*

alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao pray that the “appropriate
G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001. court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved.” This relief is clearly
premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
petitioners,  vs.  SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
758
*
G.R. No. 147781. May 10, 2001.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,  vs.ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National

758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Defense, et al., respondents.
ANNOTATED
*
G.R. No. 147799. May 10, 2001.
Lacson vs. Perez
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,  vs.  SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL
DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIR. LEANDRO MENDOZA and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of a duly issued warrant.
BERROYA, respondents. Same; Same; Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award.—The
petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters
G.R. No. 147810. May 10, 2001.
*
relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular
act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to
relief is clear at the time of the award  (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro,  85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time,
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,  vs.  THE DEPARTMENT OF petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a
JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested
GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and without a warrant.
DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents. Remedial Law; Action; Party; Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right
has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.—
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party
Constitution Law;  Arrest;  The instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.—All the must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the
the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. court’s remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr.,  239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here,
Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President MacapagalArroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a
rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is
it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and
_____________ detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right
has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
* EN BANC.
KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
757
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights;  Arrests;  In the exercise of the calling out power as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a “state of
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 757 rebellion”; Declaration of a “state of rebellion” cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights,
such as the right to due process, the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.—Section 18 grants the
Lacson vs. Perez President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call

759
Same; Same; The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is not based on the declaration of a “state of
rebellion.”—In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration
of a “state of rebellion.” VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 759
Same; Same; Resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition not justified since an
individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.— Lacson vs. Perez
Moreover, petitioners’ contention in  G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago
Petition),  and  147799 (Lumbao Petition)  that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without
warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of  mandamus  and prohibition, since an out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion. In the latter two
individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. cases,  i.e.,  rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the
Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,  or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether However, in the exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the
or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a “state of rebellion” (or, for that
a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term “state of rebellion” has no legal significance. It is vague
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the and amorphous and does not give the President more power than what the Constitution says, i.e.,whenever
delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such a declaration is “legal
against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other surplusage.” But whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights,
remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition such as the right to due process, the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government
and mandamusimproper at this time (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court). for redress of grievances, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, among others.

Same; Same; Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court Same;  Same;  Same;  Nothing in Section 18 authorizes the President or any person acting under her
for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of a duly issued warrant.—In connection with their direction to make unwarranted arrests.—Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the
President or any person acting under her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The existence of “lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion” only authorizes the President to call out the “armed forces to prevent or premised on the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is unconstitutional and contrary to existing laws. The
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
Same;  Same;  Same;  Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the against unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
declaration of martial law authorizes the President to order the arrest of any person.—Not even the no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
suspension of the privilege of the writ of  habeas corpusor the declaration of martial law authorizes the by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of the suspension of the writ produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” If a
of habeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ whereby the detention of the person is state of martial law “does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,nor supplant the functioning of the
put in issue. It does not by itself authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians, where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
Same;  Same;  Same;  A declaration of a “state of rebellion” does not justify any deviation from the writ,” then it is with more reason, that a mere declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about the
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.—In the instant case, the President suspension of the operation of the Constitution or of the writ of habeas corpus.
did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration of a “state of
rebellion,” at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and that the armed forces may be called to SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
prevent or sup- Conjunction.
760
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun for petitioner in G.R. No. 147780.
     Miriam D. Santiago for and on her own behalf.
     Ricardo C. Valmonte and Thomas M. Valmonte for petitioner in G.R. No. 147799.
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS      Aleta L. Tolentino for petitioner in G.R. No. 147810.
ANNOTATED      R.A.V. Saguisag for petitioner in G.R. No. 147781.
     The Solicitor General for the respondents.
Lacson vs. Perez
762

press it, as in fact she did. Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; To justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a showing that the Lacson vs. Perez
persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit the
offense of rebellion.—In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for their alleged
participation in the “rebellion” on May 1, 2001 are members of an outlawed organization intending to
overthrow the government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a
showing that the persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting RESOLUTION
to commit the offense of rebellion. In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking
place in the presence of the arresting officer.
MELO, J.:
Same; Same; Same; A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its burden of proving
probable cause; The determination of probable cause is a purely legal question of which courts are the final On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent mob armed with
arbiters.—A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons” assaulting and
cause. The declaration does not constitute a substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the courts,
which must still judge for itself the existence of probable cause. Under Section 18, Article VII, the attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
determination of the existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of proclaiming martial law or the state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
suspension of the privilege of the writ of  habeas corpus  rests for which the President is granted ample, directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
though not absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the determination of probable cause is a purely rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
legal question of which courts are the final arbiters. promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” which
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion: allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed
before the Court—
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Arrests; To accept the theory that the President could disregard the (1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent
applicable statutes, particularly that which concerns arrests, searches and seizures, on the mere declaration application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
of a “state of rebellion” is in effect to place the Philippines under martial law without a declaration of the filed by Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2)  G.R. No.
executive to that effect and without observing the proper procedure.—Obviously, the power of the President in
147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the
cases when she assumed the existence of rebellion is properly laid down by the Constitution. I see no reason
or justification for the President’s deviation from the concise and plain provisions. To accept the theory that writ of  habeas corpus,with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-
the President could disregard the applicable statutes, particularly that which concerns arrests, searches and Santiago; (3) G.R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary
seizures, on the mere declaration of a “state of injunction and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4)  G.R. No. 147810  for
certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
761 All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arrdyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered
the lifting of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 761 petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of
a “state of rebellion” is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary
Lacson vs. Perez of Justice denies
763
rebellion” is in effect to place the Philippines under martial law without a declaration of the executive to
that effect and without observing the proper procedure. This should not be countenanced. In a society which
adheres to the rule of law, resort to extra-constitutional measures is unnecessary, where the law has VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 763
provided everything for any emergency or contingency.
Lacson vs. Perez
Same; Same; Same; The implementation of warrantless arrests premised on the declaration of a “state of
rebellion” is unconstitutional and contrary to existing laws.—The implementation of warrantless arrests
that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the “rebellion.” VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 765
He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and military
agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents’ Joint Comments: Lacson vs. Perez

