Court to speculate on the witness' motive for taking Tilapia Street and not the C-3 Road as there could have
been some factors unrelated to the instant case which prompted him to act as he did. What remains undeniable is the fact that the witness saw
the accused and her male companions attack the deceased.13

Accused-appellant also argues that Orbino's delay in reporting the crime eroded his credibility. We do not agree. Different people react
differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience.14 A witness' delay in reporting what he knew about a crime does not render his testimony false or incredible,
for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case.15

Accused-appellant likewise professes lack of motive to kill the victim. Again, there is nothing in this case which will warrant a disregard of the
factual findings of the trial court on this score. After appreciating the testimonies of the victim's family, the trial court was convinced that the
victim and accused-appellant, who were in-laws, were involved in a land controversy which provided sufficient motive for the killing. We have
no reason to depart from such conclusion. More importantly, the issue of lack of motive on the part of accused-appellant is irrelevant because
motive gains importance only when the identity of the culprit is doubtful.16 As we stated earlier, the prosecution was able to establish accused-
appellant's identity through the eyewitness account of Gerry Orbino.

Accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail, considering that accused-appellant was positively identified by an eyewitness who
harbored no ill motive against her. Besides, accused-appellant was unable to show that it was impossible for her to have been at the locus
criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime.17 As she herself stated, the place where the victim was stabbed is
only more than thirty minutes away from her house by jeepney or tricycle, and more than one hour away if traversed by foot.18

While we affirm the trial court's finding that accused-appellant was responsible for the killing of Herman Miclat, Jr., we do not agree that the
crime committed was Murder. The trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Orbino
did not testify on the events that led to the stabbing. Hence, there is no showing whether the attack was swift and unexpected; or whether the
victim did not expect the attack or gave the slightest provocation. In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous
aggression, it must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack.19

Moreover, the fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. It is not
enough that the means employed by the malefactor gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate as when the attack came
from behind. To sustain a finding of treachery, an equally important requirement is that the means, method or form of attack must be shown to
have been deliberately adopted by the appellant with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any
defense that the party assailed might have made.20

In the same manner, the attendance of evident premeditation was not proved. In order to appreciate this circumstance, the following must be
shown: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.21 In the absence of proof of the events immediately preceding the killing, the decision and determination to kill the victim cannot be
established.

Thus, the crime committed by accused-appellant is Homicide, penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Article 64 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, prision mayor. Therefore, accused-appellant shall be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

There is a need to modify the trial court's award of damages. The amount of P50,000.00 is maintained, not as actual and compensatory
damages but as civil indemnity for loss of life.22 The amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00. The purpose for
such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.23 Finally, the award of P13,000.00 for
funeral expenses must be deleted. It appears that said amount was based on the contract for funeral services.24 However, a contract for
funeral services is not proof that what was stipulated in the contract was eventually paid. Hence, the contract cannot be considered as proof of
the amount of the loss.25

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C-47707, is
MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1)
day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the deceased Herman Miclat, Jr., the sums of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153781. September 24, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MATEO GREGORIO y CARPIO a.k.a. "Jhun Tayo", ALBERTO GREGORIO y CARPIO a.k.a. "Tonge"
(deceased) and JUANCHO OSORIO y DELA PAZ, Accused, MATEO GREGORIO y CARPIO a.k.a. "Jhun Tayo" and JUANCHO OSORIO y DELA PAZ,
Appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265, in Criminal Case No. 113892-H, finding appellants
Mateo Gregorio and Juancho Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On May 25, 1998, an Amended Information for Murder was filed against Mateo Gregorio y Carpio, a.k.a. "Jhun Tayo," Alberto Gregorio, a.k.a.
"Tonge", and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz. The Information reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, and with abuse of superior strength
and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot Juanito Regacho Gamboa, thereby
inflicting upon said Juanito Regacio y Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law. 2

The three accused were arraigned on different dates and pleaded not guilty. 3 They filed a Petition for Bail, which was denied by the trial court
in its Order dated May 16, 2001. 4

In the meantime, Accused Alberto Gregorio died 5 on July 23, 2000, while the Petition for Bail 6 was being heard.

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Prosecution witnesses Henry Ginez and Pablo Bihasa testified that at 10:40 p.m. of January 23, 1998, they saw the victim, Juanito Regacho,
standing in front of a store owned by a certain Bobit on Kalayaan Street, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. They heard the victim’s wife, Francisca,
ask him to come inside their house, located three meters away from the store. Juanito remained in front of the store.

Moments later, a tricycle pulled up and appellant Juancho Osorio alighted. He drew a gun and fired at Juanito, but the latter was able to parry
Juancho’s hand. Juanito then ran to the alley towards his house.

Juancho then pointed the gun at the bystanders, who scampered towards a parked jeepney and hide.

Meanwhile, appellant Mateo Gregorio came out from a nearby alley and fired his gun in the air. He approached appellant Juancho Osorio and
asked, "Nasaan na?" Both appellants followed the victim to the alley. Thereafter, gunshots were heard.

Prosecution witness Ignacio Lopeña, Jr. declared that earlier that day, Alberto Gregorio and the victim had a heated altercation after they came
from a mahjongan on the day the crime happened. He heard Alberto challenge the victim, "Kung gusto mo, tapusin na natin ito."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Ignacio Lopeña, Sr., testified that he was awakened when he heard a gunshot. He went outside the house and saw Mateo Gregorio running
after the victim, who was his brother-in-law. Appellants followed the victim into an alley. Thereafter, he heard gunshots coming from the alley.
Appellants came out of the alley still holding their guns.

The victim died in front of the door of his house. Ignacio, Sr. asked the bystanders to help his sister-in-law bring the victim to the hospital. The
victim was brought to the Cruz-Rabe Hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, who performed the post-mortem examination, found that the victim sustained four gunshot wounds. The wounds in
the right lobe of the liver and the lower lobe of the right lung were fatal. He testified that the cause of the victim’s death was the gunshot
wounds on the torso. 7

PO3 Conrado Mapili, the officer who responded to the shooting incident, learned from the residents that Mateo Gregorio, Alberto Gregorio and
an unidentified person were the suspects in the killing of the victim. He conducted a follow-up investigation and took the statements of the
prosecution witnesses which led to the filing of the instant criminal case.

In his defense, appellant Mateo Gregorio narrated that on the night of the crime, he was on his way home after getting the gun which
somebody pawned to him. He admitted that he fired said gun in the air because Ignacio, Sr., brother-in-law of the victim, was meddling in a
heated altercation between the victim and Alberto Gregorio. He saw the victim run away and afterwards he heard gunshots. He saw the
gunman board a tricycle. On the whole, he denied any participation in a conspiracy to kill the victim.

Joemar Gregorio, nephew of Mateo, corroborated the latter’s testimony. He learned from his mother that his uncle, Alberto Gregorio, had an
altercation with the victim. He saw Mateo Gregorio who had just alighted from a tricycle. They heard gunshots and ran away.

Appellant Juancho Osorio denied involvement in the killing. He testified that on January 23, 1998 at about 9:00 p.m., his family watched the
amateur singing contest and the gay beauty pageant at the fiesta in their barangay (Wawa, Tuktukan, Taguig). He stayed until 1:00 a.m. the
following day. He testified that he could not afford to buy a gun because he just drove a tricycle to earn a living for his family. He did not even
know how to use a gun. He claimed that he did not know Mateo Gregorio and Alberto Gregorio at the time of the incident.

On February 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MATEO GREGORIO y CARPIO a.k.a. "Jhun Tayo" and Accused JUANCHO OSORIO y
DELA PAZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER for the death of Juanito Regacho y Gamboa and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of the deceased, Juanito Regacho y Gamboa, the sum of SEVENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS as indemnity; FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED. 8

Appellants raised the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF FACTS ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BOTH ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER. 9

The first assignment of error has no merit.

While there was no direct evidence of the commission of the crime, the evidence presented by the prosecution constitute circumstantial
evidence sufficient to warrant appellants’ conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction were met, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 10

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. There was a heated altercation between Alberto Gregorio, brother of appellant Mateo Gregorio, and the victim. Ignacio, Jr. heard
Alberto challenge the victim, "Kung gusto mo tapusin na natin ito." Alberto went home while the victim stayed in front of the store which was
only three meters from their house.

2. Juancho Osorio alighted from a tricycle, aimed the gun at the victim and fired but the victim was able to parry his hand.

3. Juanito pointed the gun at the bystanders who ran and hid behind a parked jeepney.

4. Mateo Gregorio came out of the alley and asked Juancho Osorio, "Nasaan na?"

5. Mateo and Juancho followed the victim to the alley.

6. Witnesses heard gunshots coming from the alley.

7. Mateo and Juancho came out of the alley still holding their guns.

8. Appellants Mateo and Juancho ran away.

The above circumstances indeed form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that appellants were the perpetrators
of the crime. It has been held that facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in
weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. 11

The Information charged the appellants with conspiracy in killing the victim. Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself.
Like any element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 12 Conspiracy may be shown
through circumstantial evidence; deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or inferred from the acts of the
accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, a concerted action, and a community of interest. 13

In the case at bar, the appellants undoubtedly showed unanimity in purpose in attacking the victim. Juancho Osorio fired a gun at the victim.
Then, Mateo Gregorio approached Juancho Osorio and asked, "Nasaan na?" Appellants together followed the victim who ran inside an alley.
Appellants came out from the alley. Afterwards, they ran away. The prosecution was able to establish that appellants conspired in killing the
victim through these specific acts which unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design.

