Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Background of the Study

Public officials have a duty of responsible administration that entails reflective and

articulate elaboration of the policies and principles that govern their work, monitoring the

activities of peers and subordinates to induce compliance with these policies and

principles, and frequent reassessment of the policies and principles in the light of

experience and evidence. The duty is expressed in convergent strands of constitutional

law, common law, and statutes, but the expression is sometimes hesitant and ambiguous

(Magan, 2003).

Modern societies need, and largely want, police forces that can respond to a range

of emergencies. For that reason officers are granted special coercive authority: they can

invade privacy, confiscate property, restrict liberty, and engage in violence beyond what

would be permissible for non-officers. But the special powers that officers are granted

bring with them the potential for abuse. Herein lies the perennial paradox of regulating

police misconduct: societies can increase the effectiveness of policing by giving officers

more authority, but doing so increases the risk that such authority will be misused. On the

other hand, societies can reduce the risk of police misconduct by strictly limiting officers’

authority, but doing so can inhibit effective law enforcement. As preeminent police scholar

Herman Goldstein wrote in the 1970s, regulating the police involves balancing society’s

need for order against individuals’ desire for freedom (Stoughton, 2018).

The Philippine National Police is mandated to investigate all forms of crime with

the ultimate objective of giving justice to the victims and bringing the perpetrators to the
bar of justice. Hence, the PNP is a vital and indispensable institution of the Criminal

Justice System. It is in effect a guardian of justice. It’s instituted several mechanisms to

ensure that fidelity by its members to laws and regulations is ensured. This provides the

rules and procedures and the scale of penalties to be imposed upon any member of the

PNP who commits breach of discipline or becomes a subject of an administrative

complaint (http://www.pnp.gov.ph/DIDM/Criminal-Investigation-Manual.pdf).

Statement of the Problem

This study aims to investigate the efficiency of police investigators in the follow-up

of investigations and percentage of solve crimes.

Specifically the researchers sought to find out the answer of the following

questions:

1. How does the crime manifestation in General Santos City be described?

2. What crime prevention programs can be proposed from the results of the study?

3. What is the significant difference about the status of PNP administrative cases and

the response of authorities?

Hypotheses

There is no significant difference about the status of PNP administrative cases and

the response of authorities.

Theoretical Framework

By contrast, theoretical and empirical scholarship on policing strongly suggests

that the police organization bears significant responsibility for police misbehavior. It
explore the understudied and underappreciated link between organizational culture and

police misconduct. Punishing individual cops will not cure the problem of police violence

if systemic features of the police organization permit, sanction, or even encourage the

officers' violent behavior. Like the individual-specific 12 explanations that police

departments offer for the misbehavior of their members, current remedies are inadequate

to the extent that they ignore or undervalue institutional and organizational factors

(Bandes, 1999).

Over 26,000 personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) with administrative

charges since the start of President Rodrigo Duterte’s term until October 2018. Data from

the PNP Directorate for Personnel and Records Management showed that 13,700

administrative cases have been filed against 26,266 PNP personnel since July 2016 until

October this year. Of the total number of personnel, 25,968 or 99 percent are uniformed

or those engaged in law enforcement operations, while only 298 or one percent are non-

uniformed or those involved in administrative work. Administrative charges can be filed

against the personnel for violating rules and regulations of the PNP or for committing a

criminal offense (Gonzales 2018).

According to the data, only 9,201 complaints against 14,758 PNP personnel or 67

percent of all cases have been resolved. Another 33 percent or 4,499 cases against

11,508 personnel are still pending. Of the cases filed so far in 2018, only 2,132 personnel

or 18 percent had their cases resolved out of 11,613 personnel with charges filed against

them. The data also showed that of the penalized personnel, 2,448 have been dismissed

from service, 491 have been demoted, and most personnel or 4,697 have been

suspended (Gonzales 2018).

