Balance of Power: Meaning,

Nature, Methods and Relevance

“Whenever the term Balance of Power is used without qualification,
it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed
among nations with approximately equality” — Hans. J.
Morgenthau.

“Unmanaged struggle for power can be a source of war in

international relations.”

Such a realization stands universally recognized and it has led to the

development of certain devices of power management. One such
device has been Balance of Power.

In fact, Balance of Power has been traditionally an important fact of

international relations. It has been guiding the decisions and policies
of nations. Since the 17th century Several scholars regard it as the best
guide for securing the goals of national interest without getting
involved in war. Upto the first half of twentieth century, Balance of
Power was regarded as being the only known modern device of
international management of power.

“Balance of Power is a nearly fundamental law of politics as it is

possible to find.” —Martin Wright

Palmer and Perkins also hold that balance of power principle has been
“a basic principle of international relations.
What is Balance of Power?
It is indeed very difficult to define Balance of Power. It has been
defined it differently by different scholars.

“The trouble with Balance of Power is not that it has no meaning, but
that it has too many meanings.” —Innis L. Claude Jr.

Some writers define it in terms of equilibrium where as others in

terms of “preponderance” or “disequilibrium”. Some define it as a
principle of action while others define it as a policy or system.

Some Popular Definitions of Balance of Power:

(1) “Balance of Power is such a ‘just equilibrium’ in power among the
members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from
becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others.” —Sidney
B. Fay

(2) “Balance of Power is an equilibrium or a certain amount of stability

in power relations that under favourable conditions is produced by an
alliance of states or by other devices.” —George Schwarzenberger

(3) “Balance of Power is such a system in which some nations regulate

their power relations without any interference by any big power. As
such it is a decentralized system in which power and policies remain in
the hands of constituting units.” —Inis Claude

(4) Balance of Power means “the maintenance of such a just

equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should
prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to impose
its will upon the rest.” —Lord Castlereagh

ADVERTISEMENTS:

(5) “Whenever the term Balance of Power is used without

qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is
distributed among nations with approximately equality.” —Hans. J.
Morgenthau

All these definitions clearly reflect that Balance of Power is defined

differently by different scholars. It is very difficult to give or select a
uniformly acceptable definition. This difficultly makes it essential for
us to study the features of Balance of Power.

Nature of Balance of Power

Palmer and Perkins describe several major features of Balance of
Power (BOP):

1. Some Sort of Equilibrium in Power Relations:

The term Balance of Power suggests ‘equilibrium which is subject to
constant, ceaseless change. In short, though it stands for equilibrium,
it also involves some disequilibrium. That is why scholars define it as a
just equilibriums or some sort of equilibrium in power relations.

2. Temporary and Unstable:

ADVERTISEMENTS:

In practice a balance of power always proves to be temporary and

unstable. A particular balance of power survives only for a short time.
3. To be Actively Achieved:
The balance of power has to be achieved by the active intervention of
men. It is not a gift of God. States cannot afford to wait until it
“happens”. They have to secure it through their efforts.

4. Favours Status quo:

Balance of power favours status quo in power positions of major
powers. It seeks to maintain a balance in their power relations.
However, in order to be effective, a foreign policy of balance of power
must be changing and dynamic.

5. The Test of BOP is War:

A real balance of power seldom exists. The only test of a balance is war
and when war breaks out the balance comes to an end. War is a
situation which balance of power seeks to prevent and when it breaks
out, balance power comes to an end.

6. Not a Device of Peace:

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Balance of Power is not a primary device of peace because it admits

war as a means for maintaining balance.

7. Big Powers as Actors of BOP:

In a balance of power system, the big states or powerful states are the
players. The small states or less powerful states are either spectators
or the victims of the game.

8. Multiplicity of States as an Essential Condition:

Balance of Power system operates when there are present a number of
major powers, each of which is determined to maintain a particular
balance or equilibrium in their power relations.

9. National Interest is its Basis:

Balance of Power is a policy that can be adopted by any state. The real
basis that leads to this policy is national interest in a given
environment.

