Osmena Vs Pendatun

9/1/2018 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 109
[No. L-17144. October 28, 1960]
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K.

PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L.
PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES,
JOSE J. ROY, FAUSTO DU
864
864 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Osmeña, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et al.
GENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT,

PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S.
ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B.
FERNANDEZ, ,and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their
capacity as 'members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59, respondents.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS;

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS, NOT
ABSOLUTE.—While parliamentary immunity guarantees
the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall, however, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For
unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be
censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled
by the votes of their colleagues.
2. ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; FAILURE TO

CONFORM TO RULES, EFFECT OF.—Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body when the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165957f1e54737e288e003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/26
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular

measure.
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE

DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR OF MEMBERS;
SEPARATION OF POWERS.—The House of
Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour. The courts will not assume a jurisdiction in
any case which will amount to an interference by the
judicial department with the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF

EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTES DISORDERLY
BEHAVIOUR.—The House of Representatives of the
United States has taken the position that personal attacks
upon the Chief Executive constitutes unparliamentary
conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it
took action against offenders, even after other business
had been considered.
5. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS

MEMBERS.—While under the Jones Law, the Senate had
no power to suspend appointive member (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the
Constitution did not impair.
865
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 865

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Declaratory

relief and/or certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
A. Padilla, F. A. Rodrigo and T. T. Quiazon, Jr., for
petitioner.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. B. Fernandez, E. S. Baltao and Tecla
San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,

submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun

and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members 01 the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such
Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that
said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his
charges against the President, with the admonition that if
he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59,
the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960, the Honorable Sergio

Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the
Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this
Chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A
Message to Garcia;'
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman
from the Second District of Cebu stated the following:
* * * * * * *
"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports

that under your unpopular administration the free things they
used to
866

get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They
say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the
gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be
bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a
handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would
reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is
dispensing. * * *
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second
District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon
the dignity and prestige of the Office of the President, which is
the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people,
and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; * * *
Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special
committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be,
and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23,
1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., to appear before it to substantiate his
charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum
to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of
pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the
House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines."
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged:

first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct;
and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII,
sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other
business has intervened after the Member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of
petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the
majority decided to hear the matter further, and required
respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance
867
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 867

with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the

imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the
special committee continued to perform its task, and after
giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself,
submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and
acting on such report, the House approved on the same day
—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him
from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the
exception of Congressmen De 1
Pio, Abeleda, San Andres
Ziga, Fernandez and Baltao) filed their answer, challenged
the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,

defended the power of Congress to discipline its members
with suspension, upheld House Resolution No. 175 and
then invited attention to the fact that Congress having
ended its session on July 18,1960, the Committee—whose
members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to
exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a
privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President which
are quoted in Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to
produce before the House Committee created for the
purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There
is also no question that for having made the imputations
and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he
was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a
period of fifteen months, for serious diorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
"WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue

of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious diorderly
behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact,
scurrilous, malicious, reckless and
______________
1 These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the views of petitioner.
868

irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in

his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they
affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of
Representatives: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives, That
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and * * *."
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition

that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought
not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no
disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and
(3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined
therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it

had taken up other business before approving House
Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4)
that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that
"for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is
a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not
be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner
himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a f undamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the
869
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 869

English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and

encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom 2
the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." Such
immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliament as construed and applied by the Congress of the
United States. Its extent and application remain no longer
in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United
States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New
York was censured for using the following language on the

floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most
infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous
Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798–799). Two
other congressmen were censured for employing insulting
words during debate. (2 Hinds Precedents, 799–801). In one
case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a
statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea.
(3 Hinds' Precedents 123–124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or
of Congress
3
have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison , suspended, even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attests
_______________
2 Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.

3 Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189; Hiss vs. Barlett & Gray. 468,
63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.
870

to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice

and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take
disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one
instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in
April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of
Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices
of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House
may no longer take action against me, he argues, because
after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it
had taken up other business. Respondents answer that
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the
House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the
House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary
practice may be done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may
suspend the operation of its Rules, it may not, however,
affect past acts or renew its right to take action which had
already lapsed. 4
The situation might thus be compared to laws
extending the period of limitation of actions and making
them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme
Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against
the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U.
S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, courts
have declared that "the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation modification or waiver at
______________
4 Rules Rules of the House have not the f orce of law, but they are
merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient
conduct of their own proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870)
871
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 871

5
the pleasure of the body adopting them." And it has been
said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite6 number of members have agreed
to a particular measure."
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it

is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative
bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure,
adopted for the orderly conduct of business, and as security
against hasty action." (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott,
104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany,
23 Wend. [N.Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass.
220, 230. 81 N. E. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109;
City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs.
Whitson, 69 lowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham
Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. 159, Ann. Cas.
1913B, 802.) [Taken' from the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville, 78 South Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of

Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker,
for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the
House approved the resolution, despite the argument that
other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799–800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking
the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct f or
which Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro
and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction
______________
5 67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870.