[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts For all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that
petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular
preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted. act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R.       the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the
No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p.       present time, petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being
16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)      arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that
petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.
With this declaration, petitioners’ apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests G.R. No. 147799
of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers,
the declaration of a “state of rebellion.”
being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to
Moreover, petitioners’ contention in  G.R. No. 147780(Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-
“determine or interpret” what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of
Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being
rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that
of mandamusand prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
“[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense,
violence, invasion or rebellion . . .” Thus, we held in  Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain
Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are
liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
764 instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED information, some of which may be classi-
Lacson vs. Perez 766

without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail
themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time Lacson vs. Perez
(Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the fled as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-
dismissal of the petitions at bar. spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property, x x x
G.R. No. 147780 (at pp. 22-23)     
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
Mancao pray that the “appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the lifted.
instant petition is finally resolved.” This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this
date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in G.R. No. 147810
the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted
in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Filipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that
of a duly issued warrant. a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
As regards petitioners’ prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to
null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his behalf  (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia,
the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to Jr., 239 SCRA 386[1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would
leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot
proceedings initiated for that purpose. claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
Anent petitioners’ allegations ex abundante ad caittelamin support of their application for the supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or
is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg,  200 SCRA 149  [1991]), a infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
matter which remains speculative up to this very day. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner
claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the
G.R. No. 147781 declaration of a “state of rebellion” and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution.
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus.  It is However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to
basic in matters relating to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section
765 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders and police officers stems
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. from the following facts:
On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon the warrant issued by
767
the Sandiganbayan in connection with the criminal case for plunder filed against him. Several
hundreds of policemen were deployed to effect his arrest. At the
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 767
______________
Lacson vs. Perez
1 Dissenting Opinion, J. Jackson, in Brinegar vs. United States, 338 U.S. 2084 (1949).
2 G.R. No. 147780, for Prohibition, Injunction, Mandamus and Habeas Corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 3 G.R. No. 147810, for Certiorari and Prohibition.

147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking 4 G.R. No. 147785, for Habeas Corpus.
5 G.R. No. 147787, for Habeas Corpus.
earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in
6 G.R. No. 147781, for Mandamus.
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial 7 G.R. No. 147818, for Injunction.
warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of 8 G.R. No. 147819, for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Malacañang.
SO ORDERED. 769

          Davide, Jr.  (C.J.),  Bellosillo,  Puno,  Mendoza,  Panganiban  and  Gonzaga-Reyes,

JJ., concur. VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 769
     Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion. Lacson vs. Perez
     Kapunan, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
     Pardo, J., I join the dissent of J. Kapunan.
     Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I dissent. Please see my Dissenting Opinion. camp outside his residence in Greenhills Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A skirmish
     Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., On leave. ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ batons and water hoses to control
the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada
and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were then brought to Camp Crame where,
with full media coverage, their fingerprints were obtained and their mug shots taken.
SEPARATE OPINION Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA Shrine to show its
support for the deposed President. Senators Enrile, Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial
candidates including petitioner Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the
VITUG, J.:
crowd during these rallies.
I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless arrests for acts related to, or In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were brought to the Veterans
connected with, the May 1st Incident but respectfully dissent from the order of dismissal of the Memorial Medical Center for a medical check-up. It was announced that from there, they would
petitions for being said to be moot and academic. The petitions have raised important be transferred to Fort Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully addressed. In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to march to Malacañang
Palace. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was called to reinforce the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to guard the premises of the presidential residence. The marchers were
DISSENTING OPINION able to penetrate the barricades put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola and
were able, to reach Gate 7 of Malacañang. As they were being dispersed with warning shots, tear
gas and water canons, the rallyists hurled stones at the police authorities. A melee erupted.
KAPUNAN, J.: Scores of people, including some policemen, were hurt.
At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Gloria
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been characterized as belonging “in the
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila:
catalog of indispensable freedoms’
768
Presidential Proclamation No. 38

DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION 

IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and
Lacson vs. Perez
other deadly weapons, in great

Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual 770
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked
among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human 770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are
1 Lacson vs. Perez
subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.

Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, petitioners Panfilo Lacson, part coming from the mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated
Michael Ray Aquino and Cezar O. Mancao II now seek a temporary restraining order and/or and incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown
injunction from the Court against their impending warrantless arrests upon the order of the leaders, have and continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of
2
Secretary of Justice.   Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to overthrowing the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize power, and have and continue to rise
publicly, shown open hostility, and take up arms against the duly constituted Government for the purpose of
enjoin the arrests of its senatorial candidates, namely, Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Senator
3 removing from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan and4 General Panfilo Lacson.  Separate the Philippine National Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and
petitioners
5
were also filed by Senator Juan6 Ponce Enrile,   Former Ambassador
7
Ernesto M. partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable
Maceda,  Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
8
 Senator Gregorio B. Honasan,  and the Integrated under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code;
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters have
continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted Government and seize
political power; The declaration of a “state of rebellion” is supposedly based on Section 18, Article VII of the
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the President as the constitution which reads:
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to suppress the
rebellion; The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
hereby recognize and confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion compelling me to declare a rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
state of rebellion; exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 1 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
the Constitution calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National police to of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
suppress and quell the rebellion. Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
City of Manila, May 1, 2001. revoke such, proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
The President likewise issued General Order No.l which reads: for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
GENERAL ORDER NO. 1 The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
771 agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.

VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 771 773

Lacson vs. Perez

VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 773
armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the command Lacson vs. Perez
and direction of known and unknown leaders, have and continue to assault and attempt to break into
Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize
political power, and have and continue to rise publicly, show open hostility, and take up arms against the The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
duly constituted Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
National Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
powers and prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
the Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters have Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call 9
out the armed forces
continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted Government and seize in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion.   In the latter two
political power; cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the President as the the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to suppress the martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the
rebellion; armed forces, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a “state of
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under rebellion” (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term “state of rebellion” has no
the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the President more power than
of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 38, dated May 1, 2001, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine national police to suppress and quell the rebellion. what the Constitution says,  i.e.,  whenever it becomes recessary, he may call out such armed
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed
National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National during the hearing of this case, such a declaration is “legal surplusage.” But whatever the term
Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell means, 10it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as the right to due
the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. process,  the 11rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the 12government for redress
City of Manila, May 1, 2001. of grievances,  and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,  among others.
13
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al., the Court held that:
Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition were ordered arrested.
Senator Enrile was arrested without warrant in his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon.
______________
Likewise arrested without warrant the following day was former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda.
Senator Honasan and Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities have so far 9 Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al., G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
failed to apprehend them. Ambassador Maceda was temporarily released upon 10 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 1.
11 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 4.
772 12 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 2.
13 G.R. No. 141284, supra.

772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 774

Lacson vs. Perez

774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
recognizance while Senator Ponce Enrile was ordered released by the Court on cash bond. Lacson vs. Perez
The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the arrest or impending arrest
without warrant, pursuant to a declaration of “state of rebellion” by the President of the above- x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to suspend the privilege
mentioned persons and unnamed other persons similarly situated suspected of having committed of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places the calling out power in a
rebellion is illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative of the Bill of Rights different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
under the Constitution. of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio Lacson vs. Perez
altenus.
xxx
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the arrest of a person. And even then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the “calling out” power because it is following qualifications:
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of  habeas corpus  and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Congress and, in appropriate cases, review by this Court. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is to arrest
persons without warrant and detain them without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Nor did she declare
safeguards for the citizens’ civil liberties, the so-called “state of rebellion” partakes the nature of martial law. A declaration of a “state of rebellion,” at most, only gives notice to the nation that it
martial law without declaring it as such. It is a truism that a law or rule may itself be fair or exists, and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such
innocuous on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye14 so declaration does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription against
as to practically make it unjust and oppressive, it is within the prohibition of the Constitution. In unreasonable searches and seizures.
an ironic sense, a “state of rebellion” declared as a subterfuge to effect warrantless arrest and As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by a court in very
detention for an unbailable offense places a heavier burden on the people’s civil liberties than the circumscribed instances, however, the Rules of Court allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule
suspension of the privilege of the writ of  habeas corpus  and the declaration of martial law 113 provides:
because in the latter case, built-in safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The period for
SEC. 5. Arrests without warrant; when lawful.—A police officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
martial law or suspension is limited to a period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The President is arrest a person:
mandated to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours from the proclamation or
suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject to review by Congress, which may (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
revoke such attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
____________
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

14 See Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. xxx

In cases filing under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
775 forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 775 It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of
Lacson vs. Perez Rights that a person may only be arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a
“judge” after determining ‘personally’ the existence of “probable

proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in session, it shall convene in 24 hours without 777
need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basis 15thereof or its extension is subject to
review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding. VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 777
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without these rights, all other
individual rights may not exist. Thus, the very first section in our Constitution’s Bill of Rights, Lacson vs. Perez
Article III, reads:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall cause” after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. produce. Its requirements should, therefore, be scrupulously met:
And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against government impairment, Section
2 thereof provides: The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute of rule which allows exceptions to the requirement
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no of warrants of arrests is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. provided by law. To do so would infringe
16
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated
and so deserving of full protection.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or any person acting under
her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The existence of “lawless violence, invasion or A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts and circumstances before
rebellion” only authorizes the President to call out the “armed forces to prevent or suppress him which, had they been before a judge, would constitute adequate basis for a finding of
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” probable cause of the commission of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty of
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of  habeas corpus  or the declaration of committing the offense. That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that when arrested,
martial law authorizes the President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant the person “arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
consequence of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to offense” in the presence of the arresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense which had “just
issue the writ whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself authorize been committed,” that the police officer making the arrest “has personal knowledge of facts or
the President to order circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.”
Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion17
ostensibly under Section 5 of Rule 113. Respondents’ theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,  where
____________
this Court held:
15 Id., at Article VII, SECTION 18.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
776 committed in furtherance thereof or in18 connection therewith constitute direct assault against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.

776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _____________

 16 People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 14 (1986). the arrested person has the “right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits” (Resolution, p. 18) that
17 187 SCRA 311 (1990). he was exercising a right which the arresting
18 Id., at 318.

