Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs.

Civil Aeronautics Board and Grand International Airways

Facts:
A Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) was applied by the private respondent Grand
International Airways. This application was opposed by petitioner PAL, a holder
of a legislative franchise to operate air transport services alleging that that the
CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s application until GrandAir has first
obtained a franchise to operate from Congress. Respondent, on the other hand,
posits that a legislative franchise is no longer a requirement for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating
Permit, following the Court’s pronouncements in various jurisprudential cases.

Issue:
WoN the CAB has jurisdiction to hear the application of GIA even without
obtaining the franchise to operate from the Congress?

Ruling:
Yes, the CAB has jurisdiction to hear the application of GIA even without
obtaining the franchise to operate from the Congress.
No law indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable
requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator.
Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress’ control over any
franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean that
the Congress has the exclusive authority to issue the same.
In this case, the power to issue permits for the operation of domestic
transport services was given by the Congress to the CAB. The Congress
delegated to the said body the authority to determine the capability and
competence of a prospective domestic air transport operator to engage in such
venture.
 Cosmos Bottling Corporation vs. Pablo Nagrama, Jr.
G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008

Facts:
The petitioner initially employed respondent Nagrama as a maintenance
mechanic. He was elected by the local union as chief shop steward and was designated
as wastewater treatment operator. Clean Flow Philippines Inc. was hired by the
petitioner to conduct training seminars to acquaint petitioner’s personnel on the
operations of the water treatment plant. Respondent failed to attend the first two days of
the seminar and was charged of abandonment of duty and gross insubordination by his
immediate supervisor. He was then required to submit his written explanation.
Hecontendedthat he had to attend to an administrative hearing for
fellowunionistswhichwereheld atSantiago, Isabela;that before he went, he first secured
permission from the plant controller. He averred that as a union official,he is obligated to
attend to the problems of his fellow union members. Respondent was terminated from
service. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter contending that he was
illegally dismissed and that petitioner had committed unfair labor practices. The Labor
Arbiter held in favor of the petitioner. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC.

Issue:
Did the CA violate the doctrine of conclusive finality?

Ruling:
No, the CA did not violate the doctrine of conclusive finality.
The doctrine of conclusive finality is defined as the comity that courts
extend to the executive branch and the recognition of the expertise of
administrative agencies in dealing with particular questions of fact.
In this case, appellate courts may still review the factual findings of
administrative agencies. The CA may resolve factual issues by express mandate
of law. The CA shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised
in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. Despite
the respect given by the appellate courts to administrative findings of fact, the CA
is empowered to resolve factual issues. A mere doctrine espousing comity
cannot overcome the statutory mandate of the CA to resolve factual issues.
Moreover, neither the doctrine of conclusive finality nor the doctrine of great
respect and finality has direct application to the case at bar. The CA did not
simply review the decision of the NLRC. The CA took cognizance of a special
civil action of certiorari. Verily, the CA did not per se review the facts found or the
law applied by the NLRC. The CA reviewed the discretion of the NLRC.
 Smart vs. NTC
G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003

Facts:
NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services on June 16, 2000. On
August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone
service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally
eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by
another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, addressed to all public
telecommunications entities. On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed against the
NTC an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-
2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 at
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77. Petitioner alleged that the
NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the
prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is
oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in
the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be
declared null and void ab initio. The RTC issued a TRO enjoining the NTC from
implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000. Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

Issue:
WoN the CA errred in holding that the private respondents failed to
exhaust an available administrative remedy.

Ruling:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers.The rules and regulations should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.
It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order
for such rule or regulation to be valid. The administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, wherethe power to act in such manner is incidental
to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going
to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Even assuming that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records
reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Petitioners were able
to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their
respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed
schemes for the billing circular.After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive
letters dated July 3, 2000 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and
reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear
denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek
judicial relief.