6 South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649; 151 S. W. 515.
872

upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on

factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one
thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The
theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
"SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature.—The principle

is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction
in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution. * * *
"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the
courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the state Senate is given the power to

expel a member, the courts will not review its action or revise
even a most arbitrary or unfair decision" (11 Am. Jur., Const.
Law, sec. 200, p. 902.) [Italics Ours.]
The above statement of American law merely

7
abridged the
landmark case of Clifford vs. French. In 1905, several
senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus
proceedings to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate
had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense,
besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme
Court of California declined to interfere, explaining in
orthodox juristic language:
_______________
7 146 Cal. 604; 69 L, R. A. 556.
873
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 873

"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no

power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
Iegislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department
by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even
in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of
the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause
which it may deem sufficient- In Hiss vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63
Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that
this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary
to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary
to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and
that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the
exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '* * * There is
no provision authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or
forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member.
These powers are functions of the legislative department and
therefore, in the exercise of the power thus committed to it, the
senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the
legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power,
would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do."
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines

which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling
this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as
well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as
applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power;
the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as
subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible
course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that
sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of
constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound
to state that in a conscientious survey of governing
principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House
of Representatives of the United States taking the position
on at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or
874

8
breach of order. And in several instances, it took action
against offenders,
9
even after other business had been
considered.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's
power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924,
Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of the Senate,
suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of that Body for certain phrases
the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The
Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement,
challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this
Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had
no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner,
it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to
adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the
Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to
remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino.
The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may
punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member
(sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it must be observed, empowered the
Governor General to appoint "without consent of the
Senate and without restriction as to residence senators * *
* who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth

District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter
dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any
means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark
should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive
______________
8 Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497 ) William Willet, Jr. of New

York); par. 2498 (Louis T. McFadden of Pensylvania).
9 Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of Representatives by
Louis Deschler (1955) p. 382.
875
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 875

senator who was then the affected party and who was by
the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the
Twelfth District and maybe the views of the Government of
the United States or of the Governor-General, who had
appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the
Legislature had only10
those powers which were granted to it
by the Jones Law ; whereas now the Congress has the full
legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation,
except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in
the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that
the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then
exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas
now, as we find, the Congress
11
has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not
impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine
Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
"The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the
Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by
the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation
of the district's representation can not be more weighty in
the matter of suspension than in the case of imprison-
_______________
10 The Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of the Philippines
as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them, without
in the meantime impairing the rights of sovereignty by the people of the
United States." (Preamble).
11 Apart from the view that power to remove includes the power to
suspend as an incident. (Burnap vs. U. S. 252, U. S. 512, 64 L. Ed. 693,
695.) This view is distinguishable from Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil., 175.
(See Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N. E. 120) But we need not explain this now.
Enough to rely on congressional inherent power.
876

ment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power

12
in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The
petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from
acting in pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because
no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee
performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter
approved the suspension order. The House has closed its
session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should 13
be dismissed for
having become moot or academic. Of course, there is
nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to
include all members of the House as respondents, ask for
reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause.
Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will
be a pronouncement
14
of lack of jurisdiction,
15
as in Vera vs.
Avelino and Alejandrino vs. Quezon.
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the
important questions of political law, the Court thought it
proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues
as were deemed relevant and decisive.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby
dismissed. So ordered.
Parás, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Barrera,

Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
_______________
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I concur with the majority that the petition filed by

Congressman Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a case either
for declaratory judgment or certiorari, since this Court
_______________
12 See appendix par. VII, Cushing.