 Meanwhile, 154 have been forfeited of their salary, 543 have been reprimanded,

33 have been restricted, and 58 have been withheld of their privileges including incentives

and bonuses. But 3,988 personnel have also been exonerated or acquitted for their

offenses, and 2,248 others had their administrative cases dismissed for lack of probable

cause. Another 27 have been admonished or warned by their superiors, while 71 have

been restored, reappointed, reinstated, or had their leave credits charged (Gonzales

2018).

Conceptual Framework

Here is a the conceptual framework that represents the relationship between the

independent variable of status of administrative cases and the dependent variable of

response of the authorities from the research on police personnel:

Independent Dependent

variable of status variable of

of administrative response of the

cases authorities

Figure 1.

Significance of the Study

By nature and purpose of this study, the results or findings of the study will bear

significant contributions to the following persons:

 PNP Officials. This is supposed to be their guide in making adequate police policing

to consider police personnel’s whose dealing with administrative cases. It would help

them analyzing programs and solutions to lessen police misconduct and brutality in their

jurisdiction.

Police Personnel. This study will help police to understand their role as an

enforcement body to create peaceful surroundings with their constituents. To be more

heroic as their job prescribe and not to abuse their power because laws will verdict them

that can affect their living and their family as well.

Students. This study may serve as an instrument to awaken their consciousness

in present situation of criminality in our country. It is also provided for them to become

more responsible students to be aware in existing problem of our nation in maintaining

peace and order.

Future Researchers. The result of the study shall serve as a ready reference for

them with whatever similar studies they shall partake.

Scope and Limitation of the Study

This research will concentrate only to the status of PNP administrative cases and

the response of the authorities. It will only tackle administrative cases that will be filed on

a chosen precinct. The data that will be collected will surely be confidential since it can

affect a police personnel life if it will be exposed. The research also will only find the police

official’s solutions to this problem.

Definition of Terms

The following variables were used in this study and are being defined operationally

as follows:

PNP Administrative Cases – It is a case between state authority, like police

personnels, on the one side and a person from the other. Administrative cases are

governed by Administrative procedure and differs comparing to civil procedure.

Procedures of administrative cases differ depending on the type of national legal system.

Unlike most Common law jurisdictions, the majority of Civil law jurisdictions have

specialized courts or sections to deal with administrative cases which, as a rule, will apply

procedural rules specifically designed for such cases and different from that applied in

private-law proceedings, such as contract or tort claims. Administrative cases are, as a

rule, separate and independent from criminal suits and are governed by differing

evidentiary criteria. The acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an

administrative case does not conclude the administrative proceedings, nor carry with its

relief from administrative liability. This is because unlike in criminal cases where the

threshold quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, only

substantial evidence is necessary in administrative cases.

Response of Authority – Addressing police misconduct by officials of the police

force with outcomes will be sufficient to demonstrate individual accountability for any

abuse or misuse of police powers if public confidence in the police service is to be

maintained. They must also be imposed fairly and proportionately judgement base on the

governing law of each state.

 Chapter 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Foreign Literature

Legal consequences often hinge on whether events or incidents are categorized

as isolated or connected, individual or systemic, anecdotal or part of a larger pattern.

Courts tend to portray incidents of police brutality as anecdotal, fragmented, and isolated

rather than as part of a systemic, institutional pattern. Though numerous doctrines-

including federalism, separation of powers, causation, deference, discretion, and burden

of proof provide partial explanations for the judicial fragmentation of police misconduct, it

seems clear that courts cannot or do not choose to see systemic patterns for reasons that

transcend doctrinal explanations. This article explores those reasons, which, ultimately,

are relevant not only to police brutality, but to the larger judicial tendency to anecdotalist

systemic government misconduct (Bandes, 2009).