The Golden Age of BOP:

The period of 1815-1914 was the golden age of Balance of Power.
During this period, it was regarded as a nearly fundamental law of
international relations. It broke down due the outbreak of First World
War in 1914. It was tried to be unsuccessfully revived during 1919-
1939. However, the attempt failed and the world had to bear the
Second World War.

The Second World War (1939-45) produced several structural changes

in the international system as well as in the balance of power system.
Under the impact of these changes, the Balance of Power system lost
much of its relevance as a device of power management. It is now lost
much of its relevance in international relations.

Underlying Principal Assumptions and Postulates of

Balance of Power:
The Balance of Power rests upon several fundamental postulates and
assumptions.

(a) Five Principal Assumptions:

(1) Firstly, Balance of Power assumes that states are determined to
protect their vital rights and interests by all means, including war.

(2) Secondly, vital interests of the states are threatened.

(3) The relative power position of states can be measured with a

degree of accuracy.

(4) Balance of Power assumes that “balance” will either deter the
threatening state from launching an attack or permit the victim to
avoid defeat if an attack should occur.

(5) The statesmen can, and they do make foreign policy decisions
intelligently on basis of power considerations.

(b) Major Postulates of Balance of Power:

(1) A nation following balance of power is prepared to change its
alliances or treaties if the circumstances may so demand.

(2) When a nation finds that a particular preponderance of power is

increasing menacingly, it gets prepared to go to war for maintaining
the balance.

(3) Balance of Power postulates that no nation is to be totally

eliminated in war. War is aimed only at the weakening of power of the
violator of the balance. After war a new balance of power system is
achieved. The basic principle of Balance of Power is that excessive
power anywhere in the system is a threat to the existence of others and
that the most effective antidote to power is power.
From the above discussion of the features, assumptions, postulates
and purposes of Balance of Power, it becomes clear that Balance of
power is a device of power management which is used by several
major powers for maintaining a balance in their power relations.

In this process they maintain a sort of equilibrium in their power

relations and do not permit any state to violate the Balance. In case
any state tries to disturb or violate the balance of power, the other
states individually or collectively or is a group can take action,
including war, for weakening the power of the violator as well as for
restoring the balance.

Methods of Balance of Power:

Balance of Power is not automatic; it has to be secured by the states
following this policy. In fact, there are several methods by which states
try to secure and maintain balance of power. “Balance of Power is a
game which is played by actors with the help of several devices.”

Major Methods of Balance of Power:

I. Compensation:
It is also known as territorial compensation. It usually entails the
annexation or division of the territory of the state whose power is
considered dangerous for the balance. In the 17th and 18th centuries
this device was regularly used for maintaining a balance of power
which used to get disturbed by the territorial acquisitions of any
nation.

For examples the three partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795
were based upon the principle of compensation. Austria, Prussia and
Russia agreed to divide Polish territory in such a way that the
distribution of power among them would be approximately the same.

In the latter part of the 19th century, and after each of the two world
wars of the 20th century, territorial compensation was used as a
device for weakening the powers of the states whose actions had led to
a violation of the balance. It was applied by the colonial powers for
justifying their actions aimed at maintaining their imperial
possessions.

II. Alliances and Counter Alliances:

Alliance-making are regarded as a principal method of balance of
power. Alliance is a device by which a combination of nations creates a
favourable balance of power by entering into military or security pacts
aimed at augmenting their own strength vis-a-vis the power of their
opponents. However, an alliance among a group of nations, almost
always, leads to the establishment of a counter alliance by the
opponents. History is full of examples of such alliances and counter
alliances.

Whenever any nation threatened the balance of Europe, other states

formed alliances against it and were usually able to curb the power of
the over- ambitious state. After the Triple Alliance of 1882, a rival
alliance—The Triple Entente, was slowly formed through bilateral
agreements over a period of 17 years (1891-1907).

In post-1945 period, alliances like NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Pact

emerged as devices of Balance of Power. The first two were established
by the USA and the third one was organised by the erstwhile USSR for
strengthening their respective power positions in the era of cold war.

III. Intervention and Non-intervention:

“Intervention is a dictatorial interference in the internal affairs of
another state/states with a view to change or maintain a particular
desired situation which is considered to be harmful or useful to the
competing opponents. Some times during a war between two states no
attempt is made by other states to intervene. This is done for making
the two warring states weaker.