13 This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to entertain original
petitions for declaratory judgments, and (b) availability of certiorari or
prohibition against respondents who are not exercising judicial or
ministerial functions (Rule 67, secs. 1 and 2).
14 See supra.
15 46 Phil., 83.
877
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 877

has no original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment

proceedings, and certiorari is available only against bodies
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The respondent
committee, being merely fact finding, was not properly
subject to certiorari.
I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was
entitled to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for
a writ of prohibition against the committee, in so far as
House Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel, Resolution No.
175) constituted an unlawful attempt to divest him of an
immunity from censure or punishment, an immunity
vested under the very Rules of the House of
Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its
section V, provides as follows:
"If it is requested that a Member be called to order for words

spoken in debate, the Member making such request shall indicate
the words excepted to, and they shall be taken down in writing by
the Secretary and read aloud to the House; but the Member who
uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the
censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other business
has intervened."
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña

had delivered his speech and before the House adopted,
fifteen days later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the
respondent Committee and empowering it to investigate
and recommend proper action in the case, the House had
acted on other matters and debated them. That being the
case, the Congressman, even before the resolution was
adopted, had ceased to be answerable for the words uttered
by him in his privilege speech. By the express wording of
the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure or
disciplinary action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in

so far as it attempts to divest him of the immunity so
acquired and subject him to discipline and punishment,
when he was previously not so subject, violates the
constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation,
and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 are legally obnoxious and
in-
878

valid on that score. The rule is well established that a law

which deprives an accused person of any substantial right
or immunity possessed by him before its passage is ex post
facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur. Vol. 16-A, section 144, p.
153; People vs. McDonnell, 11 Fed. Supp. 1015; People vs.
Talkington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U. S. vs. Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp.,
849).
The foregoing also answers the contention that since the
immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule
XVII, the House could, at any time, remove it by amending
those Rules, and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such
an amendment by implication. The right of the House to
amend its Rules does not carry with it the right to
retroactively divest the petitioner of an immunity he had
already acquired. The Bill of Rights is against it.
It is contended that as the liability f or his speech
attached when the Congressman delivered it, the
subsequent action of the House only affected the procedure
for dealing with that liability. But whatever liability
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then incurred was
extinguished when the House thereafter considered other
business; and this extinction is a substantive right that can
not be subsequently torn away to his disadvantage. On an
analogous issue, this Court, in People vs. Parel, 44 Phil.,
437, has ruled:
"In regard to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties

and of penal actions pertains to remedial and not substantive law,
it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal system, provisions for
limitation or prescription of actions are invariably classified as
substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the provisions
for the prescription of criminal actions in the Penal Code and not
in the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal/ This is in reality a more
logical law. In criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking,
a matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to punish the
crime and consequently, goes directly to the substance of the

action. * * * (Italics supplied.)
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the

constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws,
879
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 879

that the objectionable measures happen to be House

Resolutions and not statutes. In so f ar as the position of
petitioner Osmeña is concerned, the essential point is that
he is being subjected to a punishment to which he was
formerly not amenable. And while he was only meted out a
suspension of privileges, that suspension is as much a
penalty as imprisonment or a fine, which the House could
have inflicted upon him had it been so minded. Such
punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of the letter,
of the constitutional provision against ex post facto
legislation. Nor is it material that the punishment was
inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power. "The ex post
facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled,
"can not be evaded by giving civil form to that which is
essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U.S.]
1104, 1106; Cummings vs. Missouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the
House rules is to protect the freedom of action of its
members and to relieve them from the fear of disciplinary
action taken upon second thought, as a result of political
convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. It is unrealistic
to overlook that, without the immunity so provided, no
member of Congress can remain free from the haunting
fear that his most innocuous expressions may at any time
afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever
a majority, however transient, should feel that the shifting
sands of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to
assure that members of the House may freely act as their
conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements
the parliamentary immunity from outside pressure
enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly deserving of
liberal interpretation and application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as
instances of disciplinary action taken notwithstanding
intervening business, are not truly applicable. Of the five
instances cited by Deschler (in his edition of Jefferson's
880

Manual), the case of Congressman Watson of Georgia

involved also printed disparaging remarks by the
respondent (III Hinds' Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the
debate immunity rule afforded no defense; that of
Congressmen Weaver and Sparks was one of censure for
actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec. 1657) ; while the
cases of Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio,
and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds, secs. 1248,
1252 and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of the U. S.
House of Representatives as it stood before the 1880
amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the
Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the
following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131) :
"This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle by a semicolon,