It is inevitable that courts must decide which details, events, and persona are

relevant to a particular story of police conduct. Every narrative highlights some details,

and downplays or discards others that seem to threaten its coherence. However, the

particular decisions courts make are neither inevitable nor mechanically made. These

decisions are influenced, explicitly and implicitly, by factors that are political, social,

psychological, and cultural. There are many such factors that lead courts to mask or

discount systemic harm. Sometimes, courts cannot see connections because of

conscious or preconscious assumptions and expectations about how the story should be

told, what ought to be part of the story, or how the characters will behave. This article will

seek to explore some of those assumptions (Skolnick et al, 1993).

 The story of police brutality and misconduct, is so often anecdotalized. Police

brutality is different in kind and degree from police misconduct, examples of which include

conducting an unlawful search or using unnecessary force. Police brutality is conduct that

is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade

its target. It is described as "conscious and venal,... directed against persons of marginal

status and credibility," and "committed by officers who often take great pains to conceal

their conduct."' Police brutality is longstanding, pervasive, and alarmingly resilient.

Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of its resilience is the extent to which it depends on the

complicity of multiple governmental actors, including the courts (Skolnick et al, 2011).

In most cases, the view of police brutality as aberrational shapes the conduct of

every institution responsible for dealing with the problem, including police command,

review boards, administrative agencies, city, state and federal government, and the

courts. This view allows police brutality to flourish in a number of ways, including making

it easier to discount individual stories of police brutality, and weakening the case for any

kind of systemic reform. The fragmentation of systemic police brutality needs to be

addressed at many institutional levels. This article is particularly, though not exclusively,

concerned with how and why that fragmentation occurs in the courts (Human Rights

1998).

The fragmentation takes several forms and is accomplished through numerous

doctrinal means. Often, police engaged in incidents of brutality have a history of such

incidents, departments house several officers engaged in similar types of brutality or

corruption, or the brutality is concentrated in a single neighborhood." However, there are

innumerable hurdles to identifying or documenting such patterns. Complaints are

discouraged, confessions are not videotaped, record keeping is lax or nonexistent,"

records are sealed or expunged, 'patterns are not tracked," and police files are deemed

undiscoverable. If a history of past incidents does exist and, despite these hurdles,

becomes known to the brutality victim, he faces additional hurdles introducing evidence

of the brutality in court, including restrictive evidentiary rulings, protective orders, judicial

toleration of police peijury or of "the blue wall of silence," assumptions about credibility

that favor police officers, the absolute immunity of testifying officers, substantive

constitutional doctrines insulating failures to acte9 or demanding an exceptionally high

level of proof of wrongdoing," restrictive municipal liability standards coupled with a lack

of receptivity to evidence of systemic wrongdoing,"' and standing doctrines that make

injunctive relief nearly impossible to obtain (Chin et al, 1998).

In police brutality cases, the routine categorizing of incidents as isolated rather

than systemic has had terrible consequences. Systematic police brutality has been

masked, insulated, and implicitly condoned because courts have failed to make

connections among incidents; failed to make causal links between police conduct and the

injuries and confessions of suspects; denied litigants or juries access to information which

would enable linkages to be discovered; and in general persisted in defining encounters

as separate from-and irrelevant to-any overarching systemic patterns that need to be

addressed (Yale, 1997),

Police unions sometimes successfully resist the imposition of discipline on officers

for misconduct. Huq and McAdams (2016), show that many law enforcement collective

bargaining agreements (CBAs) create procedural rights for officers that make it difficult

for agencies to investigate and discipline misconduct, including the excessive use of
force. These scholars express concern that such contractual provisions undermine the

ability of management to deter misconduct and thus may promote its commission. Unions

may also successfully lobby for state and local legislation that provides the same kind of

procedural protections against investigation and discipline, or lobby and litigate against

reform efforts. At the same time, unionization might reduce misconduct by producing a

sense of empowerment and increased job satisfaction.

Collective bargaining tends to improve wages and benefits; Becker and Stigler

(1974) argue that higher compensation can deter malfeasance among law enforcers by

raising its opportunity cost. Likewise, the theory of efficiency wages holds that paying

wages above the market-clearing equilibrium may improve productivity, which, in the

context of police, could entail decreased misconduct. Thus, the impact of collective

bargaining on law enforcement misconduct is ultimately an empirical question.

When police officers are accused of misbehavior, however, police solidarity has

the opposite effect. In the face of outside criticism, cops tend to circle the wagons,

adopting a "code of silence," protecting each other, and defending each other's actions.

If the misconduct is found to be true, moreover, their departments deem the miscreants

"rogue cops" whose conduct does not reflect negatively on the organization from which

they came. The truth, however, is that the same organizational culture that produces

extraordinary heroism also facilitates shocking misconduct, sometimes by the very same

actors (Conroy 2013).

Despite all of the attention that has been paid to this issue in recent years-the news

coverage, lawsuits, task forces, commissions, and congressional hearings-recurring

incidents of police brutality have led many citizens to wonder why very little seems to
change. Over the years, a number of prominent police departments have made efforts

toward reform, often in response to the recommendations of independent commissions

convened to investigate incidents of alleged wrongdoing by police. Still, misbehavior by

law enforcement officers seems ubiquitous, and serious, lasting reform appears illusory.

As one Los Angeles Times reporter observed in a story about the Los Angeles Police

Department: Often, an investigation is undertaken, followed by recommendations for

sweeping change, which are ignored or halfheartedly implemented. The cycle is so habitual

that one steadfast aspect of each new report is a section wondering why the

recommendations in past reports haven't been carried out (McDermott 2009).

Consider the way in which police departments describe and defend controversial

actions by individual cops: either as well-intentioned but unfortunate responses to

dangerous and ambiguous situations, or as the aberrant behavior of rogue cops. The first

kind of explanation-the kind that police departments offered to justify the Rodney King

beating and the more recent shooting of Amadou Diallo-seeks to place the incident in

question outside of the category of police wrongdoing. Occasional beatings or shootings

of suspects whom police reasonably believed were armed and dangerous are regrettable,

but not culpable. They are the unavoidable consequences of the job that we ask police

officers to do in a dangerous and unpredictable world. The second explanation, by

contrast, accepts certain police actions as unquestionably wrong, but attributes them to

a small minority of police officers gone bad. Thus, these incidents tell us little or nothing

about the experience or motivation of the well-behaved and well-intentioned majority

(Bayley, 1995).
 These explanations are powerful and important because they frame the way police

departments-and ultimately the legal system-respond to police brutality. Every

prescription for controlling police violence is based on a theory of why police officers

behave the way they do. This article argues that, because the stories police departments

tell themselves (and us) about the causes of police violence are flawed, it is not surprising

that judicial, administrative, and departmental responses to police violence have been

notoriously unsuccessful (Worden, 2006).

The primary defect in these explanations (and the solutions that go with them) is

that they view police misconduct as resulting from factual and moral judgments made by

officers functioning merely as individuals, rather than as part of a distinctive and influential

organizational culture. The regrettable accident explanation asks whether the officer's

judgment about whether to shoot, or how much force to apply, was reasonable under the

circumstances as known or perceived by the officer at the time of the incident. This

explanation deems an officer not morally or legally culpable for a reasonable, though

erroneous, decision. 7 Thus, police departments view the regrettable accident scenario

as requiring no corrective intervention, except, perhaps, an official expression of regret

for harm caused. 8 What this explanation fails to consider, however, is how the officer

came to be in that particular situation in the first place and whether there is anything to

be learned by examining the organizational norms and policies that framed his judgment

(Connor, 2002).

The misbehaving cop is off on a "frolic and detour" for which he alone is

accountable. This explanation allows the department to distance itself from incidents of

misconduct by labeling the perpetrators "rogue cops," deviants who are wholly unlike their
fellow officers. Moreover, it allows police leadership to declare to the rest of the rank and

file, "this incident is not about you," as Los Angeles Mayor Riordan proclaimed to the rest

of the police force in the aftermath of the recent Rampart scandal. 10 All of this allows the

police organization to absolve itself of any responsibility for the officer's wrong-doing

(Bandes, 2001).

In general terms, defining wrongdoing by public officials, including police officers,

is relatively easy. Misconduct falls into one of three categories: malfeasance, or the

performance of unlawful acts; misfeasance, which is the performance of otherwise lawful

acts in an unlawful or wrongful way; and nonfeasance, or the failure to perform a legally

required act. Regulating misconduct, however, is far more complicated than defining it.

The essays in this chapter offer valuable insights into legal regulation in different countries

and contexts, including reflections on the nature of police misconduct as a social and

legal problem (Harmon, 2012).

The law regulates police misconduct in at least three interrelated ways. First, it

regulates misconduct by delineating police authority—establishing who the police are,

what they are permitted to do, and how they are permitted to do it. Second, the law can

create behavioral incentives that either discourage officers from engaging in misconduct

or, counterintuitively, encourage them to do so. Third, it can establish remedial

mechanisms, creating a framework for how individuals and society respond to misconduct

after the fact (Tyler 1990).

Police authority is defined in part by restrictions on who can engage in policing.

The law often sets—or empowers a particular institution to set—minimum requirements

for officers. These may include personal attributes such as age, education, or
performance on a civil service examination. They may also include physical

characteristics such as height, fitness, or biological sex. Training requirements, similarly,

are set and facilitated by law. Such laws play a regulatory role insofar as officer

characteristics can affect officer behavior, including misconduct. A number of studies in

the United States and Europe, for example, have found that female officers, older officers,

and more highly educated officers are less likely to generate civilian complaints (Kahan

et al, 1998).

The law also regulates the substance of what officers do. Officers enforce the law,

which means that the legal classification of certain behaviors as criminal can shape officer

behavior. In some countries, for example, individuals are not legally required to observe

any particular religion. Officers in those countries would dramatically exceed their

authority by arresting people for failing to meet some religious obligations. But in other

countries religious observation is mandated by law. Officers in those nations have the

authority to arrest individuals who do not abide by religious tenets. Further, officers may

be legally required to arrest such individuals, in which case it may constitute misconduct—

legally speaking—for an officer to not arrest such an individual (Caldero, et al 2006).

The degree of clarity or vagueness in how criminal codes are drafted also can play

an important role in defining misconduct. For example, the concept of “theft” is relatively

straightforward, so it is fairly easy to determine whether an officer properly arrested

someone for stealing something. The facts may be difficult to sort through, but the law

itself is clear. But what about laws that prohibit acting “disorderly,” a common offense in

the United States, or making “offensive” statements, prohibited in a number of Asian and

Western European countries? Such laws are vague, which makes it comparatively more
difficult to determine whether an officer’s enforcement actions were appropriate (Emsly

2007).

The law not only regulates what police do, but it also governs how they do it,

establishing what officers must, can, or cannot do in the course of their jobs. Under Article

18 of the Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (Code of Criminal Procedure) in

Indonesia, for example, officers need a warrant to arrest a suspect unless they apprehend

the perpetrator in the act. This can affect police operations by encouraging tactics that

put officers in the position of witnessing crimes firsthand. That, in turn, can lead police

agencies to focus more of their attention on poorer areas, where crime is more likely to

be committed in public, rather on wealthier areas, where crimes are more likely to be

committed indoors. This pattern is repeated across a number of countries.

Consider the United States, where blacks constitute about 13 percent of the

population, and whites make up approximately 77 percent. According to the Substance

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, drug use rates among blacks and

whites are almost identical, so, all other things beings equal, the incarceration rate for

drug offenders could reasonably be expected to match that ratio. In fact, however, more

than 40 percent of inmates convicted for drug offenses are black, while only 30 percent

are white. The reasons for this disparity are multitudinous and complicated, but it is at

least partially attributable to the way the law affects the allocation of police resources.

Because the legal system directly regulates policing by protecting privacy, because

privacy is strongly correlated with wealth, and because there is a racial disparity in wealth,

the legal system contributes to racial disparities in criminal justice that many observers

find problematic (Pollock, 2010).

 The structure and substance of law also creates the environment in which police

act and can set the stage for misconduct. In many countries, for example, officers write

tickets that impose monetary fines, but officers in some of those countries are also tasked

with collecting fines on the spot, creating the opportunity for low-level graft. Even when

officers do not benefit personally from the assessment of fines, legal systems that fund

police agencies more generally with a portion of the money collected in fines can

incentivize what academics refer to as “rentseeking” behaviors: agencies use police

resources to obtain economic benefits in a way that does not provide reciprocal benefits

to society. In practice, revenue-driven policing can manifest as the over-enforcement of

certain crimes or against certain segments of the population. Aggressive enforcement in

low-income communities and the overuse of asset forfeiture laws, which allow police to

seize private property to either sell or convert to their own use, are two examples (Eck,

2005).

The law also regulates misconduct by determining how easy it is to identify. Legal

systems that disallow the video recording of police officers, for example, can obscure

officer wrongdoing, as do laws that allow individuals who have been arrested to be held

secretly or denied contact with anyone other than the police. And once misconduct has

been identified, the consequences, too, are either created by law or permitted to be

created by law. In different countries various laws govern, among other things, who can

complain about police misconduct, the way complaints must be submitted, how

complaints are investigated, and how officers can be disciplined, terminated, or

prosecuted. Legal doctrines govern when an aggrieved civilian is permitted to sue officers
or police agencies, the difficulty of succeeding, and consequences of a successful claim,

all of which play a role in regulating police misconduct.

It is also important to identify the historical, cultural, geographic, and other

influences that affect the law itself. Consider, for example, that the structure of a legal

system can have an enormous influence on regulatory decisionmaking, in part by

determining who regulates the police. In many counties, a history of monarchical rule or

colonial influence has given rise to strong centralized governments that have adopted

national police forces. Such forces are the exclusive or primary provider of public policing

services in Argentina, China, Denmark, France, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey,

to name just a few. In these systems there may be relatively little room for subnational

regulation of policing. In geographically larger countries and countries with a more

provincial governmental structure, meanwhile, state or provincial police forces play a

more significant role, which allows for more diffused regulation.

History and geography are not the only factors that affect the legal regulation of

policing. Social norms— perceptions of race, sex and gender, and religion, for example—

have enormous influence on defining what police do. In the early twentieth century, U.S.

police forces limited (and were legally allowed to limit) female officers to jobs related to

the protection of women and children. In the twenty-first century women serve in every

facet of policing in the United States, although they remain an underrepresented minority

(making up about 12 percent of all officers). In another contemporary example, Pakistan’s

late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto addressed frequent complaints of harassment and

abuse at the hand of male officers by permitting only female officers to file claims on

behalf of female crime victims.

 Cultural perceptions also play a significant role in determining what police do. In

many Western countries, for example, the laws that criminalize drug possession and use

are predicated on historically racist beliefs. In the United States early laws criminalizing

opium, cocaine, and marijuana were openly premised on explanations of how those drugs

caused Chinese, black, and Mexican individuals, respectively, to engage in antisocial

behavior, particularly the rape of white women. The vestiges of those racist beliefs can

be found in the modern legal regime, from the substantive laws criminalizing drug

possession to the laws that govern convicted defendants’ sentences.

Local Literature

According to the article of Pelayo 2018, the Philippine National Police Internal

Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) has simplified the procedure in resolving administrative cases

of errant policemen. The move is in response to the directive of PNP Chief Oscar

Albayalde to carry on with the internal cleansing and disciplining of policemen so they

could perform well in their duties. “Our inspector general and our internal affairs service

fully support the direction laid out by the chief PNP Police Director Oscar Albayalde for

internal cleansing and discipline even performance of the Philippine National Police

organization,” PNP-IAS Deputy Inspector General PDIr. Leo Angelo Leuterio said.

He also added that among the improvements, the PNP-IAS will make sure that the

service of notice regarding the case will reach the involved policemen as soon as

possible. It used to take two weeks because it has to pass through registered mail. This

time it’s just face-to-face. They will be summoned or have the notice sent to the police

station so they can look for them. The submission of affidavit has been shortened from

the previous 10 days to five days. Also, the open hearing on the case is now limited only
to five days as long as the defendant and the respondent submit their respective position

papers. With these changes, Leuterio believes they will be able to solve an administrative

case against members of the PNP within the span of a month, as compared to three

months in the past.

The popular grounds for filing an administrative case against a police are neglect

of familial duties and drug-related activities.

Last year, PNP-IAS recorded around 3,000 administrative cases filed against

policemen. — Lea Ylagan | UNTV News & Rescue

.
 Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the research design, locale of the study, respondents and

sampling used and statistical treatment of data.

Research Design

The researchers will use the descriptive method of research which is a definite

procedure to characterize, describe, and classify data or materials needed in relevance

to the study. It also included proper scrutiny and interpretation of all insights that will be

collected.

Locale of the Study

This study will be conducted in Region XII, particularly in General Santos City. The

researcher chooses PRO 12 as an advance command post of PNP Region Command 12

located at Camp Fermin G. Lira, Barangay West, General Santos City.

Research Instrument

This instrument to be used in this research will basically be the data to be gathered

from selected interviewees thru given questionnaire after interview.

Respondents and Sampling Used

The researchers will use a probability sampling procedure in choosing the

respondents. Particularly, the simple random sampling using the Slovin’s formula. There

will be a total of 20 respondents; in which will be chosen randomly at the advance

command post of PNP Region Command 12 located at Camp Fermin G. Lira, Barangay

West, General Santos City.

Data Gathering Procedure

The researchers will observe the following procedure in data gathering:

Asking permission to conduct the study. The researcher will write a letter to the

Police Officials asking permission to conduct a survey regarding the study.

Analysis and interpretation of data. The researcher will gather and analyze the

data gathered using the appropriate statistical tools.

Statistical Treatment of Data

The researcher will use the frequency distribution (percentage distribution) and the

computation of the weighted average mean (WM). These statistical tools will be used to

come up with the summary of the results of the survey. Thus, these results will be

tabulated and interpreted according to the problems of the study being identified.
 References

Gonzales, Catherine (2018), Over 26,000 PNP personnel slapped with admin

cases since Duterte’s term INQUIRER.net / 06:43 PM December 06, 2018

Retrieved from: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1060742/over-26000-pnp-personnel-

slapped-with-admin-cases-since-dutertes-term#ixzz5zid5S95M

Pelayo, Marje (April 24, 2018), PNP-IAS simplifies procedures to resolve

administrative cases of errant cops. Retrieved from: https://www.untvweb.com/news/pnp-

ias-simplifies-procedures-to-resolve-administrative-cases-of-errant-cops/

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John Conroy (2013), Town Without Pity, CHi. READER, Jan. 12, 2013, pp. 2

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see also MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND

THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 11-12, 281

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93, 94-96 (Phillip C. Stenning ed., 1995).

Robert W. Worden 2006, The Causes of Police Brutality, in POLICE VIOLENCE:

UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 29

 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (2002). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,

SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE

UNITED STATES 77

Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34

LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 665, 673 (2001)

Bandes, Susan A., Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts. Buffalo Law

Review Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 1275, 2009.

JAMES SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE

EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 19 (2011)

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY

AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (1998) [hereinafter SHIELDED

FROM JUSTICE].

Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias

and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 232 (1998);

Rob Yale, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REv.

1841, 1846-51 (1997)

McAdams (2016) develop a theoretical model of self-selection and intrinsic

motivation among law enforcement agents

Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765–68

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 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); see also infra Part I.B.

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