As such intervention and non-intervention are used as devices of

Balance of Power. Mostly it is used by a major power for regaining an
old ally or for picking up a new ally or for imposing a desired situation
on other states. British intervention in Greece, the US intervention is
Grenada, Nicaragua, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, and (Erstwhile) USSR’s
interventions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan
can be quoted as examples of interventions carried out by the big
powers.

IV. Divide and Rule:

The policy of divide and rule has also been a method of balance of
power. It has been a time honored policy of weakening the opponents.
It is resorted to be all such nations who try to make or keep their
competitors weak by keeping them divided or by dividing them.

The French policy towards Germany and the British policy towards the
European continent can be cited as the outstanding examples. The rich
and powerful states now do not refrain from using divide and rule for
controlling the policies of the new states of Asia, Africa and Latin
America.

V. Buffer States or Zones:

Another method of balance of power is to set up a buffer state between
two rivals or opponents. Buffers, observes V.V. Dyke, “are areas which
are weak, which possess considerable strategic importance to two or
more strong powers, Buffer is a small state created or maintained as a
separating state i.e. as a buffer state for keeping two competing states
physically separate each stronger power then tries to bring the buffer
within its sphere of influence but regards it as important, if not vital,
that no other strong power be permitted to do so.

The major function of a buffer is to keep the two powerful nations

apart and thus minimise the chances of clash and hence to help the
maintenance of balance.”

VI. Armaments and Disarmaments:

All nations, particularly very powerful nations, place great emphasis
on armaments as the means for maintaining or securing a favourable
position in power relations in the world. It is also used as a means to
keep away a possible aggressor or enemy.

However, armament race between two competitors or opponents can

lead to a highly dangerous situation which cans accidently cause a war.
In this way armament race can act as a danger to world peace and
security. Consequently, now-a-days, Disarmaments and Arms Control
are regarded as better devices for maintaining and strengthening
world peace and security. A comprehensive disarmament
plan/exercise involving nuclear disarmament can go a long way in
strengthening the balance (peace) that exists in international
relations.

VII. The Holder of the Balance or the Balancer:

The system of balance of power may consist of two scales plus a third
element ‘holder’ of the balance or the balancer. The balancer is a
nation or a group of nations, which remains aloof from the policies of
the two rivals or opponents and plays the role of, “the laughing third
party.”

It poses temptations to both parties to the balance, and each

contending party tries to win over the support of the laughing third
party—the balancer. Normally, the balancer remains away from both
the parties but if any party to the balance becomes unduly weak
resulting into a threat to the balance, the balancer joins it and helps
the restoration of balance.

After that the balancer again becomes aloof. Traditionally Britain used
to play the role of a balancer in Europe. However in the era cold war
no state could perform the role of a balancer in international relations.

The rise of unipolarity after 1991, involving the presence of only one
super power has now further reduced the chances for the emergence of
a balancer in international relations. These are the seven major
methods or devices of Balance of Power. These have been traditionally
used by nations pursuing the policy of a balance of power.

Critical Evaluation of Balance of Power:

Balance of Power has been strongly praised as well as severely
criticized.

Some Scholars observe:

“Balance of Power is nearly a fundamental law of politics as is
possible to find,” —Martin Wright

“Balance of Power is a basic principle of international relations.” —

Palmer and Perkins

As against this several others like Richard Cobden criticize it as unreal,

inadequate and uncertain system. They hold that Balance of Power
admits war in the have balance and makes the nations power hungry.
The supporters of Balance of Power advance a number of arguments in
favour and give example of the 1815-1914 period of history to prove the
effectiveness of balance of power as a device of power management.

Balance of Power: Arguments in Favour:

(1) A Source of Stability in International Relations:
Balance of Power provides stability to international relations. It is a
device of effective power management and peace. During the past 400
years it was successful, at most of the times, in preserving peace.

“Balance of Power has many a times prevented war. War breaks out
only when any state assumes excessive power.” —Fredric Geniz

(2) It suits the real nature of International Relations:

Balance of Power is in tune with the dynamic nature of international
relations. It helps continuous adjustments and readjustments in
relations without any grave risk of war among states.