and the Chair asks the attention of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Wilson) to the language of that rule, as it settles the whole
question:
"62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate,
the person calling him to order shall repeat the words excepted
to"—
That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words spoken in
debate "and they shall be taken down in writing at the Clerk's
table; and no Member shall be held to answer, or be subject to the
censure of the House, for words spoken in debate, if any other
Member has spoken, or other business has intervened, after the
words spoken, and before exception to them shall have been
taken."
The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order" is
"excepting to words spoken in debate." The second part of the rule
declares that a Member shall not be held subject to censure for
words spoken in debate if other business has intervened after the
words have been spoken and before "exception" to them has been
taken. Exception to the words of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Harding),
the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the gentleman
from Kentucky (Mr. Rousseau), and also by the Speaker of the
House, as the records of the Congressional Globe will show. The
distinction is obvious between the two parts of the rule. In the
first part it speaks of a Member excepting to language of another
and having the words taken down. In the last part of the rule it
says he shall not be censured thereafter unless exception to his
words were taken; but it omits to add as an essential condition

that the words must also
881
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 881

have been taken down. The substantial point, indeed the only
point, required in the latter part of the rule is, that exception to
the objectionable words must have been taken."
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases

and the Rules of our House of Representatives is easily
apparent. As Rule 62 of the United States House of
Representatives stood before 1880, all that was required to
preserve the disciplinary power of the House was that
exception should have been taken to the remarks on the
floor before further debate or other business intervened.
Under the rules of the Philippine House of Representatives,
however, the immunity becomes absolute if other debate or
business has taken place before the motion for censure is
made, whether or not exceptions or point of order have
been made to the remarks complained of at the time they
were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity
established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution
does not bar the members being questioned and disciplined
by Congress itself for remarks made on the floor, that
disciplinary power does not, as I have noted, include the
right to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a
member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts can
shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post facto
legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress
should be deprived of the same protection. Surely
membership in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of
the liberties enjoyed by the individual citizen.
"The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of

proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraint
or violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or even
more just." (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed., 324–325.)
882

"Courts will not interfere with the action of the state senate in
reconsidering its vote on a resolution submitting an amendment
to the Constitution, where its action was in compliance with its
own rules, and there was no constitutional provision to the
contrary." (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963) (Italics
supplied.)
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or

compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner,
should not deter it from recognizing and declaring the
unconstitutionality and nullity of the questioned
resolutions and of all action that has been taken up in
pursuance thereof. Although the respondent committee has
been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues
remain so important as to require adjudication by this
Court.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
I fully concur in the above dissent of Mr. Justice J. B. L.

Reyes, and I venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime
which purports to be one of law, where law is supreme,
even the Congress in the exercise of the power conferred
upon it to discipline its members, must follow the rules and
regulations that it had itself promulgated for its guidance
and for that of its members. The rules in force at the time
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech declared by the
House to constitute a disorderly conduct provides:
"* * * but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to
answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House therefor, if
further debate or other business has intervened." (Rule XVII, Sec.
7, Rules, House of Representatives.)
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on

June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June
23, 1960 when the House created the committee that would
investigate him. For f ully 15 days the House took up other
matters. All that was done, while the speech was being
delivered, was to have certain portions thereof deleted. I
hold that pursuant to its own Rules the House
883
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 883

may no longer punish Congressman Osmeña f or the

speech delivered fifteen days before.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish
Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery,
except to have some parts of the speech deleted, shows that
the members of the House did not then consider Osmeña's
speech a disorderly conduct. The idea to punish
Congressman Osmeña, which came 15 days after, was,
therefore, an afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that
Congressman Osmeña is being made to answer for an act,
after the time during which he could be punished therefor
had lapsed.
The majority opinion holds that the House can amend
its rules any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we
hold that the House may not do so in utter disregard of the
fundamental principle of law that an amendment takes
place only after its approval, or, as in this case, to the
extent of punishing an offense after the time to punish had
elapsed. Since the rule, that a member can be punished
only before other proceedings have intervened, was in force
at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech. the
House may not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority
opinion that the rule limiting the period for imposition of a
penalty for a speech to the day it was made, is merely one
of procedure. With due respect to the opinion of the
majority, we do not think that it is merely a rule of
procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time
in which the House may take punitive action against an
offending member; it is a limitation (in reference to time)
on the liability to punishment. As Mr. Justice J. B. L.
Reyes points out, the rule is substantive, not merely a
procedural principle, and may not be ignored when
invoked.
If this Government is a Government of laws and not of
men, then the House should observe its own rule and not
violate it by punishing a member after the period for
884

indictment and punishment had already passed. Not

because the subject of the Philippic is no less than the
Chief Magistrate of the nation should the rule of the House
be ignored by itself. It is true that our Government is based
on the principle of separation of powers between the three

branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition
that this Court should not interfere with the legislature in
the manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that
the Court cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what the
law is when any of its (the House) members, or any humble
citizen, invokes the law.
Congressman Osmeña has invoked the protection of a
rule of the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state
what the rule being invoked by him is, to point out the fact
that the rule is being violated in meeting out punishment
for his speech; we should not shirk our responsibility to
declare his rights under the rule simply on the broad
excuse of separation of powers. Even the legislature may
not ignore the rule it has promulgated for the government
of the conduct of its members, and the fact that a
coordinate branch of the Government is involved, should
not deter us from performing our duty. We may not possess
the power to enforce our opinion if the House chooses to
disregard the same. In such case the members thereof
stand before the bar of public opinion to answer for their
act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as
their norm of conduct.
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this
dissent personally believes that vituperous attacks against
the Chief Executive, or any official or citizen for that
matter, should be condemned. But where the Rules,
promulgated by the House itself, fix the period during
which punishment may be meted out, said Rules should be
enforced regardless of who may be prejudiced thereby. Only
in that way may the supremacy of the law be maintained.
Petition dismissed.
885
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 885

APPENDIX—SUSPENSION OF MEMBER OF
LEGISLATIVE BODY
I. Whatever is spoken in the house is subject to the

censure of the house; and offenses of this kind have
been severely punished by calling the person to the
bar to make submission, committing him to prison,
expelling him from the house or inflicting other
punishment. (Mason, Manual of Legislative
Procedure, pp. 402–403.)
II. 171.—(1) If a Member is named by the Speaker, or

by the chairman of a committee of the whole House,
immediately after the commission of the offence of
disregarding the authority of the chair, or of
persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of
the House, by abusing the rules of the House, then
—
(i) If the offence has been committed by a Member in the House,

the Speaker forthwith puts the question, on a motion being made,
no amendment, adjournment or debate being allowed, that the
Member (naming him) be suspended from the service of the House;
and * * *
(2) The suspension of a Member on the first occasion

continues until the fifth day, and on the second occasion
until the twentieth day on which the House sits after the
day on which he was suspended, but on any subsequent
occasion it continues until the House resolves that such
suspension be terminated. A Member suspended under this
rule must forthwith quit the precincts of the House. (House
of Commons, Manual of Procedure in the Public Business,
p. 114.)
III. In the course of the debate, Mr. Nelson W. Aldrich, of

Rhode Island, read the following from Cushing:
"The power to expel also includes in it a power to discharge a

Member, for good cause, without inflicting upon him the censure
and disgrace implied in the term "expulsion', and this has
accordingly been done, in some instances by the House of
Commons. Analogous to the right of expulsion is that of
suspending a Member from the exercise of his functions as such,
for a longer or shorter
886

period; which is a sentence of milder character than the former,

though attended with somewhat different effects; for during the
suspension the electors are deprived of the services of their
representative, without power to supply his place; but the rights
of the electors are no more infringed by this proceeding than by
an exercise of the power to expression." (Hinds Precedents II, Sec.
1665.
IV. The suspension of members from the service of the

House is another form of punishment. (May's
Parliamentary Practice, p. 53, cited by Hinds, p.
1141, Vol. II.)
V. The Leader of the House then moves that the
Member be suspended from the service of the
House, and the motion must be put to the question
'without amendment, adjournment or debate.'
If the member is named in Committee of the whole House

by the Chairman, the latter immediately suspends the
proceedings and reports the circumstances to the House
when the Speaker has resumed the Chair. From this point
matters proceed as described above.
If the House agrees to the suspension, the Speaker again
directs the member to withdraw and, if he still persists in
refusing to do so, even when summoned under the
Speaker's orders by the Sergeant-at-Arms, force is resorted
to. If this is necessary, the Speaker calls the attention of
the House to the fact, and in such a case the suspension of
the member is for the remainder of the session. The normal
period of suspension is now fixed at five sitting days for the
first offence and twenty for the second, the uncompleted
portion of the sitting during which the offence was
committed counting as one day. The first offence is taken to
mean the first during that session.
A member who is suspended is not exempt from serving
on a Private Bill Committee but, apart from this exception,
suspension from the .service of the House of Commons
means exclusion from the precincts of the Palace of
Westminster.
A member guilty of a breach of privilege or contempt
may be suspended without being named, but in such a
887
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 887

case the motion for his suspension would be subject to

debate. The practice of 'naming' a member was first
introduced by Speaker Lenthal (q.v.) in 1941. (An
Encyclopaedia of Parliament by Wilding and Laundy, p.
366.)
VI. Offences which are not sufficiently grave to warrant

imprisonment are punished by admonition to
reprimand, the latter being the more serious
punishment of the two.