Appellant Juancho Osorio’s contention that his identification was merely suggested by the residents is without basis. The wife of the victim and
the prosecution witnesses positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime although they did not know his name when they
reported the incident. Witnesses need not know the names of the accused as long as they recognized their faces. What is important is that the
witnesses are positive as to the perpetrators’ physical identification from their own personal knowledge. 14

Notably, prosecution witnesses Henry Ginez and Pablo Bihasa positively identified the appellants as the culprits, too. They were not in any
degree related to the victim. Positive identification by independent witnesses who have not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify
falsely must prevail over simple denials and unacceptable alibi of the appellants. 15

Moreover, appellants fled from the scene of the crime after the shooting incident. Juancho Osorio was arrested on January 8, 1999 at Tambak,
Taguig, Metro Manila while Mateo Gregorio was arrested on May 1, 1998 in Sucat, Parañaque City. It has been settled that flight of an accused
is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. 16 Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.
17

Once again, we reiterate the rule that findings of fact of the trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal absent any
strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses. In the determination
of the veracity of the testimony, the assessment by the trial court is accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is seen to have acted arbitrarily or with evident partiality. 18 We find no reason to reverse the conclusions of the trial court as regards
the guilt of the appellants.

However, appellants cannot be convicted of murder. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength were not
sufficiently established by the prosecution.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance
to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. 19
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that this qualifying circumstance was consciously sought by the assailants. 20

The actual killing of the victim occurred in an alley and was no longer seen by the prosecution witnesses. Hence, there is no way of determining
whether the elements of treachery and abuse of superior strength were met.

Undisputedly, there was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated in the case at bar. In the same way that there was nothing in the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses for the prosecution which would prove that appellants pondered upon the mode or method to insure the
killing.

Superiority in numbers is not necessarily superiority in strength 21 Although the two appellants used guns to kill the unarmed victim,
nonetheless, the prosecution failed to establish that there was indeed a deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.

The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Appellants are entitled to the benefits
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum term of which shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00. In accordance with prevailing judicial policy, the civil indemnity must be reduced to P50,000.00. 22 The award of moral damages
has no factual basis. However, the heirs of the victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it appearing that they are entitled
to actual damages but the amount thereof cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same. 23

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No. 113892-H,
is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y Carpio a.k.a. "Jhun Tayo" and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Costs de oficio.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., is on leave.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 116224-27. March 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DONATO CARAIG, Appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Appellant Donato Caraig challenges the consolidated decision1 dated 28 April 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88,
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) three counts of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-684 to Q-88-686 for the death of
Melencio Castro, Jr., Roberto Raagas, and Placido Agustin; and (2) frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. Q-88-687 for the mortal wounding of
Edmundo Diaz.

Initially, only a certain Rolando Laomoc and four Does were charged in the separate informations in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-684 to Q-88-687.
The informations, however, were subsequently amended to substitute the names of Richard Doe and Roger Doe with Renato Laxamana and
Donato Caraig. The trial court approved the amendments in its Order of 28 February 1989.2cräläwvirtualibräry

The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-88-684 reads:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO LAOMOC Y CABE, DONATO CARAIG Y GARCIA, RENATO LAXAMANA and TWO (2)
DOES, the latter whose true names and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of October 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
MELENCIO CASTRO Y PASCUA, JR., by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Melencio P. Castro, Jr., in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the New Civil Code.3cräläwvirtualibräry

The informations for murder in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-685 and Q-88-686 are similarly worded, except as to the victims who were Roberto
Raagas and Placido Agustin, respectively.4cräläwvirtualibräry

The information for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. Q-88-687 reads:

That on or about the 5th day of October 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EDMUNDO DIAZ Y
DE DIOS, by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal injuries, the offenders thus performing the acts of execution which would produce death as a consequence, but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason or causes independent of the wills of the perpetrators, that is, the timely medical intervention given to the latter, to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the New Civil
Code.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Laomoc was arrested, while the warrants for the arrest6 of Laxamana and Caraig were returned unserved.

On 9 November 1988, Laomoc was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.7 Trial proceeded as against him. However, on 31 May 1989, on motion of
the prosecution and with Laomocs consent, the trial court ordered the provisional dismissal and archival of the cases as against him on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. But later, on 28 October 1991, the prosecution filed a motion to revive all the cases as against Laomoc.8 In
its Order of 4 December 1991, the trial court granted the motion and issued a warrant for the arrest of Laomoc.9 The latter, however, has
remained at large.10cräläwvirtualibräry

Meanwhile, or on 18 July 1991, Caraig was arrested in Cavite.11 Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty in each case.12 The trial then
proceeded as against him.

The prosecutions principal witness was Edmundo Diaz. He testified that at around 11:00 p.m. on 4 October 1988, he, together with Roberto
Raagas, Melencio Castro Jr., and Placido Agustin went to the Orchids Beerhouse in Quezon City, in front of Ali Mall, Cubao. As they were leaving
the beerhouse at past midnight or in the early morning of 5 October 1988, Caraig confronted them (sinita) whether they were military men.
They did not answer.13 A rumble or fight suddenly ensued between his group and Caraig. It was a brief scuffle. Caraig then ran back to the
Orchids Beerhouse.14 Thereafter, Edmundo and his companions rode on a Rocalex taxi. They were chased, however, by an old 1976 model
white Galant car, which eventually blocked the taxi along 12th Avenue and P. Tuazon St., Quezon City, about 100 meters from the Orchids
Beerhouse.15 Caraig, Laxamana, and Laomoc alighted from the Galant car. Each of them held a .45 caliber gun, which they simultaneously fired
upon Edmundo and his companions.16 While the hail of bullets went on, Edmundo played dead. He then heard somebody utter: Pare, tama na
yan. Patay na lahat ang mga iyan. When the car left, he asked the people who gathered around the scene to bring him to a hospital, where he
underwent treatment for eighteen days. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

Another prosecution eyewitness, Danilo Javier, corroborated Edmundos story. Danilo testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1988, he
was at the Orchids Beerhouse drinking beer with several companions, namely, Caraig, Laxamana, and a certain Lando.18 Later in the night, a
commotion took place at the beerhouse exit. From there, Caraig re-entered the beerhouse shouting that someone had taken his gun. All the
men in their table rushed towards the exit. Caraig, Laxamana, and Lando got into a car and chased a taxi.19cräläwvirtualibräry

From the street pavement, Danilo observed that the taxi was moving rather slowly away from the beerhouse. The car blocked the taxi.
Laxamana pointed a .45 caliber gun at the person inside the right side of the taxi, while Caraig went to the left side of the taxi. Then somebody
handed over a .9 mm. gun to Caraig. When he received the gun, Caraig suddenly fired it upon the passengers in the taxi. Laxamana followed
suit. A person tried to get out of the taxi, but Laxamana grabbed him and shot him in the head. Danilo claimed that he was about twenty-five
meters from the scene of the incident.20cräläwvirtualibräry

Prosecution witness SPO4 Lino Banaag, one of the policemen who responded to the shooting incident, declared that he found the dead body of
Roberto Raagas on the passengers seat beside the driver, that of Placido Agustin at the passengers seat at the back, and that of Melencio Castro
Jr. on the pavement beside the taxi. The victims were identified through their identification cards. He also found empty shells and slugs of .45
caliber and .9 mm. firearms around the taxi. Banaag was also informed by the other police officers that an injured person, whom they were able
to identify as Edmundo Diaz, was brought to the Quirino Memorial Hospital. There, they took Edmundos statement.21cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Valentin Bernales, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he conducted an autopsy on the bodies of the
three victims. He found that the cause of the death of Roberto Raagas was hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds resulting to shock.22 He
opined that from the location of the gunshot wounds it could be gleaned that when the victim was fired upon he was stooping forward and
sitting. He approximated that the bullets came from a .9 mm. to a .45 caliber gun.23 His autopsy on Placido Agustins cadaver revealed that the
cause of his death was also hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds resulting to shock.24 The body sustained eleven wounds. The varying
measurements of the entrance wounds disclosed that the firearms used were a .9 mm. to .45 mm. caliber range. On the cadaver of Melencio
Castro Jr., Dr. Bernales testified that he found two gunshot wounds. The first was located on the head at the back portion, right side and
directed forward slightly downward and medially to the left. It involved the brain, the skull bone, and exited on the auxillary area or at the back
on the left side. The second was directed backward, downward and laterally; it involved the lungs and exited on the back portion of his
scapula.25cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Alberto Capuno, a resident surgeon at the Quirino Memorial Medical Center, testified that he treated Edmundo Diaz for three gunshot
wounds. These wounds perforated the chest, stomach, and leg and were fatal.26cräläwvirtualibräry

The wives of the dead victims testified on the civil aspect of the crime.

