* CHAPTER 5*

1. Whether or not the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E.
0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-
“ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL OR UNLESS OTHERWISE
Alai.
RULED BY THE COURT”

2. Whether or not the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM VS. FELIPE G. PACQUING
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

HELD:
R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to
FACTS
franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to
issue license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai-Alai from local
repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of
governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local
governments without exceptions.
The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the
Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI.

“IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED

Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments
THAT THE LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO PREVAIL”
to grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling.

KAREN SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21,
Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes
1997)
and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.

FACTS
In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and
invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the Deputy
forms of gambling issued by local governments.
Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the
American’s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of
Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
ISSUE:
attachment, garnishment or any other process of any court.
 One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold.
Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the
policy. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been
exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as
amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. ISSUE:

HELD: 1. Whether or not there was a valid notice.

Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of
foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis, where foreign 2. Whether or not Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.
investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA
6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the HELD:
Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the
innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined, stating Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the
Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the
need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written
“A LAW SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED SO AS TO CAUSE AN INJUSTICE” notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet
begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified
CARLOS & CASIMIRA ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND TECLE PADUA of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) notice in writing was given to them.

FACTS “IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS REPEAL, A SUBSEQUENT LAW CANNOT BE CONSTRUED
AS REPEALING A PRIOR LAW UNLESS AN IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCY AND
Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of REPUGNANCY EXISTS IN THE TERMS OF THE NEW AND OLD LAWS”
their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such
agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the ACHILLES BERCES VS. SEC. TEOFISTO GUINGONA JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. 112099 (February 21,
portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi- 1995)
concrete house.
FACTS
 FACTS
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi, Albay for 1) abuse
of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its
convicted, and accordingly, suspended in both cases. Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), as amended.
Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution
under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
The Office of the President stayed execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the
18. According to Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed
provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160.

ISSUE:

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18. 1. Whether or not petitioner can claim from the COA.

HELD: 2. Whether or not Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because it failed to identify HELD:
or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted
repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. In the absence of an express repeal, a on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under
inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. There is none in this case. The first implied repeal, and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court
sentence of Sec. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the
or executory.” It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term “shall” may Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation
be read mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC ,
it is found. whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government.”
ANTONIO A. MECANO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. AND COURT Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960,
OF TAX APPEALS whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would
G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989) have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged.

FACTS It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these
truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable
on August 5, 1964. consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead
to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. Petitioner demanded payment of the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964.
“PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES WERE NEVER INTENDED BY A
On August 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It LEGISLATIVE MEASURE”
protested the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due,
claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference CESARIO URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS
between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment.
G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, FACTS
994 with interest.
2. Whether or not Respondent is entitled to a refund. Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman.
He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman
HELD: because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters.
The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 representing the excess
payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the sum belonged to At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez.”
Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount, which arises from Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. He
the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142.
obligation to reimburse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to
be remedied by C.A. No. 142
 It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart its enactments such a meaning as will
HELD: render them operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.
Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court may consider the spirit of the statute PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY
where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a
penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative intention
so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
PRESUMPTION
PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible
and just law, and one should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question.
“SUBTITLE OF THE STATUTE AS INTRINSIC AID IN DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT”
PRESUMPTION AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and PEDROSA AND LORNA PEDROSA
unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.
G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE
FACTS
Interpret and apply the law independently of, but in consonance with, justice.
On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to
amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the
constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to Congress and no such law has been passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative:
have enacted conflicting statutes. initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on
1987 Constitution. the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was
registered under their name.
HELD:
No. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him.
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply Applying P.D. 957 “ The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development,
reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the
initiative on national and local laws. amortizations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
*CHAPTER 6*
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.

“THE INTENT OF THE LAW AS CULLED FROM ITS PREAMBLE AND FROM THE SITUATION,
HELD:
CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS IT SOUGHT TO REMEDY, MUST BE ENFORCED”
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is
to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment
FLORENCIO EUGENIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON AND PROSPERO
in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be
PALMIANO
plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”

G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)

FACTS INTRINSIC AIDS

Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Those aids within the statute. Resorted only if there is ambiguity in the statute.

SAMPLE OF INTRINSIC AIDS

 HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394
Title seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is
Preamble taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
Context or Body of the Statute particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
Chapter & Section headings expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
Punctuation any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize
Interpretation Clause with the pre-existing body of laws.

“PREAMBLE USED AS A GUIDE IN DETREMINING THE INTENT OF THE LAWMAKER” – PEOPLE Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided,
VS. ECHAVEZ (Chapter 4) unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one
amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.
“IT IS A WELL-ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WHERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS
MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS THOSE Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and
EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE, history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts
SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL which affect their derivation, validity and operation. The Court examined the six statuettes
AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE” repealed by RA 1394.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC.

*CHAPTER 7*
G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975)

“CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON A STATUTE BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

FACTS
CHARGED WITH IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTES
SHOULD BE GIVEN CONTROLLING WEIGHT< UNLESS SUCH INTERPRETATION IS CLEARLY
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the
ERRONEOUS”
customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by
Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) VS. BUREAU OF LABOR
include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394.
RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)
ISSUE: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by
RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax
FACTS
Law.
Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification
elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills, FACTS
Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows:
NAFLU 429 Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the
PAFLU 414 margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central
Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.
Abstained 4 However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon
Total Ballots 864 the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord
(Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.) with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609.

Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board …
Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII.
Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for
case at bar. the exclusive use of end-users.”

ISSUE: Whether r not “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing margin fee.
the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of
the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product
as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate
HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of
ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by
Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not
known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. exempt from the imposition of the margin fee.

“INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON THE FLOOR DO NOT KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. MORATO
NECESSARILY REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT”
G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. INC., VS. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ
FACTS
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)
Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. Judicial construction
The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case.

Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and
other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the
clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of
Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in
operating an on-line lottery.

HELD: No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the
phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the
lawmaking authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is
from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes, races, lotteries and other similar
activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration, association or joint venture”
with others or “by itself.”

EXTRINSIC AIDS

Existing aids from outside sources. Resorted after exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and
still there remain some ambiguity in the statute.

SAMPLE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS

History of the enactment of statutes

Opinions and rulings of government officials
Actual proceedings of the legislative body
Reports and recommendations of legislative committees
Public policy