* * * Members of Parliament who commit offences
are liable to two f urther penalties: suspension from
the service of the House and expulsion. (An
Encyclopedia of Parliament by Wilding and
Laundy, p. 456.)
VII. A portion of the majority, Messrs. L. E. McComas of
Maryland, Albert J. Beverridge of Indiana, and J.
C. Pritchard of North Carolina, submitted views in
favor of suspension of the two senators. After
discussing the power to punish generally, they
submitted:
"* * * Like Parliament, it may imprison or expel a member for

offenses. The suspension of members from the service of the House
is another form of punishment. (May's Parliamentary Practice 53).
This author gives instances of suspension in the seventeenth
century and shows the frequent suspension of members under a
standing order of the House of Commons, passed February 23,
1880."
Says Cushing, section 280: "Members may also be

suspended by way of punishment from their functions as
,such, either in whole or in part or for a limited time. This
is a sentence of a milder character than expulsion."
During the suspension, says Cushing, section 627, the
electors are deprived of the services of their representatives
without power to supply his place, but the rights of the
electors are no more infringed by this proceeding than by
an exercise of the power to imprison. (Vol. II, Hinds'
Precedents of the House of Representatives, p. 1141.)
VIII. Suspension from the service of the House was a
punishment employed by the House of Commons under its
power of enforcing discipline among its Members, long
before it was prescribed by standing order for particular
offenses, such as disregard of authority of the Chair, or
obstruction, and it can still be imposed at the discretion
888

of the House, although, of course, not under the summary

procedure authorized by that standing order (see p. 471).
In 1641, Mr. Gervaise Hollis was suspended by the
House during the session.
In 1643, Sir Norton Knatchbull was suspended by the

House during the pleasure of the House.
For nearly two centuries this form of punishment had
been in abeyance, no cause of suspension having occurred
since 1692. But at the discretion of the House on 25 of July
1877, as a result of persistent obstruction by Members who
supported Parnell, Mr. Speaker Brand gave the following
ruling:
"The House is perfectly well aware that any Member persistently

and wilfully obstructing public business without just and
reasonable cause is guilty of a contempt of this House, and is
liable to punishment whether by censure, suspension from the
service of the House, or commitment, according to the judgment of
the House" (Parl. Deb. [1877]235, c. 1814).
On 20 February 1911, Mr. Ginnell, a Member was

suspended for one week as a punishment for a breach of
privilege in publishing a letter reflecting on the Speaker's
conduct in the Chair. C. J. (1911) 37.
In February 1880, the procedure for suspending a
Member for particular offenses was laid, down by Standing
Order No. 22 (see p. 471), and suspension under this
Standing Order not infrequent. (The Law, Privileges
Proceedings Usage of Parliament, 6th Ed. pp. 48–53,
Fellows and Cocks.)
IX. Resp. having entered the Chamber of the New South
Wales Assembly, of which he was a member, within a week
after it had passed a resolution that he be "suspended from
the service of the House," he was removed therefrom and
prevented from re-entering it:—Held: the resolution must
not be construed as operating beyond the sitting during
which the resolution was passed.—Burton vs. Taylor
(1886), 11 App. Cas. 197, P. C.—AUS (Copied from English
and Empire Digest (1927) Vol. 36, p. 295.)
889
VOL. 109, OCTOBER 31, 1960 889

Kapunan, et al. vs. Casilan and Court of Appeals
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9/1/2018 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 109

[No. L-17144. October 28, 1960]

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K.

864 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

GENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT,

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS;

2. ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; FAILURE TO

requisite number of members have agreed to a particular

3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF

5. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 865

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Declaratory

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,

injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun

"WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960, the Honorable Sergio

"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports

866 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged:

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 867

with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the

the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,

"WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue

1 These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the views of petitioner.

868 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition

therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 869

English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and

York was censured for using the following language on the

2 Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.

870 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 871

"The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of

5 67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870.

872 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on

"SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature.—The principle

functions. Thus, where the state Senate is given the power to

The above statement of American law merely

7 146 Cal. 604; 69 L, R. A. 556.

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 873

"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines

874 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

* who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth

8 Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497 ) William Willet, Jr. of New

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 875

876 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

ment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power

Parás, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Barrera,

REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:

I concur with the majority that the petition filed by

12 See appendix par. VII, Cushing.

VOL. 109, OCTOBER 28, 1960 877

has no original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment