1. TIDCORP vs.

CSC
➢ Facts
➢ De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP;
his appointment was included in TIDCORP’s Report on Personnel Action for August 2001
➢ In a letter, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman appointment because the position of
Financial Management Specialist IV was not included I the Department of Budget and Management
Field Office’ Index of Occupational Service.
➢ The Executive Vice President, Jane Tamballno appealed the invalidation of De Guzman’s appointment
to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the Civil Service Committee-National Capital Region.
➢ RA 8494; Tamballino argues by a compensation and position classification system and qualification
standards approved by TIDCORP’s Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit
of actual duties and responsibilities.
➢ On the basis of RA 8494, Section 7, Tamballino argued that the TIDCOP is authorized to adopt an
organizational structure Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from the extinguish
➢ TIDCORP’s President and CEO, Joel Valdes, sent to the CSC Chairperson, Karina Constantino-David a
letter appealed Director Padilla’s decision to the CSC-Central Office
➢ In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision that de Guzman’s
appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring that the position title
indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List and found in the Index
of Occupational Service.
➢ Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing De Guzman’s appointment, the CSC-
CO held that Director Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law.
➢ Laws involved
Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and staffing pattern for officers
and employees of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon
recommendation of its President, appoint and fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits:
Provided, That the Board shall have exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-
assign personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
➢ Verba legis. This is the plain meaning rule, statute is plain, and free from ambiguity, to be
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. Verba legis is so clear that
the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have expressed its
intent by use of such words as found in the statute.
➢ Another statcon tool the SC used?
Index animi sermo est… translates to “speech is the index of intention.”
2. Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC
➢ Facts
➢ On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and suffered the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
➢ Gloria Arroyo gave Estrada pardon by restoring his civil and political rights.
➢ On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the position of
President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC; all three petitions
were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection
applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President
Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for
reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
➢ On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila
➢ On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC
➢ Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of
Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification; using Section 40 of the Local
Government Code
➢ While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were conducted as
scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The
next day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
➢ Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold
public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification.
Further, given that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes
obtained by the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his
name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of
Manila.
➢ Law to be construed?
➢ Convicted of what? Penalty?
➢ Estrada was convicted of plunder that is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
i. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
1. What does it include?
a. Right to hold office
b. Right to suffrage
➢ What about the whereas clauses? What is written there
➢ Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
➢ Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute
➢
➢ At what juncture did the SC discuss the concept of verba legis
➢ It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis
non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.31 It is this Court’s firm
view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express
restoration.
➢ The power of the President to grant pardon, it is an executive power
ii. ConCom deliberations
1. What was the proposal?
The original draft of the pardon provision in the Constitution provides that executive clemency for violation of
corrupt practices shall be limited by legislation. A commissioner (Sr. Tan) proposed that it shall be deleted because
it would limit or infringe the President in acting with full discretion on who he wants to give/grant the pardon. The
Commissioner on this amendment would like to avoid the mentality that the Constitution is anti- president
2. What is the limitation they imposed?
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the convicting court, but the Committee left it
entirely to the legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish between grave and less grave
or serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we
have strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate that the
President’s right to grant executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the concept of a public
office may be limited by Congress itself.
A proposal was given that instead of having the limitation by the legislation as to how the president would exercise
its pardon power. They want to insert of grave and gross in the violation,
3. How did the commission rule in the limitation?
The Commission divide the house to subject for voting, in the vote of 34-4 the proposed deletion of the provision
was accepted This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of
Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of
the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by
Congress through the enactment of a law. The doctrine of non diminution or non impairment is any act of Congress
by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the president.
a. On which the SC anchored its decision
➢ Why do you think there is an issue here re: the capacity to run
The framers of the Constitution would like to preserve the essence of public accountability, in which it, it is mandated
that a public office is a public trust, and all government officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and to act with patriotism and justice. Also, part
of absolute pardon is granting of political rights, in which one of that right is the capacity to run.
➢ What is the effect of pardon?
It restores not only the offender’s liability but also his civil and political liability or rights
iii. General Rule: Pardon does not obliterate(?) the crime charged
3. Revaldo vs. People
➢ Facts?
➢ That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, in the (M)unicipality of Maasin, (P)rovince of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber
➢ Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda (Maceda), Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel
Paloma Lasala (Lasala) as witnesses.

➢ Maceda went with Rojas Talisic and Sunit to the house of the petitioner. They had no guns but had to verify if it
were true the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the necessary documents.
They had no search warrant
➢ confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. Maceda
asked petitioner who the owner of the lumber was, and petitioner replied that he owned the lumber. Petitioner
stated that he would use the lumber to repair his house and to make furniture for sale. Maceda also testified
that the lumber was freshly cut. The DENR entrusted to the police custody of the lumber.
➢ Petitioner admitted to the policemen that he had no permit to possess the lumber because those were only
given to him by his uncle Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo (Bolo), his mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio
(Tenio). The seven pieces of "magkalipay" lumber were left over from a divider he made for his cousin Jose Epiz.
He explained further that the lumber were intended for the repair of his dilapidated house.9 The defense
presented Caalim to corroborate the testimony of petitioner.

i. Mere possession will make him liable?

1. Yes. “Possession without the necessary legal documents”

➢ StatCon issue
Dura lex sed lex
A statute being the will of the legislature, should be applied exactly the way the legislature has expressed
itself clearly in the law. The statute is clear that it precludes the court from construing it and gives it no
discretion but to apply the law.
Yes, the law may be harsh to him, that in his failure to provide the legal document of the timber and given
his explanation, he still be penalized. The Court in dealing with special law does not necessarily look for
the intent but mere violation of its code corresponds penalty. Dura lex sed lex.
4. Liwag vs. Happy Glen Loop
➢ Facts
➢ F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo
(Marcelo), the owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its
obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo all its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision,
as well as receivables from the lots already sold
➢ Marcelo represented to subdivision lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility was available in the Subdivision
➢ For almost 30 years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on this facility as their only source of
water. This fact was acknowledged by Marcelo and Hermogenes Liwag (Hermogenes), petitioner s
late husband who was then the president of respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association
(Association).
➢ Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes. When Hermogenes died in 2003, petitioner Emeteria
P. Liwag subsequently wrote a letter to respondent Association, demanding the removal of the
overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land.
➢ Refusing to comply with petitioner s demand, respondent Association filed before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for an action for specific performance; confirmation,
maintenance and donation of water facilities; annulment of sale; and cancellation of TCT No. 350099
against T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation (the owner and developer of the Subdivision), petitioner
Emeteria, and the other surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
➢ After the parties submitted their respective position papers, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Joselito
Melchor (Arbiter Melchor) ruled in favor of the Association. He invalidated the transfer of the parcel
of land in favor of Hermogenes
➢ Relevant laws?
➢ PD 957- it is the law that regulates the selling of the lands and properties in the subdivisions
➢ PD 1216- the law that define the concept of “open space” in subdivision or residence area
➢ Concept of open space? What law is that?
➢ The term "open space" is defined in P.D. 1216 as "an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds,
recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and
other similar facilities and amenities.
i. PD 1216
1. What is the last phrase?
2. Examples of open space
"other similar facilities and amenities."
➢ What is ejusdem generis?
➢ Where the general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin
to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.
➢ While general words or expressions in a statute are, as a rule, accorded their full, natural and generic
sense, they will not be given such meaning if they are used in association with specific words or
phrases.
ii. Relevance to the statcon issue
 Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the enumeration refers to
areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase "other similar facilities and
amenities" should be interpreted in like manner.

Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic
need in human settlements, without which the community would not survive. We therefore rule that, based
on the principle of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of the law to create and
maintain a healthy environment in human settlements, the location of the water facility in the Subdivision
must form part of the area reserved for open space.

➢ Why is the sale void?

➢ The law expressly provides that open spaces in subdivisions are reserved for public use and are beyond the
commerce of man.37 As such, these open spaces are not susceptible of private ownership and appropriation.
We therefore rule that the sale of the subject parcel of land by the subdivision owner or developer to petitioner
s late husband was contrary to law. Hence, we find no reversible error in the appellate court Decision upholding
the HLURB Arbiter s annulment of the Deed of Sale.
iii. If it is an open area, it is outside the commerce of the man and cannot be a subject
of a valid sale.
5. People vs. Flores
➢ Facts?
➢ appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape
➢ Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the
following facts:

AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;

Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and

AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one and a half years old.

➢ AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to appellant,
who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB
was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week
➢ Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1
Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran)
➢ In February 1999, AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant
touch her thighs. AAA could see appellant’s face as there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was
naturally surprised, and she asked appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but
told her not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch
his private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep.
➢ while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but
appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB.
➢ While pointing the knife at AAA’s neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAA’s pajamas. He slowly
parted AAA’s legs and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellant’s
shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after,
appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAA’s vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped
her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years
old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house of her
friend, Marvin
➢ AAA stayed at her mother’s friend’s house and came back on 18 October 2002. She, together with
Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in
apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to escape.

PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Women’s and Children Desk of Makati Police Station on 18
October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to
the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal examination

➢ Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the "hymen is with presence
of deep healed laceration at 1 o’clock and shallow healed laceration at 2 o’clock positions at the time of
examination." Said report concluded that AAA is in a "non-virgin state physically."
➢ Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father to AAA in that
he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would run away, he denied raping AAA. He alleged that
AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was even once caught stealing money from her
grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked permission to go out to buy a
"project." She never came home
➢ Why is the name AAA?
i. Because it’s a minor so there must be confidentiality
➢ How is the victim and accused related?
➢ Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife
since AAA was one and a half years old.
➢
➢ StatCon issue?
ii. Use of the term “guardian”

The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that AAA was still a
minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the
instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor AND the accused
is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we hold that the
Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA.
However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to
death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme
penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity
and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must
specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender

➢ StatCon principle?
iii. Noscitur a sociis. What is it?
Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company
of words I which it is found or with it is associated.
➢ Why is the accused not considered as a guardian?
The words under the law connote legal relationship. The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the
consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty
purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in
appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's
property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the
trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the
amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the
aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere
caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot
impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
7659, since he does not fit into that category

iv. If the guardianship is not established, then what?

1. The supreme penalty of death will not be imposed because there’s no
aggravating circumstance.
➢ How is noscitur a sociis different from ejusdem generis? –
➢ noscitur a sociis – a particular word is ambiguous so to remedy it, consider
the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
➢ Esjudem generis – where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration
of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow
the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to, persons, things or cases to akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
➢
6. Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals
➢ Facts
➢ A shipment of 438 packages of foodstuffs, declared in the name of respondent Eusebio Dichoco,
hereinafter referred to as private respondent, arrived on December 16, 1970 at the Port of Manila on board
the S/S "St. Isidro"
➢ Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and detention for violation of Section 2530 (f)
of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to Central Bank Circulars Nos. 247, 289, 294, and 295 and section
102 (k) of the said Code.
➢ private respondent requested the release of the shipment upon the posting of a cash bond, which request,
although favorably recommended by the Collector of Customs, was denied by the Commissioner of
Customs.
➢ Collector of Customs issued his decision, decreeing the seizure and forfeiture of the shipment "for the
simple reason that claimants failed to comply with the regulations, that is, with the Central Bank circulars
requiring the production of release certificates for importations similar to the subject articles."
➢ private respondent filed before respondent court a "petition for review, with a motion for release of goods
under bond", upon the grounds that the decision appealed from was not supported by substantial
evidence and that the goods seized did not constitute prohibited importation as contemplated in Sections
2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code
➢ Commissioner of Customs alleged that "the goods having been imported without the release certificate
required by the Central Bank", are "subject to forfeiture" and the goods being of "prohibited importation,"
may not be released under bond pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
➢ The respondent Court granted the motion to release the goods subject to the condition that a cash bond in the
sum of P43,854.59 be filed by private respondent with the Bureau of Customs. The bond having been filed,
respondent Court issued an order, dated February 9, 1971, directing petitioner to release the shipment
➢ The respondent Court granted the motion for reconsideration upon motion of private respondent, the
respondent Court which is the CA issue a show cause order for the petitioner and explanation.
i. What kind of prohibited articles? Why is it prohibited?
Section 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which enumerates the articles of "prohibited importations",
refers to contraband or absolutely prohibited articles and concludes in its sub-paragraph (k) with a general
statement, "all other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law,

This contention is not acceptable. In the first place, the specific things enumerated in paragraphs (a) to
(j), inclusive, of Section 102 have no distinguishable common characteristics and they differ greatly from
one another
ii. What was violated allegedly?
1. Central Bank Circular
➢ StatCon principle? Ejusdem generis
➢ the rule of ejusdem generis "applies only where the specific words preceding the general expression
are of the same nature. Where they are of different genera, the meaning of the general word remains
unaffected by its connection with them
➢ Did the SC allow the concept of ejusdem generis?
iii. Nope

7. COA Cebu vs. Province of Cebu

➢ Facts
➢ In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared
that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the
extension classes were charged against the provincial Special Education Fund. Likewise charged to the SEF
were the college scholarship grants of the province.
➢ The COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu,2 saying that disbursements for the salaries
of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF
➢ The province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court.
➢ Special Education Fund was created by virtue of R.A. No. 5447, act creating a special education fund to be
constituted from the proceeds of an additional real property tax and a certain portion of the taxes on
Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco, defining the activities to be financed, creating
school boards for the purpose, and appropriating funds therefrom.
➢ With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was
repealed, leaving Sections 235, 272 and 100 (c) of the Code to govern the disposition of the SEF
➢ Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course
be compensated for their services
➢ Thus, it should be made clear that not every kind of personnel-related benefits of public school teachers
may be charged to the SEF. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits
of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance
of extension classes. Extension classes as referred to mean additional classes needed to accommodate all
children of school age desiring to enter in public schools to acquire basic education. With respect, however,
to college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that
said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.
➢ StatCon issue and principle
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius - The express mention of one person, thing or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. The expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion
of all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had none been expressed; opposite the
doctrine of necessary implication. Also known as negative-opposite doctrine
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus - A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a
statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of
scholarship where the legislature has omitted it. Applies only if and when the omission has been clearly
established.
Exception: When the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing, or object from the
enumeration
8. CIR vs. Filipinas Campania de Seguros
➢ Facts?
➢ Respondent Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, an insurance company, is also engaged in business as a
real estate dealer. Respondent, in accordance with the single rate then prescribed under Section 182
of the National Internal Revenue Code.1 paid the amount of P150.00 as real estate dealer's fixed
annual tax for the year 1956.
➢ Subsequently said Section 182 of the Code was amended by Republic Act No. 1612; took effect on
August 24, 1956, providing a small of graduated rates: P150 if the annual income of the real estate
dealer from his business as such is P4,000, but does not exceed P10,000; P300, if such annual income
exceeds P10,000 but does not exceed P30,000; and P500 if such annual income exceeds P30,000.
➢ On June 17, 1957, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and demanded from
respondent (whose annual income exceeded P30,000.00) the amount of P350.00 as additional real
estate dealer's fixed annual tax for the year 1956
➢ respondent wrote a letter to petitioner stating that the "records will show that the real estate dealer's
fixed tax for 1956 of this Company was fully paid by us prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 1612
which amended, among other things, Sections 178 and 192 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
➢ respondent added that the Republic Act No. 1856 which, among other things, amended Section 182
of the National Internal Revenue Code, Congress has clearly shown its intention when it provided that
the increase in rates of taxes envisioned by Republic Act No. 1612 is to be made effective as of 1
January 1957
➢ On October 23, 1957, petitioner informed respondent that "Republic Act No. 1856 which took effect
June 22, 1957 amended the date of effectivity of Republic Act 1612 to January 1, 1957. However, the
said amendment applies only to fixed taxes on occupation and not to fixed taxes on business." Hence,
petitioner insisted that respondent should pay the amount of P350.00 as additional real estate
dealer's fixed annual tax for the year 1956
➢ the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision sustaining the contention of respondent company and
ordering the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to desist from collecting the P350.00
additional assessment.
i. What kind of company?
1. Real estate, insurance company
2. Subjected to what kind of tax?
➢ StatCon issue
➢ As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. A statute should be
considered to have prospective application whether it enacts, amends or repeals a retroactive effect.
Involves a proviso stated in RA 1856 of section 182, stating that the lawmakers intended not only fixed
taxes on occupation but also fixed taxes in business.
➢ StatCon principle
Provisos - Limit the application of the enacting clause, section, or provision of a statute, or to except
something from it, or qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some other ground of exclude some
possible ground of.

Exception: If there is a contrary legislative intent

*Commonly found at the end of a section, provision, and introduced by the following:
1. Provided
2. But nothing herein

*But the use of “provided” does not necessarily make the provision a proviso.

What determines whether a clause is a proviso is not is its substance then its form.

Roles: (1) Limit or restrain the general language; (2) Enlarge, restrict or limit a phrase of limited import
had there been no proviso qualifying it; (3) Give additional legislation; and (4) Qualifies or modifies the
phrase immediately preceding it.

*If there is a repugnancy between a proviso and the main provision, the first step is harmonizing the
two. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, that which is located in a later portion of the statute prevails
since it is the latest expression of legislative intent.
➢ misrepresentation
➢ Basis of CIR in applying the law retroactively?
➢ Petitioner, however, contends that the above-quoted provision refers only to fixed taxes on occupation
and does not cover fixed taxes on business, such as the real estate dealer's fixed tax herein involved.

9. Fernandez vs. NLRC

➢ Facts?
➢ How would you describe the conundrum?
i. Project employees
➢ Relevant law?
➢ What is that proviso in the Labor Code?
ii. Re: regular and casual employees
iii. How did the SC rule? StatCon discussion
10. SPMC vs. CIR
➢ Facts
➢ SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of
coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency miller’s tax and
manufacturer’s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987.
➢ The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals,
Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as
manufactured products.
➢ SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial
of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review
➢ the CTA cancelled SPMC’s liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of corn and edible
oils but upheld the Commissioner’s assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax. SPMC moved for the
partial reconsideration of the CTA affirmation of the miller’s tax assessment but it was denied
➢ SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review of the CTA decision insofar
as it upheld the deficiency miller’s tax assessment.
➢ For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two exemptions from the miller’s tax: (a)
the milled products in their original state were actually exported by the miller himself or by another
person, and (b) the milled products sold by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part
of any manufactured article by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products.
➢ Relevant law?
➢ For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two exemptions from the miller’s tax: (a)
the milled products in their original state were actually exported by the miller himself or by another
person, and (b) the milled products sold by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part
of any manufactured article by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products.
➢ Are they included in the tax exemption provided by law?
➢ Yes, SPMC's sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller's tax. Section 168 of
the 1987 Tax Code 3% additional tax is not only applicable to “that this tax shall not apply to rope,
coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and
dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by- products and dessicated coconuts,
shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself,
and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an
ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products “
➢ The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax
exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and
dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured
article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself.
➢ The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC.
Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in
the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the
exemption. Since SPMC's situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the
3% miller's tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
➢ The rule of expression unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation.22 Its
application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions instrictissimi juris against
the taxpayer. To allow SPMC's claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and
unduly derogate sovereign authority.
➢ StatCon issue
➢ When the law enumerates the subject/condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned.
➢
➢ Another StatCon principle used in this case?
i. Strictissimi juris: Tax exemptions must be construed in the strictest sense and in
favor of the State because it is a derogation in sovereign authority.
11. City of Manila vs. Laguio
➢ Facts?
➢ StatCon issue
➢ Statutory principle
i. Reddendo singula singulis
➢ Relevant law?
➢ How did the SC apply this principle?
ii. Re: contractors smth about motels na bawal iprohibit ireregulate lang