_____________
778
22 Id.,at 519.
23 G.R. No. 147785. En Banc, May 5, 2001 (minute resolution).
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 24 121 SCRA 472.(1983).
25 See Note 396 in BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, p. 180.
26 Umil vs. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991).
Lacson vs. Perez
780

Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person who “has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit” rebellion and may be arrested without a 780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
warrant at any time so long as the rebellion persists.
Reliance on  Umil  is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein, although effected a day or Lacson vs. Perez
days after the commission of the violent acts of petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court
because at the time of their respective arrests, they were members of organizations such as the officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person
27
should be subjected to the ordeal of a
Communist Party of the Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National United Front trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.  (Italics supplied)
Commission, then outlawed groups under the Anti-Subversion Act. Their19mere membership in
said illegal organizations amounted to committing the offense of subversion  which justified their GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion
arrests without warrants. Insofar as  G.R. No. 81567  is concerned, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations
In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for their alleged regarding “continuing offenses.” To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is, to give a
participation in the “rebellion” on May 1, 2001 are members of an outlawed organization license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political
intending to overthrow the government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest under Section offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If
5(a), there must be a showing that the persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until
20
actually committing or is attempting to commit the offense of rebellion.   In other words, there a person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is
must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion
21
is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this Court which
In  United States vs. Samonte,   the term “in his [the arresting officer’s] presence” was defined
should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will
thus: be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well-grounded on past events, that the
An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within the view of an arresting officer or private citizen
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless arrests. I
when such officer or person sees the offense, even though at a distance, or hears the disturbance created
cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner’s surfacing from
underground, 28and ounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his
______________
apprehension.  (Italics supplied)
19 87 SCRA 311, 318, 321, 323-24 (1990).
20 Under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, these acts would involve rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government: CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
(1) to remove from the allegiance of the Government or its laws, the entire, or a portion of Philippine territory, or any body of land,
naval or other armed forces, or (2) to deprive the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests
prerogatives.
21 16 Phil. 516 (1910). made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were wantonly and
systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have short memories of that
779 repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution,
this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty
in the dubious name of national security.What-
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 779
_____________
Lacson vs. Perez
27 Id., at 274.
28 Id., at 279.
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene 22
thereof, or the offense is continuing, or has not been
consummated, at the time the arrest is made. 781

This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of Senator Enrile. In the
Court’s Resolution of May 5, 2001 in the petition for habeas corpus  filed by Senator Enrile, the VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 781
Court noted that the sworn statements of the policemen who purportedly arrested him were
23 Lacson vs. Perez
hearsay. Senator Enrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly seditious speeches.
Consequently, his arrest without warrant cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which states that
an arrest without a warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been committed and ever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill of
Rights,29 no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is what democracy is all
the arresting officer or private person has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
about.  (Italics supplied)
of facts and circumstances that the person arrested has committed the offense.
At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to the cases 24at FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
bar, Umil is not without any strong dissents. It merely 25re-affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,  a
case decided during the Marcos martial law regime.   It cannot apply when the country is 12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of “continuing crimes,” which has its own legitimate
supposed to be under the regime of freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of the function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the
26
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the
following Justices in the motion for reconsideration of said case  are apropos:
elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant,
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting: the “continuing crime” doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or
committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officers are not sure what particular officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the “continuing crimes” doctrine, is infinitely
provision of law had been violated by the person arrested. True it is that law enforcement agents and even increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning
prosecutors are not all adept at the law. However, erroneous perception, not to mention ineptitude among and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal detention
their ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member
of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally
neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the granted ample, though not absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the determination of
organization involved. Note, for instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of probable cause is a purely legal question of which courts are the final arbiters.
“membership in any subversive association:” Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have announced that the lifting of 33the “state
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence, or of rebellion” on May 7, 2001 does not stop the police from making warrantless arrests.  If this is
any other document of the organization; so, the pernicious effects of the declaration on the people’s civil liberties have not abated despite
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such or association or organization in any form whatsoever; the lifting thereof. No one exactly knows who are in the list or who prepared the list of those to be
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in
arrested for alleged complicity in the “continuing” crime of “rebellion” defined as such by
any other forms;  executive fiat. The list of the perceived leaders, financiers and supporters of the “rebellion” to be
xxx arrested and incarcerated could expand depending on the appreciation of the police. The coverage
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any and duration of effectivity of the orders of arrest are thus so open-ended and limitless as to place
plan or enterprise thereof; in constant and continuing peril the people’s Bill of Rights. It is of no small significance that four
of the petitioners are opposition candidates for the Senate. Their campaign activities have been to
_____________
a large extent immobilized. If the arrests and orders of arrest against them are illegal, then their
29 Id.,
Constitutional right to seek public office, as well as the right of the people to choose their officials,
at 284.
is violated.
782
_______________

782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 33 Manila Bulletin issue of May 8, 2001 under the heading “Warrantless arrest continue” by Rey G. Panaligan:
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez said yesterday the lifting of the state of rebellion in Metro Manila does not ban the
Lacson vs. Perez police from making warrantless arrest of suspected leaders of the failed May 1 Malacañang siege.
In a press briefing, Perez said, “we can make warrantless arrest because that is provided for in the Rules of Court,”
citing Rule 113.
g) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the
objectives and purposes of such association or organization;  784
xxx
k) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association
or organization. 784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and Lacson vs. Perez
seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court’s
function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed to make life easy for police forces but rather to In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the issues raised in these cases affecting
protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of as they do the basic liberties of the citizens enshrined in our Constitution, it behooves us to rule
the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law.
Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms
thereon now, instead of relegating the cases to trial courts which unavoidably may come up with
30
which make our policy worth protecting and saving  (Italics supplied) conflicting dispositions, the same to 34reach this Court inevitably for final ruling. As we aptly
pronounced in Salonga vs. Cruz Paño:
It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the fateful day of May 1, 2001 up to the
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
present. If respondents have ample evidence against petitioners, then they should forthwith file
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given
the necessary criminal complaints in order that the regular procedure can be followed and the by constitutional guarantees.
warrants of arrest issued by the courts in the normal course. When practicable, resort to the
warrant process is always to be preferred because “it interposes an orderly procedure involving Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the Court, considered the last bulwark of democracy,
‘judicial impartiality’ whereby a neutral and detached31 magistrate can make informed and for relief. If we do not act promptly, justly and fearlessly, to whom will they turn to?
deliberate determinations on the issue of probable cause.” WHEREFORE, I vote as follows:
The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges are supposed to possess is precisely
the reason the framers of the 1987 Constitution have reposed upon them alone the power to issue (1) Give DUE COURSE to and GRANT the petitions;
warrants of arrest. To vest the same to a branch of government, which is also charged with (2) Declare as NULL and VOID the orders of arrest issued against petitioners;
prosecutorial
32
powers, would make such branch the accused’s adversary and accuser, his judge (3) Issue a WRIT OF INJUNCTION enjoining respondents, their agents and all other
and jury. persons acting for and in their behalf from effecting warrantless arrests against
petitioners and all other persons similarly situated on the basis of Proclamation No. 38
_____________ and General Order No. 1 of the President.
30 Id., at 293-295.
31  LAFAVE,  I SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  (1987), pp. 548-549. SO ORDERED.
Citations omitted.
32 Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, 171 SCRA 348(1989).

DISSENTING OPINION
783

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 783
Lacson vs. Perez The exercise of certain powers by the President in an atmosphere of civil unrest may sometimes
raise constitutional issues. If such powers are used arbitrarily and capriciously, they may
degenerate into the worst form of despotism.
A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable
cause. The declaration does not constitute a substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the ____________
courts, which must still judge for itself the existence of probable cause. Under Section 18, Article
VII, the determination of the existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of proclaiming martial 34 134 SCRA 438 (1985).
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusrests for which the President is
785
 VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 785 7 Philippine
8 PDI,
Daily Inquirer (PDI), April 26, 2001, p. A15.
April 26, 2001, p. A15.
Lacson vs. Perez 9 Manila Bulletin, April 27, 2001, p. 8.
10 Ibid.

It is on this premise that I express my dissent. 787

The chain of events which led to the present constitutional crisis are as follows:
On March 2, 2001, the Supreme Court rendered the landmark decision that would bar further
1 VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 787
questions on the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidency.  In a unanimous decision,
the Court declared that Joseph Ejercito Estrada had effectively resigned his post and that Lacson vs. Perez
Macapagal-Arroyo is the legitimate President of the Philippines. Estrada was stripped of all his
powers and presidential immunity from suit.
An estimated 1,500 PNP personnel from the different parts of the metropolis were deployed to
Knowing that a warrant of arrest may at any time be issued against Estrada, his loyalists 11
secure12the area.  On April 28, 2001, the PNP and the Armed Forces declared a “nationwide red
rushed to his residence in Polk Street, North Greehhills Subdivision, San Juan, Metro Manila.
alert.”  Counter-intelligence agents checked on possible defectors from the military top officials.
They conducted vigil in the vicinity swearing that no one can take away their “president.”
Several senators were linked to an alleged junta plot.
Then the dreadful day for the Estrada loyalists came.
During the rally, several Puwersa Ng Masa candidates delivered speeches before the crowd.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against
Among those who showed up at the rally were Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Gregorio
Estrada, his son Jinggoy, Charlie “Atong” Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
2 Honasan, Juan Ponce Enrile, Edgardo Angara, Vicente 13Sotto and former PNP Director General
Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas.   Emotions ran high as an estimated 10,000 Estrada loyalists,
Panfilo Lacson and former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda.
ranging from 3 tattooed teenagers of Tondo to well-heeled Chinese, gathered in Estrada’s
On April 30, 2001, the government started to prepare its forces. A 2,000-strong military force
neighborhood. Supporters turned hysterical. Newspapers captured pictures of raging men and
4 backed up by helicopter gunships, Scorpion tanks and armored combat vehicles stood ready to
wailing women.  When policemen came, riots erupted. Police had to use their batons as well as
5 counter any attempt by Estrada loyalists to mount a coup. And to show that it meant business,
water hoses to control the rock-throwing Estrada loyalists.
the task force parked two MG-520 attack helicopters armed to the teeth with rockets on the
It took the authorities about four hours to implement the warrant of arrest. At about 3:30
parade ground at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon14 City. Also deployed were two armored personnel
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Director General
carriers and troops in camouflage uniforms.   Over 2,500 soldiers from the army, navy, and air
Leandro R. Mendoza, with the aid of PNP’s Special Action Force 15
force were formed into Task Force Libra to quell the indignant Estrada loyalists.
On May 1, 2001, at16 about 1:30 o’clock in the morning, the huge crowd at Edsa started their
_____________ march to Malacañang.  Along the way, they 17overran the barricades set up by the members of the
1 G.R. Nos. 146710-15; G.R. No. 146738, Estrada v. Desierto, et al., 358 SCRA 452 (2001). PNP Crowd Dispersal Control Management.
2 Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 13. Shortly past 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same 18day, the marchers were at the gates of
3 inq7.net, April 26, 2001, p. 1. Malacañang chanting, dancing, singing and waving flags.
4 Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 14.
5 inq7.net, April 25, 2001, p. 1.
_____________
786
11 Ibid.
12 Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 2001, p. 1.
13 Ibid., April 29, 2001, p. 1.
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 14 inq7.net, April 30, 2001, p. 1.
15 philstar.com, May 1, 2001, p. 2.
Lacson vs. Perez 16 inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
17 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
18 Ibid., p. 3.
and reinforcements6
from the Philippine Army and Marines, implemented the warrant of arrest
against Estrada. 788
Like a common criminal, Estrada was fingerprinted and had his mug shots taken at the
detention center of the former Presidential Anti-Organized Task Force at Camp Crame. The
shabby treatment, caught on live TV cameras nationwide, had sparked off a wave of protest all 788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
over the country. Even international news agencies like CNN and BBC were appalled over the
manner of Estrada’s arrest calling it “overkill.” In a taped message aired over radio and Lacson vs. Perez
television, Estrada defended himself and said, “I followed the rule of law to the letter. I asked our
people now to tell the powers to respect our constitution and the rule of law.” At around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, the police, with the assistance of combat-ready soldiers,
Being loyal to the end, the supporters of Estrada followed him to Camp Crame. About 3,000 of conducted dispersal operations. Some members of the dispersal team were unceasingly firing
them massed up in front of the camp. They were shouting “Edsa Three! Edsa Three!” They vowed their high-powered firearms in the air, while the police, armed with truncheons and shields, were
not to leave the place until Estrada is released. When7 asked how long they planned to stay, the slowly pushing the protesters away from the gates of Malacañang. Television footages showed
protesters said, “Kahit isang buwan, kahit isang taon.” protesters hurling stones and rocks on the advancing policemen, shouting invectives against
At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon, also of the same day, the PNP’s anti-riot squads them and attacking them with clubs. They burned police cars, a motorcycle, three pick-ups owned
dispersed them. Thus, they proceeded to the Edsa Shrine in Mandaluyong
8
City where they joined by a television
19
station, construction equipment and a traffic police outpost along Mendiola
forces with hundreds more who came from North Greenhills.  Hordes of Estrada loyalists began Street.   They also attacked Red Cross vans, destroyed traffic lights, and vandalized standing
gathering at the historic shrine. structures. Policemen were seen clubbing protesters, hurling back stones, throwing teargas under
On April 27, 2001, the crowd at Edsa begun to swell in great magnitude. Estrada loyalists the fierce midday sun, and firing guns towards the sky. National Security Adviser Rollo Golez
from various sectors, most of them obviously belonging to the “masses,” brought with 9
them said the Street had to be cleared of rioters20
at all costs because “this is like an arrow, a dagger
placards and streamers denouncing the manner of arrest done to the former president.   In the going all the way to (Malacañang) Gate 7.”
afternoon, buses loaded with loyalists from the nearby provinces arrived at the Edsa Shrine. One Before noontime of that same day, the Estrada loyalists were driven away.
of their leaders said that the Estrada supporters will 10
stay at Edsa Shrine until the former The violent street clashes prompted President Macapagal-Arroyo to place Metro Manila under
president gets justice from the present administration. a “state of rebellion.” Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto
21
Tiglao told reporters, “We are in a state
of rebellion. This is not an ordinary demonstration.”  After the declaration, there were threats of
______________ arrests against those suspected of instigating the march to Malacañang.
At about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested in his house in
6 Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 1. Dasmariñas Village, Makati City by a group led by Reynaldo Berroya, Chief of the Philippine
22
 22
National Police Intelligence Group. Thereafter, Berroya and his men proceeded to hunt re- Arroyo committed a constitutional short cut. She disregarded the clear provisions of the
electionist Senator Gregorio Honasan, former PNP Chief Panfilo Lacson, former Ambassador Constitution which provide:
Ernesto Maceda, Brig. Gen. Jake Malajakan, Senior Superintendents Michael Ray Aquino and
Cesar Mancao II, Ronald Lumbao and Cesar Tanega of “Sec. 18.  The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
_____________ not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
19 inq7.net,
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
May 2, 2001, p. 1.
20 inq7.net, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
May 2, 2001, p. 1.
21 inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
22 inq7.net, May 1, 2001. regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
789 such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.

VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 789 791

Lacson vs. Perez

VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 791
23
the People’s Movement Against Poverty (PMAP).  Justice Secretary Hernando Perez said that he Lacson vs. Perez
was “studying” the possibility of placing Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago “under the Witness
protection program.” The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation, or suspension,
Director Victor Batac, former Chief of the PNP Directorate for Police Community Relations, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
and Senior Superintendent Diosdado Valeroso, of the Philippine Center for Transnational Crime, The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
surrendered to Berroya. Both denied having plotted the siege. factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
On May 2, 2001, former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda was arrested. extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
The above scenario presents three crucial queries:  First,is President Macapagal-Arroyo’s A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
declaration of a “state of rebellion” constitutional?  Second,  was the implementation of the the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
warrantless arrests on the basis of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” constitutional?  And agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
third, did the rallyists commit rebellion at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001?
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
The first and second queries involve constitutional issues, hence, the basic yardstick is the offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
1987 Constitution of the Philippines. The third query requires a factual analysis of the events During the suspension of the privilege of the, writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
24
which culminated in the declaration of a state of rebellion; hence, an examination of Article 134 of judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.”
the Revised Penal Code is in order.
On May 7, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 39, “DECLARING Obviously, the power of the President in cases when she assumed the existence of rebellion is
THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION HAS CEASED properly laid down by the Constitution. I see no reason or justification for the President’s
TO EXIST,” which in effect, has lifted the previous Proclamation No. 38. deviation from the concise and plain provisions. To accept the theory that the President could
I beg to disagree with the majority opinion in ruling that the instant petitions have been disregard the applicable statutes, particularly that which concerns arrests, searches and seizures,
rendered moot and academic with the lifting by the President of the declaration of a “state of on the mere declaration of a “state of rebellion” is in effect to place the Philippines under martial
rebellion.” law without a declaration of the executive to that effect and without observing the proper
I believe that such lifting should not render moot and academic the very serious and procedure. This should not be countenanced. In a society which adheres to the rule of law, resort
unprecedented constitutional issues at hand, considering their grave implications involving the to extra-constitutional measures is unnecessary, where the law has provided everything for any
basic human rights and civil liberties of our people. A resolution of these issues becomes all the emergency or contingency. For even if it may be proven beneficial for a time, the precedent it sets
more necessary since, as reported in the papers, there are saturation drives (sonas) being is pernicious as the law may, in a little while, be disregarded again on the same pretext but for
conducted by the police evil purposes. Even in time of emergency, government action may vary in breath and

____________ _____________

23 inq7.net, 24 Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

May 01, 2001, p. 1.

790 792

790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacson, vs. Perez Lacson vs. Perez
25

whersin individuals in Metro Manila are picked up without warrants of arrest. intensity from more normal times, yet it need not be less constitutional.
Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and unconstitutional are capable of being My fear is rooted in history. Our nation had seen the rise of a dictator into power. As a matter
repeated by the respondents. In Salva v. Makalintal (G.R. No. 132603, Sept. 18, 2000), this Court of fact, the changes made by the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the martial law text of the
held that “courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is ‘capable of repetition, Constitution were to a large extent a reaction 26
against the direction which the Supreme Court
yet evading review’. . .” took during the regime of President Marcos.  Now, if this Court would take a liberal view, and
consider that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” carries with it the prerogatives given to the
I & II—President MacapagalArroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” and the implementation President during a “state of martial law,” then, I say, the Court is traversing a very dangerous
of the warrantless arrests premised on the said declaration are unconstitutional. path. It will open the way to those who, in the end, would turn our democracy into a totalitarian
Nowhere in the Constitution can be found a provision which grants upon the executive the power rule. History must not be allowed to repeat itself. Any act which gears towards possible
to declare a “state of rebellion,” much more, to exercise on the basis of such declaration the dictatorship must be severed at its inception.
prerogatives which a president may validly do under a state of martial law. President Macapagal- The implementation of warrantless arrests premised on the declaration of a “state of rebellion”
is unconstitutional and contrary to existing laws. The Constitution provides that “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given every support in
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the
Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are we
produce,27 and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be fighting for.”
seized.”   If a state of martial law  “does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,  nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the I need not belabor that at the time some of the suspected instigators were arrested, (the others
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians,28 where civil courts are are still at-large), a long interval of time already passed and hence, it cannot be legally said that
able to function,  nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ,”   then it is  with more they had just committed  an offense. Neither can it be said that Berroya or any of his men had
reason, that a mere declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about the “personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons to be arrested have committed a
crime.” That would be far from reality.
______________
III—The acts of the rallyists at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001 do not constitute
25 Smith/Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 13.
26 Bernas,
rebellion.
S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Edition, p. 789.
27 Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution. Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
28 Article VII, Section 18 (par. 4), Id.

“ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection—How committed.—The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed

793 by rising publiclyand taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any
body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 793 partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.” (As amended by RA No. 6968, O.G. 52, p. 9864, 1990)
Lacson vs. Perez 795

suspension of the operation of the Constitution or of the writ of habeas corpus.

VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 795
Neither can we find the implementation of the warrantless, arrests justified under the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Pertinent is Section 5, Rule 113, thus: Lacson vs. Perez
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: From the foregoing provisions, the elements of the crime of rebellion may be deduced,
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is thus:  first,  that there be  (a) public uprising  and (b)  taking arms  against the
attempting to commit an offense. government; second, that the purpose of the uprising or movement is either  (a)  to remove from
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal the allegiance to said government or its laws  (1)  the territory of the Philippines or any part
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and thereof; or (2) anybody of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive
X X X.” 30
or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Petitioners cannot be considered “to have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to Looking at the events on a magnified scale, I am convinced that the two elements of the crime
commit an offense”at the time they were hunted by Berroya for the implementation of the of rebellion are lacking.
warrantless arrests. None of them participated in the riot which took place in the vicinity of the First,  there was no  “taking of arms”  against the government. To my mind,  “taking
Malacañang Palace. Some of them were on their respective houses performing innocent acts such arms”  connotes the multitude’s  deliberate  and  conscious  resort to arms or weapons for the
as, watching television, resting etc. The sure fact however is that they were not in the presence of purpose of aiding them in accomplishing any of the purposes of rebellion. Admittedly, the Estrada
Berroya. Clearly, he did not see whether they had committed, were committing or were loyalists pelted the policemen with rocks and stones and attacked them with sticks and clubs, but
attempting to commit the crime of rebellion. But of course, I cannot lose sight of the legal such was merely a result of the heightening tension between opposite camps during the period of
implication of President Macapagal-Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion.” Rebellion is a dispersal. The stones, rocks, sticks, clubs and other improvised weapons were not deliberately
continuing offense and a suspected insurgent or rebel may be arrested anytime as he is resorted to by the Estrada loyalists to further any of the purposes of rebellion. They availed of
considered to be committing the crime. Nevertheless, assuming  ex gratia argumenti  that the them, at the precise moment of dispersal (this explains why their weapons were those which could
declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional, it is imperative that the said declaration be be easily gathered on the street)  and only for the purpose of stopping the policemen from
reconsidered. In view, of the changing times, the dissenting opinion of the noted jurist, Justice dispersing them. In this age of modernity, one who intends to overthrow the government will not
29
Isagani Cruz, in Umil v. Ramos,  quoted below must be given a second look. only settle for stones, woods, rocks, sticks or clubs as means to disable the government. It will be
extremely pathetic and the result will only be in vain. Unlike a true rebellion which
“I dissent insofar as the  ponencia  affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile that subversion is a is organized, what happened at the vicinity of Malacañang was merely a riot, a mob violence, or a
continuing offense, to justify the tumultuous uprising. At this juncture, it bears stressing that the crime of rebellion  is a vast
31
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.   It must be distinguished from riot
_____________ and offenses connected with mob vio-
29 187 SCRA 311 (1990).
______________
794
30 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, Thirteenth Edition, 1993, p. 73.
31 Ibid., p. 74.
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
796
Lacson vs. Perez

arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is Lacson vs. Perez
doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is
sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the ‘continuing’ offense of subversion. Libertarians were 32
appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new lence. In rebellion/insurrection, there is an organized and armed uprising against authority.
Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful Second, the purpose of the Estrada loyalists was neither (a) to remove from the allegiance to
vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against the government or its laws (1) the, territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any part
of land, naval or other armed forces; nor (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. I looked at the chronology of events, and one RTC, Br. 69, Silay City
thing surfaced—the Estrada loyalists mainly demanded that their beloved “president” should not
be incarcerated.  The crowd at Edsa swelled in great magnitude on April 25, 2001, the day
son acting in their behalf, are enjoined from arresting petitioner herein without the required
Estrada was arrested. In fact, when they followed Erap at Camp 33Crame, they were
judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
shouting “Edsa! Edsa! and they vowed not to leave until Estrada is released.”
of Malacanang. So ordered. (Vitug, Kapunan, Pardo and Gutierrez, JJ., maintain their Separate
One must not be swayed by the theory of respondents that the purpose of those people who
Opinions in the four aforecited cases. Quisumbing, Buena, Santiago and De Leon, JJ., on leave)
gathered in Edsa and marched to Malacañang was to commit rebellion. For sure, there were a
thousand and one reasons why they proceeded to Edsa. In determining their purpose, one must
trace the roots,—what prompted them to go to Edsa? They were the Estrada loyalists who wanted
him to be freed. If indeed there were minorities who advocated another cause, the same should
not be considered as the prevailing one in the determination of what crime was committed. Facts
should not be stretched just to build a case of rebellion. This runs counter to the principle of due
process.
As a final word, I subscribe to the principle that the rule of law implies the precept that
similar cases be treated similarly. Men can not regulate their actions by means of rule if this
precept is not followed. Edsa I, Edsa II and Edsa III are all public uprisings. Statements urging
people to overthrow the government were uttered in all these occasions. Injuries were sustained,
policemen were attacked, standing structures were vandalized . . . in all these scenarios, one
cannot be said to be extremely away from the other. The only difference is that the first two
succeeded, while the last failed. This should not result to an unbridled or unlimited exercise

___________
32 46 CJS, Section 1, p. 1058.
33 Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2001, p. A15.

797

VOL. 357, MAY 10, 2001 797

Lacson vs. Perez

of power by the duly constituted authorities. It is during these trying times that fealty to the
Constitution is strongly demanded from all, especially the authorities concerned.
WHEREFORE, I vote to give DUE COURSE to the petitions and GRANT the same and to
enjoin the respondents from arresting the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 147780,-147781, and 147799
without the corresponding warrants.
SO ORDERED.
Petitions denied.

——o0o——

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated 10 May 2001.
G.R. No. 147818—(In RE: Petition for Judicial Review of the Sufficiency of the Factual Basis for the
Proclamation of a State of Rebellion in the National Capital Region; Gregorio Honasan vs. the Honorable
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, the Honorable Chief of the Philippine National Police, Director-
General Leandro Mendoza, and the Honorable Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General
Diomedio Villanueva).

Before the Court is an “Urgent Motion to Resolve Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction” filed by petitioner.
It appearing, however, that the basic petition and the present motion raise substantially the
same allegations, issues and arguments as those presented in  G.R. No. 147780  (Lacson v.
Secretary Perez),  G.R. No. 147781(Santiago v. Reyes),  G.R. No. 149999  (Lumbao v. Secretary
Perez) and G.R. No. 147810 (LDP v. Department of Justice), the Court RESOLVES to dispense
with the Comment it earlier required respondents to file and instead, to DISMISS the petition
and DENY the motion for the same reasons given in the Court’s Resolution in said cases
promulgated today, May 10, 2001, but consistent and congruent with their undertaking in said
four cafces, respondents, and their agents, or any other per-
798

798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED