“[D]eceit is obvious not only from the fact that

respondents have represented a fictitious car rental

business to complainants but also from the deliberate
concealment of their business’ lack of sufficient
assets or paid-up capital… no shred of evidence has
been presented by the respondents to prove financial
capability from the onset to fully comply with their
supposed guaranteed returns for the investments.”

In the case of ROSITA SY vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010
discussed the ways of committing the felony of
estafa, thus:

"X x x.

The sole issue for resolution is whether Sy should be

held liable for estafa, penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Swindling or estafa is punishable under Article 315 of

the RPC. There are three ways of committing estafa,
viz.: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
(2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or
(3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of
committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by
means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of
deceit.
The elements of estafa in general are the following:
(a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that
damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused the offended party or third
person.

The act complained of in the instant case is penalized

under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,
wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall
defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. It is committed by using
fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the

following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense
or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his
money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.
Thus, the Court held that the president used false
pretenses when it sold membership shares to the
public when it was not duly authorized to do so for
failure to secure a license and registration from SEC.
It also clarified that unlike estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b), estafa under paragraph 2(a) “does
not require as an element of the crime proof that the
accused misappropriated or converted the swindled
money or property. All that is required is proof of
pecuniary damage sustained by the complainant
arising from his reliance on the fraudulent
representation.”

The Court also added that the “registration

requirement under BP 178 applies to all sales of
securities ‘includ[ing] every contract of sale or
disposition of a security,’ regardless of the stage of
development of the project on which the securities
are based. No amount of ‘ industry practice’ works to
amend these provisions on presale registration”

The gravamen of the offenses charged in all the

afore-mentioned cases is the employment of fraud or
deceit to the damage or prejudice of another. As
defined in Balasa:

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise

anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which
an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes
all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated. On the other
hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal Injury.34

The elements of estafa by means of deceit under

Article 315 (2 )(a) of the RPC are the following: (a)
that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense
or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.22
In addition, fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to
comprise anything calculated to deceive, including
all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by
which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another.23 It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes
all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated.24 On the
other hand, deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury.25

Estafa by Means of Deceit

Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code

penalizes fraud or deceit when committed as follows:

xxxx
2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of fraud:

(a) by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely

pretending to possess power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.

"The elements of the crime of estafa under the

foregoing provision are: (1) there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3)
the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and
was thus induced to part with his money or property;
and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage."13

Petitioners presented themselves to Lourdes as

persons possessing the authority and capacity to
engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of
Final Access Marketing. This was a clear
misrepresentation considering their previous
knowledge not only of Erlinda’s complaint but also of
several others as regards the failure of Final Access
Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles bought.
Lourdes relied on their misrepresentations and
parted with her money. Almost a week passed by, but
petitioners and Rule did not deliver the said motor
vehicle. They also did not fulfill their subsequent
promise to provide a replacement or to refund her
payment. When Lourdes visited the office of Final
Access Marketing to demand the return of her
money, it was already closed. She could not locate
any of them except for Franco who denied any
wrongdoing. Consequently, she suffered damage.

If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be,

Erlinda’s complaint to petitioners and the 12 other
similar complaints with "Hoy Gising" regarding
undelivered vehicles should have dissuaded
petitioners from further soliciting customers. The fact
that they continued to offer for sale a second-hand
car to Lourdes is indicative of deceit and their
complicity in the conspiracy to commit estafa. The
manner in which petitioners transacted business with
Erlinda and Lourdes as well as their awareness of 12
other similar complaints with "Hoy Gising" were
sufficient to establish the existence of a modus
operandi.