(3) Ensures Multiplicity of States:

Since Balance of Power postulates the presence of a number of major
international actors (7 or 8 even more), it ensures multiplicity of
nations and their active participation in preserving balance in
international relations.

(4) Guarantees the Freedom of Small States:

Balance of Power ensures the preservation of small and weak states.
Its rule that no nation is to be completely eliminated, favors the
continued existence of all states. Each state feels secure about its
security in the balance of power system.

(5) Balance of Power Discourages War:

Balance of Power discourages war because each state knows that any
attempt to become unduly powerful shall invoke an action, even war,
by all other states and hence, it keeps its ambitions under control.

(6) A Source of Peace in International Relations:

Finally, Balance of Power is always a source of peace and order in
international relations. It supports status quo in relations. Between
1815-1914 it successfully prevented war.

Balance of Power: Arguments Against:

(1) Balance of Power cannot ensure Peace:
Balance of Power does not necessarily bring peace. Even during its
golden days, it failed to prevent the domination of small states by the
big states. It was not successful in preserving the security of small
states. In fact, in the past, wars have been fought in the name of
preservation of Balance of Power.

The three periods of stability—one starting from 1648, the second

from 1815 and the third from Treaty of Versailles (1918), were
preceded by continuous warfare and by the wholesale elimination of
small states starting with the destruction of Poland, and followed by a
large number of isolated acts of a similar nature. The tragedy is that all
these acts were accomplished in the name of balance of power.
Balance of Power cannot really secure peace and freedom of the
nations.

(2) States are not Static Units:

Each state always tries to secure more and more national power. It
does not really belong to any balance of power system. Another point
that must be raised about the balance of power is that nations are not
static units.

They increase their power through military aggressions, seizure of

territory and alliances. They can change their power from within by
improving social organisation, by industrializing and by mobilizing
internal resources. So the traditional mechanism of the balance of
power is not the only cause responsible for an increase of power.
(3) Preponderance of One State in the world can also secure
Peace:
A preponderance of power in the hands of one state or group of states
does not necessarily threaten world peace or the independence of any
nation. The unipolarism resulting from the collapse of one super
power (USSR) and the continued presence of the other super power
(USA) has not in any way disturbed international peace and security
or power balance. In contemporary times the preponderance of one
state is a reality and yet there is peace and peaceful coexistence.

(4) Narrow Basis:

The concept of Balance of Power is based upon a narrow view of
international relations. It regards power-relations as the whole of
international relations. It gives near total importance to preservation
of self and national-interest as the motives of all state actions. It fails
to give proper weight age to other ends—social, economic, cultural and
moral, that provide strong motives to international relations.

(5) A Mechanical view of Peace:

Balance of Power wrongly takes a mechanistic view of world peace as a
situation of balance or equilibrium in power relations. Peace does not
depend upon balance in power relations. It really depends upon
international consciousness and morality.

(6) Equality of a number of States is a Myth:

Balance of Power presupposes the existence of a number of equally
powerful states. In practice no two states have or can have equal
power. It involves the conception of equilibrium which is in fact
disequilibrium and is subject to continuous change.

(7) Nations are not free to break Alliances:

The theory of the balance of power can also be criticized on the ground
that it wrongly assumes that nations are free to make or break
alliances as and when they may desire for the main consideration of
balance of power.

(8) Uncertainty of Balance of Power:

Morgenthau criticizes Balance of Power for its uncertainty. Balance of
Power is uncertain because its operation depends upon an evaluation
of power of various nations. In practice it is not possible to have an
absolutely correct evaluation of power of a state.

(9) Balance of Power is Unreal:

Since the evaluation of the national power of a nation is always
uncertain, no nation can afford dependence upon the balance of
power. Each nation always keeps a secret about its power. Since all
nations keep safe margins, the balance of power at a particular time is
always unreal.

(10) Inadequacy of Balance of Power:

Balance of Power in itself is an inadequate device of international
peace and security. It even accepts war as a means for maintaining a
balance. Fear cannot be a real basis of international relations.

(11) Balance of Power has now lost its Relevance:

Finally, the critics argue that now Balance of Power it is not a relevant
principle of international relations. The big changes in the
international system as well as in the balance of power system have
made it almost an obsolete system. On the basis of above arguments,
the critics of Balance of Power advocate its total rejection.