Mrs. Ruth Agustin testified that her husband was 37 years old at the time of his death. Her husband was an employee of the Social Security
System receiving a monthly salary of P5,000. She and her children had suffered mental anguish and torture and financial setback as a result of
her husbands untimely demise. She spent around P150,000 for the funeral of her husband.27cräläwvirtualibräry

Mrs. Rhodora Raagas testified that her husband was 40 years old at the time of his death. He was the President of Sinclair Security and Allied
Services, a family-owned corporation, with a monthly compensation of P30,000. Mrs. Raagas claimed to have spent more than P100,000 for
funeral expenses. She said that she and her children were at a loss and in a state of shock as a consequence of her husbands
death.28cräläwvirtualibräry

Mrs. Merle Loria-Castro testified that her husband was 36 years old at the time of his death. He was a taxi driver of New Rocalex with an
average earning of P500 per day or P7,500 a month. She spent a total of P19,900 for the burial of her husband.29cräläwvirtualibräry

The defense presented as its sole witness appellant Caraig, who was still a member of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) when the incident in
question happened. He recalled that on the night of 4 October 1988, he went to the Orchids Beerhouse to look for Rolando Laomoc, a driver of
the service vehicle of the PC. Caraig was with Laxamana, another member of the PC. They used their service car, a 1979 white Galant. They
found Laomoc and joined him in drinking beer with twelve other persons, one of whom he recognized as prosecution witness Danilo Javier.
Later, he gave the car keys to Laomoc and excused himself from the group, as he wanted to go back to the barracks.30cräläwvirtualibräry

When Caraig stepped out of the beerhouse, a man whom he later identified as prosecution witness Edmundo Diaz approached him and asked
whether he was a member of the PC. Caraig replied in the affirmative. Edmundo countered that he was a member of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS). Caraig then asked for identification or proof of Edmundos claim, but the latter remarked, CIS to. Makulit ka. Ignoring Edmundo this
time, Caraig proceeded to the street pavement.31cräläwvirtualibräry

Suddenly, Edmundo poked a gun at Caraigs side. But Caraig merely turned his back against Edmundo. The latter then hit him with a gun on his
left eyebrow and lips. Suddenly, the companions of Edmundo ganged up on him, held his arms, and hit him on the different parts of his body.
They took his service pistol. After almost ten minutes, he was able to kick the side of a parked car, and they all fell down. He forthwith ran
towards the beerhouse and told his companions that his service pistol was grabbed from him. His companions scampered towards the exit of
the beerhouse.32cräläwvirtualibräry

Caraig was aided by Laxamana while he walked towards the exit. He pointed to Laomoc the taxi where his assailants rode. Laomoc and his
companions rode in the Galant car and chased the taxi. Laxamana and Caraig were still at the street pavement when they saw the taxi
passengers exchange gunfire with those riding in the Galant car. The gunfire ceased when the car blocked the taxi. Caraig was shocked with
what he saw, and he remained rooted from his vantage point for one or two minutes. After the gunfight, he noticed his pistol service on the
ground, got it, and later rode in the car with Laxamana and Laomoc back to their headquarters.33cräläwvirtualibräry

Caraig denied that he was one of the assailants. He also claimed that Danilo Javier was still in the beerhouse when the chase started, and
arrived at the scene only when everything was over.34cräläwvirtualibräry

In its challenged decision, the trial court found that the prosecution established with moral certainty that Caraig was one of the assailants who
shot the victims. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were clear, straightforward, and convincing as opposed to the testimony of the
defense witness, which consisted merely of denial and alibi. These defenses cannot prevail over the positive identification of Caraig by
eyewitnesses Edmundo Diaz and Danilo Javier, as well as the documentary, physical, and other testimonial evidence offered by the prosecution.
The trial court appreciated treachery and conspiracy in the commission of the crime. It then decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered accused Donato Caraig is found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the three counts of murder for the
deaths of Melencio Castro, Roberto Raagas and Placido Agustin and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the
offense and ordered to pay the heirs of Melencio Castro the sum of P19,900 for burial expenses, P50,000 for indemnity and P100,000 for moral
damages; to pay the heirs of Roberto Raagas the sum of P140,000 for burial expenses, P50,000 for indemnity and P500,000 for moral damages
[and] to pay the heirs Placido Agustin the sum of P150,000 for burial expense, P50,000 for indemnity and P300,000 for moral damages.

Accused is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of frustrated murder for the mortal wounding of Edmundo Diaz and
sentenced to serve the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the cost.35cräläwvirtualibräry

Caraig seasonably appealed to us from the judgment of conviction.

For causes hereunder discussed, the disposition of these cases was delayed.
On 26 September 1994, we accepted the appeal in these cases but required the clerk of court of the trial court to explain why the records of the
cases transmitted were incomplete, and directed him to require the stenographers concerned to submit the transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs).

In our resolution of 23 November 1994, we noted the Compliance of the clerk of court, who explained that a part of the records were
irretrievably lost and that he required the stenographers to submit to the trial court their copies of the TSNs.

Except for Mirasol Ramos, the stenographers submitted the TSNs. Mirasol Ramos was the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes
of the 1 February 1989 hearing, specifically the testimony of Dr. Jose Albert Capuno and part of the testimony of Merle Castro. Despite diligent
efforts to do so, Mirasols whereabouts could not be located. Finally, our Office of Administrative Services reported that she had been officially
dropped from the rolls. Thus, in our resolution of 12 February 1997, we required the parties to manifest whether the TSNs for the 1 February
1989 hearing could be dispensed with.

It also appeared that Caraigs counsel of record, Atty. Phytagoras Oliver, was no longer holding office in the address given in the records. We
then required Caraig to manifest whether he was willing to be represented by a counsel de oficio. It took Caraig some time to submit his
manifestation. So on 18 April 1997, we appointed Atty. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., as his counsel de oficio.

In its Compliance with our 12 February 1997 Resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it was inclined to dispense
with the TSNs in question. On the other hand, in his Compliance filed on 18 July 1997, Atty. Gupit maintained that if he would be compelled to
take a stand, he ha[d] to state that the missing transcript should not be dispensed with because the accused on appeal is entitled to due process
in its full spectrum, no more and no less.

Thus, in our Resolution of 11 August 1997, we required the trial court to retake the testimonies of Dr. Jose Albert Capuno and Merle Castro. The
retaking of the testimony was, however, delayed for a number of reasons. Finally, on 9 August 2001, we received the letter dated 20 July 2001
of Judge Abednego Adre, then Presiding Judge of Branch 88 of the RTC of Quezon City, informing us that the testimony of Dr. Capuno was
retaken on 13 September 2000 and the TSNs thereof were transmitted to us on 8 March 2001 by registered mail. Judge Adre also stated that
Merle Castro had been missing and efforts to locate her had proved futile; hence, her testimony could not be retaken.

On 3 September 2001, we required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to dispense with the TSNs of the testimony of Merle
Castro. In its Manifestation, the OSG answered in the affirmative. Atty. Gupit, on the other hand, manifested that the TSNs of the testimony of
Merle Castro could be dispensed with only if the facts sought to be proved by her testimony would be disregarded. The Court noted the
manifestation of the parties.

In his Appellants Brief filed on 1 April 2002, Caraig asserts that the trial court erred in (a) believing the alleged eyewitnesses testimonies of
Edmundo Diaz and Danilo Javier; (b) discarding his defense of alibi and denial; (c) finding the existence of a conspiracy and treachery; (d) finding
as established beyond reasonable doubt the criminal charges filed against him; and (e) ordering him to pay damages.

Caraig emphasizes that Edmundo Diaz and Danilo Javier are not credible witnesses because it took them quite some time, i.e., three years from
the time of the incident, before they testified in court. He then boldly asserts that his conviction is based on mere gut feeling, as the proverbial
axe which has to fall on someone did fall on him by his convenient presence at the place and time when the crime was committed.

In the Appellees Brief filed on 26 August 2002, the OSG counters that the trial court committed no errors in these cases. The trial court correctly
rejected the defenses of alibi and denial, which could not outweigh Edmundo Diazs positive identification of Caraig as one of those who
peppered with bullets the taxi that carried the victims to their death, and Edmundo to his near death. This identification was corroborated by
Danilo Javier, who was one of Caraigs drinking buddies at the beerhouse.

On Caraigs attempt to diminish the credibility of the eyewitnesses accounts on the ground that they were reluctant witnesses, the OSG
maintains that the initial reticence of prosecution witnesses for fear of reprisal is not uncommon. Such observation is supported by
jurisprudence and explained in these cases, as Caraig was a PC member at the time of the incident. The OSG likewise agrees with the trial courts
appreciation of treachery and conspiracy.

After a careful review of the records of the cases and the evidence adduced by the parties, we agree with the OSG. The trial courts decision was
not based on gut feeling. The proverbial axe falling on someone did fall on Caraig on the basis of the evidence duly established at the trial.

The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Caraig, in conspiracy with his co-assailants, killed Roberto Raagas, Placido Agustin, and
Melencio Castro Jr. and almost killed Edmundo Diaz. They used the Galant PC service car to pursue the victims, who were riding on a Rocalex
taxi, and to block the path of the taxi. They alighted from the car and then used their .45 caliber and .9 mm. service guns to pepper the taxi and
the victims with bullets, and they left them for dead. Only Edmundo Diaz escaped from the carnage because of timely medical treatment and
attention.

The foregoing acts undoubtedly showed unanimity in design, intent, and execution of the attack on the part of Caraig and his co-assailants. They
performed specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design to bring about the death of
the victims. Conspiracy among Caraig and his co-assailants was thus established with moral certainty.

Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence; deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or
inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, a concerted action, and a community of interest.36 It was not even
necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victims.

Caraig wants to impress us that he was merely a horrified spectator of the gruesome events that unfolded before him. We are not persuaded.
His version is incredible and must be rejected in light of his positive identification as one of the assailants, as well as the categorical and
straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses. His bare and uncorroborated denial amounted to nothing more than a negative and
self-serving evidence unworthy of weight in law.37cräläwvirtualibräry

Caraig cannot fault the prosecution witnesses initial reluctance to testify. It is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance
about getting involved in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial notice. It is understandable for a
witness to fear for his safety,38 especially in this case where PC men were involved in the commission of the crime. Such initial reticence does
not affect the witnesses credibility.39 Besides, their delay in testifying was principally caused by the delay in the trial caused by, among other
things, Caraigs success in avoiding the service of the warrant of arrest. It was only in 1991 when he was finally arrested.
We also agree with the OSG and the trial court on the finding of treachery. There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods, or
forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.40 Two elements must therefore concur: (1) the means of execution employed
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and the (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.41cräläwvirtualibräry

The attack upon the victims in these cases was attended by treachery. Per Danilo Javiers testimony, the taxi on which the victims were riding
was moving slowly away from the beerhouse when Caraig and his co-assailants pursued it and then blocked its path. The interception took
place at less than 100 meters away from the beerhouse. Since the victims were inside the taxi, they had no chance to fight back or defend
themselves. The number of the victims individual wounds and their relative positions when found dead by the police emphasized further the
essence of treachery. The means, method, and form of the attack in this case were, therefore, consciously adopted and effectively forestalled
the victims from employing a defense against their attackers.

Accordingly, as correctly found by the trial court, Caraig should be held liable for three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.

And now on the civil liability of Caraig.

In awarding in favor of the heirs of Roberto Raagas the amount of P140, 000 for burial expenses, the trial court relied on Exhibits A and A-1,
which are merely lists of expenses written on a PCIBank check booklet.42 It based the award for burial expenses in the amount of P19,900 in
favor of the heirs of Melencio Castro Jr. on Exhibits C (receipt issued by Memorial Homes), D(list of expenses), and D-1(Affidavit of
Adjudication).43 Notably, these exhibits were presented during the trial of the cases against Laomoc on 14 December 1988 and 1 February 1989
before appellant Caraig was arrested. They were not among the documentary evidence offered in evidence during the trial of the consolidated
cases against Caraig.44 Hence, they cannot be considered as evidence against him.

Besides, a list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business transactions.45
Neither can the mere testimonies of the victims widows Ruth Agustin, Rhodora Raagas, and Merle Castro in the consolidated cases against
Caraig justify the awards for funeral or burial expenses. It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim will be recognized in court. 46 Nonetheless, in line with People v.
Carillo,47 reiterated in People v. Bonifacio,48 we shall award nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 for each group of heirs of the victims,
since they clearly incurred funeral expenses.

Anent the awards for moral damages, the same must be sustained in addition to the awards of civil indemnity. Ruth Agustin and Rhodora
Raagas testified on the mental anguish they and their children suffered as a consequence of the death of their respective husbands.

As to Merle Castro, it is unfortunate that the TSNs of her testimony in the cases against Caraig were irretrievably lost and could not anymore be
reproduced, and her testimony could not be retaken. Moreover, the decision of the trial court did not mention of a testimony on her moral
suffering. What remained in the records is the TSN of her testimony during the trial of Laomoc, where she declared that she experienced
difficulties in life as a consequence of Melencios death and that she and her children missed him so much. However, this testimony was not
adopted in the cases against Caraig; hence, it cannot be taken into consideration for purposes of determining the civil liabilities of Caraig.
Nevertheless, conformably with People v. Carillo,49 People v. Panela,50 and People v. Panado,51 where we reconsidered our policy on moral
damages and held that an award therefor is mandatory and does not require allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, we uphold
the award of moral damages in favor of Melencios heirs even granting that there is no allegation and proof of their emotional suffering. We
reiterate what we said in People v. Panado:

Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental
suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim
of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this
reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. Verily Hilda and her
son Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband and a father. With or without proof, this fact can
never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be considered proved.52cräläwvirtualibräry

The amounts of moral damages awarded for each group of the deceaseds heirs are, however, reduced to P50,000 in accordance with current
jurisprudence.53cräläwvirtualibräry

We also observe that there was testimonial evidence by the widows of Placido Agustin, Roberto Raagas, and Melencio Castro Jr. on their
respective husbands monthly compensation and age at the time of death. The trial court, however, was silent on the indemnity for loss of
earning capacity under Article 2206 of the Civil Code. In view of the testimonial evidence on the loss of earning capacity, we deem it necessary
to make a pronouncement on the matter.

The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages therefor may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony that the victim
was either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the victims line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.54cräläwvirtualibräry

The testimonial evidence shows that Placido Agustin, Roberto Raagas, and Melencio Castro Jr. were not self-employed or employed as daily-
wage workers earning less than the minimum wage under the labor laws existing at the time of their death. Placido Agustin was a Social
Security System employee who received a monthly salary of P5,000. Roberto Raagas was the President of Sinclair Security and Allied Services, a
family owned corporation, with a monthly compensation of P30,000. Melencio Castro Jr. was a taxi driver of New Rocalex with an average daily
earning of P500 or a monthly earning of P7,500. Clearly, these cases do not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning
capacity can be given despite lack of documentary evidence. Therefore, for lack of documentary proof, no indemnity for loss of earning capacity
can be given in these cases.
On a final note, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should also be awarded to Edmundo Diaz. He testified that he was treated for
eighteen days at the hospital for the injuries he sustained. He also showed the scars of said wounds on his chest, left foot, knee, and the back of
his leg.55 As stated earlier, Dr. Alberto Capuno, the physician who treated Edmundo, testified that these wounds were fatal.56 The fact that he
sustained nearly fatal wounds for which he was treated for eighteen days at the hospital constituted the trauma of physical, psychological, and
moral sufferings on which the award for moral damages under Article 2219(1) of the Civil Code could be based. Moral damages can be awarded
without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof if it is too obvious to still require the recital thereof.57 The physical suffering of
Edmundo is quite obvious to still direct him to recount the same.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-684 to Q-88-687 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant DONATO CARAIG is found guilty of three (3) counts of murder and of frustrated murder, and SENTENCED to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the first three cases and an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in the fourth case. The awards of civil
indemnity decreed by the trial court for the heirs of Roberto Raagas, Placido Agustin, and Melencio Castro Jr. are affirmed. The awards for burial
expenses are, however, deleted for lack of documentary proof, and in lieu thereof, an award for nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 is
hereby adjudged in favor of each group of heirs of the deceased victims. The award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000 for each group of
the heirs of the deceased. Appellant is likewise ordered to pay Edmundo Diaz moral damages in the amount of P50,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 137407 January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILLERIE AVENDAÑO, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On automatic review is the decision1 dated January 29, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in Criminal
Case No. R-4227. Appellant Willerie Avendaño was found guilty of murder and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:

In an information dated August 18, 1997, Willerie Avendaño was charged with two counts of murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of July, 1997 at night time (sic) in Purok Bagong Silang, Barangay Aguas, Municipality of Rizal, Province of
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being then armed with a jungle knife, with
intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab with the said weapon Remedios
Castillo and Melvin Castillo inflicting upon the victims serious wounds which caused their untimely death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The principal witness for the prosecution was JEFFRE CASTILLO, an eight-year-old son of the victim Remedios Castillo and brother of the victim
Melvin Castillo. In his testimony, he stated that his parents were named Remedios and Boyet; that they were six children in the family, namely,
Michael, Dikong, Ape, Manolito, the victim Melvin and himself, and that he was a Grade I pupil at the Aguas Elementary School. He testified that
he knows appellant, having known him for about three or four years before the incident of July 29, 1997. On said date, at around 6:00 P.M., he
saw appellant in their house, looking for his plow and asking if he knew who got it, to which he replied that he did not. While appellant was in
their house, his mother was upstairs and his Kuya Melvin was also inside the house. His father and the rest of his brothers and sisters were in
Cabanatuan City. He recalled that appellant was then wearing a green t-shirt and shorts, the color of which he could not remember.3
Thereafter, appellant left. After dinner, he, his mother and brother went to sleep. Before they slept, he recalled they had a pangmagdamagan or
overnight lamp which was turned on.

That night, according to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He was suddenly awakened when he heard a commotion (kalambugan). However,
by the time he woke up, the room was very dark because the lamp was already turned off. He heard his mother shout, "Dikong, tulungan mo
kami." When he heard the kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept their pillows and tried to hide. Then, there was
silence. Then he heard somebody going downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the lamp, while Jeffre stayed where he was. He then heard the person
downstairs going up again.4 He saw through his blanket that the person had come up: "Naaninag ko po sa kumot yung tao."5 That was when he
distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, "Kuya Willie, tama, na, tama na!" That was just before Melvin was killed.6

Jeffre recalled that someone coughed and he recognized the cough as that of his Kuya Willie. He recognized it because he had heard a similar
cough on several occasions in the past when appellant frequented their house. He remained where he was until appellant left.