G.R. No. 159280 May 18, 2004

AUGUSTO SIM, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and The PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On appeal by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a
Decision1 by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 21,
2003 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 34,
finding petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and co-accused
Elison Villaflor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) thereof, as well as its Resolution3
dated August 1, 2003 denying appellant’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner and co-accused Elison
Villaflor were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusión temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan
the sum of P480,000.00 representing the amount paid
for the purchase of the car that was impounded by
the authorities.
Elison Villaflor and Augusto Sim, Jr., were formally
charged with the crime of Estafa in an Information
dated September 6, 1999 which reads:4
That on or about May 2, 1998, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jay Byron
Ilagan in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused by means of false manifestations which
they made to said Jay Byron Ilagan to the effect
that they are selling one (1) colored green Nissan
Pathfinder pick-up with motor number PD27-
555735 bearing Plate No. BCF-620 in the amount
of P480,000.00 registered in the name of Henry
Austria, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said Jay
Byron Ilagan to give and deliver, as in fact he
gave and delivered to said accused the amount
of P480,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent, as the said car is a stolen car and
they are not the owner, and were made solely, to
obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of
P480,000.00 which amount once in their
possession, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said Jay Byron Ilagan in the aforesaid amount of
P350,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire
supplier whose store, Marfi Tire Supply, is
located along the highway at San Pablo City,
Laguna. He had been dealing with accused
Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is
engaged in the same business of selling tires and
rims at 39 C-3 Road, Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan
City.
In March 1998, private complainant talked to
Elison somewhere in Tondo, Manila, and
expressed his interest in buying a vehicle. Elison
told him that he knew someone who sells vehicles
at a cheap price, and that he had bought a Toyota
Tamaraw FX at lower than the market price.
Private complainant then asked Elison to ask if
there was an Isuzu pick-up for sale. A month
 later, Elison called private complainant to inform
him that he was able to find a 1997 Nissan
Pathfinder. They agreed to inspect the vehicle
together as private complainant wanted to buy it
before his birthday on May 31, 1998.5
On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to Dagupan City to
get the Nissan Pathfinder from his friend, petitioner
Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Elison that the Nissan
Pathfinder was given to him by a customer in
payment of a debt and had been used only for a year.
Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to San
Pablo City. Private complainant at first did not like the
vehicle since it was not the brand he was looking for.
Elison said that his kumpadre would look at the
vehicle as the latter was also interested in it.6
Private complainant decided to buy the 1997 Nissan
Pathfinder at the agreed price of P480,000.00. The
amount was paid in five checks issued by Fe Ilagan
under her account at Solidbank-San Pablo Branch.
One check was dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of
P350,000.00, and four checks in the sum of
P32,500.00 each was dated June 6, July 6, August 6
and September 6, all in 1998.7
Elison gave private complainant photocopies of the
Certificate of Registration (C.R.) and Official Receipt
(O.R.) issued by the Land Transportation Office (LTO)
showing the name of the owner as one Henry Austria.
While waiting for the processing of the papers, the
vehicle was parked at private complainant’s place.
After a week, Elison brought the deed of sale which
private complainant signed without the signature of
the owner, Henry Austria. After private complainant
signed the deed of sale, he gave it back to Elison to
be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the
owner/vendor and transfer of registration in the name
of private complainant.8
On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to
private complainant the deed of sale signed by the
owner/vendor, together with the new C.R. and O.R.
issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the
name of private complainant.9
The checks given by private complainant in payment
of the vehicle were deposited by petitioner in his
name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five checks
were debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the
registration papers from Elison, private complainant
was eventually able to use the Nissan Pathfinder.10
On October 28, 1998, private complainant’s vehicle
was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping operatives of
the Philippine National Police (ANCAR NCRTMO). The
vehicle and its registration papers were inspected
and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. It turned out
that the vehicle was a "hot car" as it had been
reported stolen on November 29, 1997 by its real
owner, Golf Construction of the Philippines, Inc.
pursuant to the Alarm Sheet issued by the PNP
Traffic Management Group.11
Private complainant accompanied the ANCAR
operatives to the residence of Elison. He went with
them to Camp Crame, and named petitioner as the
owner of the vehicle. However, they were not able to
locate petitioner right away. Meanwhile, the vehicle
was impounded by the authorities. The investigation
revealed that its original motor and chassis numbers
were replaced and/or tampered but its Production
Number remained intact. Eventually, the real
description of the vehicle was fully established and
identified by no less than the
manufacturer/assembler of the unit, Universal Motors
Corporation.12
Private complainant spoke with Elison about the
possible recovery of the money paid by him for the
confiscated vehicle. On November 30, 1998, private
complainant met petitioner for the first time.
Petitioner signed a Promissory Note with Deed of
Undertaking whereby he obligated himself to pay
private complainant the amount of P480,000.00 plus
attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 in scheduled
installments. Petitioner issued a check in the amount
of P75,000.00 but private complainant did not encash
it, thinking that if he does, petitioner would not pay
him anymore. Private complainant was unable to
recover the money paid by him to petitioner.13
Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged with
estafa under a criminal information dated September
6, 1999. Elison was arraigned on September 17,
1999; while petitioner was arraigned on June 1, 2000.
Both pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, the trial court convicted both Elison and
petitioner of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with
the modification that appellants should be convicted
of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,
assigning the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH
DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT CONSPIRACY IS
 PRESENT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH
DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE
ACQUITTAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
Two issues are presented before this Court: (1)
Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner
and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private complainant
Jay Byron Ilagan; and (2) Whether petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under
Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, petitioner argues
that there is no conspiracy between him and co-
accused. He points that it was only co-accused Elison
Villaflor who dealt with private complainant. The
latter had not even met him before he was allegedly
forced to sign the amicable agreement.
Petitioner further alleges that contrary to the findings
of the appellate court, there is no convincing
evidence to show that petitioner performed any
previous or simultaneous act with Elison in
committing the offense against private complainant.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution did not
show or prove that petitioner directly participated in
the commission of the offense or performed an act
which would show community of purpose with Elison.
Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit.
Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior
agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be
deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before,
during and after the commission of the crime, which
are indicative of a common design, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments.14 Conspiracy is
deemed implied when the malefactors have a
common purpose and were united in its execution.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all
perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the
crime is sufficient to create joint criminal
responsibility.15
In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals,16 we ruled that
conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown
as clearly as the commission of the crime. However,
conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence,
but may take the form of circumstances which, if
taken together, would conclusively show that the
accused came to an agreement to commit a crime
and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation
and participation.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court,
petitioner’s actions in relation to the fraudulent sale
of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant
clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the
information, which acts transcend mere knowledge
or friendship with co-accused Elison.17
Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who
dealt with or personally transacted with private
complainant until the time the sale was
consummated, by his own testimony petitioner
admitted all the acts by which he actively cooperated
and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the fraud
upon private complainant.18 That petitioner is a
conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is
evident from the fact that as between them, both
knew that petitioner was the person selling the
vehicle under the false pretense that a certain Henry
Austria was the registered owner.19 Petitioner,
together with Elison, clearly deceived private
complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of
P480,000.00, to the latter’s damage and prejudice. In
addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately
misrepresenting himself to private complainant as
having the necessary authority to possess and sell to
the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him
P480,000.00 only to renege on that promise and for
failure to reimburse the said amount he collected
from private complainant, despite demand, amount to
estafa punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the findings of fact
of the trial court, aptly observed:20
That conviction under the afore-cited provision is
more proper is evident from the trial court’s
finding that appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. from the
very beginning was aware that the subject
vehicle was not his nor given to him in payment of
debt as he made appellant Villaflor to believe.
Nonetheless, appellant Villaflor was not absolved
from liability, having actively conspired with
appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. to convince private
complainant to purchase the Pathfinder upon
their false pretense and representation that said
vehicle was being sold by its real owner, Henry
Austria, the name appearing in the registration
papers and deed of sale under circumstances
clearly showing their knowledge that the status
of said vehicle is dubious or anomalous, as in fact
it turned out to be a "hot car" or had been
stolen/carnapped from its true owner. The totality
of the evidence indicates a common or joint
design, purpose and objective of the accused-
appellants to defraud private complainant who
parted with his money upon the belief that there
 is no problem regarding the ownership of the
Pathfinder sold to him by the appellants.
The trial court rejected the argument of the defense
that it was private complainant who supposedly had
the vehicle and its registration papers checked at
Camp Crame before buying the same. It pointed out
that verification would have been difficult considering
that the motor and chassis numbers in the
registration papers are correct but the name of the
owner appearing therein is false.
Elison’s false pretense in holding out that he had
authorization from the owner to sell the 1997 Nissan
Pathfinder was made in conjunction with petitioner’s
fraudulent misrepresentation that he was legally
entitled to possess the aforesaid vehicle. The
evidence shows that petitioner and Elison acted in
conspiracy to deceive private complainant into
buying a stolen Nissan Pathfinder, thereby
defrauding the latter in the amount of P480,000.00,
and upon their false pretense and representation as
to the real status of the vehicle, i.e., that said unit is in
fact being sold by its true owner Henry Austria and
that Augusto Sim, Jr. in whose name the checks were
issued had the authority or right to sell the same.
After a few months, the vehicle sold was
apprehended and impounded by police authorities
for being stolen or carnapped which resulted in
pecuniary damage to private complainant who had
demanded the return of his money from petitioner
and Elison.21 The evidence of the prosecution
satisfactorily established the fraudulent acts and
representations which induced private complainant
to part with his money for which he suffered damage
and loss when the vehicle sold to him by petitioner
and Elison was recovered by its true owner through
operatives of the police anti-carnapping group.22
On the second assignment of error, petitioner
contends that the evidence is not sufficient to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable.
While the trial court charged and convicted petitioner
and his co-accused of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the appellate court
modified the lower court’s decision by convicting
them of the same crime under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Regardless of whether petitioner is charged or
convicted under either par. 1 (b) or par. 2 (a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, he would still be guilty
of estafa because damage and deceit, which are
essential elements of the crime, have been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. False
pretenses or fraudulent acts were committed prior to
or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud by
falsely pretending to possess property. In this case,
false pretenses or fraudulent acts were employed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud by falsely pretending to possess the 1997
Nissan Pathfinder, where damage and deceit have
been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise
anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which
an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes
all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a
species of fraud.23
Swindling or estafa by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud is committed "[b]y
using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by other similar deceits."24
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) are:
(1) There must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means;
(2) Such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(3) The offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means;
(4) As a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.25
These four elements are present in the instant case:
(1) False pretenses were employed by petitioner and
his co-accused to deceive private complainant into
purchasing the stolen Nissan Pathfinder;
(2) False pretenses were employed prior to, and
simultaneously with, the fraudulent sale of the Nissan
Pathfinder;
(3) Private complainant relied on false pretenses of
petitioner and co-accused, inducing him to part with
his money due to the misrepresentation employed by
the perpetrators of the fraud; and
(4) As a result of false pretenses and
misrepresentations by petitioner and co-accused,
private complainant suffered damages in the amount
of P480,000.00.

Furthermore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the

findings of the trial court, which is in the best position
to make an assessment of the witnesses’ credibility
and to appreciate complainants’ truthfulness,
honesty and candor.26 Factual findings of trial courts,
as well as their assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, are entitled to great weight and respect
by this Court more so when these are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.27 As against the positive and
categorical testimonies of the complainant,
petitioner’s mere denial cannot prevail.
The proper imposable penalty for the crime of estafa
under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) is prisión correccional in its
maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00
but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
In such cases, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,28 if the
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty
next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed
by the Code for the offense, without first considering
any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion
of the court and can be anywhere within the range of
the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.
In the present case, petitioner defrauded private
complainant in the amount of P480,000.00. The fact
that the amount involved in the case at bar exceeds
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead,
the matter should be so taken as analogous to
modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.
This legal interpretation accords with the rule that
penal laws should be construed in favor of the
accused.29
The maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner
should be taken from the maximum period of the
penalty under Art. 315, which is reclusión temporal,
since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but
the total penalty which may be imposed should not
exceed twenty (20) years.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
estafa under Art. 31530 is prisión mayor in its
minimum period if the amount of the fraud exceeds
P22,000.00, the minimum term should be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense, which is prisión
correccional in its maximum period. Hence, the
minimum period of the penalty should be from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
The determination of the minimum penalty is left by
law to the sound discretion of the court and can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided.
We are convinced that the appropriate penalty in
accordance with law that can best serve the ends of
justice in the case at bar should range from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to twenty years of
reclusión temporal, as maximum, for the crime of
estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, the May 21, 2003 Decision and August
1, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed. Appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. is sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal,
as maximum, for the crime of estafa under Art. 315,
par. 2 (a). He is further ordered to indemnify the
private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan, jointly and
severally with Elison Villaflor, the sum of P480,000.00
with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum until
fully paid.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.*, Panganiban**, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.