Undoubtedly, in contemporary times the balance of power has lost its

utility and much of its importance due to changes in the international
system. However it cannot be denied that it continues to be an
important factor in the regional power relations among the states of a
region. It is used by nations for assessing the nature of power relations
at the regional level.

Role and Relevance of Balance of Power in

International Relations:
“As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of
international society, balance of power policies will be followed in
practice, and in all probability, they will continue to operate, even if
effective supranational groupings on a regional or world level are
formed” —Palmer and Perkins.

In contemporary times, Balance of Power has lost much of its utility

due to several changes in the international relations. The following
changes in the international relations as well as in the traditional
balance of power system have adversely affected the role and relevance
of Balance of Power as a device of power management in International
politics.
(1) End of the era of European Domination and the dawn of
era of Global Politics:
The structure of international politics has undergone a radical change
from the classical period. From a narrow European dominated
international system it has come to be a truly global system in which
Asian, African and Latin American states enjoy a new and added
importance. Today Europe is no longer the centre of world politics.
European politics constitutes only one small segment of international
politics. This changes has considerably reduced the operation ability of
balance of power.

(2) Changes in Psychological Environment:

The characteristic moral and intellectual consensus that characterised
European nations during the classical period of Balance of Power
(1815-1914) has ceased to exist. Each major power now seeks to
protect its interests as universal interests and hence tries to impose
these upon others. The use of propaganda and ideology as instruments
of national policy has increased manifold. This development has
further checked the importance of balance of power.

(3) Rise of Propaganda, Psychological and Political Warfare

as instruments of National Policy:
Previously, diplomacy and war used to be the chief means of
conducting foreign policies. The decline of diplomacy, rise of new
diplomacy and the new fear of war as a means, have brought into
operation two new devices- Propaganda and Political warfare, as the
instruments of national policy. These have in turn reduced the
popularity and role of balance of power principle in international
relations.

(4) Emergence of Ideology as a Factor of International

Relations:
The new importance of ideology and other less tangible but,
nevertheless, important elements of national power have further
created unfavorable conditions for the operation of balance of power.

(5) Reduction in the Number of Major Powers:

The most obvious structural change that has seriously limited the role
of balance of power has been the numerical reduction of the players of
power-politics game. For its operation, Balance of Power needs the
presence of a number of major power actors. The presence of two
superpowers during 1945-91 discouraged the operation of balance of
power and now there is present only one super power in the world.

(6) The Bipolarity of Cold War period and the new era of
Unipolarity:
The bipolarity (presence of two super powers and their blocs) that
emerged in the cold war period reduced the flexibility of the
international system. It reduced the chances of balance of power
whose working requires the existence of flexibility in power relations,
alliances and treaties. Presently unipolarity characterizes the
international system.

(7) The End of the Era of Colonialism and Imperialism:

Another big change in the structure of balance of power has been the
disappearance of imperialism and colonialism: It has limited the scope
for the exercise of power by the European powers, who in the past
always worked as the key players of the principle Balance of Power.

(8) Disappearance of the “Balancer”:

The rise of two super powers the disappearance of the “holder of
balance” or the “balancer” considerably reduced the chances of
balance of power politics during 1945-91. Traditionally, Britain used to
play such a role in Europe. The sharp and big decline in the power of
Britain in the post-war period compelled it to abandon its role of
balancer between the two super powers. No other nation or even a
group of nations was successful in acting as a balancer between the
USA and the (erstwhile) USSR. The absence of a balancer further
reduced the role of balance of power in post-war international
relations.

(9) Change of Concept of War into Total War:

The emergence of nuclear weapons and other revolutionary
developments in war technology has produced a big in change the
nature of war. The replacement of war by Total War has made war the
most dreaded situation in international relations. This has forced
nations to reject war as an instrument of balance of power which rests
upon the assumption that nations can even go to war for preserving or
restoring the balance.

(10) The Emergence of Global Actors:

The rise of the United Nations and several other international and
regional actors in international relations has given a new looked to the
international relations of our times. The presence of the UN has made
a big change in the structure and functioning of the international
system. With a provision for collective security of international peace
and security, the United Nations constitutes a better source of peace.
Due to all these changes in international relations, Balance of Power
has come to suffer a big decline. It has definitely lost much of its
relevance.