Jeffre said he fell asleep and was awakened only the following morning by persistent knocking on their door. He opened the door to find his Ate
Annie (Juliana Castillo), Ate Norma (Roldan) and Ate Ann (Roldan) looking for his mother. He then told his Ate Annie that Willerie Avendaño
killed both his mother Remedios and his Kuya Melvin. He remembered that thereafter, their relatives as well as some policemen arrived.7

Jeffre recounted that he was brought to the police station where his sworn statement was taken and he signed it in the presence of Mayor
Bartolome Miranda of Rizal town.8 He said he was accompanied by his Lola Nena who read to him what was written in the statement because
he did not know how to read. He said no one coached him to answer the way he did, particularly to the question: "Sino ang taong umubo na
yon?" His answer was: "Hindi ko po nakita pero kilala ko ang boses niya na si Kuya Willie."9

In the course of his testimony, Jeffre was shown a green t-shirt and a pair of shorts which he recognized as those appellant wore the night of
July 29, 1997, when appellant went to their house earlier in the evening.10

On cross-examination, Jeffre said his father talked to him about the case four times, and that before coming to court, several of his relatives
also talked to him about the case and told him to point to appellant as the person who killed his mother and brother.11 The child further
testified that on the night his brother and mother were killed, he heard his Kuya Willie cough four times — three times downstairs and once
upstairs, after which he again pointed to appellant as the culprit behind the deaths of his mother and brother.12

Witnesses JULIANA CASTILLO13 and VIRGILIO CASTILLO14 testified that they were neighbors and relatives of the victims. They lived in a
compound in Brgy. Aguas, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro where the houses of three brothers were built: the house of Ramon Castillo, Juliana's
husband; the house of Virgilio Castillo, who was still single and lived alone; and the house of Benedicto Castillo, his wife Remedios, and their
children.

According to witnesses, appellant was the adopted son (or palaki) of an aunt of the Castillo brothers. Appellant had four children. His wife lived
in San Roque I, Occidental Mindoro, and seldom visited him.15 He owned and worked on a seven-hectare farm adjacent to the lot where the
witnesses and the victims lived. He frequented the neighborhood while he bought food and supplies from the store of Juliana.16 He spoke with
Virgilio at times, although Virgilio said that they were not close because Virgilio was not used to having a barkada.17

Both witnesses claimed that when appellant was working on his farm, he frequented the house of Remedios, dropping by almost three times a
day, especially when the victim's husband was not around. He sometimes had coffee or left some of his farm implements there. They claimed
that appellant had spent a night there. Juliana further testified that on two occasions prior to the incident,18 the victim Remedios confided to
her that she was angry at appellant because he was courting her. Witness Juliana added she already suspected that fact even before Remedios
confided in her, but she did not tell appellant's wife because the wife might not believe her.19
Juliana recalled that at about 7:00 P.M. on July 29, 1997, appellant arrived at her store and bought a cigarette. After that he invited Virgilio, who
was then having dinner, for a drink. The latter declined.20 She recalled that on that night, she and her children slept at around 8:30 P.M. She did
not recall hearing any noise coming from Remedios' house because it was raining heavily then and she was also listening to the radio.21 The
next day, at about 7:00 A.M., her neighbor Norma Roldan and her daughter, Ann, arrived and asked her to accompany them to Remedios, to ask
the latter for their wages for planting palay. Remedios was their kabisilya at that time. They knocked for about 30 minutes, calling "Nanie".
Jeffre then opened the door and told them that his mother and brother were both dead and that the killer was his Kuya Willie.22

In his testimony, 23 Virgilio Castillo stated that, at approximately 7:00 to 7:10 P.M. of July 29, 1997, while he was seated in the terrace of Juliana
Castillo's house, he saw appellant with a lighted cigarette enter the kitchen door of the victims' house. At that time, he saw Remedios washing
clothes in the poso (water pump), about six arms-length from her house where her two sons were. Appellant inquired where his plow was. After
about three minutes, he left. Virgilio recalled that appellant, returned at about the same time he went out of Juliana's house. Appellant
followed and invited him to "go around". According to Virgilio, he declined because he was tired. He could not recall where appellant went
after. He remembered appellant wore a green t-shirt with the words "Landbank" printed in front and back, and a pair of dark green shorts.
When shown a green t-shirt and short pants (marked as Exhibit "C"), witness identified the clothes as those worn by appellant the night of July
29, 1997. He said he learned of Remedios and Melvin's death the following morning. He said he did not hear anything the previous night as it
was raining hard and because a cement wall separated his house from that of Remedios.

The fourth witness for the prosecution was SPO2 ESTEBAN MARIANO DIMALALUAN,24 Chief of the Police Relations Section and Chief
Investigator assigned at the Rizal Police Station. He testified that on July 30, 1997, his office received a radio report of an incident in Sitio Bagong
Silang, Barangay Aguas, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro. Upon arrival at the scene he and three other policemen found the bodies of Remedios and
Melvin Castillo, soaked in blood. They bore numerous stab wounds. The room where the bodies were found measured about three meters by
four meters. After they took pictures of the bodies, and after further inspection, he noticed fresh footprints with mud on the toilet bowl and on
the wall made of light materials. He also took pictures of the footprints but the negatives got exposed prematurely.

In the course of his investigation, said SPO2 Dimalaluan, he met eight-year-old Jeffre Castillo, who had survived the carnage. The boy told him
that he heard his mother shout "Dikong, tulungan mo kami" and also his brother shouting ". . . Kuya Willie," and "Tulungan nyo kami, hindi na
po ako uulit." According to Jeffre, the last time he saw appellant in their house was before nighttime of the day of the crime.25 Dimalaluan
added that Juliana and Virgilio also saw appellant then.

Later, according to Dimalaluan, they went to the house of appellant 150 meters away from the crime scene. There they found appellant who
had just taken a bath. They asked him what he wore the day of the incident, and appellant pointed to the clothes he was wearing. Doubting
appellant, Dimalaluan went inside the house. In the bathroom, a green t-shirt with "Landbank" print and dark short pants, newly washed and
still wet, were hanging from the clothesline. He said he noticed dark stains on them. These were brought to the police station. During
Dimalaluan's testimony he marked the stains found on the clothes.26 These, however, were not subjected to laboratory examination.

Appellant voluntarily went with the police to the police station, according to Dimalaluan. While detained, appellant made an oral admission that
he killed the victims and that he used a knife, said the police officer. Hence, on July 31, 1997, Dimalaluan accompanied appellant back to his
house, where appellant got from the cabinet a hunting knife with scabbard and then handed it over to him.27 According to Dimalaluan,
appellant's admission was not reduced into writing28 because when appellant made the admission, he was not assisted by a lawyer. The knife
was likewise not subjected to any laboratory examination.

The last prosecution witness, DR. MICHAEL C. JIMENEZ,29 Municipal Health Officer of Rizal, testified that he conducted the autopsy on the
bodies of the victims. He issued their respective death certificates.30

Appellant WILLERIE AVENDAÑO31 was presented by the defense as its sole witness. He denied committing the crimes and interposed an alibi.
He said the deceased Remedios and he had no disagreements.32 He did admit that in the late afternoon of July 29, 1997, he bought cigarettes
from Juliana's store and there saw Virgilio Castillo. He denied he invited him for a drink.33

According to appellant, he learned of the stabbing incident the following day, July 30, 1997, at about 8:00 A.M. He then went to the place where
the victims were killed.

Thereafter he went back home. A few moments later five policemen, headed by SPO2 Dimalaluan, arrived. They asked him to accompany them
to Remedios' house. After taking them there, he returned home to cook. He later went back to Remedios' house and SPO2 Dimalaluan no
longer allowed him to go home. Accompanied by policemen, he was allowed to go home only to lock the door of his house. There, they took
one t-shirt and a pair of shorts. Thereafter, he was brought to the Rizal police station and detained.

According to appellant, he was told to admit to the killings but he refused, saying he did not do it. He did not give a written statement while
under detention. The following day, July 31, 1997, the policemen brought him back to his house using a service jeep. They took a knife from his
house and before they left, took a photograph of him pointing to the knife. He did not protest or say anything at the time because he was
afraid.34

On the witness stand, he admitted ownership of the t-shirt and short pants taken from his house but denied having worn them in the afternoon
of July 29, 1997. He averred he did not wash them and said that these were hanging for sometime when the police found them. Later, however,
he said he hanged said clothes on July 29, 1997.35

On January 29, 1999, the RTC convicted appellant as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the accused Willerie (Willy) Avendano is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 6 of Republic Act
Number 7659, otherwise referred to as the Death Penalty Law, and is hereby sentenced to DEATH.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims Remedios Hilario Castillo and Melvin Hilario Castillo in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.000) for each victim, and to furthermore pay said heirs the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) for each victim as and for moral damages.

The Provincial Warden is hereby directed to cause the immediate transfer of the accused from the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.36

Hence, this appeal. Appellant, in his brief, assigns the following errors for our consideration:

I. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JEFFRE (sic) CASTILLO WHO IS ONLY
EIGHT YEARS OLD.

II. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JEFFRE CASTILLO WHO PLAYS IN THE
COURTROOM AND UNMINDFUL OF THE TRIAL AND WHO DOES NOW (sic) UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF AN OATH.

III. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JEFFRE CASTILLO WHO WAS COACHED BY
THE FATHER AND MANY RELATIVES.

IV. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE OFFICER THAT ACCUSED ADMITTED
THE OFFENSE VERBALLY TO HIM.

V. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT ANY WARRANT
AND PUT TO JAIL UP TO THE PRESENT.

VI. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE CONFISCATED T-SHIRT AND SHORT PANTS WHICH THE
PROSECUTION CLAIMED TO HAVE BLOOD STAINS WITHOUT LABORATORY EXAMINATION.

VII. THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHILD IS CONTRARY TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR, EXPERIENCE, OBSERVATION AND NATURAL COURSE OF
THINGS.37

From the foregoing, the main issue for resolution is whether the prosecution's evidence suffices to convict appellant of murder beyond
reasonable doubt, and impose on him the death penalty. We must, for this purpose, inquire (1) whether the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses are credible; (2) whether the arrest and the confinement of appellant are legal; and (3) whether the T-shirt and short pants taken
from appellant are admissible in evidence.

Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution's witness, Jeffre Castillo. According to appellant, the boy is only a playful eight-year-old who
could not possibly understand the value of an oath. Appellant points out that during Jeffre's testimony, the defense counsel called the attention
of the court that Jeffre was playing with a rubber band while testifying and appeared to be inattentive to the questions propounded to him.38
Moreover, appellant states that Jeffre did not understand his oath because he did not even know his birthday, did not know how to read and
write even in Tagalog, and did not know where he was born.39 According to the appellant, based on these observations, Jeffre's credibility is
questionable.

In previous cases, the Court has held that a witness is not incompetent to give testimony simply because he or she is of tender age. The
requirements of a child's competence as a witness are: (1) capacity of observation; (2) capacity of recollection; and (3) capacity of
communication.40 It is the degree of a child's intelligence that determines the child's competence as a witness. If the witness is sufficiently
mature to receive correct impressions by his senses, to recollect and narrate intelligently, and to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth, he
is competent41 to testify. A minor's testimony will suffice to convict a person accused of a crime so long as it is credible.42

The determination of a child's intellectual preparedness to be a witness rests primarily with the trial judge, who assesses the child's manners,
his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. These abstract matters cannot be
photographed into the record. The judgment of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review, unless from that which is preserved, it is clear
that it was erroneous.43

In the case at bar, the trial court found that despite Jeffre's age, his testimony was delivered in a firm, candid, and straightforward manner and
that his demeanor while at the witness stand was credible.44 On this point, we see no reason to depart from the evaluation by the trial judge,
who had the advantage of directly observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, as well as having certain potent aids in
understanding and weighing the testimony of the witness.45

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies in Jeffre's testimony were only on minor details and trivial matters that serve to strengthen rather than
destroy Jeffre's credibility.

Appellant avers that Jeffre's father and relatives coached him on what to say and that his testimony and identification of appellant appeared
rehearsed. He points out that Jeffre's father was allowed to sit near him while he was testifying. He also places emphasis on the admission
made by Jeffre in open court46 that on several occasions, including the night before he was to testify, his father and relatives talked to him
about the case and taught him what to say and who to point to as the culprit. These, according to appellant, strip the testimony of the child of
any shred of credibility.

The records of this case, however, do not support appellant's claim. As found by the trial court, Jeffre's testimony was delivered in a firm,
candid, and straightforward manner. There is no showing that Jeffre wavered from the basic facts of his testimony, even when he was subjected
to rigorous cross-examination.

If we are to believe the defense's assertion that the child was coached before he testified, wouldn't his coaches also teach him to vehemently
deny that such was the fact? Being a child of tender age, Jeffre naturally needed guidance to face the ordeal of testifying before the court on a
matter as gruesome as the death of his own mother and brother. His spontaneous admission that his elders talked to him beforehand did not
diminish, but rather bolstered, his truthfulness. With regard to the proximity of his father to him while he was testifying, the records bear out
that the defense had the opportunity to manifest its objection. Such proximity was duly noted by the trial court yet upon its own judgment
allowed it, with the observation that any improper behavior would be readily observed by the judge as he was close enough to do So.47

When it comes to the issue of credibility, this Court ordinarily defers to the assessment and evaluation given by the trial court, for only the trial
judge has the unique opportunity to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment on the witness stand while
testifying, an opportunity denied to the appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages of the records of the case.48 Only when such
assessment is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some significant fact or circumstance will the appellate court depart from the trial
court's factual conclusions.49
The records reveal that the trial court duly noted the objections, closely observed the proceedings, and propounded its own questions to satisfy
itself of the accuracy of the witness' testimony. We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.

Jeffre's credibility is also being assailed on the ground that his testimony, particularly his reaction to what transpired in his presence, was a
contrary to human behavior, experience, observation and the natural course of things. Appellant alleges that the natural reaction of a child his
age is to be afraid and either shout for his mother or brother or hide, or else run away outside the house. This Court observes that was exactly
how this child witness reacted. He was afraid and realized something was definitely wrong, which then prompted him to inch his way to a place
where he felt safer and out of harm's way. He hid where he could not be found, in the dark but safe area for pillows, and escaped the bloody
carnage that took her mother's and his brother's lives.

We have long recognized that different people react differently to a given situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.50 Witnessing a crime is one novel experience that elicits different reactions
from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn.51 This is especially true if the assailant is physically near.52
Moreover, it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected under
the circumstances from mature persons.53

Appellant questions the child's testimony with respect to his recognition of the coughing made by the assailant as that of appellant himself.
Appellant contends this is unbelievable, and that any identification made in this manner is subject to mistakes.

In People vs. Reyes,54 however, the Court held that once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task
even from a considerable distance. The sound of a person's voice is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the
witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.55

In this case, Jeffre has known appellant for about three to four years. The latter lived in the same barangay and his farm was right beside the
house where the witness lived. They were in close contact with each other, especially since appellant often came to the house of the Castillos.
Such day-to-day familiarity and close proximity lend credence to the child's testimony that he would indeed recognize the distinctive cough of
appellant. The child testified that on that fateful night, the assailant coughed not only once but a total of four times. Taking into account all the
other circumstances of this case, this Court is convinced that Jeffre's identification of appellant's coughing is credible.

When there is no evidence to indicate that the witness against the accused has been actuated by any improper motive, and absent any
compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the testimony given by a witness is ordinarily accorded full faith and credit.56 As a whole, we find the
prosecution's witnesses and their testimonies credible.

With regard to the legality of the arrest and confinement of appellant, it was shown that upon arraignment, appellant voluntarily entered a plea
of "not guilty" without first questioning the legality of his arrest. By so pleading, he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest. Such act amounted to a waiver of the right to question any irregularity in his arrest.57

It was error on the part of the trial court, however, to give probative value to the alleged verbal admission made by appellant to SPO2
Dimalaluan. The alleged admission was not reduced into writing. It was obtained in violation of appellant's right under custodial investigation.58
As regards the items of clothing as well as the knife found in and taken from the house of appellant, a search warrant should have been
obtained as required under Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.59 Failing thus, the exclusionary rule applies. Hence neither the knife
with scabbard nor the T-shirt with shorts ought to be allowed in evidence.

Appellant denies the commission of the crime and interposes the alibi that he was in his house on the night of July 29, 1996. For alibi to stand, it
must be shown that not only was appellant somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Appellant failed in this regard. His house was only about 150 to 200 meters
from the house of Remedios; it was not impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses. Since appellant is unable to substantiate his alibi with
the testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law.60

In sum, we find appellant's defense of denial and alibi unavailing. Given the testimonial evidence for the prosecution which we find credible, we
entertain no doubt as to his criminal liability for the death of Remedios and Melvin Castillo. The only remaining question is whether these
killings were attended by qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery was found present by the trial court, resulting in appellant's conviction for two counts of murder.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there is treachery "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make." 1 For treachery to exist, two conditions must be found: (1) that at the time of the attack the victim was not in
a position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.62

In this case, we find no adequate proof of treachery. Evidence on record does not show that appellant consciously and purposely adopted
means and methods to ensure the commission of the crime without any risk to himself. Thus, absent treachery or any circumstance that would
otherwise qualify an offense to murder, the crime committed is only homicide. Hence, appellant should only be held for two counts of
homicide, not double murder.

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, and unlawful entry. Of the three, however, only nighttime was
properly alleged in the information. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000, requires that every
complaint or information should state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.63 This rule may be given retroactive
effect in the light of the settled doctrine that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.64 Hence, following this new
rule, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and unlawful entry, since they were not alleged in the information.

As to nighttime, this circumstance is considered aggravating only when (1) it was especially sought by the offender; or (2) the offender took
advantage of it; or (3) it facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture.65 In this
case, the prosecution did not adduce evidence that the appellant deliberately sought the cover of the night to commit the offense. The mere
fact that the killing was committed at night would not suffice to sustain nocturnity for, by, and of itself.66 Aggravating circumstances must be
established with the same quantum of proof as fully as the crime itself, and any doubt as to their existence must be resolved in favor of
appellant.67

At this juncture, we note the observation of the trial court that only one criminal information was filed for the two deaths, in violation of Rule
110, Section 1368 of the Rules of Court which mandates that one information for each crime should be filed, except in cases for which the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. This observation, however, should not stop the court from imposing a penalty for each
crime committed in the light of appellant's failure to object to the defect in the information. As held in People vs. Ramon:69

Regrettably for the accused-appellant, however, he has failed to timely question the above defect, and he may thus be deemed to have waived
his objection to the multiplicity of charges. In People vs. Conte, this Court has ruled:

. . . Under Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the appellant, before entering his plea, should have moved to quash the complaint for being
duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to have waived the defect. Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120, the court could convict
him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them. (Citations omitted)

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the appropriate penalty therefore
is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant's sentence for each homicide should be an
indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Finally, on the award of damages. For each count of homicide, the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim, is in accord
with prevailing jurisprudence. 70 Given the facts of this case, where mother and son perished in a shocking carnage from numerous wounds
inflicted by the malefactor, the amount of P50,000 as moral damages for the death of each victim should also be awarded.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in Criminal Case No. R-4227, is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant WILLERIE AVENDAÑO is found GUILTY of two counts of homicide. For each count, there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law. Appellant is
also ordered to pay the heirs of each victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
together with the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C . J ., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J ., on leave.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148912. September 10, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias Tomy, Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

By interposing self-defense, herein appellant admits authorship of the killing. Thus, shifted to him is the burden of proof showing that the killing
was justified. Despite his failure to prove self-defense, he may be convicted only of homicide, not murder, because of the inability of the
prosecution to establish any qualifying circumstance. Here, treachery is negated by the victims awareness of the impending attack.

The Case

For automatic review before the Court is the May 29, 2001 Decision[1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Branch 46) in
Criminal Case No. U-10792, finding appellant guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt accused Timoteo Escarlos of the crime of Murder and the
Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; he is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Antonio Balisacan the sum of P28,650.00 as
actual damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.

The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living
body of Timoteo Escarlos to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.2cräläwvirtualibräry

The Information[3 dated August 29, 2000, charged appellant as follows:

That on or about July 1, 2000, in the evening, at Barangay Dumanpot, Asingan, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a sharp pointed bladed weapon, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hold and stab from behind Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, inflicting upon him
the following injuries:

External Findings:

(1) Stab wound located below right clavicle measuring 3 inches length and 8 inches depth.

(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 [inches] length and 6 inches depth.

(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4 inches depth

(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches length.

Internal Findings:

(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.

(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.

which injuries directly caused the death of said Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659.4cräläwvirtualibräry

During his arraignment on November 8, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,[5 pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6 After trial in
due course, he was found guilty by the lower court.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual version of the prosecution as follows:

Around 9 oclock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan went to the residence of Jaime Ulep in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan to
attend a benefit dance which was near the place. In the benefit dance was his son Crisanto Balisacan, who attended the dance with his friends.
Crisanto stood beside the emcee, Ceasario Escarlos, appellants brother. While Ceasario was calling the victim, Antonio Balisacan, to come to the
the stage as he was a kagawad, Crisanto heard the people at his back shout Ay!. Five (5) to six (6) meters at his back, with the place [illuminated]
by a 50 to 100 watts bulb, he saw appellant stab his father, Antonio, several times. Crisanto was momentarily shocked that he was not able to
react. When appellant fled, Crisanto came to his senses and ran to Antonio. Antonio was still alive so he brought him to Urdaneta Sacred Heart
Hospital where he expired a few minutes after arrival.

Jesus Dismaya was also beside Ceasario when Antonio Balisacans name was called. When he heard people shout, he turned around and saw
from a distance of four (4) meters appellant stabbing Antonio four (4) times with a ten (10) inch-long knife. He then called Antonios brother,
[Marcelo] Balisacan.

Within the vicinity was Antonios brother, Marcelo Balisacan. He was in the Asingan-Urdaneta road, which was about fifteen (15) meters outside
Uleps yard when he heard people shout and run from the benefit dance. Wanting to know what was happening, he went to the benefit dance
and saw that Antonio was stabbed. He went near Antonio, hugged him, and asked who stabbed him. He replied, Tomy Escarlos.
Meanwhile around 9:30 of the same evening of July 1, 2000. SPO1 Patricio Badua was on duty. He received a phone call about a stabbing
incident in a benefit dance in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan. When he went to the scene of the crime, the victim, Antonio Balisacan was
already in the hospital and appellant had already fled. He later learn[ed] that Antonio died.

Dr. Noemi Taganas conducted an autopsy on Antonios body and found:

External Findings:

(1) Stab wound located below the right clavicle measuring 3 inches length (in) and 8 inches (in) depth.

(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 inches length and 6 inches depth.

(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4 inches depth

(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches length.

Internal Findings:

(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.

(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.

She later issued a death certificate. She stated in court that out of the four (4) stab wounds, Antonios second stab wound was fatal because the
lungs were penetrated.

Dr. Ronald Bandonil, an NBI medico-legal officer confirmed Taganas autopsy report. He also conducted an autopsy on the exhumed body of
Antonio. In his autopsy he found that Antonios first and second wounds were fatal as these caused his death due to hypovalmic shock or
massive blood loss.[7 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts in this manner:

On the night of July 1, 2000, accused TIMOTEO ESCARLOS together with Rexie Yabes, Fredo Ramos, Erwin Ramos, Rowena Alamigo and others
were at the yard of Jaime Ulep, in Purok Inanama, Domanpot Asingan, Pangasinan watching a benefit dance sponsored by Mr. & Mrs.
Organization. He was invited to buy lechon during the benefit dance.

While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused and told him, You are here again to create trouble.
Accused was offended so he answered back saying Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here. Antonio Balisacan told
him, OKINNAM KETDI (vulva of your Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit on the forehead, which left a scar on his
forehead about an inch above the right eyebrow. He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife, so for
fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left
armpit. He stabbed him twice and when the victim was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time.

The weapon that Timoteo was able to get from Antonio was a kitchen knife about 10 to 12 inches. Antonio drew the knife from his left side.
Timoteo was able to get hold of the handle of the knife when he grappled for the same from the victim, by taking hold of the knife with his right
hand and stabbed Antonio who was intending to stab him. Antonio was one (1) inch taller than accused.

Timoteos testimony was corroborated by an eyewitness, CESARIO ESCARLOS, the brother of Timoteo and president of the Mr. & Mrs.
Association which sponsored the benefit dance on July 1, 2000.

On the night of July 1, 2000, Cesario Escarlos was at the yard of Jaime Ulep. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening of the said date, he saw his
brother Timoteo Escarlos together with Dexie Yabis standing in a corner watching the dance. Several minutes later Kgd. Antonio Balisacan
arrived and later on, while Cesario was on his way to urinate. He heard Antonio uttered to Timoteo ADDA CAYO MANEN NGA AGARAMED TI
NILOLOCON. While relieving himself, he heard both Timoteo and Antonio arguing and before he could get near and pacify them, he saw them
wrestling with each other. Many people were around but nobody pacified them. Next minute he saw Antonio bloodied and lying on the ground.
There were at least 100 people then and might have seen the incident. He noticed that Jesus Dismaya was there but the latter did not do
anything. Cesario, after the incident only stayed there for 3 minutes because he was looking for his three year-old daughter. In the meantime,
nobody touched the body of the victim.8

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court believed that the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of murder qualified by treachery. It rejected his plea
of self-defense, because there had been no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

x x x. The established facts revealed that the victim was one of the persons who filed a case of malicious mischief against [appellant]. Said case
was filed five (5) months before the instant case happened. To the mind of the Court, the accused only found a way of avenging what he felt
towards the victim. He took advantage of that x x x particular time and place to let out his feelings in the presence of his barangay mates. Such
hidden grudge by the accused against the victim, established the motive of the former.

xxx

The second element of self-defense is also lacking. The nature, location and the number of wounds inflicted on the victim belie and negate the
accused[s] claim of self-defense. The post mortem findings of the autopsy report showed that the victim sustained four stab wounds.

If there is any truth to the accused[s] claim of self-defense, he would not have stabbed him several times. [Worse,] the location of the wounds
suggested that the accused was at the back of the victim when the wounds were inflicted. It is therefore evident from the conduct of the
accused that he was determined to kill the victim and did not just act to defend himself. In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to
discuss the third element.9cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this automatic review.[10

The Issues

Appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

1. The honorable trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance despite failure of the prosecution to prove its
attendance.

2. The honorable trial court erred in not finding that the testimony of the supposed eyewitnesses for the prosecution as to the attendance of
treachery is flawed and unworthy of belief.

3. The honorable trial court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the theory of self-defense interpose[d] by the accused-appellant.

4. The honorable trial court committed a grave and serious error in not finding that the victim [was] the first to assault accused.

5. The honorable trial court erred in considering motive to establish the guilt of the accused.

6. The honorable court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder instead of acquitting him or at most convicting him of
homicide.11cräläwvirtualibräry

These issues boil down to four: (1) sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence, (2) viability of self-defense, (3) appreciation of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance, and (4) propriety of the penalty and the damages imposed by the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence

Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence as an issue, this Court nonetheless deliberated on it motu
proprio, because an automatic appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecutions evidence
must be passed upon, especially in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed by the trial court.[12 We have carefully examined the
evidence for the prosecution and found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were duly established beyond reasonable doubt.

Prosecution Witness Crisanto Balisacan, son of the victim, testified on the stabbing incident, which had occurred during a benefit dance on that
fateful night of July 1, 2000. The witness testimony is as follows:

COURT:

You go to the main point.

ATTY. VELASCO:

While there, did you observe or did you see if there was any unusual incident that took place?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: What was that unusual incident you have seen and observed?

A: Stabbing incident, your Honor.

COURT:

Who was stabbed?

ATTY. VELASCO:

Who was the victim of that stabbing?

A: My father.

Q: Who stabbed him?

A: Mr. Timoteo Tomy Escarlos, the accused in this case, your Honor.

Q: Will you please focus your eyes within this Honorable Court and tell us whether the person you said who stabbed your father by the name of
Timoteo Escarlos is in the premises of this Honorable Court?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please stand up and point to him?

A: The first one, your Honor (Witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked, he
answered Timoteo Escarlos).

Q: How long have you been acquainted with the accused Timoteo Escarlos?

A: About ten years, your Honor.

Q: He is also from Domampot?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: Considering that it is already about 9:20-9:30 oclock in the evening when this stabbing incident took place, how can you be sure that it was
Timoteo Escarlos who stabbed your father?

A: There was x x x light, your Honor.

Q: What kind of light are you trying to say?

A: 50100 watts bulb.

xxx

ATTY. VELASCO:

Did you see the spot where your father was actually stabbed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How far is this place where your father was stabbed in relation to the entrance of the dance arena.

A: About 5 to 6 meters at my back, your Honor.

Q: And at that distance, what happened next while you were watching?

A: I heard shouting.

Q: These shouting that you heard, where did they come from?

A: From my back.

xxx

COURT:

What is that shouting about?

ATTY. VELASCO:

You heard shoutin[g], according to you, what did you hear, if you know?

A: About the incident.

COURT:

Tell [us] exactly what you heard[.]

A: I heard shouting, Ay!

Q: How many people shouted, Ay?

A: Many, your Honor, because that was a benefit dance.

ATTY. VELASCO:

When you heard shoutin[g], what did you do, if any?

A: I turned my head to my back.

Q: When you focused your attention and sight at your back, what happened next?

A: I saw stabbing. I saw my father stabbed by Timoteo Escarlos, your Honor.13 (Italics supplied)

Undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by appellant are clear and undisputed. He did not at all deny the
allegations against him and openly admitted that he had killed the victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration from
criminal liability.

Second Issue:
Plea of Self-Defense

In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice
but to defend himself under the circumstances. In his testimony before the trial court, he described the confrontation that had led to the fatal
killing as follows:

Q: And while you were there at the yard of Jaime Ulep on that night of July 1, 2000 do you remember having seen the person of one Kgd.
Antonio Balisacan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And did he see you also?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And did you happen to see him?

A: When he passed in front of me he uttered in a loud voice you are here again to create trouble (ADDA KA MANEN DITOY NGA AGARAMID TI
NILILOKO).

Q: To whom did Antonio Balisacan utter these words?

A: I, sir.

Q: And you said it was uttered in a loud manner, how far were you when he uttered these words?

A: More or less 3 to 4 meters, sir.

Q: What did you say?

A: I was offended, sir.

Q: And do you know the physical appearance of Antonio Balisacan when he mentioned those words to you?

A: As if he was drunk, sir.

Q: What made you say that as if he was drunk?

A: I smell his breath, sir.

Q: How did you react later when Antonio Balisacan uttered those words to you?

A: I said: Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.

Q: By the way, when Antonio Balisacan said those words to you, were you doing anything that time?

A: None, sir.

Q: What happened later on when you answered Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?

A: He said: OKINNAM KETDI (vulva of your mother) and then he boxed me, sir.

Q: Were you hit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What part of your body was hit?

A: This one on my forehead, sir. (Witness is pointing on his forehead).

Q: Were you injured?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What injury did you suffer?

A: My forehead was injured (Witness is pointing a [to] a scar on his forehead about an inch at the right above the right eyecrow).

Q: And what did you do after you were boxed by Antonio Balisacan?

A: When I intend to box him I noticed that he withdrew a balisong and I tried to grab and used the balisong in stabbing, sir.

xxx

COURT:

How many times did you stab him?

A: Two times but when he was about to fall down I was able to hit him once for the third time, sir.

Q: You said that he drew a knife, where did he draw the knife?

A: At his left side, sir.

Q: What kind of weapon did he draw?

A: I sized it to be a kitchen knife, sir.

Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court the length of that knife to include the handle?

A: 10 to 12 inches, sir.

Q: And how did you grapple for the possession of that knife?

A: I was able to hold the handle of the kitchen knife, sir.

xxx

Q: What prompted you to stab him considering that you already got hold [of] the knife from him?

A: Yes, sir, because he intend[ed] to stab me, so, when I had possession of the knife I stabbed him, sir.14 (Italics supplied)

We stress that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense. Thus, the latter
assumes the responsibility of establishing this plea by clear and convincing evidence.[15 Upon its shoulders rests the duty of proving, to the
satisfaction of the trial court, the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[16cräläwvirtualibräry

The implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the burden of proof is concerned was explained by the Court in Macalino v. People,[17 from
which we quote:

In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was then incumbent upon him to prove that justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, relying on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The reason is
that even if the prosecution evidence were weak, such could not be disbelieved after petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the
victim.18cräläwvirtualibräry

The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus probandi of proving the elements thereof.[19 The
essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.[20
Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[21

Unlawful Aggression

on the Part of the Victim

In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him
on the forehead in the heat of their argument. Appellant adds that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that the victim was
pulling out a kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the weapon and used it to stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the
circumstances, he was legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to wait for the knife to be raised and to fall
on him before acting to defend himself would be asking too much, he argues.

The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated the confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view
that the former was subjected to an unlawful aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase.

The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of
animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The former
might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.

Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -- not merely threatening and intimidating action.[22
Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn
out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not just speculative.[23cräläwvirtualibräry

Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of
that danger had already ceased the moment appellant disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence,
appellant became the unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.[24cräläwvirtualibräry

When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the
former aggressor.[25 To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack
was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of appellant.[26 Undoubtedly,
the latter went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter, even when
the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.

Reasonable Necessity of the

Means Employed to Prevent

or Repel the Attack

Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position to calculate or determine the effects of his blows, and that it was
nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his own life.

As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the location of the wounds inflicted upon the victim were important indicia
disproving self-defense.[27 The claim of appellant that only two of the four stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the means he
employed was glaringly disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He admitted in his testimony that he had stabbed the victim for
the third time, even when the latter was about to fall.

The means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to
be averted, as held by the Court in People v. Obordo:[28cräläwvirtualibräry

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means
he employed to repel Homers punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get
something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and
inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victims body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant
himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.29cräläwvirtualibräry

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression.[30cräläwvirtualibräry

Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[31 Unless the victim has committed
unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to
prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.[32

Third Issue:

Appreciation of Qualifying Circumstances

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus
depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the aggressor.[33
Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[34cräläwvirtualibräry

There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is
aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former.[35cräläwvirtualibräry

In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was no treachery, and that the victim was aware of
the imminent danger to his life.[36 Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of
attack for the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.[37cräläwvirtualibräry

Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle before
the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack, and that he was afforded the
opportunity to put up a defense.[38 Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the
existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[39cräläwvirtualibräry

In People v. Cario,[40 we modified the trial courts decision and ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery had not been clearly established. Thus, the Court declared:

However, we agree with the OSGs recommendation that appellant be held liable only for homicide, not murder. In this case, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not conclusively established. For treachery to exist, the following requisites must be met: (1) that at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. The facts show that Edmundo was placed on guard concerning a possible assault by Pedro. First, there was a
heated argument between them at the place of the wake. Second, Edmundo was not unaware that he and Rolando were followed outside by
appellant, who did not adopt any means to conceal himself or hide his intention of confronting Edmundo. Third, the abrasions and contusions
on Edmundos face show that Edmundo was able to put up a fight before he was fatally stabbed. These circumstances negate the existence of
treachery in the commission of the offense.41cräläwvirtualibräry

As in People v. Cario, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended in this case that appellant be convicted of homicide only, inasmuch as
the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been sufficiently established.[42cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court correctly ruled that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present in the killing. Essentially, there is
evident premeditation when the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out a
criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[43 Obviously, the acts of appellant in the present case can hardly
be described as a product of reflective thought or deliberate planning towards a decisive resolve to kill the victim. On the contrary, the
confrontation that escalated to a violent brawl was quite spontaneous, casual and incidental. Verily, the brutal killing was not the result of a
previous plot or sinister design to end the life of the victim.

The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (a) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to the determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a period of time, between the determination
and the subsequent execution of the crime, sufficient to allow the accused an opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of the act.[44 As
found by the trial court, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish any of the foregoing requisites. To be sure, when there
is no showing how and when the plan to kill was decided or how much time had elapsed before the crime was carried out, there is no evident
premeditation.[45cräläwvirtualibräry
In a criminal prosecution -- especially in cases involving the extreme penalty of death -- nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged must be established.[46

Fourth Issue:

Proper Penalty and Award of Damages

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but failed to award P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim.
Moral damages cannot be granted in the absence of proof therefor.[47 Unlike in rape cases, this type of award is not automatically given in
murder or homicide. The prosecution was, however, able to prove actual damages in the sum of P28,650. The award of exemplary damages
should be omitted considering that no aggravating circumstance was duly proven.[48cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of homicide and sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison
mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He shall also pay
the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650as actual damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[49
The grant of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and
Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Puno, and Azcuna, JJ., on official business.