In contemporary times, Balance of Power has ceased to be a fully

relevant and credible principle of international relations. However, it
still retains a presence in international relations, more particularly, in
the sphere of regional relations among states.

Some scholars observe:

“The idea of balance of power is still the central theoretical concept in
international relation.” —Snyder

“The Structural changes in international politics of post-war period

have not greatly affected the principle of Balance of Power. It still
holds good in respect of regional relations among nations.” —Arnold
Wolfers

Although Balance of Power has lost must of its relevance as a global

level device of power management, it is still being used by the states
of a region to maintain a balance in their power positions.

Several scholars admit its continued presence:

“As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of
international society, balance of power policies will be followed in
practice, and in all probability, they will continue to operate, even if
effective supranational groupings on a regional or world level are
formed.” —Palmer and Perkins

Indeed the concept of Balance of Power is bound to continue so long

as the struggle for power among nations continues to characterize
international relations. Even the staunch critics of Balance of Power
like, Martin Wright and Friendrich admit that Balance of Power is still
a basic element in international relations. Balance of power is neither
totally obsolete nor dead. Its role, however, has changed from a global
device to a regional device of power management.

A Balance of power system can functions effectively in two different ways:

1. Multiple states can form a balance of power when alliances are fluid—that is,
when they are easily formed or broken on the basis of expediency, regardless of
values, religion, history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a
balancer role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest.
Britain played this role in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly in its
relations with France, Russia, and Germany.

2. Two states can balance against each other by matching their increases in military
capability. In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and United States both expanded
their nuclear arsenals to balance against each other.

One weakness of the balance of power concept is the difficulty of measuring

power. Ultimately a state's power derives from the size of its land mass,
population, and its level of technology. But this potential power—measured
roughly by a state's gross domestic product (GDP)—translates imperfectly into
military capability. The effective use of military force depends on such elements as
leadership, morale, geography, and luck. Furthermore, leaders' misperceptions can
seriously distort the calculation of power. During the Vietnam War (1959-1975),
for example, U.S. presidents consistently underestimated the strength of the
Vietnamese Communists because by conventional measures of power they were
much weaker than the United States.

Balance of Power in Ancient Times

Historical examples of power balancing are found throughout history in various

regions of the world, leading some scholars to characterize balance of power as a
universal and timeless principle. During the Period of the Warring States in China
(403-221 BC), the development of large, cohesive states accompanied the creation
of irrigation systems, bureaucracies, and large armies equipped with iron weapons.
These Chinese states pursued power through a constantly shifting network of
alliances.

In ancient Greece during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), the rising power of
Athens triggered the formation of a coalition of city-states that felt threatened by
Athenian power. The alliance, led by Sparta, succeeded in defeating Athens and
restoring a balance of power among Greek cities.

In the 17th century the Habsburg dynasty, which ruled Austria and Spain,
threatened to dominate Europe. During the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), a
coalition that included Sweden, England, France, and The Netherlands defeated the
rulers of the Habsburg Empire.

Early in the 19th century, french emperor Napoleon I repeatedly made efforts to
conquer large areas of Europe. A broad coalition of European states—including
Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—defeated France in a series of major battles
that climaxed with Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

The classical European balance of power system emerged thereafter in an alliance

known as the Concert of Europe, organized in 1815 by Austrian statesman
Klemens von Metternich. This loose alliance between Britain, Russia, Austria,
Prussia, and France ensured that a handful of great powers would coexist, with
none able to dominate the others. Under this system, and with Britain playing a
balancer role, peace largely prevailed in Europe during the 19th century. During
World War II, Germany's rising power, aggressive conquests, and alliance with
Italy and Japan triggered yet another coalition of opposing states—notably the
capitalist democracies of Britain and the United States, and the Communist Soviet
Union.

Balance of Power and Cold War

Balance of power so perfectly described the polarity of the Cold War that it
became integral to, indeed practically synonymous with, the concept of the East-
West order. Although the image was so familiar as to be almost transparent, a great
deal of political presumption was locked within its crystalline structure. East and
West existed, and there was a "balance" between them that presumably somehow
"weighed" a quality called power, possessed by the enemies, each side, in the way
material objects possess mass. This enemy, real enough, but also postulated by the
balance of power-without an enemy, what would be balanced?-served to solidify
political alliance, and hence political identity, on both sides. Throughout the Cold
War, divisions among states party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) or the Warsaw Pact, as well as divisions within each state, were obscured
by the need to maintain a common front against the enemy.

In the context of the balance of power, the discipline of strategic studies turned on
a single inquiry: to what extent did an event, either actual or possible, enlarge the
military potential of one side or the other? This inquiry often raised nice issues of
judgment. For example, both the United States and the Soviet Union long
maintained inefficient capacity for the manufacture of steel in order to serve
anticipated wartime needs. Within the contours of the strategic argument, the
precise relationship between the capacity to manufacture steel and military fitness
was debatable, but the stakes and the terms of the argument were clear . Equally
clear was what was not at issue in the security debate, viz. broader questions of
political conduct. Political questions, such as how to pay for the subsidy, were not
unrelated, but were considered analytically separable inquiries. Just as participants
in a sport rarely consider the appropriateness of the rules that inform their game,
the balance of power so well defined strategic questions that larger questions went
unasked.

Today, a strategic study is a far trickier business. The East-West order, which
defined both the actors and the objectives, no longer exists. In the words of Polish
politician Bronislaw Geremek, we are confronted by dangers, not enemies. There
is no balance of power with danger, no conflict with danger. Danger may be
assessed. But without a hard-edged notion of conflict to provide a context in which
probability can be calculated, danger assessment is a hazy enterprise. Suppose, for
plausible example, that the European Union is somehow at risk from unrest in
Southern Europe. Should the Union attempt to integrate its forces to defend itself
against Southern Europe? Should a new wall be built? Or should the Union attempt
to integrate Southern Europe into its defense structure, either through NATO or the
Western European Union, in the hopes of minimizing the risk of violent disorder?
How much of Europe (what is Europe?) should be included in this process of
integration? Should this process be limited to the military sector, or should it
include the economy? How complete, and how swift, is this effort to be? And so
forth.

Strategy that would confront such threats requires a view of politics considerably
more nuanced than polarity; policy cannot be determined by argument that one
"side" enjoys some military advantage over the other. Strategic thinking now
entails politics, economics, and history, in addition to its traditional focus on
military capability, because a strategic world where security is threatened by
dangers rather than enemies is complex eeks stability more avidly than it seeks
some ill-defined "advantage." Stability is hardly a new concern; what is new is that
stability has become virtually the only concern. So, for example, it recently
appeared to make strategic sense to cut the size of our military, in part because the
federal deficit was thought to hamper national competitiveness and economic
unrest was seen as a greater threat to our security than invasion.

Similarly, it makes strategic sense for Western European states to give money to
help the young governments of Central and Southern Europe stabilize their
economies, not because those governments plan to invade, but because their failure
may lead to massive immigration or civil war. Rather than the purchase of military
hardware, security concerns now impel the provision of loan guarantees. Strategy
used to mean the attainment of military superiority, or at least deterrence; it now
means the pursuit of social stability. Politics writ large has absorbed strategic
studies.

The vague character of threats to social security means that when we cannot
quarantine social instability (as we frequently do with those chaotic Africans),
intervention is likely. In a dangerous world, security is obtained by proactive
measures designed to shore up the social order. In contrast, in the traditional world
of enemies, security is the capability to respond to the threat posed by the enemy.
(Only rarely has security been thought best obtained by preemptive attack.) So we
long preserved the capacity to respond to Soviet aggression with nuclear force, if
necessary. The very language of the clichà is reactive. Today, the United States is
criticized not for its lack of readiness, but for not taking enough action within the
former Soviet Union to help ensure that the weapons of mass destruction remain in
sane hands. In this light, the invasion of Panama and the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement may be understood as attempts to establish a
viable social order in situations that present profound threats to our security, our
lust for drugs and the weaknesses peculiar to a highly technological economy.

If security is now better procured than defended, then early intervention will often
be more effective and cheaper than late intervention. Contemporary strategic
thinking inclines to the adage "a stitch in time saves nine." Diffuse threats to
security should be addressed before they have time to gain focus and momentum.
The task for contemporary strategic thinking is therefore the avoidance, rather than
the development, of the logic of war. For example, it is has for some time been
argued that more decisive action by the European Community (and then the
European Union) and the United Nations at the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia
might have prevented at least some of the carnage and associated risks. War, even
civil war, has its own awful logic, and the various factions in what was Yugoslavia
fought within that logic, to regain territory lost by military action, to avenge loved
ones, and so bloody on, in the gyre of public and private violence bemoaned since
the Oresteia. Had the logic of violence not been established, Yugoslavia might be
merely politically fractious, like Belgium or even what was Czechoslovakia. The
transformation of strategy amounts to an imperative to intervene, militarily if
necessary, in the service of order.

Liberal Realism and Balance of Power

Liberal realism's concern with the balance of power necessitates that liberal states
must be willing to use power and force to support the balance of power against
threats hostile to self-interest and liberal values. The Reagan administration
believed that it was necessary to counter the Soviet threat in order to purge the
"intense emotional resistance against the use of U.S. power for any purpose"
created by the American experience in Vietnam. Again, the Reagan
administration's perspective included prudence and liberal conviction. Kirkpatrick
suggested that "[w]hat is called the conservative revival is just this: the return of
American confidence in our values, and in our capacities, and of American
determination to protect ourselves--from war and defeat." Kirkpatrick also
emphasized the broader liberal conviction in the Reagan administration's
willingness to use American power.

The restoration of the conviction that American power is necessary for the survival
of liberal democracy in the modern world is the most important development in
U.S. foreign policy in the past decade. It is the event which marks the end of the
Vietnam era, when certainty about the link between American power and the
survival of liberal democratic societies was lost.

The Reagan administration's sensitivity to the prudential and liberal aspects of the
balance of power and its willingness to use American power to confront threats to
self-interest and liberal values illustrate well the liberal realist tradition's
perspective on the balance of power.

Balance of Power Today

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as the world's sole
superpower. Balance of power theory suggests that without the Soviet threat the
United States, as the dominant world power, will face difficulties in its relations
with such states as China and the European powers. For example, key countries
such as China, Russia, France, and Germany all opposed the United States invasion
of Iraq in 2003 in diplomatic arenas such as the United Nations. Yet this opposition
did not stop the United States from acting, exposing the significant gap in military
capability that now exists between the United States and the rest of the world.
Small states that fear the United States are no longer able to join a
counterbalancing coalition to protect their security. Instead, many are developing
nuclear weapons in an attempt to dramatically expand their military capability. For
example, North Korea claimed in 2003 that it was developing nuclear weapons to
balance against U.S. power.

The changing nature of power in the contemporary international system further

complicates the operation of the global balance of power. Globalization, the
Internet, weapons of mass destruction, and other technological developments have
made it possible for small states and even non state groups to acquire significant
power. These factors also dilute the relative importance of military power. For
example, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
assembled a broad coalition to invade Afghanistan, using military force to topple
the Taliban government and end the Taliban's support for al-Qaeda terrorists. This
application of military power did not provoke a balancing coalition of other states,
but it also did not end the terrorist threat to the United States. In the future, the
balance of power may continue to operate among states engaged in prolonged
disputes, but it is less applicable to conflicts involving terrorists and other non state
groups.

Example;
For example, the United States followed a containment policy towards the
Soviet Union after World War II by building military alliances and bases
throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Conclusion
The balance of power has been a central concept in the theory and practice of
international relations for the past five hundred years. It has also played a key role
in some of the most important attempts to develop a theory of international politics
in the contemporary study of international relations. Another basis for the realist
theory is the idea of a balance of power and the anarchic nature of the global
system as there is no effective global government and the world system is anomic
(without rules). This ties in well with the idea of global relations being one of self
help and each state striving to promote its own interests at the expense of others. In
short, realists see the global system as one of self help. The idea of the balance of
power is put in place to explain the situation where states will ally themselves to
prevent the hegemony of one state over all others. Balance of Power, theory and
policy of international relations that asserts that the most effective check on the
power of a state is the power of other states.